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# Refugee Camps' Impact on Institutional Trust in the Global South

A Multilevel Analysis of Institutional Trust in  
Kenya and Tanzania

Master's thesis in Political Science

Supervisor: Karin Dyrstad

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Norwegian University of Science and Technology  
Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences  
Department of Sociology and Political Science



Kunnskap for en bedre verden



# Summary

This thesis researches how refugee camps affect institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. Research on the effects of refugees has mainly concentrated on Western countries, which is problematic. Applying a multilevel analysis in this context, one can see how the individual and regional factors explain institutional trust. Kenya and Tanzania receives a high level of refugees from their neighbouring countries and has implemented anti-refugee policies to hinder unwanted effects from increased refugee presence (Mogire 2009:24). These non-Western refugee-hosting countries have gained too little attention in research. Therefore, this thesis also looks more broadly at which explanatory factors influence institutional trust levels, in addition to looking at refugee camps' effect.

Handling the influx of refugees is demanding for both states, but they inherit some differences in camp settlement patterns. In Kenya, most refugees are hosted in fewer and larger camps influencing fewer regions. Tanzania has a higher number of refugee camps, spread across different regions and hosts a fewer number of refugees. Data from the Geo-Refugee dataset, tracking settlement patterns in Kenya and Tanzania from 2000-2014, and Afrobarometer data are the sources of data for this thesis. The results cannot trace a difference in institutional trust due to refugee camp exposure, but it does identify other explanatory factors in explaining institutional trust which are linked to the level of safety of the individual, and whether the person resides in a rural area. It is clear for this thesis, using newly updated refugee settlement data, just how unexplored institutional trust is in this context. Through new sources of data previously unexplored contexts can show how institutional trust functions in these refugee-hosting countries.

# Abstrakt

Internasjonal migrasjon er historisk høg i følge Alrababa'h et al. (2021). Forskinga på verknadane av migrasjon er difor høgst relevant, men fokuset i forskinga ligg på vestlege land som mottek relativt få migrantar, og har høg kapasitet til å handtere dei (2021:33). Denne masteroppgåva gjennomfører ein fleirnivåanalyse av flyktningeleirar sin innverknad på institusjonell tillit i Kenya og Tanzania. Sidan dette er eit lite utforska forskingsområde tek denne oppgåva ei breiare tilnærming, og ser på andre faktorar som er betydelege for institusjonell tillit i Kenya og Tanzania. Gjennom nyleg oppdaterte data frå Geo-Refugee datasettet kartlegg eg dei regionane i Kenya og Tanzania som har flyktningeleirar, og gjennom data frå Afrobarometeret ser eg korleis dette påverkar institusjonell tillit på individnivå og regionnivå. Funna frå analysen kan oppsummerast slik: Talet på regionar med flyktningeleirar til stades var for få for å kunne vise ein samanheng for institusjonell tillit, likevel har fleirnivåanalysen identifisert andre verknadar for institusjonell tillit, ut ifrå kvar ein bur og graden av tryggleik ein føler i desse regionane. Oppgåva viser til at vidare forskning burde ta høgde for at regionale skilnadar er store i Kenya og Tanzania.

# Acknowledgements

This master thesis is relevant for the lector programme since it investigates how institutional trust affects non-Western cultures. Building democratic values and legitimacy in state systems rely on a legitimate state relying on its citizens' trust. Understanding different cultures are beneficial, especially since the Norwegian classroom is becoming more diverse. Having a broad perspective on current issues are therefore highly relevant for students in the social science classroom.

I think I could not be any luckier with my supervisor for this thesis. Karin Dyrstad has been an incredible motivator and has opened me up to new environments, which I have benefited greatly from. Answering every email, helping me with STATA-related issues, showing immense pedagogical skills, and asking the right questions has improved my thesis greatly. I want to thank you for your patience and help during this process.

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I take the full responsibility for possible errors in this thesis.

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Trondheim, June 2021

# Acronyms

CCM:	Chama Cha Mapinduzi.
CRRF:	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework.
GOK:	Government of Kenya.
IDP:	Internally Displaced People.
IOM:	International Organisation of Migration.
KANU:	Kenya African National Union.
TRA:	Tanzania Revenue Authority.
UNHCR:	The UN Refugee Agency.
VPC:	Variance Partition Coefficient.



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## Chapter 1: Introduction

In 2018 Kenya decided to shut down refugee camps due to national security interest (Bhagat 2020:439), and Kenya's minister of interior stated: "Due to Kenya's national security interest, the government has decided the hosting of refugees has to come to an end" (Agutu 2016). The effects of hosting refugees are pressuring African states to act, but how does the presence of refugee camps<sup>1</sup> affect citizens' trust in their political institutions? Trust in political institutions has been described as a primary indicator for government legitimacy (Hutchison & Johnson 2011:739). Research on opinion-effects of hosting refugees is mainly covered in the Western Hemisphere, which excludes numerous refugee-hosting contexts. This thesis covers this gap in research, looking at how refugee camps affect Tanzanian and Kenyan institutional trust levels. Tanzania is known as the world's most generous refugee-hosting country (Chaulia 2003:147), and according to the UNHCR, Kenya hold amongst the highest refugee populations in the world (UNHCR 2018).

The main objective for this thesis is to answer the following research question: *how is institutional trust affected by refugee camps in different regions in Kenya and Tanzania?* Secondly, the research explores other explanatory variables for institutional trust in this context. Sub-Saharan Africa alone hosts more than 26 per cent of the world's refugee population (UNHCR 2021a), and Kenya and Tanzania are categorised as two major refugee-hosting nations in Africa (Mogire 2009:16). Hosting a large refugee populations in developing countries might lead to security consequences that the state needs to handle (Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch 2019:73).

Kenya and Tanzania inherit some structural similarities relating to economic factors, but they are characterised as quite different when it comes to refugee policy. Although Tanzania has more recently followed in Kenya's footsteps by pulling out from the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (Romtveit 2019), Kenya and Tanzania represent two different refugee-hosting contexts which are fruitful for research. Both Kenya and Tanzania receives a high level of refugees from their neighbouring countries and has implemented restrictive policies to hinder unwanted effects from increased refugee presence (Mogire 2009:24). The influx of refugees is

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<sup>1</sup> Refugee camps are according to the UNHCR temporary facilities which are built to provide immediate protection and assistance to people who have been forced to flee their homes for different reasons. Some of these reasons being: war, persecution, or violence (UNHCR 2021g).

demanding for both states, but they inherit some differences in the concentration of refugee camps.

In Kenya, most of the refugees are hosted in fewer and larger camps impacting fewer regions. Tanzania has a higher number of refugee camps located across different regions, which hosts a smaller number of refugees in each camp. By conducting a multilevel analysis where the individual and regional level is covered, the case countries contribute to explain how the presence of refugee camps affects institutional trust in this non-Western context. Kenya and Tanzania did not show a negative association between refugee camps and institutional trust. However, this research utilised newly updated data to illustrate how future research can research refugee-hosting countries in the African context.

Research on refugees' effects on public attitudes is highly relevant since international migration is at its all-time high. Even though this is an international trend, most research focuses on developed countries, which receive relatively fewer migrants and inherit more state capacity to absorb them (Alrababa'h et al. 2021:33). This thesis focuses on the East-African context explicitly, where states do not have the same resources or capacity to tackle unwanted effects of immigration and is the main objective for conducting this research.

Political trust research has been in a period of strong growth and constitutes an essential field within public opinion studies. This growth is caused by new sources of data surfacing, which can test many explanations for political trust (Listhaug & Jakobsen 2018:573). One can explore institutional trust in new parts of the world, and this thesis utilise the Geo-Refugee dataset (Fisk 2021)<sup>2</sup> and data from the Afrobarometer round 6 (Afrobarometer 2015) to measure refugee camps and its effect on institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. The findings reject that there is a relationship between camps and institutional trust. However, the analysis revealed further influential factors for institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. Not feeling safe and living in rural areas showed a negative association for institutional trust in both countries. The strongest negative effect for institutional trust was found in Kenya's case for insecurity, and the strongest negative association for institutional trust in Tanzania was living in a rural area.

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<sup>2</sup> The Geo-Refugee dataset provides geocoded data on location, population size and accommodation types in refugee camps. Gaining access to more recently updated data from Kerstin Fisk and got access to the second version of the dataset in December 2020, including data from 2000 until 2017.

## **1.1 Thesis Structure**

The structure of this thesis is outlined here. After the introduction, a case chapter covers central similarities and differences between Kenya and Tanzania. Since this thesis operates within an area of limited previous research, the theory chapters are structured into three parts. The first chapter handles institutional trust and chapter four covers the literature on migration research and attitudinal impacts of hosting refugees. Further, chapter five presents the hypotheses based on relevant previous research. Chapter six covers the methodology and data sources for the multilevel analysis. The multilevel analysis results are found in chapter seven, and chapter eight discusses the results from this analysis. The final chapter, chapter nine, includes the conclusion for this thesis.

## Chapter 2: Background for Researching Kenya and Tanzania

Kenya and Tanzania, two major refugee-hosting countries in Africa (Mogire 2009:16), are the focus for this thesis, researching how refugee camps affect institutional trust. The countries are of interest based on their refugee policy and institutional trust levels. This chapter addresses these countries' main similarities and differences relating to economic factors, history, and refugee policy, creating a basis for comparing the two countries' refugee situations and their effect on institutional trust.

### 2.1 Comparing Kenya and Tanzania

Kenya and Tanzania are often subject of comparison in different areas of research (Barkan 1994; Miguel 2004), but it is important to point out areas where the countries differ. After this clarification one can identify what these two countries are the cases of, and what they can contribute with. Barkan (1994) argues for a comparison between Kenya and Tanzania since they have similar influential variables which can be prominent for their political climate. Both countries are former British colonies, have similar geography (1994:7), and host a significant number of refugees from neighbouring countries.<sup>3</sup> Since Barkan's book was published, Kenya and Tanzania have evolved and changed. But Kenya and Tanzania still inherit similarities in this respect, which allows for a MSSD-analysis, keeping major structural elements constant while researching effects of institutional trust.

Gerring (2008) marks that using the most similar method (MSSD) in a hypothesis generating study the researcher looks for cases that differ on the outcome variable (institutional trust) but are similar in various factors that could have contributed to this outcome (2008:668). MSSD fits well here since both countries are experiencing a high influx of refugees but are different in their institutional trust levels. In addition, Miguel (2004) observes that many social scientists see Kenya and Tanzania as fundamentally similar (2004:335). It is important to keep in mind that these countries might be similar in economic aspects, but in terms of state-building for example, they are dissimilar.

Before a more comprehensive review of Kenya and Tanzania takes place, Table 1 will shortly give an overview of some central aspects of the Kenyan and Tanzanian context, looking at a

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<sup>3</sup> Some examples being: Kenya's experience of large immigration flows from Somalia, and Tanzania's experience with high level of immigrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda (Betts 2013:34-37).



range of topics: colonialism, independence, population size, refugee-population, and different development indexes.

**Table 1: Case Overview of Kenya and Tanzania**

		<b>Case</b>	
<b>Element</b>	<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>Kenya</b>	<b>Tanzania</b>
<i>History</i>	Colonial past	Previous British colony	Previous British colony
	Independence	1963	Tanzania – Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964.
	Regional reform	2010 (47 counties)	2012 (31 regions)
<i>Regime type</i>	Regime type	Presidential Republic	Presidential Republic
	Freedom score <sup>4</sup>	48 (Partly free).	40 (Partly free)
<i>Development</i>	Poverty	37 per cent of Kenyans lived in extreme poverty in 2015.	49 per cent of Tanzanians lived in extreme poverty in 2017
	Human Development Index <sup>5</sup> (2019)	0,601	0,529
<i>Refugee-situation</i>	Total number of refugees and asylum seekers (2018)	471,724	330,755
	IDP <sup>6</sup>	1,400 (2019)	1,300 (2019)
	Majority of refugee and asylum seeker's country of origin	Somalia (54%), South Sudan (24.6%), DRC (9%).	Burundi (73.9%), DRC (26%).
	Largest refugee camps	Dadaab (hosting 44% of Kenya's refugees) <sup>7</sup> .	Nyarugusu, Nduta and Mtendeli.
	Refugee policy	Hosts refugees in camps, but are starting to close Dadaab (2018)	Re-opening old camps, building new, and withdrawing from CRRF.
<i>Demography and language</i>	Population size	52,573,973	58,005,463
<i>Demography and language</i>	Official languages	Kiswahili and English.	Swahili and English

Sources: (Thomson 2010; The World Bank 2019; UNHCR 2021a; UNHCR 2021d UNCHR 2019b; UNCHR 2019c; UNHCR 2019d; UNHCR 2019e; IDMC 2019 UN 2015; UN 2017; The Republic 2010; UNDP 2020; Transparency International 2017; Freedom House 2020; KNBS 2019; NBS 2011 ).

As seen in Table 1, there are several areas where these two countries are similar, regarding to their history, demography, freedom score and population size. Kenya has a stronger development score, and both countries host a significant number of refugees.

<sup>4</sup> Freedom House rates people's access to political rights and civil liberties in 210 countries and territories through its annual Freedom in the World report. This score range from 0 (not free) and 100 (free) (Freedom House 2020).

<sup>5</sup> Health Development Index is based on three indicators: life expectancy, education and income (GDP per capita). Ranging from 0 (lowest value) and 1 (highest value) (UNDP 2020).

<sup>6</sup> Internally Displaced People = IDP's. Statistics from Global Internal Displacement Database (IDMC 2019).

<sup>7</sup> Kenya started to dismantle the Dadaab refugee camp in 2018, and by the end of the year, over 75,297 refugees were returned to Somalia. The population of Dadaab has diminished by 50 per cent as of 2018 (Bhagat 2020:439)

## **2.2 System of Governments**

Kenya's government consists of four organs: Parliament, Executive, Judiciary, and the Devolved Government. To understand factors influencing Kenya's institutional trust, we need to understand what these institutions represent, and which functions they inherit. In 2010, Kenya approved a new constitution which aimed at decentralizing power through providing 47 new county governments, which constitute the Devolved Government (Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis 2016:2).

The three remaining state organs which comprise the Kenyan state are the Judiciary, the Legislature and the Executive (Republic of Kenya 2021). The Judiciary and its related institutions<sup>8</sup> have the following functions; "Administration of justice, formulation and implementation of judicial policies, and compilation and dissemination of case law and other legal information for the effective administration of justice" (Republic of Kenya 2021). The President, the Deputy President and the Cabinet constitute the executive branch of Kenya's government. Lastly, the Legislative branch is the Parliament of Kenya, which includes the National Assembly, and the Senate – representing the county interests (Constitute Project 2010).

Tanzania's system of government is similar to Kenya's. The Tanzanian parliament consists of the President of the United Republic and the National Assembly. The National Assembly has 295 members and makes up for Tanzania's Parliament.<sup>9</sup> The Executive branch includes the President and the appointed cabinet, and the judiciary consists of a five-level judiciary combining the jurisdictions of tribal, Islamic, and British common law.<sup>10</sup> Although both Kenya and Tanzania are presidential republics, their government institutions are unique for each country (United Republic of Tanzania 2015).

## **2.3 Political Life**

Before one can move on to the topic of refugee policy a short outline of Kenya and Tanzania's politics is provided.<sup>11</sup> Kenya experienced increased pressure for democratisation and human

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<sup>8</sup> These institutions include: Judicial Service Commission (JSC), Kenya Law; previously National Council for Law Reporting (NCLR), Tribunals and the Judiciary Training Institute (JTI) (Republic of Kenya 2021).

<sup>9</sup> With five members of Zanzibar House of Representatives among other specified seats. Zanzibar's House of Representatives can make laws for Zanzibar without the approval of the union government if it does not involve union-designated matters. One can see that there are differences between the countries due to the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 (Parliament of Tanzania 2015).

<sup>10</sup> It is important to mark that all state authority is being exercised and controlled by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.

<sup>11</sup> In the year of 2014, which is the year the selected Afrobarometer survey was conducted the President in office in Kenya was Uhuru Kenyatta and Jakaya Kikwete sat in office in Tanzania.

rights after the cold war, and in 1992 the republic turned into a multi-party system (NIMD 2003). Although there were organised elections taking place, the political party Kenya African National Union (KANU) sat in office from Kenya's independence, in 1963, until 2002. After four decades, Kenya experienced for the first time that a president retired from office, and Kibaki took over as president (Nasong'o & Murunga 2007:9).<sup>12</sup>

In comparison, Tanzania gained its independence around the same time as Kenya, in 1964 (see Table 1). But since independence Tanzania has focused more on state-building than Kenya.<sup>13</sup> Since independence the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has dominated parliament in Tanzania. Despite the fact that Tanzania has held multiparty-elections since 1995, the CCM has won (O'Gorman 2012:313). This is because the opposition in the country is divided and lack power to overthrow the sitting government (UN 2020).<sup>14</sup> In comparison to Kenya we see that there is an absence of suited oppositional alternatives to the CCM in Tanzanian politics.

## **2.4 Refugee Policy**

In accordance with Alrababa'h et al. (2021), I argue for a greater focus on regions being largely affected by recent waves of migration, which accumulates in areas where refugees and asylum seekers flee conflicts. This thesis specifically concentrates on East-Africa, which has gained increased interest by the academic community after an increase in migration to the region in the 1990s (Jansen & de Bruijne 2020:669). Kenya and Tanzania are hosting a large proportion of the refugees in Eastern Africa (Bhargat 2020; Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010). Mogire's (2009) research compares Kenya and Tanzania's refugee policy (2009:16).

Both countries are pointed to by Mogire (2009) as destinations of major refugee flows from neighbouring countries, due to Kenya and Tanzania's relative political stability.<sup>15</sup> Their location next to Africa's major conflict and refugee producing zones, their limited ability to control their borders and hospitality, attracts refugees from neighbouring countries (2009:16). In response

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<sup>12</sup> In a later election in 2007, the sitting president Kibaki were announced as the winner, winning with a small margin which led to large riots, which became rooted in ethnic divisions in the country (Norad 2018).

