Jingyi Dong

A Study of Rural Students in the Higher Education System in China in Relation to Their Context

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my father Jieren Dong

Preface

Education was granted great importance in traditional Chinese society. At times of drastic social change, Chinese idealists tended to appeal to school education. From the time of Confucius (551-479 B.C.) to Y. C. James Yen (1890-1990), hope for society was based on education as a means of reforming society. Likewise, in a traditional agricultural country they were deeply concerned about peasants, with the hope that upgrading the substructure of society through education could lead to social equality. However, the massification of higher education that is taking place in China seems to have achieved something else that is far removed from this goal, as inequality in education has become an increasing marked trend in this country, which may consequently entrench class differences. The prospect of the peasants upgrading themselves through education appears to be poor.

I became a university student as soon as the Chinese higher education system was restored to normal student recruitment after the Cultural Revolution. Later I worked as a university teacher for sixteen years, having witnessed the period when Chinese higher education shifted from being an elite system to being an institution for the masses. I am, so to speak, a witness to the history of the Chinese higher education system over a period of more than thirty years. Because of my personal experience, as well as my interest when I was pursuing Master's and Doctoral degrees, my research has been focused on the process of massification in Chinese higher education. I especially examine the rural students as a disadvantaged group on the university and college campuses. This study examines how the current Chinese higher education institutions give rise to inequality. This is a theme that has been widely discussed in China, but the main targets, the rural students, are far from being well studied as the focus of scientific research.

I intended to tell the story about the rural students, but found it difficult to make it comprehensible unless I told the story of their parents, as well as the story of their universities and colleges, and ultimately pointed to the power of the state that has largely defined these three stories. This leads to some specificities in my research "journey": as the study into rural students delved deeper, the research has been extended in scope out of necessity, and has eventually involved three different social categories, i.e. the rural students, peasants and university intellectuals. The continuity of my journey through the different fields points to the inherent relation between these topics, which may be interconnected through an integrated theoretical framework and a shared theme: the relationship between the state, society and the university.

Although my research started on the rural students, the story I am telling here starts from the very beginning, i.e. from their rural homes, and then their universities and colleges. Therefore, the first step is to present the process when the state established a rural-urban segregation system and gradually deprived the peasants of their basic rights. The aim is to uncover the root cause of the plight that the Chinese peasants and their children have suffered. Next is the analysis of the restructuring of the Chinese higher education system which was more or less synchronous with the process that rendered the peasants powerless. The intention is to reveal how the intrusion of state power has changed the nature of Chinese higher education. After having first informed about the background, I commence the story of the rural students. China is currently long overdue for a comprehensive reform. In Chinese society, the community of intellectuals and peasants undoubtedly represent two highly important variables. As the rural students relate to both communities, they may be a critical factor for the future of the country, and it is this that makes the focus of this study, on the rural students, so important. It intends to provide important reference points for any efforts aiming to contribute to the peaceful transformation of China, or to the wellbeing of other

analogous societies.

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Jingyi Dong

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Abbreviations

CCCPC: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

CPC: The Communist Party of China

PLA: The People's Liberation Army of China

PRC: The People's Republic of China

SMEs: Small and medium-sized enterprises

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Chapter One: Introduction

1. 1. Background and research rationale

Peasants constitute the majority in the overall population of China.[i] The rural college students are the elites in the countryside and will undoubtedly make themselves felt in the future of the country. Nevertheless, very little scientific research has been conducted on this group. This study intends to provide knowledge on this widely discussed but poorly researched group. Out of necessity, this study also involves two other social categories that are closely related to the rural students: peasants and university intellectuals. Consequently, it uses some terms that are unique to the Chinese context and these three groups. *Rural students* refers to students who are registered as permanent rural residents or reside in rural areas before they enter university or college. Before they have become financially independent, they are mainly supported by family members who are permanent rural residents. Social categories that are closely related to rural students are peasants and *off-farm workers*;[1] the latter term refers to those who, on the one hand, leave their villages and migrate to urban areas to work as cheap labourers but, on the other hand, are not granted the status of permanent urban residents. By now, 14.96 million rural students who have pursued a tertiary education have difficulty being formally employed and have to work temporarily as cheap labourers (Worker's Daily, June 28, 2013, parag. 1), and for these people, the term *college-graduate-off-farm workers* has been introduced. The *urban-rural segregation system*,[ii] which Whyte

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[i] According to the China Data Centre of Tsinghua University, permanent urban residents make up 27.6% of the population (China Youth Daily, November 05, 2013).

[ii] In the urban-rural segregation system, most peasants are registered as permanent rural residents and are excluded from many privileged professional fields and social welfare, a status passed down from parents to children.

(2010, 1) labels as "socialist serfdom" and which will be introduced in detail in Chapter Three, is the principal mechanism that has excluded peasants from the urban society and has forced some of their children with tertiary education qualifications to follow a historical cycle, with their status shifting from that of rural students to that of college-graduate-off-farm workers. Another category, which will be introduced in detail in Chapter Four, consists of intellectuals in government-run universities and colleges; members of this group are employees of the state, labelled as the e*stablishment intellectuals* by Hamrin and Cheek (1986).

The point of departure for this study, which tends to be pragmatic and problem-oriented, is the research on the rural students. As mentioned-above, the research has been extended in scope, involving not only higher education, but also the rural society and, above all, the state, which plays a decisive role in all aspects. Consequently, it has resulted in four relatively independent chapters that centre on three topic areas which follow different theoretical guidelines and apply different methods. The inherent relations between these chapters make it possible to integrate them in a common theoretical framework and under a common theme: how the state policies have impacted the society and university and, in turn, the agents in these fields. Under this broad theme, the scope of the research may be gradually narrowed down until the focus is fixed on the rural students. To put it another way, the presentation of the overall thesis starts from looking at the macro context (state vs. rural society and university) and progresses to the micro focus (rural students), and from emphasizing the objective structure to further examining the nuances on the subjective side.

In the presentation of the overall thesis, the first two topics are intended to contextualize the rural students both in history and in the present. The first topic attempts to uncover the real status quo of the Chinese peasants and traces the rural students to their home background as this can help to explain the limited opportunities

they have. In the second topic, the Chinese higher education institutions and university intellectuals, which mirror China's politics and culture, are examined to understand the new environment that the rural students move into after they have left their homes. In these two topics, special attention is paid to historical factors, focusing on two systems: the urban-rural segregation system and the higher education system. The urban-rural segregation was initiated in 1958 and is still in existence today. This system witnessed a "man-made disaster" (Tian[2] 2004) during which more than thirty million peasants died of starvation over a three-year period (J. Yang 2009). It has not only seriously impeded the development of rural areas, but it has also reshaped the mentality and behaviour of the Chinese peasants. The higher education system was restructured in 1952.[3] Since then it has served as the centre of a series of political campaigns such as the "Anti-rightist Campaign"[4] and the "Great Cultural Revolution" and its unique structure has remained fundamentally unchanged right up to the present day. It has impacted the identity and mentality of the Chinese intellectuals in a devastating way and it humiliated Chinese intellectuals in a way that is unprecedented in the history of the country. When it comes to the present situation, we find the third and central topic. At the end of the last century, the Chinese higher education system suddenly began to progress towards massification, in sharp contrast to its previous resistance to an increase in the enrolment rate.[5] This was a government policy of coercion as a means of addressing and counteracting the financial crisis (Lanqing Li[6] 2003, Part 4). Consequently, the student body on campuses has expanded dramatically.[7] Within four years, the numeric index of mass higher education, the 15% participation rate, was reached (L. Cheng 2008). In 2012, the proportion of the age group entering tertiary education institutions was 30%,[8] with 59.1% of the students enrolled from the rural areas (CNS China News Service 2014). This is understandable in terms of demographic structure, but might be difficult to understand from an economic perspective. For one thing, under urban-rural

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segregation, most Chinese peasants are disadvantaged in an economic sense; for another, with government funding seriously insufficient,[9] state policies allow tertiary education institutions to charge high tuition fees. Higher education may be too expensive for peasants (Dong 2004; Yanzhong Wang 2012). Just as the following discussion reveals, the rural students and their families have paid a great price for the massification of higher education in China.

1.2. Central research problems

The primary aim of this research is to uncover how the urban-rural segregation system and the higher education system may influence the students. This objective has been used as the foundation for developing the central research problems of the study:

> How is the urban-rural segregation system related to the motivation of
> the rural students in their pursuit for higher education? What is the role of
> the Chinese higher education institutions when the rural students break
> through urban-rural segregation?

The above-mentioned central research problems cover three interrelated topics: the rural students, higher education and urban-rural segregation, and these topics are invariably defined by state policies. The very general central research problems will be further elaborated upon when the researcher looks for answers to some more specific research questions. These research questions are distributed across the four relatively independent chapters, Chapter Three to Six.

1.3. Methodology

1.3.1. Paradigm choice

The approach in this study is guided by Bourdieu' notion of relational thinking.

According to Bourdieu:

> ... the goal of sociology is to uncover the most deeply buried structures of the
> different social worlds that make up the social universe, as well as the
> "mechanisms" that tend to ensure their reproduction or their transformation....
> Indeed there exists a correspondence between social structures and mental
> structures, between the objective divisions of the social world... and the principles
> of vision and division that agents apply to them. (1996, 1)

The above statement points out the importance of the underlying structure, and highlights the relation between objective and the subjective aspects, the macro and micro world, history and the present, individuals and society. Accordingly, the first feature of this study is the emphasis on objective structure. This may help to pinpoint what is a necessity without misconstruing it as a contingency. This may also provide a more or less common point of departure for biased rival arguments. As a second feature, attention is also given to the subjective aspect of the groups and individuals being studied, which is closely related to the objective structure. As a third feature, much attention is paid to the macro context, and highlight the correlation between local phenomena and the overall background. The fourth feature is emphasis on the inseparability of history and the present.

In the choice of paradigm, this study prefers a qualitative method which belongs to the interpretive repertoire. This study does not have the benefit of a body of literature established by previous researchers or variables that can be easily identified. The aim of this study would be to recommend methods of an exploratory and interpretive nature. This is in accordance with Creswell's (1998, 17-18) reasons for undertaking a qualitative study: 1) to develop theories; 2) to study individuals in their natural setting rather than out of context; 3) to present a detailed view of the topic, sometimes even

engage a storytelling form of narration; 4) to take the view of a participant rather than an "expert" who passes judgement on participants. Thus, the social research techniques chosen should fit such definitions as given by Neuman (2011, 102, 104, 107): be sensitive to context, capture people's subjective sense of their contexts rather than reduce social life from abstract, logical theories that may not relate to the daily feelings and experiences of those being studied.

This study is problem-oriented rather than structured according to preconceived theories. Therefore, the design of the study, according to Creswell (1998, 19, 21), is open and evolving. In the research process, the rules and procedures are not fixed, and the theories and specific methods are chosen according to the aims of the study. The first instrument is grounded theory that satisfies the need for an empirical study. The researcher takes the perspective of those who are being studied, extends the scope of the study and gradually transcends this limited perspective. It is at a later stage that high-level theories of wide applicability are incorporated to theoretically strengthen the study and to explore the macro structure. Nevertheless, the presentation of the thesis starts with a general theoretical framework to inform the overall approach.

This comprehensive approach is challenging: if several topics are confined within the university field alone, it will be difficult to interpret the situation comprehensively; when, however, this study is embedded in a wider macro context, it becomes entangled in a very complex reality. Aided by the analytic triangle of Maassen and Cloete (2002), the contents can be categorized under one central topic on the rural students, and two subtopics on peasants and on university intellectuals. Each time, the analysis may be focused on one topic, while the overall study is still integrated. However, since the chapters are relatively independent, the research methods, the theories applied and the information sources that meet specific needs of the chapters will be detailed in each chapter, respectively.

It is particularly interesting that the author has conducted the research abroad. While the Chinese peers have access to limited literature because the publications and the internet in China are under official supervision, the author has access to a rich source of information which may give her a more comprehensive perspective. Meanwhile, the author's wide experience of China may open for a more nuanced reflection on the issue.

1.3.2. Information source

Part of the data comes from the interviews of the 50 rural students. But the study is mainly based on literature from various sources, including works by other researchers, government and CPC documents, articles, news reports and surveys in the public media oriented to a mass audience. The literature has mainly been obtained from libraries, the internet, or private sources. Some websites are referred to for information. Personal observation and work experience also form a complementary source of information. The internet is indispensable as an information source. China has very strict censorship, while the internet is too large in size for the authorities to examine exhaustively, so that it has become a platform where the people can have relatively liberal voices, including some anti-establishment voices. Also, due to censorship, critical works formally published in Continental China are under close scrutiny. Therefore, this study heavily relies on works which are published outside Continental China.

1.4. Delimitation and limitation

This study covers three interrelated topics, among which the topics on urban-rural segregation and on the establishment university will help to interpret the situation of the rural students. On the other hand, research on the rural students issue may help to

interpret the other two topics. Rural students, the rural areas and higher education institutions are very general topics. This study is mainly limited to the structures of the rural society and the internal structure of the higher education institutions, as well as to how such structures may shape the mentality and behaviour of the agents in these structures. Part of the study is based on a review of history and refers to state policies with the aim of illustrating how the state has managed to establish and maintain urban-rural segregation and dominate intellectuals in the higher education institutions.

Most of the theories employed here have been created for the general landscape rather than being tailored for the specific context of China. There are few indigenously produced mature theories to employ or ready models to follow that the researcher can use. CPC and government documents serve as an important source for this study. However, as many documents related to CPC policies have not been disclosed to the public due to secrecy measures, the researcher has had to rely on what is revealed in the public media. While this study involves history, the focus is on the present, and for this reason the history section is limited to events and figures that are considered representative and relevant to this study. China is in the midst of a time of drastic change. The subjects of this study and their conditions are constantly changing. The existing materials on which this study is based can hardly be satisfactorily up-dated, although every effort has been made to include the latest data as far as possible. An important source of empirical data is the interview of 50 rural students, while the researcher's personal experiences and observations are also a source for the analysis. Due to the biased nature of personal experience, this information may lack in accuracy and coherence and will be insufficient to cover the extensiveness and diversity in the country of China. As a result, this study is limited in terms of generalization, authenticity, scope, timeliness and objectivity.

1.5. Structure of the thesis

Following this introduction in Chapter One, Chapter Two reviews the theories adopted in this study, mainly the theories of Galtung, Bourdieu and Lindner. These theories are considered illuminating as they are focused either on the objective or subjective side, or both, and deal with the macro and the micro world as well. Aided with the analytic triangle devised by Maassen and Cloete (2002), the researcher has managed to integrate the theories used into an overall theoretical and conceptual framework. This analytic triangle also delimits this comprehensive study by interrelating the state, the rural society and the higher education institutions. Some theories that are tailored for the landscape of China are also reviewed, which facilitates the application of the above theories of European origins in the Chinese context.

Chapter Three is based on a comparative analysis focusing on the status of the Chinese peasants. The land reform in Taiwan, serfs in Russia and migrant workers under apartheid in South Africa are cases used as references. It is found that the free peasantry tradition in China was dismantled and the contemporary peasants have been reduced to the status of unfree labourers under urban-rural segregation. Further exploration of this theme in reference to Galtung argues that the extreme conditions in China were due to, among other things, a social structure dominated by structural violence. One of the most important pillars of this structure has been the urban-rural segregation system with which the state manages to maintain the existing power relations.

Chapter Four aims to explore how the current Chinese higher education institutions have shaped the status quo and the mind-set of university intellectuals, which in turn heavily influences their choices, including their attitude to their public roles. With Bourdieu's field theory as the guiding approach, it analyses the process

through which the university field has been invaded by the forces of politics and economics. In conclusion, the Chinese higher education institutions has been under a condition of heteronomy, and the intellectual community has developed a habitus corresponding to the unique structure of the field.

Chapter Five commences with an inquiry on the economic aspect of the life rural students have in the Chinese higher education institutions at a time of mass higher education, but the discussion goes beyond the economic field. Strauss's approach of grounded theory is the main notion used to generate a substantive grounded theory from data through systematic comparison. Based on qualitative interviews, this study compares rural students who are located at different levels in the higher education system, which eventually leads to such findings as: all the rural students are pressed into poverty, their subjective responses to such deprivation, however, vary according to how much they are distanced from the big metropolis; the more they are marginalized and the less they are aware of their marginalization.

Chapter Six is a relatively comprehensive analysis based on the previous chapters. Bourdieu's field theory and Lindner's theory of humiliation are applied to shed light on how the rural field and the university field may influence the rural students. It leads to such conclusions as: first, the rural students located at different levels of the hierarchical system respond to their tertiary education experiences in different ways presumably because they are either exposed to absolute or relative deprivation; second, when invaded by heterogeneous forces, the higher education institutions are not likely to provide a platform for the students of different social backgrounds to compete on an equal basis, even in scholastic areas; third, the rural students may find that their efforts to reproduce capital by way of the higher education institutions tend to return little gain or are even in vain, and thus there is a process of reproduction of the urban-rural segregation in which the higher education institutions play a critical role.

Chapter Seven briefly informs of the recent situations, presenting some quantitative data which are considered relevant to the future of the rural students. The pattern in power relations has remained basically unchanged right to the present day. It may serve as a mechanism to reproduce history and facilitate the state's continued exploitation of the rural society. However, new factors, such as changes in the education level of the rural population and in the demographic structure of the younger generation, may have an impact on Chinese society. Bearing this in mind, the rural students as a marginalized group today may turn out to be a critical variable in the future.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Conceptualization

2. 1. An analytic triangle

Trow (1973, 35) identified and analysed a number of problems characteristic of mass higher education as early as 1973, including the conflict between the two cherished ideals of quality and equality. This is understandable. On the one hand, as Scott (1998, 113) points out, massification implies an increase in the financial dependence of the universities on the state. On the other hand, as Trow (1973, 36; 2003, 6) claims, no country in the world can afford a system of mass higher education at the same cost levels that it formerly provided to its elite research universities. Up to now, increasing participation in higher education has become a "global orthodoxy" (Maassen and Cloete 2002, 24). It has also been argued that entrance to higher education has become part of the quest for democratization (Scott 1998, 125). All in all, the massification of higher education will inevitably give rise to multiple problems that may go beyond the university field and enter the political arena.

In the specific case of China, the massification of higher education is invariably heavily influenced by the unique political context. The issue of rural students that gives rise to this study, in particular, is entangled in this complex background. Consequently, this study involves several topics, and out of necessity, applies different theories. These theories contribute to a comprehensive study, but such complexity also makes the structuring of the thesis a challenge, i.e. the need to integrate the different theories coherently and at the same time present the multiple facets of this study in an orderly and clear fashion. This challenge, nevertheless, creates the opportunity to tentatively make a breakthrough: the application of the analytic triangle devised by Maassen and Cloete (2002) as the framework to integrate the different theories. This analytic triangle

may define the general profile of this study and set delimitations on it. In this triangle, the state, society and higher education institutions are seen in relation to each other, and three dimensions are identified: the state-society dimension, the state-institution dimension and the institution-society dimension. The advantage of this model is that, on the one hand, it studies higher education in relation to the general context rather than considering it in isolation, and on the other hand, it reduces the complicated reality to three relations, placing various issues that are entangled and complex into three dimensions, and dealing with them in turn. In the state-society dimension, an analysis at the macro level is focused on the relationship between the state versus the rural society. Galtung's theory of structural violence helps to clearly depict the structures of rural China at different points in time, which explains why urban-rural segregation was established and how it has been maintained. By now, an increasingly larger rural population has migrated to and been distributed in urban areas. In this case, Bourdieu's concept of field is found to be more applicable, as it allows for a focus on the rural students and off-farm workers regardless of their geographical locations. In the state-institution dimension, an analysis at the macro level is focused on the relationship between the state versus the higher education institutions. Bourdieu's field theory is applied to describe how the state has managed to reshape the objective structure of the higher education institutions and how university intellectuals have developed corresponding dispositions. The research on the rural students is located in the institution-society dimension. Part of it is an analysis on the micro-level focused on individual rural students and applying grounded theory. The other part is a more comprehensive research on the rural students by applying the theories of Bourdieu and Lindner to analyse their objective environments and their subjective responses to the environments. The exploration is focused on the educational system as a mechanism of capital reproduction, and on the deprivation and humiliation that the educational process

may impose on the rural students and the potential negative impact this might then have on society.

It thus can be seen that, within the general framework of the analytic triangle, the research has several facets. It intends to 1) involve three social categories, i.e. the rural students *per se*, as well as peasants and university intellectuals who are closely related to them; 2) consider both the objective and the subjective aspects of the three groups; 3) put focus on the evolution from the past to the present; 4) operate at both the macro and the micro level. Therefore, the theories adopted for this analysis should allow for the generalization of a dynamic, evolutionary process, a relative panoramic picture, relating the multiple aspects to each other rather than considering them as isolated, and covering a long period of time. Bourdieu's field theory, above all, can fit such needs, both in constructing a major theoretical and conceptual framework and in functioning as an instrument of analysis. Bourdieu's theory allows for the combination of a micro study with researches on the macro level, emphasizes history and gives consideration to both the objective and cognitive structures. When the study is focused on the objective and the subjective aspect, respectively, Galtung's theory of structural violence, which focuses on objective structure, and Lindner's theory of humiliation, which is a psychological approach, will be integrated as an extension of Bourdieu's theory. The former helps to depict the major framework of the objective structure, screening for details that might be distracting, while the latter sheds light on a detailed study of the cognitive structure which is generated from the objective structure. Grounded theory is applied in a micro study to present the subjective aspect in support of the analysis of the cognitive structure.

2. 2. The position of higher education in the analytic triangle

In the triangular relation, the state-institution dimension was traditionally dominated by

the state, at least in Continental Europe. "Social expectations with respect to higher education were not addressed in direct links between social actors and higher education, but were taken up by the state." The state occupied this "near monopolistic position" in many countries until recently (Maassen and Cloete 2002, 10). On the other hand, international reform ideologies see the growing prominence of the institution-society dimension in the triangular relation. According to the underlying ideas and assumptions of reform thinking, the activities of universities and colleges:

> ... should be formally evaluated, they should be held accountable for their performance, they should be steered by market forces and not by governmental or state mechanisms.... Societal participation takes place through organised interest groups.... This would imply that instead of isolating itself from social needs, higher education is now trying to respond to all social and economic demands unloaded on it.... [This may lead to a] growing imbalance between demands and the institutional capacity for responding to them [and, in turn, a dilemma where] the more they move away from the traditional basic characteristics, legacy and functions of higher education, the more they seem to face formidable legitimacy challenges as public institutions. (9, 13, 14)

In practice, however, it may be difficult to initiate and steer organizational changes in universities and colleges from the outside, most likely because a number of traditional characteristics still define these institutions. Above all, the university has a knowledge-based structure. Consequently, it has such features as: 1) a knowledge-based structure which leads to a high level of organizational fragmentation; 2) loosely articulated decision-making structures; 3) change generally takes place in an incremental, grassroots way. Such characteristics, in turn, lead to differences between higher education institutions and other business: A) higher education institutions lack a

single, clearly definable production function, and demonstrate low levels of internal integration; B) the commitment of the academic staff to their discipline and profession is higher than the commitment to their institution; C) the nature of institutional management allows for a low ability of institutional managers to hire and fire staff (Maassen and Cloete 2002, 26-7).

To summarize, as a general tendency in the international landscape, the power of the state is decreasing in the triangular relation. The society, in the form of organized interest groups, increases its participation in higher education. Higher education institutions steered by market forces should be held accountable for their performance and their activities should be formally evaluated. Whatever the changes in the triangular relation, the university, with its unique structure, manifests an inherent dynamic to maintain institutional autonomy, which, as Olsen (2000, quoted in Maassen and Cloete 2002, 8) puts it, is a "condition for legitimate governmental steering of higher education and peaceful co-existence with other institutions."

2. 3. Galtung's theory of violence

Galtung's theory of violence, which emphasizes causality, is widely applicable. In this study, this theory, especially the theory on structural violence, is applied to illustrate the situation in the state-society dimension, and to describe and analyse the urban-rural segregation system that dominates the objective structure of rural China. Moreover, the application of this approach of peace studies is intended to define the existing system of urban-rural segregation as a violent structure, which in the first place helps to establish the attitude of this study as critical.

Galtung (1996, 196-200) identifies three types of violence that construct a cultural-direct-structural-violence triangle. *Structural violence,* which is manifested as fact, *direct violence,* which is manifested as act, and *cultural violence,* which is

symbolic, are interrelated, form causal chains and cycles and mutually strengthen each other. Cultural violence and direct violence function, respectively, to legitimate and maintain structural violence; structural violence, in turn, internalizes cultural violence and sustains direct violence. The central underpinning of structural violence is inequality, especially the inequality in the distribution of power (1969, 175). Exploitation is one of its core elements and is so strong at times as to violate the basic needs for human survival (1996, 198). However, there is no identifiable actor who commits structural violence (1969, 170). Galtung highlights such "protective accompaniment" strategies as *penetration*, *segmentation*, *marginalization* and *fragmentation*. By using such strategies, the dominant group is capable of "implanting the topdog inside the underdog, ... giving the underdog only a very partial view of what goes on, ... keeping the underdogs on the outside, ... keeping the underdogs away from each other" (1996, 199). A society dominated by structural violence may have the following features: structural similarity; linear ranking order, leaving no doubt as to who is higher in any pair of actors; only one "correct" path of interaction between actors; the higher the rank of an actor, the more central the position; actors at the lower level are represented at the higher level through the highest ranking actor in their community (1969, 176). As a way of strengthening structural violence, "[t]he culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and /or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them" (1996, 198, 200). In this way, structural violence deprives people of their human identity and freedom and reduces the victims to passive acceptors of oppression. "With the violent structure institutionalized and the violent culture internalized, direct violence also tends to become institutionalized, repetitive, ritualistic" (208).

2. 4. Bourdieu's theory of field

2.4.1. Field

The main theme in Bourdieu's theory is *to think relationally* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 96). Bourdieu has managed to reduce the complicated reality to an abstract structure of relations. Aided by the concept of *field*, different domains which are heteronomous in nature may be related to each other. The structure of a field is defined as "systems of relations" and can be understood as "a space of objective relations between positions defined by their rank in the distribution of competing powers or species of capital" (106, 114). These fields may serve as the locus where one can study the objective structures, and the cognitive structures of the agents in the objective structures. In the study of a given field, according to Bourdieu, it is necessary to learn about the habitus of the agents in the field, to examine how the objective positions in the field occupied by the agents are related to each other, but first of all, to analyse how the field is related to the field of power (104-105).

The *field of power* is a unique field, which may be defined as a:

... field of forces structurally determined by the state of the relations of power among forms of power, or different forms of capital.... [In this field, the] objective is no longer the accumulation of or even the monopoly on a particular form of capital..., but rather the determination of the relative value and magnitude of the different forms of power that can be wielded in the different fields. (Bourdieu 1996, 264-5)

Another important field is the state, which Bourdieu reduces into the *meta-field*, and then examines the *meta-capital* or *statist capital* that is particular to this meta-field:

> [T]here has occurred, since the construction of the... state, a long-term process of
> concentration of different species of power, or capital.... The result of this process is
> the emergence of a specific capital, *properly statist capital*, ... which allows the state to
> wield a power over the different fields.... This kind of *meta-capital*... grants power over
> the different species of capital and over their reproduction (via the school system in
> particular). (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 111, 114-15)

The above quotations indicate that, the field of power does not have its own specific capital, rather, it is a battle field where holders of various forms of capital struggle, not over a particular form of capital, but over, as Bourdieu (1996, 265) puts it, "the legitimate principle of legitimation," or the power to determine the "exchange rate" between different forms of capital. In the field of power, the state represents an overpowering force. Whoever seizes power over the state would control the statist capital capable of exercising power over other types of capital, and particularly over their rate of exchange (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 114-15). This explains Bourdieu's assumption: many struggles within the field of power belong to those aimed at seizing the power of the state and, in turn, over the economic and political resources that enable the state to wield power over all games and over the rules that regulate them (99-100).

A field is relatively autonomous and regulated by its own specific logic and necessity (Ibid, 97). Since the various fields are both related to each other and located in unequal positions in the field of power, a given field may be penetrated or even dominated by external forces when a state of *heteronomy* arises. In this case, as depicted by Bourdieu (1998, 54-63), the field will become structurally subordinated to external pressures, i.e. heteronomous agents are introduced into this previously autonomous world and heteronomy is brought into this field. To illustrate, someone who is not an expert gives an opinion about a specific field and is listened to. Of course, a

heterogeneous force only functions through the specific mediation of the field's particular forms and forces after undergoing re-structuring (Bourdieu and Wacquant1992, 105). It is especially noteworthy that whether a certain field is invading or being invaded by other fields is largely defined by its position in the field of power. It thus follows that the effect of the field of power is especially significant in the issue of heteronomy.

2.4.2. Habitus

Bourdieu finds that the objective structure of a field fosters *habitus* which is subjective (Ibid, 127). He defines habitus as "a system of lasting and transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions", or a set of historical relations deposited within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perceptions, appreciations, and actions. Agents who have internalized the specific necessity of a field in the form of habitus would become active reproducers (16, 18, 140). On the other hand, habitus helps make the field a meaningful world. A field is different from an apparatus that is constructed to attain certain goals. Social agents are not "particles" that are mechanically pushed and pulled about by external forces. The moves that they make may be defined by both the volume and structure of their capital, their trajectory and their objective relation to other positions. Agents in the field are constantly involved in the struggle for their own benefits. They possess capital of a different volume and structure, and in turn occupy unequal positions. Accordingly, they have tendencies either to preserve or subvert the existing structure. In this way, they actively contribute to shaping the environment that has shaped them -- through their habitus which generates perceptions and practices (102, 108-09, 127, 136).

The field and habitus may define each other because there is a *homology* between them, i.e. they are genetically linked and recursively and structurally correspondent to each other. Moreover, it is found that a whole range of structural and functional homology exists between a field and the structure of social space, or class structure (Ibid, 13-4, 105-106, 127). It follows that habitus may not control its field of action unless it is fully inhabited by the field of power which has been the very source of its structures (Bourdieu 1996, 228). This may explain why Bourdieu (1-2) emphasizes that "the analysis of the acts of construction performed by agents, in their presentations as much as in their practices, can only become fully meaningful if it also sets itself the task of grasping the social genesis of the cognitive structures that agents implement in them".

2.4.3. Capital

Just as the concept of field may help to reduce the structure of different domains to various comparable relations, Bourdieu has managed to convert the different forces in the fields into various forms of *capital* so that heterogeneous elements from different fields become comparable. In a field, different species of capital circulate and vary in value (Bourdieu and Wacquant1992, 98). An agent in a given field may possess several forms of capital, including cultural, social, political and economic capital. To illustrate using the definitions of some forms of capital: cultural capital may be institutionalized in the form of academic qualifications, or it may be in the embodied state, i.e. in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body. Social capital is not defined as individual, but rather as the aggregate of the actual or potential resources linked to membership of a group. It is this group that provides each member with the backing of the collectively-owned capital (Bourdieu 1986, 243, 248-249).

According to Bourdieu, the position of an agent in a field is largely determined not only by the volume of capital, but also by the "structure" of capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 108). The structure of capital, according to Bourdieu's (1996, 278) definition, refers to the profile of the distribution of the different forms of capital (e.g. economic, cultural, political capital) that an agent possesses. It is therefore reasonable to assume that while the struggle within a given field may be more apparently focused on the volume of a specific form of capital that is unique to this field, the struggle in the field of power may be more apparently related to how different forms of capital are distributed. The latter struggle operates across the boundaries of different fields, and the issue of heteronomy involves struggles of this type.

2.4.4. Educational institutions and reproduction

Bourdieu defines the school system as the mechanism of social *reproduction*. This definition is contrary to the assumption that schools may benefit the dominated classes in social mobility and cultural advancement. Bourdieu points out that the objective interest of the dominated classes may be misrecognized as the sum of the individual interests of their members. Educational institutions may allow controlled mobility of a limited number of members of a dominated class while denying such mobility to the class as a whole. This "can help to perpetuate the structure of class relations" (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 54, 167).

Bourdieu (1996, 219, 276-78) also labels the school system as one of the institutionalized mechanisms of capital reproduction, capable of converting a given form of capital into another form currently in use in another field. This then entails a *displacement between fields*. For instance, when the transfer of family capital cannot be directly passed down along hereditary lines, the holders of capital may transform the forms of capital they hold into forms that are rated as more valuable in the current state

of the instruments of reproduction so as to maintain their position in the social space. The strategies of different agents vary depending on the volume and structure of their capital in relation to the education system, on the relative value of the profits that they expect from their investments and on the distance between them and the appropriate information. Since the transformation of one type of capital into another means displacements between fields, its meaning and value would be especially defined by the objective relations among the different fields, or by the pattern in the field of power.

Cultural capital is relatively immune to the exploitation of the holders of economic or political capital. However, cultural capital varies in forms. One form of cultural capital is institutionalized in the form of academic qualifications, i.e. the academic capital (e.g. diploma). In comparison with embodied cultural capital (e.g. academic learning), the institutionalized academic capital may be more vulnerable and tend to have a dominated status. Bourdieu relates academic capital with other forms of capital and points out that what ultimately allows an academic qualification to acquire its full value in economic and social return is mainly the social capital or even economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986, 243, 245, 248; 1996, 276). Therefore, in capital conversion, more attention should be paid to the relations between different forms of capital. The pattern of such relations is invariably defined by the pattern in the field of power.

