



Master's thesis

NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology  
Faculty of Humanities  
Department of Historical Studies

Marianne Lund Buset

## From Hostility to Reconciliation

The development of the German-Norwegian  
bilateral relationship 1950-1980

Master's thesis in European Studies

Trondheim, May 2015

Marianne Lund Buset

## **From Hostility to Reconciliation**

The development of the German-Norwegian  
bilateral relationship 1950-1980

Master's thesis in European Studies  
Trondheim, May 2015

Norwegian University of Science and Technology  
Faculty of Humanities  
Department of Historical Studies



**NTNU – Trondheim**  
Norwegian University of  
Science and Technology

## **Forord**

Først og fremst: takk til veileder Jonas Scherner for gode ideer, kyndig hjelp og endeløs tålmodighet. Takk til Hans Otto Frøland for utlån av et helt bibliotek av bøker og blide svar på enhver mail jeg har sendt. Jeg skylder også en stor takk til de snille ansatte ved arkivene i Koblenz og Berlin, som fant frem stabel på stabel med dokumenter til meg og hjalp meg med å navigere dem.

Mesteparten av denne oppgaven har blitt skrevet sittende alene på kafé i Salzburg, så takk til Vilde, Eirik, Maja og alle dere andre på kullet som har gjort at det ikke har føltes ensomt. Takk til Anders S. som har tatt seg tid til å hjelpe og diskutere midt i egen oppgaveskriving, og til Nick som har lest gjennom, oversatt, støttet og vist uendelig med entusiasme og interesse hele veien. Du har vært helt uvurderlig.



## Abbreviations

<b>BDI</b>	Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie
<b>CDU</b>	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
<b>DM</b>	Deutsche Mark
<b>EC</b>	European Community
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>EFTA</b>	European Free Trade Association
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FRG</b>	Federal Republic of Germany
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GDR</b>	German Democratic Republic
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NI</b>	Norges Industriforbund
<b>NOK</b>	Norwegian Krone
<b>SPD</b>	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
<b>SSB</b>	Statistisk Sentralbyrå
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom

Forord.....	i
Abbreviations.....	ii
<b>1 INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION .....	2
1.2 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY .....	3
1.3 METHOD AND SOURCES.....	4
1.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH.....	6
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE.....	8
<b>2 BACKGROUND: THE NORWEGIAN-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY .....</b>	<b>11</b>
2.1 NORWAY AND GERMANY BEFORE WORLD WAR II .....	11
2.2 WORLD WAR II AND THE FIRST POST-WAR YEARS .....	13
<b>3 1950-1965: A ROCKY START .....</b>	<b>16</b>
3.1 TRADE 1950-65: MUTUAL DEPENDENCY.....	16
3.1.1 <i>Aluminum and Norway's access to affordable energy/Norway's largest competitive advantage</i> .....	16
3.1.2 <i>Coal: the backbone of German industry</i> .....	17
3.1.3 <i>The shipping industry</i> .....	18
3.1.4 <i>The weapons industry: a touchy subject</i> .....	20
3.1.5 <i>General developments of the German-Norwegian trade relationship</i> .....	21
3.1.6 <i>The Kiel ferry: a private actor's influence on the German-Norwegian relationship</i> .....	23
3.2 THE POLITICAL SITUATION 1950-65: KEEPING A DISTANCE.....	24
3.2.1 <i>Norway's "awkward political challenge"</i> .....	24
3.2.2 <i>The Cold War and Adenauer's 'Westintegration'</i> .....	26
3.2.3 <i>Adenauer's eastern policies and Norwegian attitudes</i> .....	29
3.2.4 <i>Personal relationships</i> .....	31
3.3 MISSING FACTORS, LACK OF FOCUS.....	34
<b>4 1965-1980: RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION .....</b>	<b>35</b>
4.1 TRADE: GRADUAL EXPANSION .....	35
4.1.1 <i>General developments</i> .....	35
4.1.2 <i>Oil and gas</i> .....	37
4.1.3 <i>The Gjerde-Friedrichs Protocol</i> .....	40
4.2 THE POLITICAL SITUATION 1965-80: SHARED VALUES AND COMMON GOALS.....	43
4.2.1 <i>Personal relationships and their influence on German-Norwegian bilateral relations</i> .....	43
4.2.2 <i>The "Neue Ostpolitik"</i> .....	48

4.2.3	<i>The European Community and EFTA</i> .....	50
4.3	SHARED VALUES, FRIENDSHIP AND TRADE.....	53
<b>5</b>	<b>THE RECONCILIATION OF NORWAY AND WEST GERMANY 1950-80</b> .....	<b>55</b>
5.1	ECONOMIC FACTORS.....	55
5.1.1	<i>Trade</i> .....	55
5.1.2	<i>Industrial cooperation</i> .....	57
5.1.3	<i>Exchange of people</i> .....	58
5.2	POLITICAL FACTORS .....	58
5.2.1	<i>Foreign policy: Western Europe</i> .....	59
5.2.2	<i>Foreign policy: Eastern Europe</i> .....	59
5.2.3	<i>The personal dimension</i> .....	60
<b>6</b>	<b>SOURCES</b> .....	<b>62</b>
6.1	ARCHIVAL RESOURCES .....	62
6.1.1	<i>Koblenz Endarchiv:</i> .....	62
6.1.2	<i>Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin:</i> .....	62
6.2	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	63





# 1 Introduction

Emotionally, the idea that we should co-operate with the Germans and fight side by side with the Germans naturally appears disgusting – how can one forget so quickly? (Storting member Svein Nilsen 1950, in Frøland, 2006:501)

Relations between our two countries are excellent. Germany is our most important trading partner, and Norway is a major supplier of energy to the German market. Germans eat our fish, cook with our gas and visit our fjords, and we drive German cars, admire German hi-tech products and explore the world through German gates. (HRH Crown Prince Haakon 04.06.2004)

As these two quotes show, German-Norwegian relations have gone through some massive changes in the 20<sup>th</sup> century from Germany's occupation of Norway during the Second World War, through years of awkwardness and hostilities, to what today is a close relationship in both trade and politics. Norway's grudge against Germany after the war was generally described as particularly strong, and thus demanded extra hard work to alleviate. Today, however, the German-Norwegian relationship is so well functioning that in 2000 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder found it completely natural to tell Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg that “the biggest problem in the relationship between our two countries is that there are no problems.” (Hannemann 2005, translation mine) How did we get here? The aim of this thesis is to examine the development of the bilateral relationship between Norway and Germany in the first decades after the Second World War and to identify what factors contributed to this development.

By the mid-1950s, Norwegian politicians were forced to realize that ignoring the rising economic power of the FRG would be detrimental to the Norwegian economy. Oslo was thus forced to make some adjustments trying to balance the public's animosity towards Germany with the industry's apparent needs. Frøland describes this as “an awkward political challenge”(2006:506). Indeed, the political tension often got in the way of trade and economic relations in the post-war years. However, in 1976, Norwegian Minister for Industry Bjartmar Gjerde and German Minister for Economics Hans Friedrichs signed an extensive protocol stating that Norway and West Germany would cooperate closely especially on natural oil and gas – Norway's most important resource. The protocol was a result of friendly relations and

trust. By 1980, World War II animosities seemed almost forgotten and the bilateral relationship had normalized.

Frøland distinguishes between *functional* and *political normalization*. (1999:184) Here, functional normalization is interpreted as the process of achieving cooperation on economic and industrial matters as well as trade, whereas political normalization is understood as the process towards becoming close allies, as Norway and Germany are today. (ibid.) In the case of the German-Norwegian relationship we can generally conclude that the functional normalization was a much speedier process than the political one. However, I would argue that attempting to analyze one without taking the other into consideration would be ill advised. For this reason, the research question of this thesis is a fairly wide one, as it aims to give a more complete picture of the reconciliation process between Norway and West Germany.

## **1.1 Research question**

The enormous change in the political relationship as well as the expanding trade relationship between Norway and the FRG from immediately after the war until 1980 clearly shows that an extensive reconciliation process has taken place. When one considers the massive challenges the Norwegian-German relationship was faced with as a result of World War II, this reconciliation process becomes an interesting topic for further research. The aim of this thesis is therefore to analyze the Norwegian-German relationship and how and why it changed from one of bitter mistrust to close cooperation. What were the interests of those involved in this process? This objective can be summed up with the following research question:

*What factors contributed to the reconciliation process between Norway and West Germany after World War Two?*

In addition, I will examine how my findings fit within the existing literature, which will be presented in chapter 1.4.

As the topic of this thesis is such an extensive one, it is necessary to apply certain parameters to the research. The focus will therefore mainly be on state actors in the two countries, namely the governments in Oslo and Bonn. As those industries dealt with in those parts of the thesis which analyzes the economic aspect of the German-Norwegian relationship were so vital to the national economies, I am assuming that the interests of the governments and of these companies are fairly uniform. This does not mean that private companies and actors will not be discussed where appropriate, and one cannot disregard the influence of private companies on the reconciliation process. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Furthermore, the time period examined here is limited to the years between 1950 and 1980. Anything before this time will be described in the background chapter. The FRG was not established until 1949. 1950 thus seems like a logical starting point. By 1980, trade between the two countries had reached new heights, and the political relationship saw little to no friction. This thesis will therefore not discuss the German-Norwegian relationship past this point in time.

As mentioned, I will place my findings within the existing literature. Previous research will be consulted and used in place of a theoretical framework. As very little has previously been written on this subject from a German perspective, empirical research in German archives is needed in order to create a balanced account of the issue.

## **1.2 Justification of the study**

Germany is a massive player not just in Europe but in the world, and it is also Norway's main trade partner and ally. A thorough understanding of Norwegian-German bilateral relations and the underlying interests is therefore especially important. At the same time, Norwegian interest in our shared history as well as the German language is decreasing among young students. Norwegian businesses, on their hand, are in dire need of workers who know and understand German and Germany. (Lohne 2015) A comprehensive insight into and analysis of what has formed the bilateral relationship is therefore especially relevant.

This thesis is justified first and foremost by the lack of existing literature. In general, the literature concerned with describing the German-Norwegian relationship focuses mostly on

Norway's point of view, and there is an overwhelming focus on defense- and security policy. This thesis aims to clarify West Germany's motivations, as well as to give a comprehensive explanation to the reconciliation process and the factors which were instrumental in it. Much of the existing literature has an overwhelming focus on Willy Brandt's positive impact on the German-Norwegian relationship. This thesis does not dispute Brandt's importance, but aims to give a more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the reconciliation process which shows that today's close bilateral relationship is based on and exists because of historical ties, economic dependencies and personal connections.

### **1.3 Method and sources**

As mentioned, the aim of this thesis has been to discover which factors have contributed to the improvement of the German-Norwegian relationship. In order to achieve this goal, a historical method of approach has been used in order to provide a qualitative analysis of the German-Norwegian bilateral relationship in the time period 1950-1980. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005:10), a qualitative analysis entails highlighting processes and meaning that cannot be measured in quantity or frequency. It was a clear choice for this thesis as it goes further than a quantitative analysis in enabling a discussion regarding motives and thought processes. This has been especially valuable considering some of the political motives this thesis will discuss and interpret.

It is crucial that such interpretations happen within an established context. In the case of this thesis, context has held two different meanings. Firstly, when considering the economic factors, the political context has always had to be taken into consideration, and vice versa. Secondly, the factors identified have all been considered in the context of the existing literature, which will be further presented and discussed in chapter 1.4.

The data for this thesis has been collected in three ways. Firstly, it needs to be pointed out that as a supplement to the qualitative analysis, quantitative data has been retrieved and analyzed. This has been necessary for the chapters which deal with economic factors, and the data has been collected from SSB, Statistisches Bundesamt, and the Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Currency info and exchange rates have been retrieved from the European Central Bank. Secondly, especially considering the Norwegian perspective,

extensive research within the existing literature has been made. In addition, documents such as speeches held by Norwegian politicians and transcripts of meetings in the Norwegian Storting have been read and analyzed.

Thirdly, due to holes in the literature concerning the German point of view it has been necessary to access two political archives in order to make a balanced account of events. These archival sources have been accessed at the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz Endarchiv and at the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt (PAAA) in Berlin. Among the sources are political reports, statistics and personal correspondence as well as transcripts of bilateral meetings and interviews. The PAAA stores the files of the German Foreign Ministry and has therefore provided me with documents concerning contact with the Norwegian government as well as communication between the consulates and the Embassy in Norway and the Foreign Ministry in Bonn. These have been especially helpful regarding insight in political factors. In the archive in Koblenz I have consulted the archive of the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, as this archive includes communication and reports regarding the German-Norwegian trade relationship and has therefore been helpful when analyzing the economic aspects of the bilateral relations.

Archival primary sources give the advantage of being less edited than other types of sources, thus freeing the researcher from the interpretation of others. At the same time, archival research requires a firm grasp on the context in which the documents were written, and the researcher needs to be aware of his or her own bias. Secondary sources, if chosen carefully, therefore have the benefit of already containing all necessary information. With this thesis the knowledge and editing of others has been instrumental as the thesis covers such a long period of time and so many different factors. The archival research has been used as a way of supplementing, discussing and assessing the accuracy of the existing literature.

The most challenging aspect of the historical research method which has been applied to this thesis is the critical evaluation and analysis of the evidence. In the case of this thesis, language has made this especially demanding, as most archival sources have been written in German which is not my mother tongue. Further, when critically evaluating the evidence as in stage 3, both international and national context must be taken into account. As mentioned, with such a wide subject as the German-Norwegian bilateral relationship, this context is incredibly complex and one must recognize the possibility of overlooking an important factor.

Further, it is important to note that even though the historical method seeks to minimize biases, the potential for biased analysis still exists. This can especially happen when the access to data is limited. (Golder 2000:161) In order to avoid such pitfalls, numerous books and articles on a vast array of subjects have been consulted continuously throughout the research process. In addition, I have consulted fluent German speakers in order to ensure the accuracy of translations from German to English.

#### **1.4 Previous research**

As already stated, one of the aims of this thesis is to place the findings within the existing literature. In order to do so, an account of the main arguments and tendencies in this literature needs to be established. There are two main points to be made regarding the existing literature. Firstly, that the subject of West Germany in the years after World War II is widely described and analyzed, also from a Norwegian perspective, and secondly that even though much is written on the German-Norwegian relationship from a Norwegian point of view, the German literature barely if at all mentions Norway.

The subject of West Germany's economic and political rehabilitation after World War II is one which is widely described and analyzed in a vast array of books and articles. These can, roughly speaking, be split into two main groups: those dealing with the economic recovery, and those about the political rehabilitation. In the literature which examines the economical aspect, the focus is mainly kept on the establishment of and continuous success of 'the German Model', i.e. a cooperative (or "corporatist") approach to industrial modernization. Hence, it is mostly focused on domestic economic policies. Werner Abelshauser is one example of an author who has written a comprehensive work of German economic history: *Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* thoroughly discusses all aspects of the German economy. However, Abelshauser also focuses mainly on domestic policies. Norway is not mentioned at all.

The politically and historically themed literature that has been consulted for this thesis can be split into three different categories: that dealing with West Germany and its relations with Western Europe, i.e. European Integration literature, that which centers around the FRG's relationship or lack thereof with the Eastern Bloc during the cold war, and finally the strand

of books and articles that have shown how West Germany dealt with the aftermath of World War Two as their topic: i.e. the Nuremberg trial and acceptance of public guilt. These works all provide useful context but none touch specifically on the Norwegian-German relationship. The main idea to take away from these works is that the West German leadership, especially Konrad Adenauer, chose to focus on Western Europe and the European integration project in order to regain trust in the international community. With Willy Brandt in the late 1960s and onwards, times had changed slightly and the world was more open to a policy of communication with the eastern bloc. The consequences of the War have been an element with strong influence on German foreign policy throughout.