<sup>13</sup> This is one central difference between the case countries. Miguel (2004) points to certain dimensions ranging from language policy, educational curriculum, and local institutional reform, where Tanzania pursued nation-building policies (2004: 327).

<sup>14</sup> O'Gorman (2012) lists two reasons for why the CCM is highly supported in Tanzania: the citizens see them as a maintenance for peace and their performance before the multiparty rule (2012:314).

<sup>15</sup> There are good reasons for Mogire describing the political stability as relative. Border regions towards Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia are more exposed to negative effects of refugees. In areas in North-Eastern Kenya, with a high number of Somali refugees (Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera), have been historically influenced by for instance conflict, terrorism, and riots (Africa Research Bulletin 2015; Lochery 2012).

to massive influx of refugees Kenya and Tanzania adopted de-politicisation as a strategy<sup>16</sup> “controlling the refugees’ political activities, which they claim could lead to conflict with the refugees’ countries of origin and could import political violence into their countries” (Betts 2009:23). This allows Kenyan and Tanzanian governments to implement anti-immigrant policies (Betts 2009:24).

Comparing Kenya and Tanzania is argued as beneficial for refugee research. According to Betts (2013), a comparison between Kenya and Tanzania is fruitful to explore the effects of refugees, since they inherit different approaches to hosting refugees. This is mainly because Tanzania is referred to as one of the world’s most generous refugee-hosting country (Chaulia 2003:147). In recent later years, both countries has gained a more restrictive approach, attaining anti-refugee policies. However their approach is fundamentally different, since Kenya has for a longer period of time seen their refugees as a threat (Jacobsen 2002:588), and both countries have during the last decades changed their policies relating to hosting refugees (Betts 2013:44-45).

Alix-Garcia & Saah (2010) marks that Tanzania have gone through changes in its refugee policy. Due to two large waves of immigration, one in 1993 (from Burundi), and a second in 1994 (from Rwanda), Tanzania changed its refugee policy drastically and went from hosting refugees in Tanzanian villages, to hosting refugees in larger refugee camps (2010:148-151). The refugees were separated from the local population (Landau 2000:286). Historically, Tanzania is often referred to as the world’s most generous refugee-hosting country, but changes have occurred since the 1990s (Chaulia 2003:147). Refugees are not allowed to leave the camps since the Tanzanian government focuses on returning refugees to their home country rather than integrating them locally (NRC 2019). The governments of Tanzania and Burundi, with assistance from the UNHCR, agreed to voluntarily send back Burundi refugees living in Tanzania UNHCR (2021f)<sup>17</sup>.

Kenya has a long history as a refugee-hosting nation (Betts 2013), and is an interesting case for migration research. Refugees are experiencing violence, and Nairobi has been characterised as a hot-spot for urban refugees (Bhagat 2020:439-440). Statistics from UNHCR shows that in 2018 there were 450,000 refugees staying in Kenyan refugee camps and urban settlements, with

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<sup>16</sup> De-politicization has entailed promulgating restrictive regulations governing the refugee involvement in political activities both in the country of asylum or in their home countries (Mogire 2009:23).

<sup>17</sup> The governments and UNHCR agreed to uphold the principle of voluntariness and more than 70,000 refugees have returned since September 2017 (UNHCR 2021h).

100,000 pending registrations in these areas, making Kenya hold amongst the highest refugee populations in the world (UNHCR 2018).

Kenya altered its refugee policy in 2016 (NRC 2019). This was triggered, among other things, by terrorist attacks in 2013 and 2015 (Bhagat 2020:349). In the aftermath of these events the Kenyan state started to dismantle the Dadaab refugee camp. This refugee camp had hosted Somalis since 1991, and by the end of 2018, over 75,297 were returned to Somalia, and the population of Dadaab diminished by 50 per cent as of 2018 (Bhagat 2020:439). Betts (2013) points to the hosting of Somali refugees after the 1990s has been unique, hosting large numbers of refugees, and in relation to the level of quantity of asylums, but this has come at the price of the quality of asylum. “Somali refugees [...] have faced extremely restrictive conditions” (Betts 2013:136). This is why Kenya is marked as a more restrictive country in comparison to Tanzania.

More recently, in 2018, Tanzania withdrew from the CRRF.<sup>18</sup> This initiative aimed at finding solutions for refugees and improving the situation in refugee-hosting countries. The withdrawal has contributed to massive underfunding of aid to refugees in the country (Romtveit 2019). Rudolf (2019) claims that the reason for withdrawing were a contradiction between Tanzania’s domestic policies, and CRRF’s goals (2019:208). The Government of Tanzania were “[...] concerned with indebting their own citizens on behalf of the refugees” (Anker 2018) the NRC country director for Tanzania stated.<sup>19</sup>

## **2.5 Expected Effects for Kenya and Tanzania**

Researching Kenya and Tanzania, this thesis looks specifically at how the refugee camps can affect institutional trust. As previously stated, Kenya and Tanzania have hosted refugees for a long period and has a large refugee-population. Their difference lies in their refugee policy. Kenya administers a stricter refugee policy after 2016, returning Somali refugees and deciding to shut down refugee camps. In relation to this, another tendency is seen in Tanzania. With its previously open approach toward refugees, with a focus on resettlement. More recently, Tanzania also has changed its tactics to become more restrictive (Mogire 2009:17).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The UNHCR (2021c) defines the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) as a framework for improving the situation for refugee-hosting countries, including enabling refugees to integrate into the local economy.

<sup>19</sup> NRC country director: Neil Turner.

<sup>20</sup> Kenya’s government has decided to shut down camps and return refugees, and Tanzania still enforced voluntary returns of refugees.

Based on this argument I do not expect to find the same effects on institutional trust in these countries, both because they have different ways of handling incoming refugees, but also when it comes to institutional trust (further described in section 4.2). Tanzania's citizens' have a strong trust towards its ruling institutions (Uddhammar 2011:1168). In consequence Tanzania's institutional trust is expected to be higher than Kenya's.<sup>21</sup> Kenya is expected to show lower levels of trust due to its citizens' tendency to be more sceptical towards its ruling institutions (Uddhammar 2011:1168). This is despite both countries seeing their refugee-situation as increasingly problematic.

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<sup>21</sup> This argument is seen in hypothesis five in chapter five.

## Chapter 3: Theoretical Outline of Political- and Institutional Trust

The thesis' theoretical framework is structured in three chapters.<sup>22</sup> The first introduces what political trust is, relevant research literature, and why institutional trust matters. The primary purpose is to provide an overview of the trust literature, so the thesis can further focus the effect of refugee camps on institutional trust. This chapter and the upcoming one will focus on limiting, explaining, and defining different aspects of political trust. Chapter four presents previous research on institutional trust and migration. Lastly, chapter five presents previous research which leads to the thesis' main hypotheses.

### 3.1 Defining Political Trust

One of the most important terms to define in this thesis is political trust. For this reason, I see it necessary to evaluate different definitions of political trust to identify the one definition, which is best suited to answer the research question. One central question needs to be addressed before we move on to the specific definitions: is political trust related to the trust in political institutions or trust towards specific people in government or selected positions? Newton in Dalton and Klingemann (2007) offers their insight here. Newton notes that most survey questions in political opinion research about trust in people and confidence in institutions. This means that trust can only be related to people, and confidence is often restricted to institutions (2007:344). The latter distinction illustrates a theoretical issue. Most surveys tend to use this distinction, but not all measure trust in this manner. For example the Afrobarometer round 6 does not use this distinction, and ask for people's trust in institutions (Isbell 2017).<sup>23</sup>

The work of Hutchison and Johnson (2011) provides a definition of political trust which connects it to the literature. They define political trust as one of the primary indicators of state legitimacy, because it measures the society's overall confidence in political institutions that comprise the state (2011:739). In this definition, political trust is separated into two sections: first, as one of the primary indicators for state legitimacy, and secondly, as a measure for the society's overall confidence in political institutions. This is the main definition of political trust this thesis is based on.

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<sup>22</sup> The reason for separating these three chapters is to mark which theory is linked to the research field of trust (chapter three), which research connects to migration's effect on institutional trust, and finally, what previous research lays the groundwork for what this thesis is interested in testing.

<sup>23</sup> The Afrobarometer survey is used to investigate the political trust in Kenya and Tanzania in this thesis.

### **3.1.1 Common Explanations of Political Trust**

One of the more frequently used definitions, in the field of trust, is made by Easton. Easton (1975) sees trust as the probability that the political system will produce wanted outcomes even if it is left unattended. If this is the case the political system is so stable and predictable that it will be able to fulfil the population's wishes without being checked by its people (1975:447). In this scenario, people will trust their political system to act in their best interest, which is very close to how a representative democracy works. Not all states inherit this kind of political stability, and the countries researched by this thesis can be an example of such states. Therefore Easton's definition can mainly give an overarching idea of political trust, but is not as precise as the definition from Hutchison and Johnson (2011).

Norris (1999) sees political trust as unrelated to the political system, but rather is linked to the smaller dimensions of the political system. In this line of thought you can trust the system, although you are not trusting the currently sitting government. Warren (2018) supports this argument by marking that trust to an institution in a democracy is not the same as trusting the political officials who represent the institution.

Other influential scholars<sup>24</sup>, such as Lipset (1959) indicates that "legitimacy involves the capacity of the political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society" (Lipset 1959:86). Kramer (2018) sees political trust as a facilitator for a more stable, harmonious, and stable intergroup relations, drawing on insight from previous influential scholars (Uslaner 2002; Dinesen & Sønderskov 2015). This point is in line with this thesis looking at how refugee camps represent an outgroup that can affect institutional trust in the host communities in Kenya and Tanzania.

### **3.2 Institutional Trust**

Institutional theories mark that the trust a citizen has toward an institution is politically endogenous, which means that institutional trust is a consequence of institutional performance (Mishler & Rose 2001:31). The reason for looking at this specifically is based on Hutchison and Johnson's (2011) argument that citizen's political trust can be related to political actors such as the president, or to the political institutions which comprise the state (2011:739). It is here that the interest area for this thesis lies.

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<sup>24</sup> An additional scholar marks that "legitimacy arise out of the confidence of the ruled" (Weber 1975:267).



Institutional political trust, or institutional trust<sup>25</sup>, connects to the crucial components of the state system. The reason behind this focus on institutions specifically can be supported by Godefroidt, Langer, & Meuleman (2017). The scholars mark the following in their article on political trust in developing countries: “institutional trust is considered to be a cornerstone of democracy, enhancing the legitimacy, efficiency, and sustainability of governments by linking citizens to the institutions created to represent them” (Godefroidt et al. 2017:906). This is the main definition for institutional trust in this thesis. Focusing on trust to the institutions which are essential for the state, one can measure the trust of citizens have to their system of government.

Mattes & Moreno (2018) define institutional trust through its purpose: “it is thought to convey a vertical sense of confidence in the formal, legal organisations of government and state, as distinct from the incumbents [...] within those organisations” (2018:357).<sup>26</sup> This sort of trust is a form of consent between the public and the incumbents of these government and state organisations, to make decisions without having to constantly seek consultation to obtain their mandates (2018:357).

When it comes to institutional trust in new emerging democracies, which is the context for this thesis, Letki (2018) notes that people living under these conditions need trustworthy, reliable, and transparent institutions that citizens can trust as guarantors of the safety and predictability of social interactions. The measured institutional trust in countries that have recently transitioned into democracy, or are still struggling to become one is difficult to research. Letki (2018) concretises this by affirming that there are various factors of influence, making it difficult to disentangle when it comes to trust in institutions, not only because these factors co-vary but also because they influence each other (2018:337).

Although it is challenging to research, there are many reasons for studying newly established states and transitional democracies. As Cook, Hardin, and Levi (2005) describes: a reliable and trustworthy state provide a sense of security, cooperation, and evoke a willingness to take risks even among strangers (2005:160). The willingness to take risks, cooperate, and gain security is difficult to gain without trust in state institutions (Marien & Hooghe 2011; Mishler & Rose 1997; Fukuyama 2001).

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<sup>25</sup> For the remaining of this paper institutional trust will be used instead of institutional political trust.

<sup>26</sup> Incumbents referring to the actual people working in these political institutions.

### **3.3 Why does Institutional Trust Matter?**

In order to correctly research institutional trust, it is necessary to mark its consequences. Gouws & Schultz-Herzenberg (2016) comments that political trust will start to wane when citizens stop respecting the norms and principles of the democratic process. As political trust is disappearing, it can be destabilising for a country, even if the country is transitioning into a democracy, and it can even revert this process, and throw the country back into authoritarianism (Norris 1999 in Gouws & Schultz-Herzenberg 2016:7). The support for institutions and political actors is important for democracy to survive. The trust citizens have in political institutions are extremely important for democracy to work, in addition to many other important features (Warren 2018:88).<sup>27</sup> For democracies to last, Diamond (1999) states that it is crucial that the citizens trust the political institutions. Through granting political freedom, transparency, a strong rule of law, constitutionalism and an absence of arbitrariness, this is attained in the political process (1999:168). Godefroidt et al. (2017) point specifically to institutional trust being a cornerstone of democracy (2017:906). Several political scientists, Fukuyama (2015); Huntington (1968); Marien & Hooghe (2011); Listhaug & Jakobsen (2018), support this relationship.

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<sup>27</sup> Some of them being: personal security and freedom, welfare supports and protections, banking and pensions, extensive economic divisions of labour that generate wealthy societies (Warren 2018).

## Chapter 4: Institutional Trust and Refugee Presence

This chapter focuses on previous research which can provide insight on how institutional trust is being affected by refugee camps in Kenya and Tanzania. It will firstly outline the differences between the terms; refugee, migrant and IDP's, secondly present previous research in relations to political trust and thirdly bring forward research on political trust in East-Africa, and finally, previous research is presented.

### 4.1 Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced People

Based on the research question it is essential to mark the different terminologies being used in migration research. The term refugee is defined as: “individuals granted complementary forms of protection and those enjoying temporary protection” (UNHCR 2013). A migrant<sup>28</sup> is “[...] a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons” (IOM 2021). Not all migrants are refugees, and according to the UNHCR (2021b) the tendency to see refugees and migrants as the same thing, or to refer to refugees as a subcategory of migrants, can have serious consequences.<sup>29</sup> In doing so, one does not acknowledge the human rights and dignity of all people moving from one country to another. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that refugees differs from migrants (UNHCR 2021b).<sup>30</sup> The UNHCR (2021e) defines internally displaced people (IDP's) as people who are not crossing any country borders, but are moving internally within their own country borders. IDP's are under protection of its own government, even if the government is the reason for their displacement (UNHCR 2021e).

### 4.2 Political Trust in the East-African Context

It is vital to mark that political trust acts differently in various parts of the world. In the Western context, democracies are often characterised as more stable and less challenged. Most of the research on migration effects is conducted in this context, and several researchers see this as problematic. In their view, research on political trust is needed all around the world (Betts 2013). In the West citizens' political trust is highly connected to the country's economic situation, but in the African context political trust is more linked to whether the state can provide

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<sup>28</sup> Has a different meaning across different contexts.

<sup>29</sup> Some of the consequences relates to the lives and safety of people fleeing prosecution or conflict (UNHCR 2021b).

<sup>30</sup> The important distinction between refugees and migrants was acknowledged by the UN in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UNHCR 2021b). This resolution was then adopted by the UN general assembly on the 19<sup>th</sup> September 2016 (UN 2016). since they are a protected group in international law and are not able to return to their country of origin (UNHCR 2021b).

basic political rights and less dependent on the economic situation (Bratton & Mattes 2012:447).<sup>31</sup>

Uddhammar (2011) demonstrates how diverse political trust can be in three East-African countries: Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, which lies directly within the area of interest for this thesis. By using Afrobarometer data he finds that Kenya and Uganda are more sceptical toward their ruling institutions, while Tanzanians are characterised as very trusting (2011:1168). Further, Uddhammar (2011) focuses on why these three countries differ in their expressed support for the local opposition, on the one hand, and in the ruling political institutions on the other (2011:1169).

A second discovery is that the evaluation of government significantly affects how citizens trust its government and the opposition. This includes the handling of the economy, corruption, crime, health and infrastructure, and order. Interestingly Kenya has a strong adherence to democratic constitutional values, which is crucial for voting for the political opposition. In Tanzania, these values tend to increase support for the government and ruling institutions (Uddhammar 2011:1186).

#### **4.3 Refugee Presence and its Effect on Non-Western Host Communities**

Refugees' effect on hosting environments in East Africa has been subject of much academic attention since the late 1990s (Jansen & de Bruijne 2020:669).<sup>32</sup> Since then, it is safe to suggest that refugee arrivals have not ceased to exist. On the basis of this development, an understanding of the impacts of hosting refugees on poor host populations is imperative, according to Alix-Garcia & Saah (2010) there is little mention of the effects of refugee-crises on host communities (2010:149). This is despite increased attention on this topic since 1990s (Jansen & de Bruijne 2020; Baez 2002; Fisk 2014). The main function for this upcoming section is to present the exceptions of this trend, showing previous research on effects of hosting refugees.

Ghosn, Braithwaite, & Chu (2019) note that the contact hypothesis is important to discuss in research looking at the effects of hosting refugees (2019:122). The contact hypothesis, according to Homola & Tavits (2018), expose individuals to new information regarding one another. This new information helps generate affective ties, which reduce fears and help

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<sup>31</sup> It is important to add that this is a general observation across many different African countries, this thesis focuses more specifically on the East-African context here.

<sup>32</sup> This was due to an increase in refugee arrivals in this area during this period (Jansen & de Bruijne 2020:669).

develop positive views of the out-group (2018:1790). Allport (1954) introduced a statement of high influence for the contact theory research field: contact between groups under optimal conditions could reduce intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006:752).<sup>33</sup> Pettigrew & Tropp (2006) found a near-universal positive effect of diversity on out-groups in small scales, pointing to a difference in how contact mechanisms work in different contexts (2006:751-766).<sup>34</sup> Examining how different regions act is central for this thesis as well.