According to Bourdieu's (1996, 141) research, young people coming from different positions of the field of power are channelled into different educational institutions. The structure of the distribution of power over the instruments of reproduction determines that these different instruments will reward different agents with differential returns, hence determining the reproducibility of their capital and social positions (277). It follows that there are two aspects in this process of capital reproduction: first, different social classes have different educational chances; second, different sections and types of schools promise different chances of success. The

disadvantages of these two aspects may combine into a mechanism of *deferred selection* that excludes working-class students, and will eventually convert social inequality into a specifically educational inequality. However, the educational institution, which imposes symbolic violence, has been able to conceal this truth (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 13, 158).

2.4.5. A summary of field theory

In short, the various fields are just social microcosms that constitute the social cosmos. The field defines the habitus and vice versa, given the homology between the two (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 13-4, 97, 127). Different forms of capital circulate in a field, and they have a potential capacity to produce profits, reproduce themselves and to be transformed into other forms (Bourdieu 1986, 241; 1996, 277). To think relationally, such concepts as field, habitus and the specific forms of capital that are active in a field should not be defined in isolation, but within the theoretical system that they constitute. The different fields are related to each other and occupy unequal positions, among which the field of power is of great importance to other fields, while the state, or the meta-field, occupies a unique position in the field of power (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 96, 104, 114-15). A field is relatively autonomous; when it is dominated by other fields, *heteronomy* arises (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97; Bourdieu 1998, 57).

In a modern society, families finding it increasingly difficult to transfer capital directly between generations may choose to invest in education. Aided with the educational institutions as the instrument of capital conversion, the patrimony may be transferred into academic capital. This may be one of the important strategies of family capital reproduction. It deserves special attention that the school functions as a mechanism of reproduction in two senses, both socially and economically: on the one hand, it reproduces the existing social structure; on the other, it transforms a given form

of capital into another as a way of reproducing capital. It is the former function that defines the latter.

2. 5. *Lindner's theory of humiliation*

Traditionally, humiliation was "a universally accepted and honorable [sic] tool" used to maintain stability, law and order, which was the order of "vertically ranking human value and essence". In a hierarchical honour society, in particular, each level has its own sense of honour. Underlings might be assisted by what could be called "voluntary self-humiliation," wrapped in various definitions of honour (Lindner 2006, 34). In such situations, anguish and pain were valued as *honourable medicine* rather than as something unfortunate. Such humiliation practised in hierarchical honour societies, which Lindner labels as *honour humiliation*, is opposed to the understanding of humiliation in a human rights context, which Lindner labels as *dignity humiliation*. Only after making long mental and emotional journeys from honour humiliation to human rights steered dignity humiliation is it possible for individuals to define themselves as victims (18, 29, 165). When people have more opportunities to compare themselves with others, especially when the human rights ideal has become more widespread, expectations of equal dignity and opportunity rise, and unawareness of absolute deprivation may be replaced by an awareness of relative deprivation; what used to be accepted as "normal" may be rejected as inequalities. This awakening, however, may become the source of such ill feelings as humiliation (xv, xvi, 42-43). A possible consequence of such ill feelings is that those who have learnt to consider themselves as victims of undue humiliation may turn their rage inwards, or they may explode in a hot desperate and destructive rage, and result in passionate murder and/or suicide. They may even attempt to redress their humiliation by inflicting humiliation on the supposed humiliators, achieving only another spiral in the cycle of humiliation (31-32).

2.6. Grounded theory

Grounded theory, which fits empirical situations, is found suitable for the chapter based on the data obtained from the interviews of the rural students. It discovers theory from data that are "systematically obtained and analyzed [sic] in social research" through the application of "a general method of comparative analysis" (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 1). It aims to view this world as the research participants do (Charmaz 2006, 14). On the other hand, there are critics who claim that the theory is more about particulars than about universals (Thomas and James 2006, 781) and, therefore, question the status of this approach as a theory. Nevertheless, this study may benefit from grounded theory in that the chapter on the subjective feelings and local situations of the rural students tends to be open and empirical. The substantive grounded theory generated in this chapter will be combined with the above-mentioned theories which have wider applicability, as a way of strengthening the theory base of the research.

2.7. Conceptualization in the context of China

As the theories that this study will apply originate in the West they will not reflect all the details and nuances of the Chinese context. Moreover, with the exception of grounded theory, which has found some cases of application in China, these theories are far from being widely applied in the Chinese context, meaning that there are few examples of precedence that can be used here. Therefore, the concepts of these theories need to be clarified, not only in relation to the specific context of China, but also to the specific case being considered in this study. In particular, the analytic triangle of Maassen and Cloete which sees the state, society and higher education institutions in relation to each other has a wide applicability, but the manner in which the three agencies are related varies from context to context. The most salient feature in the

Chinese context is that the state heavily overpowers the university and the society because of its peculiar form, often referred to as "the party-state". In this study, it will be referred to as "the state", "the party-state", or "the state of China". It is found to be necessary to distinguish the concept of the party-state from Continental China (in this study mostly referred to as "China" for brevity), which is a geographic concept.

2.7.1. The party-state

Xin[10] (2010b, parag. 2) defines the party-state as duplicated from the Soviet model and patterned after Leninism, and M. Xia[11] (2006, parag. 1) labels it as "partocracy", where the CPC accurately captures China's political reality. In this unique structure, Xin (2010b, parag. 4) finds that the CPC is *de facto* above the Constitution and in command of the army, an assumption evidenced by the *Constitution of the PRC* (2004) and "Regulations on the Political Work of the PLA of China" (September 2010, Item 4). Xia (2006, parag. 1) finds that the CPC commands, controls and integrates all other political organizations and institutions in China, and Taylor *et al.* (2003, 19) and Z. Ma (2009, 375) present figures which vividly illustrate this model of absolute top-down administration. Given the power of the party-state, it follows that the Chinese university has been reduced to a subservient establishment and urban-rural segregation has been imposed upon Chinese society.

Bourdieu highlights the privileged position of the state, or the meta-field, in the field of power, which helps to explain why, in the triangular relationship, the party-state of China has managed to establish this model of top-down control and invaded other fields. As a political party, the CPC has established its dominant position in the field of power step by step. First, it seized power over the state, by military force, and consequently controlled statist capital. Second, with statist capital, it has the capacity to define the pattern in the field of power and decide upon an exchange rate in its own

favour, i.e. increasing the value of its own capital while decreasing the value of other forms of capital. The result of this is that political force is lifted to a dominant position in the field of power in relation to economic and cultural forces. Third, the fact that the political field overpowers other fields has in turn strengthened the CPC's domination over the field of power. Given that in China the political field, the party-state and the field of power are related in a unique way, the key to understanding Chinese affairs, including the operation of universities and colleges, would be an understanding of the political field.

2.7.2. The political field

The *Constitution of the PRC* (2004) emphasizes the leadership of the CPC and centralization, i.e. all decisions are made in a top-down manner. It follows that the political field is monopolized by the CPC, and the CPC in turn is monopolized by the privileged groups within this political party. As can be envisioned, the political field is an exclusive space that forbids the intrusion of external forces. In this field, two closed systems are in operation: first, the CPC organization system has created a gap between the party members and the masses; second, the government administration practises a monopoly over public affairs and has created a gap between the officials and the people. Within this second closed space, however, the boundary between the CPC and administration is blurred, i.e. it is institutionalized that the party departments may manipulate administrative affairs, and party workers may be appointed to administrative positions. Outside the two closed systems, civil societies are completely prohibited. Even the people's congresses, according to the research of Z. Ma (2009, 372), have a "rubber-stamp" function. The structure depicted above, in which the party-administration system is exclusive and the populace is atomized, indicates that individuals find that all channels through which they could give voice in public affairs

are basically blocked. Since this situation has been established by the *Constitution of the PRC*, and hence has become persistent, the status of officials tends to be secured for life, or is even a hereditary posting.[12] Ultimately, interest groups based on political power have become consolidated at different levels of the entire society, forming an anti-democratic mechanism.

With respect to economic and political resources, the party-state, as a totalitarian regime, is better equipped than any other type of state governance. It can afford to substantialize the symbolic political capital. For example, representatives of the political field can be installed in various fields as secretaries of CPC committees and branches. CPC members can benefit from their membership, such as being given access or promotion to more privileged positions. The volume of political capital that individuals possess depends on the distance between them and the dominant groups in the field. In the Mao era, unequal volumes of political capital were allocated to people from birth according to "family backgrounds".[13] In adulthood, an individual could acquire a certain political identity, for example, by joining the CPC or having a close affinity to this organization.[14] More often than not, political capital could be generated from obedience to the leaders of CPC grassroots organizations. In the post-Mao era, various forms of capital, such as economic and cultural capital, began to show some muscle. However, the objective structures of different fields reveal very well that the representatives of the political field still occupy the dominant positions and in fact control various resources in the fields, although less directly. It can be envisioned that, as long as the state of China remains under the monopoly of a single party, the political field may continue to overpower other fields, subverting the specific logic and necessity of these fields, interfering in their normal operation and undermining their autonomy. This, according to Bourdieu, is heteronomy.

2.7.3. Establishment intellectuals

Although the intellectual community may be categorized by their interests, spiritual goals or moral appeal, this study adopts the definition of Gramsci and Julien Benda (quoted in Said 1994, 9) and aims at university intellectuals who are "connected either with the production or distribution of knowledge". In this category, Chinese intellectuals differ from their peers in most other countries in that they are "establishment intellectuals", as labeled by Hamrin and Cheek (1986). As is defined by some historians, the basic political formula laid down early in the post-1949 period defined the intellectual community as undoubtedly subordinate to the wishes of the CPC (Suttmeier and Cao 2004, 152). Or, to put it another way, vertical patron-client relations dominated the pattern of communication between the top CPC leaders and intellectuals (Goldman, quoted in Hamrin and Cheek 1986, 15). Hamrin and Cheek describe their unique status as follows:

> As a subgroup within the ruling elite, they had a deep interest in perpetuating the system.... We stress... that there is no clear gap between the Party and intellectuals. Rather, there are interlocking sets of patron-client relationships, with a mix of political and intellectual roles and interests at each level. (1986, 3, 15)

This community is considerable in size, with its members' behaviour largely defined by the authorities:

> In contemporary China, if you are not some kind of establishment intellectual, you are not a legitimate intellectual at all.... [C]ritics as well as supporters of the status quo must operate within a well-defined institutional framework and circulate their opinions only through authorized channels in which one's status and personal connections play a determining role. (Isreal 1986, x)

The decade following the military suppression of the democratic movement in 1989 saw considerable evolution and change in the Chinese intellectual community. Some researchers may find the label "establishment intellectuals" appropriate for only a small number of the intellectual elite who held key posts or monopolized resources (E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004, 7). Nevertheless, most of the intellectuals who are state employees, to a great extent, retain characteristics of the establishment intellectuals as follows:

> There is a more cooperative and more symbiotic relationship between China's intellectuals and the state's leaders than between intellectuals and the common people. (Ogden 2004, 128)

> As beneficiaries of state policies over the past decade, members of the technical community are thus often more interested in protecting their gains than in challenging the political leadership, suggesting that the inherited patron-client relationship between intellectuals and the Party may now be stronger than ever. (Suttmeier and Cong Cao 2004, 153)

Bourdieu's field theory, especially the concept of heteronomy, sheds light on how the Chinese higher education system has been transformed into a subservient establishment, and why the institutions have lost many of the features as specified by Maassen and Cloete (2002, 27), such as decision-making structures that are loosely articulated, changes taking place in an incremental, grassroots way, and little authority for institutional managers to hire and fire staff. In this study, the discussion on establishment intellectuals is limited to the intellectual community in the government-run universities and colleges, rather than on intellectuals in general. For one thing, it is in such institutions that one finds the most intellectuals working as state

employees. For another, higher education institutions as a whole are strictly controlled by the government.

2.7.4. The rural society of China

That the analysis of the triangular relation includes the rural society rather than society in general is based on such facts as: only 27.6% of the Chinese population are granted the status of permanent urban residents (China Youth Daily, November 05, 2013), while the rest, whether they are living in the city or village, are formally registered as permanent rural residents and excluded from the state welfare system in many ways. Many agents in the rural field have left the countryside and quit farming. Therefore, the concept of rural field adopted in this study is a social concept rather than a geographical one, and the term "peasant" referring to the agent in the rural field, indicates membership of a disadvantaged, deprived group, rather than the term relating to a trade. Other social categories that are related to the peasants, such as rural students, off-farm workers or college-graduate-off-farm workers, are invariably considered as indicating that they are members of disadvantaged groups because of their kinship with the peasant community. Comparable cases in other countries are referred to with the aim of defining the status of these disadvantaged groups in China. In this process, the social categories that are disadvantaged in other societies, such as working-class students in France, serfs in Russia, migrant workers under South African apartheid, underlings in stratified societies, are regarded as categories that are comparable to the above-mentioned rural students, peasants, off-farm workers or college-graduate-off-farm workers.

2. 8. Summary

A summary may help to articulate the theme of this study: Bourdieu has envisioned a

social cosmos composed of relatively autonomous social microcosms (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). The three agencies in Maassen and Cloete's (2002) analytic triangle can be easily identified in Bourdieu's theoretical system, such as the university field, the social field, the meta-field and political field that are the counterparts of the state. The analytic triangle, which integrates these relevant fields into a triangular relation, helps to delimit this study in the social cosmos. On the other hand, Bourdieu's emphasis on the privileged position of the state in the field of power sheds light on why the party-state can be perched on top of the triangle, while it dominates and reshapes the structures of the society and the university.

This study progresses from the macro and objective structure to the micro and subjective world. Galtung's theory of violence helps to interpret the evolution in the objective structure of the rural society, tracing the causal chains and cycles. Bourdieu's theory of field helps to interpret the evolution of the objective structure of the university, also considering the subjective aspect. In the system of field theory, the rural students as a social category are a stride above the university field and the field of rural society; in the analytic triangle, they are located in the institution-society dimension. Urban-rural segregation and university heteronomy will inevitably impact them and ultimately be reflected in their subjective dimension. Grounded theory helps to discover the correlation between their objective financial security and their subjective sense of financial security. Bourdieu's theory on strategies of capital reproduction will help to uncover how educational institutions may influence the rural students' academic investment. And Lindner's humiliation theory helps to delve further into the subjective aspect of the rural students, shedding light on the prospect of their unique mind-set in relation to the context.

Chapter Three: Reflections on the Status of Contemporary Chinese Peasants

3.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the state-rural society dimension in the analytic triangle, focusing on the urban-rural segregation system. This research covers a period of time of over sixty years, during which the state prepared, initiated and has maintained urban-rural segregation. It has been a long-standing problem that peasants constitute the main disadvantaged group in Chinese society. Up to now much research has been conducted on the situation of Chinese peasants. To list a few authors and their works as illustrations: Whyte (2010, 1) labels the Chinese system as "socialist serfdom", which highlights the urban-rural inequality. Economic deprivation is characteristic of this system and Dikötter (2010) and J. Yang (2009) find the most extreme case of deprivation when they examine the "man-made disaster" (Tian 2004) during which more than thirty million peasants died of starvation over a three-year period. In the post-Mao era, economic deprivation continues to be a problem in rural China, as has been recorded by G. Chen and Wu (2004) and Liang (2010). Even the peasants who migrate to work in urban areas have difficulty escaping the economic deprivation and suffer from the lack of basic rights, as Zou and Q. Gao (2010) find in their study of legislation. Apart from economic conditions, according to Dong (2004) and Lu Wang (2008), peasants are also marginalized in the area of education. M. Zhang (2004) examines the political structure of rural China. Qin, a well-known specialist in agricultural history, sketches a relative panoramic picture by reviewing the evolution of the social structure of rural China and comparing the case of China to other unfree labour systems (Qin 1994, 2003, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Qin and Su 1996).

In most cases, however, the research is limited to a specific period of time or a specific event, and more on studies in history than analysis based on sociological theories. Researchers in Continental China, moreover, tend to refrain from openly criticizing the current system due to the censorship code, i.e. more concerns over the plight of the peasants than queries over the situation in the state-rural society dimension. All in all, the role the state has played in defining the status quo of rural China has not been clearly identified. However, this chapter focuses directly on the relationship between the state and rural society, and some relevant historical events that occurred at different points in time are considered relationally in order to examine the evolution of the social structure. The aim is to define the status of the Chinese peasants in the contemporary state system and to identify the main patterns in the state policy.

It is found that the application of Galtung's theory of violence, the theory on structural violence in particular, may satisfy the needs of this study in several ways: an emphasis on causality may help to trace the "causal chains and cycles" (1996, 198) between different forms of violence. The focus on structure may help to retain a relatively objective position. Through the light of Galtung's theory of structural violence, this chapter explores what is behind the state policy. The research questions are formulated as follows:

What is the position of Chinese peasants in the state system?

What mechanisms keep them confined in their current position, and why?

3.2. Methods

The research in this chapter is problem-oriented and literature-based. In the process of reviewing relevant literature, the researcher finds illumination in other authors who compare the Chinese peasants with unfree labourers in other societies. This has inspired the author to look for similarities and differences between the Chinese case with

comparable cases in other contexts, adopting what Glaser and Strauss (1967, viii) refer to as a "general method of comparative analysis". The comparison method has the following features that in several ways facilitate the work of the researcher. First, it allows the researcher to have a pragmatic attitude without commitment to preconceived high-level theories. Second, it allows the researcher to see the case being studied in different lights and relates this research, which is limited in scale, to the substantive material from other relevant cases. Third, the choice of methods is also justified by the idea that "any analysis of social development should be comparative" (Mjøset 2000, 392-3; 2006a, 759).

The comparisons between the Chinese case and cases in other contexts are oriented to specific pragmatic problems as the intention is not to go into a comprehensive comparative study. The contents chosen for comparison are limited to specific times and specific events that are considered relevant to the research questions. *The first step* is to divide the time of over sixty years into three periods according to the evolution in the state policies governing the peasants during different historical periods; the foci are respectively on the land reform around 1949, the People's Commune in Mao's era, and the off-farm workers in the post-Mao era. *The second step* is to choose three comparable categories in other contexts. Hence three groups of comparison are generated. 1) Comparison between the land reforms in Continental China and that in Taiwan; this is justified by the fact that traditionally the two contexts shared the same political ideological orientations. 2) Comparison between the labour system in Mao's era and that in serfdom Russia; this is justified by researchers (e.g. Qin 2010c; Whyte 2010) who refer to the Chinese peasants as serfs. Besides, of all the slave societies, Russian serfdom allowed the greatest independence (Kolchin 1987, 237), and hence may be used as a criterion of definition. 3) Comparison between the labour system in the post-Mao era and the system under apartheid in South Africa; this is justified by Qin

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(1994, 2010a) who compares the urban-rural segregation to apartheid, and also by the fact that China has adopted measures similar to the migrant worker system and influx control that were part of apartheid.

The comparisons may provide an answer to the first research question, as mentioned above. However, for the second research question, the same effort, which is limited in scale and depth, is insufficient for providing an answer. Nevertheless, the lengthy process of comparison has the advantage that the social structure being studied has been roughly outlined. The researcher then turns to a new instrument to analyse the social structure as a way of continuing the exploration of this theme. Eventually, Johan Galtung's theory of violence is applied as the theoretical foundation, which helps to identify elements of violence and to reveal the way in which these elements are combined and function.

The literature that forms the basis of the comparison mainly comprises Taiwan Land Reform Museum (1995), works by Kolchin (1987), Terreblanche (2000), Zou and Q. Gao (2010), and, in particular, works by Qin (1994, 2010a, 2010c) that legitimates the comparison and contrast between the Chinese peasants and other forms of unfree labourers. The personal knowledge of and observations made by the author, as a contemporary Chinese, also form the basis of the analysis. The chapter first examines the similarities and contrasts between the comparable cases, where the aim is to define the status of Chinese peasants. This is followed by an analysis of the structure in which the Chinese peasants find themselves, where the aim is to reveal the elements and mechanisms that maintain their disadvantaged position. Since the researcher cannot find and, therefore, cannot obtain help from other authors who apply Galtung's theory of violence in the study of the urban-rural segregation, this research tends to be limited in depth. However, the findings in this chapter contribute to the overall study in that it

sheds light on the motivation of the rural youths who are urged to break through the urban-rural segregation.

3.3. Preparation for, initiation and continuation of urban-rural segregation

3.3.1. Preparation: Land reform in Continental China as opposed to Taiwan

3.3.1.1. Land reform in Continental China

For a long time, the equal distribution of land was the justification for the acts of direct violence in the CPC's revolution. In 1947, when the communist army conquered northern China, the *General Outline of Chinese Land Laws* was pronounced, which called for a bottom-up land reform. This policy was based on a very thin outline, more political than economic, and in the name of the class struggle, the reform relied on direct violence. The fundamental aims of the land reform were to: 1) organize the mass peasants into a union, which would exclude landlords and the rural gentry, as the institution in charge of land redistribution; 2) redistribute lands equally among peasants and deprive the rich of their wealth; 3) classify peasants according to their possession of land into the exploited class and the exploiting class, the latter being targets of political censure, and labelled as such from generation to generation.[15] In practice, rather than being a bottom-up mass movement, the land reform process was manipulated from above by the armed "work groups" (*gongzuozu* 工作组) which penetrated the villages as the representatives of the government.[16]

3.3.1.2. Land reform in Taiwan

In 1949, the Kuomintang government in Taiwan also introduced a land reform policy based on three principles where the aim was to: 1) reject direct violence; 2) grant poor

peasants land and consider the interests of the landlords at the same time; 3) help the landlords, who obtained capital from land sales, to invest in industry. This land reform policy was also a form of government coercion, but based on full investigation and supervised by experts and scholars. On the condition that their living standards would not be reduced below the average level, the landlords were compelled to sell their surplus lands to the government; the latter in turn sold the lands at par value to poor peasants and granted loans to those who did not have sufficient funds to buy the land. To ensure fairness and social stability, the government acted as a mediating agent for land purchase and distribution (Land Reform Museum 1995).

3.3.1.3. Comparison

Apparently, the land reform in Taiwan was in accordance with a traditional ideology that emphasizes private property protection and respects rural autonomy. In the traditional structure, rural autonomy and a unique form of "democracy" were based on the patriarchal clan conference and formed the foundation on which social stability was built. The peasants were free and self-reliant farmers under the rule of a weak central government (Yen 1929, 46-7; 1934, 59). The above-mentioned structure of power relations, as defined by Yen, to a large extent protected the substructure from the intrusion of the comings and goings of dynasties at the overriding level. The rural elites and gentry often functioned as the pillar of the local economy, as well as the protector of local culture, social order and public services. Some of the rural elites had such status as intellectuals or retired officials, but they were born with the membership of their patriarchal clan, a status that lasted for life and was passed down to their children. They were deeply rooted in their clan and had vested interests in it. This loose structure emphasized family bonds as the law of nature and therefore established the private sector as a realm partly independent of the state. However, some Confucius and

Mencius literature reveals that this did not come into being by natural force, but had been introduced by ancient idealists to shelter the people from the tyranny of the state.[17] Nan (1976, Chapter One, under "Content of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism") suggests that at a time when there was no constitution such ancient doctrines functioned as constitutional ideas. Moreover, the prominence of the clan in ancient times also created a more or less laissez-faire approach to the monarchy. Nevertheless, patriarchy is structural violence, according to Galtung (1996, 33). As can be seen, the inequality in status within the patriarchal clan had remained unchallenged because it was the foundation of the clan organization; collectivism was a prominent feature because it played a utilitarian role in consolidating the small rural community. There were pioneering democratic reformers who expressed regret that the humanitarian ideals underpinning clan autonomy were not interpreted in a way that would enlighten the peasant masses.[18] Contemporary historians also prove that the power of the emperor encroached on the territory of the patriarchal clan, making it increasingly symbolic (e.g. Qin 2003, 79-81). Eventually, educated youths with modern ideas of individual liberty began to criticize the dominance of the patriarchy.[19] This change notwithstanding, Yen (1928, 30; 1929, 46) observed that the patriarchal institutions were still the basic units in the state organization, especially at the local-government level. And for the peasant masses, extended patriarchal families continued to be the mainstream power in their culture. Given that peasant autonomy was the foundation of the traditional society, and that the intellectuals were closely related to the clan, it is reasonable to assume that the rural community was the matrix of traditional values and the cradle of intellectuals.

With respect to the economy, land resources were put under constant pressure by the growth in population. In most cases, as is proved by Qin's (2010b, sec. 6, parag. 4) research, lands were rarely amassed by big landlords. Other researchers also cite data material that points to the same conclusion. According to an official survey conducted

in several provinces in 1937, 98.66% of the families covered by the survey possessed land of less than 120 *mu*; in 98.62% of the families, individual possession of land averaged less than 16 *mu* (1 acre = 6.07 *mu*). It can thus be inferred that those with more land tended to be large families (Kuisong Yang 2008). In commercially developed areas, most, sometimes as much as 70% of the land in the village was collective property (Wen 2004). Land prices were low, in contrast to the monthly income of wage earners in the early twentieth century. For example, a university professor could have a monthly income of about 200-300 silver *yuan*, whereas an ordinary worker in industry could earn anywhere from ten to forty silver *yuan*. In some fertile areas, where land was more valuable, 1 *mu* of land could be sold for approximately only 2-3 silver *yuan* or 300-400 kilos of grain. Take, for example, a typical family with six members and 100 *mu* of land. The family property equalled the monthly income of a university professor. If the family cultivated the land all by themselves, the annual net income would amount to several thousand kilos of grain (L. Qu 2010). As can be seen, the income would be less if the land was cultivated by sharecroppers or farmhands. As capital, land provided limited protection against disasters in comparison to other forms of capital, such as positions in the bureaucratic system. Land was valued, presumably, not only because it was inflation proof and more secured than other forms of capital, but also because it symbolized "the root" in one's ancestral place.

On the other hand, in a pre-industrial, small farmers' society, as can be inferred from the data above, it was possible to use manpower alone as capital in exchange for land. In this way, family wealth witnessed an ebb and flow; land was transferred from owner to owner. Since the rural communities were connected according to their bloodlines, land property transfer often occurred within the circle of kin and neighbours.[20] The status of landlord or poor peasant was rarely hereditary. It is thus reasonable to conclude that, on the whole, the major institutionalized conflicts in the

traditional society were not between poor peasants and landlords, who were economically different, but within the same "class". Peasant uprisings that were recurrent in history may serve as evidence that the major conflicts were between the peasants and the ruling authorities.[21] However, the land reform policy ruled that whoever leased the land to tenants or hired farmhands belonged to the exploiting class. In fact, the traditional society was far more complex. The research of Qin and Su (1996, 63-4) proves that, more often than not, economic inequality was the result rather than the precondition for inequality in other capital distribution. The CPC rulers, however, using a simplistic definition of exploitation, labelled landlords as the scapegoats for all societal evils.

With hindsight, the two land reforms in Continental China and in Taiwan can be seen as differing not only in that one relied on direct violence while the other did not, but also in how they significantly defined later political and economic patterns. On the political front, Taiwan realized the ideal of granting land to all farmers, while the original social structure and traditional values of the rural areas were not radically affected. On the economic front, the status of peasants remained that of private property owners. Zou and Q. Gao (2010, 185) define Taiwanese agriculture as already "fully developed" by the time of industrialization and urbanization. The development in urban areas also brought benefits to peasants when land increased in value (Land Reform Museum 1995). This serves as an illustration that Chinese traditional societal structure, however obsolete, had the possibility to be transformed into a modern society through reform. And the traditional ideological orientations, although outmoded, did not come into sharp conflict with the general line of modern democratic thinking.

Continental China provided a sharp contrast to this picture. On the political front, an "exploiting class" was identified and given the permanent label of "enemy of the people", which was the start of a series of witch-hunts. When the employers and

employees were divided into two conflicting camps with the government representing "the people", the dividing line between the rulers and the ruled, which used to be open and institutionalized, became blurred. The patriarchal institution was dismantled, and declining with it were the coexistent ethical systems. The CPC organization branches quickly replaced all previous rural institutions; even the peasant union initiated by the CPC was not exempt from this purge. On the economic front, equal land ownership, which was the alleged achievement of the land reform but which only existed transiently, had in effect initiated a wide-ranging project that deprived peasants of their lands and economic independence; it was a so-called "socialization of agriculture", as Mao (1949, 1477) labelled it. Starting from 1951, step-by-step, the individual private economy was converted into a village-owned collective economy. Ultimately, the People's Commune, serving as a bottom-level government institution was established in 1958 to manipulate all the villages.[22] This meant that the state in effect gained control of all the land. Up to the present day, the state still benefits from the huge resources that it inherited from Mao's era: the various levels of governments can easily obtain collective land property from villages at a very low price without having to deal with owners of private land property; most grave of all, the rural society has been completely atomized ever since.

3.3.2. Initiation: The People's Commune in China as opposed to the serf commune (mir) in Russia

3.3.2.1. The People's Commune of Mao's era

A. The main features of the People's Commune.

The People's Commune, consisting of several natural villages, was omnipotent,

covering everything from farming to justice, militia, commerce, basic education and sometimes even small-scale industry. In this mini state, the CPC organization, which was intended to reshape the values of the peasants to create consensus, paralleled the administrative bureaucracy, which controlled the life of the masses and managed agricultural productivity. All aspects of farm life, ranging from seeding varieties to acreage, were governed through top-down directives. The inner workings of the structure were unified and synchronized, making it what M. Zhang (2004, parag. 2) and L. He (2008, parag. 4) define as a "military" organization. When first established, many of these communes had "forced labour"[23] camps (*laogaiying* 劳改营) (M. Zhang 2004, parag. 13). In this way, state domination reached from the capital right into the remote villages, in contrast to the traditional assumption that the monarch's administration should terminate at the county level.

In this system that was established and maintained through direct violence, the commune members 1) were not allowed to migrate to urban areas, and their status was hereditary; 2) had no ownership of land, nor large-scale husbandry or farming instruments, nor guaranteed income or food rations; 3) had no say in farm management and produce distribution; 4) were supervised by state bureaucrats at the commune level and, in the village, were headed by production brigade cadres who were authorized by the top political hierarchy in one way or another, and who were empowered to deprive the villagers of the right to work and consequently their possibility to earn an income.

B. Related government policies.

1) The household registration system was gradually constructed in 1958.[24] This established that a citizen's legal status was bound to his or her place of residence. After 1949, with the aim of establishing an industrial and military power, the state moved heavily from agriculture and into investment in the urban areas.[25] To control the whole

population, but most of all to stop an influx of peasants in the wake of urban prosperity, the state adopted this discriminatory policy.

2) The repatriation system, which was in effect from 1953 to 2003, buttressed the household registration system. Under this system, the police had the authority to imprison and enforce the repatriation of peasants who entered the city without official permission.[26]

3) The state monopoly over purchasing and marketing since 1953 meant that the state had control over all staple farming produce while the market was by all intents and purposes eliminated.[27] In urban areas, food and other necessities of life were rationed, making it almost impossible for peasants to survive in the city.

4) By 1956, all entrepreneurs were either state-owned or belonged to the collective but were controlled by the state, and the private sector was eliminated. The government rigidly controlled the recruitment of entrepreneurs from among the peasants.[28]

The status of urban resident was a privilege. Only those who were considered to excel in some areas could be elevated from the countryside to the city; and on the other hand, urban residents whose ideology needed to be "remolded" or who were to be punished for criminal offenses could be temporarily or permanently driven outside the city. Although the entire population was disfranchised and lost the right of free migration, urban residents had the possibility of career advancement and enjoyed state welfare. Most important of all, their food rations were for the most part guaranteed. Exclusion from the city meant not only poverty, but also insecurity over one's subsistence. The above-mentioned policies sealed off the city borders, while the People's Commune locked peasants up in their villages.

3.3.2.2. Serfdom in Russia

According to Kolchin (1987, 2, 4), serfdom in Russian history also represented a

regression from a free to unfree labour system. The serf commune was the basic economic unit in the agricultural society that was in charge of evenly distributing land among serfs and collecting taxes. Serfs, a status inherited from generation to generation, had no right to land ownership or free migration, and were bonded to aristocratic landlords (1, 10, 63, 77, 217). However, the commune could also function as the political representative of the village in disputes with the government or landlords. On a regular basis, serfs had the right to elect their own leaders, who remained ordinary peasants without privileges (63, 201-3). Another function of the commune was to enforce family morality and block external interference. Serfs were able to forge communal values, customs and organizations based on centuries of tradition. Their religion also sheltered them against the harsh realities of life (63, 201-3). In economic terms, serfs owned large-scale farming tools and farm animals, managed their share of the land and controlled the produce after taxes. On estates where the quit-rent policy was adopted, the serfs could find employment in the city or engage in other activities than farming (45, 335). It is reasonable to conclude that the serfs enjoyed considerable *de facto* autonomy (217).

3.3.2.3. Comparison

Chinese peasants resembled Russian serfs in that they were unfree and landless, with a hereditary status passed down from generation to generation. However, they were different in some ways. In Russia, landlords hired managers to supervise the serfs. On the other hand, the serfs had the right to elect the heads of the communes who participated in administration but who had no standing in the state (Ibid, 63, 69). In the People's Commune of China, the administrators acted as agents of the state who taxed peasants unfairly. In contrast to their Russian counterparts, Chinese peasants had no right to make decisions on farming production or on the distribution of produce after tax.

They worked according to the rule of the para-military institution, completely chained to the soil. It can thus be seen that with less independence, the Chinese commune members were more deprived than the Russian serfs were.

