Øystein S. Christie

The Eagle or the Dragon?

An Examination of How 53 Small and Medium Powers Stand in the Tug-of-War Between the United States and China

Master's thesis in Political Science
Supervisor: Jo Jakobsen
October 2020

Master's thesis

Picture by Eivin Floer.

NTNU
Norwegian University of
Science and Technology

Øystein S. Christie

The Eagle or the Dragon?

An Examination of How 53 Small and Medium Powers Stand in the Tug-of-War Between the United States and China

Master's thesis in Political Science
Supervisor: Jo Jakobsen
October 2020

Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences
Department of Sociology and Political Science

Acknowledgements

Sammendrag:

Rivaliseringen mellom Kina og USA intensiveres stadig, og de to er fanget i en tautrekkingskonkurranse over støtte fra resten av verden. I denne avhandlingen spør jeg om hvilke faktorer som påvirker hvordan små og mellomstore makter posisjonerer seg i denne kampen. Videre vil jeg finne ut hva som foregår i dagens globale arena med tanke på balansering og *'bandwagoning'*. Jeg bruker 53 staters holdninger til Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), og Huaweis rolle i 5G som empirisk grunnlag, og utleder tre hypoteser fra veletablerte teorier innen politisk realisme. En, med grunn i Walt (1987) foreslår jeg at å oppfatte sterk trussel fra Kina gjør stater betydelig mer aksepterende *eller* mer avvisende til de tre initiativene og institusjonene, avhengig av trusselen og statens natur. To, med grunn i 'patron-client' teori (se Carney 1989) foreslår jeg at det å ha sikkerhetsbånd til USA gjør stater betydelig mer avvisende til de tre. Tre, med grunn i Hirschman (1945 [1980]) foreslår jeg at det å ha sterkere økonomiske relasjoner til Kina enn til USA gjør stater mer aksepterende til de tre – og motsatt. Ved å bruke metodene bivariat korrelasjonsanalyse, case-studier, og multivariat regresjonsanalyse finner jeg bevis for at alle de tre teoretiske dimensjonene er innflytelsesrike og nødvendige for å forstå staters holdninger til Kina. Fire av effektene jeg finner er spesielt sterke, og jeg tolker dem på følgende måte: stater som blir dverger i forhold til Kinas makt har en tendens til å *'bandwagon'* med dem; stater som har traktatsallianser med USA har en tendens til å balansere mot Kina, og stater med frihandelsavtaler med Kina eller USA har en tendens til å henholdsvis 'bandwagon' med eller balansere mot Beijing. Case-studiene illustrerer at dette kun er generelle trender, og at det alltid finnes alternative tolkninger. Mot slutten diskuterer jeg noen av dagens trender og kommenterer framtiden til denne rivaliseringen.

Nøkkelord: Kina, USA, små og mellomstore makter, balansering, *'bandwagoning'*, AIIB, BRI, Huawei, 5G.

Abstract:

The rivalry between China and the US keeps intensifying, and they are entrenched in a tug-of-war over the world's support. In this thesis, I pose the question of which factors influence how small and medium powers position themselves in this struggle. By extension, I also seek to establish what is happening in today's global arena in terms of balancing and bandwagoning. Taking 53 states' stances on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Huawei's role in 5G as empirical vantage points, I derive three hypotheses from well-established branches of realism. First, deriving from Walt (1987), I suggest that perceiving a strong threat from China will make states markedly more acceptive *or* rejective of the three initiatives and institutions, depending on the nature of the threat and the state itself. Second, deriving from the patron-client theory of international relations (e.g. Carney 1989), I suggest that having the US as a patron makes states more rejective of the three. Third, deriving from Hirschman (1945 [1980]), I suggest that having closer economic ties with China than with the US will make states more acceptive of the three – and vice-versa. Using a mixed-methods approach of bivariate correlation-analysis, case studies, and multivariate regression analysis, I find evidence that all three theoretical dimensions are influential and necessary to understand states' stances on China. Four of the effects I find are particularly strong, and I interpret them in the following ways: those states most dwarfed by China's power tend to bandwagon with it; states in treaty alliances with the US tend to balance against China, and states with free trade agreements with China or with the US tend to bandwagon with it or balance against it, respectively. The case studies illustrate that these are only general trends, and that there are always alternative interpretations. Towards the end, I discuss some current trends and comment on the future of this rivalry.

Keywords: China, the United States, small and medium powers, balancing, bandwagoning, AIIB, BRI, Huawei, 5G.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

1 INTRODUCTION

There are 193 countries in the world. Two of them are America and China. It would be a safe bet to say that the remaining 191 countries are beginning to prepare actively for the roller-coaster global environment that has been and will continue to be generated by the growing geopolitical contest between America and China.

-Mahbubani 2020a: 211.

The relationship between the two most powerful countries in the world is deteriorating rapidly. We see new signs of this consistently, as US President Donald Trump and his administration keep picking fights with pretty much everything that might add to China's influence. His infamous trade war with China is just one example. The newest example came in early August, when it was reported that Trump is planning to ban the Chinese-owned video app *TikTok* from the US (Wong and Hautala 2020). Trump's administration, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in particular, keeps using harsh language against the Chinese that one commentator recently called "extremist, simplistic and dangerous" (Sachs 2020).

Under Trump, the US has arguably abandoned any pretense of engagement of China, instead pursuing a policy of strategic competition and even Kennan-like containment[1] (e.g. Campbell and Sullivan 2019; Small 2019). Yet, the anti-Chinese sentiment in the US is far from exclusive to Trump; while he has divided the US on most issues, he has actually managed to gather broad bipartisan support in Washington that China is now a great threat to the US and to the world (e.g. Browne 2017; Walt 2020). The ongoing pandemic has only made things worse. "Over the course of the novel coronavirus crisis, analysts have watched relations between the United States and China spiral to a historic nadir, with scant hope of recovery" (Campbell and Rapp-Hooper 2020). By many indicators, then, a clash between the United States and China may be nearing.

For most US-Americans, as well as for many Westerners, it seems to be a no-brainer that the US would be backed by almost the entire world in a potential showdown. Only a handful of states, notably Russia, Iran, North Korea, perhaps Pakistan, and maybe some developing states would likely join forces with China, and even these are far from certainties (e.g. Lin 2020). The rest would stand with the US, tipping the scales decisively in favor of the West. And when the US asks states to turn their back on Chinese initiatives and institutions, they will obey. *Of course they will*. Walt (1987: 282), for example, holds that "the world's most important

---

[1] In 1947, the US-American diplomat George Kennan argued that the Soviet Union was inherently expansionist and had to be contained. His text inspired the Truman Doctrine.

countries are strongly disposed to ally with the United States," and that "it can count on widespread support from a set of valuable allies when truly serious threats emerge."

In today's world, however, the answer is likely to be far more complex than this. When I interviewed renowned Norwegian diplomat and politician Erik Solheim, he told me: "It has become clear to me that Trump is trying to start a new Cold War with China. Luckily, it's far from certain that he'll succeed with this strategy" (see Appendix D, or Solheim 2020). This time, as opposed to what was the case during the actual Cold War, when states had to make definite choices between the two, it is more of an open question where the world will stand in the tug-of-war between the US and China.

This is arguably the most important theme of twenty-first century international politics. Since the turn of the millennium, a virtually endless list of scholars and commentators have written and said things about the two powers, their distinctiveness, and the future of their bilateral relationship[2], but less has so far been said and written about which side the rest of the world would stand on in an imagined showdown between the two. That is the novelty of this thesis.

There is a second main aspect as to the relevance and importance of this thesis. The literature on alliances, how and why they are formed and how they function, is enormous.[3] Yet, several scholars have argued that the literature on alliances is in no way unified.[4] In his examination of some 270 articles and books on alliance dynamics, Ward (1982: 5) finds that the overall literature on alliances is very divergent, and not particularly cumulative. Also, few if any have applied this literature directly to today's intensifying US-China rivalry. This thesis will attempt to gather several scholarly works on alliances, and to apply them to this issue.

More specifically, my approach in this thesis is inspired by Stephen M. Walt's *Origins of Alliances* (1987). Posing the question of what makes states seek allies, he deduces five main hypotheses from the existing literature. He then uses a relatively large dataset of alliances in the Middle East to assess the validity of each hypothesis. I do much of the same. Yet, crucially, Walt's study is from a completely different time period, as well as from a limited geographical

---

[2] See Friedberg 2011, 2018; Christensen 2015; Allison 2017; Etzioni 2017; Mahbubani 2020a, 2020b, for general discussion of the US-China relationship. See Johnston 1995; Kang 2007, 2010; Jacques 2009; Kissinger 2011 for discussions on the unique nature of the Chinese state. Also, see Huntington 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 2008, 2016; Brands 2016 for discussions of the US's impressive preeminence and endurance in the face of challenges.

[3] See Morgenthau 1948; Liska 1962, 1978; Rothstein 1968; Schroeder 1972 for some general accounts of individual alliances between states and their realistic objectives. See also Riker 1962; Schelling 1966 [2008]; Snyder 1984 for takes on the aspect of game theory in alliances.

[4] See Holsti et.al. 1973; Bueno de Mesquita and Singer 1973; Burgess and Moore 1973; Aggarwal and Kapoor 2018 for assessments of the various gaps in the existing literature on international alliances.

area. His results are therefore unfitting for the specific questions I pose, and I have to develop new models, modify the questions and the hypotheses, and carry out a new analysis.

1.1 Two Attractive Choices

Today, the US's attractiveness as a partner is obvious; it remains the most powerful country in the world, in both economic and military terms. Numerous scholars stress the continued primacy and centrality of the US in the world. Gates (2020), for example, maintains that US leadership will be absolutely essential in the face of today's many global challenges. The most obvious source of attraction for the US is as a security partner; in crucial ways, the US security presence remains vital in large parts of the world. For example, as Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (2020) points out, without the US, "Japan and South Korea would be compelled to contemplate developing nuclear weapons," surrounded as they are by potentially hostile nuclear powers. In Southeast Asia, "the U.S. Seventh Fleet has contributed to regional security since World War 2, ensuring that sea lines of communication remain safe and open, which has enabled trade and stimulated economic growth."

There are numerous similar examples of how the US's presence still has enormous influence across the world. And despite "its increasing military strength, China would be unable to take over the United States' security role" (ibid.). Yes, the US has done *a lot* of dubious things over the years; Chomsky (e.g. 2016, 2017), for example, regularly calls the US the world's leading terrorist state.[5] Still, there is no denying that for a large majority of the world's leaders, the US is *the* centerpiece on the world stage.

That said, one cannot and should not overlook China's considerable attractiveness as a partner, either. Since Deng Xiaoping began the process of opening in 1979, China has grown to become a highly respected power and a desirable partner. China's "Charm Offensive", as Kurlantzick (2007) labels it, which has been going on since the early 2000s, includes a catalogue of diplomatic, economic, cultural and military tools, all with the same usage; bolstering the perception of China as a benign and lucrative partner to all who want to be associated with it. The charm offensive has generally been quite successful, opening the world's eyes to China's ways. An important arena for the offensive is made evident by Freedom House's (2019) reports that democracy is in serious decay all over the world, a trend that has been growing in momentum for 15 years. In the vacuum left by the receding Western-styled liberal

---

[5] See also Beckley (2020), who argues that the US is a "rogue superpower" and warns of the dawn of an "illiberal American century".

democracy, the Chinese authoritarian model has been able to swoop in and catch all who are growing tired of the US. As Chomsky (e.g. 2016, 2017) repeatedly argues, China is one of those who can profit the most off the global discontents the US has garnered.[6]

Arguably, Trump is carrying out a decoupling of the US-American and Chinese economies; at least, he has started that process. Time and time again, he has pulled the US out of multilateral initiatives and organizations, be it the UN Human Rights Council, the Paris Climate Agreement, or the World Health Organization (Harris 2018; Friedman 2019; Tandon 2020).

Xi seems to be doing the exact opposite. Indeed, he has carried out a late embrace of multilateralism (e.g. Christensen 2016, chapter 1; Friedberg 2018). A notable example is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is set to be completed in 2020. It involves China, Japan, South Korea, the ten ASEAN countries, Australia, and New Zealand (and potentially India), making it the biggest free trade agreement in the world (Mahbubani 2020a: 212-213). This is only one example; since the turn of the millennium, China has grown into one of the most active players in the United Nations, in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, and as by far the biggest contributor to the UN peacekeeping forces. Over the same period, China has founded or cofounded a series of transnational initiatives, organizations, and forums, many of which have China itself in prominent roles, and in many of which the US is shining with its absence from the top tables (Friedberg 2011: 171). Because of these agreements and organizations, China looks set to become an ever-more skilled and central player in the global game of chess.

Moreover, over the past decades, China has, in important ways, asserted itself as "the champion and leader of the developing world" (Christensen 2016: 27). From 2000 to 2014, China committed $350 billion across 4300 projects in 140 countries (Dreher et.al. 2017). These include many of the states on my panel from Asia, Africa, and South America. In this period, Nigeria received over $7 billion, Pakistan received over $24 billion, Brazil received $8.5 billion, Indonesia received well over $8 billion, and Kazakhstan received more than $8 billion, just to mention a few. These numbers have surely grown much bigger by 2020.