As mentioned, German literature or literature that focus on Germany does not mention Norway much, if at all. The reason for this is fairly obvious: compared to powerful European states such as France or Great Britain, Norway is and was both small and insignificant in comparison. To Norway, on the other hand, Germany has always been of the utmost importance. It is therefore not surprising that a fair amount of literature concerning the German-Norwegian relationship seen from a Norwegian perspective exists. Hans Otto Frøland is perhaps the scholar who has explored the German-Norwegian relationship after World War Two the most. His focus is mainly on the political relationship, and he especially put emphasis on Norwegian distrust of West Germany that most notably manifested itself in NATO, where the FRG was discriminated against until the 1980s. However, a functional normalization was achieved long before the political atmosphere had warmed up. Frøland argues that this was because of Norwegian dependency on the West German *Wirtschaftswunder*. The political and diplomatic relationship did not, according to Frøland, change until Willy Brandt became German Foreign Minister in 1966. Brandt was widely respected and liked in Norway, and the government there felt more comfortable dealing with the FRG after he came into office.

This conclusion is generally agreed upon in all literature on the subject. With the exception of Robin M. Allers, who has written his doctoral thesis about Brandt's special relationship with Norway, the scholars who have dealt with the subject are Norwegian and write from a Norwegian perspective. In addition to Brandt's personal connections with Norway, his *Neue Ostpolitik* is especially emphasized as a factor which contributed to increase Norwegian trust in the FRG. The general impression is that most scholars have chosen to focus almost solely on Brandt and his contributions.

In addition to scholarly articles and books, such as those by Frøland and Allers, a few edited volumes on the subject of Norwegian-German relations exist, the newest of which is called *Norsk-tyske forbindelser gjennom hundre år. Ikke bare laks og pølser*. This book is edited by Fauke Stuhl and contains a vast array of shorter pieces describing close to all aspects of the Norwegian-German relationship written by numerous scholars and experts. Another such book is *1949-1989: Norsk-tyske forbindelser 40 år*, edited by M.A. Moscovici. Both of these works have in common that they are thorough in their choice of topics, but that they provide little analysis and serve more as a type of encyclopedia than a comprehensive work. They do however to some degree contain articles written by Germans as well as Norwegians.

On the whole, however, little to no German literature concerning the Norwegian-German bilateral relationship after 1945 exists. Thus, the German perspective on this topic is sorely lacking. Additionally, trade and politics are either portrayed as separate entities or as being only vaguely connected. The trade relationship is seen as having had a linear development with few to no hurdles. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of all of the most important aspects of the Norwegian-German relationship does not exist.

## **1.5 Thesis outline**

In order to provide background and context, the next chapter will provide a brief overview of the history of the German-Norwegian bilateral relationship in the first half of the twentieth century. It describes how the two nations have a long shared history of friendship and economic cooperation. However, World War II put an abrupt end to this relatively warm relationship. At the same time, it is worthwhile to note that many projects such as factories, railways and even airports that since have been important to Norwegian industry were built during the occupation.

The main part of this thesis is split into two chapters. Chapter 3 deals with the time period 1950-1965, and chapter 4 with 1966-1980. This division has been made because of the very clear change in the political relationship that happened when Willy Brandt was made Foreign Minister in 1966. There seems to be a clear before and after. Both chapters are fairly chronological in order to create a narrative that is easy to follow, but they are also split into



two subchapters each, one that discusses the economic and one concerning the political relationship.

Chapter 3 deals with the first phase of the post- World War II relations between Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany (the FRG): 1950-1965. In the early 1950s, Oslo faced the challenge of balancing Norwegian economical dependency on the FRG with the particularly strong sense of distrust towards Germany that existed both in the general public and in the government itself. The chapter argues that even though the trade relationship had a positive development in this time period, it was negatively influenced by diplomatic difficulties. This, in turn, served as a motivational factor for both Germans and Norwegians to make sure the political relationship improved.

Chapter 4 discusses the changes that happened when Willy Brandt became first Foreign Minister, then Chancellor of the FRG in the late 1960s. The political atmosphere became much friendlier and cooperation easier. The chapter argues that this change also had a positive effect on the trade relationship, as seen with the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol: it is difficult to imagine such an extensive cooperation happening had the Ministers responsible not gotten along well. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of shared values and respect for each other to the bilateral relationship between Norway and the FRG. Further, it discusses the impact of the findings of oil in Norwegian waters.

Chapter 5 will summarize and further the analysis. It is structured thematically into two parts: the first will analyze the economic factors which have influenced the Norwegian-German reconciliation process. The second part will summarize what political factors and motives that lay the reconciliation.



## **2 Background: The Norwegian-German relationship in the first half of the 20th century**

### **2.1 Norway and Germany before World War II**

The German-Norwegian relationship is both an old and historically speaking a predominantly friendly one. Kaiser Wilhelm II, for instance, did not only travel to Norway as many as 23 times, he also contributed financially in the reconstruction of Ålesund after the great city fire in 1904, which very nearly obliterated the city completely. (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005) When, in 1905, the Norwegian government fought to gain recognition as an independent nation, German support was especially important. (Jervell 2005:94) The German support culminated in the co-signing with France, Russia, and the UK, of an agreement which made them all guarantors of Norway's sovereignty. (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005)

From an economic standpoint, Germany became extremely important to Norway in the early 1900s. Germany was becoming a leading nation in both politics and industry, and had an especially impressive track record within science– the number of German Nobel price winners in the fields of medicine, physics and chemistry was remarkable. (Nerheim 2005:1) In the early 1900s, the German economy was blooming, but so was the Norwegian one: from 1902 to 1920, the Norwegian GDP per capita increased with about 2 per cent every year. The main reason for this development was the expansion of hydroelectricity. This was done mainly with the help of imported capital and technology. (ibid) A consequence of the increased GDP was that Norwegian citizens had more money to spend, and as German companies were known for producing high quality items, companies like Siemens and AEG saw an impressive increase in demand from Norwegian customers. So much so, in fact, that both companies decided to establish subsidiary companies in Norway. (ibid) It thus becomes evident that German companies saw value in the Norwegian market even though it was a relatively small one. To Norway, on the other hand, Germany was exceptionally important: Germany was considered Norway's most important trade partner as early as 1905. Norway imported approximately 87 million NOK worth of goods from Germany at the time, and Germany was the second largest export market only surpassed by Great Britain.

Another important aspect of the German-Norwegian relationship at the time was the exchange of art and ideas. Culturally, the two nations have always been especially close, and it was especially important for Norwegian artists to spend time in Germany. Kjell Bækkelund (1990:227) notes that the general consensus was that if “a Norwegian artist were to learn anything, he or she had to go to Germany. And if a Norwegian artist were to be successful (...) he or she had to go to Germany.” (translation mine) For this reason, artists such as composer Edvard Grieg went to receive his education in Leipzig, and the Germans, too, learned from their Norwegian students. (ibid.) Henrik Ibsen’s “Peer Gynt” was the play most frequently played on the German theatre stage in the 1920s, and Edvard Munch was also especially popular.

In addition to artistic exchanges, it was also popular for Norwegian students – especially engineering students- to spend at least a few semesters in Germany. Although some Germans raised concerns about the high intake of foreign students as they felt the spots should be filled with Germans, the universities were generally united in defending this practice by arguing that the students would become great ambassadors for Germany in the future. There is every indication that this indeed was the case in Norway (Simensen, 1999:121), and in the early 1900s large parts of the Norwegian elite felt a close connection with Germany. (Henningsen 2005:94) The relationship between Norway and Germany before World War II was, in other words, one filled with friendly recognition and an exchange of ideas as well as goods and services. As Bækkelund writes: “we have so much in common.” (1990:229, translation mine) These close ties became especially evident in the time leading up to the Second World War, when numerous German artists as well as scholars fled to Norway. Among these were notably author Max Tau and mathematician Werner Romberg who both became expats in Norway in 1938, and of course would-be Chancellor Willy Brandt. (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005)

The 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, brought two world wars, and in spite of close ties and similarities Norway and Germany were not on the same side in either of them. In World War I, Norway had status as a “neutral ally” and stood firmly with Great Britain. New agreements on cooperation and trade were negotiated and came in to force as soon as the war was over, though. (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005) In 1940, however, the Norwegian wish to remain

neutral was blatantly ignored by the German Reich, as “Operation Weserübung” was put into action on April 9th and Norway was invaded.

## **2.2 World War II and the first post-war years**

Norway was occupied by Germany from 1940 to 1945, and during this time everything German got more attention than ever before. Norwegians who were drawn to Germany got every opportunity to indulge their interests. The German occupants made full use of unemployed Norwegians and put them to work: several railway lines, power plants and even air ports were built, or in the case of several projects that had already been planned and started by Norwegian companies or the government, finished. Even though most of the Norwegian population was strictly anti-German and resented the occupation, the Norwegian workers found it difficult to understand why participating in such work could be bad. They were, after all, helping build their country. However, the occupants of course used it all to help Hitler’s war machine. (Nerheim 2005:3)

In the years immediately following the end of the war, all things German were shunned in Norway. Anti-German sentiments can be characterized as especially strong compared with those in other European countries, in spite of the fact that Norway was far from being the country that suffered the most economically from the occupation. Several other European countries were far worse off. (ibid) Furthermore, several of the German projects were used in the rebuilding of Norway, and several German subsidiary companies were now owned by the Norwegian state. One example of a project started during the German occupation which was to become important to Norwegian industry was major aluminum factory Årdal & Sunndal Verk. This factory as well as many other establishments show how German and Norwegian interests would sometimes coincide, and also how German influence over Norwegian industry is undeniable. That is not to say that being occupied was an advantage to Norway. Between the first and the Second World War, Norway and Sweden were economically fairly equal. After World War II, Sweden was far ahead of Norway. (ibid)

If Norway suffered economically in the years following the end of the war, Germany had it worse: by many, 1945 is dubbed “hour zero” in Germany as the impact of the war had had such a devastating impact on the country and its economy. Extensive bombing of German

cities had also led to the need to rebuild state structures. (Silvia 2013:16) The German state no longer existed, its cities had been heavily bombed, an estimated one fourth of all homes were lost, and the currency was undermined by rampant inflation. Large parts of the German population became refugees. The Allies (the Americans, British, French, and Soviets) divided Germany into four zones. The American, British, and French zones together made up the western two-thirds of Germany, while the Soviet zone comprised the eastern third. Berlin was placed under joint four-power authority but was partitioned into four sectors. (Elkins 23.03.2015) In hour zero, it seemed the powerful Germany of the past and the future seemed extremely distant.

Still, the other European states had not forgotten what is referred to as “the German Problem”: a fear of the economic and political power of a reunited Germany. The divisions of the Cold War meant that a new dimension was added to this – what if Germany experienced a *Drang nach Osten*, and became Communist? Maintaining the east/west division was much preferred to this option. As Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange put it in a speech held at the Storting: “If a divided Germany is a tragedy, then a Communist Germany would be a disaster” (Lange 1952:254, translation mine) For this reason, the establishment of the FRG in 1949 was supported by Norway, but demilitarization was considered an absolute condition. Although the government realized that cooperation would need to happen, this was only accepted grudgingly. (Frøland 2006:501)

As this quote shows, anti-German sentiments were especially strong in Norway after the war. Former ambassador to Norway, Richard Balken, writes that

I am often asked by German countrymen why people in Norway, 25 years after the end of the war, still were not willing to forget. To this (...) there is one clear answer: (...) here, everyone knew everyone. There were no anonymous fates. (Bernd 2005:147-149, translation mine)

In the years immediately following the war, therefore, German-Norwegian contact consisted almost exclusively of the presence of Norwegian soldiers in the British zone of Berlin. (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2005)

What, then, was the attitude of the German public at the time? It is fair to say that the German public in general was less concerned with Norway and more concerned with dealing with the aftermath domestically. Publicly, the focus was on making amends. One important part of this

was the Nuremberg Trial, which began on November 20th 1945, and continued until October 1st, 1946. It was conducted in four languages, and each of the victor nations had their area of responsibility. 12 of 22 Nazi defendants were sentenced to death, 7 to imprisonment, and 3 were acquitted. (Wright 1947:38-41) The Trial was what some call “a spectacle”, but one with a very important task: to tell the truth about what had happened. Up to 85 % of the German population read about the trials and, according to reports, agreed with its message. (Karsted 2008:19)

However, after the initial success of the Nuremberg Trial, the German people went into a state of what Susanne Karsted famously dubbed the “collective amnesia”: a period where Hitler and his inner circle of Nazi Party members got blamed for it all, and the wish was to “close the books and put the past to rest.” (Karstedt 2008:26) German criminal lawyer Jürgen Baumann described the German attitude thus:

For years, most German citizens made all possible efforts to forget what happened in twelve ill-fated years. They made their gaps in memory systematic, and developed the handling of these generous gaps to perfection. That foreign countries neither could nor would forget as easily had to be taken note of from time to time, yet did little to disturb the inner-German silence. Already the term reconciliation with the past was becoming frowned on. Of collective responsibility, a responsibility of the German people (not collective guilt), nobody wanted to know. (Burchard 2006:812)

This period of “public amnesia” lasted well into the 1950s and did, as will be discussed in the next chapter, do little to help the Norwegian-German relationship. As a new decade began, Norway and Germany’s previous friendship seemed almost forgotten.

### **3 1950-1965: A rocky start**

In the 1950s, it became evident that Norway would benefit from a strong West German economy for several reasons. A West Germany that did not supply investment goods was reinforcing the dollar problem and slowing the recovery in Norway. (Frøland 2006:499) In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, the FRG was a potential major customer for a Norway that sought to not just rebuild, but also to expand its economy. Frøland argues that “Norway’s bilateral policy was dictated by self-interest and dependency rather than friendship and trust” (2006:495), and in the late 1950s to early 1960s this dependency was due to the possibilities available for Norwegian industry in the West German market. In spite of wide spread distrust, both politicians and those who worked within Norwegian industry realized that it was an absolute necessity for Norwegian export products to gain access to West German markets, “or else Norwegian businesses face a dark future” as diplomat and businessman Søren Chr. Sommerfelt put it in May 1958. (Røhne 1989:41, translation mine) For this reason, the Norwegian government was inclined to seek cooperation on matters of trade with the FRG. The lack of trust that was ingrained in the Norwegian public as well as the politicians, however, made for a slow start and a difficult balancing act for Oslo.

#### **3.1 Trade 1950-65: mutual dependency**

##### **3.1.1 Aluminum and Norway’s access to affordable energy/Norway’s largest competitive advantage**

Statistics from SSB show that Norway’s export in the 1950s to West Germany mostly consisted of base metals and ore, as well as fish and agricultural products. Aluminum was especially important, as Norway at the time was one of the world’s largest producers of this highly versatile metal. However, in comparison to other aluminum producing countries, there has been very little capacity for processing it in Norway. The Norwegian aluminum industry therefore focused more on export than any other country in Western Europe. (Karlsen 2005:1) This coincided nicely with West German needs, as the rapid growth in their economy led to



an increase in demand for aluminum. A lack of access to affordable energy made it impossible for the Germans to produce enough themselves.