Jacobsen (2002) researched whether refugees can benefit the African state (2002:577). Although every host country in Africa has its own set of studies describing the burdens of hosting refugees, Jacobsen marks that the presence of refugees can have positive effects as well. Some of them being international refugee assistance, human capital, and economic activities (2002:580). On the other hand, Jacobsen (2002) also identifies different challenges for refugee-hosting nations in Africa:

Increased demands for government bureaucracy in areas where the state might be absent or weakly represented. Higher demands for the state's security apparatus to control borders and manage security threats. Increased needs for the state apparatus to control and manage contested refugee resources [...] (Jacobsen 2002:588).

Jacobsen (2002) weighs negative and positive consequences of hosting immigrants for African states and further concludes with the resources embodied in refugees (2002:593). Through utilising what Jacobsen calls refugee resources states can utilise refugee's skills and resources through their policy. Government's ability to shape policies can have significant beneficial effects for state-building, but this is only if the government can hinder security problems, among other issues.

International migration is at its all-time high, Alrababa'h et al. (2021) argues. However, the literature focuses on developed countries, which have relatively fewer migrants and a higher capacity to absorb them (2021:33). This claim is also supported by Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch (2019), stressing the importance of the state managing security consequences<sup>35</sup> of hosting

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<sup>33</sup> Refugee-hosting areas in Kenya and Tanzania cannot be characterised to be under these conditions: "equal status between the groups in the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom" (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006:752).

<sup>34</sup> In this thesis the Kenyan and Tanzanian contexts are explored separately, mapping out individual and regional effects on institutional trust.

<sup>35</sup> This is seen in Kenya's management of its refugees after terrorist attacks in 2013 and 2015 (Bhagat 2020:349).

refugee populations in developing countries (2019:73). This represents the research gap which this research aims to fill.

According to Mattes & Moreno (2018), people in Sub-Saharan Africa express some of the highest average levels of institutional trust in the world (2018:367). Nevertheless, looking more closely at the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, these countries diverge in their levels of political trust (Uddhammar 2011:1181). Many factors influence this level of trust, and it is difficult to find a one-sided yes answer to the question if refugees are damaging for institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. Based on previous research one can anticipate what influence refugee-presence can have for institutional trust, and this requires a closer look at central aspects of how these two states are managing their refugee inflow.

As mentioned in section 2.4, Kenya and Tanzania experience high level immigration from neighbouring countries (Betts 2013:37). They also experience, in accordance with general trends for refugee-hosting countries on the African continent, inflows of refugees due to conflict ridden neighbouring countries (Jacobsen 2002:586). Kenya and Tanzania are, as a result, left with an immense responsibility to handle the effects of neighbouring conflicts in, for example, Somalia (Anderson & McKnight 2015:1), and the DRC (UNHCR 2021h).<sup>36</sup>

Managing the effects of refugees are demanding for these states, and in more recent years both Tanzania and Kenya have started to implement a stricter refugee policy to handle issues deriving from refugees arriving (Bhagat 2020; Betts 2013). The pressure they experience can threaten state legitimacy, if they are not able to handle the effects of immigration in a good way its citizens can suffer from unwanted effects, such as terrorism (mainly in Kenya's case). Godefroidt et al. (2017) argue that having low institutional trust may result in a democratic breakdown and even a return to authoritarianism (2017:906). It is therefore essential to research if the presence of refugees have a negative impact on citizen's perceptions of safety, employment and their trust in central political institutions which are expected to manage the refugee-situation.

I argue for the following mechanism in relation to government handling the refugee situation; as developing countries are faced with increased refugee presence (UNHCR 2019), there is a need for government engagement to handle the effects of hosting refugees in these regions. In areas where large amounts of refugees are arriving, the host-community will evaluate their

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<sup>36</sup> DRC refers to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

government's performance through how they prioritize help or assistance in these regions. Therefore, institutional trust can be negatively affected by refugees in host communities.

## Chapter 5: Refugee Camps and Institutional Trust in Kenya and Tanzania

The main objective for this thesis is to tell how institutional trust is affected by refugee camps, and secondly, it research more generally what influences institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. This chapter lists expected effects through five hypotheses. The expected mechanisms are presented based on previous research. Initially, I wanted to include interaction effects that could test certain relationships shaping the refugee camps' influence on institutional trust. Due to a low level of variation at the regional level, this was not possible for this thesis (see section 6.4). Since this is an unexplored research area, the central arguments from previous research on what makes refugee presence problematic in the non-Western context are essential.

It is expected that the effects of hosting refugees will be negative for institutional trust since Kenya and Tanzania do not inherit the same capacity to handle possible unwanted effects of hosting migrants as more developed, Western countries (Alrababa'h et al. 2021:33). Institutional theory sees government performance as national institutions' performance, and their ability cope with challenges (Hutchison & Johnson 2011; Mishler & Rose 1997; Whitaker 2002). In this thesis, performance of government is reflected in institutional trust. This implies that if institutions act poorly, it tends to create a cycle of decreasing trust in these institutions (Godefroidt et al. 2017:909). Decreasing institutional trust in developing countries can cause serious outcomes such as a democratic breakdown, or a return to authoritarianism (Godefroidt et al. 2017:906).

Applying this logic to the refugee-hosting context, these institutions are evaluated based on their ability to handle central challenges in hosting refugees. Handling the effects of hosting refugees includes managing ethnic differences, labour market competition, and food resources (Rüegger 2019; Jacobsen 2002; Whitaker 2002). Baez (2011) studied host communities in Tanzania and found negative effects on health outcomes of residents that were living close to refugee camps. This area hosted refugees fleeing from the genocides of Burundi and Rwanda in 1994 (2011:391). During a rapid inflow of refugees to a region, it is interesting to see if Baez' argument can be found in Kenya and Tanzania. I base my first hypotheses ( $H_1$ ), on the previously stated arguments.

*$H_1$  People in regions with refugee camps express lower institutional trust than people in regions with no refugee camps present.*



## 5.1 The Hosting Community: Unemployment and Insecurity

Whitaker (2002) notes that there are several reasons why host experiences differ.<sup>37</sup> These are related to benefits and burdens these communities face due to hosting refugees. Some of these factors relates to gender, age, and class.<sup>38</sup> In Whitaker's research, these experiences were also contingent on settlement patterns, pre-existing socio-economic conditions, and the host–refugee relations. Hosts who already had access to resources, education, or power, were better positioned to benefit from the refugee presence. In comparison, those who already was disadvantaged in the local context became even further marginalised (2002:339). This research is highly relevant for how pre-existing characterisations are influential for the experiences of refugee-hosts.

One of the central aims of this research is to see if refugee camps can influence institutional trust at the regional level. Some of these regions are more vulnerable to begin with (Whitaker 2002:339). This can be seen in unemployment rates in the host communities. Certain scholars see heightened competition for jobs as an issue deriving from higher influx of refugees (Borjas 1987; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva 2016) . Other research focuses on the positive effects on host communities. Bilgili, Loschmann, Fransen, & Siegel (2019) find that “children residing closer to the camps have better schooling outcomes and that locals residing closer to the camps have mostly positive views regarding the effects of refugees on local education” in Rwanda (Bilgili et al. 2019:391). There seems to be a divide between considering refugees as a burden or a benefit in the migration literature, and this might also be a consequence of how different African countries and regions are affected by refugee presence.

Fisk (2019) researches the effects of refugee camps in her article on camp-settlement and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Fisk indicates that refugee camps have a significant marginal effect on conflict only if they are located in areas with politically marginalized host groups (2019:57). The essence of Fisk's argument can also be made for political trust. It underlines the significance of researching the effects of refugees more closely. Researching institutional trust can identify how refugee presence affect an essential factor for democracy to work (Warren 2018:88).

There is a lot of research which focuses on more severe outcomes of hosting refugees (Wig & Tollefsen 2016, Gineste & Savun 2019, Ghosn et al. 2019). But as Braithwaite et al. (2019)

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<sup>37</sup> This research was based in Tanzania's case, but these factors can also be present in the Kenya due to limited resources to handle large amounts of refugees arriving.

<sup>38</sup> Age and gender are included in the thesis' explanatory variables in section 6.6.

marks, there is a need for more knowledge on the relationship between refugee populations and political instability in host countries, and tracking public attitudes towards the refugee-hosting populations (2019:5). Although large amounts of research look at the negative effects of hosting refugees, some scholars focus on what refugees can contribute with to the hosting community. This positive effect relates to certain variables: the human capital refugees bring with them, the host country response to these refugees, and actions taken by the international community (Braithwaite et al. 2019:8). The latter point draws an interesting picture of the effects of hosting refugees in developing countries.

In the North-Western region in Tanzania, Ruiz & Vargas-Silva (2016) identified a negative effect on the labour market after large inflows of refugees. A core result of this research was that immigration influenced the work situation of natives in this area. After the large inflow of refugees in the region, Tanzanians were more likely to work in household shambas<sup>39</sup>, or caring for household stocks, and were less likely to work outside the household as employees. The main reasons for this shift within the agricultural sector are the increase in the supply of low-skilled labour resulting from the refugee shock (2016:667). As this research shows, the impact of refugee inflow affects the labour situation for the Tanzanians casual workers<sup>40</sup>, since workers were particularly likely to compete with refugees for jobs (2016:667).<sup>41</sup> The following hypothesis tests how employment affects institutional trust in different regions.

*H<sub>2</sub> Employed people have a stronger institutional trust than unemployed people in Kenya and Tanzania.*

Further, I want to test if insecurity can influence institutional trust. Areas with a higher refugee-population can affect citizen's institutional trust:

Refugee flows present a challenge to one of the key principles of state sovereignty: the control of borders and of non-citizens in the country. African host countries experience a range of security related problems associated with refugees and others crossing the border from conflict ridden neighbouring countries (Jacobsen 2002:586).

In some cases, governments have, in response to coping with unwanted effects of refugees, decided to shut down refugee camps and implement a stricter refugee policy based on refugee's

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<sup>39</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary (2021) define shambas as a cultivated plot of ground; a farm or plantation.

<sup>40</sup> A casual worker is a person with temporary employment, opposed to a permanent and regular one.

<sup>41</sup> Ruiz & Vargas-Silva (2016) suggest that particular attention should be brought to the well-being of native workers who are likely to compete with refugees in the labour market, such as agricultural or casual waged workers (2016:667).

threat of security. One can see in Kenya's response to shut down certain camps of the Dadaab Refugee Camp (Bhagat 2020:439). The state's ability to secure the individual's security is crucial in these refugee-hosting contexts, Böhmelt et al. (2019) argues, and it is essential for the citizens' perception of the refugees they are hosting in their communities (2019:73).

Further research from Ruegger in Braithwaite et al. (2019) demonstrates that in cases where refugees have ethnic ties to host regions, which upsets the demographic balance within the state, conflict is most likely to erupt. Somali refugees in Kenya, and Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo, are examples of this (2019:8). One can see that safety is a factor which can be challenged in areas of increased refugee presence. This will be tested for in relation to institutional trust in H<sub>3a</sub> and H<sub>3b</sub>.

Mogire (2009) researches Kenya and Tanzania's refugee policies relating to whether they portray refugees as a threat, arguing, especially in Kenya's case, that refugees are a danger for the citizens' safety. Mogire marks that both countries have been able to adapt anti-refugee policies due to citizens fearing for their safety (2009:25). Based on this assumption from Mogire I want to test whether Kenya, particularly, have a stronger negative effect on institutional trust for people that are feeling less safe. In addition, Mogire found that refugees were linked to rising crime in both countries (2009:18). This research can provide insight since safety is an important factor for future research to include. I will test if insecurity can affect institutional trust. Based on the arguments from various scholars in the migration research field, I want to test the following hypotheses:

*H<sub>3a</sub> People that are not feeling safe in their neighbourhoods show a lower level of institutional trust.*

*H<sub>3b</sub> The negative association between insecurity and institutional trust is stronger in Kenya than Tanzania.*

## **5.2 Urban and Rural Hosting-Communities**

The following hypothesis involves urban and rural effects on institutional trust. Firstly, it might be helpful to clarify what an urban and rural area implies. There is no universal definition of urban or rural areas according to Wineman, Alia, & Anderson (2020). These urban definitions produce different levels of urbanization (2020:254). Based on this complex definition, this thesis will fully rely on the distinctions made in the Afrobarometer round six (Afrobarometer 2015; Afrobarometer 2021a).

Previous research from Alix-Garcia & Saah (2010) looks at the impact of refugees and internally displaced people on the communities that receive them. Their research concentrates on Western Tanzania and points to positive wealth effects of refugee camps on nearby rural households, while households in urban areas have negative wealth effects due to refugee camps (2010:148). Other studies have also controlled for placement of refugee camps (Bhagat 2020; Landau 2002; Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, & Saah 2012) . Due to research limitations<sup>42</sup>, how the refugee camps influence this connection is not explored in this thesis, but will look at how the regional differences explain institutional trust levels in the urban and rural areas in Kenya and Tanzania. Based on Alix-Garcia & Saah's (2010) argument I want to test if institutional trust will decrease in urban areas and institutional trust will increase in rural areas. Hypothesis four test the effect of refugees on institutional trust and test whether the refugee camp is placed in a rural or urban area. Based on previous research on camp placement, I expect the effects of refugees to be different in urban and rural areas.

*H<sub>4a</sub> People living in a rural area will have a higher institutional trust than people living in an urban area.*

*H<sub>4b</sub> Tanzania will have higher levels of institutional trust for people living in rural areas in relation to urban areas than Kenya.*

### **5.3 Trust Levels in Kenya and Tanzania**

The final hypothesis for this paper is connected to the general institutional trust levels in the two countries. Based on previous research from section 4.2, Tanzania will express a higher level of institutional trust than Kenya (Uddhammar 2011:1184), this is expressed in hypothesis five:


*H<sub>5</sub> Institutional trust is higher in Tanzania compared to Kenya.*

Since expected effects are outlined in the previous hypotheses, I see it beneficial to include a causal diagram to get an overview over these effects:

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<sup>42</sup> Low level-2 variance is further elaborated on in chapter six.

**Figure 1: Expected Effects for Independent Variables on Institutional Trust**



Note: The independent variables are equal to the variables from chapter 6.

## Chapter 6: Data and Methodology

The following chapter describes the data sources and methodology for this thesis. First, it provides information on the research design, the datasets, operationalisation of the dependent variable institutional trust, and lastly, it presents the independent variables at the regional and individual level. The primary purpose of this chapter is to present the data material and elaborate on the selected variables.

### 6.1 Research Design: Multilevel Analysis

Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen (2017) marks that one central criticism of the quantitative method is that it does not take the context of the individuals into account when studying them (2017:195). A reply to this criticism is multilevel modelling, which considers factors that influence different contexts. By applying a multilevel analysis, one can identify the share of variance at the individual level on the dependent variable (in this case, institutional trust), and the share of variance at the regional level (Steenbergen & Jones 2002:220).

Multilevel models are usually estimated using maximum likelihood, and this study is no exception. Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen (2017) marks that maximum likelihood estimation finds the coefficients that make the data most likely, this means that it estimate the hypothetical population value that is more likely than any other to generate the sample that is actually observed (2017:199).

The analysis is conducted separately for Kenya and Tanzania. The main reason for separating the countries completely, is because of their difference of units on the regional level. While Tanzania are made up by only 29 regions for this analysis, Kenya have 47 districts present (see 6.4 for further elaborations).<sup>43</sup> Including them in one multilevel model would then be affected by the difference in level-2 units. In addition, I wanted to keep a within-country focus since the two countries differ in the number of regions that have a refugee camp present. Based on these arguments, the multilevel analysis is kept separated for Kenya and Tanzania throughout the whole thesis.

The respondents of the Afrobarometer survey live in different contexts, which can influence their political values and attitudes. Examples of these effects can be if there has been violent conflict in a region, a shared national history, or other influential experiences (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:198). This is the main reason for conducting a multilevel analysis, researching

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<sup>43</sup> For the remainder of this thesis Kenya's 47 districts will be referred as regions.

factors at the regional and individual level. Using this kind of modelling can show the different of refugees across contexts with various refugee situations.

It is expected that the presence of refugees influence citizen's institutional trust differently in Kenya and Tanzania. There number of camps in the different regions vary, for example, some regions have highly concentrated amounts of refugee camps, such as in Kigoma in Tanzania and Dadaab in Kenya. Other regions might have no camps present at all. The multilevel analysis will include two levels and will be carried out separately for the two countries to create the simplest model possible. By conducting a within-country study where individual differences and regional differences are taken into consideration, I can exclude effects connected to Kenya and Tanzania's number of regions. The number of regions for each of the case countries differ, and in order to make an analysis which is not affected by the difference in number of regions<sup>44</sup> I conducted the multilevel analysis separately for each of the countries.

### **6.1.1 Prerequisites for Multilevel Analysis**

A prerequisite for multilevel analysis is that the data are hierarchically structured, which means that observations are nested in units.<sup>45</sup> Multilevel analysis is used to accommodate for the complexities of estimating regression models with two or more levels (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:196). The more levels one includes in a multilevel analysis, the more complex it becomes. Only two levels are included in this analysis: the main independent variable (X) *refugee\_camp* is based on level-2 data at the regional level, and the dependent variable (Y) called *institutional trust*, which is situated at the individual level. It might be theoretically interesting to include a third level to the analysis, which would look at the country levels, but this thesis implicitly compares the different results from the two-levelled analysis. In this thesis, the regional level is the highest level included since it is crucial to keep the research centred around the individuals and the different regions' context. The analysis will follow a "bottom-up" structure, which means that first, a simple regression model is presented, and from here, there will be added more variables for the model to become more complex.

In multilevel analysis one takes the number of observations for each level into account. The individual level includes number of observations for Kenya and Tanzania, and the regional level includes 47 regions in Kenya and 29 regions in Tanzania.<sup>46</sup> According to Mehmetoglu &

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<sup>44</sup> 29 in Tanzania and 47 in Kenya.

<sup>45</sup> An example being pupils are categorized are categorised by classes.

<sup>46</sup> The region of Songwe is not present in either Afrobarometer round 6 or in the Geo-Refugee dataset, and therefore data from this region is excluded since it was created first in 2016. In addition the region of Rukwa is added to the region of Katavi, measuring one region, due to Tanzania's regional reform (see section 6.5).