In line with its embrace of multilateralism, China has seen a surge of influence and establishment of formal ties in these regions. This has even led to speculation of an own Chinese *order* in the developing world. The widespread concept of the "Beijing Consensus" suggests that China's success can offer developing countries an alternative vision to the reigning

---

[6] China is often accused of being an "autocratic patron". See De Soysa and Midford 2012; Bader 2015 for arguments that this concern is overstated.

"Washington Consensus" of liberal democracy and free competition (e.g. Fengming 2005; Williamson 2008).[7] Elements of the "Beijing Consensus" include (in Ramo 2004):

1. Innovation-based development.
2. Economic success is measured not by per capita GDP growth, but by its sustainability and level of equality.
3. Self-determination for China and for other states vis-à-vis the US.
   a. Opposition to the "Washington Consensus".
   b. Globalization on their own terms.
   c. Chinese influence by example, not by weaponry.
   d. Develop asymmetric capabilities to balance against the US.

In sum, it seems like the time in which China was "bereft of friends" and "a beacon to no one" is over (Strüver 2014, 2016). China's new, ever-growing network of institutions and organizations, in addition to being platforms of asserting its power and its influence, are also a way for China to *reassure* the small and medium powers of the world by signaling restraint and, in some ways, tying itself down by making its power more predictable and easier for others to engage (Ikenberry 2015: 30-31). Applied to this thesis, this may well make it less certain that the US will ultimately beat China in the tug-of-war over the world's support.

This may even apply to the US's friends and allies. Friedman (2020) notes that: "Despite the network of global alliances Washington has built up, it is been unable to convince those allies to hop on the "great-power-competition express" and leave China behind." If the US is intent on recreating the Cold War's bifurcated world, where it fights China at every turn, expecting its side to do the same, "it will likely find itself largely isolated."

An illustrative case of this general trend is that of the Philippines, which, over the last few years, have begun backing out of its alliance with Washington. Since coming to power in 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte has been a critic of Trump and the US. Soon after taking office, Duterte even announced his "separation" from the US and the subsequent realignment with China, and he promised that he and Xi would resolve their South China Sea disputes through peaceful dialogue (Blanchard 2016). Another hard blow was dealt by Duterte in February 2020, when he served notice that his government would terminate an accord that governs the rules for US forces participating in joint military exercises and training in the Philippines. Duterte gave

---

[7] Far from all scholars agree on this. For a corrective, see Scott Kennedy's (2010) argument that the "Beijing Consensus" is a myth.

the US 180 days to find a way to salvage the pact before the termination. In and of itself, this may not be a very dramatic move, but it nevertheless "constitutes the gravest threat to the [US-Filipino] alliance in years and jeopardizes the U.S. military's efforts to deter Chinese aggression in the region" (Friedman 2020). Nowadays, there are many speculating that the Philippines and China could broker new military cooperation agreements, even despite their ongoing territorial disputes (e.g. ibid.).

Of course, there is plenty of negativity towards China as well; the Philippines do in no way exemplify a unanimous trend. As I will discuss more in later chapters, over the past years, China seems to have adopted a much harsher and more assertive style of conduct. As a result, parts of the world, and particularly the US's friends and allies, have begun to turn their backs on China. Moreover, China's process of hardening has only accelerated over the course of the pandemic. This has begun to trigger a global backlash, seen in things like the UK's ban on Huawei, the "Milk Tea Alliance"[8], Australia's sharply increased defense budget, and NATO's hardening rhetoric against China (see my interview with NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, Appendix C; Power 2020). This has already manifested itself in markedly more negative and rejective responses to Huawei, and I think it is a fair prediction to say that China's global appeal will continue to sink if it carries on with the same conduct.

India is another case in point here. For a long time, India seemed to move closer to China on some areas. In October 2019, Xi Jinping met with Narendra Modi, and the two pledged to take their relation to new heights (Madan 2020). However, this relationship was always highly fragile, and especially the past year has been troublesome; "instead of deeper ties, 2020 has highlighted the growing rivalry between China and India." Since May, a series of violent face-offs between the states' troops has been happening along their disputed border. There have been speculations that the worst of these, which happened on June 15, might mark a "watershed moment", gravely hurting the Sino-Indian relationship. Now, India faces a critical choice; should it let these events "push it back" to the US?

Similarly illustrative, global attitudes toward China have been growing worse for some time. A *Pew Research* survey from December 2019 of 38,426 people spanning 34 countries from all over the world showed that while majorities in most countries agreed that China's influence on the world stage has grown markedly, it has led to very mixed views of the country (Silver et.al. 2019). Opinion of China in developed countries, i.e. Western Europe, North America, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, is predominantly negative, and these numbers are

---

[8] The informal online alliance between netizens from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, and Australia, aiming to combat ultrapatriotic Chinese internet-users (Lam 2020).

dropping in similar polls each year. Much of the developing world, however, remains positive to China, and the numbers are also up from previous years.[9]

So far, then, China remains an attractive partner for many in large parts of the world. With the world's two biggest powers both being attractive in their own sense, how can we know, or at least get some pointers, as to where the rest of the world will stand between them? And what does the world's stances tell us about the future prospects for balancing?

1.2 Theoretical Vantage Points for the Thesis

In this thesis, I will examine these and related questions from a theoretical baseline of political realism, where *power* is the real currency of international affairs. Specifically, structural realism will be the source of much of my reasoning, as I will be giving primacy to systemic forces, even though I do use occasional elements from other branches of realism. For structural realists, like Waltz and Mearsheimer, "differential growth rates, which over time change the relative distribution of capabilities between states, are the driving forces of international politics" (Ripsman et.al. 2016: 17). By this logic, with China's growth rates being far bigger than the US's in most societal areas, we should all fasten our seatbelts for a turbulent time ahead of us.[10]

The main research question of the thesis is this: *Which factors influence how 53 of the world's small and medium powers respond to and stand on growing Chinese influence, given pressure from the US to avoid Chinese initiatives and institutions?*[11] Primarily, I will be examining three clusters of explanatory variables.

First, using Walt's (1987) criteria for what constitutes a threat from one state to another – aggregate national power, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived aggressive intentions – I check the influence of perceived threat from China on states' stances. By his logic, states who are dwarfed by China's power and capabilities, who lie close by China, and/or who perceive aggressive intentions from it, should seek alliances more frequently – either with the US or with China.

Second, I examine the influence of patron-client theory (e.g. Carney 1989); does relying on the US as a security partner affect how states stand between it and China? By this logic,

---

[9] Obviously, such polls only reflect various public's stances, which are not necessarily the same as the officials' stances (which is what I look for). However, while I should avoid putting too much weight on polling, it does give some important indicators. As Allen et.al. (2020: 6) write: the preferences of publics matter "because they constitute the microfoundations of state preferences".

[10] See also Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987 for discussions of how uneven growth rates may lead to trouble.

[11] I have chosen to call them "small and medium powers" because, compared with the US and China, *all* states are small and medium-sized.

things like treaty alliances, strategic partnerships, arms imports, and US military presence should all make states *comply* with their patron more frequently. In this case, compliance would translate into rejecting Chinese initiatives and institutions.

Finally, Hirschman (1945 [1980]) argues that states with asymmetric trade relations to a more powerful party are put under that party's power and influence. So, do states' economic relations to China and/or the US influence how they stand? Specifically, does having closer economic ties to China than with the US make states more acceptive of Chinese initiatives and institutions? Or turned around, does having closer economic ties with the US than with China make states more rejective of them?

By implication, there is also a second aspect of my research question: What is really happening in today's world in terms of balancing? To answer this, I deploy two theoretical endpoints (each endpoint is again split into two, see Figure 1), both based on realism's predictions, in order to illustrate the spectrum in which states can realistically stand between China and the US. The first endpoint I use becomes relevant if my 53 states prove to be dominantly *acceptive* of the Chinese initiatives and institutions, and it is what various balance-of-power theorists have been waiting for since the end of the Cold War; balancing against the US. Today, has the world at last begun balancing against the US by gathering around China as the main pole in a coalition, or is it simply bandwagoning with China out of fear? The second endpoint I use becomes relevant if my 53 states prove to be dominantly *rejective* of the Chinese initiatives and institutions, and it is based on a less controversial prediction; balancing against China. Is the world today balancing against China by gathering around the US as the main pole in a coalition? Or, again, is this rather explained by bandwagoning with the US?[12]

Figure 1: My theoretical endpoints.

Of course, the range of policy choices for states facing similar situations is *much* broader than just these two. There are numerous strategies in between, two main ones being hedging and

---

[12] Of the four, this last route is the one I explore the least.

engagement, which both entail keeping open more than one strategic option (Schweller 1999: 7-16). Many states in East and Southeast Asia, for example, have chosen a strategy of hedging between the US and China over simpler one-dimensional strategies (e.g. Lim and Cooper 2016; Cook and Storey 2018). Moreover, the alternative strategies may include elements of one or both of the endpoints; hedging, for example, can be said to include "low-intensity balancing" (Roy 2005: 305). So, these two endpoints are in no way the only options, but I will use them as imagined extremes, *ideal types*, for simplicity and analytical clarity.

Adding to the complexity of these issues, scholars from both of these theoretical endpoints agree on one thing, that while balance-of-power theory is good at predicting *that* counterbalancing eventually and inevitably will arise whenever too much power is concentrated in the hands of a single great power, it cannot say exactly *when* that will happen (e.g. Waltz 1979: 3). So, no one can ever say with certainty what is really going on in terms of balancing. What I try to do, however, is to give an essential snapshot of today's situation. I cannot expect to find solid answers to this second question, but the answers I find to the first will give important pointers as to the second. Shedding some light on these other issues, then, is another main research goal of the thesis. Specifically, I will construct an 18-point scale which measures where states stand on China, where the lowest and the highest points on these scales represent these two theoretical endpoints. Seeing how and why states stand as they do might reveal somethings about the broader trendlines of today's balancing landscape.

1.3 Three of the US's Campaigns Against China

As I mentioned in the very beginning, had I posed the question of who would back whom in a US-China showdown just a handful of years ago, the answer would likely have been quite a lot simpler. The aftermath of September 11, 2001 serves as a fitting example. Immediately after the attacks, the states of the world were quite hesitant to go out with strong statements. Illustratively, a high-ranking French official said that they were afraid of being caught in a "hellish trap" of endless wars (in Chomsky 2001: 20). The US, however, made it clear very early on that there would be no middle ground for the rest of the world. As soon as two days after the attacks, *New York Times* reported*:* "the Bush administration today gave the nations of the world a stark choice: stand with us against terrorism, deny safe havens to terrorists or face the certain prospect of death and destruction" (Apple Jr. 2001). The ultimatum was clear: you

are either with us or against us in this conflict. Soon after, countries started to fall in line, joining or at least supporting the "War on Terror".

Today, looking back at almost two decades of extensive, trillion-dollar wars in which very large parts of the world have been involved in some way, I can say with certainty that the US's "mob-mentality", as Chomsky (2001: 83) calls it, worked as Bush intended.[13] As I touched upon above, Trump and his administration is currently re-using this mentality, running intensive pressure campaigns to get the world to avoid Chinese initiatives and institutions; symbols of China's growing power and influence. On this area, Obama was not much better than Trump; his Asia-strategy from day one was "to spread fear and combat every move by China" (Kurlantzick 2016). The empirical foundation in this thesis will be three such pressure campaigns, started by Obama and escalated by Trump, that the US has led against China.

The first is the one against the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In October 2013, Beijing stunned Washington by announcing AIIB, which some has dubbed China's own version of the World Bank (Allison 2017: 22). It is also an alternative and direct competitor to the heavily US-influenced Asian Development Bank, as the US is absent from all of AIIB's functions. The bank serves as the spearhead of the BRI initiatives (my second empirical source), and it aims to facilitate infrastructure development in huge parts of the world (Yu 2017: 353). China is clearly the biggest player – it is both the bank's biggest funder, and the bank's headquarters are in Beijing (ibid.: 358). In a lot of ways, the bank has been a great success. Nowadays, it is arguably "proving itself to be a better governed institution than the IMF and the World Bank; reportedly, its standards of corporate governance are higher and more transparent" (Mahbubani 2020a: 52).

Regardless, the US started battling the bank from the day of its announcement, repeatedly urging the world not to join it. From the thesis' realist perspective, Washington naturally see it as a major threat to its own primacy.[14] To this day, the US maintains that its opposition to its launch was justified, but it nevertheless convinced many in China (and the world in general) that "Washington held a zero-sum view on Chinese diplomatic advances" (Christensen 2016: 314).

Either way, the US's warnings were of little use; 57 states signed up as funding members before AIIB officially launched in December 2015. This included several of the US's closest allies, which of course made Washington very angry (e.g. Bird 2015). Ever since, states have

---

[13] The most notable example is the war in Afghanistan; there have been more than 60 active participant countries in Operation Enduring Freedom (Doucet 2020).

[14] See power transition theory for an in-depth explanation of why this kind of behavior is to be expected from a hegemon who risks losing the top position (Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980).

kept rushing to join AIIB (e.g. Rowley 2015). Today, the bank has 102 members, including 44 regional, 36 non-regional, and 22 prospective members (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 2020). Several scholars have expressed that the US's opposition to the bank, having largely fallen on deaf ears around the world, has been a failure and a strategic blunder (e.g. Etzioni 2016). A more detailed account of the global responses to the bank will be in short in data and methodology (chapter 3, section 3.2.1), and a full list will be in Appendix A, section A.1.