This was and is an old problem of Germany's, and an interest in Norwegian resources was nothing new. During the occupation, Germany invested large sums in the aluminum industry in Norway. However, they never got to harvest the fruits of their labor, and after the war ended Norway got ownership of everything and continued to develop the industry well into the 1970s. Large parts of - German industry was bombed and destroyed during the war. Thus, in the case of aluminum, it seems as though the FRG was more dependent on Norway than Norway was on the FRG, as Norway had what Karlsen calls the "largest competitive advantage": access to affordable energy. (2005:1)

On the other hand, Norway sought to expand their aluminum industry and in order to do so funds were needed. In this endeavor, West Germany was considered especially important. (Røhne 1989:40) So much so, in fact, that an ambitious aluminum smelting program was launched by the Norwegian government in the late 1950s almost solely based on the assumption that the FRG would be a major customer. (Frøland 2006:504) And so it was: in 1962 about half of the FRG's aluminum use was imported, mainly from Norway and North America. (Bernd 2005)

### **3.1.2 Coal: the backbone of German industry**

Aluminum, however, was not the only commodity. For instance, Norway also exported coal from Spitsbergen to the FRG. Coal had been the backbone of German energy production both in Hitler's Germany and in the 1950s. Parallel with the increased coal production in the 1950s the import of oil increased too, and oil became cheaper and more popular. Between 1950 and 1970 the FRG became the country in Western Europe with the highest increase in oil consumption. (Nerheim 2005:3) This was mostly due to the fact that the prices of oil decreased dramatically. For example, the price of fuel oil in 1957 was 242 Deutsche Mark (DM) per ton. In 1960, the same amount cost 125 DM. (Pohl 2001:234) The change in cost naturally had an impact on the mining industry in the FRG. In the Ruhr area, the number of coal mine workers sank from 443 661 to 167 466 between 1958 and 1970. (ibid) Thus, the import of coal from Spitsbergen became the subject of some discussion. In 1961, though, the

leader of the German delegation could happily tell the Norwegians that “the Federal Republic has, in spite of significant provision difficulties in the German coal mines, because of the traditional German-Norwegian trade relationship, found a way to uphold our deal on import of Spitsbergen coal.” (Report on negotiations with Norway regarding trade protocols, Dr. Volpp, 21.09.1961, Koblenz Endarchiv B 102/263946, translation mine)

What this letter does not mention is that at the time, imported coal was cheaper than the coal the FRG produced domestically. (Pohl 2001:234) Furthermore, Norwegian coal was fairly cheap. In 1960, a ton of American coal cost 15,25 dollars whereas a ton of Norwegian coal was significantly more affordable at \$9,6 per ton. (Current prices. SSB 2005, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1961) Although oil and gas became increasingly important to Germany after World War II, coal kept a central position. A clear indicator of coal’s significance is the fact that in 2014, coal produced 43% of German electricity. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015) The importance of coal and coal import makes it unlikely that the Germans decided to keep importing Spitsbergen coal merely as a friendly gesture. However, the letter quoted above is interesting because it makes it clear that the German delegation found it necessary to put an emphasis on the “relationship”, indicating a desire to improve it. Further, it seems as though the message to Norway is that this “traditional relationship” clearly benefits Norway, too. Hence, Oslo should also wish to honor it.

### **3.1.3 The shipping industry**

In other matters it seems as though politics and diplomacy got more in the way of business. One example of this is a case in which the shipping industry in Norway had a payments problem with German shipyards in the late 1950s. The shipping industry served as the backbone of Norwegian trade industry throughout the 1900s, and a restructuring in the 1920s and 1930s created the most modern merchant fleet in the world. This meant that it was a major military target during World War II, and as a consequence large parts of it had to be rebuilt after the war ended. (Ramskjær 2005:2) Immediately after the war, however, the government focused on the energy industry rather than shipping. Few Norwegian shipyards had the expertise to build new, modern ships, so subcontracting was necessary. Most countries were busy rebuilding their own fleets, and the prices increased. As currency restrictions added to the cost, most ships in the first post war years were built in Norway.

In the early 1950s, however, currency restrictions were slowly eased. As a result, more Norwegian ships were built abroad, and in Germany especially. One example of a successful partnership here is the cooperation between the German shipyard Blohm & Voss in Hamburg that delivered ships to Norwegian ship owner A/S Uglands Rederi in Grimstad. Ugland, in turn, transported cars to New York and Baltimore. One of the most popular cars was German Volkswagen. (ibid.) Although Ugland did not begin its transport of cars until the 1960s, this practice is nevertheless a typical example of how the relationship between West German and Norwegian shipping industries is portrayed in the literature as being a friendly and fruitful one. Archival sources however reveal that German-Norwegian cooperation in this field got off to a rocky start.

A secret report from a meeting held in Berlin 1958 describes how the Norwegians complained that a disproportionate burden was put on Norwegian currency reserves due to Germany not being able to create reasonable conditions. The Norwegian delegation did, it seems, find it unreasonable that they were to carry the entire burden of the difficult financial situation alone. It is further made very clear that, from the Norwegian perspective at least, it is “of the utmost importance for the future of the German-Norwegian trade relationship that a satisfactory solution to this payments problem can be found.” (Protocol of trade negotiations with Norway, writer unknown, Berlin 14.05.1958, Koblenz Endarchiv B 102/26394, translation mine)

The payments problem is not mentioned in the literature as part of German-Norwegian shipping industry relations. It is therefore difficult to ascertain exactly what the issues were and how and when they were resolved. However, documents retrieved from the Koblenz Endarchiv show that in spite of several promises from the German side, and persistent dunning from the Norwegian side, the problem was not solved until well into the 1960s. Although not clearly stated in any document, this could be due to diplomatic difficulties. At the very least it seems reasonable to assume that such matters would be easier to solve had the political relationship been warmer. As such, the situation becomes an example of how a chilly political atmosphere and lack of goodwill between two parties can negatively affect their economic relationship. This should increase both parties’ interest in improving the political relationship.

Further, it is worth noting that the Norwegian politicians also put such an emphasis on the term ‘relationship’ in this setting. In the case of the Spitsbergen coal, the Germans were eager to use it as an example of how a good German-Norwegian relationship would benefit the Norwegian economy. As discussed, the Norwegians were clearly aware of this already, but still did not hesitate to use the chilly atmosphere to pressure the Germans for a solution to the shipping payments issue. Thus, one could argue that both sides used the bilateral relationship as a bargaining chip in the 1950s and early 1960s.

#### **3.1.4 The weapons industry: a touchy subject**

Considering the long history of partnership and cooperation, to continue this tradition seemed natural in spite of the unfriendly atmosphere. According to Røhne (1989), one of the most immediate fields in which West Germany seemed a natural trade partner to Norway was the weapons industry. This was because of two factors: Firstly, the FRG seemed to be the largest potential market for conventional weapons in a time when NATO because of the Cold War mostly sought nuclear ones. Secondly, the rearmament led to a highly competent weapons industry that Norway could benefit from. The Germans also showed great interest in the Norwegian produced torpedo boat NASTY. (Røhne 1989:38-39) Thus, an interest for cooperation arose. At the time however, the political relationship was still very chilly, and the Norwegian government was not yet prepared to follow up German interest with formal, official contact. When, in 1958, German representatives suggested that the Norwegian Minister for Industry Sjaastad contact German Defence Minister Strauss, Røhne writes, Sjaastad unfortunately “did not have the time at present” for such a meeting. (ibid)

Sjaastad’s reluctance is once again an example of how the Norwegian skepticism towards West Germany proved to get in the way of the trade relationship. Military cooperation was an especially sensitive issue in Norwegian public opinion. However, the interest for the West German market in Norway persisted, and when the Norwegian navy began its Fleet Program in 1960, Norway opened negotiations with the FRG about a repurchase agreement. The result was an armaments deal which became a reality on December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1960. (Tysklands Ambassade Oslo 2005). Norway bought 15 submarines from the FRG, and in return the FRG committed to buying industrial commodities from Norway. Here, Norway did not have any

misgivings about establishing the formal contact they had hesitated to make two years prior. (Røhne 1989)

This somewhat inconsistent behavior becomes fairly logical when one takes into account what Norway's main objectives with regards to the FRG were at the time. First of all, as already mentioned, Norway was in the process of rebuilding and expanding its industry. For such expansion, capital, investors and clients were necessary. The fact that Norway agreed to the armaments deal can thus be interpreted as the government being somewhat opportunistic, not letting political and diplomatic difficulties stand in the way of a lucrative and necessary deal. Secondly, as discussed earlier, the FRG was not alone in wanting to achieve a better relationship between the two countries. Norwegian state officials were very much aware that West Germany would make for a valuable partner, especially because of its economic strengths. Developing a trade relationship in this area would therefore make sense. However, as the Norwegian public was so mistrusting of Germans, cooperation was nearly impossible. This distrust was deeply rooted in Norwegian society. So deeply rooted, in fact, that both German and Norwegian state officials feared public opinion when German artillery troops were allowed to participate in NATO maneuvers on Norwegian soil for the first time as late as in 1988. (Frøland 1999:183) When politicians were that wary of public opinion in 1988, one can imagine it as being an enormous hurdle to cooperation in the 1950s and 60s.

Still, the benefits of cooperation with West Germany could not be denied, and it was therefore clear that a strategy to achieve détente not only at the official level but also among the public was needed. In 1957, Norwegian foreign minister Halvard Lange "proclaimed that increased West German imports from Norway and capital exports to Norway would contribute substantially to eliminating the friction between the two countries." (Frøland 2006:504) Agreeing to purchases such as the one described above could be seen as part of such a Norwegian strategy to make a positive contribution to the Norwegian-West German relationship through trade.

### **3.1.5 General developments of the German-Norwegian trade relationship**

Trade did indeed increase throughout the 1950s and 60s. West Germany's importance to Norway increased significantly from 1955 to 1960: In 1955, 14% of Norway's import came

from the FRG, and in 1960 this number had increased to 19,5% (ibid). For exports the development is similar, although somewhat smaller: 11,2% of Norway's export went to the FRG in 1955, and in 1960 the FRG accounted for 13,7 %. The same is not, statistically speaking, true of Norway's importance to the FRG. In fact, in 1955 2,2% of West Germany's import and 4,4% of the export was tied to Norway, but in 1960 the statistics show a decline to 1,8% and 3,9% respectively.

It is however important to keep in mind that the sheer volume of trade is not the only measure of importance. As discussed earlier, Norway provided the Federal Republic with metal and ore, aluminum especially, and these are commodities which the FRG relied on importing as there was no other way to cater to the needs which existed for this type of goods. It is also worth keeping in mind that this is a time period in which the West German economy was booming. In 1955, the export was at 13 149 mill. Euro and the current account balance +637 mill. Euro. In 1960, West Germany exported goods for the sum of 24 514 mill euro and the current account balance had risen to 2 670 mill euro in their favor. (All numbers in current prices.) This is an increase in current account balance of 319%. (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014) Thus, it is perhaps not so surprising that Norway makes up a smaller part of the import-export statistics in 1960 than in 1955.

Still, trade between Norway and the FRG was on a steady increase in the 1960s. The two countries kept their level of importance to one another, whereas the volume of trade increased. As the West German industry sector grew, so did the number of goods Norwegians imported from it. "German quality" meant a wide range of commodities: instruments, photography equipment, optical products, typewriters, calculators, tool- and printing machines. German companies like Zeiss, Agfa, Siemens, Bosch and AEG became increasingly popular. In addition, the appetite for German cars was enormous: in some years after the end of the restriction on car purchases in 1960 more than half of Norwegian owned cars came from Germany. (Nerheim 2005:2) According to SSB, the number of "means of transport" imported from the FRG in 1950 was 129. In 1970, it was 50 000. (SSB 2001)

### **3.1.6 The Kiel ferry: a private actor's influence on the German-Norwegian relationship**

One important addition to the exchange of both goods and people was the 1960 opening of the first Kiel ferry line. The Kiel ferry has been of great importance to the Norwegian-German relationship first of all because it made it so much easier to transport both people and goods between the two countries. This has of course been of great importance to tourism and Norwegian-German relations in general, but also to the exchange of ideas as mentioned in chapter 2. In 1961, 1600 Norwegians studied at German universities, and “A whole generation of Norwegian academics gets their knowledge from Germany, and they all travel with ‘Kronprins Harald’ and ‘Prinsesse Ragnhild.’ (Bakke 2011:15)

Further, the establishment of this ferry line was also of great importance to Germany. After World War II, 80% of Kiel lay in ruins, and the allies were threatening to demolish all the shipyards to send them somewhere else. The newspapers spoke of Kiel being faced by a “catastrophe” and thousands of workers took to the street to demonstrate in a hope that they would be able to keep their jobs. Anders Jahre, originally a lawyer from Sandefjord, had founded his shipping company in 1922, and saw great potential in Kiel. There, he was “met with deep recognition and gratitude” (ibid:21) and helped save Kiel from its downfall by helping rebuild the harbor as well as bringing tourists to the city. In its first year, MS Kronprins Harald transported 54 212 passengers and 8 286 cars. Five years later, the numbers had doubled and MS Prinsesse Ragnhild was bought and put into operation. (ibid)

The Kiel ferry, which is the only direct ferry connection between Germany and Norway, thus becomes an example of how a private actor can have a major influence on the bilateral relationship between two countries. Jahre, who originally was in the tank ship business, was motivated to expand and change his business by a price fall on tank ships. As a private actor, he was also freer to be opportunistic and make decisions without considering public opinion, which is perhaps why the Norwegian government did not establish this ferry line. In Denmark, for instance, the ferry line to Germany was government owned. (Stampehl 2005) Another explanation could be that the government simply chose to prioritize differently.

## 3.2 The political situation 1950-65: keeping a distance

### 3.2.1 Norway's "awkward political challenge"

There can be little doubt that the political situation meant a great deal to the Norwegian-German trade relationship in the 1950s and 60s. As the examples of Spitsbergen coal and shipyard payments issues as well as the case of the troubles with weapons trade discussed earlier show, politics and diplomacy can get in the way of a healthy economic relationship. This situation was not ideal for either of the countries. In a speech held at the Storting in 1952, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange made it clear that Norway would have to deal with the realities of Germany's potential:

(...)We have to face the reality: even in Germany's current state of division the Federal Republic is a state which will compete at the same level as all other states in Western Europe. This is due to the country's population, its considerable productive resources, its highly developed industry, and the German public's well known skillset." (Lange 1952:247, translation mine)

As discussed earlier, Germany had always been important to Norway in terms of trade, and Norwegian politicians had to acknowledge that regardless of how the public felt about it, Norway depended on the "Wirtschaftswunder". Oslo was thus faced with "an awkward political challenge": how to balance Norwegian dependency on the Federal Republic with domestic distrust. (Frøland 2006:504-506) This distrust was made clear with incidences such as the one that occurred when a visit from the German NATO general Hans Speidel to Oslo in 1957 was heavily protested, as described in the New York Times: "On one of his inspection tours in Oslo, buses and street cars were stopped for two minutes in protest, and demonstrators at an airport held banners saying, "We have forgiven the German people but not Hitler's generals.'" (Berger 1984) Speidel, although never a member of the Nazi Party, served under Rommel in the war. He was, however, forgiven and awarded his post in NATO because he partook in a plot to kill Hitler, and did therefore perhaps not deserve this animosity from the Norwegian demonstrators. The fact that his visit was still met with protest shows how strong and, at times, blind, the Norwegian public's dislike of Germany was at the time.

It seems as though Norwegian media contributed to maintaining this hostile environment. A letter from the German ambassador to the Auswärtiges Amt in 1955 discussing several



articles published in Norwegian newspapers concerning Germany's handling of post-war issues, expresses concern at how the Norwegian public perceived Germany at the time, noting that the newspapers helped sustain the negativity. The ambassador notes that the newspapers in question are read by many and thus help shape how Norwegians view Germany. Even though the facts presented in the articles are correct, the headlines especially have a "sobering effect", and the overall impression is that "Unfortunately these articles present an inaccurate and misleading representation." (Report to the Auswärtiges Amt regarding an article published in Dagbladet 30.09.1955, author unknown, PAAA B81/222, translation mine)

In 1960, however, one important step towards reconciliation was made: the question of war damages compensation was finally settled. The deal, which was signed in 1959, stated that the FRG was to transfer 60 Million Deutsche Mark to the Norwegian state by 1961.<sup>1</sup> It was accepted by the Norwegian Storting without any problems, but interestingly met more opposition in Germany. The German Social democrats (SPD), for instance, felt the amount was *too low*. However, the deal was ratified, and fulfilled its primary objective: it eliminated the question of war damages compensation from the political agenda, thus making sure it could no longer get in the way of normalizing the Norwegian-German relationship. (Frøland 2005:2)

However, Norway continued to want to slow the FRG's growing status in Europe, especially as an economic power. As a part of the work to achieve this, the Norwegians refused official state visits from West Germany for "emotional, symbolical and *realpolitik*-reasons" up until 1965, when Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen finally went on an official visit to Bonn. (Frøland 1999:184, Tysklands Ambassade Oslo 2005). Chancellor Erhard was welcomed in Oslo the year after, but the atmosphere was "not very cordial." (Frøland 2006:415, 1999:184)

---

<sup>1</sup> At the time, this would amount to about 107 million NOK, which was perhaps not a very impressive sum. In comparison, Norwegian export at the time had a value of about 6,6 billion NOK.