Jakobsen (2017) it is problematic to include more than one independent variable per ten observations. This can lead to unreliable confidence intervals (2017:206). This study include the lowest number of regions for Tanzania, with 29 regions, I do not see it fit to include more than *two* level-2 variables for this multilevel analysis at the most.

In order to conduct a multilevel analysis there is a need to test for heteroscedasticity, which according to Mehmetoglu & Jacobsen (2017) can create a bias in the estimates of standard errors in the model. To check whether the multilevel model has a problematic association with heteroscedasticity one can conduct a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (2017:149-150). It showed that the models did not have an issue with heteroscedasticity. I also plotted the variance of the residuals, to supplement for the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (Mehmetoglu & Jacobsen 2017:150). Lastly it is important to check if the variables included in the random intercept models are normally distributed. This is checked with a *sktest* which is a test of the normality based on skewness and kurtosis. In addition, a plot of the residuals' normal distribution was done. All variables lie within the critical value for skewness and kurtosis.<sup>47</sup>

## 6.2 Data Sources

The data consists of two datasets; the Afrobarometer<sup>48</sup> and Geo-Refugee.<sup>49</sup> The Afrobarometer round 6 collected data in 2014 and was released in 2015, and the Geo-Refugee dataset includes the populations in refugee settlements in Kenya and Tanzania from the year 2000-2017. The datasets are described in greater detail below, in addition an assessment of the data's reliability.

### 6.2.1 Geo-Refugee: A Refugee Location Dataset

Fisk (2021) created Geo-Refugee to investigate the presence of refugees and armed conflict, but the dataset can be used to investigate other refugee related issues. The data assigns administrative units, geographical coordinates to refugee camps or centres, and locations hosting dispersed (self-settled) refugees (Fisk 2021 ).<sup>50</sup> These numbers are gathered from the UNHCR location data which also includes the total population in these settlements for each year. The Geo-Refugee dataset includes population data for 17 years in total (2000-2017).

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<sup>47</sup> Skewness is defined as the lack of symmetry in a distribution, and a normal distribution has a skewness value of 0. Kurtosis is if a distribution has too many observations close to the mean (Mehmetoglu & Jacobsen 2017:326-327) .

<sup>48</sup> The Afrobarometer is a public attitude survey focusing on democracy, economy, governance, and society in 30 (+) African countries on a regular basis (Afrobarometer 2021).

<sup>49</sup> Geo-Refugee provide data on the geographical location, population sizes and accommodation type for refugees in Africa (Fisk 2021).

<sup>50</sup> In Kenya and Tanzania, the refugee-population is mainly hosted in refugee camps, with some exceptions (Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010).



To be categorised as a refugee by the Geo-Refugee dataset a person is either recognised as a *refugee* under the 1951 Convention<sup>51</sup>, or living under what is called a refugee-like situation. According to these sources, a refugee is recognized in accordance with the UNHCR statute; “individuals granted complementary forms of protection and those enjoying temporary protection” (UNHCR 2013). The difference between what the UNHCR (2013) define as people in a refugee-like situation and people being acknowledged as refugees, are the fact that people in refugee-like situations “includes groups of people who are outside their country of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained” (UNHCR 2013). Geo-Refugee sums up the total population living under these conditions and administers them into three administrative levels: country, region, and camp or settlement location. The numbers for the population\_total variable include the number of people living in the following settlements:

**Table 2: Description of Settlements in the Geo-Refugee Dataset**

Unit	Description
Camp_Centre	Number of people living inside a refugee camp.
Urban_Dispersed	Refugees with individual accommodation in urban areas.
Rural_Dispersed	Refugees with individual accommodation in rural areas.
SS_Camp	Settlement in camps independent of assistance from local government or the aid community.
Undefined	Refugees at unknown locations within a country.
Population_Total	Summarised numbers of population living in any of the settlements above for each location within a region for each year.

Source: (Fisk 2021).

A refugee location, is defined as a geographical unit with a known refugee population, recorded by UNHCR country offices (Fisk 2021). An updated version of the Geo-Refugee was provided directly from Kerstin Fisk for the purpose of this thesis, including new data from the UNCHR.<sup>52</sup> Initially, the data only included population info for areas with over 100 refugees present. In this newly updated version, the UNCHR provides additional data from areas hosting under 100 refugees within this timeframe. It allows for a more comprehensive view of the refugee situation in the different regions.

<sup>51</sup> Under the 1967 protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention regarding Africa’s refugee problem.

<sup>52</sup> This version of the dataset was made available the 20<sup>th</sup> of December in 2020.

One can clearly see differences in refugee-settlement patterns of Kenya and Tanzania. Kenyan refugee camps tend to be localised in fewer regions, where more camps are located in the same area, such as Dadaab in the region of Garissa. This is in accordance with the outline of settlement patterns from the case chapter (Bhagat 2020) where the hosting of refugees often takes place in large camp settlements.

The Geo-Refugee includes geocoded data, which provides the exact coordinates for the different refugee settlements. Fisk (2021) utilized the database from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to assign the coordinates for refugee-settlements. These coordinates are one central strength of this dataset, making it one of the most accurate data sources on refugee settlement, but geocoded data was not possible to utilise for this specific thesis, with its limited timeframe. If additional time were provided one could have requested a geo-coded version of the Afrobarometer data.<sup>53</sup> In combination, this could have gathered data on how far a respondent is located from a refugee-settlement.<sup>54</sup> But I had to focus on using the data that was available.

Instead of using geocoded data, the variable measuring refugee camps is situated at the regional level. This is a simplified approach to measuring refugee presence but is one alternative solution since geo-coded data were not applicable. The variable *refugee\_camp* shows a simplified picture, but this measurement works for a multilevel analysis at the regional level. Total population numbers in the camps are present in the Geo-Refugee data, but is not included as an independent variable due to restrictions on the number of level-2 variables that can be included in the multilevel analysis (see section 6.7). Since this multilevel analysis includes regions as the secondary level, limiting what one can test for in the models.

Gathering settlement information at the regional level had its consequences. Therefore, a discussion of this dataset's reliability is needed. Simplistically put, reliability reflects whether repeated measurements with the same instrument would provide the same result. In measuring refugee presence, the Geo-Refugee dataset has its limitations, and there were cases where one had to recode which regions some camps belonged to because of regional changes in Kenya and Tanzania (in 2010 and 2012)<sup>55</sup>.

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<sup>53</sup> This requires an application with detailed questions on variables and rounds, which I was not ready to request in January. Due to a high request for these data there were expected delays in delivering it. I saw it as impossible to request this data during my limited timeframe.

<sup>54</sup> Gathering data on the exact distance between a respondent and a refugee-camp could have showed a more comprehensive picture of how the effects on institutional trust. This can be interesting for further research.

<sup>55</sup> For specific examples of how the different regions were recoded and developed, see section 6.4.

In addition, the reliability of a study is affected by measurement errors which represent an unreliable portion of variance of an indicator variable (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:320) . This can be caused by random error or systematic error, and the random errors are the one that influence a study’s reliability, which occurs when: “repeated applications of a given measurement procedure yield inconsistent results” (Adcock & Collier 2001:531). The information on camp settlements come from records from UNHCR, and therefore it is considered reliable for analysis. Also, all camps on record have been cross-checked with alternative sources to ensure that Geo-Refugee inherits the correct regions. Geo-Refugee is the only available dataset that provides these kinds of data, and therefore this thesis is entirely reliant on this.

Changes had to be made to prevent measurement errors and improve reliability. By merging the Geo-Refugee dataset with the Afrobarometer data, there appeared missing values in the dataset. Firstly, some camps listed in the Geo-Refugee datasets had a population total of zero and had to be recoded. The solution was to recode these camps into missing, which was done in instances where the variable for the number of camps, *campcount* (counting the number of camps at the ID\_2 level<sup>56</sup>), were equal to one and the population total was zero.

Secondly, there were instances where camps were marked as undefined, with marks that the UNHCR location names were unknown. These could not be included in the dataset and were recoded to missing values because of this. The latter case is a measurement error that introduces noise in the data material. After these variables were recoded into missing, *campcount* was created to count the camps present in the entire dataset, which showed that a higher mean of camps was found in Tanzania compared to Kenya (see table below).

**Table 3: Summary Statistics of Campcount**

Country	Mean	Standard deviation
Kenya	1.556	1.7
United Rep. of Tanzania	2.507	2.671

In addition, there were specific cases where settlements were not connected to any of the regional units or settlements, which made it impossible to state where these camps are exactly located. For these unknown values, only the administrative unit was available at the country level. Since this study focuses on regional placement of camps, I saw this as problematic. The

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<sup>56</sup> Geo-Refugee utilise three administrative levels: ID\_0 = Country level, ID\_1 = Regional level, ID\_2 = Camp/settlement level.

various and unknown settlements are present in Tanzania for the most part (12 cases). Kenya has one unknown location in Geo-Refugee. These missing or unknown locations are easily identified by looking at the regional level variable (ID\_1), which is left blank, and at the exact location names from the UNHCR. Therefore, the unidentified locations were recoded into missing values.

The management of these missing locations influence this study's findings. By recoding these unknown camps, one can isolate the cases where refugees are settled in an area that is not specified, but it also excludes refugee locations where one could have had more extensive settlement data. This study relies on correct location data to research how refugees affect institutional trust on different administrative levels. If these camps were not dropped, it could have had an enormous negative impact on this study's results. This could have created noise in the data and could have assigned refugee settlements with no concrete evidence for where these camps were placed.

### **6.2.2 The Afrobarometer Dataset**

The Afrobarometer survey measures attitudes on democracy and governance, the economy, and other topics. The survey is a pan-African, non-partisan survey collecting high-quality, reliable data on what Africans are thinking. The data is characterised by: nationally representative samples, face-to-face interviews, and allows for comparisons between countries and over time (Afrobarometer 2021a). Round 6 was conducted in 36 countries in total, and the fieldwork for Kenya and Tanzania was conducted in 2014 (Afrobarometer 2021b).

By including one round of the Afrobarometer survey, one cannot look at how institutional trust varies over time. This is a result of the process of merging the Afrobarometer with Geo-Refugee at the regional level. The process was time-consuming caused by inconsistencies due to regional reform, administrative units, and missing values.<sup>57</sup> Based on these considerations, the research is limited to one round of the Afrobarometer instead of including more rounds since this would not have been possible within the thesis' timeframe.

It is crucial to reflect on the effects of this choice. Will opinion data from one year be able to reveal how institutional trust is shaped by refugee camps? The answer lies in the number of respondents and which variables are included. The number of respondents is high in round 6 for both countries, which creates a sound foundation at the individual level. At the regional

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<sup>57</sup> I had to contact Kerstin Fisk personally to gain more in-depth information on the different settlements and specific cases where for example regional reform changed the location of camps.

level, the number of regions opens for contextual explanations for institutional trust, but regions vary in their number of observations within one group, which is seen in chapter seven.

### **6.2.2.1 Unweighted Data**

This section discusses why the data were kept unweighted, excluding the weighting variable *withinwt*<sup>58</sup> from the analysis. This decision was taken to deliver the most reliable results for both countries. The Afrobarometer data includes a population weight which weights the observations within the country. The weight adjusts the distribution of the sample based on individual selection probabilities (Isbell 2017:72).<sup>59</sup> The inclusion of weights is essential for uncovering causal relationships which can be generalised for the entire population for the country in question (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:331). The multilevel analysis includes the regional level, and using weights based on an entire population would be unfit for this research. For example, when a weight is based on the entire region's gender distribution and urban-rural distribution. This could have led to incomplete results since each group within a region is different. All variables included in the models, including the independent variable *refugee\_camp*, have been recoded for missing values, and this can create errors that could be damaging.

In addition, Kenya do not have as many observations per group in the multilevel models as Tanzania. Tanzania had a minimum of 23 observations for each group. Kenya had a minimum of one observation per group. To treat the data as equally as possible, I chose to exclude weights. If this limited number of observations were to be weighted in relation to gender, age, and the basis of rural-urban distribution, the results would provide unsatisfactory results, which could not provide answers to this thesis' hypotheses. Although they are not included in the thesis, results of weighted data are included in appendix C2-C4, which leaves the impact of weighted data explored.

## **6.3 Measuring Institutional Trust**

Institutional trust<sup>60</sup> reflects individuals' trust in different political institutions. To measure institutional trust a scale was created based on the following indicators from the Afrobarometer survey, which handles trust towards the President, the Parliament, the National Electoral

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<sup>58</sup> The weighting factor *withinwt* was based on region and was design to take the rural-urban distribution into account in addition to gender, household size, and enumeration area (EA) (Isbell 2017:72).

<sup>59</sup> This is created on the basis of region, gender, urban-rural distribution, and size of household and enumeration area (Isbell 2017).

<sup>60</sup> For the remainder of this thesis institutional trust concerns the institutional trust scale created for the multilevel analysis.

Commission, the Tax department, the Police, the Courts of Law, and trust in the Local Government Council.

### **6.3.1 Institutional Trust's Content Validity**

For a scale to measure what it is intended to, its content validity needs to be evaluated. I conducted both a factor analysis and a correlation matrix to ensure the indicators could be added to a scale, measuring the same phenomenon. Before I can go further into the results from the analyses, I want to comment on the process of deciding which factors to include in a scale, which tests hypothesis five.

According to Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen (2017), it is vital to evaluate how many factors which are to be included in a scale (2017:276), which is critical for content validity which relates to: “the degree an indicator represents the universe of content entailed in the systematised concept being measured” (Adcock & Collier 2001:537). Institutional trust is not supposed to measure the performance of the person sitting in office or working in these positions (Mattes & Moreno 2018:357), but the trust the individual has to the political institution as a whole. Hutchison & Johnson (2011) note that a citizen's political trust can be related to political actors such as the president or to the political institutions<sup>61</sup> which comprise the state (2011:739). In this study's analysis I want to include trust in political institutions comprising the system of government (such as the President) and other central democratic institutions (such as the Courts of law) to get a complete view of trust in Kenya and Tanzania's institutions which comprise the state.

This thesis' focuses on the institutions representing its citizens and are performing essential government duties (such as the National Electoral Commission and the Tax Department). Tanzania lacks an opposition which is powerful enough to overthrow the sitting government through an election (UN 2020). The president is therefore one of the institutions which needs assessment before including it into my scale. Having a sufficient opposition which could overthrow power is crucial for a democracy (Uddhammar 2011), but it is important to evaluate this in accordance with the cases the research handles. To research institutional trust in areas with refugee camps, especially in the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, one must be inclusive in the approach to gain results which are in accordance with the reality.

In addition, Godefroidt et al. (2017) adds what institutional trust should enhance: “[...] the legitimacy, efficiency, and sustainability of governments by linking citizens to the institutions

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<sup>61</sup> From this point political institutions refers to the included institutions in the institutional trust scale.

created to represent them” (2017:906). Although Tanzania is highly trusting towards their president (O’Gorman 2012:314), there is no good reason to exclude this indicator from Kenya’s case. This thesis will not exclude a central aspect of their executive power which the president represents. Kenya and Tanzania are dissimilar in this aspect, which will be kept in mind during the analysis. The thesis also includes trust levels connected to central government functions, such as keeping order (the Police) and collecting taxes (the Tax Department). Including the president in the institutional trust scale can contribute to valuable discoveries for Kenya and Tanzania, which will be further discussed in this thesis.

Specific indicators were excluded in the institutional trust scale. The reason for omitting these is based on this research’s area of interest. By excluding trust in oppositional parties, political parties, and the ruling party, one can separate trust in political institutions and political parties, including party politics. This research is strictly connected to Kenya and Tanzania’s trust in political institutions of the state apparatus. The following indicators are included in the new dependent variable: trust in the President, trust in Parliament, trust in the National Electoral Commission, trust in the Tax Department, trust in the Police, trust Courts of Law, and trust in Local Government Council.

When the Afrobarometer survey asks for the level of trust the respondent has to each of the following: the President, the Parliament, the Electoral Commission, the Elected Local Government Council, the Tax Department, the Police and the Courts of law (Isbell 2017:31-33). The respondent answers within four categories according to the level of trust they have in these institutions. These range from having no trust at all, just a little, to somewhat, or a lot of trust. In STATA I recoded the answers to missing if the respondent answered any of the following: “Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, refused to answer and missing” (Isbell 2017:31-33). The remaining four categories range from 0 to 3, which makes scale for the institutional trust continuous.

Based on the already discussed differences in trust regarding the president, it is interesting to see how this plays out in the two different case countries. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the correlation matrix and conduct the factor analysis for each country.<sup>62</sup> A correlation matrix tells how indicators correlate with each other, and as seen in the table below, each indicator is perfectly correlated with itself, showing a coefficient of 1.00 for all seven variables.

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<sup>62</sup> For the remainder of this thesis the specified models relating to each country will be marked as “a” for Kenya and “b” for Tanzania.

**Table 4a: Correlation Matrix for Institutional Trust in Kenya**

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) President	1.000						
(2) Parliament	0.557	1.000					
(3) Elec. Com.	0.638	0.505	1.000				
(4) Tax Dep.	0.399	0.446	0.486	1.000			
(5) Local Council.	0.336	0.459	0.343	0.457	1.000		
(6) Police	0.335	0.353	0.364	0.320	0.359	1.000	
(7) Courts of Law	0.413	0.458	0.435	0.445	0.398	0.445	1.000

**Table 4b: Correlation Matrix for Institutional Trust in Tanzania**

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) President	1.000						
(2) Parliament	0.619	1.000					
(3) Elec. Com.	0.621	0.662	1.000				
(4) Tax Dep.	0.500	0.583	0.674	1.000			
(5) Local Council.	0.526	0.514	0.573	0.586	1.000		
(6) Police	0.399	0.443	0.451	0.488	0.459	1.000	
(7) Courts of Law	0.450	0.475	0.509	0.498	0.479	0.596	1.000

In both Kenya and Tanzania's case (Table 4a and 4b), there is a positive correlation between all seven variables. Pearson's correlation coefficient<sup>63</sup> measures the strength of the linear relationship between two variables, and varies from -1 and 1, where levels below zero, indicate that low levels of one of the variables are connected to higher values on the second (showing a negative relationship). If the score is above zero higher values on one variable tend to go together with higher values on the second variable. The closer the value are to 1 or -1, the stronger the effect is (Pripp 2021). For Kenya, the average correlation was at 0.43 which is well above the recommended level of 0.3. The same goes for Tanzania which shows a higher average correlation at 0.53.