The second pressure campaign I draw empirical data from is the one against the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has come to be known as Xi's "geostrategic masterpiece"'. In a series of state visits around Asia at the end of 2013, Xi announced that China was going to invest $1.4 trillion in building a network of highways, railroads, airports, ports, pipelines, power transmission lines, and fiberoptic cables across Eurasia and the states bordering to the Indian Ocean. By 2016, BRI consisted of over 900 major projects with a price tag amounting to *twelve* Marshall Plans (Curan 2016).[15] By 2020, these numbers have surely grown significantly.

BRI represents a crucial effort to fill major infrastructure gaps in the relevant regions. So far, BRI has been a success on many accounts. At the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April 2019, less than six years after the announcement of the initiative, China could proudly report on a long list of remarkable achievements (Yongxin 2020). The surging developments show no sign of slowing down, either; at the Forum, China and the participating countries promised each other more cooperation, more multilateralism, and more active promotion of the projects (ibid.).

Regardless of all this, the US has combated the initiative from day one; again, the realists in Washington can only see the threat that BRI poses to its continued primacy. Many have cited Mackinder's heartland theory (1904 [2009])[16], fearing that China would use BRI as a tool to spread its influence across Eurasia (e.g. Sempa 2019; Scissors 2019). "China's global dreams gives its neighbours nightmares," writes one commentator (Daly 2018). The US has repeatedly encouraged the world to stay away from BRI. When meeting the president of Panama in October 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was all too clear in his warning about joining the initiative and accepting China's BRI loans: "When China comes calling, it's not always to the good of your citizens" (Churchill 2018). Similar messages have been delivered all over the world (e.g. Mahbubani 2020a: 221-224).

---

[15] Following the end of World War 2, the US led an extensive aid program designed to help rehabilitate 17 Western European economies (Britannica 2020).
[16] The theory that whoever controlled "the Heartland" (the core of Eurasia) would be able to control the world, because of the area's enormous strategic significance.

Despite the US's warnings, BRI has gathered remarkable momentum in its first seven years. As of January 2020, China had signed 200 cooperation documents with 138 states and 30 international organizations to jointly build the Belt and Road (Belt and Road Portal 2020). 33 of these are among the 53 states I study in this thesis. Other states, while not official members, are working with the Chinese under the framework of BRI, or they have expressed positivity to the initiatives. A handful of states are more restrained, sending out mixed signals to China on BRI, and some are even working with the US or each other on direct rivals to the initiative. A more detailed account of the global stances on BRI will be in short in data and methodology (chapter 3, section 3.3.2), and a full list will be in Appendix A, section A.2.

Even some of those who were outspokenly negative to the initiative in the beginning, have now turned around. Malaysia's prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, for example, was elected in 2018 following a major national outrage against Chinese investment, in which he went out strong on behalf of the people and opposed many of the BRI projects. Some of his first acts as PM was to suspend several of the country's China-backed mega projects, while warning about China's ambitions as a new colonial power. At the time, he was apparently willing to say no to almost $23 billion worth of projects to avoid growing too dependent on China (Osnos 2020). However, Mahathir has since warmed significantly to China and BRI. In April 2019, he was a key opening speaker at the Second Belt and Road Forum, where he pledged his full support for China's vision (Nambiar 2019).

The third pressure campaign I look at is probably the most (in)famous one; that against the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei and its role in building 5G networks around the world. There is widespread concern that Huawei is a tool which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could use to spy on its users. Every year, Huawei receives significant state financial support – according to Grotto (2019), that number was $220 million in 2018. The question is whether this puts it under the active influence of the CCP or not. The main concern in this regard is China's 2017 National Intelligence Law. This law compels all China-based companies to provide active support to the CCP's intelligence-gathering activities, by placing so-called 'backdoors' in their equipment. Huawei has consistently denied every allegation that has been thrown in its direction, always maintaining that it is an independent company, capable of saying no even if the Chinese government asked it to spy. Nevertheless, the US obviously thinks otherwise, and has thought so for a long time. As early as 2012, the US House Intelligence Committee denounced Huawei as a threat to national security, and it advised private entities to avoid doing business with the company.

The US's restrictions on Huawei has escalated sharply under Trump; it seems like he has pointed out the company as something of an arch nemesis. The harshest act came in May 2019, when the White House issued an executive order prohibiting any country or person that is a "foreign adversary" from selling certain telecommunications equipment in the US, effectively banning Huawei from the implementation of the US's 5G networks. That same day, the Department of Commerce added Huawei and 68 of its subsidiaries to the Entity List, the technological "blacklist", preventing US firms from exporting goods or service to the company without a license, which, it turns out, is very rarely, if ever, granted (Musil 2019). On May 14, 2020, Trump extended the ban for another year (Keane 2020).

Are the US's concerns justified? Perhaps, if nothing else because there is so much at stake in these matters. "Any bug, beacon, or backdoor put into our critical systems could allow for a catastrophic and devastating domino effect of failures throughout our networks" (Rogers and Ruppersberger 2012). Also, once again following realism's harsh logic, the US's opposition makes sense. There is broad agreement that whoever controls the world's 5G technology will have an enormous strategic advantage in the future. Huawei is, in many ways, one of the CCP's many arms. Therefore, Huawei having the strategic advantage of 5G would to a large degree mean that *China* would have the strategic advantage of 5G. In realism's zero-sum world, that would be a loss in relative power for the US. So, Washington cannot let that happen.

Over the past few years, therefore, the US has been going all over the world spreading a simple message: "It's the US Way or the Huawei". In February 2019, for example, the US insistently urged its European allies to avoid Huawei's equipment in their 5G rollouts. A Statement from the US State Department read: "The US advocates for secure telecoms networks and supply chains that are free from suppliers subject to foreign government control or undue influence that poses risks of unauthorized access and malicious cyber activity" (Collins 2019; Bowden 2019). They did not need to use the name Huawei; everybody knew who they meant.

Soon after, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went out even stronger, saying that countries that use Huawei tech pose a risk to the US, and that in the most extreme cases, information sharing, diplomatic and military ties and partnerships would be off the table. This was obviously a thinly veiled threat against states that remained positive to and generally acceptive of the Chinese tech giants (Zhou 2019; Chrysoloras and Bravo 2019). Similarly, US officials recently flagged their security concerns over Huawei to their allies in the Persian Gulf – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates, among others (Cornwell 2019). The US's closest allies has felt the pressure most intensely. When the UK originally decided to allow

Huawei to build non-core parts of its 5G network, Trump called British PM Boris Johnson in "apoplectic fury", accusing him of betrayal (Jee 2019; Myre 2020; Bienkov 2020)

Overall, the pressure campaign against Huawei and its role in 5G implementation has arguably enjoyed more success than the two previous ones, but the world is still far from the unanimous Huawei ban that the US seems to want. Of the 53 states on my panel, only a few have done full bans or signed 5G security agreements with the US, and a handful of states have already given contracts to Nokia or Ericsson, but even more are using or are planning to use Huawei actively in their 5G networks. A more detailed account of the global responses to Huawei's 5G will be in short in data and methodology (chapter 3, section 3.2.3), and a full list will be in Appendix A, section A.3.

In and of themselves, these three might not be all to revealing as to states' alignment choices between China and the US. They are certainly extremely different from each other, and there are many highly specialized circumstances which determine how states stand on each of them. Also, there are, to be sure, numerous other examples of Chinese initiatives and institutions that the US has been and is fighting to suppress. In other words, I cannot know how much of the tug-of-war these three actually reflect. Put together, however, I think (and hope) that these three can represent several important aspects about the type of pressure campaigns I study in this thesis.

1.4 Plan for the Thesis

This thesis measures 53 states' stances on these three Chinese initiatives and institutions. These, as well as an aggregate of the three, will be my four dependent variables. Then, I explore the reasons behind the stances, by correlating them with the three clusters of independent variables I introduced above; what brings states up or down the aforementioned 18-point scale? Doing this, I hope to see what influences the world's stances on China and, by extension of this, distinguishing or at least *discussing* what is going on in today's world in terms of balancing.

The thesis is built up in the following way. First is a theory chapter (chapter 2), divided into four sections. After outlining my theoretical baseline in political realism and balance-of-power theory, I go into each of the three general fields of theory from which I get the independent variables. In these sections, I also derive the three main hypotheses. Then follows a chapter on data and methodology (chapter 3), where I go through how I have selected my panel of states and how I have operationalized and measured the dependent and the independent

variables. This chapter also contains a discussion of some omitted variables and other potential pitfalls of the thesis.

Next is an analysis chapter (chapter 4), which I have divided into three bivariate models, one for each main hypothesis. In each of these, I examine the correlations between the dependent and independent variables, with the goal of offering (partial) support for the hypotheses, either for or against. The bivariate correlation-analyses reveal three main trendlines. First, all else being equal, those states most dwarfed by China's power tend to be more acceptive of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. Second, *ceteris paribus,* having the US as a patron makes states more rejective of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. Third, all else being equal, having closer economic ties to China than to the US makes states more acceptive of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. Interestingly, all three of these can be interpreted as pointing to *both* theoretical endpoints, that is, either balancing or bandwagoning, depending on the internal characteristics of the states. Towards the end of each bivariate model, I do various robustness-checks to strengthen the external validity and to increase the robustness of my findings.

In a fourth section of this chapter, I conduct three multivariate regression analyses, with the goal of observing how the three clusters of independent subvariables interact. This illustrates how all three of the theoretical dimensions are necessary to explain states' stances, as one subvariable from the first two models, as well as two from the third, prove to have the strongest effects. Woven into the analysis, I discuss the results I get, drawing parallels to specific cases. These discussions are mostly based on scholarly literature, and I have corroborated it with interviews with two Norwegian politicians and diplomats.[17] This mixed-methods approach is inspired by Lieberman's (2005) concept of *nested analysis*, which is about corroborating quantitative results with the insights of qualitative cases that can both illustrate and complicate the preliminary findings.[18]

The second to last chapter (chapter 5) discusses two ongoing trends which I suspect can significantly alter the future development of these issues – Donald Trump's negative impact on the US's global image and Xi Jinping's recent assertive turn. I finish the thesis with a conclusion (chapter 6), which includes a final recap of my findings as well as some policy recommendations and further nods to the future.

---

[17] The two are NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg and diplomat and politician Erik Solheim, who I was set in contact with through family and friends.

[18] The article by Brazys and Dukalskis (2017) provides an excellent example of this kind of approach. See also Seawright and Gerring (2008) for an in-depth discussion of case-selection techniques.

2 THEORY

In this chapter, I go through in more detail the theories upon which I base this thesis. First, I do a (relatively) quick summary of political realism, the family of theories that will be the baseline for my logic and my reasoning, and then examine some of its predictions about balancing behavior. Next, I go into the various theoretical works that lead to the three main hypotheses of the thesis – Walt's balance-of-threat theory, Carney and others' patron-client theory, and Hirschman's theory of economic realism.

2.1 The Realist Baseline

As I mentioned, my theoretical baseline in this thesis will be in political realism, which has been one of the defining schools of thought in political theory for centuries. To be sure, there are numerous non-realist theories of international politics, notably liberalism and constructivism, which might have some relevant things to say about the issues I study here. However, I make no attempt at a comprehensive assessment of any of these. My emphasis will be on political realism and its harsh logic, as I find this most relevant for the questions I pose. I will be using different strands of realism for different parts of the thesis, but the common denominator for all these is the language of power. "For all realists, calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them. Power is the currency of great-power politics, and states compete for it among themselves" (Mearsheimer 2001: 12). In particular, assessments of *relative* power lie as a foundation for most interactions on the international stage (e.g. Beckley 2018).

Realists are generally seen as pessimistic about the world. They agree that creating a peaceful world would be desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the harsh world of security competition and war. E. H. Carr (1939 [1962]: 10) notes that: "Realism tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies." This gloomy worldview is based on three core beliefs. First, the belief that sovereign states (and not individuals) are the principal actors in world politics. Of all states, great powers are the most consequential and therefore most interesting. Second, that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not their internal

characteristics.[19] As a result, realists generally do not draw sharp distinctions between "good" and "bad" states, as all great powers act according to the same logic and respond to the same systemic impulses. "In essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size." Third, that calculations about power dominate states' thinking and their conduct, and that states are trapped in a cold and unforgiving zero-sum competition for power among themselves. Therefore, war is an acceptable instrument of realist statecraft (Mearsheimer 2001: 18-20).

Moreover, for realists, three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another (that they live in Suspicion of each other, as Knutsen (2016: 308) puts it[20]):

1. The absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other.
2. The fact that states always have at least *some* offensive military capability.
3. The fact that states can never be certain about other states' intentions.

There are several realist theories with more or less significant internal differences. I will mention a few of the most important ones. Morgenthau's human nature realism (also called classical realism) is based on the assumption that our imperfect world is the result of objective laws and forces inherent in human nature. All statesmen are driven by a "limitless lust for power," which makes them constantly look for opportunities to take the offensive and dominate other states (Morgenthau 1948: 208).

Waltz's defensive realism (also called structural realism) assumes that states merely aim to survive, and that the anarchical structure of the international system forces the security-seeking states to compete with each other for power, which is the best means for survival. Still, Waltz believes that anarchy encourages states to act defensively and to maintain rather than upset the balance-of-power. Aggression is almost always offset by counterbalancing, and it is thus not a rational strategy (ibid: 126).