<sup>2</sup> Before World War II, the *Sonderweg* was a term which described Germany's "special path" to success. However, since WWII the connotations has been negative, and the *Sonderweg* is now more used as a term that explains Nazi Germany instead.

### 3.2.2 The Cold War and Adenauer's 'Westintegration'

As has been established in previous chapters, the Norwegian feeling of mistrust towards West Germany was a direct result of World War II. After this war ended, a new one began: the Cold War. With its position so close to the Soviet Union, Norway felt especially nervous and relied wholly on NATO for support. This dependency meant that Norway felt the need to agree with official NATO policy in almost all matters, and a direct consequence was that Norway ratified the protocol on the Federal Republic's accession to NATO in 1954, with Oslo noting that even though this decision was made with discomfort, national security had to come first. (Frøland 2006:501)

West Germany, on the other hand, was faced with the enormous task of regaining sovereignty, as Germany was now ruled over by the allied forces. Regaining status as a sovereign state could not be achieved without winning back the trust of the other nations, and reuniting the East and West seemed even more difficult. When Konrad Adenauer became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, one of his central projects was to put an end to the *Sonderweg*<sup>2</sup> and firmly anchor the FRG to the West. (Herf 1997:213) Consequently the decision was made to focus solely on what one might call the NATO countries. This, in Adenauer's opinion, was the only way to rehabilitate Western Germany. Many agree with him. Scholar Peter Merkl, for instance, argues that when West Germany became a member of both NATO and the Schuman Plan, "this extraordinary feat of foreign policy was possible at the time only by a policy of resolutely ignoring all relationships, from hopes of German reunification to making peace, with the states of Eastern Europe." (1975:803)

Adenauer's wish to rehabilitate the FRG coincided with the need to revive all of Europe, and it became clear to both Germany and France that they needed each other. France, lead by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, initiated the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan in 1950, helped by Adenauer. With this, the European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC) was founded. This signaled that France and Germany were ready to put the past behind them and go forth as

---

<sup>2</sup> Before World War II, the *Sonderweg* was a term which described Germany's "special path" to success. However, since WWII the connotations has been negative, and the *Sonderweg* is now more used as a term that explains Nazi Germany instead.

allies and friends. (Feldman 1999:340) Adenauer convinced the Schuman Plan's West German opponents by arguing that "the stronger the Federal Republic of Germany becomes (...) the better it will be for Berlin and the German East". (Dinan 2004:39) In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community and the Euratom (hereafter the EEC) and Adenauer later wrote of it:

This friendship is directed against no one within the free world; it will be to the advantage of all. Europe can only benefit if the two neighboring countries in the heart of Europe are closely united. France and Germany will form a political dam against the advance of Soviet Communism which threatens the freedom of us all. (Adenauer 1962:1)

The Germans did, in other words, see the European integration project as a peace project which would not only unite France and Germany, but also protect against the Soviet Union.

This project was, many would argue, driven by a universal fear in Europe of the economic and political potential of Western Germany (i.e. "the German problem"), perhaps even more than a fear of the Soviet Union. The idea was that it would be beneficial for all the western European states to tie Germany's capacities to a European community. Norway, fully aware of how a rehabilitated Germany could benefit the Norwegian economy, wanted this to happen in a "controlled environment" and did as such not oppose the idea of the EEC. (Røhne 1989:46) In fact, the Norwegian attitude was rather that the EEC was a fairly good solution to at least parts of "the German problem". In a speech held at the Norwegian Storting in 1952, Foreign Minister Halvard Lange explained that the government thought the Schuman Plan provided "the only possible way for West Germany to participate in a way which can be accepted by those countries which fear the power and influence of Germany the most." (Lange 1952:247, translation mine) He did, however, also emphasize that the EEC would not be enough, and that Norwegian government felt that NATO was necessary if West Germany – and later a reunified Germany – was to find its natural place amongst the other western democracies. (ibid)

That Oslo approved of the EEC's existence did not, however, mean that Norwegian membership was a goal. Concerns were raised regarding a number of aspects, such as the possibilities for smaller countries to influence decision-making within the European Community and loss of sovereignty. Furthermore, Norwegian foreign policy at the time was focused on Great Britain, and Great Britain did not wish to join. Thus, the Norwegians

showed little enthusiasm towards Adenauer's project and did not seek to participate themselves. (ibid) It is worth noting that at the time, the UK was Norway's second most important trade partner after Sweden.

In the 1960s however, the situation changed. The EFTA, a free trade area, was established in 1960, with Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland as members. Norway was content with this deal but Great Britain was not, and subsequently they applied for EC membership. The Norwegian government was very unhappy about this move towards the continent. The general sense was that it would be ideal to keep EFTA for trade and then stick to NATO and the US for security and defense. However, it seems as though the fear of being left alone "on the outside" without Britain was a bigger threat than arguments about state sovereignty, so in spite of serious misgivings the Norwegian government chose to follow the British lead and applied the year after. (Riste 2001:241)

Norway was not the only European country to make foreign policy decisions based on a fear of being left out: according to Hellman "all the efforts of the old FRG were 'devoted to avoiding international loneliness'" (1996:3) To the FRG, the reasons for choosing such a strategy was motivated by its history and "the delicate positioning of the 'semi-sovereign' Federal Republic at the center of a divided Europe."(ibid) Norway, on the other hand, was forced to find more powerful allies because of the country's small size and vulnerable position so close to the Soviet Union. As discussed, in the 1950s and early 60s this ally was Great Britain.

Adenauer was extremely pleased by the applications for membership made in the 1960s. They did, he felt, add to the European Community's legitimacy, and he proudly proclaimed that "that our policy is right is confirmed by the fact that states which had stood aside now seem to be prepared to assume the responsibilities (...)" (Adenauer 1962:2) He did, in other words, not let the fact that Norway's application was only made reluctantly faze him. Adenauer had a difficult relationship with the British (Williams 2000:294), but managed to put this aside as well. French President Charles deGaulle however did not, and vetoed Great Britain's application twice. As a result of this Norway withdrew their application both times.

### 3.2.3 Adenauer's eastern policies and Norwegian attitudes

As previously discussed, Konrad Adenauer saw it as necessary to “ignore all relationships (...) with the states of Eastern Europe” in order to rehabilitate the Federal Republic. (Merkel 1975:803) In the 1950s, Oslo was very much in agreement with this so-called *Westintegration*, and remained loyal to the FRG's “sole representation claim” in NATO. (Frøland 2006:513) This was important to Adenauer: as part of his policy at the time was the so-called Hallstein doctrine, which dictated that the FRG would see it as an unfriendly act if any nation was to recognize East Germany or maintain a diplomatic relationship with it. Norway, perhaps mostly out of loyalty to NATO as a whole rather than the FRG itself, honored the Hallstein doctrine throughout the entirety of the Cold War.

However, with the Berlin conflict of 1958-63, Norwegian attitudes towards Adenauer's eastern policies began to become more ambiguous. It became increasingly evident that hard headed refusal to recognize the GDR's existence was not helping matters. The Norwegian government preferred a more pragmatic solution to the escalated conflict, and felt that completely stonewalling the GDR would lead nowhere. Einar Gerhardsen and his labor party government began, very slowly, to indicate a softer attitude to the GDR. Gerhardsen even suggested that it *might* be considered to recognize the GDR as a state – if Sweden did so first. (ibid:514)

That never happened, but both Foreign Minister Lange and Prime Minister Gerhardsen demonstrated interest in and commitment to solving the east-west problem. However, Lange was of a more conservative persuasion and felt more inclined to stick to NATO's line, whereas Gerhardsen wanted to “build bridges” and achieve *détente*. He expressed frustration with the situation, asking: “how long is this supposed to last? For ten, fifteen, or a hundred years? (...) We have to realize the unreasonableness in not having an opinion on this at all.” (Røhne 1989:42, translation mine) It became increasingly clear that the Oslo would have preferred a softer approach to the GDR, one which involved *rapprochement*. Gerhardsen visited Moscow as early as in 1955 in an attempt to create dialogue, and in spite of differences of opinion within the government as well as in the international community he stuck with his strategy throughout his career. (ibid)

It was perhaps this favoring of dialogue which made Konrad Adenauer reach out to the Norwegian government in November 1960 and ask Foreign Minister Lange if he would contact Moscow and see if they would be willing to go into direct negotiations regarding the Berlin question. Lange, however, turned the opportunity down and suggested neutral Sweden for the task instead. (ibid:43) This decision is perhaps surprising considering how uncomfortable the Norwegian government normally felt about the FRG's policy towards the east. One could argue that it would make sense, then, to assist Adenauer when he made a rare attempt to achieve dialogue with the GDR. However, it is important to remember that if Oslo felt uneasy about Adenauer's eastern policies, they felt even less comfortable with their shared border with the Soviet Union- the big enemy. National security, therefore, had to come before other foreign policy preferences.

Although Norway at no time officially deviated from NATO's common policy, its government did express an increased frustration with Bonn's official policy. They felt it was too rigid, and made this clear on several occasions in the early 1960s. In 1960, the Storting representative Finn Moe publicly made a statement regretting Bonn's stance on the Berlin issue, and Halvard Lange, although officially more cautious, advocated on camera a de facto recognition of the GDR. (Frøland 2006:514) Thus, it can come as no surprise that Oslo communicated fairly frequently with Eastern Bloc politicians. In 1967, Trygve Bratteli spoke at the Storting, stating that: "we still do not know how much time it will take to achieve a favorable development (...) But we do know that our country has to actively participate to make this development happen" (Bratteli 13.10.1967, translation mine). And so Norway did. The FRG kept close tabs on any diplomatic developments, and noted that Norway seemed to be conducting "positive talks" with both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Especially Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek helped these relations, as he spoke Norwegian and thus struck the Norwegians as far more sympathetic. (Report from the German ambassador to Oslo regarding Norway's relations to Eastern Bloc politicians 05.08.1968 PAAA B31 382)

Oslo's contact with the Eastern Bloc might have meant that the FRG saw a friendship with Norway as more valuable than they otherwise would have. Hellmann argues that (West) German foreign policy has always been a "sowohl als auch" – policy, meaning that an exclusive focus on the West was not necessarily exactly what the FRG wanted. Adenauer's ask for help to achieve dialogue in 1960 clearly shows that although the official focus was on

Western Europe, the FRG was also interested in keeping tabs on the East. Cooperation with Norway on this issue thus seems fairly favorable. Adenauer's request is interesting because it demonstrates West Germany's need for allies, also smaller ones such as Norway – it was clear at the time that the difficult situation in Berlin especially would not be solved by the FRG alone.

### **3.2.4 Personal relationships**

The shared history and exchange of culture and ideas between Germany and Norway in the 1900s meant that friendships between Germans and Norwegians existed also in 1945. On an official level, however, the Norwegian and the West German government did not entertain friendly relationships with each other in the 1950s and early 1960s. Norwegian dislike and mistrust of Germans was strong: in the post war years, the saying that “only a dead German is a good German” got a lot of traction in Norway (Lorentz 2005:1, translation mine), and receiving a German education was no longer considered a smart career move. In fact, German-educated engineers now struggled to find jobs and an American or British education was much preferred. (Nerheim 2005:2) When major Norwegian newspaper *Dagbladet*'s new correspondent to West Germany was preparing to leave for his new home, his editor told him not to “trust these Germans too much, and don't let them fool you.” (Smith 1990:161)

The atmosphere was, in other words, not one which allowed cooperation and dialogue to blossom. Norwegian distrust of all German state leaders up until Brandt was undeniable. It must, in all fairness, be said that the Norwegians were perhaps not entirely alone: in a memorandum to the British Foreign Office General Sir Charles Fergusson wrote of then-Mayor of Cologne Konrad Adenauer: “he is clever, cunning, a born intriguer and dangerous. I suggest that too much reliance should not be placed on him, and that in dealing with him our authorities should be on their guard.” (Williams 2000:294)<sup>3</sup> For reasons such as his policy of attempting to “integrate” second-rate Nazi party members into society as well as his stance on Eastern Europe, which was too “hard” for Norwegian norms and values, Adenauer did not

---

<sup>3</sup> The British ended up dismissing Adenauer from his position of Mayor and denying him the right to work with politics in October 1945, but Adenauer still managed to become Chancellor of the FRG four years later.

enjoy more – maybe less - trust or friendship in Norway than his successor Ludwig Erhard did. When Erhard as the first West German state leader visited Oslo in 1966, the visit took place in what Norwegian Foreign Minister John Lyng later described as a “correct but not very cordial atmosphere.” (Frøland 2006:415) This observation seems to describe the general tendency of German-Norwegian relations at the time.

Dislike of West German Chancellors was perhaps an unjust one: neither Adenauer nor Erhard were Nazi supporters. In fact, Adenauer spent twelve years hiding from the Nazis in retreat in the Rhineland, something was of great disadvantage to him in at least some respects, as “the fact is that [his] knowledge of countries outside Germany, already limited, had, if anything, been further eroded during the isolation (...)” and that this “had served to set his previous ignorance into a cast of something close to insularity.” (Williams 2000:294) In addition, Adenauer led the way in the period Karstedt calls public amnesia in Germany. He publicly asked for a halt of further scrutinizing the past of high-ranking officials and civil servants. (Karstedt 2008:26). The combination of these two factors may be what made the Norwegians so suspicious of him. The Norwegian public found it difficult to trust the West German state and the people in charge of it. How could one know who had participated in the war, been a member of the Nazi party, or otherwise contributed to the atrocities that the Norwegians found so difficult to forgive?

As discussed previously, the German representation in Norway was concerned about how the FRG was portrayed in Norwegian media. However, it must also be said that it seems as though the West Germans did little to help reconcile the two countries in the early 1950s. The general impression is that German media showed little sensitivity towards the issues facing the Norwegian-German relationship. When Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, as the first Norwegian state official since the war, visited Bonn in 1953, the media reported on the event in a manner which later has been describes as “pathetic”. For example, an article in “Hamburger Anzeiger” falsely called him the Prime Minister and gushed that Norway and Germany had a long common history, not mentioning the wartime occupation with not so much as a word. Halvard Lange himself commented on this by saying with a note of resignation: “I guess we’re all Germans.” (Bohn, Elvert & Lammers 2000:70) If he took such experiences with the West German public home with him, it can hardly have inspired warm feelings.



The first West German ambassador to Norway, Georg von Broich-Oppert, also struggled to show enough sensitivity with regards to the German occupation of Norway. Both the Government and the Norwegian King met him with cordiality when he first arrived in the summer of 1951. Especially the King, according to von Broich-Oppert himself, “promised to support him with his difficult task”. (ibid:69) A year later, however, von Broich-Oppert made the mistake of telling Associated Press at an interview in Bonn that “we wish to escape from the past. The hatred that occurred between Germany and Norway during the war has almost vanished. We want Germany to achieve complete equality among the nations.” The time was not ready for such a statement. Several speakers in the Norwegian Storting demanded von Broich-Oppert’s resignation. (Jervell 2005:96)

In spite of the protests, the Ambassador stayed in Norway until 1956, and it seems he was able to redeem himself. In a letter to the owner of the building in Oscarsgate that the Embassy was set to move into, her son-in-law wrote: “Dear mother in law... better or finer tenants do not exist, and it seems you do not need to fear any changes in the German representation here in Norway (...) B-O (ambassador Broich-Oppert) is not just held in high regard by Adenauer, he is also much respected here in Norway after his three years here.” (Tysklands ambassade Oslo 2008)

Jervell writes that the Embassy’s archive show that it was difficult to set up and go through with bilateral meetings in the early years of the West German representation in Norway, which also included consulates in all the larger cities. When such meetings did occur, the Norwegians only attended half-heartedly. (Jervell 2005:96) However, reports from the German Auswärtiges Amt also testify to the hard work to achieve reconciliation of West German state officials in both the Embassy and the consulate. In a report sent to the Auswärtiges Amt regarding the Consulate in Bergen in the late 1960s, the author describes how Norwegian-German relations have become significantly better and that “[this positive development] is not just due to the Norwegian government’s willingness to cooperate with us, but rather is in large part a result of the hard work of our state officials posted in Norway.” (Report regarding the German consulate in Bergen, Herr Wimmers, Bonn, 28.10.1968. PAAA B31/382, translation mine)

### **3.3 Missing factors, lack of focus**

1950-1965 can in many ways be seen as a period of time in which several important factors were missing from the German-Norwegian relationship. When one examines the economic and political aspects, it becomes clear that even though both countries clearly had trade related motivations to improve the relationship, the chilly atmosphere created several difficulties. It seems as though Norwegian politicians lacked the will to fully reconcile with Germany, which may be mostly due to the unfavorable public opinion.