In Table 4b, the highest correlation between the National Electoral Commission (3) and the Tax Department (4) with a correlation coefficient of  $r=0.67$ . Other high correlation coefficients are found between the President (1) and the National Electoral Commission (3) for both countries, which is understandable since the president often are controlled by the national electoral commission, controlling for free and fair elections. The lowest correlation coefficient,  $r=0.320$ , is seen in Table 3a between the Tax Department and the Police. The covariance for the included indicators in the scale is measured by Cronbach's alpha ( $\alpha$ ). It is a measurement of reliability and for the included variables it showed a score at 0.867, which is satisfactory since it is well above the recommended level of 0.7 (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:288).

A factor analysis is conducted to detect if there is a smaller set of underlying factors which could explain the covariance or correlation among a larger set of observed variables

<sup>63</sup> Also called Pearson's R



(Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:270).<sup>64</sup> The factor analysis showed that the scale measures the same underlying phenomenon, which is a prerequisite for creating a scale (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:272). A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test was conducted to the variables. KMO varies from 0-1, where 0 is an unacceptable score, and a score close to 1 show that the variable is useful in a factor analysis. Overall the score the seven factors gained a KMO at 0.89 which is categorised as a satisfactory score (STATA 2021).

The results from the factor analysis<sup>65</sup> show that all indicators load on one dimension, and the factor loadings show the correlation between the observed variables and factor (Skog 2015:96). The factor loadings vary between 0.535 (Police) and 0.709 (Parliament) in Kenya's case. This can explain 28.6 per cent of the variance of the police variable and 50.3 per cent of the variance of the parliament variable. For Tanzania, the factor loadings varied between 0.638 for the police variable (40.7 per cent) and 0.811 for the national electoral commission variable (65.7 per cent). Based on the results, all seven factors were kept in the scale. Although the loading is low for the police, the indicator is essential for this scale since this thesis tests for safety levels in hypothesis H<sub>3a</sub> and H<sub>3b</sub>.

Eigenvalues tells us how the amount of common variance (communality) each factor has, this can be calculated by the Eigenvalues divided on the numbers of variables and by multiplying with 100 (Ulleberg & Nordvik 2001:8). In the case for the president in Tanzania, this factor had an Eigenvalue of 3.697, which then can explain 52 per cent of the total variance in all seven observed variables. Kenya has an Eigenvalue of 2.980 (43 per cent). In factor four to seven (tax department, elected local government council, police and courts of law) all inherit negative Eigenvalues, ranging from -0,016 to -0,196 (see appendix A1).

### **6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Institutional Trust Scale**

Table 5a and 5b show the included variables for the scale for institutional trust based on the previous analysis and different tests. This institutional trust variable will also measure the more general hypothesis five: *institutional trust is higher in Tanzania compared to Kenya*. Table 5a and 5b contain the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dependent variable institutional trust for Kenya and Tanzania. It includes the number of respondents (N), the minimum and maximum values for each indicator (min, max), mean and standard deviation.

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<sup>64</sup> According to Ulleberg & Nordvik (2001), there are three main steps in factor analysis: first the calculation of factors to be included, second the rotation of factors, and last the interpretation of the factors (2011:26). Step two is irrelevant here since I am only researching one factor in this dependent variable.

<sup>65</sup> The results of the factor analysis can be found in appendix A, Table A1 and A2.

One might argue that this is overinclusive, but to gain quality data at the individual and regional level, these variables were essential to include in the scale for institutional trust. Also, by including more factors in a scale, one can compensate for measurement errors. A robustness check is done to see if this scale is overinclusive, where a scale with fewer indicators is tested (see appendix D1).

**Table 5a: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable for Kenya**

	N	min	max	Mean	Std. Dev.
The President	2380	0	3	2.04	1.008
The Parliament	2322	0	3	1.566	.949
The Electoral Commission	2263	0	3	1.428	1.131
The Tax Department	2060	0	3	1.59	.957
The Elected Government Council	2307	0	3	1.526	.971
The Police	2377	0	3	1.168	1.001
The Courts of law	2282	0	3	1.674	.935
<b>Institutional trust</b>	1954	0	3	1.56	.708

In Table 5a, the mean value for the president is highest at 2.122, which tells us that Kenyans answered that they trusted their president “somewhat”. The lowest mean value is found for the police, with a mean value at 1.168, indicating that people in Kenya trust their police “Just a little”. The variable with the largest standard deviation is the electoral commission at 1.131, followed by the president and police at 1.008 and 1.001. The police show the lowest mean value, 1.168. Lastly, one can see that the scale of institutional trust has a mean value of 1.727 and the lowest standard deviation in this table at 0.73.

Table 5b (below) shows that the police has the lowest mean value (1.707) and the largest standard deviation. The president has the strongest mean value at 2.205 which were expected since the case chapter already have argued for that trust in the president is stronger in Tanzania (Uddhammar 2011:1168). The lowest standard deviation is found for the variable institutional trust at 0.717, and the highest standard deviation is at 0.948 for the police which also has the lowest mean value.

**Table 5b: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable for Tanzania**

	N	min	max	Mean	Std. Dev.
The President	2357	0	3	2.205	.903
The Parliament	2342	0	3	1.945	.948
The National Electoral Commission	2258	0	3	1.864	.933
The Tax Department	2225	0	3	1.731	.931
The Elected Government Council	2345	0	3	1.936	.907
The Police	2359	0	3	1.707	.967
The Courts of law	2330	0	3	1.866	.904
<b>Institutional trust</b>	2154	0	3	1.878	.717

#### 6.4 Regional Variable for the Multilevel Analysis

The level-2 variable used for identifying different regions in Kenya and Tanzania needs further elaboration. It was created to merge the Afrobarometer data and the Geo-Refugee dataset. This variable was recoded from a string variable to a numerical one and included all regions in Tanzania and smaller districts in Kenya. The only official region which is missing is the region of Songwe in Tanzania. This region was not present in either the Afrobarometer or Geo-Refugee data, and as a result, this region is not present in this data either.

The variable *regionkt* lists the different regions in Kenya and Tanzania. It is based on the different regions from Geo-Refugee, which was merged with the regional variables from the Afrobarometer. Merging the regions for Tanzania were fairly straight forward<sup>66</sup>, but Kenya's regions this had to be handled differently. Since the Afrobarometer variable for region only included eight regional units, which were too few for my analysis. This led the use of the variable for district, which includes all 166 districts in Kenya, which then were matched to the correct regions from Geo-Refugee. The smaller districts were located within the 47 administrative regions in Kenya (KNBS 2019). Using this variable was the simplest way to connect the camps to the correct regions. *Regionkt* includes all 47 regions in Kenya, ranging from a value of 15 to 166 (see Table 6a below).

Adjustments in *regionkt* had to be made because of regional reform. For Tanzania, the regions of Katavi and Rukwa was recoded into one common region, called Katavi, since the refugee camp Katumba was first present in the region of Rukwa up until 2010, and after Tanzania's regional reform in 2010 (NBS 2011), the camp then was recoded as located in Katavi. This issue occurred since Katumba camp was placed right at the regional border between Katavi and Rukwa. This led *regionkt* to include 29 regions for Tanzania (see table 6b below).

<sup>66</sup> The region of Songwe in Tanzania was established in 2016 from the western part of the Mbeya region (NBS 2015). This is two years after the timespan for this study (2000-2014).

**Table 6a: Descriptive Statistics of Regionkt for Kenya**

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
regionkt	2397	94.999	43.292	15	166

**Table 6b: Descriptive Statistics of Regionkt for Tanzania**

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
regionkt	2386	752.594	8.384	740	769

### 6.5 Main Independent Variable: *Refugee\_camp*

The process of creating the main independent variable *refugee\_camp* using data from Geo-Refugee will be outlined in this section, in addition, to describe what it measures. As described in section 6.2.1, Geo-Refugee lists all refugee settlements in Kenya and Tanzania (Fisk 2021). Based on this one can identify which settlements are: camps, settled in urban/rural areas, camps independent of assistance, or simply unidentified (see Table 2).

*Refugee\_camp* is based on camp settlements, which includes official camps, and independent refugee camps being present in the region from 2000 to the year of 2014. This research aims at seeing how refugee-presence can affect institutional trust, and it is more likely that the host communities will be aware of these kinds of camp settlements, in contrast to refugees living as urban or rural dispersed people. This is main logic for excluding unknown settlements and urban or rural self-settled refugees but focusing on official and independent refugee camps.

An additional variable was also considered for neighbouring regions to a region with a refugee camp present, but this had to be excluded from this thesis. It was apparent that it was more difficult to administer this in Kenya's case since most regions with camps were located on the border to neighbouring countries. This could have resulted in a small increase of regions which are exposed to refugee camps. In Tanzania's case, the administrative regions changed during this 14-year period and had to be merged into one region. Based on the merging of these regions, a measure for neighbouring regions would not be adequate. How camps affect neighbouring regions are further discussed as an area of improvement using geo-coded data in the discussion section (see section 8.2).

Based on data of the total population in refugee-settlements from Geo-Refugee (see table 2), *refugee\_camp* is merged at the regional level, and subsequently recoded to show the regions with refugee camps present for each year from 2000-2014. The variable is dichotomous, and if there is a refugee camp present in a region the variable will have a value of 1, and if that there are no refugee camps present the variable will have a value of 0.

Another ruling for *refugee\_camp* was to include official- and the independent refugee camps. Excluding the independent camps could have led to an inadequate measure refugee camps in a region. Based on this, I chose to include both kinds of camp settlements in the analysis, since it is best fitted to test H<sub>1</sub>: *people in regions with refugee camps express lower institutional trust than people in regions with no refugee camps present.*

It was essential to exclude data after 2014. This was the year the Afrobarometer survey was conducted in Kenya and Tanzania. This collected data on refugee camps from the year 2000-2014 (14 years), excluding data from 2015, 2016 and 2017 since they are not relevant for this study since the Afrobarometer round 6 collects data from its respondents in 2014. Including data from later years would therefore be problematic. Based on this timespan, the variable *refugee\_camp* provides an overview over regions with refugee camps present (see Table 7 below).

**Table 7: Number of Regions with Refugee Camps from 2000-2014**

Regions	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Garissa	1	14.28	14.28
Turkana	1	14.28	28.57
Katavi	1	14.28	42.85
Kagera	1	14.28	57.14
Kigoma	1	14.28	71.52
Tabora	1	14.28	85.71
Tanga	1	14.28	100.00
Total	7	100.00	

## 6.6 Explanatory Variables

The explanatory variables is used to test the hypotheses from chapter five. All variables presented are level-1 variables. First, the different variables will be presented in reference to the hypothesis, and further I will present the remaining explanatory- and control variables for the models. It is important to mark that due to the limited number of refugee camps in the different regions there is not enough variance at the level-2 variable enable to test interaction effects for the variable *refugee\_camp*.

The first of the explanatory variables is connected to hypothesis H<sub>2</sub>: *which expect that the negative impact of refugees on institutional trust will be stronger among unemployed people.* In order to test this, the variable *employment* is included from the Afrobarometer where the respondent is asked the following: “Do you have a job that pays a cash income? If yes, is it full-

time or part-time? If no, are you presently looking for a job?” (Isbell 2017:63).<sup>67</sup> I recoded the variable into three based on the current employment status of the respondent. The category unemployed is recoded to 0 and includes the respondents which do not have a job, either they are looking for one, or not (value 0 and 1). The people working full-time are recoded to value 1, and the remaining people which are working part time is recoded to 2.

Hypothesis H<sub>3a</sub>: *people that are not feeling safe in their neighbourhoods show a lower level of institutional trust* and H<sub>3b</sub>: *the negative association between insecurity and political trust is stronger in Kenya than Tanzania*, is tested through the variable *safety*. The respondent is asked: “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Felt unsafe walking in *your* neighbourhood?” (Isbell 2017:14).<sup>68</sup> The missing values are recoded, and the variable is best fitted to test for this with its initial form with five categories ranging from 0-4.

Hypotheses H<sub>4a</sub> and H<sub>4b</sub>, relates to the urban-rural variable from Afrobarometer which categorise the sampling of respondents, which are done by the interviewers, this variable are has two categories, “1= urban sampling unit and 2=rural sampling unit” (Isbell 2017:3), which is measured at the individual level. The variable is recoded into to *rural*<sup>69</sup> with urban as category of reference (coded to 0).

The following variables are not directly connected to any hypothesis but are essential since they test for sociodemographic aspects, further explaining institutional trust in different regions. These variables are seen as explanatory variables since they can enhance the causal relationship on how refugee camps influence institutional trust. *Education* is a variable where the respondent is asked for their highest level of education. This variable ranges from 0=No formal schooling to 9=Postgraduate,<sup>70</sup> after missing variables are excluded (Isbell 2017:63). The variable *age* tells the age of the respondent, which ranges from 18-105, in this case missing values are also recoded to missing (Isbell 2017:10). *Woman* is a dichotomous variable showing the

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<sup>67</sup> This variable have the following response alternatives: “0=No (not looking), 1=No (looking), 2=Yes, part time, 3= Yes, full time” (Isbell 2017:63)

<sup>68</sup> The answers are then coded into the four following categories: “0=never, 1=just once or twice, 2=several times, 3=many times, 4=always”.

<sup>69</sup> H<sub>4a</sub>: Higher numbers of refugees in urban areas will decrease institutional trust. H<sub>4b</sub>: Higher numbers of refugees in rural areas will increase institutional trust.

<sup>70</sup> “0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Intermediate school or Some secondary school/high school, 5=Secondary school/high school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate” (Isbell 2017:63)

respondent's gender with two categories, where male is recoded as a category of reference, with a value of 0, and woman has value of 1 (Isbell 2017:67).<sup>71</sup>

## 6.7 Alternative Camp Measurement and Control Variables for Violence

The final section of this chapter will focus on the variables testing if there are alternative ways of operationalising the variable *refugee\_camp*. Older camp data from 14 years back might not be as relevant as the more recent settlement data. To solve this issue, I created a variable that covered camp data from five years back, called *camp5yr*. This is the second level-2 variable used in the multilevel analysis. The variable is based on the *refugee\_camp* variable. *Camp5yr* only includes camp settlement data from the years 2010-2014.<sup>72</sup> The analysis can spot whether more recent refugee-settlement trends can be more influential for institutional trust.

The final level-2 variable of this thesis is called *prevviol* and is categorised as a control variable. It focuses on the three regions in Kenya with an especially low degree of institutional trust due to Somali-Kenyans engaging in riots against the Kenyan state (Lochery 2012:615). The three regions of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera are affected by this. The *prevviol* variable is dichotomous and is based on the *regionkt* variable. Here the regions of Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera are given the value of 1, and all other regions have the value of 0.

Below, descriptive statistics are included for all independent variables, and additional information is provided in appendix B for the dichotomous variables.

**Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables for Kenya and Tanzania**

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
refugee camp <sup>a</sup>	4783	.115	.319	0	1
camp5yr <sup>a</sup>	4783	.143	.546	0	5
prevviol <sup>a</sup>	4783	.0234	.151	0	1
employment	4778	.8725	.740	0	2
safety	4780	.343	.475	0	1
rural <sup>b</sup>	4783	.357	.479	0	1
education	4782	3.517	1.804	0	9
woman <sup>b</sup>	4783	.499	.5	0	1
age	4762	37.234	13.883	18	99

a=variables at level-2 | b=dummycoded variables (where unemployed=0, working full-time =1 and part-time=2, urban=0 and rural=1 and man =0 and woman=1).

<sup>71</sup> See appendix B5 for additional information.

<sup>72</sup> Excluding data from 2000-2009.

## Chapter 7: Results

As already stated, the main objective for conducting this research is to look at the effects of refugee camps, but secondly, it also focuses on testing alternative explanations for institutional trust.<sup>73</sup> Through a two-levelled multilevel analysis situated at the regional and the individual level. The result chapter presents maximum likelihood models, which in sum, finds the coefficients that make the data most likely (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:199). The first model is an empty or intercept-only model, and further, the different independent variables are being added to test the hypotheses. This research also tests for other explanatory factors since this thesis operates in an area of limited research.

### 7.1 Empty Model and the First Random Intercept Model

The following section presents the results from the empty intercept model and the first random intercept model for Kenya and Tanzania. An empty- or intercept-only model<sup>74</sup> is the simplest model presented in this thesis. A two-level intercept-only model is given by:<sup>75</sup>

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

Based on the results from the intercept-only model one can calculate the variance partition coefficient, or VPC.  $Var(e)$  picks up the amount of variance of the dependent level-1 variable, which can be explained at the individual level, and  $var(u_0)$  shows the explained variance at the regional level (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:203). VPC is a measure of the share of variance in the dependent variable that comes from the regional level, and has the following formula (Merlo, Chaix, Yang, Lynch, & Råstam 2005:446):

$$VPC = \frac{var(u_0)}{var(e) + var(u_0)}$$

The VPC for the empty model for Kenya (see Table 9 below)<sup>76</sup> explains 18.56 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable is at the regional level (level-2), and 81,44 per cent of the variance is at the individual level (level-1). There is a rule of thumb in evaluating these results: if the lion's share of the variance is at the individual level, and the VPC is 5 per cent or more, it should not be ignored (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:203). The intercept-only model for Tanzania showed a VPC which explained 8.21 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable

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<sup>73</sup> These are specified in the thesis' main hypotheses from chapter five.

<sup>74</sup> See appendix C.

<sup>75</sup> Where  $Y$  indicate institutional trust for individual  $i$  in region  $j$ .  $\beta_0$  is the total mean value of the dependent variable in region  $j$ .  $U_{0j}$  is the variance of the level-2 error term, and  $e_{ij}$  is the variance of the level-1 error term (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:201).