Mearsheimer's offensive realism is also a structural theory. Like Waltz, he argues that survival is states' primary concern in our anarchical world. Unlike Waltz, however, offensive realists generally do not believe in the existence of status quo powers, as the system creates powerful incentives for states to always seek opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals. States can never get enough power; their ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.

---

[19] Morgenthau (1948) is something of an exception here. While he does not distinguish between good and bad states, clearly recognizing that the system shapes state behavior, he also focuses on the natural desire for power, which is an internal characteristic.

[20] In a more optimistic take on realism, Glaser (1996) argues that cooperation is very much possible.

While global hegemony is near impossible, regional hegemony is attainable. Also, states that have already achieved regional hegemony (such as the US) will at all times work to hinder anyone from rising to challenge its own dominance – regional hegemons don't want peers (Mearsheimer 2001: 21-23).

More recently, neoclassical realism has sailed up as a contender among the primary realist theories. The term was first coined by Gideon Rose in 1998, and more and more scholars are using it actively today. In 2016, Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro pushed it to the ranks of an own theory. In essence, neoclassical realism is about loosening the distinctions between theories of foreign policy and theories of international politics. It gives primacy to the external determinant logic of structural realism, its intellectual predecessor, while also opening for the influence of lower-level variables traditionally found in human nature realism and/or liberalism/constructivism. The central point of this theory is that the signals of the international system are not always clear, and misperceptions do happen. Leaders cannot always be expected to act rationally and optimally, and states cannot always react perfectly. Therefore, neoclassical realists advocate including four types of intervening variables that can complicate foreign policy responses to external pressures: leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions.

In this thesis, I will be using elements of all these in my reasoning, either directly or indirectly. As I mentioned above, I will be giving primacy to the structural imperatives of the international system (Waltz's third image of analysis (see 1959)). Yet, I cannot entirely dismiss the intervening variables suggested by neighboring theories; as will become obvious throughout the thesis, there is a virtually endless list of factors from all levels that might have an effect on states stances between China and the US.[21] The issues discussed in this thesis are of great complexity, and dealing with them will consequently require a great deal of theoretical flexibility.

******

Another thing all these theories share is the belief in the balance-of-power mechanism as an essential ordering principle in international relations. By this logic, states will always seek to prevent each other from becoming too powerful, as that invariably makes them seek to dominate all others. Within realism, there is various predictions of just how states balance, but the most

---

[21] In his attempts to apply classical realism directly to today's international situation, Kirshner (2010, 2015) illustrates how variables that are often overlooked by structuralists might often have an impact on international events.

common idea is that a counterbalancing coalition is inevitable whenever one actor grows too powerful. As I mentioned in the introduction, an important, yet secondary, goal of this thesis is finding out where the world currently is in terms of balancing. To find out what might conceivably happen, I must first map out the options at more length than I have already done.

From the very beginning of the Unipolar Moment,[22] scholars have questioned whether it could last. Layne, for example, wrote about the *Unipolar Illusion* in 1993 (and revisited it in 2006). Using a structural realist baseline, he argued that the unipolar moment was just a geopolitical interlude that would give way to multipolarity, balancing and new great powers soon enough. Those saying otherwise were simply naïve, he argued: "Proponents of America's preponderance have missed a fundamental point: other states react to the threat of hegemony, not to the hegemon's identity. American leaders may regard the United States as a benevolent hegemon, but others cannot afford to take such a relaxed view" (Layne 1993: 36). In other words, "in unipolar systems, there is no clear-cut distinction between balancing against threat and balancing against power" (ibid.: 13). The threat lies in the hegemon's power. Thus, others must worry about the hegemon's capabilities, not the intentions it is thought to have at this moment; those can realistically change at any time.

Numerous scholars have even argued that alternative forms of balancing against the US, primarily "soft" balancing, has been happening for years (Ikenberry 2004; Paul 2005; Pape 2005).[23] For these theorists, the US has succumbed to the "hegemon's temptation" to take on extremely ambitious goals, use military force unselectively and excessively, overextend its power abroad, and generally reject self-restraint in its foreign policy – all of which invariably generate counterbalancing. In this light, I must treat balancing against the US as a real option.

However, there have been plenty of scholars throughout the years who maintain that the US is an exceptional hegemon that no one would ever fear or balance against (e.g. Lieber and Alexander 2005; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 2008).[24] For them, balancing against China instead of the US is a less controversial option, and one that is far easier to imagine. Mearsheimer (2006, 2014) is probably the most prominent scholar suggesting this. He maintains that China *cannot* rise peacefully. The US and China will get caught in intense rivalry, and most of China's neighbors, as well as the rest of the world, will join with the US to contain the Chinese (2006: 160). The reason for that, he says, is simple: China poses a more

---

[22] The idea that the end of the Cold War had left the US as the unchallenged world leader (Krauthammer 1990). For a similar argument, see Fukuyama's notion of "the end of history" (1989).

[23] As opposed to traditional "hard" balancing of counterbalancing coalitions, soft balancing is pursued through more indirect efforts to undermine opponents and bolster one's own power position.

[24] An interesting perspective here is the one thoroughly examined by Levy and Thompson (2010), who hold that naval powers (i.e. the US) are generally perceived as less threatening than land powers.

serious threat to most states in Asia than the United States does. And, following the logic of his theory, states will balance against the most serious threat (2014: 24).

2.2 Walt: Threat Perception from China

Speaking the language of power that is characteristic for political realists, then, it is very much conceivable that the rise of China makes the world perceive it as a threat. Again, the main research goal of this thesis is to shed light on the factors influencing how the rest of the world stands between the US and China. So, does perceived threat from China have an effect? As I touched upon in the introduction, there has been a lot of discussion lately on whether we are currently seeing a renewed China-threat. That only makes this question more relevant than ever.

In his balance-of-threat theory, Stephen M. Walt (1987) refines and modifies the balance-of-power theory. He starts with its simplest idea: "Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them"[25] (Waltz 1979: 127). However, for Walt, a state's alliance behavior is determined not only by the distribution of power, which is the conventional idea, but by the entire *threat* they perceive from other states, a concept where power is only one component. He identifies four interrelated criteria states use to evaluate the severity of the threat posed by another state:

- **Aggregate power:** All else being equal, the greater a country's total resources (consisting of population, industrial and military capabilities, and technological prowess), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others, and the more likely it is to provoke alignment (ibid.: 22). This is the most common understanding of the balance-of-power mechanism. It explains why Kennan (1954: 63-65) defined the aim of US grand strategy as that of preventing any one state from controlling more industrial resources than itself did.

- **Geographical proximity:** It is a general conviction in international politics that the ability to project power generally declines with the distance involved, among other things because of what Mearsheimer (2001, chapter 5) calls the "stopping power of water". By this logic, *ceteris paribus,* states that are nearby pose a greater threat to others

---

[25] Of course, the question of *when* the secondary states are free to choose, is another, much more complicated issue. One might argue that those most dwarfed in power are *never* really free to choose.

than those that are far away.[26] Therefore, states will likely make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers rather than in response to distant ones (ibid.: 23). Also, weaker states are "likely to be especially sensitive to proximate power. Where great powers have both global interests and global capabilities, weak states will be concerned primarily with events in their immediate vicinity" (Walt 1987: 30).

- **Offensive power:** All else being equal, states with large offensive capabilities, that is, states with the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of others, are more likely to provoke a counter-alliance than are those that, for some reason, are incapable of attacking others (ibid.: 24). The ease with which aggregate power can be converted into offensive capabilities is determined by the relative advantage of the offense or defense at any given time. "Alliance formation becomes more frenetic when the offense is believed to have the advantage: great powers will balance more vigorously, and weak states will bandwagon more frequently" (ibid.: 25).[27]

- **Aggressive intentions:** *Ceteris paribus,* states that are perceived by others as aggressive in international affairs are likely to provoke more balancing against them. In other words, *perceptions* of aggressive intent (which in realism is always an unknown, and which may often be wrong) are key to alliance choices (Walt 1987: 25).[28] Also, when a state is believed to be unalterably aggressive, other states are unlikely to bandwagon with it, instead shying away. This is the background for Walt's, and many other realists', arguments that the US can avoid the curse of counterbalancing (discussed in previous section).

Of course, these four are all closely related, and can enhance or dampen one another. Yet, they are not identical, and all four are needed to assess a threat. One cannot determine a priori *which* of these four will be most important in a case, one can only say that all four will have a role to play. By using all four of these, that is, looking at imbalances of *threat* as the source of alignment rather than merely imbalances of power, Walt (1987: 264) argues that one will get a clear improvement of the classic balance-of-threat.

---

[26] For an interesting corrective to this, see Wohlstetter (1968), who maintains that, particularly in modern warfare, geographic distance is not a serious hindrance to projection of power and military strength.

[27] See also Jervis 1978; Van Evera 1998 for further discussions of the offense-defense balance.

[28] As neoclassical realists point out (see last section), the system's signals can be quite unclear, and we cannot trust state leaders to interpret them correctly at all times. Thus, this variable is particularly hard to grapple.

As I have touched upon, Walt (1987: 17) identifies two distinct routes states can take when faced with a significant external threat. *Balancing* is allying with others against the prevailing threat, and *bandwagoning* refers to alignment with the source of threat in order to avoid being attacked yourself. Balancing is the most common of the two, but states that are very weak relative to the source of threat may bandwagon with it instead. This idea is not a new one; in the words of one scholar: "In international politics, nothing succeeds like success. Momentum accrues to the gainer and accelerates his movement. The appearance of irreversibility in his gains enfeebles one side and stimulates the other all the more. The bandwagon collects those on the sidelines" (Thompson 1977: 20).

There can be two motives for states to choose bandwagoning over balancing, Walt says. First, it can be a form of appeasement; avoiding an attack by joining with the ascendant state. Second, if it looks like the ascendant may win, a state may align with it in wartime in order to share the spoils of victory (ibid.: 21). Balancing and bandwagoning imply drastically different realities. If balancing is the dominant trend, aggression is discouraged, as it only leads to counterbalancing. If bandwagoning is the dominant trend, however, domineering behavior would be the best way to gain allies. Of course, misperceiving one's circumstances in terms of this dichotomy can have catastrophic consequences for all involved. Getting closer to an understanding, therefore, is of crucial importance.

In sum, Walt would predict that a perceived threat from China would affect how states stand on it. He would not know which direction the tendency will go – balancing against China (states becoming more negative/rejective) or bandwagoning with it (states becoming more positive/acceptive) – but he would definitely predict a clear-cut tendency there. This leads to the first hypothesis of this thesis, which, for clarity, is split into two:

Hypothesis 1a: *When a state perceives a threat from China, that state becomes markedly more rejective of Chinese initiatives and institutions.*

Hypothesis 1b: *When a state perceives a threat from China, that state becomes markedly more acceptive of Chinese initiatives and institutions.*

Note that the very idea that China can appear threatening to others has many critics. At least, there are plenty of those who want to *nuance* this idea. Mahbubani (2020a: 85-86), for example, points out that China has a "powerful antimilitary DNA." This might have its roots in Confucius, who emphasized that scholrs and strategic planners were more valuable societal

actors than soldiers, and Sun Tzu, who held that "to win a hundred victories is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is" (in Kissinger 2011: 25).

Kang (2007: 4) argues that "the East Asian states prefer China to be strong rather than weak because a strong China stabilizes the region while a weak China tempts other states to try to control the region." Indeed, China has a historical profile which has always allowed it to be the most powerful country in its region and still have stable, peaceful relations with other regional states. According to Kang, between 1300 and 1900, China's dominant position in East Asia *never* generated balancing from other states. The era of Chinese preponderance, under the so-called tributary system, was extraordinarily peaceful, particularly when compared to Europe during the same period; not once did China "seek to translate its dominant position into a system-wide empire by force of arms" (ibid.: 37). The Chinese did use military power at certain points of this era, but these examples were often more about consolidation of power, demarcation of borders, and reestablishment of the system, than with conquest (ibid.: 39). In some ways, this might entail that to many in Asia, China does not appear explicitly threatening; at least not in the same way other great powers have done over the years.[29]

On a more general note, should *the world* really be afraid of China? In the words of Kissinger (2011: 529); while China has always "thought of itself as playing a special role, it never espoused the American notion of universalism to spread its values around the world." Indeed, instead of aggressiveness, the Chinese have traditionally sought to maintain a transnational hierarchy with itself at the top, while letting others come to seek, admire, and adopt their values (ibid.: 14). With these words in mind, one would perhaps expect that the world is not really threatened by the rising China in the way that Walt would predict.

Of course, there are several correctives to such views, too. Johnston (1995: 248), for example, argues that while it is true that China is fundamentally different from the West, we have absolutely no guarantee that China will be as peaceful and balanced as Kang suggests. Studying the *Chinese Military Classics*, Johnston identifies two very different Chinese military cultures. The *Confucian-Mencian* paradigm is a symbolic, idealized set of assumptions, saying that conflict is aberrant or at least avoidable through good governance and co-opting of external threats. This paradigm has what he calls a surprising consensus among scholars. The other paradigm, which is *actually* the dominant one in Chinese strategic culture, is often overlooked; the *parabellum* paradigm assumes that conflict is a constant feature of human affairs – in our zero-sum world, conflict is the most efficacious way of dealing with adversaries (ibid.). This

---

[29] Japan is an obvious exception to this general trend, something I examine further in the first bivariate model (section 4.1).

resembles Western scholars' notions of harsh realpolitik and Mearsheimer's offensive realism. If this is in fact the dominant paradigm for Chinese leaders, perhaps it is not a far-fetched idea that Walt's notions of threat perception apply to China, and that it should play an essential role in my thesis.