To protect their own economic interests, Russian landlords would make an effort to sustain the lives of the serfs. Even if they were exploited, the serfs had their share of land and the commune's welfare system to fall back on (Ibid, 77). It thus can be inferred that large-scale starvation was not likely to occur when harvests were normal. In contrast, the state of China in fact controlled the commune economy. Sometimes peasants were allocated small plots of land which they could manage by themselves (*ziliudi* 自留地), but this was symbolic and far from sufficient for sustenance. The state normally did not invest in farming production, nor did it guarantee minimum income or other welfare for peasants.[29] Most important, food rations for peasants were not guaranteed. In the extreme case of the Great Famine between 1959 and 1961, peasants were even deprived of their sustenance and more than thirty million died of starvation even though there was no large scale natural disaster (Dikötter 2010; J. Yang 2009). In fact, the Chinese peasants suffered more oppression than was necessary for the normal operation of this exploitative mechanism. It is therefore assumed that the People's Commune functioned as a coercive structure.

One of the basic factors leading to the erosion of peasant freedom in Russia was the centralization and expansion of the state (Kolchin 1987, 4). The same is true of China, where the state chose to rely on internal exploitation and coercion. Nonetheless, there are obvious differences. Kolchin (2, 22) finds that the economy was one of the important reasons for Russian serfdom, which was a response to the widespread scarcity of agricultural labour and backward farming technology. With the development in commerce and technology, serfdom became highly inefficient and was doomed to decline. On the contrary, China always had surplus labour, but lacked the economic

precondition of the restrictive labour system: widely available land in relation to scarce labour. Chinese peasants were reduced to the state of fettered labour after WW II, which was the period of modern industry. Whatever modern techniques were developed during Mao's time failed to improve the peasants' income. As Qin's (1994, under "Reform Eliminates Miracle") research proves, the People's Commune created the lowest efficiency in farming production in the world and in Chinese history. Apparently, the outmoded and stagnating production techniques and the lowest efficiency in farming production were not the precondition but the aftermath of state coercion and exploitation. As to why the Russian serfdom system came to an end in 1857, Kolchin (1987, 179, 335) presents the following reason: free-labour ideas had become prevalent and Russian serfdom began to develop moral problems; moreover, economic development created new kinds of employment opportunities away from the nobleman's estate, while serfdom led to a labour shortage in industry. The People's Commune in China, on the other hand, was not terminated until 1982, when the state's economy was already "on the brink of bankruptcy".[30] This fact may lead to a focus on economic factors. According to L. Sun[31] (2011a, parag. 16), however, a more important force that contributed to the economic reform in rural China is that those who lost power during the Great Cultural Revolution intended to take the opportunity to return to the centre of power. This may be a clue to why, up to this very day, peasants, unlike the freed serfs in Russia, did not regain the right to own land as private property or to choose a place of permanent residence.

The above comparisons show that, all in all, the exploitation and coercion that was practised by the state of China through legal and administrative measures had many typical features of unfree labour in Russia, but the Chinese peasants did not have the rights and security that their Russian counterparts had. Russian serfs, more or less sheltered by the commune, were mostly dominated by old-fashioned feudalist landlords,

while the atomized Chinese peasants were directly exposed to an omnipresent government network woven by a modern state. Qin (2010c, last parag.) refers to the evidence that tens of millions of souls perished silently under the rule of the modern state and arrives at the conclusion that, by contrast, the Russian feudalist lords appeared to be more "merciful". Today, there is a gigantic income gap between rich and poor. This has given birth to the myth that Mao's era was a time of equal distribution in spite of material deficiency. This assumption, however, fails to consider the huge urban-rural gap. Given that many peasants received no annual profit share and had no guaranteed food rations, and especially given the great man-made famine which took the lives of more than thirty million peasants, the status of peasant often meant abject poverty, or even death. Ironically, poverty of the disadvantaged can be a resource for the advantaged. For example, as Terreblanche (2002, 254) finds, the racist regime in South Africa deliberately made the native reserves too small to sustain the blacks so that they were forced to work as cheap migrant labour. In the same way, Mao reduced peasants to abject poverty, which greatly facilitated the situation for his successors. In the post-Mao era, rural China has become a huge pool of limitless cheap labour serving the interests of the state.

3.3.3. Continuation: Off-farm workers in China as opposed to migrant workers in South Africa under apartheid

3.3.3.1. Chinese off-farm workers

The economic reform at the end of the 1970s was significant in that it solved the long-standing food-shortage problem, and peasants witnessed considerable improvements in both their lives and production. But the reform was restricted to the economic sector only, in the wake of which the controlling mechanism quickly grew in

strength and size. Investigations made by G. Chen and Wu (2004) have exposed that the cumbersome bureaucracy, in addition to such other public services as basic education, placed a heavy burden on the peasants, who had very limited resources, especially land resources (1 *mu* per peasant). Working in urban areas as off-farm workers would be the only option for many peasants. This, however, meant a life of insecurity and displacement, as is recorded by Liang (2010).

Currently, in the urban areas most off-farm workers who make a living in labour-compact factories under poor working conditions toil for more than 10 hours a day, earning approximately 1,300 *yuan* (about $200) a month.[32] In this way, nearly 260 million off-farm workers[33] in China form a huge pool of cheap labour that can then supply cheap commodities to the whole world. Zou and Q. Gao (2010, 20) have pointed out that these creators of the Chinese economic miracle are exposed to discriminatory policies. Off-farm workers must pay "departure permission fees" to their home villages because they have been registered as permanent rural residents; they must pay fees to the local city authorities for influx administration, and for temporary work and residence visas; sometimes they even have to pay a deposit to employers. Housing prices in urban areas are another excluding factor: some of the big cities with a high number of off-farm-worker inhabitants have more expensive housing than in Euro-American countries.[34] Zou and Q. Gao (192-98) have come to the conclusion that the result of the discriminatory policies is paradoxical for rural China: on the one hand, a surplus population of registered rural residents in relation to the limited land resources leads to pervasive poverty; on the other hand, the outflow of labourers leads to a shortage of farmhands in the agricultural sector and a waste of the limited land resources.

3.3.3.2. Migrant workers in South Africa under apartheid

Qin (2010a) has found an analogy in South Africa under the apartheid system and the preceding prototypes of racial discrimination. Terreblanche (2002, 68-9) has identified three pillars, established already at the beginning of the twentieth century, in support of the South African economy: a cheap workforce based on the native reserves, primary products for export and a socio-political stability that attracted foreign investment. Terreblanche (6) points out that the white power elite managed to convert the natives into cheap labour through three steps, by: 1) creating political and economic power structures that put whites in a privileged position in relation to the natives; 2) depriving the natives of their land and economic independence; 3) reducing the natives to unfree and exploitable labour.

More specifically, the whites gained their privileged position because they represented stronger and more sophisticated power constellations and they also introduced social stratifications, modes of production, legal and property systems and ideological orientations that were new in relation to those of the natives (Ibid, 20). Through various measures, ranging from frontier wars to repressive legislation, the whites were capable of dismantling traditional social structures of the natives, eliminating African peasantry and tenantry, and forcing them into the limited space of native reserves (or homelands) (11, Part Three). Once the natives lost their rights to property ownership and economic independence, they also lost economic and political bargaining power. Impoverished, proletarianized and confined within the native reserves, and with insufficient resources and deteriorating conditions, the natives were either forced or had no choice but to leave their homes and work for very low wages (254).

It was through legal, administrative power and, ultimately, the police force that the state oppressed and discriminated against the natives. The Land Act was the foundation on which the ultra-exploitative system was built and maintained (Ibid, 260-61). Together with other related legislative acts, it not only reduced the natives to the status of proletarians, but also tied their identities to the so-called "homelands", branding them as rural. A system of legislative and administrative measures such as pass laws, urbanization laws, influx control and labour bureaus deprived the natives of their freedom of migration and denied them their share of urban areas. A ban on African strikes and on African trade unions, examples of extra-economic coercion, aimed to impede African resistance and maintain the relative cheap price of African labour (70, 260-277, 335).

Chained within a frame of systemic exploitation and exclusion, the natives had to adopt a mode of life that was destructive to their family, and their cultural and social life. The migrant labour and compound systems coupled with the subsistence base in the so-called "homelands" comprised a carefully planned trap. Worse than economic exploitation, black townships and migrant worker hostels criminalized or brutalized many Africans (Ibid, 42, 70, 261, 319). In this way, the natives devoted their most productive years to urban areas, which were said to be the white man's creation, but were excluded from the benefits of urbanization and modernization and, when past their prime, they had to survive on the pre-capitalist economies in their impoverished homelands (255, 315, 319).

3.3.3.3. Comparison

Similar to the case of South Africa, the economic miracle in China is mainly based on cheap labour. The rapidly growing economy has not brought about a spontaneous "trickle-down" effect, to borrow a term from Terreblanche (2006, 62). The majority of

the Chinese population is left with a very low consumption capacity and the national economy heavily depends on export. It was the state of South Africa that installed a comprehensive apartheid system (314), while, in the same way, it is the state of China that has initiated and maintained urban-rural segregation with overt legal and administrative measures and even direct violence. In recent years, the occurrence of violent conflicts has risen dramatically and the authorities are concerned about social stability when the conditions peasants live under see some improvements in some aspects, such as termination of the agriculture tax.[35] But so far, as F. Li and X. Hu (2010) criticize, resistance to any fundamental move from a rural migratory to a stable urban labour force still appears to be vigorous, especially in the big cities where a large population of off-farm workers lives. Through the above comparisons it can be seen that, with respect to such measures as pass laws, migrant labour, single-sex living quarters and being tied to native reserves, which were characteristic of apartheid, the situation of the Chinese off-farm workers strikingly resembles what South Africans have experienced. Today, such post-apartheid features as crime and moral decay are very much in evidence in Chinese society.

Qin (2010a, under "Similarity between China and South Africa") points out that the Chinese off-farm workers, like their counterparts under South African apartheid, are more concerned about an absence of civil rights than deprived in economy. They have the status of outcast, which is the direct result of the state practising "legitimate" discrimination. Moreover, China is hardly a legal society, as Zou and Q. Gao (2010, 42) remark. For example, most off-farm workers are not protected by employment contracts, and one recurring problem is that entrepreneurs delay payment of wages. In South Africa, the source of direct violence that maintained discrimination was the police force. In China, on the other hand, peasants are routinely confronted with the "city supervisors" (*chengguan* 城管), who are temporarily recruited by the local authority.

Once the acts of direct violence of city supervisors gives rise to "group protests", the state would then rely on the "armed police" (*wujing* 武警), a national army force used to quickly put down any possibility of domestic public revolt.[36]

Terreblanche's (2006, 321, 322, 327) research in South Africa reveals two sides of the story. Shantytowns were notorious; social engineering to remove blacks had devastating effects on millions of natives; cutting down on the available housing for blacks in "white" urban areas served as an instrument of exclusion. But on the whole, the white government strove to make its coercion indirect. Such projects as housing construction in the Bantustans and industrial decentralization were evidence that the problem of physical accommodation for the cheap labour was considered part of the overall economic development plan. The construction of bachelors' quarters for migrant workers in the urban areas was under the supervision of the authorities, and therefore satisfied the government's uniform quality standard. While the workplace was very far from the Bantustans, commuting was provided for those who returned home daily. On the other hand, Zou and Q. Gao's (2010, 14, 15, 20) research of the Chinese case reveals almost a single-sided story. Most off-farm workers rent private houses in the suburbs or live in the shanties on their work sites. Invariably, their living conditions are crowded, dirty and unsafe. For example, in 1993, in the City of Shenzhen, one of the major bases for cheap labour, a fire took the lives of 87 working girls. Even such inadequate accommodation is never guaranteed. In municipal clearance projects, the living quarters of off-farm workers are always targeted. Some local authorities mobilize cohorts of policemen to repatriate off-farm workers, totally irrespective of their legal rights and dignity.

The white democratic regime in power in South Africa respected the due course of law. When applying its discriminatory policy, the racist government was torn apart by powerful pressure groups in its own constituency. The open and institutional rivalry

between various interest groups, such as political parties, the corporate sector and white trade unions, gave room for the black opposition to grow. Black resistance and opposition set limits on what the government could achieve with its social engineering plan, and the white racist regime had to consider the cost of suppressing the blacks (Terreblanche 2006, 66, 314). The political pattern in South Africa contrasts sharply with the state of China which does not have a democratic foundation and does not respect the due course of law. As Qin (2010a, under "Similarity between China and South Africa") points out, while the discriminatory policy in China is as intense as it was in South Africa, it is "blatantly unregulated".

Racial discrimination in South Africa broke with the mainstream ideology after World War II, leading to world condemnation. In China, on the other hand, urban-rural segregation tends to be confused with urban-rural disparity, a widespread problem that could be alleviated through economic development or affirmative-action projects. When the state has imposed a strict censorship on the media, it is capable of silencing troublesome voices. Moreover, urban-rural segregation in China is different from apartheid in South Africa, which was strictly regulated by law and clearly articulated. As a large population of the rural people is moving across the geographic boundary between the rural and urban areas, the discriminatory nature of this system may not be readily detected, and the features of its structure may not be easily identified.

3.3.3.4. Summary of the comparisons

The structures depicted above exist in different historical moments that are comparatively related to illustrate that for more than sixty years the Chinese peasants have been deprived of freedom and dignity. Similarities between the comparable categories reveal that the peasants have been reduced to the position of unfree labourers under a segregation system. The differences reveal that modern rulers always treat the

peasants in the most inhumane way, a way which has eliminated all elements of humanism inherited from Chinese tradition, and which appears less "merciful" or is "blatantly unregulated" in contrast to serfdom and apartheid (Qin 2010c, last parag.; 2010a, under "Similarity between China and South Africa"). Focus on the differences between the urban-rural segregation in China and apartheid in South Africa may further reveal some specificities of the Chinese case. We may envision a stratified society as a pyramid and, aided by this image, we can highlight several differences. 1) Racial segregation split the pyramid with more or less a vertical dividing line, separating the whites and the natives into two sectors, with each sector composed of unequal social strata, i.e. holders of different forms and volumes of capital. Urban-rural segregation splits the pyramid with a horizontal dividing line, separating the peasant population from the rest who are engaged in other trades, with the peasant sector mainly composed of holders of physical capital. As a result, the rural society is deprived in various forms of capital. 2) Racial segregation was a heritage from history, aiming to institutionalize *de facto* segregation without a plan as to whether the majority or the minority were marginalized. In China, there was no *de facto* segregation before the CPC came into power. The substructure of the pyramid, or the majority of the population, was composed of peasants. The segregation that marginalized peasants in effect marginalized the majority. 3) Racial segregation was based on race difference, which is immutable; urban-rural segregation was based on the status that the state assigned to individuals according to their trades and places of residence, which can be changed. As a result, unlike the dividing line between different races, which is impassible, the barrier between the urban and the rural society may be overcome. Of course, such "flexibility" is controlled by the dominant party. It is with such flexibility that the dominant party had managed to continuously penetrate into and drain resources from the dominated sector. The above outlined structure presents such a pattern as: the rulers, in the

minority, ruled the overwhelming majority, with the majority being impoverished, their private space penetrated and various forms of capital drained from them.

3.4. Discussion

The conclusions drawn from the above comparisons may give rise to new questions. What is the purpose of the Chinese unfree labour system when the peasants are exploited so extremely that the national economy is undermined? And why does the regime deliberately defy the power of the majority while we fail to see the type of repeated peasant uprisings that have occurred throughout the course of Chinese history? If Galtung's concepts are applied, these questions can be reformulated as: why do the rulers so readily resort to violence, especially direct violence, and why do the oppressed tolerate such a violent structure that disregards their survival needs? To track the ideological orientations underlying the state policies, some clues may be found in Mao's declaration that he considered himself to be a combination of the First Emperor (259-210 B.C.) in Chinese history and Karl Marx (D. Chen 1989, 28). Or to put it another way, the state was continuing an ancient policy of "weakening the people in power relations" (Shang Yang, 395-338 B.C.) while supporting the structure with elements of modernity.

Mao's reference to the First Emperor may indicate his heritage based on ancient Chinese tyranny. The First Emperor, building his power upon a para-military prince state, conquered his rivals, unified China and established the first centralized regime. One of the important reasons for his success was that he adopted a policy that manipulated his subjects in his state with laws that disregarded moral rights. According to his political backers, the power of the state would be correspondingly increased as the power of the people was weakened. They believed that if the state monopolized all resources, did not allow the people to own surplus property, denied them independent

identity, freedom of speech or ideas, the people would be obedient and could be easily manipulated; in the long run, the prince state could become a super power in inter-state affairs (Ibid).

If we look at modern times to find the reasons for Mao's success in China, Mann (1999, 21, 27, 28) may shed light on this issue through his analysis of how democracy, which is the most sacred institution of Western modernity, may also give rise to some undesirable consequences. In the twentieth century, citizens had more expectations of their states. On the one hand, the most "advanced" political theory of mature democracy could arouse aspirations for the central idea that the *whole* people must rule, while on the other hand, in areas with a backward economy, "the people", mostly rural, were largely outside the reach of working-class organizations and consequently had less power to withstand the elites' manipulation and mobilization from above. Especially in regions fraught with imperial versus local conflicts, the awakening to democracy could escalate the conflicts by involving not only the elites but also the populace. In this case, communism might rise as part of the central political theme of modernity, which viewed dictatorial states as bearers of a moral project to cleanse this people of its enemies. Through the modern practice of vesting political legitimacy in "the people", such regimes could claim kinship to the bearers of true modernity, such as advocates of liberalism and social democracy (19, 21, 39). In Yen's (1933, 54; 1937, 176) observations of China, he finds that the ancient country was fraught with multiple "social diseases", the traditional culture was losing legitimacy, and different values were in conflict with each other. It was a crucial time when politics became a very sensitive topic and sharp and value-loaded dichotomies were prevalent (1980, 294). Moreover, the rise of the USSR exerted a strong impact upon Chinese mentality.[37] Compared to the new ideologies, traditional values on which peasant autonomy was based had much less sophisticated ideological orientations. Hence the "roots of the roots" were shaken,

to borrow an expression from Galtung (1996, 206). At a time of bewilderment and vulnerability, what would eventually be ushered in instead was, according to the criterion of Galtung (1996, 203), cultural violence: political ideologies made up for the absence of religion and the modern state was lifted to the status of God. By the time Mao claimed victories on the battlefield, the stage had already been set for a unique structure of violence, often referred to as "the party-state".

The empire initiated by the First Emperor lasted only fifteen years before it was overthrown. Classical texts[38] put this short lifespan down to the extreme exploitation of all the people in the country. Exploitation is a "center-piece" [sic] of violent structure, as Galtung (1996, 198) puts it, and it is also one of the reasons why this structure is maintained. In modern times, however, this old type of violence needs new and more sophisticated strategies that can function as what Galtung (1996, 199-200) terms "protective accompaniment." While the CPC military victory in 1949 paved the way, it was more the process of land reform, the destruction of the patriarchal system, the introduction of the People's Commune and urban-rural segregation that reconstructed the entire society and perpetuated the structure of violence. In contrast to the First Emperor, who mainly depended on military forces, the modern tyrant had a larger repertoire and more sophisticated equipment, including cultural violence that lent justification to other forms of violence, and more importantly, structural violence that internalized cultural violence and institutionalized direct violence. Structural violence was supported from the subsequent more specific strategies that were aimed at depriving peasants of their freedom and identity.

Fragmentation and marginalization. Through redefinition and perpetuation of class status, and with the traditional private economy transferred to a mode of public economy that was directly or indirectly dominated by the state, the political and

economic ties based on paternal blood lines were broken so that the peasants were atomized. All villages were located at the bottom of a vertical bureaucratic structure, while horizontal ties, such as those based on inter-village marriages or local culture, lost their significance. Urban-rural segregation divided industrial workers and peasants into two classes that were geographically distanced and economically and politically unequal,[39] making it difficult for the two to form alliances. Out of the ruins of all the horizontal structures that had previously existed within civil societies grew a new and consolidated state power. While this power mostly fed on agriculture, it put peasants at the bottom of society. Industrialization and modernization ruthlessly drained resources from rural China, while in the city the peasants were treated like pariahs. Fragmented on multiple levels and totally marginalized, the peasants could afford neither to organize nor to accumulate other resources that could help them resist exploitation and oppression.

Penetration and segmentation. When the peasants were reorganized, the village structure began to reflect the hierarchical structure of the party-state. Rural elites were no longer village seniors, or rural gentry, or those esteemed by the villagers, but rather production brigade cadres with "good" backgrounds and the "right" political attitude. Since the new elites were chosen from among the villagers, the peasants could be under the illusion that their ancestors' village was still in their own hands. Nor could they see through the collective economy through which the land property of the village was already monopolized by the party-state. In fact, the party-state had already penetrated the village structure, using the peasants' own language and mobilizing the peasants themselves to destroy their traditional values.[40] On the other hand, urban-rural segregation blocked the channels through which they obtained basic social, political and economic information. Without the opportunity to compare their situation to others, the

peasants were unaware of the extreme urban-rural disparity. They might gradually become accustomed to a condition of absolute deprivation, or even be under the illusion that acceptance of a poor living conditions could be equated with devotion to the community. Using Galtung's (1969, 170) term, this is a "positive approach", in contrast to the use of direct violence as a "negative" approach. The party-state adopted both the positive and negative approaches to weave a systemic and imperceptible web of manipulation but always remained remote and impersonal. It was difficult for the peasants to identify the real culprit, and very hard for them to move from bewilderment and dissatisfaction to consciousness formation.

Using various strategies to colour all its violence as progressive and modern, this party-state managed to impose a system that reflected nearly all of what Galtung (1969, 174-77) defines as the mechanisms of structural violence: commune members formed a linear ranking order with little horizontal interaction, and those filling the lower ranks in the party-state system were also marginalized in their villages; all communes fit in the party-state system with identical structures and status in which all members were affiliated with the collective and adopted a uniform way of acting. The aftermath, according to M. Zhang (2004, parag. 2), was that the overall rural society appeared uniform in structure. This combination of multiple chains goes a long way to explaining why, during the Great Famine between 1959 and 1961, the peasants just died silently in their villages, whereas in similar cases in history, starving peasants would form waves of refugees that might lead to peasant uprisings.

In the post-Mao era, the concept of modernity also dressed the economic reform in a deceptive cloak. The termination of some restrictive policies may have given the people a feeling of liberation. In fact, however, the two important legacies of the Mao era, deprivation of peasants' land property ownership and urban-rural segregation, continue. These two exploitative and discriminatory institutions, combined with the

scarcity of land resources, have left very little room for the peasants to manoeuvre. They are therefore forced to migrate to the city but are excluded from the urban public goods. When the identity of each peasant is tied to the village while they are actually migrant workers in the city, it is difficult for them to form stable relations among each other in either location. Excluded from the mainstream life of the city, they continue to be denied basic political, social and economic information. An itinerant life is destructive to their families, and urban-centred consumerism, a mode of living that is widely marketed through the modern media, erodes the rural tradition and morals that somehow survived the ravages of Mao's era. Such new concepts as the market economy and modernization provide excuses for unequal distribution of wealth and disguise the many sins that were unknown to the traditional society. Economic development may make the threat of starvation less prevalent. However, with a legal system that prohibits independent trade unions, strikes and participation in politics, and with the peasants exposed to the direct violence of the "city supervisors" and "armed police" at both the local and national levels, the Chinese peasants retain their position as unfree labour, still chained in a violent structure that has extended from the village to the city.

The gravest abuse was the exploitation of the modern education system as a means of penetration, segmentation and marginalization. In an issue related to education, Bourdieu's comment is enlightening: social mobility granted to a controlled selection of a limited number of individuals, rather than upgrading the underclasses, may guarantee social stability and help to reproduce the structure of class relations. Compulsory schooling, in particular, is capable of imposing upon the dominated groups the value of the dominating class and, at the same time, relegating their own value and knowledge to an inferior position (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 42, 167).

Since the 1950s, although higher education suffered greatly, the party-state did manage to expand rural basic education, which raised the level of literacy. However,

this process of education, according to the criteria of Haavelsrud and Galtung, could be defined as anti-dialogic and the content of the education emphasized sharp and value-loaded dichotomies, worship of the state ruler (Haavelsrud 1996, 143; Galtung 1996, 203). Such processes and content manifested structural violence. Especially during the Great Cultural Revolution, intellectuals were sent to the rural areas to perform manual labour in the name of moral purification, which would then deny them professional identity. And, in the name of combining theory with practice, the peasants who had the "right" political attitude were often invited to participate in education. This kind of "dialogue" would give people a feeling of democracy, but the context of the dialogue can be labelled as what Haavelsrud (1996, 87) calls "the framework of the monopolized premises". In this way, without the support of the imagination of the intellectuals, the rural schools in China were prevented from following the international trend to democratize education, and the peasants could hardly realize the opportunity of achieving a real education, but were permanently reduced to the status of simple, manual labour. The expansion of the low-quality basic education in rural China during the Mao era has a negative effect that it could deprive the peasants of their independent values, representing a further destruction of the rural culture, in the process of state penetration. But there is another negative effect: the monopoly of the government-run education system meant destruction of the ancient tradition of private schools. In the post-Mao era, basic education in rural areas has gradually declined, as has been observed by Jiao (1999). Deficiency in funding may explain the decline. But an equally important reason may be that the general context in rural China has also been reshaped in a way that is unfavourable to non-official enterprises.

Urban-rural segregation has always been part of Chinese education, but is not as defined by corresponding state laws as it was in South Africa. Discrimination to a large extent is achieved through economic measures, as we can see, for example, in primary

and secondary education: the village economy supports rural schools while the municipal economy supports urban schools. In Mao's era, all the staff in urban schools were state employees, while many rural teachers, without professional qualifications and temporarily employed, were subsidized by the village. Such education policies that correspond to urban-rural segregation have continued into the post-Mao era. By now, the number of rural schools has sharply decreased. Within the twelve years between 1997 and 2009, half of the primary schools in rural China were shut down, with 64 rural primary schools disappearing each day (China Youth Daily, December 24, 2011). More than 60% of the rural children do not continue to senior middle school (M. Han 2009). Insufficient funding to rural education accounts for much of this phenomenon. As a large peasant population has migrated into the urban areas, and many are granted a "long-term" urban residence permit, some private schools have emerged to admit their children.[41] Lu Wang's (2008, 700-01) research proves that these low-quality and low-cost schools tend to reproduce the underclass. Even such opportunities are not always available, for many of the low-quality schools are not authentically accredited and hence are targets of municipal clearance projects (Sha 2014). Some municipal schools are open to rural children, but charge extra fees,[42] while some openly impose segregation policies that separate urban and rural children (Nanfang Metropolis Daily, June 09, 2010). At the tertiary level, the state policy that encourages higher education institutions to charge high tuition fees effectively deprives many rural people of education opportunities (Dong 2004). Moreover, with a poor educational background at the primary and secondary level, rural youths are often streamed into the non-elite, low-quality institutions. As a result, rural students tend to exhaust their family finances but are likely to find themselves in a difficult situation at a time of employment crises, or may become college-graduate-off-farm workers, as will be detailed in Chapters Five and Six.

It is note-worthy that the "state cadre"[43] selection system and the higher education system recruit civil servants and college students from among the peasants, the small elites that have some capacity for political activity. Since the urban-rural difference is not immutable like the racial difference, the status of these rural elites can be altered. Once these elites have been assigned urban status, which they can then pass down to their children, they are uprooted from rural society. This is in sharp contrast to the traditional society when one's identity in the rural community represented rights rather than marginalization. When officials or intellectuals found the environment for their career too adverse, they could retire to their rural homes -- socially and politically, as well as geographically. It thus can be seen that, on the one hand, urban-rural segregation in a way resembles a perpetuated racial segregation; on the other hand, it manifests some flexibility which is controlled by the dominant group and contributes to a continuous brain drain from the peasant community. Qin (2010a, under "Difference between China and South Africa") points to the cadre selection system in particular as one of the factors making it less possible for a popular leading figure like Nelson Mandela to emerge from the masses in rural China. This remark may in part explain why the Chinese peasants seldom protest against the discriminatory institutions in as rational and systemic a manner as the South African natives did.

It thus can be seen that in the evolution of the state policies one theme is salient: the peasants are disadvantaged in the power relations, which has been duplicated from the First Emperor. But the endeavours of the First Emperor turned out to be a great failure, which led to the first peasant uprising in Chinese history. The downfall of the giant seemed to have proven the prophecy of Mencius (372-289 B.C.), the ancient idealist who maintained that the stability of a state lies in its reciprocal relation with the people. This also helped to create a myth that demonstrated the power of peasant rebellion. This may in part explain why the ancient rulers who competed for power at

the top level would more or less leave some autonomy to, and sought to negotiate with the majority of the population. However, most of the time Chinese history tells us a different story: most of the monarch dynasties, even though lasting for centuries, invariably collapsed, and an important force that defined the comings and goings of dynasties was peasant uprisings. When asked for the countermeasure to prevent this historical periodicity, Mao gave the solution, "democracy" (F. Huang 2012). In practice, apparently, Mao went to the opposite extreme, falling back on the First Emperor in addition to modernity. In this way, the relationship between the modern rulers and the people was undoubtedly that of the conqueror and the conquered, leaving no room for negotiation. However, the conquest was bound to be an endless process, for it was a conquest of the minority over an overwhelming majority, and the conquerors were extremely afraid of a revolt by the conquered.[44] From the very beginning, therefore, the conquerors made every effort to deprive all resources from the peasants in a way that no previous dynasties had managed to do. This permanently eliminated the possibility of the peasants duplicating the rebellions of the past. Most significant of all was the exploitation of modern education. By persecuting the intellectuals, the First Emperor mainly persecuted the small number of elites. The modern party-state, on the other hand, not only denied peasants the right to enlightenment more severely than was done in medieval times, but also created a culture of violence through the system of populace education to justify and popularize structural and direct violence. This lifted the party-state to the level of omnipotent entity, enjoying limitless power and legitimacy.

Rulers in the post-Mao era seem to have inherited Mao's fear of public revolt. They then resort to direct violence, such as funding "public security" with so much money that has exceeded expenditures on the national defense (BBC.co.uk 2013, 2014). They resort to structural violence as well, such as maintaining urban-rural segregation. In maintaining this structure, they also seem to have inherited what Hamrin and Cheek

(1986, 10) refer to as Mao's "wartime norms of official flexibility". Acts of direct violence that are not legitimated by laws are possible due to such flexibility. The suppression of the student protests in 1989 was a typical example of such flexibility. In the case of urban-rural segregation, this flexibility may be misrecognized as evidence that the Chinese peasants suffer less discrimination than did the victims of racial segregation. The long co-existence of such flexibility and the urban-rural segregation system confirms Galtung's (1996, 208) statement that a violent structure tends to institutionalize direct violence. The phenomena, such as what Qin (2010a, under "Similarity between China and South Africa") refers to as blatantly unregulated, what Zou and Q. Gao (2010, 42) refer to as disrespect of legal procedures, are invariably made possible by the flexibility that accompanies the urban-rural segregation system. When such flexibility is applied in the educational system, it may lead to such phenomena as follows: rural schools are merged by force; private schools oriented to the children of off-farm workers are shut down by force, universities and colleges unduly charge high tuition fees from rural students.

However, the regime has always been under the threat of both fiscal strain and public revolt: as the party-state expanded, and government inefficiency and waste of resources continued, extreme exploitation became necessary; when the peasants were even deprived of what they needed for survival, their instinct to resist was inevitable. From the very beginning, therefore, the party-state relied on violence and deliberately and *rationally* eliminated all elements of humanism inherited from tradition. Today, the Chinese peasants are more directly exposed to and thus much more aware of the huge distribution disparity accompanying the economic reform, which is also plagued with widespread corruption. The educational system marginalizes their children, depriving them of their last hope for social advancement. This, to a considerable extent, leads to a situation that CPC propaganda in the ideological arena (i.e. cultural violence that

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legitimates structural violence) has become less effective. And the rulers, in turn, will more readily rely on direct violence, the other supporter of structural violence, in order to crush the people's belief in the myth of peasant rebellion, and to make every individual shudder at the mere thought of party-state power.

3.5. Conclusion

Collins, Skocpol and Goldstone summarize a model of "state breakdown" which is the combination of the following key factors: state fiscal strain, popular revolt, lack of legitimacy, intra-elite conflict (Collins 1999, 47, 49). The party-state is being threatened by the first three of the four factors. Apparently, the rulers do not plan to reform the existing power relations and find solutions in democracy, which means they will have to continue to undermine the power of society so as not to repeat the historical periodicity that saw the eventual fall of the dynasties. Once society has been unduly undermined, the national economy may also be undermined. This is the price the party-state has to pay to prevent its collapse, and the conventional measures that the party-state applies in undermining the power of the people are aimed at depriving the majority of the population, i.e. the peasants. Since such deprivation is structural, peasants' disadvantaged status would turn out to be permanent and would pass down to their children through the functioning of such mechanisms as the educational system. It is therefore assumed that the urban-rural segregation system is one of the most important pillars of the party-state and it is used to reduce the peasants to the status of unfree labourers and, in turn, to control other sectors of Chinese society. The flexibility inherent in the violent structure shows the institutionalization of direct violence, which guarantees that the state can undermine the power of the society as much as possible.