<sup>76</sup> See appendix C1a.



was explained at the regional level, and 91.79 per cent of the variation is explained at the individual level (see Table 9 below). The VPC is above 5 per cent, but it is significantly lower than Kenya's. This means that the regional context is more influential for Kenyans' institutional trust than for Tanzanians, where institutional trust is explained to a larger extent at the individual level.

Model II includes six independent variables measured at the individual level. By only including the level-1 variables, one can see the independent variables without level-2 variables' interference. In the formula below, the X-variables mark the independent variables included, with a suffix ij showing the variance in the independent variable for the individual (i) living in the region (j).

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1ij} + \beta_2 X_{2ij} + \beta_3 X_{3ij} + \beta_4 X_{4ij} + \beta_5 X_{5ij} + \beta_6 X_{6ij} + \beta_7 X_{7ij} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

In Table 9, the VPC decreases from 18.56 to 16.41 per cent for Kenya in the second model, and all six independent variables lower the share of variance in the dependent variable at the regional level. Significant results are found for the variables rural (-0.080) and safety (-0.242), which relates to hypothesis three (safety) and four (rural). In comparison to Kenya, Tanzania shows a higher number of significant relationships in model II, these are present for the variables *age* and *woman*.

Both countries show a negative association for institutional trust for the variables *safety* (-0.165) and *rural* (-0.091). Residing in a rural area will affect institutional trust negatively in comparison if one resides in an urban area, supporting hypothesis 4<sub>a</sub>: *having a refugee camp present in a region will decrease institutional trust in urban areas* and hypothesis and 4<sub>b</sub>: *having a refugee camp present in a region will increase institutional trust in rural areas*. It also supports hypothesis 3<sub>a</sub>: *people that are not feeling safe in their neighbourhoods show a lower level of institutional trust*. In addition, the

re is a more substantial negative effect for the variable safety in Kenya. Table eight also supports hypothesis five, that institutional trust is higher for Tanzania than Kenya.

**Table 9: Multilevel Regression Models of Institutional Trust in Kenya and Tanzania:  
Empty Model and Individual Level Variables**

	Kenya		Tanzania	
	I	II	I	II
Insttrust	1.564 (32.33)***	1.690 (21.01)***	1.873 (44.87)**	1.798 (22.93)***
Employment		-0.019 (0.96)		-0.032 (1.52)
Safety		-0.242 (7.96)***		-0.165 (4.35)***
Rural		-0.080 (2.16)**		-0.091 (2.38)**
Education		-0.014 (1.55)		-0.009 (0.83)
Woman		0.033 (1.12)		0.127 (4.22)***
Age		0.002 (1.41)		0.003 (2.99)***
N	1,954	1,943	2,154	2,145
Var (e)	0.408	0.392	0.477	0.463
Var (u)	0.093	0.077	0.043	0.041
VPC	18.56	16.41	8.21	8.17

Unstandardised b-coefficients, Z-values and P-values: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

## 7.2 Random Intercept Models including Level-2 Variables

To follow the thesis's main hypotheses and their results in the multilevel analysis, I want to present one model for the hypotheses from chapter five.<sup>77</sup> The main independent variable *refugee\_camp* is included in each of the models. The explanatory variable is then added to see if the results positively or negatively impact institutional trust and whether it improves the models in explaining institutional trust.

### 7.2.1 Refugee Camps and Institutional trust

The first level-2 variable, *refugee\_camp*, is included in model three to test H<sub>1</sub>: *People in regions with refugee camps express lower institutional trust than people in regions with no refugee camps present*. It also includes an alternative measure for camp settlement, *camp5yr*. Based on the table below (Table 10), there is no significant change in institutional trust for either Kenya or Tanzania based either of these two variables. This might be because there are not enough camps in the two countries to find a significant change in institutional trust. H<sub>1</sub> is rejected, and there is no relationship found for Kenya or Tanzania in the models below. Additional variables

<sup>77</sup> Hypothesis 5: *institutional trust is higher in Tanzania compared to Kenya*, will be answered in regard to the final model, see table 13.

measuring camp presence were also tested out<sup>78</sup>, but *camp5yr* and the *refugee\_camp* variable was selected for this thesis.

A rule for regression states that there should be at least 10 observations for each independent variable. If there are fewer than 15-20 level-2 units (regions in this case) this leads to confidence intervals that are unreliable (Stegmueller 2013). It is important to mark that this thesis has a minimum of 29 level-2 units (Tanzania's case) and a maximum of 47 regions (Kenya's case). This means that one can only include two level-2 variables in Tanzania's case and four level-2 variables in Kenya's case. I limit the use of level-2 variables to one in Tanzania's models and a maximum of two in Kenya's models.

The included variables for Kenya's model three and four differ from Tanzania's; this is due to the *prevviol* variable, which excludes regions where violence has decreased institutional trust drastically. Excluding these regions located at Kenya's border did not provide more significant results in this case, and if one excludes these areas even fewer camps are present in Kenya. In these regions, close to the border of Somalia, one find many of Kenya's refugee camps (Lochery 2012). Controlling for violence is important in studies of institutional trust, since this would decrease institutional trust, but as seen here, it does not provide enough camps to support for hypothesis one.

There is no significant result for the variables measuring refugee camps at the regional level in Tanzania's case. Since the variable *refugee\_camp* shows camp data from 14 years in total, I want to keep this variable in the upcoming models that test the rest of the hypotheses. The reason for doing this is because the variable will rather be over-exclusive, rather than too narrow, to uncover the effects of camp settlement in Kenya and Tanzania.

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<sup>78</sup> The results from alternative measures measuring camp data from the three last years and the last year (2014) is found in appendix C6 and C7.

**Table 10: OLS Regression, Institutional Trust and Refugee Camps, Kenya and Tanzania**

	Kenya		Tanzania	
	III	IV	III	IV
Refugee_Camp	0.245 (0.96)		0.13 (1.22)	
Camp5yr		0.046 (0.58)		0.033 (0.39)
Prevviol	-0.075 (0.35)	-0.076 (0.32)		
N	1,954	1,954	2,154	2,154
Var(e)	0.408	0.408	0.477	0.477
Var(u)	0.091	0.092	0.04	0.042
VPC	18.24	18.4	7.74	8.09

Unstandardised b-coefficients, Z-values and P-values: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

### 7.2.2 Employment and Institutional Trust

The upcoming intercept model see how the employment variable affect the results for institutional trust, testing hypothesis two: *employed people have a stronger institutional trust than unemployed people in Kenya and Tanzania*. In Kenya's case, one cannot see any significant results for the variable employment. Therefore, one cannot verify that Kenyan's work status affects their institutional trust levels. For Tanzania, employment shows a significant negative relationship at the 0.05-level in Table 11. Employed people are then less trusting towards their government than the unemployed, which tells how people with jobs might be more self-sufficient. They might not need to rely on their government as much as the unemployed do. The VPC shows that model five for Tanzania explains in total 7.7 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable. Employment did not show significant results in model two.

**Table 11: OLS Regression, Institutional Trust and Employment, Kenya and Tanzania**

	Kenya	Tanzania
	V	V
Refugee_Camp	0.219 (0.92)	0.124 (1.18)
Employment	-0.026 (1.28)	-0.046 (2.19)**
N	1,951	2,152
Var(e)	0.408	0.475
Var(u)	0.09	0.04
VPC	18.07	7.77

Unstandardised b-coefficients, Z-values and P-values: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

### 7.2.3 Insecurity and Institutional Trust

In the upcoming model six, the independent variable safety is included to the model, testing for hypothesis 3<sub>a</sub>: *People that are not feeling safe in their neighbourhoods show a lower level of institutional trust*, and 3<sub>b</sub>: *The negative association between insecurity and institutional trust is stronger in Kenya than Tanzania*. In model two the safety variable showed a significant negative relationship for both countries, and the effect is stronger for Kenya in relation to Tanzania, confirming H<sub>3b</sub>.

Kenya shows that the safety variable has a strong positive association for institutional trust in model six (see Table 12 below). The measured VPC for this model is higher than for the empty intercept model, explaining 15.57 per cent of the level-2 variance in institutional trust. An alternative explanation for this relationship is if one feel less safe if one is less trusting in the institutions. I exclude the safety variable from the model (see appendix C5a & C5b), and based on this revised model, reversed causality might be present here; people with lower institutional trust might feel less safe. If the multilevel analysis could take interaction effects into account, it would control for this.<sup>79</sup> For Tanzania, perceived safety is also significantly negatively associated with institutional trust, and the substantial effect is quite strong, but the effect is not as strong as in Kenya's case supporting H<sub>3b</sub>. The effect of safety will also be investigated further in Tanzania's case.

<sup>79</sup> As stated, one could not take interaction effects into account, further discussion found in section 8.2.2.

**Table 12: OLS Regression, Institutional Trust and Safety, Kenya and Tanzania**

	Kenya	Tanzania
	VI	VI
Refugee_Camp	0.199 (0.92)	0.132 (1.22)
Safety	-0.248 (8.17)***	-0.174 (4.58)***
N	1,953	2,153
Var(e)	0.396	0.472
Var(u)	0.073	0.042
VPC	15.57	8.17

Unstandardised b-coefficients, Z-values and P-values: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

#### 7.2.4 Residency and Institutional Trust

Model seven will include the variable *rural* to test the two hypothesis 4<sub>a</sub>: *People living in a rural area will have a higher institutional trust than people living in an urban area*, and 4<sub>b</sub>: *Tanzania will have higher levels of institutional trust for people living in rural areas in relation to urban areas than Kenya*. Kenya's institutional trust is lower for people living in rural areas compared to urban areas. This rejects H<sub>4a</sub>. Tanzania show a lower negative association for the relationship than Kenya, supporting H<sub>4b</sub>.

**Table 13: OLS Regression, Institutional Trust and Rural, Kenya and Tanzania**

	Kenya	Tanzania
	VII	VII
Refugee_Camp	0.211 (0.88)	0.119 (1.15)
Rural	-0.118 (3.18)***	-0.103 (2.75)***
N	1,954	2,154
Var(e)	0.406	0.476
Var(u)	0.091	0.037
VPC	18.30	7.21

Unstandardised b-coefficients, Z-values and P-values: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

#### 7.3 Final Random Intercept Model for Kenya and Tanzania

The fifth and final model includes the all the explanatory variables from chapter six, excluding *camp5yr* and *prevviol* since they are not seen as beneficial.<sup>80</sup> The different variables testing for the thesis' hypothesis is included here, in addition to the independent explanatory variables. Two variables still show a significant result for institutional trust (see Table 14 below). Safety

<sup>80</sup> The two variables have been tried out as main independent and as a control variable, and the results remain the same, therefore they are excluded from model five.

shows a stronger negative effect in this model, and rural show a significant negative association for institutional trust. The independent variables *woman* and *age* show a positive association for institutional trust in Tanzania. The VPC for model eight is 16.05 per cent, which is lower than both the empty intercept and model II.

In comparison, Tanzania’s final model shows a total VPC of 7.76 per cent, which indicate that the level-2 variance is lower in model one and two. However, in model eight (see Table 14 below), there are four significant results in the final model. These include variables *safety*, *rural*, *woman*, and *age*, which in Tanzania’s case show a positive relationship for institutional trust.

**Table 14: Final Random Intercept Model for Kenya and Tanzania**

	Kenya	Tanzania
	VIII	VIII
Refugee_Camp	0.190 (0.86)	0.116 (1.11)
Employment	-0.020 (0.99)	-0.032 (1.50)
Safety	-0.242 (7.97)***	-0.165 (4.36)***
Rural	-0.081 (2.17)**	-0.090 (2.36)**
Education	-0.013 (1.48)	-0.008 (0.78)
Woman	0.033 (1.14)	0.127 (4.23)***
Age	0.002 (1.44)	0.003 (3.00)***
N	1,943	2,145
Var(e)	0.392	0.463
Var(u)	0.075	0.039
VPC	16.05	7.76

Unstandardised b-coefficients, Z-values and P-values: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

#### 7.4 The Model’s Explanatory Power

One can calculate this models’ explanatory power by comparing this model to the intercept-only model (Hox 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk 2002), which calculate how much of the level-1 and level-2 variance is explained by independent variables which are included. These measurements are not unproblematic since some variables can offer a negative contribution to the explained variance. We use the following equation for level-1 (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:208):

$$R^2 = \frac{\text{var}(e)_b - \text{var}(e)_m}{\text{var}(e)_b}$$

$$\frac{0.408 - 0.392}{0.408} = 0,0392$$

Where  $\text{var}(e)_b$ , is the residual variance for the baseline model (see appendix C1), and  $\text{var}(e)_m$  is the level-1 variance for the final model. This will be separated for each country. First, Kenya shows an  $R^2$  which explains 3,92 per cent, in relation to baseline model, of the variance at the individual level is explained in model eight.

$$\frac{0.477 - 0.463}{0.477} = 0,0293$$

Second, Tanzania's  $R^2$  is calculated, which is lower than the previous value. Model eight explains 2,93 per cent of the variance at the individual level. Calculating how much variance the model explains for the regional level, or at level-2 comes next. Here the  $R^2$  is explained by the following equation (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:208):

$$R^2 = \frac{\text{var}(u_0)_b - \text{var}(u_0)_m}{\text{var}(u_0)_b}$$

The following calculations were made to find the variance at the regional level that are explained by model eight:

$$\frac{0.093 - 0.075}{0.093} = 0,1935$$

The variables included in model eight show an  $R^2$  at 19.35 per cent for Kenya. This percentage indicates that 19,35 of the total variance at the regional level is explained in model eight. The same calculations were made for Tanzania, showing an  $R^2$  of 0,093 which shows that model eight includes 9,3 per cent of the variance in relation to the baseline model. One can see large differences between the two countries here.

$$\frac{0.043 - 0.039}{0.043} = 0,0930$$

## 7.5 Robustness Checks

A central aim for this section is to strengthen the models which have been explored. By checking weaknesses in the models, one can precisely answer what the models can test and what they are insufficient to test. The first robustness test relates to multicollinearity, the second to the institutional trust scale, and lastly, a linktest is conducted to see if any central variables are omitted from the models.



Multicollinearity implies that variables measuring the same phenomenon should not be included in linear regression models. It is also problematic if coefficients are over 0.8 since this can be difficult to interpret, and the variable will steal explanatory power from each other. If there is a multicollinearity problem, it is best to remove the variable, or if possible, try to collapse the variables into a scale (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen 2017:146). By measuring the variance inflation factor (VIF), one can see if there is a problem with multicollinearity in the model. The values for Tanzania and Kenya did not show a problem with multicollinearity and are attached in appendix D2.

A limited scale for institutional trust is explored to see if excluding some of the variables from the institutional trust scale (see appendix D1 for results) can improve the random intercept models. It is essential to clarify that this limited scale is insufficient to research institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania since the institutions, such as police, is essential for perceived safety. Excluding this from the trust scale can provide more evident results, but it does not show the entire picture of how the government carry out safety and order in different regions. The limited trust scale also cuts off a central task of a functioning state by excluding the tax department. An intercept-only model was run with the limited trust scale variable (*limtrust*), which exclude the variables: trust in the Tax Department and trust in police. Both countries' VPC was increased by this limited trust scale (see appendix D1). Although these levels have increased, it does not mean that this limited trust scale is a better fit to measure institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. The original trust scale includes central factors that are important for researching these specific countries.<sup>81</sup> The limited trust scale did not change the results for hypothesis 1.

Based on the previous section's explanatory power, I want to test if there is any relevant variables that have been left out in the final random intercept model, or if some wrong forms of the variables have been included in the model. This is seen though a linktest, which gave significant results for Kenya and Tanzania, which detect that the model is missing some central variables, or the variables are not specified correctly. Based on these results I conducted Ramsey's (1969) regression specification error test. Significant results were gained for this test for both countries, which strengthens the assumption that I am missing some central explanatory variables from my model, or variables might be specified incorrectly.

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<sup>81</sup> Specifically, I want to test for central government tasks such as obtaining for order (police) and gathering taxes (tax department).

It is not surprising that these simplified models are expected to have other variables that can influence institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. For example, if I had a sufficient measure for camp settlement, and previous violence, this could have exceeded the results found in these tests. Adding other variables such as income and conflict could impact institutional trust. Additional variables will be further discussed in section 8.1.3.

## Chapter 8: Discussion

In exploring the main research question, this thesis did not find that refugee camps decrease institutional trust. However, this was expected based on previous research. The final model did identify other variables influencing institutional trust. A discussion on research limitations and strengths will be elaborated. In the table below an overview of the results for each of the hypotheses is presented.<sup>82</sup>

**Table 15: Results for the Hypotheses**

Hypotheses		Kenya			Tanzania		
		Relevant tables	Hypothesis supported	Significance levels /mean	Relevant tables	Hypothesis supported	Significance levels /mean
<i>H<sub>1</sub></i>	People in regions with refugee camps express lower institutional trust than people in regions with no refugee camps present.	10	No	>10%	10	No	>10%
<i>H<sub>2</sub></i>	Employed people have a stronger institutional trust than unemployed people in Kenya and Tanzania.	11	No	>10%	<b>11</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>&lt;0.05%</b>
		14	No	>10%	14	No	>10%
<i>H<sub>3a</sub></i>	People that are not feeling safe in their neighbourhoods show a lower level of institutional trust.	<b>12</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>
		<b>14</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>
<i>H<sub>3b</sub></i>	The negative association between insecurity and institutional trust is stronger in Kenya than Tanzania	<b>12</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>
		<b>14</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>
<i>H<sub>4a</sub></i>	People living in a rural area will have a higher institutional trust than people living in an urban area.	<b>13</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>
		<b>14</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>&lt;0.05%</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>&lt;0.05%</b>
<i>H<sub>4b</sub></i>	Tanzania will have higher levels of institutional trust for people living in rural areas in relation to urban areas than Kenya.	<b>13</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>
		<b>14</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>&lt;0.01%</b>
<i>H<sub>5</sub></i>	Institutional trust is higher in Tanzania compared to Kenya.	<b>5a</b>	<b>Yes</b>	Mean value: 1.560	<b>5b</b>	<b>Yes</b>	Mean value: 1.878

<sup>82</sup> The results in bold present statistically significant p-values.