Another goal for hypothesis 1a and 1b is to get some answers as to which scholars in this back-and-forth are right. If I do find that perceived threat from China has a marked influence on states' stances, it might support the notion that China *is* a threat that others have to react and respond to with some form of balancing. If I do not find a relation, it might be a sign that China is not a threat. Obviously, there would be several alternative ways to interpret the results I will get; more on this when I discuss the results of the first bivariate model in the analysis (chapter 4, section 4.1).

2.3 Carney and more: Patron-Client Relationships with the US

In most of the literature on leadership in global governance, it is generally acknowledged that "successful leadership depends not only on resources and ambition but also crucially on the support of followers" (Schirm 2010: 199). In general, for the transmission of influence, bilateral linkage, understood as dense, formal ties, is generally seen as a precondition (e.g. Way and Levitsky 2007: 53-54). So, could it be that having such ties to the US influences states' stances between it and China?

The concept of patron-client systems originated in anthropological studies which used it to describe certain intratribal and/or intraregional relationships between leaders and followers. In such settings, tribal chiefs, or patrons, dispense particular favors to their subjects, or clients, in return for their loyalty (Carney 1989: 43). The field of international relations has borrowed this concept, applying it instead to the relationship between states (e.g. Lande 1983; Shoemaker and Spanier 1984). The more clients a patron has depending on it, the wider its power base.

In terms of behavior, a central characteristic of patron-client relationships is *compliance*: "The patron expects compliance from the clients in matters of patronal interests" (Carney 1989: 45). Compliance can be measured in numerous ways, but an especially important one is "the client's policies toward the patron's primary adversary" (ibid.: 52). Weaker states abdicate significant amounts of autonomy to subjugate themselves to the influence or even control of a stronger protector. The most obvious reason for doing this, given my realist baseline, is often

simply "to have a friend in the harsh environment of the international arena" (ibid.: 48). For weaker states, then, the benefits of having a powerful friend outweighs the cost of reduced autonomy. In my interview with NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, he talked about China's inclination to single out weaker countries to punish for going against it (see Appendix C). In this light, it is understandable that smaller states want (and need) a protector.

In modern history, few, if any, have mastered the art of getting friends and allies in this way better than the US. For a majority of the time that has passed since the end of World War 2, the US has been working hard to build a network of friends and allies around the world; a system of clients in which itself is the patron (e.g. Carney 1989). As I mentioned above, the US has undoubtedly done a lot of questionable things to endanger and even hurt its own standing in the eyes of its friends and allies, but the foundational agreements have in themselves remained more or less solid. The US still has numerous treaty allies, strategic partnerships, and strategic dialogues around the world.

Lake (2013) argues that the subordinate states in what he calls "contractual relationships" cede certain aspects of foreign policymaking to the US in exchange for its security guarantee (see also Liska 1978: 272). The US undoubtedly gains a lot of influence and soft power from this, not only through direct imposition of policies, but also through more indirect mechanisms, like lesson-drawing, transnational policy coordination, and political cooperation (e.g. Bennett 1991; Holzinger and Knill 2005). This is arguably the US's major advantage over China (e.g. Brooks and Wohlforth 2016).[30]

The patron can show its commitment to this guarantee in many ways, but two main ones are the stationing of US military personnel in a client state, and arms sales to it. First of these, the number of US military personnel stationed overseas has decreased greatly since the end of the Cold War, especially in Europe, where the number went from over 300,000 in 1989 to 60,000 in 2017 (Jakobsen 2018: 506). Still, I suspect that such presences can have major impact on a state's patron-client relationship to the US, particularly when considering that the presence of limited forces have traditionally been considered sufficient for purposes of deterrence (Schelling 1960 [1980], chapter 8).[31]

Second, Tessman and Li (2011) argue that controlling a state's arms transfers enables the more powerful state in a dyad to impose foreign policy choices on the weaker recipient state

---

[30] This is not to say that China's leaders are operating completely by themselves. Indeed, a central feature of the country's rise in international affairs has been its ability to align and cooperate with other states" (Strüver 2014, 2016: 170). However, I suspect that the US's network of friends and allies has a more distinguishable effect, and so that is what I focus on here.
[31] See also Atkinson (2014), who argues that the military, traditionally seen as only a hard power tool, can be used as a soft power tool.

according to the former's core interests. Through such measures, then, I would expect to see a higher degree of compliance from the US's clients. In patron-client theory, these are also questions about how much so-called *affectivity* that bind the clients to the patron (Lemarchand and Legg 1972: 151). Are the relationships between the US and its friends and allies simply a matter of instrumentality, or do they include elements of affinity and loyalty? And if they do, is it enough that we can see a distinct influence of patron-client ties to the US on states' stances on China? As I described above, developments over the past decades have changed much about the world's architecture. For the US, that its friends and allies (its clients) should listen to it when it comes to China might no longer be a given. I want to examine this further, which leads to my second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: *When a state has formal ties to the US and sees it as its patron, this has a marked influence on how rejective that state is of Chinese initiatives and institutions.*

What I really ask, is this: How firm would the US's strategic relationships be if it came down to a more intense conflict or even all-out war with China? Are the US's friends and allies really more receptive of US pressure to avoid China? Can the US really be certain that its many friends and allies will back it in a conflict? More generally, to what degree are alliances and friendships in the international community ever carved in stone? This has for a long time been a key debate in some parts of international relations scholarship. Leeds and Savun (2007: 1118), for instance, pose: "Are treaties only valuable as matters stand, or are pacts respected in good faith regardless of changing circumstances?"

Analyzing the termination of 304 historical alliances from between 1816 and 1989, Leeds and Savun argue that alliances are more likely to be abrogated opportunistically when one or more members experience changes that affect the value of the alliance, for instance a change in the distribution of international power (ibid.: 1118). Based on various theories on alliance formation from the 1990s - Fearon 1997; Morrow 1994; Smith 1995, 1998; Walt 1997 - they identify four factors crucial to the value of alliances: the level of external threat faced by the allies, the military capabilities of the allied states, the extent to which policy goals are shared by the allies, and the availability of substitute allies (Leeds and Savun 2007: 1118). Arguably, all four of these are changing drastically in today's world, as the rise of China is rocking every aspect of global affairs by its foundations. Will this mean the end of the US's extensive network of friends and allies as we know it? And if not a definite end, to which degree can the nature of these agreements be expected to change with China's surge?

It is far from obvious what a *change* would entail for the alliances. Leeds and Savun (2007: 1119) point out that, contrary to what much of previous research on this assumes, alliances do not all end for the same reason, that is, in opportunistic violation of its terms. Actually, in their pool of cases, only 34 percent ended in opportunistic abrogation, while the rest ended in various other ways. As many as 16 percent ended simply because they had fulfilled their purpose; their *casus foederis* and their driving force no longer existed. So, even if the US's many alliances may not end in any "dirty" or dramatic ways, they may lose their power and influence in other, perhaps less noticeable ways; states may for example decide that the US no longer has that much to offer them, at least not enough to maintain a formal alliance or a close friendship. The second bivariate model of the analysis (chapter 4, section 4.2) will give some pointers.

2.4 Hirschman: Economic Relations as Power Tools

Again, by realism's harsh logic, close economic relations between states of different power-levels will inevitably put the weaker under the influence of the stronger. As I touched upon in the introduction, China has built an extensive network of economic ties around the world – one that, by many indicators, is more extensive than the US's analogous one. Does this network help Beijing garner more positive and acceptive stances on its initiatives and institutions around the world?

In his seminal work on the foreign policy consequences of trade, Albert Hirschman (1945 [1980]) describes the political aspect of international economic relations and explores the ways in which trade can be used as a power tool by those seeking increases in national power. The main argument for free trade theorists is that it will create a bond of friendship between nations. However, to suggest that economic projects of huge scale mainly aim at creating friendship and cooperation is for Hirschman simply utopian, based on a "belief that the dependence of **A** on **B** is roughly the same as the dependence of **B** on **A**" (1945 [1980]: 9). He points out that historically, benefit from international trade is almost never equally divided, especially when the trading parties are of different sizes and power-levels.

An essential term in his book is *trade dependence,* which he asserts produces foreign policy convergence. The more states trade, the more costly the interruptions to that trade relationship; both sides therefore have incentives to converge on matters of foreign policy, fearing that foreign policy disputes could interfere with the benefits of trade. As he notes:

[T]he total gain from trade for any country is indeed nothing but another expression for the total impoverishment which would be inflicted upon it by a stoppage of trade . . . this connection can serve as a modern application of the ancient saying *fortuna est servitus*" (i.e. "a great fortune involves great obligation").

-Hirschman 1945 [1980]: 18.

In other words, trade dependence increases the relevant country's "responsiveness to external demands, including unspoken ones, due to fears of losing market access and other economic benefits, and causes the economically weaker states to accommodate the foreign policy interests of the more powerful one" (in Dreher et.al. 2008).

Hirschman further identifies two types of effects from foreign trade. The first is the *supply effect* - by providing a plentiful supply of goods, foreign trade enhances the nation's power. The second effect of foreign trade is the *influence effect*; when foreign trade turns into a direct source of power. **A** can increase its hold on **B, C**, or **D** by creating a situation where these countries would do anything to continue the trade they have with **A** (ibid.: 16). Put another way, by increasing others' dependence on it, **A** bolsters its influence. Both these effects can arguably be identified in China's economic practices. BRI and similar investment initiatives are obvious examples of this; "China's use of infrastructure and development assistance in neighboring countries – as well as in Africa and Latin America – is clearly tied to an agenda of building political support within these countries" (Ikenberry 2015: 24).

More specifically, Hirschman says that the difficulty for country **B, C,** and **D** of dispensing with the trade they have with **A** is dependent on three factors: the total net gain of their trade with **A**, the length and painfulness of the adjustment process of switching their trade partners, and the strength of the vested interests which A has created within their economies (Hirschman 1945 [1980]: 18). By accepting BRI projects, then, states – particularly those dwarfed by the Chinese economic power – drastically increase all three. This is not to say that China necessarily has cynical, purely geopolitical motives behind initiatives like BRI. As Ikenberry (2015: 24) also notes, using Hirschman's term; "the growing size of the Chinese economy and the expansion of its trade and investment ties worldwide will have an "influence effect" whether or not China's government wants one." Recall that in realism, true motives and intentions are always unknown. The question of interest, then, is whether or not it is enough to bend states away from the US and toward China.

Similarly, Hart and Jones (2010: 72-73) apply Hirschman directly to the case of China. They hold that, due to Beijing's trade relations with weak and fragile states, China is in a particularly beneficial position to use its economic leverage to influence these states. Of course,

the same can be said of the US. It could also be argued that Washington is likely exploiting these effects on an even bigger scale, as it never shies away from interfering in others' domestic affairs. However, the general point stands, if anything, it is strengthened; great powers in economic "big brother" roles always wield a lot of power to influence their "smaller brothers". For China, this effect is perhaps most obvious in Africa, where both trade and largely untied foreign aid help "cultivate the goodwill of African leaders who provide Beijing with diplomatic support and valuable contracts as a matter of reciprocity" (Tull 2006: 468).[32]

In sum, by Hirschman's logic, China's economic strength puts it in a very influential position in relation to the world's small and medium powers; having a far bigger economy than all the states on my panel, the trade *percentage* for China is always smaller than the percentage for the other country. In most cases, China is therefore in a position where it can afford to walk away from the trade, which puts it in a much better bargaining position than the ones who will suffer if trade is disrupted. As such, these kinds of disparities in trade dependence can act as "a powerful weapon in the struggle for power," making the more dependent country more willing to make political concessions to the stronger party (Hirschman 1945 [1980]: 17). In the words of Zhu (2010: 2), Beijing's economic resilience and its ever-growing stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves makes "it possible for China to expand trade and investment and enhance its political influence in every corner of the world."

Like it always is with anything in international relations, the supposed link between China's expanding trade and foreign policy alignment to China's interests has its critics. There are those who hold that in most places, Chinese economic leverage is less conclusive than is often assumed. For example, Goh (2011: 24), through a series of case studies, finds that "China does not thus far have a significant record of managing to get its smaller Southeast Asian neighbors to do what they would not otherwise have done." Similarly, in his study of East Asian states, Ross (2006: 368) concludes that "economic capabilities alone are insufficient to generate accommodation" by the smaller states. They are generally more leery of China's military rise than they are enticed by the potential economic benefits of foreign policy cooperation, he says, and so they are more likely to balance against it than to comply with its foreign policy. Yet another prominent critic is not limited to East Asia. In a cross-national study of states' reactions to the 2008 Taiwan UN referendum and to China's 2008 crackdown on protestors in Tibet,

---

[32] In accordance with China's principle of non-interference, its foreign aid generally has "no strings attached". One notable exception concerns Taiwan; all recipients of Chinese aid must accept the *one China*-policy and cannot acknowledge Taiwan's independence (Strüver 2010: 172; Leger 2017).