Furthermore, Norwegian and German leadership were out of sync. The Norwegian government did not approve of Adenauer's policy towards the eastern bloc and was not sufficiently impressed by the EEC. In addition, Norwegian economic interests lay more with Great Britain at the time. Even though Oslo clearly saw the potential in West Germany and realized the importance of a well functioning trade relationship with the FRG, it seems fair to assume that the close ties with Great Britain diverted attention from it. Since the Norwegian public felt so negatively about Germany, focusing on the relationship with the British instead must have seemed an easier option for the government.

West Germany, on their hand, was naturally preoccupied somewhere else. Granted, Adenauer did focus on Western Europe, and was pleased when Norway decided to apply for EEC membership, but he had little reason to devote much attention to Norway specifically. There is every reason to assume that Norway, to the general German population as well as to Adenauer's administration, was a fairly insignificant country. Hence, the bilateral relationship received little attention outside that rewarded to it by German representation in Norway. In 1966, however, the situation changed, and this will be analyzed in the next chapter.

## **4 1966-1980: reconciliation and cooperation**

The later part of the 1960s brought with it a fairly dramatic change to the bilateral relationship between Norway and West Germany. Although certain strides were made in the early 1960s, as discussed in chapter 3, the real shift came in 1966, when the FRG changed its government from Adenauer's CDU government to a coalition one. Not long after, Willy Brandt became Chancellor. As chapter 4.2. will discuss, this change was of considerable importance to the German-Norwegian relationship, not just because of Willy Brandt's personal relationship to Norway but because his government introduced policies and politicians that shared values with Oslo. This naturally had a positive impact on the relationship.

The trade relationship, too, really began to blossom in the 1960s. By the 1970s, it had expanded to even more sectors and had inspired close cooperation between the two countries. As chapter 4.1. will discuss, a prime example of this is the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol, which aimed to encourage German-Norwegian cooperation in a vast amount of technical and industrial areas. Thus, 1965-80 can be seen as a time in which the German-Norwegian relationship really flourished.

### **4.1 Trade: gradual expansion**

#### **4.1.1 General developments**

In the 1960s and 70s, Norway and the FRG maintained their importance to each other in regards to trade. The FRG made up between 10 and 20% of Norway's import and export, and Norway made up between 1 and 4% of the FRG's export and 1-2% of its import. (SSB 2001, Statistisches Bundesamt 2013) There were, in other words, few changes in this aspect. What did change to a greater extent however, is the volume of trade, which has greatly expanded since the 1950s. The composition also changed somewhat. For instance, Norwegian import of German cars was modest in the 1950s and early 60s, but flourished in the later 1960s and 70s. (ibid) The increase in import and export between Norway and the FRG happened gradually over the years, but Norway had a consistent deficit in the current account throughout. That is, more was imported to Norway from the FRG than the other way around.

In general, trade and cooperation especially expanded in the 1970s. One example is the agricultural sector. Here, reports show, Norwegian export to and import from West Germany increased significantly throughout the 1970s: from 106 million Deutsche Mark in 1975 to 200 million just two years later. Norway exported mostly fish- and dairy products and imported sugar, coffee and other unspecified food products. (Report on the agricultural sector, Bonn 1978, PAAA 121.629 420/305) It is however noteworthy that the dependence of West German industry on the import of metals and ore was seen as a threat to the development of German industry. This caused some concern: “without the existence of a German raw material industry, the Germans lack the necessary tools to maintain its competitiveness and know-how,” reads one memorandum to the Minister of Trade (Report regarding cooperation between some German and Norwegian entrepreneurs, Ministry for Economy, 09.1978, Koblenz Endarchiv B102/288016, translation mine)

In the later parts of the 1970s German import of goods such as non-ferrous metals such as nickel and lead from Norway decreased dramatically. (Report on Norwegian-German trade relations, Bonn 14.02.1978, PAAA 121.625 420/302) However, reports found in the archives show that the West German industry was still dependent on import of several materials, one of which was copper. “There are no copper deposits in Germany,” reads a report on the subject, which goes on to raise concerns that apart from its own waste, the Bundesrepublik is therefore dependent on supply from abroad. This is highly problematic for “[a] country that has a limited supply of raw material and a high copper demand like the Bundesrepublik “(Memorandum on possible copper trade with Norway, Elkem 06.02.1979, Koblenz Endarchiv B102/288016, translation mine) Norway, on the other hand, had at the time a fairly marginal production of copper, all of which basically was sold to the FRG. The memorandum suggests that “the FRG should consider whether it would be beneficial to cooperate with Norway in keeping the mines open, as it is one of very few sources of copper in Europe.” (ibid)

One can thus argue that even though the general policy in the FRG was to rely less on imports there was a clear understanding that they could never be self-sufficient. The memorandum also shows that the FRG saw value in having Norway as a supplier. It seems as though much of this value stems from Norway being a European country, which would make sense: as a member of the EFTA Norway would be bound to laws which would make it a more

accountable trade partner, and the geographical proximity and preexisting traditions would mean that the process would go more smoothly and probably also be cheaper.

As the FRG was and is dependent on importing several raw materials in order to feed its industry sector especially due to its problems with accessing affordable energy, it seems logical that Bonn would focus on maintaining close, well-working relationship with its suppliers. As will be discussed in greater detail below, this has also been a case with oil and natural gas. It is, further, reasonable to assume that the FRG preferred to not solely rely on one country as the supplier of any single material. This, together with the factors mentioned above, could help explain why Norway, although not necessarily the biggest or most powerful supplier, still played an important part for the FRG and why achieving and then maintaining a good relationship would be a priority for Bonn.

#### **4.1.2 Oil and gas**

As discussed in chapter 3, the FRG became one of the largest oil importers in Europe in the 1950s and 60s. West German industry therefore became dependent on yet another imported source of energy. From 1960 until 1973, the petroleum demand increased continuously throughout. (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe 2009:193) The 1970s, however, saw two major oil crises, the first one being a result of the Yom Kippur war in 1973. OPEC sanctions lead to the oil prices increasing with as much as 400 %. (Nerheim 2005:3)


The oil crises naturally impacted the world economy. While all economies were affected by the recession, the policy response and subsequent economic performance differed greatly between the advanced industrialized countries. The FRG was among those states that managed best to adjust to slower growth, competition from developing countries, and financial instability. (Vitols 2005:2) Abelhauser (2011:12, translation mine) writes that this was the breakthrough of the so-called “German model”: “Viewed from the outside, the German ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ was at first reduced to a combination of luck, German skill and hard work. Social market economy was not an export good in the 1950s.” But in the 1960s, he argues, the German model received more attention, and when the FRG so successfully survived the 1970s, it really became internationally known and respected. (ibid)

As part of the process of adapting to the new, post-recession reality, the FRG decided to subsidize the coal industry as a result of the oil crisis in order to stimulate it into producing more so that the country would not rely as heavily on OPEC oil imports. (Nerheim 2005:3) A clear evidence of this is that Africa's share, which dominated in the early 1970s (Libya was the main exporter), today is just above 17%. (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe 2009:193) However, oil maintained its status as the most important source of energy to the FRG. Natural gas also increased its importance throughout the 1960s and 70s. (ibid) Thus, West Germany showed great interest when oil and natural gas was discovered at the Ekofisk-field in Norwegian waters in 1969.

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the current account balance between Norway and West Germany has always been in the FRG's favor. The discovery of oil changed that. Norwegian business entered a new era as did its relationship with its trade partners. Norwegian off shore industry was developed in speedy fashion, helped by foreign competence and the increase in oil prices from 1973. European industrial countries were worried about their energy supplies and were eager to make good use of Norway's "black gold". This was especially important for the Norwegian-German trade relationship. Liesen argues that the relationship gained a whole new dimension – one which has tied the two countries closer together. With larger income due to an increase in export, Norway was now able to increase its import from the FRG. The FRG, on the other hand, now got the opportunity to import its all-important gas from a country that was low-risk. (1990:279-81) Germany relies on import for about 70% of its energy supply, and its largest supplier is Russia. Given Russia's reputation of being somewhat unreliable, it comes as no surprise that Germany has been and still is skeptical on relying on Russia too heavily. (Deuse 2014)

The two nations agreed that petroleum would be sent from the Ekofisk field to Germany as early as in 1974, a year after the international oil crisis, and in 1977 a gas pipe connected Norway to Emden in the FRG (Tysklands Ambassade Oslo). The gas pipe facilitated an ever increasing export of oil and gas from Norway to the FRG, but import from the FRG increased too: after the FRG began to buy gas in 1977, they also increased their export to Norway by 300%. By 1983, 80% of the growth in West German import was due to the delivery of oil and gas. (Frøland 2014:4) The graph below clearly shows how Norwegian export of oil and gas to the FRG influenced the current account balance in such a way that the FRG became the one

with less export to than import from Norway for the first time in the German-Norwegian trade relationship.



Graph 1. Export to and import from the FRG to Norway in the years 1955 to 1979. (SSB 2014)

### 4.1.3 The Gjerde-Friedrichs Protocol

The discovery of “black gold” in Norwegian waters was naturally a great shock to the system and opened up a whole new world of potential. Frøland (2014) writes that the foundation for the very prosperous trade with oil and gas was laid by Norwegian Minister of Industry Bjartmar Gjerde and Hans Friedrichs, West German Minister of Economy. They both authored and signed what is known as the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol in 1976. The protocol stemmed from a recognition of mutual usefulness, so to speak: Germany wanted to import oil and gas and Norway needed investment of foreign money. (ibid) However, there is little other mention of this protocol in the existing literature, even though the general consensus is that it has played a major part in the German-Norwegian trade relationship. Its aim was to enhance bilateral cooperation in energy and industry issues.

For such an important document, it is curious that it seems almost impossible to find any reference to it in the existing literature. One might be tempted to believe it was made up. However, records show that it does exist, and that it was signed on August 19. 1976. In addition to this information, the official German record of this merely states that the protocol will strengthen industrial and energy cooperation and that it is valid effective immediately. Norwegian sources contain the same sparse amount of information. However, in the archives of the Auswärtiges Amt, there are also letters and reports regarding the protocol which give a more detailed insight into it.

What is particularly interesting about the Gjerde-Friedrichs cooperation is that they went much further than just making an agreement on oil and gas. They also made sure to establish a committee consisting of representatives for both governments; the industry sector in both countries and business organizations. State secretaries Lars Uno Thulin and Detlev Karsten Rohwedder<sup>4</sup> were heads of the committee, which was tasked with “encouraging contact and conversations between the affected industry groups and businesses in order to determine what concrete cooperation opportunities exist.” (Thulin and Rohwedder in report to Gjerde and Friedrichs, 06.06.1977, PAAA 121.625 420/302, translation mine)

---

<sup>4</sup> Rohwedder was later killed by terrorists in 1991 when he was the head of the ”Treuhand”, the organisation which tried to sell the East German state owned industrial assets after the reunification.



The work of the committee explored cooperation opportunities in industrial and energy areas such as electro technical industry, workshop industry, petrochemical industry, engineering, aluminum and steel, and many other, and in general ascertained that the right conditions were in place. The general tendency after a year of work, which included several meetings between businesses and industry leaders, the establishment of a Committee of Contact between the two largest industrial associations in the FRG and Norway: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) and Norges Industriforbund (NI), and two meetings of the Gjerde-Friedrichs Committee, was that most industry areas had established a substantial amount of contact and some had also agreed on several areas of cooperation. In the case of aluminum, plans were made to build a common plant in Emden. (ibid.) In a letter to the leader of BDI, Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher expresses how pleased he is that the cooperation is going so smoothly. "I would particularly like to commend you for not only investigating industrial cooperation, but also our interests in making concrete offers in the energy field. The general assurance from the Norwegian side that they will contribute to the German energy supply makes your travel a particular success." (Letter from H.D. Genscher to H.G. Sohl, 11.01.1977, PAAA 121.627 420/303, translation mine)

The Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol thus succeeded in facilitating closer industrial cooperation between Norway and the FRG in several areas. It appears that this was mostly motivated by a desire to secure energy supplies. In 1979, a report concluded that when it came to cooperation and trade regarding commodities such as "oil, gas, steel, light metals, chemicals, naval technology, synthetic substances and the electronics industry," good results had been achieved and were to be seen as a foundation for further work and cooperation. A report from this meeting, the author writes that "intensifying this cooperation will demand considerable effort from the German side. In spite [of this] it is possible to strengthen the industrial cooperation long term," and that "the Chancellor has made it clear that he has every intention of supporting the development of industrial cooperation between the two countries. (...) The Germans emphasized their wish for a continued cooperation over time, and the importance of this" (Dr. Philipp in report to Bonn regarding Norwegian-German industry cooperation, 12.01.1979, PAAA 121.627 420/303, translation mine)

The report by Dr. Philipp clearly states that industrial cooperation with Norway was important to the FRG. In a meeting between the Norwegian Ministry of Industry and the German

Ministry of Economy in Bonn in 1977, Hans Friedrichs shed some light on the German motivations behind the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol. He acknowledged that not all industries were happy with, or understood, the political meddling. Many thought it would be better to leave it to the businesses to make the connections themselves. He said, however, that as both countries, but perhaps especially Norway, had industries which were specializing in difficult fields, further incentives were necessary in order to make sure an exchange of ideas and knowledge would happen. Furthermore, he placed the cooperation with Norway in the greater political context of the European Integration process. In 1970, Greece, Portugal and Spain all emerged from dictatorship. They thus became eligible for membership in the EEC. The existing members were weary of this possibility and feared the impact a Mediterranean enlargement might have on the Community. The feeling in the FRG, Minister Friedrichs explained, was therefore that in the light event of a southern enlargement and with the possibility that this might change the character of the EEC, it was all the more important to bridge the gap to the industrial countries of the EFTA even more. (Dr. Streitt: Report on the meeting between Hans Friedrichs and Bjartmar Gjerde in Bonn, 06.06.1977, 15.06.1977, PAAA 121.625 420/302, translation mine)

Bundesminister Friedrichs thus clearly showed how closely politics and economy are tied together. There seems to be a strong idea that closer economic relationships would also lead to closer political relationships. This sentiment echoes that of Halvard Lange in 1957 when he “proclaimed that increased West German imports from Norway and capital exports to Norway would contribute substantially to eliminating the friction between the two countries.” (Frøland 2006:504) Although it is important to note that very little friction existed at this point. The report of Rohwedder and Thulin did, however, note that in the military and defense sector, cooperation depended on “the two countries’ political decisions.” (Thulin and Rohwedder in report to Gjerde and Friedrichs, 06.06.1977, PAAA 121.625 420/302, translation mine) The subject of military cooperation, which will be discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter, was still a touchy subject in Norway. The FRG was in fact discriminated against by Norway in NATO up until 1988. (Frøland 1999:185)

## **4.2 The political situation 1966-80: shared values and common goals**

As discussed in chapter 3, the bilateral relationship between Norway and FRG in the 1950s and early 1960s was a fairly chilly one which at times got in the way of trade and economic cooperation. However, the discrimination against the FRG in NATO was actually atypical to the bilateral relationship between Norway and West Germany in the late 1960s and 70s. In fact, from about 1966 onwards the atmosphere changed dramatically. Some of the groundwork for this shift had no doubt been laid in the years before, but this chapter will argue that most of the changes happened as a direct result of the change in West German leadership: in 1966, a coalition government under Kiesinger came into office. Here, former mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt was Foreign Minister. Brandt had close ties to Norway and invoked a trust in the Norwegian public towards the FRG which had not previously existed.