## 8.1 Refugee Camps' Effect on Institutional Trust

No significant relationship between refugee camps and institutional trust were found. Despite this, many scholars have covered the difficulties of hosting refugees (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva 2016; Whitaker 2002; Bhagat 2020; Landau 2002). This first section connects the result for the main hypothesis,  $H_1$ , explaining why not any of the random intercept models did support this relationship. None of the models showed a significant association between refugee camps and institutional trust in either Kenya or Tanzania's case, although the models were conducted separately for each country and were tested using different measures of camp presence. One cause might be how this thesis has measured refugee camps, using a variable on the regional level. This measurement might be a too simplistic to provide sufficient effects on institutional trust.

In section 7.4, the  $R^2$  was used to measure model eight's explanatory power by comparing this model to the intercept-only model (Hox 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk 2002). The outcome showed that the final model for this analysis explained 3.92 per cent of Kenya's variance at the individual level and 2.93 per cent of Tanzania's variance at the individual level. Model eight also explained 19.35 per cent of Kenya's variance at the regional level, while  $R^2$  for Tanzania's case only explained 9.3 per cent of the regional variance. Based on these results, the variance situated at the regional level is better covered in this thesis' final model than the variance at the individual level. As pointed to in the previous section, it would be interesting to see if other explanatory variables could increase the  $R^2$  for institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania.

Living in a region with a refugee camp present was expected to affect citizen's institutional trust negatively, according to  $H_1$ . According to Whitaker (2002), host experiences differ (2002:339), and it is likely that in the different regions included in the multilevel analysis, some were better suited to tackle effects of refugees than others. An example is Kenya's tense relationship to hosting refugees, adapting a stricter refugee policy in more recent years (NRC 2019; Bhagat 2020:439). Another example is Tanzania's initiative to pull out from the CRRF-agreement (Rudolf 2019:208). Regional differences are likely in these two countries. They also differ in terms of where the refugee camps are located, they are more centralised in Kenya than in Tanzania.

On the other hand, one might also consider national tendencies. Kenya has a more robust economy than Tanzania, but still, their refugee policy is becoming stricter. It might be plausible for some refugee-hosting communities to be worse off after a refugee camp is established due

to limited resources, water, and health services. Such a connection was not studied in this thesis, but is based on insight from previous research, which could influence host communities (Baez in Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010:149). Limited resources can hurt institutional trust in some regions, since the public evaluates their national institutions' performance, and their ability to cope with challenges (Hutchison & Johnson 2011; Mishler & Rose 1997; Whitaker 2002).

Living in proximity to refugees from another country does not automatically make you more tolerant towards refugees (Homola & Tavits 2018:1790). When it comes to institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania, model eight showed different variables that were influential for the countries' trust levels. Even though Kenya and Tanzania are often characterised as similar and used in comparative studies, this thesis' results, looking at regional and individual levels within the country,<sup>83</sup> show different factors influencing institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. These two countries differ in their expressed institutional trust but experience large pressures from receiving refugees.

Having a within-country focus through the multilevel analysis was one way to see how hosting a large proportion of the refugees in Eastern Africa (Bhagat 2020; Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010) influence institutional trust. In addition, it showed how new sources of data, such as Geo-Refugee, can further improve refugee presence measurements used in research on refugee camp's effect on institutional trust in African countries.

Although hypothesis one was not supported in this study, it does not imply that refugee camps are unproblematic to host. The research of Jacobsen (2002) identifies several ways refugee presence can affect a host community in the African context. Some of these positive effects are international refugee assistance, which can better the living conditions for people living in near proximity to camps (2002:580). However, this is not always the case (Borjas 1987; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva 2016). Positive outcomes of refugee camps are highly dependent on what kind of context these are located in (2002:580). In order to research Kenya and Tanzania there is a need for a more complex model to identify the many different contexts for refugee camps.

For future research it is essential to factor in camp settlement patterns and ethnic composition. I see it as vital to keep research on institutional trust and refugee presence in the Global South focused on the different countries, regions, cities, or villages hosting refugees. Research on

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<sup>83</sup> In addition to conducting the analysis separately.

Kenya and Tanzania in this regard, should factor in the regional differences when it comes to refugee exposure. Utilising geo-coded data could have improved this further.

Refugee camps might be too isolated from the host communities to affect trust levels, although previous research contradicts this (Borjas 1987; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva 2016). Since no effects were found for this thesis, one can argue that this has something with settlement patterns and more general characterisations for this research. Either way, refugee camps are being shut down by the Kenyan government to control the harmful effects of hosting refugees. Tanzania restricted its refugee policy since they were not interested in using government spending on behalf of refugees (Anker 2018). Based on this thesis' results, the effects for institutional trust should not be a reason for closing refugee camps.

Further research on institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania is needed. As political trust is disappearing, it can destabilise a country, even if the country is transitioning into becoming a democracy. It can even revert this process and throw the country back into authoritarianism (Norris 1999 in Gouws & Schultz-Herzenberg 2016:7). If refugee camps do not affect institutional trust, state leaders should not worry that camps will affect citizens' trust levels. Since this thesis did not identify a significant effect here, further research needs to explore the consequences of hosting refugees on institutional trust in non-Western contexts (Letki 2018:337).

## **8.2 Research Limitations and Strengths**

To ensure the best measurement of institutional trust and refugee camps, the data and analysis were thoroughly described in chapter six. The multilevel analysis was kept separate for each country. In addition, the research design could only include one round of the Afrobarometer due to time limitations.<sup>84</sup> The number of refugee camps in Kenya and Tanzania influenced this thesis greatly. Kenya's two regions with camps were too few to gather significant results on camps' influence on institutional trust. Two regions, Garissa and Turkana, hosts many camps, but due to this thesis's regional focus, the number of regions with camps present was too low. These regions host many camps, only in the Dadaab refugee settlement four camps were present (Bhagat 2020:439).<sup>85</sup> In Tanzania's case, the five regions of Katavi, Kagera, Kigoma, Tabor, and Tanga did not show an effect on institutional trust. The number of regions was doubled,

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<sup>84</sup> Merging more than one round of the Afrobarometer with Geo-Refugee was not possible within the limited timeframe for a 30-credit score thesis. This would have been easier to gain access to if there were no delays from the Afrobarometer in delivering the geo-coded data.

<sup>85</sup> Which is home to about 463,422 refugees, making it the largest in the world according to Kumssa & Jones (2014:28).

but they still could not provide satisfactory results. Therefore, the number of regions influence the ability to see effects on institutional trust. However, the number of respondents from each of these countries was sufficient, but the level-2 variable, *refugee\_camp*, could not provide significant results. If this thesis would also have gained access to camp settlement data from Uganda, this could have shown a different picture. Until this is made available, looking at within-country levels are a challenge without using geo-coded data.<sup>86</sup>

A two-levelled multilevel analysis was selected for this thesis, which also limits the thesis. Gathering data at the regional level uncovered regional trends for institutional trust. In this regard, one needs to assess spatial dependency. Spatial dependency can cause artificially inflated degrees of freedom and increased likelihood for type I standard errors (Goodchild 2010:9).<sup>87</sup> It is likely that regions are influenced by cross-regional factors or factors located at the micro-level, where citizens' trust is shaped by, for example, factors at smaller units such as villages. The main reason for conducting a multilevel analysis with two levels was to identify individual trends and regional trends in Kenya and Tanzania. If the research had considered looking at neighbouring regions to refugee camps as well, this could have improved the research. But as stated in section 6.5 this was not seen as beneficial due to the settlement patterns for Kenya's specifically, and the merged regions in Tanzania.

A central strength for this thesis is its data sources which can find influential factors for institutional trust, showing significant results for institutional trust. Through the main research question, I localise central characteristics for Kenya and Tanzania: where camps are located and how many camps are present for the different regions. Utilising the Geo-Refugee dataset contributed to further research the effects of hosting refugees in the Global South. This is highly unexplored by the research field, and this thesis can gather opinion data for Kenya and Tanzania and identify influential factors for institutional trust. The research also maps out how future research on similar topics should be conducted. New data sources are available for non-Western countries, and this context must be explored further.

### **8.3 The Refugee Camp Measurement**

The regional refugee camp measurement did not provide satisfactory results for this thesis, but which improvements could have been made to better this measurement? This section examines

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<sup>86</sup> Using geo-coded data from Afrobarometer and Geo-Refugee could have provided the exact distance between a respondent and camps. This is the main area of improvement to provide better results, especially for future research on refugee camps effect on institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania.

<sup>87</sup> Rejection of the null hypothesis if it is true.

this question and comes with alternative suggestions to measure refugee camps. The *refugee\_camp* variable was a simplified measure of camp presence, which was seen as most beneficial since refugees were more isolated from the host community than people living in urban or rural settlements.

One question to discuss concerning the *refugee\_camp* variable is whether the effects of refugee camps can impact institutional trust. One can imagine these effects to be well established after 14 years. Suppose the theses focused explicitly on more recently established camps in areas where no camps have been present before. In that case, specific regions could have been handpicked and matched with relevant rounds of the Afrobarometer, measuring institutional trust before and after a camp appeared in a region. In addition, using a variable that also showed the number of camps present in each region would have been beneficial.

Some variables were excluded from this thesis' models. This includes variables measuring camp presence during the last year (*camp2014*) and the last three years (*camp3yr*), which were seen as too narrow for this study.<sup>88</sup> Another variable measuring neighbouring regions with refugee camps present were also excluded (see section 6.5). However, this measurement would be attractive for future research, especially using geo-coded data.

Controlling for areas with particularly low institutional trust, I also included the control variable *prevviol*. It was clear that this variable excluded all regions with camps present in Kenya's case. In hindsight, I want to mark that the regions included in this variable were too simplistic.<sup>89</sup> This control variable was excluded from the models. Lastly, I want to add that interactional effects could have been further explored if the number of level-2 variance was higher. This could explore relationships such as: if there is a camp present in the region and high unemployment, this could have led to institutional trust decreasing. Nevertheless, due to low level-2 variance, this would not give satisfactory results for this thesis.

#### **8.4 Research Design**

Kenya and Tanzania have, through this thesis, been investigated individually to see if refugee camps have any effect on institutional trust. As pointed to in the case chapter and the introduction, these two countries are selected based on their difference in refugee policy and their similarity in exposure to refugees. These countries are of interest because they represent

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<sup>88</sup> The results using these two camp variables are found in appendix C6 and C7.

<sup>89</sup> The additional regions covering the regions the boarder towards South-Sudan and Uganda, and in the case for Tanzania, also including the regions neighbouring towards the DRC and Uganda.



refugee-hosting nations under development, both economically and in terms of democratic development. Institutional trust has been argued as an important factor for these states for a sufficient and legitimate source of power. It was therefore important to treat these countries separately to see if the cases could contribute to different effects on institutional trust, which they did as seen by the thesis's results.

The research design was limited to two countries, focusing on researching within-country differences, taking the regional and individual level into account. This design did not focus on uncovering cross-country differences through its multilevel analysis; it looked at each country internally. An area of improvement would be to open the methodology to include geo-coded data. This thesis has an exploratory nature, operating within an area of limited research, looking at two East-African countries, but this research design could also be interesting to investigate in other refugee-hosting contexts.

### **8.5 Explanatory Factors for Institutional Trust in Kenya and Tanzania**

Additional variables could be influential for institutional trust. Some examples have already been mentioned regarding the ethnic composition of the host communities and the ethnicity of the refugees residing in the camps (Dinesen & Sønderskov 2015; Rüegger 2019; Whitaker 2002). Geo-Refugee did not provide this data, but Afrobarometer collects the ethnic groups of the respondents. Adding the ethnicity of the people living inside the camps to Geo-Refugee data could open for further research looking at ethnic tensions in the different regions. Due to time limitations, this was not added to this thesis' explanatory variables, but would be an area of improvement.

Certain explanatory variables showed effects for both countries. Feeling unsafe and living in rural areas was negatively associated with institutional trust, which contribute to answer the broader research objective looking at general effects for institutional trust. Kenya and Tanzania differ in how they trust their institutions (Uddhammar 2011:1184). Institutional trust is stronger for Tanzania in comparison to Kenya, supporting hypothesis five: *Institutional trust is higher in Tanzania compared to Kenya* (see Table 5). Different results were found for the two countries related to the variables *woman* and *age*. In Tanzania this had a significant positive effect for institutional trust, but these effects were not found for Kenya.

The safety variable showed a strong positive association for institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania. This is in accordance with previous research from Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch (2019), stressing the importance of the state managing security consequences of hosting refugee

populations in developing countries (2019:73). A separate model was created to see the VPC without the safety variable present to check this relationship. In appendix C5, one can see the results for Kenya and Tanzania, where the VPC increases substantially in Kenya's case from 16.05 to 18.75 per cent. Tanzania sees a decrease in VPC from 7.76 to 7.32. Indicating that the level of safety varies in Kenya's different regions, and Tanzania shows a lower variation regionally. Consequently, regional differences are central in discussing how institutional trust is being effected by safety in Kenya, specifically, but also in Tanzania's case. Endogenous relationships might be present for this variable and explain why this effect is strong for institutional trust in model eight.

This thesis is conducted in an area of limited previous research. Based on this, the thesis only explored limited explanatory variables in this paper. There are many interesting variables to further explain the relationship between refugee camps and institutional trust levels in these two countries. One suggestion for future research is to include a variable measuring degree of threat in the included regions, especially for Kenya's case. This would be of interest, especially since there is a lot of literature on how refugees connect to threat levels (Jacobsen 2002; Ghosn et al. 2019).<sup>90</sup> Threat is clearly one driver in Kenya's response to shut down certain refugee camps (Bhagat 2020:439).

Significant negative associations for institutional trust were found for the rural variable for both countries. As Bhagat (2020) notes, Nairobi has been characterised as a hot-spot for urban refugees (2020:439-440). Based on this core finding, citizens residing in a rural area have lower institutional trust than people in urban areas. However, previous research pointed to institutional trust being negatively affected by refugees in urban areas than rural ones (Alix-Garcia & Saah 2010:148). This would be interesting to further research using geo-coded data, pinpointing the exact distance between a respondent and a refugee camp.

This thesis only has a limited number of explanatory variables present in the models. The variables *age* and *woman* showed a positive association for institutional trust in Tanzania. In Kenya, these variables did not provide sufficient results for institutional trust. The robustness check showed that the model was missing some variables, or the specification of the variables was insignificant. Some variables could have improved the model. For example, how income and social class could affect institutional trust for people living in a region with camps present

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<sup>90</sup> In Jacobsen (2002) the presence of refugees is seen as a challenge for states to: "[...] control borders and manage security threats (2002:588).

would be interesting to research more. The element of previous conflict or ongoing conflict would be beneficial for the analysis. Adding an explanatory variable measuring the level of civil liberties<sup>91</sup> would also be interesting to explain institutional trust levels, especially since these would relate to the host communities' ability to tackle increased pressures from camp settlements.

Based on the change in refugee policy in Kenya and Tanzania, there seems to be a negative effect of housing refugees present in both countries. From an alternative perspective, these countries receive a large number of refugees due to their proximity to refugee-producing areas. Kenya and Tanzania's strategy to restrict refugee's rights is a sign that these countries are struggling to host refugees, at the same time as domestic policies are pressuring them to act. Being able to host a large number of refugees is demanding, and when Tanzania pulled out of the CRRF-agreement, it was because they could not ignore other domestic issues which was demanding to handle (Rudolf 2019:208).

### **8.6 Suggestions for Future Research**

This thesis, conducted in a limited area of research, uses newly updated data from a non-Western context to investigate institutional trust levels. Future research should also focus on describing the effects of camp settlements since many different areas in the Global South host refugees. It is in the vulnerable hosting communities that research can contribute to creating positive changes. International migration will increase in the years to come (UNHCR 2019a), and if research continues to focus on the non-Western Hemisphere, the best solutions to handle this increased migration will not be covered.

If refugee-hosting countries stop housing refugees, where are all these refugees supposed to be settled? The Western countries host only a small proportion of the world's refugees and have a strong state capacity to absorb the hosting effects (Alrababa'h et al. 2021:33). International migration has never been higher, and a question for future research is when will these major refugee-hosting countries have reached their limit? This question is central for future research to explore.

### **8.7 Summary**

In sum, this thesis shows that researching institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania should take regional differences into account since they can explain contextual factors which individual-

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<sup>91</sup> Civil liberties are often used in research on the status for developing countries' democratisation process (see Fukuyama 2001; Newton 2001).

level analysis cannot. The thesis rejects that institutional trust will decrease due to a refugee camps' presence. It further identifies explanatory variables that are influential for institutional trust, which was a secondary research objective due to little focus on institutional trust in this context. The two refugee-hosting countries differ when it comes to camp settlement patterns. In Kenya, most of the refugees are hosted in fewer and larger camps affecting fewer regions. Tanzania has a higher number of refugee camps, which are more spread across different regions. This thesis could not produce significant results for this relationship. However, it shows how recently published data can be of use for future research. Utilising the Geo-Refugee dataset will contribute to explore further the effects of hosting refugees in the Global South.

## Chapter 9: Conclusion

This thesis has answered the main research question: *how is institutional trust affected by refugee camps in different regions in Kenya and Tanzania?* A central argument for this thesis is the overrepresentation of Western-focused studies considering the small portion of the total amounts of migrants they receive on a global scale. By limiting this thesis to focusing on two East-African countries, I have illustrated how one can utilize newly updated data to explore influences for institutional trust in countries that need attention from different research communities. Research on the effects of migration on public attitudes is highly relevant. Although this is an international trend, it is evident that most of this literature focuses on developed countries, which have relatively fewer migrants and a higher capacity to absorb them (Alrababa'h et al. 2021:33). This claim is also supported by Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch (2019), stressing the importance of the state managing security consequences of hosting refugee populations in developing countries (2019:73). This is the gap which this research aims to fill, although this thesis does not identify it as an influential factor for institutional trust. However, the thesis unveiled important factors for institutional trust in Kenya and Tanzania, including where citizens live and their level of security.