Kastner (2010: 1) finds "no systematic relationship between China's foreign economic ties and national policies on these issues."

Despite the critics, I strongly suspect that having close economic relations to China will have a marked influence here. Also, the mechanisms I have described in this section should of course apply to the US in similar ways as they apply to China. I therefore suspect that having close economic relations to the US has a similar, but opposite effect. That is, if economic relations to China make states more acceptive of Chinese initiatives and institutions, it is my belief that economic relations to the US will make states more rejective of them. I could therefore have separated this into two hypotheses, one for China and another for the US. However, I think it will be even more interesting to examine *which* of these two effects is the strongest; which of the world's two leading powers is best at wielding its economy to get foreign policy compliance? This leads to my third and final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: *When a state has closer economic relations to China than to the US, it has a marked effect on how rejective that state is of Chinese initiatives and institutions (or vice-versa).*

In essence, this hypothesis pits the need for survival against the wish of prosperity. Any structural realist would, of course, argue that security considerations almost always trump economic ones. Thus, the logic of structural realism implies that the variables on economic relations might not have that much influence on the dependent variables, at least less so than the previous two models. Nevertheless, I think it will be interesting to check this myself. I think it is a general idea or even a conviction in our society that China's most potent weapon in influencing the world is its economic might (e.g. Ghosh 2013; Economic Times 2020). Is this really the case? The third bivariate model of the analysis (chapter 4, section 4.3) will give me some pointers.

*****

These three theories or groupings of theories all belong more or less strictly in the realist paradigm. Walt is the most obvious; he identifies as a defensive realist. The patron-client theory is, when applied to international relations, clearly linked to realism's propositions, even as it may be said to have certain elements of constructivism. Hirschman can be classified within

classical realism, even though his theory arguably contains certain elements of economic interdependence theory, that is, liberalism. What all three of them share, is the language of power, and a logic that implies that smaller states will inevitably be pushed around and controlled by the more powerful states.

The clearest illustration of this logic might be Thucydides's Melian Dialogue. In the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, the island of Melos had remained neutral. Athens conquered the city, slaughtered all the men and enslaved all women and children. In the negotiations, the Athenians did not even try to offer moral justification for their invasion, instead capturing the essence of realpolitik: "We shall not trouble you with specious pretenses … You know as well as we do that *right* is a question that only has meaning in relations between equals in power. In the real world, the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must" (in Allison 2017: 38, emphasis added). This also implies that, despite all talk of alliance *choices,* the weakest states might not have a real choice.

In sum, I have now derived three main hypotheses from realist theories. The next major task is to assemble a body of evidence that will enable me to examine which of the three work best to explain states' stances in the tug-of-war between China and the US.

3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY

In the following chapter, I gather the dataset I use in the analysis. I begin by explaining how I have chosen the 53 states on my panel. I then move on to explain how I have operationalized and measured the three dependent variables and the three clusters of independent variables I use. Finally, I go through some potentially relevant variables that, for different reasons, I have had to omit, and discuss some other potential pitfalls of the thesis.

3.1 Selecting the Panel of States

Given the exact wording of my research question, readers might have expected an analysis of all 193 countries in the world. Because of limitations in both time and space for the thesis, however, I have had to set a limit for my panel. I chose my states from the top of International Monetary Fund's (IMF) list of top states by nominal gross national product (GDP), a list I retrieved from the *World Economic Outlook* from April 2019.[33] I limit my cases in this way because I believe GDP is a good indicator of these states' actual global significance – these are states that the US and China actually *care* about, whose support can make a significant difference in global affairs.

Starting with 57 states, I take away the US and China themselves from the top positions. I have also decided to leave out two other states from my panel; Hong Kong and Taiwan. I do this for multiple reasons. In the case of Taiwan, it is debatable whether it can be counted as a sovereign state. For Hong Kong, sovereignty is not even a relevant question. In relation to China, these two face a completely different range of options and limitations than other states do. Indeed, what Fermann (2013) calls space for political action, which he defines as "the set of alternative actions which are politically possible and operationally available after external and internal framework conditions have influenced a decision-making problem" (51, my translation) is extremely limited in these two cases. I think these two are deserving of their own theses, ones fully devoted to the highly special circumstances surrounding them.

I am left with a panel of 53 sovereign states who are, to varying degrees, caught in the middle of the tug-of-war been the US and China. A majority of the states on the panel are the US's friends and allies (clients), but there are also a handful of states in more neutral positions who are torn between the two. The panel includes some developing states, who, as I have

---

[33] For some reason, Pakistan is missing from this list. I retrieve its numbers from the World Bank Databank (2018).

discussed, are heavily influenced by Beijing. A few, notably Russia and Iran, are by many indicators on "Team China", at least in force of having been alienated by the US and put under international sanctions (e.g. Ellyatt 2019a; McGregor 2019; Christensen 2016: 134).

3.2 Dependent Variables

I will now go through how each of the 53 states on my panel stand on the three Chinese initiatives and institutions I described in the introduction – AIIB, BRI and Huawei's 5G. These three are essential symbols of growing Chinese power and influence, and states' stances on them are therefore important indicators of how receptive or acceptive states are of China. I have codified these three dependent variables on scales from 1 to 6, where 6 denotes a stance that is fully rejective (thus likely pleasing the US while angering China), and 1 denotes a stance that is fully acceptive (thus likely pleasing China while angering the US).

Table 1: How I codify and operationalize the dependent variables.

Score	Y1: AIIB	Y2: BRI	Y3: Huawei's 5G
6	Full denunciation.	Actively opposing, for example by running an own alternative.	Full ban, often with associated phase-out of equipment.
5	Is showing absolutely no signs of or interest in joining.	Not a member, and highly suspicious.	Weighing up a ban or will most likely ban soon / Signed network security agreement with US.
4	Wavering: sending mixed signals. Might have expressed some interest, but is obviously hesitant.	Wavering: has played with the idea, but still skeptical. Or no particular position taken.	Wavering: has cancelled projects and/or has chosen competitors because of concerns, but no (full) ban.
3	Actually considering to join / prospective member / member with very small sum (under 0.05 percent of nominal GDP).	Sending positive signals, or already doing projects with Chinese help / High-level officials saying they want to deepen cooperation.	Only some limitations / On the fence, decision impending / will remain open (entails accepting the risk or even neglecting it in some ways).
2	Member, gives a moderate sum between 0.05 and 0.15 percent of nominal GDP.	Supporter by some agreement (not necessarily explicit for BRI) / Looking all set to join.	Using it for 5G with few restrictions / Has signed MoU, and/or is using it in tests or trials / In official talks.
1	Member, gives a significant sum over 0.15 percent of nominal GDP.	Fully cooperating member of the initiative, has signed on.	Using it for 5G without restrictions, major contracts in place.

Two important notes are in order before I carry on with this effort. First, there are, to be sure, fluid transitions between each of the scores in the table, and there is little separating one number from the next. Indeed, one could likely argue forever about what scores a particular state should have. However, I have set the table as precisely as I could manage, and while readers can disagree, I trust that these are sufficiently solid codifications for the purposes of this thesis.

Second, for Huawei's 5G, to a much bigger degree than for AIIB or BRI, the global responses are constantly changing, and will continue to do so for some time. For example, Germany is set to make a final decision on Huawei in early October 2020 (around the time when I submit my thesis; Liu 2020). So, while I have set a final date for my measurements on August 1, things are sure to keep changing. This is a good illustration of the general notion in political science research that it is challenging to choose an ongoing issue as the object of study. To my advantage, I "stabilize" the inherent fluctuation of the Huawei question by using a dependent variable in three parts, where the two others are more stable. The aggregated Y, which will be most in focus throughout the analysis, can therefore be said to be much more stable than any of its three subvariables, and much more impervious to specialized circumstances and irregular events. Still, I have to keep this potential weakness of my approach in mind.

3.2.1 Stances on AIIB

For the first dependent subvariable, I retrieve numbers on members' investment from AIIB's own web page (2020). To incorporate states' relative economic sizes, I convert all the investments to percentages of the state's nominal GDP, which I again get from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) list from 2019. A fully detailed list of how the 53 states on my panel stand on AIIB, including all relevant sources, is in Appendix A, section A.1. Here, I recap the responses by region, as well as mention a few notable examples.

The first thing that strikes me when it comes to AIIB is the very large degree of support from virtually all parts of the world. The Europeans' responses, and the EU's in particular "reflects the willingness of member-states such as UK, Germany and France to engage more closely with Beijing" (Balasubramaniam 2016). Indeed, close to all of the European powers have signed up as members of the bank, with contributions around 0.10-0.12 percent of GDP. Four European states on my panel are members with very modest contributions compared to the others, and one European state is neither a member nor a prospective member.

Similarly, among those AIIB lists as its *regional members* – which includes several of the US's key allies – all but two (Malaysia and Singapore) have made relatively large contributions. It is notable that Iran, despite the international regime of economic sanctions against it, has been working closely with China under the framework of infrastructure investment for quite some time. For example, in 2019, China pledged to provide $35 billion to Iran in financing and loans (Tianyang 2019).

There is really only one state other than the US who has had a distinctly rejective response to AIIB, and that is, perhaps not surprisingly, Japan. The Japanese are the leaders and the largest shareholders in AIIB's direct rival, the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Therefore, Japan's initial response to AIIB was quite negative. More recently, there has been some focus on cooperation between the two banks, and some indications that the Japanese might grow to accept having a rival (e.g. Sender 2020). I therefore hesitate to say that Japan is fully *denouncing* AIIB. The other "colder" responses to AIIB has come from those regions that are far away from China. In these regions, most states are currently holding back to various degrees. Some have remained mostly quiet about the bank, and others are showing very restrained positivity.

3.2.2 Stances on BRI

For the second dependent subvariable, I use *Development Reimagined*'s (2019) excellent infographic of the Belt and Road-countries as of September 2019. I have retrieved additional info from the official site *Belt and Road Portal* (2020), which contains a full list on BRI deals China has signed around the world. A fully detailed list of how the 53 states on my panel stand on BRI, including all relevant sources, is in Appendix A, section A.2. Here, I recap the responses by region, as well as mention a few notable examples.

Almost all the states on my panel from Asia, as well as from the Pacific, have signed up as members of the initiative. I want to mention Russia, who is the largest recipient of BRI investments, and who has grown to be an "indispensable partner" of the initiative (Husein 2020). As I wrote about in the introduction, a series of major projects under the flagpole of BRI are already underway all over Asia. They are at various levels of progression; a few are more or less finished, and even more are in planning. I will not describe them all in detail here, but a full list of projects can be found on the *Belt and Road Portal* (2020).

In these regions, there are only three significant holdouts; Japan, India, and Australia.[34] China's primary regional competitors are working with the US on *The Free and Open Indo-Pacific*, which is commonly seen as their attempt at creating an alternative to BRI (Parameswaran 2019). The FOIP is only one example of their opposition; along similar lines, Japan signed a pact with the EU in 2019 to boost connectivity, a move that was seen as a riposte to BRI (Pandey 2019).

---

[34] These three all have their reasons to be opposed to BRI. Perhaps most significantly, India has repeatedly expressed great concern with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through the intensely disputed areas of Kashmir (Laskar 2017). For India, of course, anything that might bolster Pakistan's standing in these regions is seen as threatening.

In Africa, BRI now covers 40 of 55 states, including the four on my panel. BRI also has a series of major projects in Africa. Of my five states in South America, the responses have generally been quite acceptive, but not overwhelmingly so. Brazil is illustrative. While not a member, it is quite positive to BRI, among other things emphasizing the initiative's great potential for Brazilian markets and strengthening of the two's economic ties (Xiaojing 2019). There are also some quite significant BRI projects in this region, a major one being the laying of 24,000 kilometers of subsea fiberoptic cable to connect Chile and China, a project which signals China's intention to use Chile as a gateway into South America (Development Reimagined 2019). The US's closest neighbors have been a bit more hesitant about BRI, trying hard to avoid taking sides and being careful not to anger either the US or China.

Large parts of Europe, including some members of NATO, have signed up as members. Notably, in March 2019, Italy shocked the world by signing a cooperation document with China on BRI. This is regarded as BRI's biggest victory as of yet, as the Italian economy is by far the largest among the signatories. Italy is also the first G7 country besides China to join the initiative (Ma 2019). While not a member, the UK's Boris Johnson has at several times praised the Chinese initiative, and it has been speculated that an EU-exit could entail a BRI deal for UK (Devonshire-Ellis 2019).

Parts of Western and Northern Europe, on the other hand, have been more wavering in their approaches to BRI. Some of these states, notably Germany, France, Sweden and Spain are showing significant restraint and are holding back in various ways. Illustratively, the French government, being firmly principled while remaining cautious, has stated that it will only consider cooperation with China on a project-by-project basis (Nicolas 2019).

3.2.3 Stances on Huawei's 5G

Finally, for the third dependent subvariable, I retrieve most of the information from *NS Tech*'s infographic (Goodier 2020), and the rest is from various newspapers and magazines. Again, these numbers are updated to August 1, 2020. Some states may well have changed their stances since then, as these are constantly developing issues. A fully detailed list of how the 53 states on my panel stand on Huawei's 5G, including all relevant sources, is in Appendix A, section A.3. Here, I go through the responses by region, as well as mention a few notable examples.