In the first half of the twentieth century, direct violence, often in the form of open warfare, raged across most of China. At a time of ideological conflicts, the

legitimacy of the traditional local autonomy, which had sheltered the peasants in history, was in decline. The peasants' vulnerability left room for cultural and structural violence to penetrate into the rural communities. The newly established totalitarian structure not only oppresses peasants politically, robs them economically, hurts them physically, but has also destroyed their values and beliefs derived from their traditional political autonomy and economic independence. Today, to control the violence of the party-state, what is necessary is not only a structure that is more sophisticated than the patriarchal system, but also a culture that is based more on modernity than on traditional collectivism. Or, to put it another way, only when the peasants are equipped with both organizational know-how and political awareness will it be possible for them, faced with the overwhelmingly powerful violence of the party-state, to uphold individual rights as inalienable, just as they upheld family morals in the past with an almost religious tenacity.

Chapter Four: Reflections on the Status of Chinese University Intellectuals

4.1. Introduction

One of the sources on the situation in the university-society dimension is the discussion in the public media about the moral degradation of Chinese intellectuals. For example, between June and July in 2009, *Xiaokang*, a sub-journal of *Qiushi* (the journal run by the CCCPC), undertook a survey on the integrity of 49 social categories. Teachers and scientists, who used to enjoy high social prestige, ranked lower than prostitutes, and lower than peasants, clergymen, soldiers and students (Xiaokang 2009). There are also individuals within the establishment who criticize academia. For example, the vice mayor of Guangzhou City complains that 60% of the national research funding has been consumed in areas other than scientific research (Lin Zhang 2013). Criticism from outside the establishment is more common, for example, the President of Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications, Binxing Fang, who is known as the "Father of the Firewall" in China, published a Spring Festival greeting on the internet in 2013. Within two days, he received more than twenty thousand derogatory responses (Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2013).[45] Some well-known scholars join in the voices in the public media, such as Y. He (2010) and Lixiong Wang (2002), who criticize the intellectual community under the titles "The Most Desperate Degradation" and "Aspiration for Degradation".[46] Yu (2009) says that contemporary Chinese intellectuals are undergoing a status transformation from the servants of power to market peddlers.[47] D. Liu (2012) warns of the impending overall collapse in academic ecology.[48] X. Ding (2010) declares that Chinese academics are hopeless.[49] Q. Zhang (2011) suggests that the hypothesis that the deterioration of the Chinese intellectuals is related to the system is so self-evident that it no longer needs verification; what really

matters is that this community has lost the support of the professional spirit.[50] In order

to examine the extensiveness of such criticism, the researcher undertook a simple

experiment in September 2012. Aided by the Chinese internet search engine,

"baidu.com", the search for "university president/academic corruption" has more than

five million hits. Scanning through the first 70 hits one finds the names of presidents or

deputy presidents of eight universities. The above criticism, which mainly takes aim at

the intellectuals' failure to play their public roles properly and at their corrupted

demeanour, is mainly based on the critics' personal observations.

This study is not intended to add another voice to the public media and to

discuss the topic as merely a problem of some individuals. Rather, the aim is to examine

how the deterioration of the Chinese intellectuals is related to the system. In other words,

the state-university dimension in the analytic triangle is the focus of this chapter. And

the discussion will be narrowed down to explore a more specific question, which is

formulated as follows:

> How has the structure of the Chinese higher education institutions, under
>
> the influence of their relationship with the state, shaped the university
>
> intellectuals with respect to their mentality and attitude toward their
>
> public roles?

4.2. Methods

Bourdieu's field theory is applied as the guiding approach, which prompts the researcher

to think relationally. The choice of methods is subordinate to the purpose of the study:

to interpret the relationship between different parties, such as how the state influences

the university, how the university influences the intellectuals and how the intellectuals

respond to their context. This is done to demonstrate a dynamic, evolutionary process in

the institutions' structure in relation to its macro-context, not unlike sketching a diagram.

The objective structure of the university is outlined mainly by referring to relevant CPC and government policies, as well as regulations within the institutions, or by referring to some important historical events.

This chapter is mainly based on literature. The different types of material serve multiple purposes: to outline the structure of the Chinese higher education institutions, to depict a general background or to provide illustrations for this chapter, to help identify the gap in which this chapter finds its position, to construct a conceptual framework for the analysis. The websites of several universities are referred to in order to present the objective structure. The major sources of information are the internet and publications outside Continental China, invariably because of the strict censorship; as a matter of fact, some critics referred to in this chapter have suffered persecution to various degrees.[51] The researcher is familiar with the organization and norms of the Chinese universities and colleges, which forms part of the basis for the analysis and reflection.

With its limited scale, this study focuses its analysis on the major frame of the institutions' structure that is relatively permanent, giving less heed to the details that vary with the state's shifting political line and contradictory goals. The university intellectuals are studied as a social category and their habitus is seen as collective: close scrutiny of the individual habitus at the micro level is not the focus of this study. The category being studied in this chapter covers professionals and technical personnel engaged in management, education and research. They have such academic titles as PhD, assistant lecturer, lecturer, associate professor, professor, PhD supervisor, which only indicate academic qualifications or positions in the bureaucratic structure, but are less defined by academic competence, and even less related to the spiritual and ideological aspects.

4.3. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

As general background, the history of the modern Chinese university is very short, only covering a period of one century. The structure modelled according to the Western university only came into existence two to three decades before 1949 (Hayhoe 1996, 116-17). After the CPC came to power, the "thought remolding"[52] of intellectuals was considered to be one of the most important measures for the realization of "democratic reform" and industrialization (Mao 1951, 184). Two events in the 1950s could serve as the milestones in the process. First, the system began an "institution and discipline adjustment" (*yuanxi tiaozheng* 院系调整) in 1952, which gradually phased out some of the former national universities, all the private or church funded universities[53] and terminated some liberal arts disciplines such as law, political science and sociology (Haibo Wang 2006). The new system was mainly composed of technology and engineering colleges that were oriented towards economic development.[54] Second, the Anti-rightist Campaign in 1957 marginalized academic authorities and expelled a great number of the top teachers and students from the campus (S. Ding 1993, 2007). Intellectuals not only lost the freedom to research and teach, but faced the potential threat of arrest without recourse to the law (Y. Gao[55] 2007). These two events are important indicators: the former meant the reconstruction of the university by government ordinance; the latter meant the implementation, aided with the reshaped structure, of more severe state policies that were often manifested in the form of political campaigns.

The vertical patron-client relations, which were the dominant pattern in the communication between the state leaders and intellectuals (Goldman, quoted in Hamrin and Cheek 1986, 15), were strengthened by a series of political campaigns. In the post-Mao era, an obvious change is that political campaigns as a routine means of

control have been terminated in favour of other forms. For example, regular field armies were deployed to put down the student protests in 1989 without providing a legitimate excuse; some individual dissidents were fired or arrested with recourse to the law.[56] But on the whole, the regulatory approach of the rulers has shifted to a more restrained and selective approach to control intellectuals, as S. Ma (1998, 450) comments. Consequently, the intellectuals' living and working conditions have improved to some extent. Especially since the 1990s, with the economy gaining in importance as a means of manipulation, the state's political control has been relatively relaxed. Meanwhile, however, as some researchers have observed, the growing market forces have increasingly distracted the intellectual community from its public role (E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004, 12). This may explain the large volume of criticism found in the public media.

In contrast to what is being said in the public media, it appears that Chinese researchers on the whole fail to have a corresponding degree of research on intellectuals. To list a few well-known authors who have made inroads into the relevant areas: Pei (2004) points out that contemporary China has been largely influenced by the choices of the intellectual community.[57] G. Fu (2008) observes that the intellectual community is undergoing a great change; this group is now split and no longer shares common interests, nor do they have common spiritual goals or moral appeal.[58] J. Xu (2003) has identified a salient feature about the intellectual community, seeing that they are increasingly indifferent to public affairs; if they used to be marginalized in the political sphere, they are now in turn socially marginalized.[59] K. Chen (2004) suggests that the tension between the Communist regime and academia does not result from the rulers' personal preferences, but is created by the structure and institution.[60] P. Hu (2005, 2012) analyses the CPC's thought-remolding strategies that they used on the intellectual community from the perspective of philosophy and psychology; he also assumes that,

under the market-oriented situation, the CPC rule has converted the Chinese intellectuals into cynics, or people who only recognize external secular benefits while ignoring intrinsic virtues and values.[61] Xia (2010), in contrast, finds that the intellectuals are collaborators in government crimes. The above-mentioned researchers either have a tendency to study the community as a whole,[62] or concentrate on specific cases of some prominent intellectuals.[63] When it comes to research specifically aimed at university intellectuals, much remains to be explored.

In the search for relevant material, the researcher has found only one monograph (J. Zhang 2009) published in recent years that analyses university intellectuals. This work defines the field of Chinese research universities not as an academic community that searches for balanced truth, but as a field in the hierarchical government bureaucracy. However, it is mainly focused on the young teachers' professional stability and development trajectory. Such questions as how state political and economic policies interfere in the higher education system largely remain unanswered. Or, in terms of field theory, the work fails to give significant consideration to the process through which the omnipresent political force intrudes on the university field. The researcher has found only one short paper (L. Gu and X. Zhou 2011) published in Continental China that is focused on the heteronomy of university. It is very valuable that the authors ascribe the status quo to the invasion of state power. In conclusion, however, the paper deviates from the conflict between the state and higher education institutions. All in all, the above-mentioned researchers rarely incorporate much systematic theories, or focus on objective structures, and although some of them assumes that the intellectual community and the objective structure interact, they rarely demonstrate the specific process of how this takes place.

This chapter follows the idea of Bourdieu's theory to think relationally (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 96) so as to avoid alternating between condemnations of

either society or the educational system as the sole culprit of the problems (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 178). To be more specific, this research attempts to relate the higher education institutions to the state as well as to individual intellectuals; it is focused on the objective structure of the institutions, and also gives heed to the intellectuals' subjective response to the structure. To achieve this purpose, this chapter is set within a conceptual framework which is based on Bourdieu's field theory. The concept of field generalizes the space within which the university intellectuals live, and thus filters out the minor details that might interfere with the aim of the research. The concept of habitus is history-based, which enables this research to cover different periods of time; in combination with the concept of homology, it explains the relationship between the objective structure of the institutions and the subjective dispositions of the intellectuals. Several forces that impact the university field are converted into various forms of capital that are comparable. The concept of heteronomy summarizes the process through which the university field has been invaded and helps to discern the heterogeneous forces that are undermining the field.

4.4. Outline of the Chinese Higher Education Institutions

In spite of all the changes over recent decades, the basic structure of the institutions remains the same in that the senior leaders of the universities and colleges are appointed by the personnel department of the CPC committee at the overriding level. Two CCCPC documents are decisive here: the Cadre Management System Reform Regulations (1983) and the CPC Grassroots Organizations Regulations in General Higher Education Institutions (1996; 2010). According to the first document, senior university leaders in both the party and administrative sections are directly under the leadership of the CPC committees at the corresponding overriding levels.[64] For example, the heads of the two top universities in China, Tsinghua University and Peking University, are appointed by

the personnel department of the CCCPC, and the heads of provincial universities are appointed by the personnel departments of the provincial CPC committees. The second document is mainly focused on affairs within the institutions. For example, the so-called President Responsibility System is under the leadership of the CPC committee, while the institutions' cadres (i.e. heads and directors) at various levels are appointed and managed by the CPC grassroots organizations.[65] In 1999, the *Higher Education Law of the PRC* was issued. Obviously, it has never deviated from the above two CCCPC regulations. It lays down that the university president is an independent legal entity, while in Article 39, it lays down that the president shall be under the leadership of the CPC committee of the university; the CPC committee appoints the heads of different sections and defines the institutional organization. With respect to the cadre appointment procedures, the university president is subordinate to the CPC committee on the overriding level, as well as to the CPC committee at the institutional level. In effect, the *Higher Education Law of the PRC* fails to provide significant protection to the president who exercises his powers independently, for it fails to provide any specific legal guarantee regarding academic autonomy and funding. It is, so to speak, the CCCPC policy reformulated in the form of law.

Chinese universities and colleges constitute a highly stratified system (Xie 2011, 37-38). Within such a huge, hierarchical structure, there will be differences from institution to institution. However, within the macro framework of a strongly centralized state, the major structures of the universities and colleges tend to be homogeneous. Table 4.1 attached at the end of this chapter, which demonstrates the main structure within the institutions, is based on the information found on the internet in September 2012. It lists 20 elite universities that function as models for other institutions. It would appear that the field of Chinese higher education still retains the basic structure that is the legacy of the 1950s. All the universities are under the top-down leadership of the

CPC committees and are subordinate to the central or local governments. The major management sections in the institutions are supervised by the corresponding offices in the governments.[66] Within the institutions, as can be seen from Table 4.1, there are two parallel leading agencies. One is the CPC apparatus, which controls ideology and appoints the heads of all the faculties and departments. In this way, it dominates the university, but may be staffed by non-experts.[67] The other is the administrative bureaucracy, which deals with the daily affairs and whose staff is appointed and supervised by the CPC. Taking Huazhong University of Science and Technology as an example, one sees that not only the administrative bureaucracy is under the leadership of its CPC committee, but also the university administrative leaders, including the university president, vice presidents and executive vice-presidents, are all members of the CPC Standing Committee. The Personnel Department of the CPC Committee is responsible for the appointment and management of all leaders at or above the faculty and department level, including the heads of the various academic sections. The CPC Committee of the institution is also in charge of the Youth League Commission and Student Work Department/Office; the latter sections control the students' political and ideological actions or manage other student affairs, ranging from the students' extracurricular activities to scholarship and student loans. The United Front Department of the CPC Committee controls the members of the many democratic parties that have no more than a rubber-stamp function. Especially noteworthy is the Security Department of the CPC Committee, whose "internal security responsibility" (*neibao* 内 保) is similar to the role of political police (Hust.edu.cn).

The Constitution of the CPC (2007, Chapter Five, Item 29, 31) stipulates that wherever there are three or more formal party members, a grass-roots party organization should be established. Accordingly, the CPC organization penetrates vertically from the top down and is linked to academic sections to construct a hierarchy normally

consisting of three levels: CPC committee of the university, CPC committees of the faculties and CPC branches rooted in the departments or teaching offices. The CPC recruits its members from among staff and students who are obliged to promote the influence of the CPC on the campus. Apart from the above-listed institutions, there are also quasi-institutional control systems. For example, financial means are used to encourage the students to become part of a watchdog network, often referred to as the "the system of teaching information staffs" (*xinxiyuan zhidu* 信息员制度).[68] In this way, the CPC organization penetrates all academic sections and on all levels of the university, and it could be said that it has constructed a vast nerve system.

In sharp contrast to the well-organized CPC, the intellectuals are "atomized", to borrow a term from Galtung (1969, 177). There are no system-wide teachers' unions or other professorial associations that are taken for granted in other countries, while the teachers' union within each university is not independent but subordinate to the CPC committee; the leader of the union is a member of the CPC committee.[69] The student union, which is affiliated with the Youth League Committee, is indirectly controlled by the CPC Committee. As can be expected, it is difficult for teachers to form horizontal allegiances with each other or with their students, either within or across campus borders. It is also difficult for peers to form vertical allegiances beyond the institutions: peers in other countries find their professional standing chiefly in their disciplines (Clark 1983, 33; Maassen and Cloete 2002, 27); the Chinese intellectuals, in contrast, find their professional standing mainly within their institutions, with the assessment of the teachers' qualifications controlled by CPC and administrative officials. Ogden (2004, 115) describes this status quo as "factionalized intellectually and organizationally along the same lines as the Party-state."

All in all, the university intellectuals manage to survive between the two intertwined networks of party and administrative bureaucracy, confined in their

segmented campuses. The following are five examples which illustrate how, at different times, some Chinese intellectuals cope with their environments. These cases are widely-noted and involve some very influential figures in the university field:

Example 1. Intellectuals yielded to political pressure and provided false theory. In 1958, Professor Qian, a world-famous Chinese scientist, wrote an article in support of the state project called the "Great Leap Forward" in agriculture.[70] The project deprived peasants of food and took over 30 million lives. This came in the wake of the Anti-rightist Campaign of 1957 during which many intellectuals were persecuted.

Example 2. Intellectuals who refused to yield to pressure suffered persecution. Professor Wanli Huang, the most renowned hydraulics specialist in China, was sent to a forced labour camp during the Mao's era because he opposed the construction of the Yellow River Dam, a symbolic project that caused an enormous ecological disaster and led to astronomical economic loss. In the post-Mao era, he was once again marginalized because he opposed the repetition of the same mistake, the construction of the Three Gorges Dam, a symbolic project that has led to a grave waste of resources, ecological disaster and social problems (Q. Dai[71] 1989).

Example 3. Four cases of thought control. Xuesong Lu (2005), a teacher at Jilin College of The Arts, taught Chinese film history. She discussed an unjust verdict with her students that was recounted in a documentary about the Cultural Revolution. She was reported by some of her students to the authorities and was deprived of her freedom for one year without recourse to the law. Xuesong Lu revealed that there were students who were paid to inform the authorities about things said in class. Professor Shiqun Yang of East China University of Political Science and Law, and Professor Yeling Xia of Peking University were reported by their students to the

school authority, the municipal Education Commission, or the Public Security Bureau, as "counter-revolutionary" or "anti-CPC and anti-socialist" (Kaiwen 2010; Y. Lu 2011; F. Shi 2008). Yeling Xia is no longer employed by his university. In 2010, X. Zhang, an associate professor of the East China University of Political Science and Law, opposed the imposition of CPC ideology on the students and proposed that such courses as Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong's Thoughts and Deng Xiaoping Theory be removed from the public curriculum; he was subsequently labelled as academically "unqualified" and no longer entitled to teach (Hai 2012; X. Zhang 2011).

Example 4. A case of corruption. Professor Jin Chen, the director of the Faculty of Microelectronics at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, PhD supervisor and "Chang Jiang Scholar" (*Changjiang xuezhe* 长江学者), faked scientific achievements and claimed to have made a historic breakthrough in China's microchip manufacturing technology. He cheated one research fund out of as much as 100 million *yuan*.[72] This project had been examined by a group of experts who had unanimously agreed that Jin Chen's innovation was original in China and advanced at the international level, and could serve as a milestone in the history of chip development in China. This case also involves the Ministry of Information Industry, Ministry of Science, Ministry of Education and the Shanghai Municipal Government. After this case was exposed, none of those who have been involved has been subject to criminal justice (Q. Wang and Ren 2006).

Example 5. Intellectuals' indifference to crime. In recent years, "group protests" from the underclasses have occurred more frequently than ever.[73] In contrast, university intellectuals, as a whole, often choose to remain silent. As a case in point, in 2010,

a car accident killed one rural female student and injured another on the campus of

the University of Hebei Province. It was reported that the culprit openly declared

that his privileged position placed him beyond punishment (Zonghe 2010). The

whole campus, as well as the entire higher education system, remained silent in this

case. Strong condemnations were made on the internet, a locus that allows more

democratic voices.[74] As another case in point, during the earthquake in Sichuan

Province in 2008, a large number of primary and secondary school buildings

collapsed, killing more than ten thousand children. According to the local

government, the investigation by such institutions as Tsinghua University (which is

said to have the best architecture faculty in China) reveals that the high degree and

high intensity of the earthquake were "the first and foremost reason" for the

building collapse (People.com.cn 2009). On the other hand, Ai (2009), an artist,

and Xia *et al.* (2009), a professor in the US, have made documentaries to expose

that poor quality of the school buildings was the main reason for the disaster.

As a qualitative study, this chapter attaches great importance to a few examples rather

than base its arguments on quantitative data obtained through large-scale surveys. The

limited number of examples cannot test how extensively the establishment has defined

the intellectual community. Nevertheless, they may illustrate the degree to which the

former may influence the latter. These extreme examples, as well as the structure of the

institutional organization as has been outlined above and illustrated with Table 4.1,

provide material for the following analysis and reflection.

4.5. Discussion

Bourdieu emphasizes three points in the study of a field: the habitus of the agents in the

field; the relation between the objective positions occupied by the agents in the field;

and, most important of all, the relationship between a given field and the field of power (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 104-105). Given that the state, or meta-field, occupies a special position in the field of power, and that the state of China is monopolized by a single political party, the interpretation of the university begins by looking at the effect of the political field.

4.5.1. The invasion of the political field

In examining the state-higher education institution dimension, it is noteworthy that the university's opponent is the party-state. As Y. Lian (2011) comments, the CPC had to penetrate the university structure before it took power, and had to subvert the university once it was in power. Otherwise, it would have been impossible to transform Chinese society and consolidate the regime.[75] From Y. Lian's comment it may be inferred that the heteronomy practised over the university field by the political field is a precondition for the party-state's control of society. However, the university's subordination to external forces places challenges on the entire system of logic under which a university develops and the rich legacy inherited from the history of the university is lost. Such re-structuring can only be realized in a step-by-step manner. Although the higher education "adjustment" formally started in 1952, the prelude to the heteronomy of the university field by the political field began as early as 1950 when the political ideological framework for transforming the university was formulated.[76] Afterwards, the administrative authority of the new regime was established at the university, which involved a large number of party members gradually assuming the key positions in the colleges and universities, which then made it easier to implement government policies.[77] By 1956, the university was institutionally placed under the leadership of the CPC committee.[78] CPC workers dominated the field and some university intellectuals who lacked academic competence chose to join the party organization and became the CPC's

constituents, while the academic authorities who insisted on independence were marginalized. Ultimately, through political campaigns, such as the Anti-rightist Campaign that created terror on campus, the vertical patron-client relations between the party-state and the intellectuals were fortified. As a result, not only sociological research, but also natural science research was dominated by political trends or even by the leaders' personal whims, as illustrated in Examples 1 and 2 above. Even today, no matter how much flexibility is incorporated in the control strategies, the primary concern the authorities have about intellectuals is not their academic achievements, but their political obedience, as illustrated by Example 3. Currently, all the agents in the field are products of this re-structuring, and some of them are survivors of political terror. Due to this type of mentality, which has existed for decades, the patron-client relation between the party-state and the intellectuals tends to be taken for granted.

4.5.2. The invasion of the economic field

What is particularly noteworthy is the unique characteristic of the economic field in China. Ever since the beginning of the economic reform in the early 1980s, a conspicuous trend has been that official corruption and "official profiteering" (*guandao* 官倒) has become increasingly widespread. This contributed in part to the student protests in 1989, and, the party-state response was to fall back to the measures of military suppression. This means that military violence has defined the pattern of the Chinese market after the 1990s, which is sharply different from how a market is normally defined in economics. Meanwhile, this military suppression left the rulers open to a crisis of legitimacy. At such a critical moment, the party-state of China paid special attention to the knowledge and expertise of its intellectuals, just like other communist or post-communist regimes striving to base their legitimacy on economic development and economic reforms, as E. X. Gu and Goldman observe (2004, 7).

Moreover, the student protests that originated on the university campuses seemed to remind the rulers that the intellectuals had the potential to consolidate into an opposing force, whereas the majority of the population, the peasants, who were poor in social, cultural and economic capital, could not readily muster themselves into a large-scale threat to CPC supremacy. It did not take long before peasants and intellectuals were assigned to two extremes in the economic model of the party-state: intellectuals as a whole were subject to bribery, though they were still under strict control, while peasants were oppressed, exploited and exposed to whatever might befall them.

With the economic prosperity of the 1990s, the structure of forms of capital in the university field has undergone considerable change. The CPC still tightly controls the university and the major structure of the internal management has rarely changed, as can be seen from Table 4.1; political capital still plays a critical role, although it is no longer the only dominant capital. Most conspicuous is the intrusion of economic capital. More attention is being given to cultural capital, often recognized and manifested in such forms as administrative positions or bonuses. A minority of the academic elite has been granted additional benefits, such as position allowance, research funding, favourable housing conditions, conference fees, large bonuses. In some cases, the CPC's wishes gradually penetrate specific research projects through economic input.[79] In contrast, those who are at odds with the CPC's wishes may be dismissed from their privileged positions or suffer economic loss, as illustrated by Example 3. Particularly in the process of the massification of higher education, the state has made use of the great social demand for tertiary education. Higher education has been an important means to stimulate domestic consumption and to counteract economic crisis (Lanqing Li 2003, Part 4). Consequently, state policy empowers the universities and colleges to drain financial resources from society legitimately and to charge tuition fees that well exceed the income of many ordinary peasant families (Dong 2004, 60-1, 81-4). The rate of

income growth of university teachers on the whole is rising significantly above that of unskilled labourers. In contrast, the peasants, the real creators of the economic miracle in China, are still subjected to the tyranny of urban-rural segregation that traps them in poverty, as has been presented in Chapter Three. The rate of their income growth is well below the consumer-index rate over the last two decades. University intellectuals can afford a relatively affluent life in part because the large working population lacks consumption capacity, and the bitter life of the disadvantaged groups may well intimidate the university intellectuals into obedience.

Ironically, the massification of higher education has further undermined the foundation of the intellectuals on the campuses: since the finances of the institutions are controlled by the CPC and the administrative bureaucracy and the sources and allocation of the revenue are not transparent, political capital, combined with economic capital, has been further reinforced. Due to this so-called "massification", the number of doctoral level graduates has multiplied, ranking first in the world.[80] As a result, the position of university teacher has become an even more rare resource, making the teachers more dependent on their work units. As is observed by researchers, the growing market forces not only negatively impact intellectuals' critical spirit and sense of social responsibility, but also erode their autonomy (E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004, 12). With academia exposed to both pressure and temptation, a problem that cannot go undetected began to impact the university, i.e. academic corruption. The many cases of plagiarism in papers and research, and faked scientific data have seriously polluted the research environment, as illustrated by Example 4.

The heteronomy practised over the university by the political forces is a coercive process by which the university has been reduced to a mechanism that provides justification for the state deprivation of society, as illustrated by Example 1. The heteronomy of the economic forces is more like a "soft" process. Especially in the

process of massification, the university functions as the government's exploiting instrument, while the intellectuals are lured to directly participate in depriving society, particularly the poor rural society. In the 1950s, the party-state was able to seize control of the university field, presumably because the intellectuals were bewildered by the newly emerged modern state. But by now, the military suppression of 1989 should have removed the disguise of a paternal party-state. Nonetheless, a large majority of the university intellectuals chooses to collaborate with the party-state in return for material benefits. Increasingly dependent on this collaborative process, the university intellectual community has become trapped in a vicious cycle of destruction and self-destruction.

4.5.3. The value of cultural capital

While Mao (1957a, 337) used the "establishment" as a mechanism with which to deprive the intellectuals of political capital, the specific measure was to arrange jobs for them. Therefore, the other side of the story is that the intellectual community has been quite privileged in many aspects. For example, during Mao's time intellectuals were no longer exposed to the risk of "unemployment". Their status was that of "state cadres", i.e. members in the state bureaucratic system, who enjoyed much more state welfare than did ordinary industrial workers and peasants. With respect to salary, they were a high-income group comparable to state officials in an era when income was generally low (M. Chen 2006). Of course, once they were confined within the establishment, they no longer enjoyed free mobility. And, since the relative values of the various forms of capital that circulate in the university field are determined by the profile in the field of power, the assessment of the intellectuals' capital, particularly cultural capital, was exposed to the domination of the party-state.

Mao's (1957a, 337) scheme was to deprive the intellectuals of "every bit of their political capital", a process that should continue "until not one jot is left to them".

Devaluation of their cultural capital in effect contributed to the decline of their political capital. This, however, was not enough to totally undermine them. Unlike the Chinese peasants, whose economic capital in the form of land property could be taken from them once and for all through a collectively-owned economy, the intellectuals possess academic learning, one form of cultural capital that has been "embodied", or is in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body, as Bourdieu (1986, 243) puts it. Nevertheless, the heteronomous university structure could serve as a base from which to launch political campaigns that could reduce the intellectuals to a morally impure group.[81] This in effect would continuously decrease the value of the intellectuals' cultural capital and continuously deprive them of political capital. This might explain why, in comparison to other dominated groups, such as the peasants, who were more severely deprived in economical and cultural capital, the intellectuals were more frequently subjected to political campaigns.

At the end of Mao's era, the national economy was already "on the brink of bankruptcy".[82] One reason apparently lies in the fact that the excessive devaluation of the intellectuals' cultural capital is contrary to the goal of constructing a modern state. In the post-Mao era, intellectuals, as an indispensable force for the modern state, have been declared part of the working class (Deng 1978, 89). In looking to improve their living conditions, considerable importance is attached to cultural capital, which they can exchange for economic capital under some conditions in order to upgrade their material life. What is most of all evident is that indiscriminate and extensive political persecution has come to an end. However, the deprivation of political capital has not ceased. One indicator is that the intellectual community still does not have academic autonomy, and in turn tends to be deprived of the right to determine the value of its cultural capital. It can be inferred from the existing organizational structure that the intellectuals are not the main force in the assessment of cultural capital. As outlined above, the Chinese

higher education system does not allow horizontal association between teachers, a mechanism that would have allowed the holders of cultural capital to identify with each other, nor does it allow vertical association between peers of the same disciplines, a mechanism that would enable them to assess and apply cultural capital. The lack of horizontal and vertical allegiances makes it difficult to sustain the value of cultural capital, and it in effect guarantees the domination of political capital. Academic titles and positions, which Bourdieu (1986, 247; 1996, 276) categorizes as "institutionalized" capital with a relatively "dominated status", are resources directly or indirectly controlled by the party-state, whose power would tend to be unrestrained and in turn breed academic corruption. In fact, institutionalized cultural capital has been undergoing a mutation in parallel to the political process. For example, some doctoral programmes are designed to cater to those who are politically powerful (X. Sun 2009). Many intellectuals are compelled to invest their efforts in areas irrelevant to academic activities. They may even resort to plagiarising scientific papers and produce fraudulent test data, as illustrated by Example 4 and the researcher's "baidu.com" search results.

Bourdieu assumes that the state of power relations between agents defines the structure of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 99). It follows that when one side gains in power in a field, the other side will correspondingly and necessarily be eroded of its power. When the intellectuals only have cultural capital but have no say over their job assessment and therefore have lost academic autonomy, they bear resemblance to the Chinese peasants, the most disadvantaged group in Chinese society that has only physical capital without the right to own land. By exchanging their cultural capital for economic capital, the intellectuals are much better-off than other groups who suffer more severe economic deprivation. However, as part of the establishment, they have always been exposed to more severe thought control and face the threat of being eliminated from the establishment. These mechanisms of control and elimination are

evidence that the party-state values their culture capital only on the condition that they continue to be deprived of their political capital.

4.5.4. Habitus versus the field

P. Hu (2005) and K. Chen (2004) place the blame for the moral deterioration of the intellectual community mainly on the communist rulers. Their assumption is supported by Bourdieu's finding that the field contributes to the formation of the habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 127). On the other hand, Bourdieu claims that a field is not an "infernal machine". Agents in the field, who occupy unequal positions, are constantly struggling for their own benefits, and contribute to shaping the objective structure that has shaped them (102, 136). The concept of habitus, which emphasizes subjectivity, provides another perspective that focuses on the university intellectuals *per se*. Bourdieu (1998, 63) points out that heterogeneous intellectuals constitute the Trojan horse. This supports the argument of Xia (2010) that the intellectuals are collaborators in government crimes. If this argument holds true, then it is justified to assume that, to a considerable extent, the Chinese university intellectuals are collaborators in the process of heteronomy.

Economic privilege may be one of the many factors that have encouraged intellectuals to collaborate with the state. However, the economy has been gaining force since the 1990s. Before that, especially in Mao's era, deprivation in political rights seems to be a more important cause. Particularly, a sense of fear, a remnant from the past, may have a profound and long-term effect. Looking back at the post-Mao era, the most large-scaled and also the only nation-wide challenge that the party-state has ever encountered, namely the student protests in 1989, stemmed from the higher education campuses. In response, the party-state promptly imposed military suppression that shocked the world. But routinely, the control strategies should be less extreme, and an

elimination mechanism could be one of the instruments.[83] Such a mechanism is intended to nip the forces that may subvert the existing structure in the bud. This may be accomplished, perhaps, through such a method as thought control. If this first step fails, the next step may be marginality or the elimination of those who openly challenge the establishment. Since there is no corresponding mechanism to counteract such elimination, such as an independent professor association, teachers' union or student union, the function of the elimination mechanism would be effective and successful. The control strategies should also include strategic and restricted adjustments to meet the complex and changeable reality. Higher education policy in the post-Mao era shows signs of a marked relaxation of controls. However, this is only a change in modes of leadership because the historical mission of the CPC shifted from taking power to implementing modernization programmes, as the analysis of Hamrinn and Cheek (1986, 9) finds. Accordingly, whatever liberalization of controls one finds is limited to some minor issues, such as the intellectuals' criticizing social injustice or mocking the political figures in private. Some principle issues, such as the CPC's leadership over higher education, and its organization network rooted on the campus, are never open to negotiation. When non-collaborators are instantly and constantly eliminated, the intellectuals would find themselves in a situation envisioned by Bourdieu: their interest in yielding to the dominant group obviously is more than their interest in overlooking it (Weber, quoted in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 115). As a result, more intellectuals would yield to the CPC's flexible policies which have been, as Goldman and Cheek describe (1987, 13), shifting between repression and relative relaxation. Should this situation become internalized into a habitus, the intellectuals might develop an inclination to submit to, or at least tacitly accept violence, such as in Example 5, or even reject an independent and critical attitude as heresy.