There is general consensus among scholars that Willy Brandt's rise to power in the FRG is the one factor which has contributed the most towards Norwegian-German reconciliation. However, this chapter will argue that the situation was more complex, and that other politicians as well as personal relationships between other state officials have played important roles as well. Further, the political situation and the trade situation clearly influenced each other in the time period 1965-80.

### **4.2.1 Personal relationships and their influence on German-Norwegian bilateral relations**

It seems evident that the reconciliation process between Norway and the FRG was in large part driven forward by individuals who recognized the importance of fostering a friendly and productive relationship between the two countries. Among the people who contributed the most were Germans who had lived in exile in Norway. Of the approximately 500 000 refugees that fled Germany after Hitler's takeover in 1933, only about 1300-2000 came to Norway. This was in part due to Norway's very restricted immigration policy. The German refugees were both few and unwelcome. Attitudes changed over time however, and the exiled

Germans ended up making a lasting impression on Norway as well as being influenced themselves.<sup>5</sup> (Lorentz 2005)

The most prominent of these German refugees is undoubtedly Willy Brandt. Brandt came to Norway in 1933 as somewhat of a political activist on the far left. In fact, the Norwegian government called him a “communist agitator” and attempted to evict him twice. (Lorentz 2005) Brandt however had powerful friends who protected him, and he formed a close and loving relationship with both Norway and the Norwegian people. The Norwegian labor movement informed his political opinions, and he describes the meeting with the youth movement as “one of the happiest parts of my life. Here, I came together with friends who would go on to carry enormous responsibilities for the development of their country.”<sup>6</sup> (Myrli 2013, translation mine)

Even after Brandt went back to Germany and began his political career there, he kept close ties with Norway. He spoke Norwegian, was married to Norwegian Rut Brandt, and generally had close ties with the Norwegian community. Throughout his time as Chancellor he made a point of keeping the Norwegian government up to speed on what he and his government were doing. (Hoppenstedt 2005:2)

There is general consensus in the Norwegian literature that Willy Brandt’s appointment as Foreign Minister in 1966 in the Kiesinger government and as Chancellor in 1969 has meant a great deal to Norwegian-German relations. Especially his Ostpolitik invoked feelings of trust in the Norwegian public. (Frøland 2014:3) Foreign correspondent to Bonn, Jon-Hjalmar

---

<sup>5</sup> For more on the history of German refugees in Norway, see Lorenz, Einhart et al (red.): Ein sehr trübes Kapitel? Hitlerflüchtlinge im nordeuropäischen Exil 1933 bis 1950. Hamburg 1998, and Lorenz, Einhart: Exil in Norwegen. Lebensbedingungen und Arbeit deutschsprachiger Flüchtlinge 1933– 1943. Baden-Baden 1991.

<sup>6</sup> Brandt has described his relationship with Norway in several of his biographies, however this quote is from Brandt (1960): *Min vei til Berlin*. Oslo, Cappelen forlag. See also: Lorenz, Einhart (1989): *Willy Brandt i Norge. Eksilåra 1933-1940*. Oslo, Tiden Forlag

Smith describes Brandt as “crucial” for the détente in the Norwegian-German relationship, and explains his wording thusly:

This was not only due to his Norwegian past, but also his consistent attitude at a time when so many of his countrymen were actively or passively supporting the Nazi regime. As a Norwegian correspondent in Bonn I often tried to convince conservative German friends of Brandt’s importance for West German prestige abroad – but it seems I was not completely successful. (Smith 1990:161, translation mine)

Conservative Germans might have been unwilling to recognize Brandt’s importance, but from the Norwegian point of view it is unmistakable. As discussed in chapter 3, Norwegian distrust of all German state leaders up until Brandt was undeniable. Once Brandt came into power, though, he wasted little time in visiting Oslo again. This visit, which Lyng recalled in his memoir, was “like arriving in a whole new world.” (Frøland 2006:415) This friendly atmosphere extended to all branches of the governments it seems, as Frøland writes: “The talks between the two foreign ministers, Walter Scheel and Sverre Strøm, in 1970 were characterized by a trust and mutual cordiality that had not existed in the early 1960s.” (2006:516)

Brandt was not the only German to help improve the German-Norwegian relationship. Another public figure worth mentioning is author and founder of the German-Norwegian Association (Deutsch-Norwegische Gesellschaft) Max Tau. His importance is made clear in a letter to the foreign ministry in Bonn. Here, the German ambassador to Norway urges the Bundespräsident to follow the advice of Dr. Max Tau and holds a speech at the 10 year anniversary of German-Norwegian reconciliation in 1970. The ambassador clearly emphasizes the importance of Dr. Tau’s work to achieve a better relationship.

Dr Max Tau, who is held in the highest regard in Norway, has worked harder than anyone else for a German-Norwegian reconciliation since the war. As he himself was persecuted by the Nazi regime he has been successful in relaxing Norwegian mistrust in Germany. Further, he has managed to make several influential Norwegians who used to belong to the resistance movement and who have earlier been very reserved interested in German culture. (Dr. G Ritzel: Letter to das Auswärtige Amt regarding the forthcoming visit from the Bundespräsident to Oslo, 27.01.1970, PAAA B31/382, translation mine)

As described by the Ambassador, Dr. Tau himself had suffered at the hands of the Nazi regime, and fled to Norway in 1938. He spent the war years in Sweden but returned to

Norway in 1945, and went on to found the Norwegian-German society, and worked tirelessly to improve Norwegians' regard for German literature especially, but also to improve the German-Norwegian relationship in general. As such, he joins a group of highly influential Germans who sought refuge in Norway during the war and maintained ties after its end. Among these were also renowned psychiatrists Leo Eitinger and Bertold Grünfeld; painter Kurt Schwitters and expressionist Rolf Nesch. (Lorentz 2005:1)

The German exiles to Norway were in a unique position to help reconcile the two countries after the war ended. As previously discussed, general trust toward Germans was generally very low. With the likes of Willy Brandt and Max Tau however, Norwegians felt they could be trusted because they were victims of the National Socialism themselves, and because they had lived in Norway, had Norwegian friends, and spoke the language. This was, as discussed earlier, especially true regarding Willy Brandt. His importance to the shift in the Norwegian opinion of Germany is undeniable. Minister of Foreign Affairs John Lyng "(...) stated that Norway had felt a 'greater trust in West German policies after Willy Brandt, with his past and his record under the Nazi regime, became the German Minister of Foreign Affairs.'" (Frøland 2006:516)

According to Lorentz, their time spent in Norway until 1940 and Sweden after the war broke out was important to the German refugees and their future careers as well. He argues that their time spent in free societies with humanistic values influenced them and gave terms like freedom, justice and solidarity new meaning. Further, there can be little doubt that the small size of the Scandinavian countries offered the opportunity to get to know political and cultural leaders in a way that was not possible in larger countries. Many friendships were formed between people who would go on to hold powerful positions in their home countries. Thus, the Germans who were exiled in Norway and Sweden came back to Germany with a different kind of experience than other refugees, and a clear advantage especially compared to people who had been imprisoned, or who had to hide either in other countries or anonymity. (Lorentz 2005:1)

As discussed in chapter 3, Konrad Adenauer serves as a good example of someone who might have benefitted from exile in Scandinavia, as some would argue that he was held back by his time spent in solitude in the Ruhr area. He might have had more allies and friends and favored other policies, had he been exiled in Sweden instead. However, Adenauer also shows that

such experiences were not a necessity as he did serve as the FRG's Chancellor for an impressive 14 years and was and is extremely well respected. However, Lorentz argues that almost immediately following Adenauer's time in power, the Bundestag was to be dominated by politicians who had spent time in Norway and Sweden. (ibid)

With such positive experiences of their time spent in Scandinavia, it seems reasonable to assume that Willy Brandt and his fellow expats to Norway brought a higher regard for the country home with them. This, in turn, would possibly have contributed to a desire for reconciliation that perhaps was stronger than it might have been had they been in exile elsewhere. Whereas, as described in chapter 3, the early 1960s showed signs of diplomatic difficulties, once Brandt came to office he took charge and instructed the West German ambassador to "take active steps to eliminate" lingering Norwegian distrust. (Frøland 2006:516) It could be argued that friendly sentiments played a part in this commitment to the bettering of German-Norwegian relations.

Although Brandt and his government were not the first West German officials to attempt reconciliation, it seems clear that there was no big shift in political attitudes in Norway before Brandt's rise to power. A report from a visit from Justice Minister Josef Neuberger in 1968 sent to the Auswärtige Amt illustrates how important the new, friendlier atmosphere was to the cooperation between the two states, and also how this depended on similarities in values and opinion: The Norwegians were "eager" to show Minister Neuberger the Norwegian justice system and also to learn about the West German system from him. "Herr Minister Dr. Neuberger delivered a convincing report and awoke sympathy and understanding with his liberal and open ideas and attitudes. (...) All in all, the visit of Herr Minister Dr. Neuberger represents a victory for the German-Norwegian relationship." (Report regarding the visit of Justice Minister Dr. Dr. Neuberger to Oslo from the German Embassy to the Auswärtige Amt, 06.08.1968, PAAA B31/382, translation mine)

This new, friendly tone was to become the rule rather than the exception in diplomatic as well as economical and industrial dealings after the Cabinet of Willy Brandt came into office. Records from the Auswärtige Amt show that from the early 1970s on it was commonplace to praise the friendly atmosphere and the positive bilateral relationship, and friendships were formed. A telegram from Willy Brandt to Halvard Lange's wife Aase after her husband's

death illustrates how the ties between the two governments were not strictly professional, but in fact a result of actual respect and admiration:

Sehr verehrte, Liebe Frau Lange, the news of Halvard Lange's death has shaken me deeply. Halvard was through our years of working together a friend and an idol to me. We were connected through our shared ideas for the political futures of our countries and of Europe. (Willy Brandt in telegram to Aase Lange, date unknown, PAAA B31/383, translation mine)

Further friendships, such as the above mentioned one between Ministers Stray and Scheel, are also evident in documents from the time and can hardly have been a disadvantage to the process of making West Germany "one of Norway's closest allies." (Frøland 1999:183) Warm relationships, it seems, also formed the basis for the all-important Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol. It is, according to Frøland, an example of how a friendship characterized by trust helped foster the functional normalization between the two countries. Indeed, Ministers Gjerde and Friedrichs got along well not just when doing business but also in private, as is evident in this note from Friedrichs to Gjerde: "My wife and I are very much looking forward to seeing you and your wife again here in Germany. We remember with fondness our beautiful days together in Norway last August". (Hans Friedrichs in letter to Bjartmar Gjerde, 12.05.1977, PAAA 121.625 420/302, translation mine) Hans Friedrichs was not just a member of Brandt's government (although not an SPD member, Friedrichs belonged to the far smaller Freie Demokratische Partei), he was also born in 1931 and therefore too young to have been spoiled by Nazism. No doubt this helped increase the level of trust with the Norwegians.

#### **4.2.2 The "Neue Ostpolitik"**

The findings presented in chapter 4.2.1. clearly show that shared values have been particularly important to the bilateral relationship between Norway and the FRG. A clear example of this is the FRG's policy towards Eastern Europe: as discussed in chapter 3, Adenauer's policy of ignoring the eastern states made the Norwegian government uneasy. When Willy Brandt became Foreign Minister, he also expressed that he did not feel such a rigid attitude was the right way to go. When he became Chancellor a few years later, he wasted little time in launching his *Neue Ostpolitik*. He did this with "a dispatch born of years of observing the ups



and downs of Soviet-German relations.” (Merkl 1975:811) The *Neue Ostpolitik* was created by Brandt and his Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office, Egon Bahr.

Bahr had long been aware that the current policy was not working as it should, and as early as 1963 he held a speech that explained his vision for a new policy thusly:

The first conclusion to be drawn from applying this strategy for peace to Germany is that the policy of all-or-nothing must be ruled out. Either free elections or nothing, either all-German freedom of choice or an obstinate “no,” either elections as the first step or rejection – all this is not only hopelessly antiquated and unreal, but in a strategy of peace it is also meaningless. Today it is clear that reunification is not a one-time act that will be put into effect by a historic decision on an historic day at an historic conference, but rather a process involving many steps and many stations. If what Kennedy said is right, that the interests of the other side also need to be recognized and considered, then it is certainly impossible for the Soviet Union to let the Eastern Zone be snatched away from it for the purpose of strengthening the West's potential. The Zone must be transformed with the approval of the Soviets. (...) This is a policy that can be summarized by the formula: change through rapprochement. (Bahr, 15.07.1963)

Willy Brandt, having observed the many problems facing the relationship of the eastern and western parts of Germany, agreed with Bahr’s ideas and formulated a policy based on them. It is important to keep in mind that although there can be little doubt that Brandt was instrumental in this foreign policy change, he was able to make it solely due to his own cleverness. Times had changed, and the German people had had more than a decade by now to get used to a divided Germany. Brandt was not the first German politician to realize a change was needed. His predecessor, Gerhard Schröder<sup>7</sup>, also sought to reestablish a relationship with the Eastern states. Brandt therefore, according to Merkl, “merely undertook to complete under more favorable circumstances and in a more effective manner what Schroeder had attempted in vain.” (1975:804)

Regardless of the times and circumstances and their influence on it, this change in policy towards the East was important to the German-Norwegian relationship for two reasons. Firstly, such a dramatic change in policy was a risky move by Germany, as the world still feared a German “move towards the East” and thus was sure to be met by a certain level of

---

<sup>7</sup> This Gerhard Schröder was born in 1910 and a member of the CDU. He served as Foreign Minister for under Adenauer and should not be confused with Gerhard Schröder, the SPD leader who was born in 1944 and Chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005.

resistance and criticism. Hence, Willy Brandt and his government were in need of supporters. Norway was an obvious candidate here, as they had already made their sympathies for the “change through rapprochement”-idea clear.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* meant that Norwegian trust in the FRG increased. It “satisfied Norwegian ideas about bridge-building and détente that transcended party boundaries” (Frøland 2006:516) In a meeting between Foreign Ministers Walter Scheel and Svenn Stray in 1970, Stray made a point out of recognizing the FRG’s efforts to work in a multinational framework when dealing with Eastern Europe, praising a recently signed treaty between the FRG and the USSR which focused mainly on the FRG’s willingness to accept current national borders and not to attempt in any way to change them – a treaty the Norwegian government felt confident would lead to improved relations with Eastern Europe and, most importantly: “Foreign Minister Scheel expressed Norway’s complete support (from both the government and the opposition) for Germany’s *Ostpolitik*. (...)Norway believes that Germany’s new approach will lead to a general relaxation of tensions within Europe.” (Report about meeting between Foreign Ministers Stray and Scheel 10.09.1970, PAAA B31/382, translation mine)

According to Frøland, this meeting was far friendlier than any meeting in the 1960s. (2006:516) It is likely that the mutual trust and respect exhibited was not just a result of good personal chemistry, but that it was just as much due to the fact that the two ministers could agree on such an important issue. The change in German policy towards the Eastern bloc thus helped better their relationship with Norway and became, like the reparations question, an issue which was cleared out of the way and made reconciliation possible.

#### **4.2.3 The European Community and EFTA**

Norway and the FRG might have been in close to complete agreement with regards to the *Ostpolitik*, but in the case of European integration the situation was more complicated. Whereas the German idea might have been to create peace through cooperation and unity, Frøland argues that fear of missing out on the growth in the West German market was one of the main motives behind the Norwegian applications for European Community (EC) membership during the 1960s. (2006:504-505) This fear, combined with the vigorous

following of the British example, shows how economic considerations clearly influenced Norwegian policies at the time. As trade with the FRG grew, so did the political motivation to work with the Germans to achieve Norwegian membership in the European integration process. According to Tamnes, the FRG was to gradually become Norway's foremost European ally from 1965 onwards, especially after the German government change from the Christian Democrats of Adenauer to the coalition government of Kiesinger and social democrat government of Brandt. (Frøland 1999:185)

This argument is supported by the fact that from about the mid-1960s and onward it is clear from documents and reports from bilateral talks between Norway and the FRG that the question of Norwegian membership in the EC is among the most talked about subjects. The closer the two countries grew, the more important the question it became. In 1979, the German embassy noted that "Norwegian interest in an intensified dialogue with the EC has grown since the enlargement. [This] correlates with a wish to expand their economic and technological cooperation with us." (note concerning the state visit of Willy Brandt to Oslo, 12.07.1979., author unknown, PAAA 121.624 420-300, translation mine) This clearly indicates economic motives as having a strong influence on the bilateral relationship.