The European responses have been quite mixed, but they seem to be growing ever more rejective. A few states, notably Spain and Ireland, are already using at least *some* Huawei in their 5G networks. For a long time, most Europeans remained "on the fence", displaying a

general unwillingness to single out any one company, not wanting to anger either side. More recently, however, quite a few of the European states have dared stand more firmly against Huawei, even without internal coordination. Some have signed cyber-security agreements with the US, signaling that they will reject the company. Others have imposed stricter laws on network security, though without mentioning Huawei explicitly. Others again have cancelled business with Huawei and/or have now given 5G contracts to Nokia and/or Ericsson, thus signaling an early rejection of Huawei. Even Italy, who for a long time has enjoyed good relations with Beijing, recently shut Huawei out of a tender for 5G equipment, which can be seen as an early signal of compliance with the US. The UK even banned Huawei in July 2020, marking the end of what former British PM David Cameron once dubbed a "golden era" of British-Chinese ties (Sandle and Faulconbridge 2020).

Turning to Asia, Huawei's home grounds, the use of the company for 5G implementation is high; several Asian states are using it virtually without limitations. Many have also involved Huawei in their 5G trials and/or -pilots, making the probability of upcoming bans very low. Russia, notably, is already working closely with Huawei, and the company's activities in the country has been called a "courtship". Reportedly, it is working as intended, and Huawei has already launched Moscow's 5G (Gabuev 2020). More recently there have been some early signs of an Asian push-back. For example, Israel recently shut Huawei out of a tender for 5G contracts, India is reportedly weighing up a ban in light of the recent border-clash with China, and Singapore recently chose Ericsson for its 5G implementation (Bassist 2020). Japan put a full ban on Huawei in place as early as December 2018 (Tao 2018).

All the African states on my panel have been acceptive of Huawei's 5G; some are using it fully, while others have pledged to remain open to all providers. Similarly, the South American states on my panel are all quite acceptive of Huawei and/or unwilling to say no to it. The company's attraction in this region should be obvious; a report from March 2020 predicts that 5G implemented by Huawei will bring $300 billion in investments to South America by 2023 (LABS 2020a).

In the Pacific, Australia put a full ban in place as early as October 2018 (Slezak and Bogle 2018). While some thought that New Zealand had banned Huawei for good in 2018, it later became evident that New Zealand had *not* taken a strict all or nothing-approach (Ayson 2020). That said, Huawei's prospects for contracts in New Zealand are getting dimmer by the day, a major contract was recently given to Samsung (Keall 2020). Finally, the US's two neighbors are quite rejective (at least highly hesitant) to Huawei's 5G. Canada, having recently suffered a setback in its relations with China following the arrest of two Canadians in China,

have teamed with Ericsson. Trudeau have postponed Canada's final decision on Huawei, but he is reportedly weighing up a full ban (Reuters Staff 2020a; Canadian Press 2020).

****

Below is a complete table where I have summarized the 53 states' scores on the dependent variables. The sixth column shows the aggregated Y, which is simply the sum of the three subvariables. The states in China's own region are marked in yellow. Again, fully detailed accounts of how I have set these scores are in Appendix A.

Table 2: Values on the dependent variables.[35]

Country	Country code	Stance on AIIB	Stance on BRI	Stance on Huawei's 5G	Aggregated Y
Japan	JPN	5 (normalizing)	6 (FOIP)	6 (full ban)	17
Germany	DEU	2 (0.11)	4 (mixed)	4 (stricter laws)	10
India	IND	1 (0.26)	6 (FOIP)	5 (weighing up ban)	12
United Kingdom	GBR	2 (0.10)	3 (positive)	6 (full ban)	11
France	FRA	2 (0.12)	4 (mixed)	4 (advising against)	10
Italy	ITA	2 (0.12)	1 (March 19)	4 (excl from tender)	6
Brazil	BRA	3 (prospective)	3 (positive)	3 (remain open)	9
Canada	CAN	3 (0.054)	4 (mixed)	5 (weighing up ban)	12
South Korea	KOR	1 (0.20)	1 (Nov. 2015)	2 (using *some* Hua.)	4
Russia	RUS	1 (0.39)	1 (indisp. partner)	1 (very close coop.)	3
Spain	ESP	2 (0.12)	4 (mixed)	2 (contracts to Hua.)	8
Australia	AUS	1 (0.25)	6 (FOIP)	6 (full ban)	13
Mexico	MEX	5 (no commitm.)	4 (flirting)	4 (excl. from core)	13
Indonesia	IDN	1 (0.36)	1 (November 2018)	3 (remain open)	5
Netherlands	NLD	2 (0.11)	2 (MoU on coop)	4 (excl. from core)	8
Turkey	TUR	1 (0.32)	1 (November 2018)	2 (Huawei in tests)	4
Saudi Arabia	SAU	1 (0.32)	1 (March 2017)	1 (using Huawei)	3
Switzerland	CHE	2 (0.10)	1 (April 2019)	1 (using Huawei)	4
Poland	POL	2 (0.13)	1 (January 2019)	5 (sec. agr. with US)	8
Taiwan					
Sweden	SWE	2 (0.11)	4 (skeptical)	2 (using *some* Hua.)	8
Belgium	BEL	2 (0.052)	2 (agr. Sept. 18)	3 (on the fence)	7
Thailand	THA	1 (0.26)	1 (September 2017)	2 (using *some* Hua.)	4
Argentina	ARG	3 (prospective)	3 (Ch. projects)	2 (in official talks)	8
Nigeria	NGA	4 (hesitant)	1 (September 2019)	3 (on the fence)	8
Iran	IRN	1 (0.32)	1 (January 2019)	2 (reports of links)	4
Austria	AUT	2 (0.10)	1 (April 2018)	3 (on the fence)	6
U. A. Emirates	ARE	1 (0.23)	1 (July 2018)	1 (using Huawei)	3
Norway	NOR	2 (0.13)	3 (building bridge)	4 (picked Ericsson)	9
Ireland	IRL	3 (0.032)	3 (positive)	1 (using Huawei)	7
Israel	ISR	1 (0.19)	1 (2B&RF, Apr. '19)	4 (left out of tender)	6
Hong Kong					

---

[35] For Y1: percentage of nominal GDP in parenthesis. Abbreviations: FOIP=Free and Open Indo-Pacific, B&RF=Belt and Road Forum on International Cooperation, 2B&RF=Second Belt and Road Forum.

Malaysia	MYS	3* (0.03)	1 (B&RF, May 2017)	2 (several contracts)	6
Singapore	SGP	3* (0.064)	1 (B&RF, May 2017)	4 (chosen Ericsson)	8
Philippines	PHL	1 (0.25)	1 (November 2018)	1 (using Huawei)	3
South Africa	ZAF	3 (prospective)	1 (Nov. 2018)	1 (using Huawei)	5
Denmark	DNK	2 (0.10)	3 (positive)	4 (want Western 5G)	9
Colombia	COL	4 (hesitant)	3 (positive)	2 (Huawei in trials)	9
Bangladesh	BGD	1 (0.19)	1 (October 2016)	1 (using Huawei)	3
Egypt	EGY	1 (0.20)	1 (January 2016)	2 (Huawei in tests)	4
Pakistan*	PAK	1 (0.33)	1 (B&RF, May 2017)	2 (have done trials)	4
Chile	CHL	3 (prospective)	1 (November 2018)	2 (involved)	6
Finland	FIN	2 (0.11)	3 (building tunnel)	2 (Huawei in tests)	7
Vietnam	VNM	1 (0.23)	1 (November 2017)	4 (Nokia-coop.)	6
Romania	ROU	3 (0.058)	1 (May 2017)	5 (sec. agr. With US	9
Czech Republic	CZE	4 (hesitant)	1 (November 2015)	5 (sec. agr. With US	10
Portugal	PRT	3 (0.026)	1 (December 2018)	4 (keep out of core)	8
Iraq	IRQ	4 (hesitant)	1 (March 2017)	1 (using Huawei)	6
Peru	PER	3 (prospective)	1 (2B&RF, Apr. '19)	2 (in rollout tests)	6
Greece	GRC	3 (0.0043)	1 (MoU)	4 (picked Ericsson)	8
New Zealand	NZL	1 (0.21)	1 (March 2017)	4 (chosen Samsung)	6
Qatar	QAT	1 (0.30)	1 (November 2014)	1 (using Huawei)	3
Algeria	DZA	3 (0.0026, new)	1 (September 2019)	2 (in rollout tests)	6
Hungary	HUN	3 (0.056)	1 (B&RF, May 2017)	1 (using Huawei)	5
Kazakhstan	KAZ	1 (0.41)	1 (October 2016)	2 (Huawei in trials)	4

A few observations about this table: The mean aggregated Y of all 53 states is 7.00. It is safe to say that this is far from as rejective as the US would want the states of the world to be (the US would arguably have liked the mean score to be 18). It is also worth noting that the states in China's nearby regions (in yellow, 23 states) have a mean aggregated Y of 5.52, while the states outside those regions (30 states) have a mean aggregated Y of 8.13.

3.3 Independent Variables

I will now operationalize the three main clusters of independent variables I use to examine the *reasons* behind the 53 states' stances. Fully detailed tables of these variables, with all measured values, are in Appendix B.

3.3.1 Perceived Threat from China

For this first cluster of independent variables, I operationalize and measure three of Stephen Walt's four components of threat perception from others.[36] Recall that the smaller these three subvariables become, the bigger the threat that state should perceive from China, which will again influence its alignment.

---

[36] The fourth of his components – perceived aggressive intentions – is not as easily operationalizable as the others, but it will be discussed more at several points in later chapters.

X1.1 Aggregate Power relative to China (*powerchn*)

For the subvariable aggregate power, I take Correlates of War's list on *National Material Capabilities*, where I use the latest available numbers from 2012 (originally from Singer 1988).[37] This measures a state's power by six key indicators: iron and steel productions, military expenditures, military personnel, energy consumption, total population and urban population. Note that I have calculated all numbers as relative to China's score of 0.218, so the least powerful states score close to 0, while the most powerful approximate 1.

X1.2 Geographical Proximity to Beijing (*distchn*)

For the subvariable geographical proximity from a state's capital to Beijing, I use the *CShapes*-dataset from Weidman, Kuse and Gleditsch (2010). This dataset was built by using a formula that calculates the distances between the city centers of all the world's capitals (in kilometers).

X1.3 Offensive Capabilities relative to China (*offcapchn*)

For this one, I use the list from *Global Firepower 2020*. This ranking utilizes over 50 individual factors, notably manpower (total population, fit-for-service), equipment (military vehicles), finances (defense budgets, external debt), logistics (airports, labor force strength), natural resources (oil, gas) and geography (square land area, coastline, borders) to determine a nation's overall military strength.[38] 0 is the best possible score on this ranking (the US, which is number one, has a score of 0.0606). Importantly, I look at the numbers *in relation to* China's score of 0.0691, so that those states closest to China in offensive capabilities get a score close to 1, and those with the least capabilities get a score close to 0. Note that Russia, who has slightly more offensive capabilities than China, scores a bit above 1 (1.014).

3.3.2 Having the US as a Patron

For the second main cluster of independent variables, I operationalize and measure five essential indicators of states' patron-client relationship with the US. Recall my suggestion that when these subvariables display close patron-client ties, the relevant states can be expected to comply more often with the US.

---

[37] That these numbers are eight years old, should not be a significant problem, as the NMC score is changing very slowly from year to year. Running the numbers along with ones from earlier years, I find correlations of close to 1.00.
[38] This variable is quite similar to aggregate power, as they measure many of the same indicators. However, there are some significant differences, and I want to include both.

X2.1 Treaty Alliance with the US (*allyusa*)

This subvariable describes what sort of formal alliance states are in with the US, and has five categories: 1 is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); 2 is the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS); 3 is the Rio Treaty (*Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Reciproca*, TIAR); 4 is bilateral treaties, and 5 is no treaty. I find the member-lists on the respective organizations' webpages. Note that this subvariable is *categorical* and not *ordinal*, that is, the five categories are functionally collateral.

X2.2 Strategic Partnership with the US (*partnerusa*), and X2.3 Strategic Dialogue with the US (*dialogueusa*)

These two subvariables depict two forms of formal ties with the US that many of the states on my panel have. Both are a few steps down in formality from a treaty-bound alliance, but far from inconsequential, I suspect. A full list of the states with these ties to the US is found in Hamilton (2014: 22-23). There are a number of different types of partnerships and dialogues that can be maintained with the US. These can have more or less "fancy" names, including Pacific Partnerships, Comprehensive Partnerships, Strategic Framework Agreements, Global Partnership Dialogues, and Binational Commissions. However, I deem the internal differences between these types to be inconsequential for my purpose and thus neglectable, and so I treat all of them as *1* on dichotomous variables.

X2.4 Number of US Military Personnel in State (*usmltprsnc*)

For the next subvariable, I use the Department of Defense's list containing the number of US military personnel in other states (from December 2019). The list includes members of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard on active duty, the army national guard, and all reserves.[39] This variable is naturally skewed to the right; while the US only maintains a handful of troops in most of the world's states, a few states host very many. Japan, Germany, and Italy, for obvious, historic reasons, all host tens of thousands of US troops. The UK and South Korea also distinguish themselves with huge presences of US troops. To minimize this skewing effect and flatten the curve, I generate the natural logarithm of this subvariable before examining its effect on the dependent variables.