Bourdieu assumes that the actions of the agents in a field may be defined by such factors as their trajectory, their objective relation to other positions and the volume and structure of their capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 99, 108). The majority of the intellectuals who are located at "the understructure of a national system" (Clark 1983, 109) are carriers of cultural capital. They are inclined to devalue heterogeneous capital and thus may in effect constitute an anti-heteronomy force. The habitus of the agents who occupy the dominant positions in the field, such as the presidents and CPC secretaries, may turn out to be more complex. From the perspective of the structure, the dominant positions installed in the field are undoubtedly the core parts supporting the heteronomy. Such positions should generate a habitus that bears the strongest conservative tendencies. But from the perspective of individuals, their actions are corresponding to their "trajectory" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 108), and their previous experiences may render them "primary habitus". This, according to Bourdieu, is the basis for the formation of later habitus (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 42). University leaders who are also holders of cultural capital, because of their primary habitus, may also constitute an anti-heteronomy force. However, the two potential anti-heteronomy forces, which come respectively from the majority of the intellectuals and those who occupy the senior positions, have apparently failed to make a profound difference. Table 4.1 proves that a typical heteronomous structure continues to exist. Whatever appeals intellectuals have openly made, such as expressing dissent, demanding autonomy or voicing concerns over social injustice, have never developed into a culture that may undermine their status of "atomization", and have been less consolidated into movements of considerable scale since after the military suppression of 1989. Criticism is allowed to a limited degree, and it is possible to exchange economic capital for cultural capital, so this may have eased the intellectuals' urgent demand to put an end to the heteronomy. Moreover, no individual has ever been able to

hold the dominant position in the field for long if he makes the effort to subvert the existing structure of the field. And, of course, no one has ever been able to establish such individual efforts in the field as an institution: there are numerous cases that prove just the opposite.[84] Some representatives of the CPC in the universities may resist heteronomy within the limit prescribed by the CPC. On condition that the overall structure remains unchanged, they may, paradoxically, become a buffer between the dominant and the dominated because between their primary habitus and the habitus of the ordinary intellectuals there exists what Bourdieu calls "structural affinity" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 125). The intellectuals' habitus may exert influence on the university field, but this is related to what is taking place in the field of power. Or, the power relations between the university, state, society and market have empowered the state to manipulate, directly or indirectly, the mechanisms of elevation or relegation, appointment or elimination. The control over the intellectuals' career opportunities enables the state to control their thoughts and transform the potential anti-heteronomy forces.

The few examples included in this chapter to illustrate the habitus of the intellectuals are not extensively representative. However, the influence of these cases depends on how much the university field, or rather, how much the field of power, may empower them. The insignificant number of cases, aided by the dynamics in the field, could play the role of examples and may contribute to a corresponding habitus in the large population of intellectuals. This habitus will reduce the mass intellectuals to automatically impose censorship upon themselves and treat criticism of the establishment with indifference. To this extent, the heteronomous structure has already been extensively supported. This may, to a great extent, explain why the party-state does not mind allowing relative liberalization, like window dressing, for example, allowing some diverse intellectual groupings and schools, as well as their debates and

criticism, although censorship is much more strict in the university field than in other fields, such as the extensive use of the internet, the entertainment industry and the rural areas. Likewise, this may explain the harmony between the university and the state which is in sharp contrast to the widespread and frequent protests outside the establishment. It may well be anticipated that the state will be able to concentrate on selective repression, and will efficiently duplicate more extreme cases in this structure.

4.6. Conclusion

The definition of establishment intellectuals is ironic because intellectuals are expected to have anti-establishment tendencies. Contemporary establishment intellectuals have suffered humiliation for decades. Today, their knowledge and expertise prove to be indispensable to the modernization of the state, which has altered its control strategies and improved the intellectuals' living conditions to a limited extent. Consequently, the university intellectual community has come to terms with the establishment, especially when it comes to the massification of higher education, where the state uses higher education as a means to counteract financial crisis. In other words, the intellectual community, with some important exceptions, has a tendency to shift its role from a politically marginalized group to promoters of exploitative state policy, which will be illustrated in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. This does not only represent a passive mind-set; it may be manifested as corrupt conduct, and may become a way of life, gradually established as a unique relationship between the dominant and the dominated.

We may consider this from the perspective of the state-institution-society relationship. The state unduly overpowers the higher education institutions so that the political forces have managed to invade the university field. When the economic forces which are dominated by the state have also invaded the university field, they help to sustain the state domination over the higher education institutions. As a subordinate of

the state, the unique status and structure of the university would generate a corresponding intellectual habitus, and this habitus and the structure would promote each other. The existing pattern of state-institution relationship traces back to the 1950s, when higher education was converted into the establishment and Chinese society at large was also undergoing a general transformation. With civil societies prohibited and the privately owned economy eliminated, the state managed to weaken society and monopolized the national economy, as has been explained in Chapter Three, 3.3.1.1. and 3.3.2.1. The university was helpless in the face of the invasion of state power, while the state had sufficient resources to impose an unequal pattern that violated the logic and necessity of the university field. At the same time, the subordination of the university helped the state to further deprive society. Today, society at large, still highly atomized, has been protesting continuously, often in the form of "group protests,"[85] forcing the state to develop flexible and resourceful strategies, but has been unsuccessful in its attempt to subvert the overall structure. This may turn out to be a frustrating factor that has negatively impacted the morals of the university intellectuals, and in turn helped to sustain the existing power relations between the state and university. Especially after higher education began to charge high tuition fees, society has developed greater expectations for the higher education institutions, and interaction on the institution-society dimension has increased. The aftermath of heteronomy is more easily exposed to the public and more likely to invite criticism. We may also consider it from the perspective of a hierarchy. Of the different forms of capital competing for domination in the field of power, cultural capital is inferior to political and economic capital; on the university campus, the status of teacher is inferior to that of the party and administrative officials. In the whole social field, however, university intellectuals as part of the establishment are much more privileged in comparison with other dominated groups. Now that it is affiliated with the establishment, the intellectual

community is likely to be targeted when the populace is not allowed to openly direct their anger at the top rulers. All in all, the situation in China is at odds with what Maassen and Cloete (2002, 7-30) refer to as the international reform trend. The society is hardly organized into interest groups that actively participate in higher education, the university lacks the unique structure characteristic of an autonomous institution to help it fend off external influence, and the power of the state is still dominant in the state-society-institution triangular relation. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the tension between higher education institutions and society is to a large extent the effect of the tension between the state and society.

Bourdieu defines the school as an institution that "most effectively contributes to the reproduction of the social order" (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 198). The French university, for example, would reproduce class inequality in a stratified society. But the French higher education institutions are, after all, relatively autonomous. In contrast, the Chinese higher education institutions are defined by a totalitarian state which at the same time also defines the stratification of society. As can be expected, the way that the Chinese university reproduces inequalities is more effective, arbitrary and extreme, leading to the following conclusion: with respect to structure, the Chinese university is fundamentally different from the institutions of education and scientific research as defined in many other countries; with respect to social function, it is difficult for this establishment to play the public role of a university.

It is the criticism of the intellectuals' moral problems that has been the impetus for this research, but the focus here is not on the morals of individuals, but on the objective structure that has influenced the morals of individuals, including the organization of the university and the whole system of power relations. Bourdieu's theory helps to establish a necessary connection between the heteronomy of the university and the moral deterioration of the intellectuals, and to explain the unique

behaviour of the university intellectuals. The analysis of and reflection on the morals of individuals has been made from this point of departure. It is by highlighting the structure that we can show that, as Bourdieu (1998, 17, 56) describes, the moral problems of individuals only mask the overall structural corruption. As Bourdieu reminds us, structure is indispensable for the sustenance of morals, and "for something like a moral anxiety to occur, that morality has to find support, reinforcement, and rewards in this structure".

Table 4.1. The Organization of the Management of Some Key Universities

Universities / Sections	Huazhong U of S & T	Peking U	Tsinghua U	People's U of China	Beijing Jiaotong U	Beijing U of Tech	China U of Political Science &	China U of Geosci
PARTY								
University Office	+				+	+	+	
Office of Party Committee		+	+	+				+
Commission of Discipline Inspection		+						
Party Committee Personnel Dept.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Party Committee Propaganda Dept.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Party Committee United Front Dept.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Party Committee Student Affairs Dept.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Party Committee Security Dept.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Party Committee Armed Forces Dept.	+	+	+	+				+
Union	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Youth League Commission	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
ADMINISTRATOR								
Information Management Office		+				+	+	+
President's Office		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Student Affairs Office	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Security Office	+			+	+	+	+	+
Personnel Dept.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Supervision Office	+	+		+	+	+	+	+
Science Research Dept.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Treasury Dept.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Office of Academic Affairs	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+		Shanghai Jiao Tong U
+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		Tongji U
+	+	+	+	+	+		+		+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+		Nankai U
+	+	+	+	+	+		Internet managemen	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+		+		Hebei U of Tech
+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		Taiyuan U of Tech
+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+			Jilin U
+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		Harbin Inst of Tech
+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+		+		Harbin Engin U
+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+		Nanjing U
+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		Zhejiang U
+	+	+	+	+	+		+		+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+		Wuhan U of Tch
+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		Xi'an Jiaotong U

Note 1. The above listed are chosen from the institutions that the state plans to invest as the key

projects in the 21st Century, 100 universities in all, affiliated to the central government or

provincial governments respectively (the so-called 211-projects, which set models for

other universities). The data is obtained from the websites of these universities. '+' indicates that a certain department or office is part of the university organization.

Note 2. The Table shows that the leading apparatus in the universities are highly identical, invariably including Office of the Party Committee and President Office, etc. In some universities, the two offices are combined into one. Invariably, the primary task of the administrative apparatus is to serve the Party.

Chapter Five: The Chinese Rural Students in the Higher Education Institutions[iii]

5.1. Introduction

This chapter illustrates how higher education institutions create inequality and lead to poverty. The application of grounded theory at first directs its inquiry on the economic aspect of the life of some rural students on the university and college campuses in Hebei Province, China. Then, through constant comparison and analysis, the research gradually covers more aspects of the rural students' lives. The fact that rural youths are increasingly marginalized in the educational system has long been the concern of many authors.[86] However, most research unfortunately indiscriminately lumps the rural students together. To make a finer distinction and clarification, this study borrows the concept of two *extremes* from Trow (1973, 35), who views inequality in the higher education system as the aftermath of massification: at one extreme are educational institutions of rich resources and high quality, while at the other extreme are educational institutions of poor resources and low quality. Chinese tertiary education institutions are generally divided into four classes and further into eight subclasses. Trow's concept helps to reduce this huge and complicated hierarchy into a manageable system for study here.

Since massification was initiated in 1999, the proportion of rural youths on the university campus has increased considerably. By 2012, the proportion of rural students in the overall student body was 59.1% (CNS China News Service 2014). However, in this highly stratified system, the distribution of students between the two extremes is

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[iii] An adapted version of this chapter was published under the title of "A Case Study of 'Habitus' and 'Field': The Chinese Rural Students on the University Campus", in *Problems of Education in the 21st Century* 40 No. 3 (2012).

seriously imbalanced, with most rural students located at the lower extreme, while only a small proportion of them are admitted to the higher extreme.[87] Does the variation in institutional status and financial resources make a difference to the students? If yes, what are the factors that influence them? This chapter therefore addresses the following research questions:

> How do the rural students with different positions in the higher education system respond to variations in resources? What are the factors that influence their responses?

In order to answer the above questions, a comparison is made between the rural students who are located at the two extremes of the higher education system, which leads to these findings: those at the higher extreme, who are more sufficiently funded, are more likely to have a sense of financial insecurity than those at the lower extreme, who are insufficiently funded. That is to say, there exists a negative correlation between objective financial security and subjective sense of financial security. In this grounded theory research, the rural students' own language is used to label some concepts and categories. In their language contexts, objective financial insecurity is simply referred to as *poverty*; their subjective sense of financial insecurity is referred to as a sense of *financial pressure*. Then, a contradictory phenomenon found in this chapter is a negative correlation between poverty and a sense of financial pressure. In the process of analysing this phenomenon, the research confirms Bourdieu's assumption that educational institutions are mechanisms that reproduce social inequality (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). In the case of Chinese rural students, the analogy is that universities and colleges play a critical role in the reproduction of the urban-rural segregation system.

5.2. Methods

The study of the rural college students continues with the researcher's Master's degree studies in higher education. The general background of this chapter is as follows: 1) China has an urban-rural segregation system, as has been described in Chapter Three, 3.3.2.1., but higher education is one of the few ways in which rural youths can become permanent urban residents; 2) the Chinese government initiated a massification movement in higher education in 1999, with the students paying high tuition fees, in order to stimulate domestic consumption as a countermeasure against financial crisis (Lanqing Li 2003, Part 4); 3) there has been a drastic increase in the number of college graduates[88] which leads to an employment crisis among these graduates.[89]

This chapter is focused on the rural students' micro environment for the empirical data. Although the overall study is directed at the systemic level, the setting to present this case is within the geographical boundary of Hebei Province, a place of contrast. Geographically, Hebei encompasses Beijing and Tianjin, two modern metropolises directly administered by the central government. On the other hand, the province has a vast underdeveloped rural area with the third largest peasant population in China. With respect to distribution of higher education resources, Beijing and Tianjin boast many universities of high prestige (Subclass 1-3), while Hebei Province hosts institutions that exist in relative obscurity (mostly Subclass 4-8).

Grounded theory is considered suitable for this chapter mainly because this approach 1) fits empirical situations through discovery of theory from data and tends to be problem-oriented; 2) allows for the study of an area without any preconceived theory that defines "relevancies" in concepts and hypotheses prior to the research, which in turn allows the researcher to be more faithful to the data and more objective; 3) does not demand a large number of cases or consider accurate evidence as crucial, and therefore

allows for small-scale research; 4) is readily understandable by a large readership, including laymen interested in this area (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 1, 30, 33-34, 237; Mjøset 2000, 393; 2006b, 353); 5) aims to view this world as the research participants do (Charmaz 2006, 14).

5.2.1. Data

The data presented in this chapter were mainly obtained through semi-structured interviews, which were designed according to principles of grounded theory: the interviews were sufficiently open to encompass the entirety of the participants' perspectives (Giske and Artinian 2007, 69). The researcher's own ideas were not imposed on the interviewees (Glaser, quoted in Giske and Artinian 2007, 70). The interview was loosely framed when the researcher guided the interlocutors with the following hints:

• Family and education background introduction.

• Does the cost of tertiary education put pressure on the family finances?

• What is the proportion of rural students in your class and dormitory? Do you find rural and urban students different?

• Tell something impressive about the campus, whether it concerns communication, study or daily life.

As an ex-university teacher, the researcher has witnessed the initiation of the massification of higher education, both as observer and participant. The interlocutors came into contact with the researcher through her relatives and friends who worked in higher education, which means that a relation-bond existed before the interview. As a

local resident, the researcher had considerable knowledge of Hebei Province. It was therefore possible to quickly find common interests between the two interlocutors with topics closely related to the background of the rural students, whether it was geography, culture or local specialty. Such features in the researcher-interviewee relationship were presumed as icebreakers between strangers and hopefully added authenticity to the data.

The primary inclusion criterion for the selection of the interviewees was that the students were from rural areas; most of them were either local residents of Hebei Province or had education experience within the geographical boundary of the province. Balance between genders, university reputation and the economic background of the participants was also taken into consideration. The samples were selected from ten universities and were at different levels, including undergraduates and Master's degree students. The interviewees should have some experience on campus. For this reason, most of them were selected from above Grade 3 of undergraduate studies. For the Master's degree students, the interviews mainly focused on their recollections of undergraduate life. The number of samples was not decided at the outset. As the interviews progressed, similar instances emerged over and over again, which signalled "saturation" according to the principles of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 61). The researcher thus stopped looking for more interviewees when 50 students were eventually involved.

Although articles and documents published on the internet served as one source of information, the most important material was the transcripts of audio-recorded interviews, which were mostly conducted between January and March of 2008 over the telephone. Follow-up e-mail and telephone communication between the two parties provided further material. As a result of comparison and selection, 13 students were deemed illustrative and included in this study. The interviews of the 13 students resulted in approximately seven hours of recording and over 40 transcribed pages. Eventually,

information provided by the 13 students was used as the resource for the comparative analysis. To put the interviewees' answers into manageable form, the information is summarized in two tables, Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the simplified version of a complex phenomenon.

Permission was granted by all the interviewees to use the material in the research on rural students, knowing that the aim was eventually to seek publication. Confidentiality was guaranteed by the researcher.

5.2.2. Analysis

For quite some time the research lacked focus as the orientation and data-collection procedures were not defined by some predetermined research questions. Rather, it was in the process of codification and comparison of the data that the concept of *poverty*, as well as the students' different responses to it, emerged from the muddled and jumbled material. Accordingly, the research questions that emerged were how rural students with different positions in the higher education system responded to variations in resources and why they responded in the way they did.

Guided by Strauss (1987, 23, 59, 64, 69), the researcher used procedures which include: coding data and abstracting concepts; constant comparison; relations between categories; theoretical sampling; generating theory. These procedures were repeated in the process of analysis. In the process of open coding, the researcher found such concepts as: poverty, sense of financial pressure, rich, scholarship, needs-based subsidies, student loan, family funding, part-time job, academic excellence, embarrassment, burden to family, mind-set, unfair, disrespect, grateful, disadvantaged, hard, hard-working, different from the others, they, the urban, we, the rural, all are from the village, have more communication, tears, angry, poor students, ability, shame and so on. In axial coding the researcher found relations between these concepts. Several

categories emerged which, in turn, covered related sub-categories: finances (family funding, public subsidy, part-time job); environment (urban-rural-student distribution, hierarchy of institutions, locus of institutions); peer communication (among rural students, between urban and rural students); personal feeling (sense of urban-rural differences, sense of financial pressure, sense of unfairness). Undertaking selective coding, when all categories are systematically linked to the core category, we see the impact of poverty on the rural students. In a more detailed examination of the categories, it was found that the interviewees' subjective responses to poverty were obviously related to the standing of their institutions in the hierarchy of the higher education system. This was an improvement on the core category. The researcher then once again compared the core category with the data that had been reviewed before and found that it was a topic that all the interviewees were concerned about. Bearing this in mind, the researcher made a further analysis of the original data. This has eventually resulted in a theory that is grounded in data obtained in the research on Chinese higher education and might be taken to apply only to that particular substantive area. This theory may be defined as a substantive grounded theory, according to Glaser and Strauss (1967, 79).

In the data-analysis process, the research increasingly became entangled in what Potter and Wetherell (2001, 203) call the "complexity of working with extended sequences of talk rather than the brief isolated utterances". Much of the analysis was also based on the subjective accounts given by the interviewees, whose language was defined by their unique interactive context. This material, once separated from its specific context, may lose some of its meanings which are nuanced but still valuable. The approach of grounded theory, which emphasizes contextualization as well as categorization and conceptualization, may meet this challenge. Following the example of Strauss (1987), the presentation of the research has retained long original conversations and detailed processes of analysis. This, hopefully, will allow the

researcher to discover a grounded theory while retaining detailed data as much as found necessary, i.e. to be focused on analyzing details without at the same time being lost in them.

In the research process, the first finding was the rural students' different subjective responses to poverty. As the research progressed and involved such aspects as their attitudes to studies, aspiration for upgrading of their academic qualification, anticipation of future employment, it was found that these aspects were invariably defined by their poverty. In the end, this research approaches Bourdieu's theory of reproduction and Lindner's (2006) theory of humiliation. On its own, however, this research is insufficient to arrive at any high degree of generalization, for it is small in scale and heavily relies on data that reflect individuals' subjective feelings. Nevertheless, it does serve important purposes in this study: it provides empirical support for the analysis in the following chapter, and it also relates a local phenomenon to systematic high-level theories which are extensively applicable.

5.3. Results of the research

The application of grounded theory has eventually generated a substantive grounded theory as follows: under the urban-rural segregation system, rural students tend to be reduced to poverty, while their subjective responses to poverty, however, varies according to how much they are distanced from the metropolis; it is assumed that the more the students are marginalized, the less they are aware of their marginalization.

The generation of the above substantive grounded theory may be illustrated by Tables 5.1 and 5.2 as well as the related analysis. The two tables use Trow's concept of the higher education system as divided into two *extremes*: universities and colleges at the higher extreme versus those at the lower extreme. The students are categorized according to their monthly expenditures and their subjective sense of financial pressure.

Comparison between the two tables reveals a contradiction: the six students at the higher extreme had easier access to financial aid or had more affluent family conditions, but five of them claimed to have a sense of financial pressure; in contrast, the seven students at the lower extreme were less financially aided and were from poor families, but only two of them claimed to have a sense of financial pressure. It is this contradiction that justifies further, detailed analysis.

Table 5.1. Variation in students' objective financial security in relation to variation in students' standings in the hierarchy of the higher education institutions.

Students / Universities	High economic standard (expend 1000 *yuan*/ month)	Low economic standard (expend 200-300 *yuan*/ month)
Lower extreme (universities affiliated to Hebei Province or municipalities of the province)	Group 1:	Group 2: Student A, B, C, D, E, F, G
Higher extreme (universities affiliated to the central government, Beijing or Tianjin)	Group 3: Student H, I	Group 4: Student J, K, L, M

Table 5.2. Variation in students' subjective sense of financial pressure in relation to variation in students' standings in the hierarchy of the higher education institutions.

Students / Universities	With less subjective sense of financial pressure	With more subjective sense of financial pressure
Lower extreme	Group 1: Student A, B, C(state scholarship winner), D, G (state scholarship winner)	Group 2: Student E, F
Higher extreme	Group 3: Student H	Group 4: Student I, J, K, L, M

The interviews, first of all, reveal much similarity among the rural students. Coming from poor families, they are usually highly motivated and extremely diligent in their academic studies. In contrast to the large population of rural children, they are the rare ones (about 10% of their rural peers) who finally made their way to tertiary education institutions. As opposed to their urban peers, most of them had one or more siblings in the family. Their costs of tuition and living per year would consume all, or more than, the family annual income. They paid approximately 4,500 *yuan* each year for tuition and housing. Their monthly expenditure on subsistence was around 200-300 *yuan* or less. There were only two exceptions: Student H, who consumed more than 1,000 *yuan* each month and Student I, who spent approximately 20,000 *yuan* on tuition and subsistence each year. In 2005, the minimum subsistence rate for residents in the provincial capital of Shijiazhuang City was 220 *yuan*, which serves as a reference to indicate the low living standards of the rural students. It can be envisioned that most of the rural students were considerably confined by their poor economic conditions and most of their student life was limited to only meals and their studies.

The students are generally required to reside in student dormitories, with four to eight students sharing a room. Since cooking is basically banned in the dormitory, they normally dine in school canteens, where meals are offered at a less expensive price than at commercial restaurants. As most frequent contact occurs in the dormitory, it was natural that the interviewees paid much attention to daily details, such as the necessities of life, meals and consumption standards, factors which often symbolized a student's identity.

5.3.1. Higher extreme versus lower extreme: Different responses to poverty

The first comparison is made between students at the lower and higher extremes, respectively, to interpret the contradiction: at the lower extreme, the students were

relatively poor, but tended to have less subjective sense of financial pressure, while it was the opposite at the higher extreme, where students were relatively well provided for.

5.3.1.1. Lower extreme: Village on the campus

Extract 1. Actually whether it's tight or not depends on how you see things. (...) I feel 200
   yuan is acceptable. (Student A)

Extract 2. 200 *yuan* per month, passable, that means, you can't eat as you please, but you
   don't have to be too hard on yourself. (Student B)

Extract 3. (Do you feel your university life is very hard?) I don't find it very hard. It's OK.
   And I didn't draw too much from my family savings. (Student G, state scholarship
   winner)

By referring to "how you see things", Student A in effect set the living standard at a relatively low level and readily accepted the status quo. This attitude might be related to a student's earlier experience in his or her rural home. But it might be more related to the living standards of schoolmates that constituted part of his or her daily life. The student canteen was not likely to serve very expensive meals. Yet, most rural students had to impose restrictions on themselves so that "you can't eat as you please" (Student B). Meanwhile, "you don't have to be too hard on yourself" (Student B) indicates a sense of contentment. Obviously, they knew that there were students who depended on an even smaller budget. What Student A and B say suggests that whether the rural students have a subjective sense of financial pressure or not to a considerable extent "depends on how you see things" (Student A), or their mind-set.

The families of Student A, B and G did not depend totally on farming or other manual work, and the costs of tuition and living were tolerable, or within the financial capacity of their families. Their universities charged relatively low tuition fees, they studied in cities with relatively low consumer standards. If they had excellent grades, they could earn a scholarship and further lighten the family burden. Thus they would find that university life was "OK" (Student G).

Most students were aware of urban-rural differences, especially when urban students' monthly expenditures nearly doubled that of the rural students (Student C). The following extracts illustrate how rural students reflected on their urban peers:

Extract 4. [Urban students] indeed have a sense of superiority when they are together with us. (...) I don't look up to them. (Student E)

Extract 5. (Whether there is pressure in communication with urban students:) No pressure. I'm not under pressure living here, because, I don't mean...   mmm...   sometimes I envy them, for they are better off financially. But for my part, I do not envy them. (Student F)

The attitude that they did not "envy" or "look up to" their urban peers (Student E and F) was common among the interviewees at the lower extreme. Why did they appear indifferent to the obviously advantaged position of their urban peers, then?

Extract 6. (More rural students win scholarships:) [Urban students] seem to have put less effort into their studies than rural students do. (Student C, state scholarship winner)

Extract 7. (Do you find that rural students feel somewhat inferior?) In::fe::rior::? (drawn out) Inferior, of course, in certain aspects, say, in comparison with them, that is, the urban students are very versatile, (...) for example, they sing and dance and

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participate in collective activities. (...) (Are there rural students who want to overtake them and inwardly make an effort in this respect?) In fact, as an innermost thought, yes. (...) I used to have that thought, why did I lag behind them [in studies]? (...) I must push forward, I must make an effort [in studies]. (...) (Whether it's financial pressure that makes rural students less active?) Maybe this is one factor. I find that my classmates are from very poor families. In general, the ones from poor families tend to have greater motivation and are very hard-working. Maybe this is the reason. I think we are all very excellent in our studies. (Student B)

Extract 8. As far as I see it, urban people, especially nowadays children, have no more merit than us. (...) After all, since childhood, they are the only child of their families, living in the city, which is simply a nest of abundance and ease. (...) (Any special talents in urban students?) Special talents...   in some respects they do have more extensive knowledge than us, say, in playing games. Some of them know everything about playing computer games. (...) (Do they read more books than you?) Reading books...   also...   varies from person to person. Some people read more books. They, the urban people, like to read such books as Harry Potter. (Student E).

The idea that urban students were "versatile" and had "extensive knowledge" (Student B and E) was more or less a common view among the interviewees. At the lower extreme, however, these advantages were not much admired. Rural students deemed their experience in the countryside as a source of merit, attaching importance to their capacity to endure hardship and their excellence in their studies. This could be

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seen from the case of Student B, who redundantly emphasized school grades and associated this merit to poor family background.

Admittedly, at the lower extreme, more rural students win scholarships, a fact which they take pride in. But multiple factors work together to accomplish this. First, rural students make up the major bulk of the lower extreme students. Second, rural students who finally made their way to university are the rare ones among their rural peers. Third, many urban students tend to have more extracurricular interests and "put less effort into their studies" (Student C). Since their basic education, the rural students are mostly focused on subjects that are included in the National College Entrance Examination. Some schools drop such subjects as Physical Education, Music and Fine Arts. As a result, rural students have a narrower scope of knowledge and their outlooks are confined. They are unfamiliar with and consequently give less heed to the knowledge of human cultures, being unaware of how such knowledge might help them forward in their future development.

Extract 9. Maybe I feel that students from the village, sometimes, many of them, don't accept the habits of those brought up in the city, thinking their way of life extravagant, that kind of life style, [rural students] dislike it a lot, it seems. (Student D, parentless)

In spite of the great disparity between rich and poor in China, most urban students at the lower extreme are from families of average income, or "belong to the salary-earner class" (Student C). It is not likely for most of them to have a very high standard of consumption. Urban and rural students dine at the same canteens. Urban students may choose meals of better quality, while rural students may mainly depend on vegetables and cereal. Once rural students make up the great majority, urban students

become the exception. Especially to those from very poor families, the consumption standard of urban students would be considered "extravagant" (Student D).

More than taking poverty for granted, rural students might gain a sense of moral superiority from it. A life of simplicity is up to the standard of morality, while a wealthy life could be considered a corrupting factor. Such an assumption tends to confine the students to a stereotyped belief that poverty is not one's misfortune, rather, it makes one mature and perfect; when poverty is used as motivation, whoever works hard and has academic excellence will be eventually lifted out of poverty. Consequently, many rural students found encouragement and standing from their academic excellence. They were not put off by the hardship they experienced in the present as long as brilliant prospects awaited them in the future.

Extract 10. All [roommates] are from the village, are easy-going. And we have more communication, talking about each other's habits and customs and the like. (Student F)

Extract 11. There were so many students who had the same or similar [poor] family background. On the contrary, these [poor] students tended to gather together and have relatively rare contact with the small circle of rich people. (Student C)

As can be envisioned, rural students, as the majority, tend to be dominant in the small student community. When conversation concerns rural topics, urban students do not have much to say. This constitutes an important source of comfort and complacency for the rural students so that urban students' versatility and extensive knowledge have rarely interfered with their confident poise. There is, so to speak, a "wall of culture," which not only separates them from their urban schoolmates, but also provides them with a temporary psychological shelter against the impact of the unfamiliar urban world.

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But this wall also functions as a segregating mechanism so that they hardly have access to the rich cultural resources that the city could offer, and they hardly realize this deprivation.

In fact, the whole group of rural students at the lower extreme is shrouded in poverty. Financial aid supports a very small fraction of the students. In some cases, a school scholarship could be as symbolic as 100 *yuan* (Student F). Needless to say, poverty is an adverse factor in anyone's life, yet none of the above interviewees mentioned the negative effect that poverty brought upon them as a whole. They did not even refer to money as a necessity for their sustenance. As such, the rural students at the lower extreme have more or less transplanted their rural society onto the campuses so that they are still living in a small niche not quite far away from their home villages.

5.3.1.2. Higher extreme: Impassable gap

Extract 12. (Something deeply impressive:) When I had just arrived here, I felt rather depressed. My tuition fees were, were... anyway were put together with much difficulty. At that time and, every day, I felt that I, anyway I was... different from the others, under very heavy pressure. Anyway, when I was alone, I was always, very gloomy and, wanted to cry. (Student M)

Extract 13. Sometimes a meal alone could provide enough evidence. When we all brought meals to our dormitory to dine, you see, the money tho-those better off spent on one meal equalled your costs for one whole day. So maybe the meals they bought were pro-probably better. Mmm... in this process, maybe, urban roommates, by comparison, could develop a sense of superiority, while rural roommates could more or less feel hurt. Although this would not lead to the kind, the kind of trouble or conflict in speech, it was there all the time. At that time I, although we got along

well, this kind of thinking per-persisted in me. So, sometimes I found it

embarrassing to take my meal to my dormitory (chuckle). (Student L)

Extract 14. (urban-rural differences on campus) Mmm...　it's something that sometimes

makes us more inferior.[90]　(...) Actually, I feel that one perceives these differences

only when one is on the dark side. (Student K)

At the higher extreme institutions, the rural students are obviously in the minority. More financial aid is available to them. Living in a metropolis, they should have a better quality of life than their peers do at the lower extreme. However, in their immediate contact with urban students, the differences between them and their urban schoolmates made them feel "depressed," "hurt," embarrassed and "inferior" (Students M, L, K). In the meantime, the sense of being hurt and inferior must have been mistaken more or less for a sin, for such feelings were attributed to "the dark side" of one's thinking (Student K). It might be an effort to lessen their pains by imposing a strict moral standard upon themselves, which would doubly burden them. However, they spoke their mind in a straightforward way and admitted their embarrassment or "dark side." Being frank and honest, alone, was not enough. They must have been exposed to continuous suffering and repeated pain, which they dwelt and reflected on.

Extract 15. Now my parents are old, can make little money. My father is now over 50 years

old. Going out, anyway, normally, going out yet you find that you can't do

anything. (...) And my mother, by herself, totally...　totally helpless. So now they

two...　just put up with it, accept whatever they can make. (...) You cannot expect

too much. Everyone has his own way to survive. Those of lower status make do

with a lower standard of living.

Say, when I told [urban students] about my folks, (...) they just couldn't understand. Your monthly cost of living, they say, you earn so little money, that little money? How did you manage to get along, how do you stay alive? (...) They simply couldn't understand what I told them, just couldn't understand how rural people got along, how they survived. (Student J)

Extract 16. (urban-rural trouble?) Er...   trouble....   My dormitory was a relatively harmonious place, everyone on good terms. In other ways, er, it, it's inevitable, definitely there was a very big difference. (...) (Urban-rural distance in culture and life?) Yes, right, right, right, it's very apparent, relatively apparent. (...) Although they didn't speak openly about it, but sometimes some people's expressions, some expressed meanings, or bearings, as if telling you that you knew nothing, you rube (chuckle). (In such a case, did you sense disrespect for us rural students?) Mmm... yes, there are such elements in it. Some students did, of course not all students behaved like that. (Student L)

Income from farming is seriously insufficient, and off-farm jobs have become vital for many peasants. For those who are no longer fit for long-distance migration and heavy physical labour, the problem is a matter of survival more than a matter of living standards. The remark that one had to "accept whatever they can make" conveys a message of desperation. At present, fully representational and accurate reports on the economic situation in rural areas are rare. Urban students, without personal experience, would find it very hard to understand the desperate poverty in the rural areas. Difficulties in communication would estrange the young peers. Against a macro background in which the city dominates over the village, this estrangement may

ultimately be manifested as feelings of superiority on the part of urban students and inferiority on the part of rural students.