The strong Norwegian interest in the EC was not one-sided. According to the archives, the Germans consistently express a wish that Norway will find a way to overcome the issues they may have with the European Community, and they also promise to help find solutions to the problems Norway had. It was these problems that complicated matters. Although the Norwegian government saw the value of EC membership, it was a particularly difficult political topic domestically with opposition among both the government and the public.<sup>8</sup> Willy Brandt was an especially eager campaigner of Norwegian membership and threw himself into the battle. Brandt's involvement was of symbolic value. As Lorentz writes:

---

<sup>8</sup> Norway struggled not only with the loss of sovereignty, but also with the fish- and agricultural sectors, which were unlikely to survive in the liberal European market. These issues meant that parts of the Norwegian public was strongly opposed to membership in the EC, and on the two occasions the issue has been put to a vote, the referenda are notorious for having caused fights and for splitting families.

No matter how you personally felt about the question of Norwegian membership in the EC, it was impossible to ignore the significance of former NN prisoner Trygve Bratteli and the returned immigrant Willy Brandt, both chiefs of governments in their respective countries, on the same stage at Youngstorget in Oslo in 1972, proclaiming their vision of a peaceful Europe. (Lorentz 2005:1, translation mine)

What prompted this German eagerness to include Norway? Firstly, there is the peace perspective. West Germany did, as is widely known, see a united Western Europe as a necessity in order to procure peace and protect the western democracies against the Soviet Union as well as internal conflict. For this to be a possibility, every Western European country should be a member. Secondly, the FRG's leadership was very conscious of the so-called "German problem", and realized that the European Community was a useful tool to generate trust towards the German democracy. Only when the trust of the international community was regained could one possibly hope for German reunification.

Thirdly, there is the market and trade argument. As has been detailed in chapter 3, West Germany and Norway were old trade partners, and a Norwegian membership in the EC would no doubt help simplify the business aspect of the relationship. What both of these arguments have in common is that they represent the initial intention of the EC: to slowly work towards becoming a Federation of Europe, in which war was impossible. From the very beginning, it was made clear that the European Community should and must be "open to the participation of the other countries of Europe." (Schuman 1950)

When answering a question from the SPD about how the German government regarded the possible accession of the UK, Denmark and Norway into the EC in 1966, Chancellor Kiesinger made it clear that he

and the German government have no doubts that the three European communities are the economic foundation of the efforts to further unite Europe. Germany has and will continue to support the unification of Europe. (...)Germany is consistently in favor of the entrance of "third countries", (...)The best way to a comprehensive economic union within Europe is participation of "third countries" with the EEC through entrance, association or special agreements. (...) Germany believes that an expansion of the EEC is vital to creating a comprehensive European community. (Suggested answer to question posed by the SPD, author unknown, 14.09.1966, PAAA B21/728, translation mine)

The German government did, in other words, see it as crucial to the development of the European Community that Western European countries joined. It is also interesting to note that Kiesinger expresses openness to association and to special agreements, which is what Norway ended up with. Even though Norway remained on the outside, the relationship with Germany grew stronger throughout the 1970s, and the FRG was soon to be described as Norway's closest ally. Kleppe explains this shift thusly: "The bilateral relationship remains strong (...) In addition to all the economic, cultural, political and human bonds that tie the Federal Republic and Norway together, we also have common interests regarding Western Europe's relations with the rest of the world. (Kleppe 1990:247, translation mine)

### **4.3 Shared values, friendship and trade**

From the time Willy Brandt and his government won the election in the FRG, the Norwegian-German relationship has consisted of several factors which did not previously exist. First of all, as the entire body of literature on the subject agrees, Willy Brandt brought an enormous change to the political atmosphere. This was first of all because of his personal relationship with Norway and the respect and trust from the Norwegian government that he enjoyed. Brandt thus serves as a clear example of how one single person can strongly influence the political atmosphere and bilateral relations.

It is too simplistic, however, to credit Brandt alone with the positive development considered in this chapter. As discussed, several other members of government as well as Germans in Norway such as Max Tau contributed substantially. There can be little doubt that the friendliness that existed between several of the ministers of government in the 1970s especially contributed to an atmosphere in which cooperation was easier. Evidently, shared values have been of the utmost importance, as the report from Herr Neuberger's visit to shows. Here, it is made clear that the fact that the German minister and the Norwegian delegation could discuss common values made Herr Neuberger seem much more sympathetic to the Norwegians, and the visit became a good foundation to build on. Brandt's importance is by no means disputed by this thesis, but it is nevertheless important to keep in mind that several other personalities contributed, too.

Furthermore, the FRG and Norway lead increasingly like-minded foreign policies after the German government change. Firstly, Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* received widespread support in Norway, and secondly, the Norwegian government showed more interest in the EC and focused to a greater extent on Europe than on Great Britain. As discussed, the British had been Norway's greatest ally for many decades, but after 1965 scholars such as Tamnes would argue that West Germany took over this position.

Additionally, trade and economic as well as technical and industrial cooperation must be said to have expanded greatly towards the end of the 1960s. Consequently, Norway and West Germany developed stronger interests in and dependency on each other. There can be little doubt that Norway relied on West Germany as a market to a much greater extent than the FRG relied on Norway. However, as previously discussed, Norway had certain advantages as an EFTA member with access to resources the FRG needed. Norwegian oil and gas especially made a huge impact on the trade relationship, and as the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol shows, motivated closer cooperation between the two countries.

## **5 The reconciliation of Norway and West Germany 1950-80**

The aim of this thesis has been to analyze the Norwegian-German relationship from 1950 to 1980, to identify which factors contributed to the development of it and to place these findings within the existing literature. The two main chapters, 3 and 4, have discussed the periods 1950-65 and 1965-80 respectively. This division has happened naturally, as the late 1960s is when the German-Norwegian relationship first underwent a substantial change.

As mentioned, when one examines the post- World War II decades, it becomes clear that there are certain elements which are lacking in 1950-65, but that exist in 1965-80. This makes them easier to identify. These elements, or factors, can be split into two main groups: economic and political factors. This chapter summarizes and furthers the analysis of these factors. It also places the findings within the existing literature.

### **5.1 Economic factors**

The economic relationship between Norway and the FRG is one which is both complex and far-reaching. It is interesting how much of Norwegian industry exists at least partly because of German influence, be it before, during or after the war. At the same time, Norwegian products such as aluminum and coal have been indispensable to the German industry. The economic factors that have influenced the German-Norwegian relationship in the years 1950-1980 are either related to trade, industrial cooperation, or people.

#### **5.1.1 Trade**

Trade is the economic factor which is the easiest to measure with numbers, as it concerns import and export. The general tendencies of the German-Norwegian trade relationship is that Norway needed the FRG as an export market in order to acquire the capital that was needed to not only keep Norwegian industry alive, but to expand it. The FRG, on the other hand, suffered under a lack of access to affordable energy and found a favorable supplier of important commodities such as aluminum in Norway. Norwegians also imported a number of

goods from West Germany, but this was less out of necessity for both countries. All in all, however, there seems to have been a certain level of mutual dependency in the German-Norwegian trade relationship which is typically not discussed in any of the literature on the subject.

Findings presented in this thesis support this argument. For instance, the report on Spitsbergen coal, which is discussed in chapter 3, shows how the FRG put emphasis on maintaining the "traditional trade relationship" with Norway. In addition, cases such as that of the weapons industry cooperation show that the FRG would initiate meetings and business agreements. The proactivity shown by Bonn in these instances could be seen as an indication that Norway perhaps was more important to the FRG than - the literature suggests. Here, the situation is portrayed to be one in which Norway was the only reliant party.

That is not to say that Norway did not need the FRG. It is clear that the Norwegian economic policy in many instances based itself on the West German market, as in the case of the aluminum smelting program which is mentioned in chapter 3. It is however important to keep in mind that in the 1950s and early 1960s, Great Britain was the most important partner to Norway. Thus, one could argue that the economic factors which could help motivate and drive a reconciliation process were less pronounced in the earliest post war years than they were later.

All in all, however, trade relations undoubtedly influenced the political relationship, as both countries saw it as beneficial to trade that their negotiations ran smoothly. In the post-World War II atmosphere, however, this was at times difficult, and politics would at times hinder trade. In spite of these difficulties, trade has been perhaps the most constant factor in the Norwegian-German relationship, and one which clearly motivated the governments of both countries to make attempts at reconciliation. It is interesting to see how both sides seem to have actively used the concept of "relationship" when communicating with each other, almost using it as a bargaining chip. This is a clear indicator of the importance of a well functioning political relationship to a trade relationship



### **5.1.2 Industrial cooperation**

As mentioned, German and Norwegian industry is tied together in a number of ways. The shipping industry, as discussed in chapter 3, is a prime example of this: Norwegian ships were built in Germany and then helped export German cars. In the 1950s and early 1960s there are some examples of such cooperation. The Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol, however, is the first coordinated attempt at such cooperation in several industrial and technical areas. It is made clear that exchange of ideas and knowledge as well as cooperation on different projects benefit both countries. Both Norway and the FRG aimed to expand their industry in order to boost their economies, and cooperation no doubt helped achieve those goals.

The industrial cooperation factor is, as mentioned, one which is definitely more pronounced in the years after 1965. The reason for this is fairly obvious. Cooperation is difficult to achieve if communication between the parties involved is poor. Thus, it was of significant importance to the industrial cooperation between Norway and West Germany that the political atmosphere improved. On the other hand, it is also possible that those common projects and the exchange of knowledge and ideas that already existed helped improve communication and trust between the peoples of Norway and the FRG and thus contributed to the positive development of the relationship.

### **5.1.3 Exchange of people**

Knowledge and ideas were not only spread through cooperation within the industrial sector, it has also happened through the exchange of people, namely students. Although less popular after the war than before, Norwegian students received an education at German universities and brought the capital of knowledge home with them, and to some extent vice versa, as well. It is difficult to measure the economic advantages to this, but it seems safe to assume such an exchange has been beneficial both economically and politically. Economically because well educated people typically contribute positively to a country's economy, and politically because the exchange of people no doubt helped reconcile the German and Norwegian people to each other.

Another aspect of the exchange of people between Norway and the FRG is tourism. Here, the establishment of the Kiel ferry must be mentioned as a factor which has greatly improved the possibility of travel between Norway and Germany. Tourists have since traveled back and forth between the two, spending money in both countries and thus contributed to the economy.

The literature on Norwegian-German economic relations is sparse and is mostly focused on how Norway depended on West Germany. There is no denying this fact. However, the evidence analyzed in this thesis shows that the situation was more complex than the existing literature would suggest. I would argue that a certain level of mutual dependency has always existed. Furthermore, it is clear that the difficult political situation troubled both Bonn and Oslo early on because of the way this influenced trade negatively. It is therefore clear that economic factors have had a strong influence on politics, and vice versa.

## **5.2 Political factors**

Whereas the economic relationship between Norway and the FRG has had a fairly steady positive development throughout, with few abrupt interruptions, the political relationship has had a clear "before" and "after". There can be little doubt that the factor which has played the

most important part in the reconciliation process is Willy Brandt. However, this thesis argues that there are several other factors to take into account.

### **5.2.1 Foreign policy: Western Europe**

The Cold War clearly brought with it a new set of conditions that both Norway and the FRG had to deal with, and NATO acted as a common ground for this. In spite of the common enemy, however, Norway and the FRG led by Konrad Adenauer did not have an abundance of coinciding interests politically. Firstly, Adenauer focused almost solely on the European integration project. Norway, on the other hand, showed little interest, as Great Britain remained unwilling to engage in the 1950s. When Norway did apply for membership in the 1960s, it was mostly to follow the British lead. In the beginning, the Norwegian attitude was that the European integration project did not really concern Norway that much. Rather, it was seen as at least a partially good solution to “the German Problem”.

This attitude changed with time, however, and even though it was domestically difficult the Norwegian government increased their interest in EC membership. One cannot credit Willy Brandt with this development, but rather the British and their change in attitude. Furthermore, it became more and more evident to the Norwegian leadership that it would make economic sense to take part. Here, West Germany was a part of the motivation. Norway feared they would miss out.

As a result of this change in Norwegian attitudes, Norway and the FRG now shared more of a common goal, and as previously discussed Bonn showed an active interest in Norway’s relationship with the EC. Brandt himself took active part in the discussion in Norway, and the issue was a recurring topic in bilateral talks between the two nations.

### **5.2.2 Foreign policy: Eastern Europe**

Even though the Norwegian government took time to get on board with the European integration process the idea was always received with a positive attitude. The same cannot be said for Adenauer’s policy towards Eastern Europe. After initial agreement, Oslo grew increasingly frustrated with Adenauer’s rigidity. Although Norway never officially broke

with the Hallstein Doctrine, it was widely disliked and it was clear that a different approach would be preferable to the Norwegian government. An important political factor was thus missing from the Norwegian-German relationship in the 1950s and 60s: the two countries did not agree on foreign policy. This naturally did not help in the reconciliation process.

As discussed in chapter 4, however, this changed with Willy Brandt's *Neue Ostpolitik*. His "change through rapprochement" –idea coincided with Norwegian values and ideas and helped him gain trust and respect. In turn, Brandt won an ally that already had a tradition for dialogue with the Eastern bloc. As discussed, Adenauer too had seen the value of this. The difference between the two was, however, that Brandt and his government shared certain values and ideas with the Norwegian government that Adenauer's administration did not. Evidence discussed in this thesis show that such common values have played an important role in the development of the Norwegian-German relationship.

### **5.2.3 The personal dimension**

The foreign policies which helped reconcile Norway and Germany were shaped by people in government who not only shared a certain outlook, but who also were friendly with each other. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the personal dimension has played a significant role in the development of the German-Norwegian relationship. In the years up until 1966, few such friendly relations existed. There is every reason to believe that this had a negative impact on the bilateral relationship, especially when one compares the Norwegian government's relationship with the Adenauer government's relationship to Brandt's.

This thesis has discussed several people who have had a particularly strong influence on the German-Norwegian government. This is nothing new. On his 23 trips to Norway, Kaiser Wilhelm II acquired such a taste for the country that he decided to help rebuild Ålesund after the great fire of 1904. Thus, the Kaiser becomes a perfect example of how important personal relationships between both countries and people can be. There are several examples of this in more recent shared German-Norwegian history. Thanks to their years in Norway, German refugees such as Willy Brandt and Max Tau gained both a liking for the country, beneficial experiences and close friendships, as did several other state officials in the 1970s especially. The telegrams quoted in chapter 4 clearly show how close some of these friendships were.

When reading the correspondence between Hans Friedrichs and Bjartmar Gjerde, for example, it seems fair to assume that their friendly tone must have helped shape the Gjerde-Friedrichs protocol that has had such an impact on German-Norwegian economic cooperation. One can thus argue that personalities and friendships have been an instrumental part of the reconciliation between Norway and the FRG. This factor is particularly interesting because it is less rational and a lot more private than the other factors discussed in this thesis. Therefore, it is also a lot harder to make specific conclusions about. It does, however, seem reasonable to at the very least assume that the close personal relationships policy makers on both sides had with each other, as well as a mutual understanding and appreciation for the others' culture and countries, have contributed to a smoother cooperation in all policy areas.

As stated in the introduction, the focus of this thesis has been primarily on state actors. For a researcher with more time and resources, it would no doubt be interesting to explore further what influence private actors have had on the German-Norwegian relationship. Surely, many private companies must have had strong interests in both markets as well as resources and connections which would make it possible to influence the governments.