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# Appendix

## Appendix A: Separate Factor Analysis for Kenya and Tanzania

**Table A1: Factor Analysis for Kenya:**

(obs=1,954)  
 Factor analysis/correlation                      Number of obs = 1,954  
     Method: principal factors                      Retained factors = 1  
     Rotation: (unrotated)                      Number of params = 7

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.980	2.746	1.080	1.080
Factor2	0.234	0.197	0.085	1.165
Factor3	0.037	0.053	0.013	1.179
Factor4	-0.016	0.092	-0.006	1.173
Factor5	-0.108	0.065	-0.039	1.134
Factor6	-0.173	0.024	-0.063	1.071
Factor7	-0.196	.	-0.071	1.000

LR test: independent vs. saturated:  $\chi^2(21) = 4577.84$  Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$   
 Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
President	0.705	0.503
Parliament	0.709	0.497
Elec. Com.	0.723	0.477
Tax Dep.	0.642	0.587
Local Council.	0.585	0.658
Police	0.535	0.714
Courts of Law	0.646	0.582

**Table A2: Factor Analysis for Tanzania:**


(obs=2,154)  
 Factor analysis/correlation                      Number of obs = 2,154  
     Method: principal factors                      Retained factors = 1  
     Rotation: (unrotated)                      Number of params = 7

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.697	3.449	1.047	1.047
Factor2	0.248	0.208	0.070	1.117
Factor3	0.040	0.075	0.011	1.128
Factor4	-0.036	0.063	-0.010	1.118
Factor5	-0.099	0.051	-0.028	1.090
Factor6	-0.150	0.017	-0.043	1.047
Factor7	-0.167	.	-0.047	1.000

LR test: independent vs. saturated:  $\chi^2(21) = 7362.32$  Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$   
 Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
President	0.713	0.491
Parliament	0.758	0.425
Elec. Com.	0.811	0.342
Tax Dep.	0.766	0.414
Local Council.	0.709	0.497
Police	0.638	0.593
Courts of Law	0.677	0.541

Figure A3: “Normalfordeling” for institutional trust scale



## Appendix B: Additional descriptive statistics of independent variables

### B1: Descriptive Statistics of Level-2 Independent variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
refugee camp	4783	.115	.319	0	1
camp5yr	4783	.143	.546	0	5
prevviol	4783	.007	.082	0	1

### B2: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Level-1 Independent Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
safety	4780	.343	.475	0	1
education	4782	3.517	1.804	0	9
age	4762	37.234	13.883	18	99
demsat	3784	2.734	.855	0	4

### B3: Tabulation of employed

employment status	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	1654	34.62	34.62
1	3124	65.38	100.00
Total	4778	100.00	

### B4: Tabulation of rural

urban/rural sampling unit	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	3075	64.29	64.29
1	1708	35.71	100.00
Total	4783	100.00	

### B5: Tabulation of woman

gender of respondent	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	2395	50.07	50.07
1	2388	49.93	100.00
Total	4783	100.00	

### B6: Summary statistics: campcount

cuntry	mean	sd
Kenya	1.556	1.7
United Rep. of Tanzania	2.507	2.671

## Appendix C: Random Intercept models

### C1a: Empty random intercept model for Kenya

Mixed-effects ML regression  
 Group variable: regionkt

Number of obs = 1,954  
 Number of groups = 47

Obs per group:  
 min = 1  
 avg = 41.6  
 max = 212

Wald chi2(0) = .  
 Prob > chi2 = .

Log likelihood = -1946.1984

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	1.564458	.0483971	32.33	0.000	1.469601	1.659314

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity var(_cons)	.0929186	.0220539	.0583544	.1479558
var(Residual)	.4077589	.0131959	.3826987	.4344602

LR test vs. linear model:  $\text{chibar2}(01) = 301.87$  Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000

### C1b: Empty random intercept model for Tanzania

Mixed-effects ML regression  
 Group variable: regionkt

Number of obs = 2,154  
 Number of groups = 29

Obs per group:  
 min = 23  
 avg = 74.3  
 max = 255

Wald chi2(0) = .  
 Prob > chi2 = .

Log likelihood = -2287.0818

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	1.873163	.0417456	44.87	0.000	1.791344	1.954983

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity var(_cons)	.0426788	.0135274	.0229307	.0794342
var(Residual)	.4769013	.0146345	.4490638	.5064645

LR test vs. linear model:  $\text{chibar2}(01) = 106.89$  Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000





### C3a: Model III: Random Intercept for Kenya with weights

Mixed-effects regression  
 Group variable: regionkt  
 Number of obs = 1,943  
 Number of groups = 47  
 Obs per group:  
     min = 1  
     avg = 41.3  
     max = 210  
 Wald chi2(7) = 56.53  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Log pseudolikelihood = -1913.3557  
 (Std. Err. adjusted for 47 clusters in regionkt)

insttrust	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
refugee_camp	.2104445	.1027465	2.05	0.041	.009065	.411824
employment	-.01702	.0236003	-0.72	0.471	-.0632757	.0292358
safety	-.2405216	.0457708	-5.25	0.000	-.3302307	-.1508124
rural	-.0798105	.0308136	-2.59	0.010	-.1402041	-.019417
education	-.0100587	.0092325	-1.09	0.276	-.0281541	.0080367
woman	.0206826	.0280484	0.74	0.461	-.0342912	.0756564
age	.0015972	.0011739	1.36	0.174	-.0007035	.003898
_cons	1.673569	.0935121	17.90	0.000	1.490289	1.856849

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Robust Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.075619	.0136111	.0531397	.1076078
var(Residual)	.3944132	.0275802	.3438977	.452349

### C3b: Model III: Random Intercept for Tanzania with weights

Mixed-effects ML regression  
 Group variable: regionkt  
 Number of obs = 2,145  
 Number of groups = 29  
 Obs per group:  
     min = 23  
     avg = 74.0  
     max = 253  
 Wald chi2(7) = 60.30  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Log likelihood = -2247.4114

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
refugee_camp	.1164002	.1051248	1.11	0.268	-.0896406	.322441
employment	-.0317115	.0210976	-1.50	0.133	-.0730622	.0096391
safety	-.1648519	.0378373	-4.36	0.000	-.2390117	-.0906921
rural	-.0899675	.0381299	-2.36	0.018	-.1647008	-.0152342
education	-.008149	.0103835	-0.78	0.433	-.0285004	.0122023
woman	.1270548	.0300572	4.23	0.000	.0681437	.1859659
age	.0033062	.0011006	3.00	0.003	.001149	.0054634
_cons	1.774246	.0809773	21.91	0.000	1.615533	1.932959

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0393111	.0127644	.0208031	.0742854
var(Residual)	.4639578	.0142706	.4368143	.492788

LR test vs. linear model:  $\chi^2(01) = 84.29$       Prob >=  $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

### C4a: Model IV: Random Intercept for Kenya with weights

Mixed-effects ML regression  
 Group variable: regionkt  
 Number of obs = 1,943  
 Number of groups = 47  
 Obs per group:  
     min = 1  
     avg = 41.3  
     max = 210  
 Wald chi2(7) = 82.93  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Log likelihood = -1894.0872

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
camp5yr	.0205211	.0626804	0.33	0.743	-.1023302	.1433724
employment	-.0193583	.0199288	-0.97	0.331	-.058418	.0197014
safety	-.2418875	.03042	-7.95	0.000	-.3015097	-.1822654
rural	-.0806215	.037184	-2.17	0.030	-.1535009	-.0077422
education	-.0134352	.0087861	-1.53	0.126	-.0306557	.0037852
woman	.0327657	.0292097	1.12	0.262	-.0244842	.0900157
age	.0016794	.0011876	1.41	0.157	-.0006482	.004007
_cons	1.686979	.0810484	20.81	0.000	1.528127	1.845831

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0763248	.0186588	.047269	.1232409
var(Residual)	.3920128	.0127251	.3678489	.4177641

LR test vs. linear model:  $\chi^2(01) = 228.66$       Prob >=  $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

### C4b: Model IV: Random Intercept for Tanzania with weights

Mixed-effects regression  
 Group variable: regionkt  
 Number of obs = 2,145  
 Number of groups = 29  
 Obs per group:  
     min = 23  
     avg = 74.0  
     max = 253  
 Wald chi2(7) = 53.90  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Log pseudolikelihood = -2156.6892

(Std. Err. adjusted for 29 clusters in regionkt)

insttrust	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
camp5yr	.0116283	.0651023	0.18	0.858	-.11597	.1392265
employment	-.0055178	.0375273	-0.15	0.883	-.0790701	.0680344
safety	-.1584821	.0534636	-2.96	0.003	-.2632689	-.0536954
rural	-.1011037	.0272615	-3.71	0.000	-.1545352	-.0476722
education	-.0091592	.0111493	-0.82	0.411	-.0310114	.0126929
woman	.1183053	.0315631	3.75	0.000	.0564427	.1801678
age	.002414	.0010824	2.23	0.026	.0002926	.0045354
_cons	1.826557	.0825251	22.13	0.000	1.664811	1.988303

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Robust Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0356562	.0090818	.0216436	.058741
var(Residual)	.4251185	.0248704	.3790642	.4767682

### C5a: Random-Intercept Model without the Safety Variable for Kenya

insttrust	refugee_camp	0.199 (0.83)
	employment	-0.022 (1.10)
	rural	-0.104 (2.77)***
	education	-0.015 (1.70)*
	woman	0.026 (0.88)
	age	0.002 (1.34)
	_cons	1.589 (18.95)***
	lns1_1_1	_cons
lnsig_e	_cons	-0.454 (28.01)***
N		1,944
Var(e)		0.403
Var(u)		0.093
VPC		18.75
R <sup>2</sup>		

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

### C5b: Random-Intercept Model without the Safety Variable for Tanzania

insttrust	refugee_camp	0.112 (1.09)
	employment	-0.038 (1.80)*
	rural	-0.096 (2.51)**
	education	-0.010 (0.97)
	woman	0.124 (4.10)***
	age	0.003 (2.98)***
	_cons	1.763 (21.84)***
	lns1_1_1	_cons
lnsig_e	_cons	-0.379 (24.67)***
N		2,146
Var(e)		0.468
Var(u)		0.037
VPC		7.32
R <sup>2</sup>		

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

### C6a: Alternative measurement of camp presence, Camp3yr, Kenya

Mixed-effects ML regression  
 Group variable: regionkt  
 Number of obs = 1,943  
 Number of groups = 47  
 Obs per group:  
     min = 1  
     avg = 41.3  
     max = 210  
 Wald chi2(7) = 82.92  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Log likelihood = -1894.0932

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
camp3yr	.0176257	.0571787	0.31	0.758	-.0944424	.1296938
employment	-.0193483	.0199287	-0.97	0.332	-.0584078	.0197112
safety	-.2418926	.0304204	-7.95	0.000	-.3015156	-.1822697
rural	-.080613	.0371842	-2.17	0.030	-.1534928	-.0077333
education	-.0134466	.0087857	-1.53	0.126	-.0306662	.003773
woman	.0327532	.0292096	1.12	0.262	-.0244965	.0900029
age	.0016787	.0011876	1.41	0.157	-.0006489	.0040063
_cons	1.687219	.0810326	20.82	0.000	1.528399	1.84604

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0763496	.0186637	.0472857	.1232775
var(Residual)	.3920128	.0127251	.3678488	.417764

LR test vs. linear model:  $\chi^2(01) = 228.75$       Prob >=  $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

### C6b: Alternative measurement of camp presence, Camp3yr, Tanzania

Mixed-effects ML regression  
 Group variable: regionkt  
 Number of obs = 2,145  
 Number of groups = 29  
 Obs per group:  
     min = 23  
     avg = 74.0  
     max = 253  
 Wald chi2(7) = 59.09  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Log likelihood = -2247.996

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
camp3yr	.01641	.0886783	0.19	0.853	-.1573963	.1902162
employment	-.0320484	.0211035	-1.52	0.129	-.0734105	.0093137
safety	-.1647528	.0378423	-4.35	0.000	-.2389223	-.0905833
rural	-.0906861	.0381471	-2.38	0.017	-.165453	-.0159191
education	-.0085155	.0103823	-0.82	0.412	-.0288643	.0118334
woman	.1268923	.0300575	4.22	0.000	.0679806	.1858039
age	.003292	.0011009	2.99	0.003	.0011343	.0054497
_cons	1.794265	.0805371	22.28	0.000	1.636415	1.952115

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0412306	.0132921	.0219182	.0775594
var(Residual)	.4639596	.0142707	.4368158	.49279

LR test vs. linear model:  $\chi^2(01) = 88.63$       Prob >=  $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

## C7a: Alternative measurement of camp presence, Camp2014, Kenya

Mixed-effects ML regression  
 Group variable: regionkt

Number of obs = 1,943  
 Number of groups = 47

Obs per group:  
 min = 1  
 avg = 41.3  
 max = 210

Log likelihood = -1893.9198

Wald chi2(7) = 83.33  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
camp2014	.1180338	.1771811	0.67	0.505	-.2292348	.4653023
employment	-.0194537	.0199267	-0.98	0.329	-.0585093	.0196019
safety	-.2422796	.0304097	-7.97	0.000	-.3018815	-.1826778
rural	-.0820008	.0372511	-2.20	0.028	-.1550116	-.0089899
education	-.0132513	.0087879	-1.51	0.132	-.0304752	.0039726
woman	.0329611	.0292097	1.13	0.259	-.0242888	.090211
age	.0016977	.0011879	1.43	0.153	-.0006306	.004026
_cons	1.68074	.0816069	20.60	0.000	1.520794	1.840687

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0757207	.0185205	.0468834	.1222953
var(Residual)	.3920073	.0127247	.3678441	.4177579

LR test vs. linear model:  $\text{chibar2}(01) = 229.30$  Prob >=  $\text{chibar2} = 0.0000$

## C7b: Alternative measurement of camp presence, Camp2014, Tanzania

Mixed-effects ML regression  
 Group variable: regionkt

Number of obs = 2,145  
 Number of groups = 29

Obs per group:  
 min = 23  
 avg = 74.0  
 max = 253

Log likelihood = -2247.874

Wald chi2(7) = 59.33  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
camp2014	.0561607	.1063042	0.53	0.597	-.1521917	.2645131
employment	-.0318375	.0211065	-1.51	0.131	-.0732055	.0095305
safety	-.1651247	.0378502	-4.36	0.000	-.2393097	-.0909396
rural	-.0917459	.0381773	-2.40	0.016	-.166572	-.0169198
education	-.0084716	.0103773	-0.82	0.414	-.0288108	.0118677
woman	.1269684	.0300574	4.22	0.000	.0680569	.1858798
age	.0033003	.0011009	3.00	0.003	.0011426	.0054579
_cons	1.786672	.0811087	22.03	0.000	1.627702	1.945642

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0408713	.0131817	.0217216	.0769033
var(Residual)	.463953	.0142703	.43681	.4927826

LR test vs. linear model:  $\text{chibar2}(01) = 87.92$  Prob >=  $\text{chibar2} = 0.0000$

## Appendix D: Robustness Checks

### Table D1a: Limited Scale for Institutional Trust for Kenya

Mixed-effects ML regression	Number of obs	=	2,114
Group variable: regionkt	Number of groups	=	47
	Obs per group:		
	min	=	5
	avg	=	45.0
	max	=	226
Log likelihood = -2206.4189	Wald chi2(0)	=	.
	Prob > chi2	=	.

limtrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	1.647289	.0519318	31.72	0.000	1.545504	1.749073

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.1104664	.0254866	.0702818	.1736272
var(Residual)	.448767	.0139514	.4222391	.4769616

LR test vs. linear model: **chibar2(01) = 366.55**      Prob >= chibar2 = **0.0000**

### Table D1b: Limited Scale for Institutional Trust for Tanzania

Mixed-effects ML regression	Number of obs	=	2,214
Group variable: regionkt	Number of groups	=	29
	Obs per group:		
	min	=	24
	avg	=	76.3
	max	=	259
Log likelihood = -2391.8972	Wald chi2(0)	=	.
	Prob > chi2	=	.

limtrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	1.941897	.0458641	42.34	0.000	1.852005	2.031789

Random-effects Parameters	Estimate	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
regionkt: Identity				
var(_cons)	.0530134	.0163599	.0289537	.0970658
var(Residual)	.4941356	.014954	.4656786	.5243317

LR test vs. linear model: **chibar2(01) = 131.37**      Prob >= chibar2 = **0.0000**

### D2a: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for Kenya

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
education	1.19	0.842043
age	1.10	0.907615
rural	1.09	0.913755
woman	1.04	0.957669
refugee_camp	1.04	0.958804
safety	1.02	0.977024
employment	1.01	0.988825
Mean VIF	1.07	

### D2b: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for Tanzania

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
education	1.23	0.813196
rural	1.15	0.866530
age	1.09	0.918306
refugee_camp	1.05	0.956540
woman	1.04	0.963396
safety	1.02	0.983872
employment	1.01	0.985403
Mean VIF	1.08	

### D3a: Linktest for Kenya

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,943
Model	76.729251	2	38.3646255	F(2, 1940)	=	83.19
Residual	894.613953	1,940	.461141213	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.0790
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0780
Total	971.343204	1,942	.500176727	Root MSE	=	.67907

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_hat	5.160763	2.021405	2.55	0.011	1.196409	9.125117
_hatsq	-1.336248	.6486931	-2.06	0.040	-2.608457	-.0640389
_cons	-3.187481	1.552304	-2.05	0.040	-6.23184	-.1431215

### D3b: Linktest for Tanzania

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	2,145
Model	42.0068629	2	21.0034314	F(2, 2142)	=	42.45
Residual	1059.84248	2,142	.494791072	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.0381
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0372
Total	1101.84934	2,144	.513922266	Root MSE	=	.70341

insttrust	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_hat	5.503655	2.218099	2.48	0.013	1.153803	9.853507
_hatsq	-1.209827	.5951027	-2.03	0.042	-2.376866	-.0427878
_cons	-4.168408	2.061077	-2.02	0.043	-8.210329	-.1264864