Extract 17. (Something impressive on campus:) A lot of students around me, they're directly divided into two groups upon university admittance. (...) Some [rural students] would change in character and began to contact some... but some students from badly-off backgrounds could not possibly go with others to dine, to sing. So, on the whole, they tend to be very restrained and withdrawn. So, in such affairs as making a speech in the class, including campaigning for class cadres, they are all... anyway, there's this disadvantaged group on campus. (...) So, their developments are much impeded in some respects.

As I told you just now, probably they just spontaneously divide into two groups. No matter how friendly they are to each other on the surface, there definitely is that, that, that kind of invisible gap, the kind of gap that is impassable. (Student H)

The higher extreme, where more urban students gather, obviously offers more privileges than the lower extreme does, both when it comes to the academic atmosphere on campus and the urban culture outside the campus. The rural students, however, tend to be excluded from these benefits for a number of reasons. Such factors as culture and personality are relevant, but what the interviewees were most concerned about was still poverty. Poverty left them disadvantaged. They tended to be "very refrained" from social activities, which could erode their confidence and in turn "much impeded" their development in other respects (Student H).

5.3.1.3. Higher extreme: A different perspective on poverty

In the transition from basic education up to higher education most rural students have to

drain their family finances. To relieve pressure, many rural students choose to take part-time jobs. Because of the surplus in the labour force, possible jobs and income are very limited. Invariably, the experience of making money is filled with hardship, while the attitudes of students at the different extremes may vary, as is shown below:

Extract 18. (Impression of the university's host city:) People [in this city] lead a life of ease. (...) Anyway, I don't enjoy staying in this city. (...) (Do you still remember how you felt the first time you got paid for a part-time job?) Yes, I do. (Can you tell me?) Ai (sighing)...   it's, ac-actually nothing much. Only, only shed some tears.... (...) Ai, this, this is, unfair. (Student M, at the higher extreme)

Extract 19. (First part-time job:) Very exhausting and a heavy workload. In the end, the payment was very small, which they nearly denied us. (...) Almost started a quarrel. We insisted on what was ours. After all we made an effort and it was our first time. We were so abused, very unhappy, very uncomfortable. (Student A, at the lower extreme)

Both students recalled hardship, but Student A at the lower extreme focused on details that were "very unhappy, very uncomfortable," while Student M at the higher extreme, being more directly exposed to the "life of ease" in the big city, arrived at a more general conclusion that it was "unfair", pointing to social injustice.

Extract 20. "Tough life spurs you while soft life spoils you (classical proverb)." This "tough life," I don't prefer to interpret it as having a poor family background. Even if you're born in affluence, you might as well "get prepared for danger in times of safety (classical proverb)". With such an attitude, you may very well make use of

the privileged condition that is denied to your peers and enhance yourself in all respects. (Student L)

Extract 21. I used to believe that most of those who got excellent grades were from poor families, while those from affluent families tended to have a relatively poor academic performance. But in senior high school, my beliefs were thoroughly subverted. In senior high school, I found that, in fact, the better the family condition, the better the student's academic performance and the greater his capacity to cope with practical affairs. (Student I, from Southern China)

Students L and I talked about a phenomenon which students at the lower extreme neglected: an advantaged socio-economic position, rather than being a corrupting factor, is actually favourable for one's development. Once arriving at the higher extreme, these rural students were confronted with a new situation in which their urban peers obviously had more merits, such as better school performance and greater capability to cope with practical affairs (Student I). This would upset their established stereotypes, evoke their reflection and restore them to the common sense notion that poverty is, after all, not a blessing.

In contrast, students at the lower extreme appeared less alert to the harmful effect of an adverse background:

Extract 22. (Why do you think there are so few urban students in your class?) Why there are so few urban students? For one thing, for one thing, this school is not very good, not famous; for another, it's...   mmm...   mmm? I don't know (laugh). (Student F, at lower extreme)

On elite campuses, rural students make up a disproportionately small number of the student body. This is evidence that diligence, a merit in which rural students take such great pride, has not in the least altered the urban-rural student distribution in the higher education system and, in turn, is evidence that adverse life does affect rural students negatively. However, none of the interviewees at the lower extreme inquired as to why there were so many rural students in their classes or wondered where their urban peers had gone. Nor did they question why they were accumulated on the lower extreme when most of them were so excellent and hard-working in their studies. On the other hand, to some rural students at the higher extreme, the urban-rural gap just emerged "certainly," "directly," and "spontaneously," and the gap was "impassable," "inevitable," "definite," and "apparent" (Student H and L). These ideas could not be triggered by accidental emotional impact, but were the result of careful reflection. Furthermore, they saw that the harsh experience was no longer just a private affair or a matter between peers. Such vocabulary as "disadvantaged group" (Student H) and "unfair" (Student M) indicates that these rural students were capable of seeing beyond the individual experience and of generalizing to their groups. This indicates that although the rural students on the whole tend to be poor, the different contexts in their universities and colleges may result in different mind-sets. It seems that only in the on-campus "village" are they capable of overpowering their poverty. But this may indicate deprivation in such aspects as political, social and cultural capital.

5.3.2. High economic standard versus low economic standard: Same poverty

The following comparison is made between the interviewees who had a "high economic standard" and a "low economic standard", respectively, with the intention of revealing their similarities in spite of the variation in their economic conditions.

5.3.2.1. Lower extreme: High university tuition versus limited student revenues

Extract 23. (The cost of higher education:) Not so much as pressure, but my family is not

so affluent as to take it easy. Anyway, family funding is hard earned. The

economic conditions being just so-so, the funding for studies is not a problem, but

there's not much surplus. (Student B, family income not purely from farming and

manual work)

Extract 24. (Financial pressure:) Quite big, there's pressure. (...) My family is just an

average one. (...) Because villagers don't have many sources of income, I'm totally

dependent on my parents' work. Money is hard earned. (...) I spend 7000-8000

yuan a year, including tuition fees and cost of living. (You consumed all the family

income). (...)Yes. It's common in the village. (Student E, family income purely

from farming)

Universities at the lower extreme enrol a high proportion of poor students and at
the same time are insufficiently funded. It is therefore difficult for such institutions to
provide aid to sufficiently support poor students. For those who are not excellent in
studying and whose families are not in extreme poverty, the availability of scholarships
is scarce and the intensely contested need-based aid is more or less inaccessible. These
students, who are primarily dependent on family funds, have suffered most from the
high tuition. Even Student B, who estimated education costs as tolerable, felt guilty that
the costs put such a large dent into the family finances. Many among the rural students
at the lower extreme have such feelings of embarrassment and guilt.

Extract 25. (Something impressive on campus:) Found it rather unfair, anyway I was rather

angry at that time. It has been in my mind for years. (...) Maybe [we roommates]

were relatively open-minded about the cost of meals and ate a bit better. After all we were studying, afraid of damaging our health. (...) [Students in other dormitories] all criticized that we spent money too casually, etc, etc. In fact, we just ate slightly better than they did. They only ate wheat bread and salted vegetables, while we sometimes ate eggs and fried vegetables and the like. (...) As a result, in the first semester, five out of six in our dormitory were elected[iv] as poor students, while, later, there were none (laugh). (...) (Poor students need to be "elected"?) There were too many who applied for need-based subsidies in our class. Our class was better, we did not ask the poor students to present family conditions. Many schools asked students to stand on the classroom platform and read their applications, shedding much tears.[91] (Student G, state scholarship winner)

With very limited funds, very few students can be granted aid. In Student G's class, for example, only two out of more than 30 students received a state scholarship of 4000 *yuan* in 2007, a year that witnessed a great increase in state allocations. Earlier, in the case of Student C, only two or three students were granted a state scholarship in a faculty comprising six classes. Since students from poor families are favourably considered for scholarships and other subsidy grants, a unique "poor students election," as Student G put it, was developed, which was a public appraisal of presented conditions to decide who deserved subsidies. When it is difficult to obtain accurate data about rural family economic details from authentic institutions, slight differences in the students' daily lives may be decisive in the public appraisal. When an applicant could be considered ineligible only because his or her diet included an egg or fried vegetables, it was obviously a case of exaggeration. To most rural students, financial aid is very important since many of them are at a critical point: with a slight increase in financial

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[iv] Student G used the word "elected", as if it was a campaign for president.

help they can complete their studies; with a slight increase in financial burdens they will suffer great deprivation or even fail in their academic endeavours. It was only natural that Student G took the competition for the subsidy very seriously and felt "rather unfair" and "rather angry".

Obviously, with very limited funds, it is impossible for all poor students to be granted relief, even if the "poor student election" was abolished. The indignation against the "poor student election," and other unfair treatment could have been aimed at a higher level, at the problematic system, and could have led to such questions as why rural students were almost unanimously poor, and why so many poor students had to compete for so little money and suffer the humiliation of "poverty presentations."

5.3.2.2. Higher extreme: Debtor mentality and subdued attitude

Extract 26. (Something impressive on campus:) My class had team spirit, very good. Like, say, my family was very poor, they, most of them could understand. And in all respects, like scholarship applications, they gave priority to me. (...) I felt quite grateful to them. At first I felt they looked down upon people, disdained me. It turned out that it was not the case. All were very nice, much concerned about me. (Student J)

Extract 27. (Something impressive on campus:) I feel that I am very lucky, lucky that I'm in this school. (...) I feel that my classmates are very helpful to me, very supportive to me. Mmm, feel that I have gained much in this area. For example, work-study programmes, state needs-based subsidies and the like. (...) And there are also state student loans, thankfully, although the application procedure is very complex.[92] (Student K)

The interviews show that most rural students at the higher extreme may be granted various types of financial aid in the form of scholarships, needs-based subsidies, student loans, work-study programmes. This aid either comes from government allocations or bank loans. However, poor rural students, such as Students J and K, felt grateful to their classmates, who could be their rivals in reality but who were entitled to decide whether they should be granted financial aid. As it was revealed above, rural students at the higher extreme tended to be sensitive to the rich-poor disparity among students. When others did them substantial favours, such as give them priority in financial aids grant, something intangible like "disdain" (Student J) tended to be ignored. Such gratitude did not seem to result from friendship between equals, but could be interpreted as a response to a favour. Meanwhile, a very practical problem can be illuminated: if most of the students were poor, as at the lower extreme, rivalry for financial aid would become unavoidable and the atmosphere would become unfriendly.

Extract 28. (Something impressive on campus:) After all, my family condition was thus, so it was natural that in daily expenditures you had this kind of mind-set: to spend as little as possible. (...) Every time, after vacation, when a new semester began, (...) I would take as little money as possible. After all, the family was burdened with costs of farming production. So, every time before leaving home, I felt gloomy. (Student L, scholarship winner)

In the case of Student L, higher education took a heavy toll: a younger sibling dropped out of school to save money. At the level of basic education, many rural students' family finances were already overdrawn and on the verge of bankruptcy. At the level of tertiary education, financial aid granted to them is not so substantial as to make a fundamental improvement in the situation. As a result, many rural students at

the higher extreme, just as much as those at the lower extreme, are heavily in debt to their families.

The following quotation is from Student H (from a civil servant/peasant family in the North), the only student who studied within the geographical boundary of Hebei Province and consumed more than 1000 *yuan* a month:

Extract 29. (Funding:) It's OK in my case. I fully depend on my family. Everything, including cost of living expenses, is covered by my family, because my family is relatively well off.

(As a rural student, you have been very successful breaking through urban exclusion.) The reason lies in this: financial concerns are the underlying cause of many phenomena. As I told you just now, I spent 60 thousand *yuan* during my four years in university. This may not be very much for some urban students, but it's not that easy to accumulate this sum from the village.

It was [the rural students'] subdued attitude, as well as their hard-working character, that pulled them through in their endeavours (...). (Student H)

To Student H, the price of higher education was great. However, this expense could not be spared, for money functioned as a stepping-stone, without which the mainstream student community would be inaccessible. While he could gain admittance to university with finances that would seem luxurious for peasants, they were not abundant for life in a metropolis. Student H is contrasted to his urban peers who had a whole system of privilege, including good basic education, cultural familiarity and a curriculum that favoured their background. Although declaring that he had no financial problems, Student H could not possibly be exempted from it. To span the urban-rural

gap, Student H expended extra money on, so to speak, an "admission fee". Money may be the most straightforward approach, although the gap may have been created by many other factors, including information and culture. However, to most rural students, whether they depend on family funds or scholarships, this route is blocked. Furthermore, the case of Student H can be contrasted with Student I, who studied in a southern metropolis, where social disparity is more salient. Student I claimed to have a subjective sense of financial pressure, even though his consumption standard is similar to that of Student H. A survey made in Guangzhou, a large southern city, reveals that students' monthly expenditures vary from less than 300 to about 8,000 *yuan* (J. Fu and C. Wang 2010). Had Student H studied in a southern metropolis, then the cost of higher education would have indeed resulted in a subjective sense of financial pressure.

Many rural families have to reduce their standard of living or go into debt to support their children. As a result, many rural students have a guilty conscience. "Taking so much money at once from the family savings, I felt very sorry" (Student B, at lower extreme, who found higher education costs bearable). "After all, a grown-up now, anyway, finds it embarrassing to ask for money" (Student M, at higher extreme, who found higher education costs unbearable). On the whole, rural students, whatever their category, are invariably burdened under the heavy cost of higher education. These elites among rural youths, though physically present in the city, still remain in the shadow of their impoverished rural homes. As such, the division that intersects across the four groups of rural students in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 becomes blurred, while the border that separates them from the city has become more distinct.

5.3.3. Higher extreme versus lower extreme: Illusion or marginalization

The following comparison is made between students at the lower and higher extremes, respectively, in order to uncover how rural students' standing in the higher education

hierarchy may influence their future orientation. This touches upon such aspects as upgrading academic qualifications, employment. Finances, though, remain a visible theme in this section.

5.3.3.1. Lower extreme: Illusion

Extract 30. I'm also looking for a job, because graduation is nearing.... Not easy, not at all.
(...) [In finding a job] I guess the most important factor is still the personal factor, for even if you enter a company through social relations, your merits still need to be verified. Your ability can serve as the marker of your strength. (...) (What, if we only look at the initial recruitment?) Maybe it equally depends on both, on social relations and on yourself as well. (Do you have relations in Shijiazhuang (the capital of Hebei Province)?) No, not influential relations. (Do you feel you have a chance in Shijiazhuang?) Er... I guess chance... chance, well, only for positions that are not so good. (Student A)

Extract 31. After all, there are too many college students now. It's difficult to find a job. Sure there's pressure. (...) (Those who graduated earlier and are still without work, what are they doing now?) Some are running small shops, selling ice cream near school, ice cream; some sell clothing, rent a shop and sell clothing. Engaged in various kinds of things.[93] (Are they all from the village?) Yes, from the village, all of them are from the village. (Do you think it fair?) It is quite fair as I deem it. In the present day society, capable persons get on. (...) When you can't find a job, you can't blame it on others. You can only say that you have no ability. (Student E)

In their childhood, most of the rural students showed outstanding performance in their studies among their peers. It is understandable that they are very proud. However,

the inadequacy of the way they have been educated has restricted the structure of their thoughts and knowledge so that many of them are clever in school examinations only. Universities and colleges at the lower extreme indiscriminately duplicate the stereotypes that adhere to unenlightened teaching methods. As a result, school products tend to be identical. Outside the campuses, Chinese economic development heavily depends on labour-intensive industries, which mostly recruit workers with low educational levels, leaving little room for college graduates, as will also be discussed in Chapter Six, 6.3.4.1 and Chapter Seven. In this situation, the major factors that affect employment obviously go beyond personal ability. In fact, rural students at the lower extreme are challenged from both sides: on the one hand we find the students at the higher extreme, who have the advantages of their prestigious schools, on the other hand we find the urban students, who have more resources and shelter in the city. Students A and E, however, failed to see the factors causing the employment crisis because university education did not deepen their insight into the existing system.

5.3.3.2. Higher extreme: Marginalization

Extract 32. As far as I'm concerned, the main purpose of leaving home is to find a job. (...) They're urban children and seek help from their parents, while we can only rely on ourselves. (Thought about going up to graduate studies?) Certainly did. Mmm, had better make money first and support myself. (...) Family has provided me for so many years, anyway, almost all the money is used up to support me through. In the end, if I go home and continue to rely on my family, it's really unacceptable. Too shameful to go home. (Student K)

Extract 33. I feel that anyway we are different from people here. After all, we want to come out [of the village] and it's just for this aim that we have made all the efforts.

Unlike [the urban students], they've always been here and don't have to worry about some future plans. (Student M)

Extract 34. For graduate studies, I applied to X University (a subclass-1 university). (...) We were three candidates for the final interview. Three candidates and the other two graduated from X university. The supervisors used to teach them and they were in the same faculty. Then I was eliminated and was transferred to this [subclass-2 university]. (...) Anyway this is very common. Because at that time I was told.... So, now many people ask me why don't you apply for the position of civil servant. Because, considering many factors, you can't just rely on your academic scores and take it for granted that you can make it.

(The experience of studying:) If I could choose, I would have rather been saved from such an experience. Too heavy. (...) Had to persevere. Persevered not because of strong will, but because there was no other choice. (Student H)

The following extract is from Student C, who had undergraduate education at the lower extreme in Hebei Province, but had graduate education in a southern metropolis. Once located at the higher extreme, where the students' socio-economic background differed sharply, Student C became aware of the disadvantaged position as a rural youth:

Extract 35. (Family influence in obtaining a position:) Er, right, there are such cases. But at the university [in Hebei Province] it did not impress me very much in that way. (...) On the contrary, I find this phenomenon more common in X City (the southern metropolis). In X City, you are more aware of the dependence on friends, parents and circle of friends, to look for a job. (In the big city, you can obviously sense this,

is that so?) Yes, I have a more obvious and more salient sense of this phenomenon

than I did when I was in Y City (the city in Hebei Province where Student C took

undergraduate studies). (Student C)

The opportunities to be admitted to elite universities are based on a quota which heavily favours residents in the metropolises.[94] Therefore, rural students at the higher extreme are the winners of a competition with the strictest elimination criteria, and it is reasonable to deem them as more competitive academically. However, they seem to be less confident and more aware of the fact that, unlike urban students, they could not get help from social relations in search of employment. They did not equate school grades and individual ability with a good work position. Their practical attitude might be a "subdued attitude" (Student H), or concession to humiliation.

To some extent, students' perceptions of reality seem to vary according to how much they approach the metropolis, where social stratification is salient: Student I became aware of the correlation between school grades and socio-economic status at the senior high school stage; Student H did so when admitted to university; Student C found social relations counted much when he arrived in a big southern metropolis; Students A and E, who were away from the big cities, were convinced that individual ability was decisive. Students' future strategies could be affected by how much their judgments about themselves and society were realistic.

5.3.3.3. Dilemma

Extract 36. This was my first choice; I directly applied to this school. And feel it was safer

in this way. Applications for better schools might fail. Better to be safe. (Student

D)

Extract 37. One goal was to be admitted to a school. (...) In fact I was very blind, so to speak. (In this blindness, there is one very important theme, that is, to leave the village as far as possible, right?) Right, right, right, find a school in the first place. (...) (Had you a very affluent family condition, would you give priority to your interests?) Er... as to interests, because at the bottom level, in general, I do not feel that enough attention is given to cultivating interests. As to the students' own interests... they hardly know what they want to do in the future, or where their interests lie. (Student C)

Extract 38. This [better-off family condition] and the fact that my parents had no regrets at breaking away from the soil provide financial and psychological support to a rural youth who chose to go in for higher education. (Student H)

Many rural students who study hard with the purpose of leaving the village are in fact more inspired by the present plight than by their studies or by some grandiose promise in the future. Higher education paves a route to the city. However, peasants, living in the closed rural environment, are unfamiliar with school affairs. Teaching staff in rural schools tend to be poorly informed about the university curriculum. As a result, most rural students are more or less blind about choices of schools and subjects. Nevertheless, behind this blindness lies the solitary goal: an urge to uproot from the soil and therefore to be admitted to a school at any rate. In this case, they would choose schools and majors of less prestige and less competition in relation to their urban peers. In so doing, they choose a position that is disadvantageous for their future upgrading and employment.

Confronted with poverty, it can be inferred from the interviews that rural students tend to falter between two choices: upgrading their academic qualifications or

employment. On the one hand, they look forward to financial self-reliance and then to reward their families. On the other hand, finding themselves in a disadvantaged position, they endeavour to upgrade their academic qualifications as a way of increasing their competitiveness. This puts them in a Catch 22 dilemma: they must have good qualifications to get satisfactory jobs, they must have money to upgrade their qualifications, and they must have satisfactory jobs to make money. Urban students have the advantage of social relations and economic conditions to buffer the impact of an employment crisis to some extent. In contrast, once back in their home villages, rural students would lose their foothold in the city and have even less chance to find jobs. In addition to this, they will find that their parents are too worn out to continue manual labour. The remark that it was "too shameful to go home" (Student K) reflects a typical mind-set that hangs heavily over many rural students.

Rural students at the lower extreme are in the most unfavourable position. With limited financial aid, they are more likely to sink their families into desperate poverty. "The village on campus" may temporarily buffer them against the impact from the city, but it may also slow down their active response to the external changes. Once they are precipitated into the employment crisis, they may have to pay a very heavy toll, and may even think that they are tangled in a trap of their own making. One incident that may confirm the findings in this research is the following: Wei Liu, a rural student who lost all hope about her employment prospects, chose suicide in February 2009, only half a year before graduation. Wei Liu was a typical poor rural student at the lower extreme: although she excelled at her studies and was once granted a state scholarship, her family was in debt and her younger brother discontinued his education to save money. Wei Liu's diary reveals that she used to be a very confident and very strong girl. She would rather "be thankful to poverty" than complain, for poverty was supposed to make her "strong and mature". In the long run, poverty put her under pressure with her family

heavily in debt, while she, "a grand university student," continued to draw on the toil of her parents without the hope of finding a job -- "How shameful!" To overcome her frustration, she relied on her "mind-set": "The key to a healthy mind-set is yourself.... Study harder, get equipped, perfect yourself, and the situation will improve." However, her mind-set failed to save her (Jingdong 2009). The fact that Wei Liu's diary overlaps with the extracts cited above is no coincidence. The data and analysis reveal that many of the rural students arrived at university with confidence. From there they have fallen financially and morally into debt. In the end, disillusionment about the future may be the last straw and they see no way out. While Wei Liu chose a drastic way out of her agony and guilt, her experience is not unique.

5.4. Epilogue

One of the advantages of grounded theory is that it is open to further modification. Therefore, the substantive grounded theory generated in this chapter has the potential to be improved by comparing it to more samples. Another way of strengthening it theoretically is to relate the findings in this chapter to high level theories that are extensively applicable. In the next chapter, Bourdieu's theory on capital reproduction via the educational system may further shed light on the problem of the rural students with respect to deprivation in different forms of capital, and Lindner's theory of humiliation helps us to delve further into the rural students' mind-sets. This also agrees with the assumption of classical grounded theorists that a literature review may follow the independent analysis as a way of urging novice researchers to discover fresh theories (Charmaz 2006, 6). The existing literature may also have a reciprocal effect by providing different lenses. While the above substantive grounded theory may view this world from the perspective of those being studied, the existing literature that will be applied may highlight power relations and help to set this chapter in the macro context.

Borrowing Bourdieu's concept of field, the Chinese higher education institutions, apart from comprising a university field, are a locus where the rural field and urban field overlap. The higher extreme tends to be dominated by urban students, while the lower extreme tends to be dominated by the rural students. This is a unique feature of the Chinese higher education system that results from the urban-rural segregation system so that the Chinese university reflects Chinese society. Rural China and urban China belong to two separate spaces, or even two different eras. Other societies that have applied welfare measures have greatly reduced disparities in necessities of life between the various social strata. For the Chinese students, however, daily details such as meals serve as indicators of "the rich" and "the poor," and, in turn, as indicators of "the urban" and "the rural." The rural students' close contact with their urban peers may intensify their sense of belonging to the village, and they may see the village in opposition to the city. In the existing pattern, resource distribution between the rural and urban areas is seriously imbalanced. The higher education system, which Bourdieu defines as an instrument that reproduces class inequality, may eventually entrench the urban-rural disparity by streaming urban and rural graduates to unequal social positions. Especially when they are exposed to employment crisis, the rural students are at risk of being left in a desperate situation to repeat the tragedies that are bred in poverty. More fundamentally, via the durable and transposable habitus developed in the university field, the urban-rural segregation system, an example of external government coercion, will have become internalized into people's mind-sets by the way the universities function.

However, the higher education institutions reproduce the unequal structure of the society indirectly and may appear to be neutral in comparison with the government policy that imposes urban-rural segregation directly. With respect to its influences on people's mind-sets, the effects of the university, as an institution that exerts symbolic

violence, could be much more profound and lasting. A combination of Bourdieu's and Lindner's theories, which give heed to both the objective structure of the society and the cognitive structure of social agents, will help to expose the process that has been camouflaged by this feature, and then reveal the potential influence that it may exert upon Chinese society.

Chapter Six: Comprehensive Analysis[v]

6.1. Introduction

To the Chinese higher education system, peasants and off-farm workers constitute an important source of revenues. They provide financial support to their children, i.e. rural students, especially those enrolled at the institutions in the lower level of the system. In this way, the distance between the higher education institutions and the rural society has been shortened since massification in 1999. As late as the end of the 1980s, higher education was still part of the planned economy. The government controlled the entire process, from the enrolment of new students to the assignment of job positions to graduates. With funding entirely covered by governments at different levels, students admitted to universities and colleges enjoyed free education as well as free medical care. All graduates had the status of state cadres and earned salaries defined by uniform standards. Access to higher education meant being upgraded in status and guaranteed financial comfort. Therefore, the National College Entrance Examination had a strong influence on Chinese society and was very competitive. In 1965, the year before the Great Cultural Revolution interrupted normal examination and enrolment, only 0.164 million students were admitted (Editorial Department of the Education Yearbook of China 1949-1981, 969). In 1977, the system was restored to normal operation, which continued the old mode of operation with a limited enrolment scale and uniform government allocation of work opportunities. Since the 1990s, education policies underwent some evolution. The old notion that the governments should provide free education and assign job positions gradually gave way to the market-oriented idea that

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[v] Part of the content in this chapter was published under the title of "A Case Study of 'Habitus' and 'Field': The Chinese Rural Students on the University Campus".

students should share part of the cost and find jobs on their own. This gradual evolution continued for nearly ten years until 1999 when there were drastic changes.

On July 06, 1999, only twenty days before the National College Entrance Examination, a new education policy was issued to counteract the Asian financial crisis and promote domestic consumption (Lanqing Li 2003, Part 4). This new policy, the result of the combined efforts of the National Development Planning Commission and the Ministry of Education, was issued in the form of an urgent notice. Accordingly, the previous plan made at the beginning of 1999 was modified to further increase the enrolment scale: a total of 1.53 million students were to be admitted to formal education institutions, an increase of 42% (L. Cheng 2008).[95] At the same time, tuition was increased. From 1989 to 2012, student tuition fees have increased 25 times, and it would take a peasant's net income of 13.6 years to support a student through his or her undergraduate period (Y. Wang 2012). Apparently, this education policy, whose objective was openly declared as promoting the state economy, foreshadowed the employment crisis for college graduates, and has paved the road from higher education into poverty.[96]

On the one hand, peasants are disadvantaged when it comes to economic capital; on the other hand, the cost of tertiary education has increased dramatically, while college graduates' prospects in the employment market are far from optimistic. This gives rise to a series of questions. What is the motivation of the rural students who seek higher education? What kind of process have they been through when they have been admitted to higher education institutions? What kind of role do the Chinese higher education institutions play in such public issues as equal opportunity for rural youths? How do the experiences of the rural students on the university and college campuses shape their mind-set? And how might their mind-set, in turn, impact Chinese society? In

applying the theories of Bourdieu and Lindner, these inquiries may be formulated into the following research questions:

> How have the Chinese peasants' reproduction strategies, in the form of investment in higher education, come into being? After the Chinese university, as an instrument of capital reproduction, has absorbed the peasants' investment, what dividends will it pay? Specifically, what kind of mind-set will it leave the rural students with? And what will the significance of such output be to Chinese society?

The previous chapters may have shed some light on these questions: the state has imposed urban-rural segregation which has reduced the peasants to the status of unfree labourers and the state has reduced the higher education system to a heteronomous institution which serves the purpose of the state rather than play its public role properly. This chapter will apply the theories of Bourdieu and Lindner to analyse the life of the peasants' children in a heteronomous higher education system as presented in the previous chapter. It will shed light on the effects of using higher education as a mechanism of capital reproduction, and on how this mechanism may influence the cognitive structure of the rural students.

6.2. Literature review

As a disadvantaged group on the campus, rural students have been the subject of a considerable amount of literature. This literature records their lives and academic studies, and has attracted deep societal concerns about their plight. But the literature that can be defined as scientific research is rare and limited.[97] Among the scientific research papers that the author has so far reviewed, the ones that are considered relevant to this research can be roughly divided into four categories. The following authors and papers are considered to be illustrative: research on the rural students' socialization (e.g. Lai

and Z. Wang 2002; X. Xu 2003, 2007), on their adaptability (e.g. Yiquan Zhang and Yijie Wang 2006), on their ideological and moral value to education as well as employment education (e.g. W. Zhang 2006; T. Lei 2005; Yi Liu 2006), and on their interpersonal relations from a sociological perspective (e.g. Xin Zheng 2002). Most researchers agree that the urban-rural segregation structure and the differences between urban and rural cultures are the main reasons for these problems. Some researchers also attribute the plight of the rural students mainly to their own characteristics, making little further exploration of the cause of these characteristics.

The above literature review, which is limited in scale, tends to lead to the following conclusion: these researchers approach the topic from different perspectives, but have some common shortcomings. First, although some researchers relate the plight of the rural students to the urban-rural segregation system and rural culture, they fail to trace the roots of the system and culture, and in turn fail to point to areas beyond the rural society. Second, although their subjects live on campus, these researchers rarely reflect on the higher education institutions' role in exacerbating the plight of the rural students, and in turn fail to criticize the structure and nature of the specific environment in which the rural students live and study. Third, in most cases, the researchers almost invariably lump rural students together for study. Up to this point in time, the author has been unable to find researchers who focus on how the unequal positions in the hierarchy of the higher education institutions may create differences in the way the rural youths are treated, or how the students subjectively respond to the different standings in the hierarchy. Fourth, given that scientific research within China is exposed to strict censorship, most research within Continental China tends to be focused on short-term and immediate events, stopping short at looking into the political perspective and thus not studying the rural students in relation to the state. Moreover, so far, the author has

been unable to find even one piece of Chinese research that applies systematic theories to analyse the conditions of the rural students.

Bourdieu's theory on strategies of capital reproduction will guide the analysis and help to uncover how educational institutions, through capital conversion, may influence the behaviour and economic conditions of the rural students. According to Bourdieu (1996, 219, 276-77), those who invest in education have strategies which may be influenced by such factors as: the volume and structure of their capital in relation to the education system; the relative value of the profits that they expect from their investments; the distance between them and the appropriate information. The return on the investment may vary because different social classes have different educational chances, and different sections and types of schools promise different chances of success (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 158). School benefits, such as academic capital (e.g. diplomas), may give economic and social return but in many cases are determined by the social capital or even economic capital. And the transformation of one type of capital into another means displacement between fields (Bourdieu 1996, 276-77). It is therefore assumed that what is ultimately decisive is the pattern in the field of power.

6.3. Discussion

Bourdieu (1996,1-2, 228) emphasizes the relation between the acts of construction performed by agents and the social genesis of the cognitive structures of the agents, i.e. the homology between the habitus and the field. The previous chapter presented the rural students' accounts of and comments on their life and studies, and analysed their mind-sets to a certain degree. Here, the chapter will trace the social genesis which may help us to understand the rural students' presentations and practices, as well as the underlying cognitive structures. It departs from giving a presentation and analysis of the rural field, or the origin of the peasants' strategies of reproduction.

6.3.1. The rural field, the capital and habitus of peasants

For a long time, a large population of rural labourers have quit farming and are making a living in the city. For instance, a considerable number of restaurants and grocery stores in urban areas are run or staffed by peasants; sweatshops are mostly staffed by off-farm workers. However, their status is still institutionally bound to the village, making it difficult for them to become integrated in urban society. This excluded status helps to preserve the habitus that they have developed in the village. From some terms currently adopted in the Chinese media, such as "off-farm worker" and "rural college student", as well as "college-graduate-off-farm worker" that has more recently come into use, it can be seen that, people with rural status dwell in a space that has already extended into the geographical boundary of the urban areas. Therefore, it is more precise to describe their microcosms using the concept of "rural field" rather than "rural area".