## **6 Sources**

### **6.1 Archival resources**

#### **6.1.1 Koblenz Endarchiv:**

B 102/263946 Report on negotiations with Norway regarding trade protocols, Dr. Volpp, 21.09.1961

B 102/26394 Protocol of trade negotiations with Norway, Berlin 14.05.1958, author unknown

B102/288016 Report regarding cooperation between some German and Norwegian entrepreneurs, Ministry for Economy, 09.1978

B102/288016 Memorandum on possible copper trade with Norway, Elkem 06.02.1979

#### **6.1.2 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin:**

PAAA 121.624 420/300 note concerning the state visit of Willy Brandt to Oslo, 12.07.1979..  
author unknown

PAAA 121.625 420/302 Thulin and Rohwedder in report to Gjerde and Friedrichs, 06.06.1977

PAAA 121.627 420/303 Letter from H.D. Genscher to H.G. Sohl, 11.01.1977

PAAA 121.627 420/303 Dr. Philipp in report to Bonn regarding Norwegian-German industry cooperation, 12.01.1979

PAAA 121.625 420/302 Dr. Streitt: Report on the meeting between Hans Friedrichs and Bjartmar Gjerde in Bonn, 06.06.1977, 15.06.1977

PAAA 121.625 420/302 Hans Friedrichs in letter to Bjartmar Gjerde, 12.05.1977

PAAA B21/728 Suggested answer to question posed by the SPD, 14.09.1966, author unknown

PAAA B31/382 Dr. G Ritzel: Letter to das Auswärtige Amt regarding the forthcoming visit from the Bundespräsident to Oslo, 27.01.1970

PAAA B31/382 Report regarding the visit of Justice Minister Dr. Dr. Neuberger to Oslo from the German Embassy to the Auswärtige Amt, 06.08.1968

PAAA B31/382: Report regarding the visit of Justice Minister Dr. Dr. Neuberger to Oslo from the German Embassy to the Auswärtige Amt, 06.08.1968

PAAA B31/382 Report about meeting between Foreign Ministers Stray and Scheel 10.09.1970

PAAA B31/383 Willy Brandt in telegram to Aase Lange, date unknown

## 6.2 Bibliography

Abelshauer, W. (2004): *Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945*. München, C. H. Beck Verlag

Adenauer, K. (1962): The German Problem, a World Problem, *Foreign Affairs*. [Internet], from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23447/konrad-adenauer/the-german-problem-a-world-problem> [Accessed 24.03.2015.]

Allers, R. M. (2009) *Besondere Beziehungen. Deutschland, Norwegen und Europa in der Ära Brandt (1966-1974)*, Bonn.

Bakke, A. C. (2011): *Med fremtid i blikket: Oslo-Kiel 50 år*, Color Line, [Internet], from <http://newsroom.colorline.no/2011/05/med-fremtid-i-blikket-oslo-kiel-50-ar/#more-1198> , [Accessed 01.03.2015]

Bahr, E. (15.07.1963): Wandel durch Annäherung, *speech delivered at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing*; from: [http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub\\_document.cfm?document\\_id=81](http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=81) [accessed 25.03.2015]

Banchoff, T. (1997) German policy towards the European union: The effects of historical memory, *German Politics*, 6(1), 60-76

Banchoff, T. (1999): German Identity and European Integration, *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(3), 259-289

Berger, J. (1984): Gen. Hans Speidel, Who Plotted to Kill Hitler, *the New York Times*, 29.11.1984[Internet] from: <http://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/29/obituaries/gen-hans-speidel-who-plotted-to-kill-hitler.html> [Accessed 30.01.2015]

Bohn, R., Elvert, J., & Lammers, K. C. (2000): *Deutsch-skandinavische Beziehungen nach 1945*, Leipzig: Franz Steiner Verlag

Bratteli, T. (1967): *Speech held at stortingsforhandlinger* , 13.10.1967, [Internet], from: [https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Stortingsforhandlinger/Lesevisning/?p=1967-68&paid=7&wid=a&psid=DIVL974&pgid=a\\_0204&vt=a&did=DIVL980](https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Stortingsforhandlinger/Lesevisning/?p=1967-68&paid=7&wid=a&psid=DIVL974&pgid=a_0204&vt=a&did=DIVL980) [Accessed 27.04.2015]

Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (2009) *Energy Resources Germany*, [Internet], from: [http://www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Energie/Downloads/Energierohstoffe\\_2009\\_Teil3\\_en.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=2](http://www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Energie/Downloads/Energierohstoffe_2009_Teil3_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2) [Accessed 13.04.2015]



Burchard, R. (2006): The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany, *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 4(2006), 800-829

Bækkelund, K (1990) Vi Hører Sammen, in Moscovici, M.A. (ed.) *1949-1989: Norsk-tyske forbindelser 40 år*. Oslo, Selskapet. 223-237

Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. (2005): *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, Inc.

Deuse, K. (2014) "Just how important is Russian gas to Europe?", *Deutsche Welle* 17.04.2014, [Internet], from: <http://www.dw.de/just-how-important-is-russian-gas-for-europe/a-17574004>, [Accessed 16.02.2015]

Dinan, D. (2004) *Europe Recast- A History of European Union*, New York, Lynne Rienner Pub

Elkins, T. H. (23.03.2015): Germany. The Era of Partition. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, [Internet], from: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/231186/Germany/58213/The-era-of-partition> , [Accessed 13.04.2015]

European Central Bank (10.02.2015): *Exchange rates – Norwegian Krone* [Internet], European Central Bank, from: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/eurofxref-graph-nok.en.html> [Accessed 11.02.2015]

Feldman, L. G.(1999): The principle and practice of 'reconciliation' in German foreign policy: relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic, *International Affairs*, 75 (2), 333-356

Frøland, H. O. (1999): Tysk-norske forbindelser etter 1945 in Simensen, Jarle (ed.) *Tyskland-Norge: Den Lange Historien*. Oslo, Tono Aschehoug

Frøland, H.O. (2005): *Tyskernes erstatning til norske borgere*, [Internet], Tysklands ambassade Oslo, from:

[http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2768334/Daten/856875/49\\_DownloadDatei.pdf](http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2768334/Daten/856875/49_DownloadDatei.pdf)

[Accessed 10.01.2015]

Frøland, H.O. (2006): Distrust, Dependency and Détente: Norway, the Two Germanys and 'the German Question', 1945-1973, *Contemporary European History*, 15 (4), 495-517

Frøland, H.O.(19.12.2014): *Von Mistrauen (bis) zur zuverlässigen Interessengemeinschaft. Eine Kontextualisierung der norwegischen Freundschaftspflege mit dem vereinten Deutschland* [Internet], Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, from:

<http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/zeitgeschichte/deutschlandarchiv/197834/eine-kontextualisierung-der-norwegischen-freundschaftspflege-mit-dem-vereinten-deutschland>,

[Accessed 01.02.2015]

Fulbrook, M. (2004): *A Concise History of Germany*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Golder, P.N. (2000): Historical Method in Marketing Research with New Evidence on Long-Term Market Share Stability, *Journal of Marketing Research*, Vol. XXXVII (May 2000), 156–172

Hannemann, M (2005): *Et tilbakeblikk mot framtiden: Om de politiske forbindelsene mellom Tyskland og Norge* [Internet], Tysklands ambassade Oslo, from:

[http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2767504/Daten/856690/21\\_DownloadDatei.pdf](http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2767504/Daten/856690/21_DownloadDatei.pdf)

[Accessed 20.04.2015]

Hellmann, G. (1996): Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany, *Mershon International Studies Review*, 4(1), 1-39

Henningsen, B. (ed.) (2005): *Norsk-tyske forbindelser gjennom hundre år. Ikke bare laks og pølser*. Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag GmbH

Herf, J. (1997): *Divided Memory, The Nazi Past in the two Germanys*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press

Hoppenstedt, W. (2005): *Willy Brandt: Utenriksminister og forbundskansler*, [Internet], Tysklands ambassade Oslo, from:

[http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2767522/Daten/856691/27\\_DownloadDatei.pdf](http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2767522/Daten/856691/27_DownloadDatei.pdf)

[Accessed 10.01.2015]

Jervell, S. (2005): Bonn og Berlin: Ambassadehistorie, in Henningsen, B. (ed.) (2005): *Norsk-tyske forbindelser gjennom hundre år. Ikke bare laks og pølser*. Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag GmbH

Karlsen, A. (2005): *Aluminium fra Norge: Råstoff til Tyskland*, [Internet], Tysklands ambassade Oslo, from:

[http://m.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2760450/Daten/856399/15\\_DownloadDatei.pdf](http://m.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2760450/Daten/856399/15_DownloadDatei.pdf) [Accessed

20.04.2015]

Karstedt, S. (2008): The Nuremberg Tribunal and German Society: International Justice and Local Judgement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, in Blumenthal, D.A., and McCormack, T.L.H (eds.): *The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutional Vengeance?*, Leiden, Boston 13-32

Karstedt, S. (2009): The Life Course of Collective Memories: Persistency and Change in West Germany between 1950 and 1970, *Polish Sociological Review*, 1(165) 27-38

Kleppe, P. (1990): Partnere i Europa. Norge, Tyskland, Europa, In: Moscovici, M.A. (ed.) *1949-1989: Norsk-tyske forbindelser 40 år*. Oslo, Selskapet. p. 237-247

Königlich Norwegische Botschaft (04.02.2014): *Samhandelen mellom Norge og Tyskland*, [Internet] Norwegen.no, from: <http://www.norwegen.no/Norsk/Okonomi-og-naringsliv/Samhandelen-mellom-Norge-og-Tyskland/#.VIM1hWSG-Fd> [Accessed

14.01.2015]

Lange, H. (1952): *Norsk utenrikspolitikk siden 1945: foredrag og debattinnlegg*, Oslo, J.G. Tanum

Liesen, K. (1990): Partherschaft mit Zukunft. I: Moscovici, M.A. (ed.) *1949-1989: Norsk-tyske forbindelser 40 år*. Oslo, Selskapet. p.276-291

Lohne, L. (2015) Mehr Deutsch, bitte. *Dagens Næringsliv*, 16.04.2015, [Internet], from: <http://www.dn.no/talent/2015/04/16/2152/Utdannelse/mehr-deutsch-bitte>, [Accessed 20.04.2015]

Lorenz. E. (2005): *Norge som eksilland* [Internet], Tysklands ambassade Oslo, from [http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2768330/Daten/856873/47\\_DownloadDatei.pdf](http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2768330/Daten/856873/47_DownloadDatei.pdf) [Accessed 16.02.2015]

Merkel, P. H. (1975): The German Janus: From Westpolitik to Ostpolitik, *Political Science Quarterly*, 1974-1975 89(4), Winter, 803-824

Moscovici, M.A: (ed.) (1990): *Deutsch-Norwegische Beziehungen 1949-1989*, Norsk-tysk selskap, Oslo

Myrli, S. (2013): Norges mest kjente politiske flyktning, *Dagbladet* 18.12.2013 [Internet], from <http://www.dagbladet.no/2013/12/18/kultur/meninger/hovedkronikk/debatt/politikk/30902714/> [Accessed 16.02.2015]

Nerheim, G. (2005): *Transfer og transformasjon* [Internet], Tysklands ambassade Oslo, from: [http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2753828/Daten/856423/11\\_DownloadDatei.pdf](http://www.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2753828/Daten/856423/11_DownloadDatei.pdf) [Accessed 16.02.2015]

Pohl, H. (2001): *Die Rheinischen Sparkassen: Entwicklung und Bedeutung für Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft von den Anfang bis 1990*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag

Ramskjær, L. (2005): *Tankskip, torpedoer, tonnasje: Tysk-norske skipsfartsforbindelser*, [Internet], Tysklands ambassade Oslo, from:

[http://m.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2760464/Daten/856427/17\\_DownloadDatei.pdf](http://m.oslo.diplo.de/contentblob/2760464/Daten/856427/17_DownloadDatei.pdf) [Accessed 01.03.2015]

Riste, O (2001), *Norway's Foreign Relations: A History*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget

Røhne, N. A. (1989): De Første Skritt Inn I Europa. Norsk Europa-politikk fra 1950. *Forsvarsstudier*, 5(1989). 5-111

Schuman, R. (1950): *Declaration of 9 May 1950*, [Internet] European Union, from [http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm), [Accessed 14.02.2015]

Silvia, S.J. (2013): *Holding the shop together: German industrial relations in the postwar era*, New York, Cornell University Press

Simensen, J. (ed.) (1999) *Tyskland- Norge: Den Lange Historien*. Oslo, Tono Aschehoug

Smith, J-H. (1990): Korrespondent i Bonn, in Moscovici, M.A. (ed.) *1949-1989: Norsk-tyske forbindelser 40 år*. Oslo, Selskapet. 159-175

SSB (2001): *Månedstatistikk for utenrikshandelen 1913-2001*. [Internet] SSB, from: <http://www.ssb.no/a/histstat/mu/> [Accessed 01.02.2015]

SSB (2005): *Svalbard. Kulldriften 1907-2005*. [Internet] SSB, from: <http://www.ssb.no/a/histstat/svalbard/tab2.html> [Accessed 02.05.2015]

SSB (2014): *Utenrikshandel. Tabell 18.11*. [Internet] SSB, from: <http://www.ssb.no/a/histstat/tabeller/18-18-11.txt> [Accessed 01.02.2015]

Statistisches Bundesamt (2013): *Gesamtentwicklung des deutschen Außenhandels ab 1950*, [Internet], Statistisches Bundesamt, from <https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/Aussenhandel/Gesamtentwicklung/Tabellen/GesamtentwicklungAussenhandel.html>, [Accessed 01.02.2015]

Statistisches Bundesamt (2014): *Außenhandel*, [Internet], Statistisches Bundesamt, from: <https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Indikatoren/LangeReihen/Aussenhandel/Irahl01.html> [Accessed 25.02.2015]

Statistisches Bundesamt (2015): *Im Fokus: 43 % des Stroms aus Braun- und Steinkohle in 2014*, [Internet], Statistisches Bundesamt, from: [https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Wirtschaftsbereiche/Energie/Energie.html#Tabelle\\_n](https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Wirtschaftsbereiche/Energie/Energie.html#Tabelle_n) [Accessed 09.04.2015]

Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1961) *Internationale Übersichten: Großhandelpreise Wichtige Waren*, [Internet], DigiZeitschriften, from: [http://www.digiZeitschriften.de/dms/img/?PPN=PPN514402342\\_1960&DMDID=dmdlog137&LOGID=log137&PHYSID=phys748#navi](http://www.digiZeitschriften.de/dms/img/?PPN=PPN514402342_1960&DMDID=dmdlog137&LOGID=log137&PHYSID=phys748#navi) [Accessed 02.05.2015]

Tysklands ambassade Oslo (2005) *Norsk-tyske forbindelser gjennom hundre år- et bilateralt prosjekt*, [Internet], Tysklands ambassade Oslo, from: [http://www.oslo.diplo.de/Vertretung/oslo/no/01/Tidsakse/Zeitleiste\\_Unterbereich.html](http://www.oslo.diplo.de/Vertretung/oslo/no/01/Tidsakse/Zeitleiste_Unterbereich.html) [Accessed 10.01.2015]

Tysklands ambassade Oslo (2008) *Tysklands ambassade - 50 år i Oscars gate 45* [Internet], Tysklands ambassade Oslo, from: [http://www.oslo.diplo.de/Vertretung/oslo/no/02/Jubileum/Jubileum\\_Seite.html](http://www.oslo.diplo.de/Vertretung/oslo/no/02/Jubileum/Jubileum_Seite.html) [Accessed 10.03.2015]

Vitols, S. (2005), *Globalization and the Transformation of the German Model*, In: R. Stubbs and G. Underhill, eds., *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*. 3rd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. [Internet], Available from: [http://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/u13/vitols05\\_german\\_model.pdf](http://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/u13/vitols05_german_model.pdf) [Accessed 15.04.2015]

Williams, C.(2000): *Adenauer: the Father of the New Germany*, Great Britain, Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Wright, Q. (1947): *The Law of the Nuremberg Trial*, *The American Journal of International Law*, 41(1), 38-72