Regarding the peasants' capital, deprivation in economic capital is a feature that can be easily identified in the structure of their capital. However, as has been revealed in Chapter Three, deprivation supported by a systematic structure will necessarily lead to comprehensive poverty, i.e. deprivation in political, social, cultural and economic capital. Regarding political capital, as has been presented in Chapter Two, Section 2.7.2., the field of politics in China is a closed space within which most of the agents tend to have secured tenure positions in the establishment while peasants are almost completely excluded. What is apparently shared by all in the rural field is a rural identity, which is their label by birth, or a bond that relates them to one another. To enter other fields, the social agents must have a special capital that Bourdieu calls the "admission fee" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 107), while in the rural field, one must have special capital, or pay a ransom, in order to escape the field. Or, in other fields, the

losers in the competition get out of the arena, while in the rural field the winners get out. Therefore, the rural field possesses less unique capital and has less vitality than any other fields, although it is the largest in size. It is subordinate to the urban field in that it not only provides manpower and material resources for the city, but also bears the consequences of economic crisis in the city. For example, at times of employment crisis, peasants are more likely to lose their temporary jobs in the city.[98] At present, nearly 260 million off-farm workers are working in the urban areas (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of PRC 2011). Because of urban-rural segregation, the few big cities where a large population of off-farm workers lives, such as Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, implement highly exclusive policies.[99] Even some cities which claim to offer open access to rural migrants impose strict criteria.[100]

The subordinate status of the village to the city is only one of the numerous pieces of evidence showing that, deprived in political capital, peasants are subsequently deprived of other forms of capital, and have no institutionalized guarantee to voice their case and impact policy-making. As has also been revealed in Chapter Three, the Chinese peasants have been deprived of land property as economic capital. A decline in rural schools deprives the peasants in cultural capital. Regarding peasants' social capital, we can turn to Bourdieu (1986, 249): the volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent largely depends on the size of the network of relations he can effectively utilize and also on the volume of the economic, cultural or symbolic capital possessed by him or by all members in this network. Now that the traditional rural society has long been atomized, it is assumed that the peasants' small network of kin (who tend to be equally poor) can yield insignificant profit.

With respect to the habitus of the Chinese peasants, Arthur Henderson Smith (1900), who lived in China more than a century ago, made observations and summarized some of the characteristics of the Chinese peasants. To list a few examples:

frugal, hard-working, polite, absence of public spirit, patience and perseverance, content and cheerful. Yen (1933, 54) reflected on the culture of rural China and diagnosed four diseases: illiteracy, poverty, vulnerability and privacy/selfishness. The above characters listed by Smith and Yen illustrate habitus corresponding to a diseased society where the peasants were segmented, incapable of establishing a welfare system that covered the whole society, but had to rely on extended families or closed patriarchal communities that were deeply rooted in the private economy. After the CPC had seized state power, peasants were deprived of their land and patriarchal autonomy. Urban-rural segregation further deteriorated their social and economic ecology. Since field and habitus are homologous, the existing structure of the rural field tends to bring some of the peasants' practices to the extreme, as for instance, more than ever, peasants are inclined towards such features as self-control but submission, independence but selfishness, endurance of hardship and poverty but leaning towards contentment, and, in particular, unawareness of political rights. The urge to break away from their ancestors' roots should be part of a newly developed habitus. The rural field may have also profoundly shaped rural students. For instance, such virtues as diligence and endurance may be attributed to the autonomy that peasants enjoyed in the traditional society, and their efforts in higher education may reflect their desperate efforts to rebel against the existing urban-rural segregation system that has reduced them to extreme deprivation. Some rural students at the lower extreme of the higher education system consider poverty as a positive factor for promoting their progress in academic studies, as has been presented in Chapter Five, as they are unaware of their deprivation in other forms of capital. This may be the effect of urban-rural segregation as a mechanism of segmentation.

6.3.2. Access to higher education

6.3.2.1. Peasants' reproduction strategies

Under the urban-rural segregation system, peasants without a retirement pension or sufficient social welfare mainly depend on their children as they get older. Given that at present Chinese manual labourers generally have a low income, if the children repeat the life of their parents, they may even not be able to properly support their parents who are in old age. Therefore, manual labourers tend to have a strong urge to transform their capital into a new, more profitable form before they have become physically exhausted, as for instance, by investing in their children's education. While capital conversion, as Bourdieu (1996, 276-77) points out, is a way of maintaining one's position in social space, different agents would prefer different strategic systems according to the amount and structure of their capital. The inclination to invest in education, in particular, depends on how much one relies on the cultural capital. The Chinese cheap labourers are not likely to possess significant economic and social capital. They have only limited alternatives when they want to make investments. However, apart from physical capital, peasants have one more resource which they can develop, i.e. the talent of their children. Moreover, investing in children's education is a traditional practice. Peasants are different from those who are, according to Bourdieu's categorization, best equipped with the forms of capital giving access to the new instruments of reproduction (278). Just the opposite, peasants' capital tends to be under threat in a rapidly changing time and, therefore, they tend to be traditional in their choice of capital reproduction strategies. As can be anticipated, with higher education, the next generation would have better income and consequently improve the living condition of the families. And tertiary education qualifications, as an institutionalized form of cultural capital, objectified in the form of a diploma, may impress people as being substantial. Under the urban-rural segregation

system, government household registration policies grant considerable privileges to holders of tertiary education qualifications.[101] Higher education holds promise for rural youths who wish to enter the city and avoid the life of off-farm workers like their parents, even though families which invest in higher education may risk bankruptcy. Given urban-rural segregation and the peasants' lack of economic capital, the rural students' motivation to higher education is understandable. Indeed, the Chinese peasants' endeavour to support their children in higher education regardless of its cost is a reproduction strategy that they have developed in a state of desperation, based on rational choices.

6.3.2.2. Removed from the appropriate information

Bourdieu refers to capital conversion as "cost" because it means changes in conditions objectively imposed by the need to maintain the value of an inheritance. This would also entail a comprehensive change in subjective experiences (Ibid, 277). From the outset, the Chinese peasants' plan of capital reproduction is bound to be more costly. They are confined in the rural field and their practices are defined by rural habitus. Particularly, they tend to be removed from the appropriate information about higher education. Currently, more than 60% of the rural children quit school at the basic education stage (M. Han 2009), and only promising children enter senior middle school. On the other hand, in most provinces the higher education system admits as many as 80% of senior middle school graduates (Ministry of Education 2012). The identity of a college student is no longer the marker of success. The focus has shifted to employment prospects, where for many urban students the competition is over admittance to high-level and famous institutions. It is not easy for many peasants to understand the relationships between the multiple categories of disciplines and institutions, nor do they fully comprehend the significance of the differences between the categories. Often, they

will not have good insight into the overall situation until after they have witnessed specific examples. Bourdieu (1996, 219) terms this phenomenon as "structural hysteresis of the categories of perception and appreciation". This structural delay will be greater when one is more distanced from the necessary information. In the case of China, the peasants, compared to other disadvantaged groups, such as the urban poor who have no choice but to invest in higher education, are exposed to more risks, for they are even more distanced from updated information by the segmentation mechanism of urban-rural segregation.

6.3.2.3. Disorder as revolt against inequality

The data in Chapter Five was mainly collected through interviews conducted in 2008. At that time, the students at the lower extreme did not appear to respond strongly to inequality in higher education. In recent years, however, information spreads more efficiently and rural people have become more aware of the inequality in education. One example of this is the National College Entrance Examination of 2013, where some examinees and their parents attacked invigilators who were stopping candidates from cheating. "We want fairness; no cheating, no fairness", the local attackers declared (L. Lei 2013). This occurred in a town that has an examination preparation centre that is both famous for its high rate of admission to tertiary education and noted for cheating. Senior middle school education in China is not free and may even be a lucrative business. The town's high admission rate has brought it honour as well as huge revenues. A high number of students from other areas come to this famous examination preparation centre and pay tuition fees and accommodation fees. This encourages persistent and wide-spread cheating, which even involves some local officials and teachers. Cheating has already developed into an industry, where "companies" supply special cheating instruments or supply agents. When the invigilators were strict with the

rules, the money that many examinees invested in cheating would have been paid in vain. The rural people were angry because they thought they were being treated unfairly, and the invigilators, who were non-locals but were hired in to supervise the examination in this county, became the targets of their anger. Needless to say, their way of seeking fair treatment can only have detrimental effects. In this way, children of poor peasants are incapable of establishing an institutional guarantee of their rights. Some university intellectuals have voiced their opinions on an institutionalized elimination of inequalities in admittance to higher education. However, such a proposal has irritated the authorities, as will be illustrated below by the case of Zhiyong Xu (2013), who has been arrested and imprisoned.

6.3.2.4. How intellectuals act on the issue of inequality

The big metropolises, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, accommodate the largest population of off-farm workers. Residents in these big metropolises enjoy more high-quality education resources and are allocated more quotas for admittance to the more renowned universities than the rest of the population.[102] Consequently, competition for admittance to elite universities is much less intense in these cities than it is in the other provinces. However, the children of off-farm workers who work and live in these metropolises are excluded from this privilege. Before 2013, the children of rural residents who have received secondary education in the city had to return to their hometowns to sit for a tertiary examination where they had to compete with young people of their own category. At the end of 2012, the Ministry of Education proposed that municipal governments should permit students to participate in the examination in the cities where their parents stay rather than in their hometowns.[103] But the big cities that accommodate a large population of off-farm-workers set very strict regulations to exclude the rural children; Beijing, in particular, simply does not accept non-local

examinees. Thus, the big cities where a large population of rural children live and study do not accept or tend to exclude rural examinees, while the smaller cities that are open to rural examinees do not accommodate a large population of off-farm workers, nor do they have ample education resources. In the National College Entrance Examination of 2013, of the 9.12 million examinees, less than 5000 were non-local examinees (J. Guo 2013). Evidently, rural examinees are still excluded from the urban examination room.

By now, people come closer together both physically and digitally. Meanwhile, the human rights ideal has become more widespread. In this case, as Lindner (2006, xv, xvi) points out, people tend to accept such a notion as: any attempt to lower the expectations of any one group becomes an offence against all individuals. In China, however, nearly 260 million off-farm workers fail to form a powerful voice when they are exposed to a social injustice that can no longer be concealed. In 2012, Zhiyong Xu (2013) and several other university intellectuals proposed to the Premier of the State Council that the children of off-farm workers should be entitled to take the National College Entrance Examination in cities where they live and study (S. Guo 2013). This is the first time since the economic reform that university intellectuals have openly appealed to the government through public media on this long-existing problem. Zhiyong Xu was also involved in the petition that some non-local student parents delivered to the Ministry of Education. In comparison with other appeals made by a small number of intellectuals, such as those on civil societies or constitutionalism which have the potential to challenge the regime, topics related to higher education appear to be much less a politically sensitive issue. Nevertheless, very few university intellectuals openly challenge the system, and participate even less in such petitions. Zhiyong Xu was arrested in July of 2013 and one of the causes was the appeal he made on behalf of the children of off-farm workers (Li Li 2013). On the whole, the university intellectuals are conspicuous with their absence on some issues that are closely related to their public

roles. For decades, only a few have spoken up, and never have they had any impact on government policy-making. Zhiyong Xu's arrest shows that the reason for this absence is the threat of direct violence.

6.3.3. Process of higher education

Bourdieu (1996, 141) finds a correlation between the different higher educational institutions that the students enter and their different social-class backgrounds. Students within the same categories of institutions tend to come from the same positions of the field of power and have dispositions that are similar. When the proportion of working-class students is significantly increased, the correlation between academic performance and social-class background will become apparent. In effect, one type of social inequality would be transmuted into a specific educational inequality (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 76, 158). As an illustration of Bourdieu's assumption, the National College Entrance Examination of China, particularly after the system has enormously expanded and admitted more rural youths, tends to channel more urban students to the higher extreme and more rural students to the lower extreme of the system.[104] The effect of this unfairness will be significant and far-reaching for the rural students. They have habitus and capital that are structurally similar. Once they are assigned to the higher extreme and the lower extreme respectively, they will interact in different manners within their different environments.

6.3.3.1. Lower extreme: The village on the campus and absolute deprivation

At the lower extreme, rural students make up the majority and are capable of extending the boundary of the rural field onto the campus of universities and colleges. As can be seen from the interviews in Chapter Five, they tend to be confined in a closed mini rural

society duplicated on the campuses, living under financially harsh conditions but maintaining a poised mind-set. Bourdieu relates habitus to the field and may explain this phenomenon as follows: habitus means being "at home" in the field one inhabits (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 128). Bourdieu's study of the working-class students indicates that they become inured to harsh conditions and take them for granted. Those who are academically excellent tend to be more rigorously selected in the education process and therefore have better school performance. Yet, they are not inspired to a level of ambition that corresponds to their academic excellence. Moreover, exposed to the cultural arbitrary of their class, they have developed a corresponding habitus which is homologous to the harsh environment. As a result, they are not likely to show moral indignation at forms of repression which anticipate the treatment most probable for their class (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 16, 72-80, 207; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 24). Lindner (2006, 18, 165) has also observed that traditionally there have been situations in which underlings may accept the pain that comes with their lowliness, seeing it as honourable medicine. The Chinese tradition was not an exception in this regard. In this study, even though the interviewees are from different villages and families, they used to live in the same field and had a similar habitus. This ensures the overall harmony between them and exempts them from a feeling of isolation and marginalization (Student F). Their habitus tends to be at odds with the urban students who lead a more affluent life (Student D). When some rural students slightly adapted their habitus to the new environment, for example, a slight improvement in diet, the students as a whole showed disapproval. The slight change appeared to be so provocative for the group that those who intended to make the change suffered unfortunate consequences (Student G). Such events illustrate the durability of the rural habitus, i.e. while agents in the field compete for interests, the basis for establishing a criteria of judgment is their shared habitus. The fact that the rural students take the harshness of life for granted is

apparently related to their rural habitus, which, to a considerable extent, is the internalization of an objective structure that reduces peasants to a poor condition. Traditionally in China such merits as thriftiness, diligence and devotion were emphasized. The state makes use of these traditional merits with the intention of imposing the values of the dominant culture. For example, the CPC set some moral models with such traditional merits.[105] Propaganda promoting such models is still being churned out today even though the disparity between rich and poor is appalling. This overstates the effect of honourable medicine, so that the rural students let obvious social injustice go undetected or un-remarked. In particular, they may overlook the fact that they have been excluded from the city, or even mistake poverty as the source of virtues (as for instance, the rural student Wei Liu, referred to in Chapter Five, Section 5.3.3.3.).

Bourdieu finds out that in matters of culture, those who are exposed to absolute deprivation may be unaware of their status as victims. This may be even more to the point in matters of education, as the pedagogic authorities may conceal the correlation between the symbolic violence exerted by an educational institution and the existing power relations (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 65, 210). The rural students at the lower extreme seem to have a feeling of being "at home" in their small village on the campus. If this feeling largely results from absolute dispossession, the rural students would inevitably have to pay a price for that. For example, they tend to misrecognize one fact: they are rewarded with better academic records largely because the educational system has imposed a much more rigorous selection process on them than on their urban peers. Sometimes they have to deliberately contain their ambition and reduce their ultimate goal to something "practical" so they can merely break away from the village and enter the city (Students C and D). This impedes the realization of their potential. To prepare for the National College Entrance Examination, most rural students sacrifice extracurricular studies and have a limited knowledge structure. They may look upon the

urban students' advantages in this respect with disapproval, thinking of them as something dispensable, like games and entertainment. Therefore, they do not experience the pain of dispossession (e.g. Student E). It seems that their illusion about higher education persists, even though the system drains financial resources from them, but fails to sufficiently convert their merits, such as diligence and perseverance, into deep insight and high competence on the employment market.

To interpret the unawareness of humiliation, Morton Deutsch (quoted in Lindner 2006, 31) points out: "Discontent and the sense of injustice may be latent rather than manifest in a subordinated group. Neither the consciousness of oneself as victimized or disadvantaged, nor the consciousness of being a member of a class of disadvantaged may exist psychologically". In the case of the Chinese rural students, this unawareness may deflect the realization of humiliation, yet it rarely relieves their pain, or helps them out of their plight. Rather, this unawareness may lead to a more disastrous end. An illustration can be found in the case of Wei Liu as mentioned in Chapter Five, Section 5.3.3.3. She surrendered to her strong sense of shame rather than seeing herself as the victim and then feeling indignant. And worse, she was not inspired to action to change her environment. Each year, millions of rural youths leave their villages and enter the higher education system and then enter society. The course of their stay on the campus may also be a latent period of humiliation for them.

6.3.3.2. Higher extreme: Humiliation and relative deprivation

At the higher extreme, a field where the urban students make up the majority, it may be inevitable for the rural students, being in the minority, to feel out of place. They have already entered a new field where their old habitus impedes them. It may be frustrating to find one's habitus under challenge, and it would take much effort to readapt one's old habitus, which is durable and transposable, to a new field. But that alone does not

necessarily lead to humiliation. As long as the university is not neutral, the higher extreme of the system, which is dominated by the city, would invariably respond to the overall hierarchical structure of urban-rural segregation. In this overriding structure, the existing power relations have assigned the village and the city unequal status. It follows that the urban field would not only find the rural habitus out of place, but also reject it as unworthy. As a result, the rural students will find themselves marginalized in matters of culture, as well as proletarianized in matters of economic and social capital. Bourdieu assumes that the move of an agent in a certain field may be defined by both the volume and structure of his capital and his objective relation to other agents (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 99). Therefore, the feeling of frustration that the rural students have experienced tends to be the effect of a class opposition between those with rich capital and advantaged positions and those with poor capital and disadvantaged positions, more than it is the conflict between the rural culture and urban culture.

When the rural students have entered the higher extreme, they witness urban luxury. When they live in the same dormitories with their urban peers, they have the opportunity to observe every day in detail the differences between the two groups, or rather, two classes, including some differences that can be quantified, such as the expense of the necessities of life. They may go beyond a superficial observation of the city and experience psychological impact (e.g. Student L). The rural youths would be reminded that they are exactly the same kind of human beings, but with different identities. Lindner (2006, 43) gives a vivid illustration: it is like being shown the amenities of modern life in Western soap operas and being invited into the family of equal human beings, while at the same time being deprived of those very amenities. Lindner (xv, 29, 42-3) tells how negative psychological impact could be created in such a situation. Unawareness of absolute deprivation may be replaced by an awareness of relative deprivation. This process may be accompanied by an awakening, which,

paradoxically, may become the source of such ill feelings as humiliation. It takes a long mental and emotional process to become aware of such humiliation, and to see the difference between "honor humiliation" [sic] and human rights steered "dignity humiliation". Tradition or the official propaganda machine that recommend this honourable medicine would define the dispositions of the rural students at the higher and lower extremes. But those who have come to the higher extreme in the big cities have been directly exposed to the sharp contrast between the urban and rural areas. They may come to realize that they are deprived of the very benefits entitled to their urban peers, and that the gap between them and the city is "impassable" (Student H). They can wear the halo of famous institutions and can receive various types of financial aid, but this can hardly make up for the humiliation that they have suffered as an inferior group. When they begin to reject the honourable medicine and refuse to accept their situation as normal, they will become aware of the truth about their status and context.

If such awareness is achieved due to the feeling of humiliation, a negative effect would be inevitable. Lindner (2006, 21) may define this negative effect by distinguishing between shame, i.e. a humbling experience a person agrees to, and humiliation, i.e. those experiences a person does not agree to. The difference between the two states lies in the fact that one person may feel ashamed and humbled without feeling humiliated; another person may feel humiliated but not ashamed. Using Lindner, it can be seen that the delimitation of these two feelings is context-sensitive. It is a common practice in many societies that some students need to do part-time work to support their studies while some do not, or some students have a higher level of consumption while some are thrifty. Most rural students are used to poor conditions, and many of them have had experiences of hard physical labour since they were very young. In their rural homes, this rarely leads to humiliation. While at the higher extreme,

this signifies more than physical labour and material inequality, it may give rise to a sense of humiliation (e.g. Student M). In some cases, rural students, probably in an attempt to alleviate the pain derived from a sense of humiliation, may deliberately attribute the awareness of urban-rural disparity and a consequent sense of inferiority to "the dark side" of one's personality, as Student K did. Due to moral self-discipline, a feeling of humiliation may be misrecognized as a feeling of shame. In other cases, however, vocabulary choices that are not proper, or facial expressions that are not appropriate, may constitute humiliation; even the urban students' relatively better meals may embarrass the rural students (e.g. Student L). As long as human beings are classified into the superior and inferior classes, as long as the gap between them is found impassable, in short, as long as the existing structure imposes humiliation on some, the feeling of being humiliated is bound to develop, even when there is no specific person responsible for humiliating the other or any intended humiliating acts. A sense of humiliation could easily develop where there might be a sense of shame. In comparison to their counterparts at the lower extreme, the rural students at the higher extreme are more likely to be reduced to an unstable condition in that they are faced with two dichotomies, one between segregation and integration, and the other between humiliation and shame.

6.3.3.3. In scholastic areas

With respect to the attitude towards study and academic achievements, Bourdieu studies different categories of students in France and lists two points. First, bourgeois students tend to have such attitudes as "dilettantism, self-assurance and irreverent ease"; their advantage is more marked in those areas least directly controlled by the school system. Second, working-class students tend to manifest "tense application and educational realism"; as a highly selected group, they may perform at least as well as the upper-class

students in the most scholastic area. With the criteria governing elimination becoming more rigorous, the structure of the population of selection-survivors is changing constantly and the direct relation between social origin and academic success tends to be progressively weakened, or even reversed (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 74-76, 82, 160-61). Using Bourdieu, it can be seen that, at the high extreme in the Chinese system, the first point may be exemplified by answers from the interviewees. As to the second point, urban students tend to have advantages in both the scholastic area and those areas least directly controlled by the school system. Rural students who have somehow made their way to the higher extreme have survived the most rigorous elimination process: 60% of the rural children have been eliminated from the education system before the senior-middle-school stage (M. Han 2009). Moreover, the way that the elite universities allocate quotas in favour of metropolitan residents has eliminated most rural senior middle school graduates from the higher extreme.[106] Yet, the reality in the elite universities of China fails to confirm Bourdieu's assumption of the French example. This may be due to the rural students' experiences before they have entered university: disparity between the urban and rural areas in the allotment of educational resources, which means that the form and content of rural basic education impedes the development of the rural youths. But if the focus is on the process of higher education, one more factor should be considered: the political and economic forces that have dominated the university field. That is to say, the university is incapable of protecting the rural students from the impact of external forces as it does not have the mechanisms to redress social injustice, even in the scholastic area.

Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 76) finds that if the proportion of working-class students entering university were significantly increased, a correlation between academic performance and social-class background may become more apparent. This is true in the overall higher education system of China: with more urban

students at the higher extreme and more rural students at the lower extreme. But if we only look at the lower extreme, the Chinese case, again, appears to be puzzling: the rural students tend to excel in most scholastic results. Is it possible that the "village on the campus" has contributed to Bourdieu's (Ibid 82, 160) assumption that, in the scholastic area, the direct relation between social background and academic success tends to be weakened, or even reversed? It is important, therefore, to examine how this village has been constructed on the campus. The fact that the rural students have some advantages in this symbolic village seems to be the effect of the rural students' power as the majority. So far, no evidence has been found by the author that non-elite institutions have made more efforts than elite institutions to help the rural students in the academic areas. The interviews reveal that in this small rural community the students (e.g. Students A and E) tend to resemble their parents who are distanced from the necessary information. It is true that among the students who are academically excellent, for example, scholarship winners, rural students make up a greater proportion in comparison to their urban peers, but this is partly related to the greater proportion of the rural students in the overall college student body. In comparison with working-class students in France who have entered non-elite institutions, the Chinese rural students, the rare ones in a very large population of rural children, are more rigorously selected but have found their way into tertiary education institutions of an inferior status than the elite universities. Thus, their excellent academic records may indicate that the Chinese examination system wastes the potential of the rural students due to the urban-rural segregation. Or it may indicate that the rural students bring more interest to their studies because their social success depends on their academic success to a greater degree than their urban peers. This does not likely indicate that in Chinese non-elite institutions the dispositions of the privileged groups are, in Bourdieu's (1996, 288) words, "relatively unpromising for success in the strictest academic competitions".

6.3.4. Graduation and employment

Bourdieu assumes that children of working-class origin are more likely to "eliminate themselves" from the educational institutions by declining to enter it. He also notices another form of elimination:

> [T]hose who do not eliminate themselves at the moment of moving from one stage to another are more likely to enter those branches (establishments or sections) from which there is least chance of entering the next level of education.... [Such] institutions and school careers [may] entice them with the false pretences of apparent homogeneity only to ensnare them in a truncated educational destiny. (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 153, 158)

"Deferred elimination" is what Bourdieu labels such *de facto* self-elimination, which is in fact the consequence of relegation to a second-order branch (Ibid, 153-54). The focus of such a phenomenon may be on two types of relation: first, the relation between those who enter a stage of schooling and those who have successfully graduated; second, the relation between those who have graduated from the previous stage and those who enter the next stage. In many cases, the latter relation is neglected. Deferred elimination may reduce the role of self-elimination at the end of the previous stage of schooling. When the students enter the next stage, "chances of entry" may be disguised as "chances of success" (159). This represents a "gentle style of elimination", but is a slow and costly process. The victims of deferred elimination not only include the so-called "failures," but also those who hold titles that "normally" would give them the right to a privileged occupation, yet who cannot fully realize the value of their titles on the market, usually because they are not from the right class (Bourdieu 1996, 287). Therefore, deferred elimination is a way of concealing the elimination of the working

classes (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 159). The discriminatory nature of the Chinese higher education system has been concealed partly through its function of deferred elimination, which often occurs after graduation.

6.3.4.1. Employment trap at the lower extreme

It turns out that while most Chinese universities and colleges establish relatively high thresholds for admission, they have much less rigorous criteria for graduation, which leads to an average graduation rate of 97% (Xiaodong Lu 2011). When students have the opportunity to ascertain whether the university can give them what they have been expecting, they are in most cases already off the campus. Upon entry into the workforce, according to Bourdieu (1996, 168, 276), inherited social capital or even economic capital, rather than the criteria for academic selection, begin to gain in force. As long as most rural students relegated to the lower extreme will graduate with relatively less academic capital, as long as they might be confronted with elimination at the moment when inherited social capital or economic capital, which they are short of, recovers all their efficacy, as long as academic capital, which is almost their only asset, tends to be devalued in relation to political, social and economic capital in the unique social field of China, and most importantly, as long as the target of the massification policy is equivalent to the economic goals of the state rather than to a goal of upgrading the poor peasants' economic situation, a "truncated educational destiny" would be a *de facto* trap for the rural students.

In the eleven years from 2003 to 2013, the mass system has produced nearly 55 million graduates, including urban students and rural students (S. Shi and N. Li 2014). In 2013, for instance, the student body on campus was 33.252 million,[107] and there were more than seven million graduates.[108] Comparatively, the United States with the biggest economic scale in the world had about 1.7 million graduates in 2010 (Hacker

2012). Given the current economic situation in China, a large number of tertiary education graduates are bound to become victims of deferred elimination. The real estate industry, which contributes to one third of GDP, the manufacturing industry, which is mainly based on labour intensive enterprises, and the services industry, which is mainly based on traditional service, are mostly staffed by workers with low educational levels. Meanwhile, the government economic policies are increasingly biased in favour of occupations monopolized by the state.[109] SMEs, the most important employers of rural graduates, are taxed heavily and are dealing with a difficult situation.[110] Some occupations related to the life and wellbeing of the large population of peasants, such as rural basic education or rural medical care, could have been a huge market for college graduates, but the state rarely makes an effort to develop them. The most attractive positions are those of civil servants and state employees, whose welfare and income are much higher than employees in other occupations (Heilongjiang Morning News, March 25, 2013; Hua Wang 2013). Competition for such positions has been intense, often with hundreds of applicants competing for one position. Many, including Master's degree holders, compete for positions of manual workers to clean the streets or dig dung, since holders of such positions are formal employees of the municipal governments (Zheng Xu 2013; Ke Yang 2009). Considering both the amount of college graduates and the existing economic situation, it can be seen that the industrial structure of China, which is dominated by the state, cannot possibly accommodate the huge number of graduates. Under such circumstances, even those who are located at the higher extreme may have to, as Bourdieu (1996, 229) puts it, accept being turned away from the positions of power made available by their academic excellence. Those who arrive at the lower extreme, with their diplomas unfavourably rated on the labour market, are more likely to find themselves in grave situations, such as unemployment.[111] Some rural students have to join their peers who do not have

tertiary education qualifications, migrate to urban areas, take temporary jobs and become a college-graduate-off-farm worker. According to the State Statistics Bureau, the population of this unique groups amounts to 14.96 million, making up 5.7% of the total off-farm peasant population; among those under the age of 30, one eighth have tertiary education qualifications (Worker's Daily, June 28, 2013, parag. 1).

People try to upgrade their social and economic status through higher education, but a common phenomenon is that this system, rather than eliminating class differences, tends to entrench the existing social order.[112] However, the case of China is unique. It is true that, according to Bourdieu, universities in different countries tend to reproduce the status quo through a similar logic and may repatriate the working-class students to the lower classes or socio-economic levels, but in the Chinese case, the rural students may be exposed to bankruptcy. This is different from the "self-elimination" prior to admittance to higher education, where the magnitude of the inequalities, as Bourdieu suggests, can be evaluated more precisely or more eloquently with a simple mathematical device (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 156). In many cases, the process of "deferred elimination" lasts until after graduation, which is difficult to indicate through quantitative data. The university is likely to escape criticism, although it consumes more of the peasants' time and charges them higher prices. Both the peasants' determination to invest in higher education and the rural students' hesitation about their further plan after graduation may appear to be lost causes. However, as the analysis has shown, their investment strategies are in fact the best that they can afford. Such strategies are in fact, as Bourdieu (1996, 220) puts it, "strategies of despair". A higher education system that lacks innovation and an economic pattern that does not support mass higher education have destroyed the employment market, especially for the rural students who graduate from the lower extreme. But the peasants' weak position in the field of power, as well as the state monopoly over education and economy, could be the more crucial factors.

6.3.4.2. The role of higher education in the imposition of the dominant culture

The moment of graduation is the time when peasants test whether their reproduction strategies have been successful. At this point in time, they will find themselves facing the college graduate employment crisis, which by now has become a serious social problem.[113] Some may even find that they have been ultimately excluded from the arena after, rather than before, they have exhausted all their resources in exchange for tertiary education qualifications. Such a large population of graduates each year should have converged into a significant source of power. But, there have never been nation-wide appeals since the massification process started in 1999. Likewise, university intellectuals, having witnessed the plight of the rural students, have never publicly come forward as a collective voice. Invariably, the most important reasons include atomization of Chinese society at large and in turn atomization of the college student community, i.e. the difficulties of the rural students in finding employment are related to their weak status in the field of power. But the university, which has been under a heteronomy, cannot escape without blame.

The heteronomous university field also shapes the rural students, making them co-conspirators with their oppressors. One of the factors that constitutes such co-conspiracy might be pedagogic authority. Bourdieu points out that pedagogic action is invested with pedagogic authority. Therefore, from the very beginning, the pedagogic receivers tend to recognize the dominant culture that is being inculcated as the legitimate culture and internalize the message received. As long as the system of pedagogic actions is subject to effect of domination by the dominant pedagogic action, it tends to impose the dominant culture as the legitimate culture. The reproduction of the dominant culture then contributes to reproducing the power relations, while the power relations determine the characteristic mode of imposition (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990,

15, 21, 22, 31). Subject to the party-state, the Chinese university imposes the dominant culture in a mode that tends to be direct and arbitrary. A CPC document issued in 2004 targets the students and claims that college students are under the impact of Western culture and values, and that "we" are at war with international hostile forces to win over the next generation, and the struggle is intense and complex.[114] Another CPC document issued in 2013 continues the same view, which targets the teachers and claims that it is necessary to educate the young university teachers, who come into direct contact with and are similar in age to the students, thereby reinforcing the unique Chinese mode of socialism theoretically, politically and psychologically.[115] With the ruling group changing their strategies, the role of the CPC has gradually become less highlighted in the teaching of the dominant culture. Rather, the propaganda institutions, aided by mechanisms of direct violence, choose to impose so-called "nationalism" on the students. The most important thing is not what is being taught, but what is prohibited in pedagogic actions. There are strict rules on the content of education. In May 2013, Associate Professor X. Zhang revealed in his personal microblog that the teaching staff at his university was warned not to discuss with the students such topics as universal values, freedom of the press, civil society, civil rights, CPC mistakes in history, Chinese bourgeois in power and the independence of the judiciary.[116] In April of 2014, Y. Gao was detained because she confirmed that the above contents were part of a CPC secret document (Bao 2014). In such an environment, tertiary education may change the rural students in their knowledge structure, but is not likely to enlighten them, to encourage them to confront the sources of their humiliation and frustration or to uncover the state's reasons for imposing urban-rural segregation on the people, i.e. to expose the nature of the relationship between the state and themselves as individuals. Nor are they really encouraged to acquire the necessary skills which they could use to change their atomized status, subvert the existing power relations and upgrade their classes. The

dominant culture imposed by the university is not likely to erase their memory of the hardship and humiliation they have experienced as rural residents, or prevent them from rejecting the urban-rural segregation that has imposed inequality, but they may just stop there. Or even worse, as Lindner (2006, xvi, 31-2) envisions: those who have learnt to consider themselves as victims of undue humiliation may fall victim to self- and other-destructive rage, spiralling into another cycle of humiliation. Reports of some Chinese rural students' murder or suicide cases[117] may illustrate the above remark made by Lindner. More destructive is that the state may, through the teaching of the dominant culture in the university, make use of the humiliation China has suffered in the past as a nationalist rallying cry to stimulate the rural students into emotional responses. Just as Bourdieu suggests, the collaboration of the dominated may contribute to their own exclusion and subordination (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 24). Should this happen, the university, which is invested with pedagogic authority, may make the rural youths identify with the totalitarian state and become less alert to the fact that their emotions, aroused by the state rulers, may further strengthen the power of the state and, in turn, further victimize themselves, because one of the most important pillars of this state is the urban-rural segregation system.

6.4. Conclusion

Applying the theories of Bourdieu and Lindner, the research arrives at conclusions that are formulated on three points. First, in confirmation of the substantive grounded theory in Chapter Five, the rural students who are located at different levels of the hierarchical system have different subjective responses to their tertiary education experiences, presumably because they are exposed to absolute deprivation and relative deprivation respectively. Second, since the university field is heavily dominated by heterogeneous forces, even in scholastic areas it is not likely for the rural students to find a platform

where they may compete with the advantaged groups on an equal basis. Third, since the pattern in the market and society are largely defined by the power of the state, the rural students' efforts to reproduce capital via higher education tend to be low in efficiency, or even in vain. While Point One indicates the rural students' subjective response to deprivation, Points Two and Three identify two specific forms of deprivation that the rural students may be exposed to either during the process of gaining a tertiary education or after their graduation. The urban-rural segregation system is one of the most important pillars of this state. In such an overall structure, the rural students are in a disadvantaged position from the very beginning. They struggle through the process from admittance to higher education to graduation and employment. They do this to upgrade in position, but in spite of all their efforts they may find that they never in fact get far from their original disadvantaged position. The fact that some rural youths follow a historic cycle with their status shifting from that of rural students to that of college-graduate-off-farm workers, in particular, vividly illustrates Bourdieu's definition of the educational system as a mechanism of reproduction of social inequality. In the reality of contemporary China, this mechanism of reproduction, which duplicates a social structure of urban-rural segregation, tends to condemn the children of peasants to poverty and expose them to humiliation. Obviously, as long as the situation in the field of power persists, or as long as the power relations between the three agencies in the analytic triangle remain unchanged, with the party-state dominating over the university as the establishment, and over a society handicapped with urban-rural segregation, the situation of the rural students can hardly be fundamentally improved.

Chapter Seven: Epilogue

In the previous chapters it has been revealed that rural students as well as their parents have been marginalized in the triangular relation between the state, society and higher education institutions. As long as a similar structure continues, and as long as no new forces are introduced into the power relations, it is reasonable to assume that the status quo will tend to be reproduced in the future. In other words, what may be more representative of China, more than the great economic changes in the past three decades that have attracted world-wide attention, is what has remained unchanged in this country. As the following figures will show, the underlying power relations not only define the present situation, but also may be significant for the future.

The party-state is the dominant force that maintains existing power relations. By now, much change has taken place in the profile of the society. Especially in this digital age, the thoughts and ideas of the populace are undergoing profound changes. To counteract the challenges this brings, the state is constantly expanding its control mechanisms. Huge government expenditures and decreased funding for social welfare and education, as noted in the previous chapters, have exposed the state to a new spiral of challenges. Some recent issues may illustrate a new tendency in state policies in response to the challenges: more control over the internet, for example. The internet has always been a relatively democratic phenomenon. Restrictions are being imposed on people who express themselves freely on the internet. Internet users who register their account must use real names. Anyone giving false information or using seditious language may be sentenced to imprisonment for three years if the published content is viewed over 5,000 times or forwarded over 500 times.[118] In order to dominate public opinion and supervise the internet, the state hires internet policemen and the higher education institutions hire student information workers. Governments at various levels

hire "public opinion analysts" with qualification certificates. The number of people engaged in this trade, as is revealed on the internet, is more than two million. Many college graduates are formally employed in this trade (Tu 2013). Needless to say, the cost for the state to maintain its existing power relations is rapidly increasing. In spite of that, new state leaders declare that in the state security system, the most important aspect of all is political security (J. Xi 2014). This is an open and avowed declaration that the state intends to maintain the power relations which is characteristic of Mao's time.

Mao's time was characterized by a heavy death toll, which can be documented quantitatively. A salient difference in the post-Mao era is that the economy, rather than political campaigns, is one of the most important means by which the state controls and undermines society, and particularly rural society. It is not easy to obtain quantitative evidence about destructive practices in the economy as it is about death tolls. Nevertheless, quantitative data are sufficiently available to prove that rural China is being exploited more seriously than ever before. First and foremost, the urban-rural segregation system continues to deprive rural society. According to official statistics, by 2012 the urbanization rate in China is at 52.57%. However, the survey of China Data Center of Tsinghua University proves this as a case of pseudo-urbanization, for "urbanization in household registration" is 27.6% (China Youth Daily, November 05, 2013). This means that half of the urban population included in the official statistics is made up of those formally registered as permanent rural residents but granted a "long-term urban residence permit." In addition to these "long-term" residents, there are nearly 260 million off-farm workers who migrate between the urban and the rural areas. They contribute to urban prosperity, but are not covered by many of the municipal welfare policies, such as retirement pensions and minimum subsistence allowances. Under urban-rural segregation, low income is characteristic of the peasant community.

According to a survey in rural areas carried out by the Rural Survey Group of China Society of Economic Reform (2014), in 2012, the 20% of the rural population with the highest income had an average annual income of 33469 *yuan*, while for the 20% with the lowest income, the figure is 1925.

Another vivid quantitative illustration is a brief overview of the prosperous real estate industry, as well as other related fields. Many foreign travelers may be impressed by the modern facilities and magnificent buildings in urban China, without knowing that much of the resources have been seized from the peasants. Since peasants are only allowed to use rather than own the land, governments at various levels expropriate lands from them and pay compensation not for the land, but only for the houses and the crops on the land, using very low rates.[119] Licenses to exploit the land are then sold to construction companies at market prices, which brings extra revenues for governments at various levels. In 2013, for example, local governments sold licenses to users of land and had revenues of 4125 billion *yuan* from this. In the first quarter of 2014, this extra income amounted to 1080 billion *yuan*. As a point reference, the local fiscal revenue over the same period was 1950 billion *yuan*, and normally 15% of this fiscal revenue comes from taxation on the real estate industry (K. Xu 2014a; 2014b). These figures are intended to show the importance of the real estate industry to government income. By 2007, the number of peasants who have no access to land was estimated at 70 million (Min 2007). From 2000 to 2010, 0.9 million villages, some with a history stretching back over two thousand years, disappeared. This means that within ten years, the number of Chinese villages has decreased by one fourth, and each day 300 villages disappeared (J. Li 2014). There have been countless peasant protests against government expropriation of land, but they are always suppressed by the police or armed police.[120] All in all, structural violence aimed at peasants continues, while direct violence tends to be more frequent and intense.

As the lack in legitimacy increases, governments at various levels tend to strictly control the media so that news about their violent acts are not on the public record. This differs from an earlier time when the authorities propagandized and justified acts of direct violence to create a violent culture. However, the dominance of structural and direct violence will foster cultural violence. Such destruction may be manifested in such areas as social order or family ethics. The fact that 260 million off-farm workers are migrating between the urban and the rural areas may especially have detrimental impact on family ethics, a core element of the Chinese traditional ethical system. What is most destructive about cultural violence is that it is durable and transposable, and may exert influence on the future of the country. Supported by the existing structure and accompanied by the disparity in wealth distribution, cultural violence may become more prevalent, contributing to a vicious circle, and destroying society in a more fundamental way than the quantitative destruction in the economy. And the aftermath is increasingly more difficult to redress. L. Sun (2011a) goes as far as to declare that Chinese society is falling apart.

The present conditions and prospects of the rural students are of course affected by such general trends. Most of the revenues that governments have collected from the land and real estate industry are used in urban construction rather than in rural reconstruction (J. Qu 2014). Land prices, which are controlled by governments at various levels, rise drastically, leading to skyrocketing house prices. In some big cities, the price of each square meter of housing is more than the annual income of off-farm workers (S. Huang 2010). This represents another impediment blocking the rural students who want to settle in urban areas. Large populations are flooding into the city. Many have to share a rented room, with each person occupying only a few square metres. They are often referred to as members of an "ant community", which includes rural college graduates. Surveys reveal that of the ant community members who have

tertiary education qualifications, 95.3% were born after 1980, i.e. admitted to universities and colleges after the massification of higher education (S. Lian 2009). They are not necessarily unemployed, and they may even have found jobs relevant to their academic qualifications. However, they have to accept low income standards and poor living conditions. This, to a great extent, is the effect of the employment crisis for college graduates.

China does not promise a favourable prospect for industries that employ a large number of college graduates. Factors that contribute to such a situation include: first, the regime bases its legitimacy on rapid economic development (E. X. Gu and Goldman 2004, 7), and the state pushes for speedy development with the focus on short-term effects rather than on high-tech industries that demand long-term planning and investment; second, it needs to collect revenue in support of its expanding control machinery; third, the heavy focus on the construction and real estate industry has excessively absorbed capital and resources, leading to insufficient investment in other high-tech industries; fourth, the educational system impedes individual development and academic freedom, which in turn has undermined the creativity of the technical community. One of the results is under-development in high-tech industries, and in turn less employment opportunities for college graduates. The state policies are what lead to the deprivation of land from peasants, high housing prices, the unfavorable industry structure and employment crisis, which combine into a detrimental chain of effects on the rural students as individuals.

In the meantime, it is noteworthy that the rural society is undergoing considerable changes. One change, which is related to the massification of higher education, is that nearly 15 million of the rural college graduates are in the force of off-farm workers, leading to an identifiable change in the education structure of this social category (Worker's Daily, June 28, 2013, parag. 1). Another change in the profile

of the off-farm worker community lies in their typical age bracket, with 70% of the population born after 1980 or 1990 (Dingjun, *et al.* 2014). It is noteworthy that strikes aimed at the protection of workers' rights have increased in number in recent years, where the prime movers behind the strikes are workers from the young generation (Y. Yang 2010). The authorities often employ military forces to suppress the strikes and block related news. Therefore, further investigation is needed into the role that the rural college graduates play in such strikes.

Another noteworthy phenomenon is the change in the demographic structure of China, which is significant for the future of higher education. In 1990 there were 23.54 million new-born babies; in 2000, the figure was reduced to 13.79 million; in 2010, concerned experts revealed the figure was as low as six million (B. Wang 2012). Because of the rapid decrease in the number of young people, local governments, with the intention to save expenses in education, have merged and shut down many primary and middle schools (China Youth Daily, December 24, 2011). As rural children are further distanced from schools, rural basic education is further declining (M. Han 2009). By now, higher education expansion seems to have reached its maximum limit, with most provinces admitting 80% of the senior middle school graduates (Ministry of Education 2012). As may be envisioned, there will be a decline in higher education in the coming ten years, which in turn will have an effect on many university and college intellectuals. Some rural college graduates who are now successfully employed in the university field may lose their jobs in the future. On the other hand, however, the rapid decline in the youth population, especially urban youths, combined with the rural population undergoing a change in educational structure, implies that the status of rural students will become even more important.

After the massification in higher education, colleges and universities have absorbed huge resources from society. However, society, particularly the rural society,

fails to have an influence that corresponds to their investment in the university field. This, again, is related to the fact that the power relations remain basically unchanged in the analytic triangle. The large Chinese peasant population is the foundation of the national economy and the rural field determines the people's livelihood. The rural students, as the elite of the grassroots, encompass both the rural field and the university field where the educated elite are mostly gathered. In this sense, the condition in the rural field is closely related to the situation in the university field. Whether the two fields can interact positively is a critical matter for the future of China. The rural students are better equipped than the average peasants because they have more cultural capital. And they are not isolated as the intellectuals because of their kinship with the largest segment of the population. They are the majority in the student body, which implies the potential to make a difference to the future of the country. However, they have suffered discrimination under the urban-rural segregation system and in the establishment university. How such a bitter life may influence them, and whether or not they can transcend the numerous instances of humiliation and become the bridge between the rural field and university field are questions worthy of further research. A point of departure for improvement, presumably, could be to give more attention to the micro-context of the rural students and their subjective experience of oppression.

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End Note

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Chapter One

[1] Currently, several terms are used to designate the same group, such as "migrant workers", "peasant workers", "farmer-turned workers". "Off-farm workers" is the term the researcher finds to be less misleading.

[2] Tian was the vice premier of the State Council of PRC between 1983 and 1993, in charge of economy.

[3] Gov. doc. 1949.

[4] Works of S. Ding (1993, 2007) give a systematic account of this event.

[5] The proportion of the age group admitted into the Chinese higher education institutions had been lingering under a level of 5% until 1997 (World Bank Report 2002, p 30). As late as the end of 1998, official resistance to massification still appeared to be vigorous (Dong 2004, 83).

[6] Lanqing Li was the vice premier of the State Council of PRC between 1998 and 2003, in charge of education.

[7] To illustrate, the student body on campus at undergraduate and master level amounted to approximately 4.256 million in 1999; in 2012, the figure increases to approximately 25.35 million (M*oe.edu.cn* 2005-2013).

[8] Gov. doc. March 2013.

[9] In 1993, the Chinese government promised to allocate 4% of its GDP in education. This promise was not realized until 2012. Moreover, the education budget includes the funding for military schools, party schools and pensions for those who are retired from the education field. Within 18 years, the governments owed 1600 billion *yuan* to the education sector (Lujing Zhang 2011; X. Xiong 2014).

Chapter Two

[10] Xin is a well-known Chinese historian specializing in the history of the CPC.

[11] Xia is a Professor of Political Science at the Graduate Center and the College of Staten Island, the City University of New York.

[12] According to X. Cheng (2014), a well-known journalist, one of the CPC leaders, Chen Yun, gave a secret speech after the student protest in 1989, which urged: "還是我們的孩子可靠，不會掘自己的祖墳"。"江山是我們打下來的，因此繼承這個江山也應該是我們的後代"。[Our own children are more reliable, they will not subvert everything. We are the ones who established the regime, it is justified to pass the regime to our own descendants]. J. Yang (2008), also a

well-known journalist, quotes the same clauses in his study of the party-state hereditary power, although he does not mention the name of the speaker.

[13] Those who were from a "working-class family" were considered politically trustworthy; those who were from "exploiting-class families" were considered politically unreliable. A more detailed explanation is provided in Chapter Three, 3.3.1.

[14] In the Mao era, each individual had an "archive". The contents in the archive began to accumulate from middle school at the latest, including the evaluations of the individual by the dominant groups. This archive would affect the individual for life, but its contents would remain a secret to the individual *per se*.

Chapter Three

[15] CPC doc. 1947.

[16] The intrusion of the armed "work groups" into the villages has been recorded by Guan according to his personal experiences. This serves as an evidence that the violence in the land reform process mainly came from the military power rather than from conflicts within the village (Guan 2004).

[17] Ancient Chinese humanitarians proposed measures to strengthen society so as to balance the power of the state, including the incorporation of family order into the state governance and privatization of land. See Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and Mencius (372-289 B.C).

[18] For example, Tan (1865-1898), a Chinese democratic pioneer, pronounced that Chinese political ideology was no longer based on the Confucian tenet that viewed man as naturally moral, and that elites establishing the morals of the society no longer consisted of critical and enlightened intellectuals. See Tan (1865-1898). For another example, Yen (1929, 47) diagnosed it as a Chinese social disease that traditional structure tended to confine peasants to the private sector so that they were indifferent to public affairs.

[19] For example, Xun Lu (1918), a contemporary writer, depicted the closed and decaying rural society, which tended to discourage individuality and creativity, as a destroyer of human beings.

[20] It was a convention that, in the process of land property transaction, the kin and neighbours of the land owner enjoyed priority over other purchasers.

[21] The ruling groups in ancient China were small in size, for the Crown of ancient China was based on family, while bureaucrats, for the most part of history, were not privileged aristocrats affiliated with the monarchy, but intellectuals whose roots were in the clan. The ruled tended to be more dissociated from the ruling authorities when the emperors were alien conquerors.

[22] CPC doc. September 1951; December 1953; October 1955; August 1958.

[23] "Forced labour " was one form of imprisonment without recourse to the law.

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[24] PRC doc. January 1958.

[25] CPC doc. 1952.

[26] Gov. doc. April 1953.

[27] Gov. doc. November 1953.

[28] Gov. doc. November 1955; 1957.

[29] Chinese peasants were excluded from the state welfare system. Take for example medical care, villagers collected private funds to form a "cooperative medical system"; the medical practitioners in the village, or the "bare-footed doctors" who were mostly without professional qualifications, were supported by the village economy rather than receiving salary from the state. Since the peasants were invariably poor, the cooperative medical system in most villages was next to nothing.

[30] Gov. doc. 1978.

[31] Professor L. Sun is a well-known sociologist in Tsinghua University.

[32] In Guangdong Province, an area of relatively high income, the minimum wage per month used to vary from 1300 to 850 *yuan*. As an illustration: Workers hired in Foxconn in Shenzhen City work more than 100 hours overtime each month. Some even work 140 hours overtime each month. In 2010, Foxconn witnessed 14 suicide protests. On June 02, the company raised workers' payment standards from 900 to 1200 *yuan* per month, and raised this again four days later to 2000 *yuan*. In 2011, the local government issued the minimum wage standard as 1320 *yuan* per month. It is assumed that workers' suicides forced an upgrading of payment standard (Cnwest 2010; China Securities Journal 2010; Feng 2011; Gov. doc. 2011).

[33] In 2011, there were approximately 252.78 million off-farm workers in China (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of PRC 2011).

[34] In July 2010, the average house price was 23,883 *yuan* per square metre in Shanghai; 20,000 *yuan* in Beijing and Shenzhen (S. Huang 2010).

[35] The government terminated agriculture tax in 2006 (Gov.doc. June 1958; *GOV.cn* 2006). The general background was that in 2003, there were 60 thousand "group protests" in China; in 2008, the figure rose to 120 thousand; and in 2009, 230 thousand (Xin 2010a). In 2011, according to L. Sun (2011b), there were 180 thousand protests or conflicts.

[36] The "armed police" force is organized in the same way as the national defense army force, the PLA. The difference lies in that the PLA targets alien enemies, while the armed police targets domestic enemies.

[37] At a time when China was under attack from Japanese invaders, even Yen, a liberal, was deeply impressed by the power of the USSR (1935, 126; 1936, 173-4).

[38] Among ancient Chinese intellectuals, it was a consensus that the First Emperor's dynasty was overthrown because of his extreme exploitation of the people. This consensus was expressed in many widely read classical works, including "Condemnation of the First Emperor's Dynasty" (*Guoqinlun* 过秦论) (Yi Jia 200-168 B.C), "Comments on the First Emperor's Palace" (*Epanggongfu* 阿房宫赋) (Mu Du 803-852).

[39] In the Chinese version of the *Constitution of the PRC* (2004), peasants were put under the leadership of the industrial workers; the latter were formal employees of the state-owned enterprises.

[40] Mao (1949, 1477), in his discussion on the people's democratic dictatorship, said that a serious task was to "educate" the peasants and adapt them to a "socialization of agriculture".

[41] Off-farm worker families that cannot afford to pay extra fees to municipal schools have to send their children to private schools oriented to non-local residents.

[42] Public primary and middle schools are allowed by state laws to charge extra fees from children whose parents are not permanent local residents (Gov.doc. 1998, No. 2, Item 11).

[43] In a general sense, "cadre" refers to leader, head or official, for example, "leading cadre" of an enterprise, "production brigade cadre" in the village, "class cadre" among students. But "state cadre" refers to a status in the state bureaucratic hierarchy. This is a huge, highly stratified system initiated in Mao's time, covering the governments, the management sectors and technical communities in the industrial, agricultural or military field. The scientific field and tertiary education system, as well as urban primary and secondary schools, were included in this state bureaucratic system. College graduates were automatically granted the status of "state cadres". Ordinary factory workers, peasants or soldiers also had opportunities to be admitted to the "state cadre" system, without articulated technical criteria, though. In the post-Mao era, the private sector has emerged, where management personnel and intellectuals employed by private enterprises and educational institutions no longer have the status of "state cadres". But in the public sector, Mao's initiation on the whole continues.

[44] Mao's works included redundant speeches about class struggles, repeatedly warning that class enemies would one day subvert the power of the CPC (see Mao 1957b, 375). This may be evidence that the rulers were afraid of public revolt.

Chapter Four

[45] Binxing Fang is the designer of China's Firewall which filters out politically troublesome voices from abroad and blocks Facebook, Youtube, Twitter and other websites from Chinese internet users. The news was originally published in *NetEase*, but the site is discontinued.

[46] Y. He is a researcher at The Development Research Center of the State Council of China; Lixiong Wang is a well-known Chinese writer.

[47] Yu is a well-known Chinese American professor specializing in Chinese history, and winner of the Kluge Prize.

[48] D. Liu is the Vice Dean of The Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning.

[49] X. Ding is professor of The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

[50] Q. Zhang is a professor of Peking University.

[51] To list a few examples: Lixiong Wang and Ai were detained; Q. Dai has been sentenced to imprisonment; Y. Gao has been sentenced to imprisonment twice, and in April of 2014, she was detained again; Guoyong Fu, as a prominent Chinese researcher on intellectuals has been jailed five times.

[52] By referring to P. Hu (2012, Chapter One, Section 9), "thought remolding" may be defined as the reshaping of the value system. The works of Mao and S. Liu (Chairman of the PRC before 1966) may shed light on the content and method of the remolding: The foundation of ideology should be Marxism-Leninism rather than any other points of view; the ideological system of such classes as the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and peasantry are incorrect (S. Liu 1951, 292-3). The people should rid themselves of "the bad habits and ideas acquired in the old society." A method of persuasion should be applied to the people, while coercion should be applied to reactionaries (Mao 1949, 1476-77).

[53] Gov. doc. 1949; July 28, 1950; January 1951.

[54] Gov. doc. October 1951.

[55] Y. Gao is a well-known Chinese journalist, winner of several prizes, including the UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize.

[56] There are two cases in point: Quan Guo (*Lawxp* 2009), an associate professor of Nanjing University, and Zhiyong Xu (2013), a teacher at the Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications, were sentenced to imprisonment because they dared to challenge the establishment.

[57] Pei is a well-known Chinese writer, professor of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.

[58] G. Fu is a well-known Chinese historian and independent writer noted for his research on intellectuals.

[59] J. Xu is a well-known Chinese historian, professor of East China Normal University.

[60] K. Chen is the Executive Chairman of the Princeton China Initiative.

[61] P. Hu is the Chief Editor of *Beijing Spring*.

[62] For example, K. Chen; Guoyong Fu; Gu and Goldman; Y. Gao; Hu; Pei; M. Xia.

[63] For example, Goldman and Cheek; Hamrin and Cheek; Ma; Xu.

64 Item 4 of this document is related to higher education institutions.

65 It is regulated that the CPC leadership should be strengthened and improved in higher education institutions in general.

66 Take, for example, the Department of Education of Hebei Province, which is part of the provincial government. The "Higher Education Organization and Cadre Office" of the Department is in charge of the following affairs within universities and colleges: appointment of cadres at the institutional level, construction of grassroots CPC organizations in the institutions, ideological control of the institution leaders and appointment of members of the CPC committee, affairs regarding cadres at the middle level and candidates for leading positions at the institutional level (*Hebjgbz.gov.cn* 2010).

67 Government bureaucrats or ex-army officials without relevant expertise could be appointed to staff the university CPC system.

68 To confirm the existence of "information staffs", refer to: X. Li (2009). For evidence that information staffs act as political police, Dezhou University could be a case in point: In this university, student information staffs form a "secret force on the campus." The connection between the members within the organization is linear and top-down, without vertical communication between each other. The organization is included in work-study projects for poor students, and the staffs must provide at least three pieces of valuable information each month in order to be paid salary. The regulations for information staffs "are formulated based on the instruction of the superior authority and the university leaders, as well as illuminated by the experiences of other universities" (Dezhou University 2005). The regulation was originally published at: http://211.64.32.2/bumen/bwc/show.php?id=331 (site discontinued).

69 CPC doc. 2008, art. 3, 6 and 9.

70 Professor Qian (1958) assumed that if plant photosynthesis efficiency could be as high as 30%, and if 1/5 of the plants could be converted to edible foodstuff, it would be possible to yield over 29 thousand kilos of grain per *mu* (1 acre = 6.07 *mu*). According to Jiaying Tian, Mao's secretary, Mao pronounced that his "Great Leap Forward" was based on the assumptions of the great scientist Qian. There were two witnesses to what Jiaying Tian said: R. Li (1999), who was also Mao's secretary, and Hui Zhou, who was a member of CCCPC and the first secretary of the CPC Committee of Hunan Province during Mao's Great Famine (Quan and L. Huang 1997).

71 Q. Dai is a well-known Chinese writer.

72 Professor Jin Chen bought a MOTO-free scale 56800 chip made in the US, erased the original mark, put on his own mark, and pronounced it as his achievement with "complete independent intellectual property rights".

73 In such cases as "Dazhu Protest of 2007" and "Shifang Protest of 2012", middle school students were active participants (Yunyong Jia 2007; *Global Times*, July 06, 2012). Also refer to Note 35.

74 Aided with the internet search engine, "baidu.com", the search for "My Father Is Li Gang" has about 3.49 million hits, accessed July 31, 2013.

75 Y. Lian was a consultant on CCCPC policy in Hong Kong from 1998, and was removed from office by the Hong Kong government in 2004.

76 Gov. doc. July 1950, 175-176.

77 CPC doc. November 1951.

78 According to *The Constitution of CPC* (1956), Chapter Six, Item 51, the grass-roots party organizations in enterprises, villages, schools and army troops should lead and supervise the administration agencies and mass organizations in their work units.

79 From 1991 to 2010, the National Social Science Fund invested 2.65 billion *yuan* in 24,283 projects of various categories, which were intended to strengthen the dominant position of Marxism in the area of ideology. In 2011, 70 works were selected into the National Philosophy and Social Science Achievements Library. Of the top 10 works, five achievements based in universities are related to Marxism theories; two projects study the ideology and history of the CPC. Some of the above projects were awarded prizes by the provincial authority in addition to being granted state funding. In 2012, the National Social Science Fund gave grants to 3291 projects that fall into 23 categories, including those that are not much related to political ideology, such as linguistics, archaeology, physical education, religious studies, management and ethnology. Of the 3291 projects, at least 240 are about the history, theory and ideology of the CPC. Of the 154 key projects, 26 are directly related to the history and ideology of the CPC, such as the theory of unique socialism, socialist core values (National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science 2010; *Wenku. Baidu.com* 2011a, 2011b, 2012).

80 According to the Ministry of Education, in 2011, there were 271,262 PhD candidates and 50,289 PhD graduates. According to estimates for 2012, there would be nearly 300,000 PhD candidates and 60,000 PhD graduates (*International Finance News* 2013).

81 In 1970, nearly twenty years after the CPC took over the universities, Mao (1970, 171) said that the party-state did not have its own university professors, middle school teachers or primary school teachers. The teachers who dominated the field of education were the leftovers of the old regime. The Great Cultural Revolution targeted them.

82 Gov. doc. 1978.

83 The elimination mechanisms may take different forms. For example, the primary requirement of the teachers in their annual job assessment is compliance in political ideology; this is defined and legitimated by relevant items in CPC regulations, laws and government decrees (CPC doc. 1987;

PRC doc.1993; Gov.doc. May 2012). For another example, the above-mentioned student information staffs may provide information with which to determine whether a teacher is being compliant in political ideology.

[84] The following are some examples of people who challenged senior authority and were removed from their positions of university leader: Yinchu Ma, president of Peking University from 1951, forced to resign in 1960; Daoyu Liu, president of Wuhan University from1981, forced to resign in 1988; Weiyan Guan, president of University of Science and Technology of China from 1984, removed from office in 1986; Lizhi Fang, deputy president of University of Science and Technology of China from 1984, removed from office in 1987.

[85] Refer to Note 35 and 73.

Chapter Five

[86] For example, Yao Liu (2003) and Yulin Zhang (2003) are among the researchers who have been concerned about equality of education for rural youths.

[87] In "211-projects universities" (in the 21st century, the state plans to invest in the 100 key universities; these institutions are referred to as "211-projects"), there are less than 20% rural students (B. Xiong 2014), while in polytechnics, rural students make up more than 70% (Bai 2013). Also refer to Jingyi Dong (2004, Table 3.4,120, 64-9).

[88] In the eleven years from 2003 to 2013, the mass system has produced nearly 55 million graduates (S. Shi and N. Li 2014). To give some specific figures regarding graduates in recent years: 2.12 million in 2003; 2.8 million in 2004; 3.38 million in 2005; 4.13 million in 2006; 4.95 million in 2007; 5.59 million in 2008; 6.11 million in 2009; 6.31 million in 2010; 7 million in 2013 (Baiqian 2010; Gov. doc. November 2012).

[89] In 2013, 35% of graduates at the undergraduate level signed work contracts; 32% of those who graduated from polytechnics signed work contracts (Lu Zhang 2013).

[90] In confirmation of what Student K says, refer to: "Poor Rural Students Shed Tears over Their Life in Tsinghua University: Inferiority and Great Pressure" (China Youth Daily, September 26, 2013).

[91] In confirmation of what Student G says, refer to: *Shenyang Evening* (October 16, 2013), "The University Requires the Poor Students to Present Their Poverty; The Winners Get Financial Aid."

[92] Student loans must be repaid two years after graduation, even if the student has not found a job.

[93] "Small business" in urban areas used to sustain peasants or those without a "profession." Later, a large number of laid-off industrial workers, and by now, college graduates, also step in, making it more difficult for those who previously made a living in that arena. Also refer to Note 98.

94 For example, in 2012, two top universities in China, Peking University/ Tsinghua University, respectively enrolled 150/210 science students and 83/10 liberal arts students from the City of Beijing, but enrolled only 9/44 science students and 18/4 liberal arts students from Hebei Province. In contrast, the average scores of the students admitted to Peking University/ Tsinghua University were 660/659 (science) and 622/615 (liberal arts) for Beijing students, but 692/691 (science) and 659/657 (liberal arts) for Hebei students. Applicants for admittance to higher education was approx. 73 thousand in Beijing and approx. 459 thousand in Hebei (Information source: Eol.cn 2012; Ministry of Education 2012).

Chapter Six

95 In fact, student enrolment in 1999 was more than the state plan: approximately 1.6 million, an increase of 48% (*Edu.ifeng.com*. 2010).

96 There are numerous articles and reports on the fact that higher education may impoverish rural people, and here are some examples: Ye and Q. He (2010); Q. Liu (2006); Haoguang Liu (2006).

97 To take as an example, a noteworthy work is "*Tears are Gold*" by J. He (2009), but this work is categorized as "reportage".

98 From the end of the 1970s when the economic reform was first initiated, a large number of peasants migrated to the urban areas to take part-time jobs or run small business. They made up for labour shortages and added vitality to the urban market. Since the 1990s, a trend of underemployment began to affect regular workers in state-owned enterprises. The municipal governments ran re-employment projects and helped the laid-off workers to open up new areas of employment. This, however, has largely encroached upon the space where the peasants used to make a living.

99 For example, non-local residents applying for permanent settlement in Shanghai must have second-level technician qualifications or above, and must live in the city and pay taxes to the municipality for seven years before they are considered eligible (Gov. doc. 2009).

100 For example, the City of Jinan claims to have an open policy, yet its regulations provide that applicants must fully own a dwelling of more than 100 square meters (Gov. doc. 2005).

101 Non-local residents who apply for a permanent residence permit in many cities need to accumulate enough "credits" before their cases are considered, and tertiary education qualification holders may earn more credits. The specifications may vary from city to city and from time to time. For example, the required minimum in Shenzhen is 60 credits. In Guangzhou it is 85; an undergraduate qualification/junior middle school qualification brings to the holder 60/5 credits respectively (Gov. doc. August 2010; November 2010).

102 Refer to Note 94.

[103] Gov. doc. August 2012.

[104] Refer to Note 87.

[105] An example of such moral models may include Lei Feng, who symbolizes "A Screw in the Revolutionary Machine", and Jiao Yulu, who is known as "Chairman Mao's Good Student." They were invariably hard-working, thrifty and devoted.

[106] Refer to Note 87 and 94.

[107] Gov. doc. October 2013.

[108] Gov. doc. November 2012.

[109] Examples of such state projects include "the Project of Three Gorges Dam" and "the Project of South-to-North Water Transfer", in which the state invested 480 billion *yuan* and 203.9 billion *yuan,* respectively (*Xinhuanet.com* 2002, 2003).

[110] Especially in some small cities, local SMEs tend to adopt a more open recruitment policy, making no difference between local and non-local residents (China Education and Research Network 2014). However, approximately 55% of the profit made by SMEs goes to tax or various fees (Y. Zhou 2012; Hanyuan Liu 2013).

[111] According to *Social Blue Book: Analysis and Prediction of Chinese Social Situation in 2014*, the average employment rates for college graduates are: urban students/ rural students 87.2% / 81.2%; for those who graduate from general higher education institutions at the lower extreme, the figures are 87.7% / 69.5% (ScienceNet.cn 2013).

[112] See, among many others, Bourdieu 1990; Craig Calhoun 2000, 49-50; Peter Scott 1998, 111.

[113] Refer to Note 89.

[114] CPC doc. October 2004.

[115] CPC doc. 2013.

[116] X. Zhang's personal microblog is now blocked and can no longer serve as an information source. But *The New York Times* reveals that what X. Zhang refers to is in the secret CPC Document No. 9 (Buckley 2013).

[117] One example is Wei Liu, mentioned in Chapter Five, Section 5.3.3.3. Another example is the widely known case of Jiajue Ma, who killed four schoolmates (*News.SOHU.com* 2013).

[118] PRC doc. September 2013

[119] To illustrate the low standard: In Hubei Province, a place of fertile soil in Central China, the local authority took cultivated land away from local peasants and gave compensation at the rate of 120 *yuan* per *mu* (120 *yuan* = approx. USD 20; 1 acre = 6.07 *mu*) (J. Han 2003).

[120] The peasants' protests against the government's confiscation of their lands are widely noted. The researcher undertook a simple experiment in May 2014: Aided by the Chinese internet search

engine, "baidu.com", the search for "expropriation of land/ police/ suppression" has more than 384 thousand hits.