---

[39] Note that the numbers for most Middle Eastern states are artificially low. Iraq is not even on the list; for various security concerns, the numbers of US soldiers in states like Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan are not made public.

X2.5 Arms Imports from the US (*armsimpusa*)

For this subvariable, I use numbers from the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (from World Bank Group 2019). SIPRI contains information on all transnational transfers of major conventional weapons. The US sells arms to virtually every state on my panel (unlike China, who only sells to a handful of states in the world).

3.3.3 Economic Relations to China and to the US

For the third cluster of independent variables, I operationalize and measure four aspects of a state's economic relations to China and to the US (six to begin with). Four of these are used to generate two other subvariables based on the *relation* between economic relations to the two countries. Recall my suggestion that the one who has closer economic relations to a state will have greater influence over its foreign policy choices.

X3.1 Relative Imports (*relimp*) and X3.2 Relative Exports (*relexp*)

For this subvariable, I use the World Bank's *World Integrated Trade Solution* from 2020, which contains each state's trade data with one another. The latest updated numbers on this index are from 2018 for most states.[40] The numbers for imports from China (*impchn*), imports from the US (*impusa*), exports to China (*expchn*) and exports to the US (*expusa*) can be found in Appendix B, section B.3, but these are not themselves the actual subvariables. I divide the numbers for economic relations with China on the same numbers for economic relations to the US, in order to get a measurement for the disparities between the two. If a state trades a lot with China and little with the US, the number becomes large. Conversely, if a state trades little with China and a lot with the US, the number becomes small. Note that this variable is naturally skewed to the right, primarily because of Iran. The US leads the international regime of economic sanctions on Iran, and the two's trade is extremely limited. China, by contrast, trades much more with Iran, which makes the relative trade in this instance very large. To minimize this effect, I generate the natural logarithm of this subvariable to examine its influence.

X3.3 Free Trade Agreement with China (*ftachn*) and X3.4 Free Trade Agreement with the US (*ftausa*)

---

[40] There are a few exceptions; Algeria, Iran and Vietnam have numbers from 2017, Bangladesh from 2015, and Iraq has only the export numbers, and those are from 2014.

To measure the first of these two subvariables, I use *China Internet Information Center*'s complete list of FTAs (2020). Similarly, I get the complete list of the US's FTAs from the *US Trade Representative 2020*. In both cases, there are of course internal differences between the various agreements, but for simplicity, I treat both as dichotomous variables (values 0 and 1).

3.4 Some Omitted Variables and Other Pitfalls

Before I begin the analysis, I must note a few factors which might work as pitfalls clouding my arguments. Perhaps most importantly of the things I discuss in this section, I have had to omit several potentially relevant variables. This is often because there is no easy way to operationalize them, or because they only apply to a select few of the states on my panel, and would provide too narrow a base for analysis. For example, the potentially relevant variable of foreign aid from either the US or China would be strongly skewed to the side, as only a handful of states on my panel actually receive significant foreign aid from either of these two. Logarithmic transformation would have eased the problem, but the validity and reliability of any finding would still have been very low.

Similarly, the concept of *perceived aggressive intentions* is, as I mentioned in the theory chapter (chapter 2), Walt's (1987) fourth and final element of threat perception; he even refers to this as the *primary source* of threat perception. So, *perceived aggressive intentions* could have, and perhaps should have, been my X1.4-subvariable. However, it is not operationalizable in any simple way. In fact, a bedrock assumption shared by most realists is that one can *never* be sure of another state's intentions in global affairs (e.g. Mearsheimer 2001: 30). Neoclassical realism, too, emphasizes that state leaders' abilities to perceive incoming impulses vary greatly. As this thesis has political realism as a general baseline, I must treat *perceived aggressive intentions* as something which is always unknown.

Still, I need to keep in mind throughout the thesis that *perceived aggressive intentions*, as well as *reason* to perceive aggressive intentions, vary greatly between states. For example, states who have historical enmities and/or ongoing territorial disputes with China might be expected to have generally lower bars to see China's intentions as offensive. This might complicate, but also illustrate further, the results of the next chapter. I will touch upon this in some of the examples I discuss in the first bivariate model (chapter 4, section 4.1).

In general, there is a near infinite list of other variables, both dependent and independent, which might be more or less relevant for my research. For various reasons – also for concerns

about length and parsimony of my approach – I cannot cover all of them. However, I strongly urge future researchers to consider doing the potentially lengthy efforts of operationalizing and analyzing these additional variables. For example, taking one of neoclassical realism's intervening variables, one could find an operationalization of leader image or the way the leaders of my 53 states think and act, and examine whether any specific types of leaders have higher probability of being acceptive or rejective of Chinese initiatives and institutions. Similar examples should be easily conceivable. Indeed, the framework – the hopefully sturdy skeleton – I have laid out here is one that other researchers should feel free to build upon.

Another major pitfall in this paper is that I have no way of accounting for other threats that may come in from the side and muddy the waters. It should go without saying that the international system is far more complex than a simple US-China dichotomy. For one thing, most of the states on my panel perceive multiple threats around the world; ones which may complicate, strengthen or even lessen the threat these states perceive from China and/or the US. One example is the perceived threat from Iran; states like Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel, to mention a few, currently have or have had intense disputes with Iran, something which surely (albeit indirectly) alters the way these states perceive the US and China. To go into one of these, Israel – who perceives threats from virtually *all* the Arab states – probably does not have as much time or capacity to worry about a potential threat from China, and it could therefore be that it is less skeptical of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. At the same time, one would expect that this overwhelming number of perceived threats would make Israel cling even harder to its alliance with the US. In sum, other threats can conceivably come in and change things from many directions and in many ways.

Another obvious example of something complicating the picture of global threats is the threat many of the states on my panel perceive from Russia. To mention some of the most important ones: Kazakhstan was once part of the Soviet Union; Poland, Romania, Hungary, what is now the Czech Republic, and the former East Germany were once behind the infamous "Iron Curtain" that divided Europe in the Cold War; Finland fought an all-out war with the Soviets in 1939-1940; the states of Northern Europe are threatened by Russia's often aggressive behavior in the Arctic; and Turkey is currently on the opposite side of Russia in the war in Syria. In many ways, the looming Russia can be said to have reemerged as a security threat for most of the European powers and other states around the world (Cohen and Radin 2019; Potrovskiy 2019; Henderson 2019; Johnson 2019, Ellyatt 2019a, 2019b). For most or all of these states, the potential threat coming from Russia can likely be said to be more real than the

potential threat coming from China. Again, I would expect that this makes states cling even harder to the alliances they might have with the US.

These are all things that severely complicate the picture of perceived threats around the world, and, by extension, the ways the states on my panel stand in the tug-of-war between the US and China. The examples above, together with very many similar ones, share one thing; they make the relevant states *more* reliant on the security partners they have. For most of the states on my panel, this is the US. In other words, for these states, having other threats to worry about, no matter what that might be, will only drive these states more firmly into the hands of the US, and, by extension, away from China. In this way, and for the relevant states, the concept of other threats is perhaps not a true *pitfall,* but rather a device that *strengthens* the mechanisms I examine in this thesis.

Yet, the effects of these things are all but linear, and thus very much unpredictable, as they would influence each state on my panel differently. Not all 53 states have the US as a security partner; some are more or less neutral, while others again have similar relationships with China. In a way, the bipolar world of the Cold War was highly stable, easy to grasp, and easy to cope with. Now, by contrast, the world is ripe with potential threats, and they vow into each other and interact with each other in ways no one can ever really understand. And since other threats affect each of the 53 states on my panel differently, I have to think of them as things which can potentially mess with my findings. Therefore, I raise it as a pitfall before embarking on the analysis.

Note that there are certain elements of process-tracing involved in the relation between the three dependent subvariables. AIIB came first, and certainly has had an impact on both the constitution and reception of BRI, and both of them again influence how states respond to Huawei's role in 5G. In essence, the three initiatives and institutions are everything but disconnected; they interact in ways I cannot always foresee or even understand. Nevertheless, my approach in this thesis does not really account for any of these crossover-effects, which is another potential pitfall, or at least something I will have to keep in mind when analyzing the findings.

Finally, the results I get in this paper should be met with caution, primarily because of the relatively low number of cases. 53 observations qualify as medium-*N*, at best, and is generally too small to make any definite conclusions. This challenge can be especially troublesome given that my three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. The correlations I find in this thesis are highly vulnerable to spurious effects and other systemic or random errors. Therefore, once again, I strongly urge future researchers to build upon the foundation I lay in

this thesis, for example by extending it to cover *more* states, *more* independent variables, and/or *more* Chinese initiatives and institutions.

4 ANALYSIS

In the following chapter, I analyze the impact each of the independent variables have on the value of the dependent variables. In other words, this chapter aims to evaluate the hypotheses developed in chapter 2 in light of the dataset gathered in chapter 3. I split the analysis into three bivariate models; one for threat perception from China (the three subvariables of X1), one for the patron-client ties to the US (the five subvariables of X2), and one for the economic relations (the four subvariables of X3). In each bivariate model, I conduct standard correlation-analysis, before doing some robustness-checks. I also corroborate the findings by taking certain cases, both on-the-line cases and outliers, for more in-depth study. In a fourth section, I conduct three multivariate regression analyses in order to see the interactions of my three clusters of independent variables.

4.1 First Bivariate Model: The Effect of Perceived Threat from China

In this section, I will examine the first bivariate model, which consists of the X1-variables of threat perception. I will also assess the related hypotheses 1a and 1b, which predicted that perceiving a threat from China would have a marked influence on whether states are rejective or acceptive of the three Chinese initiatives and institutions.

I begin by making a table with all the correlation-coefficients between the dependent variables and the three subvariables of threat perception.

Table 3: The correlations between the dependent variables and the three subvariables of threat perception from China.[41]

	Y_AIIB	*Y_BRI*	*Y_Huawei*	*Y_aggreg*	*powerchn*	*distchn*	*offcapchn*
Y_AIIB	1.0000						
Y_BRI	0.2124	1.0000					
Y_Huawei	0.2039	0.4784	1.0000				
Y_aggreg	0.5726	0.8016	0.8044	1.0000			
powerchn	-0.0536	0.4828	0.2486	0.3383	1.0000		
distchn	0.4514	0.1052	-0.0113	0.2117	-0.2299	1.0000	
offcapchn	-0.2659	0.2605	0.1565	0.1064	0.8206	-0.2341	1.0000

---

[41] X1.1 Aggregate power relative to China (*powerchn*), X1.2 Geographical proximity to Beijing (*distchn*), and X1.3 Offensive capabilities relative to China (*offcapchn*).

As seen from the nine yellow numbers in this table, the independent subvariables have quite diverse correlations with the three dependent subvariables. Some of the coefficients are sharply positive, such as the correlation between aggregate power relative to China and stance on BRI, or between geographical proximity to Beijing and stance on AIIB. In other words, when these subvariables grow in value, the stances on the Chinese initiatives and institutions grow accordingly (state becomes more rejective). Other coefficients are much more modest, such as the correlation between proximity to Beijing and stance on BRI, or between proximity and stance on Huawei's 5G. Three coefficients are even negative; the correlation between aggregate power and stance on AIIB, between offensive capabilities and stance on AIIB, and between proximity and stance on Huawei's 5G.

As I mentioned above, however, none of these nine may in themselves be all that revealing, as they are each influenced by a special set of circumstances. The most interesting numbers (and the most relevant as to my research question) are the three in green; the correlation-coefficients between the three independent subvariables and the aggregated Y. Again, the benefit of having three Ys is that the findings can be stabilized in an aggregate of the three. On first glance, I note that all three of these coefficients are positive, but that the correlation between offensive capabilities and the aggregated Y is quite weak. This indicates support for hypothesis 1b; that states perceiving a bigger threat from China become more rejective of the Chinese initiatives and institutions.

To get a closer look at these three effects, I draw up graphs, scatter the results, and draw up lines of best fit:

*Figure 2: The correlation between X1.1 Aggregate power relative to China (*powerchn*) and the aggregated Y.*

This graph is pointing quite sharply upwards; the correlation-coefficient is 0.3383. In general terms, the more a state's power is dwarfed by China's, the more *acceptive* that state is of the three Chinese initiatives and institutions. Conversely, the more a state's aggregate power approaches China's, the more *rejective* that state is to the Chinese initiatives and institutions. India (IND), being on-the-line, is illustrative. It approximates China's power, and it should therefore feel more capable of resisting the Chinese. Based on its scores on the dependent variables (*12* on the aggregated Y), it does, and it uses that position.

In the theory chapter, I mentioned that Walt (1987) said there were two main ways states reacted to threats; balancing or bandwagoning. This first correlation implies that those small and medium powers most threatened by China (threat by Walt's definition), tend to bandwagon with it. As is the case with all the correlations I study in this chapter, there are obviously several exceptions to this, as the graph clearly shows. Yet, all else being equal, this is the general trend.

There are two other subvariables to examine before I can establish any links or effects. Next is the second subvariable of X1, for which I draw up the graph in the same way:

*Figure 3: The correlation between X1.2 Geographical proximity to Beijing (*distchn*) and the aggregated Y.*

This graph is pointing notably upwards; the correlation-coefficient is 0.2117. This effect is more modest than the previous, but it is still quite distinct. In general terms, the closer a state is to Beijing, the more *acceptive* that state is of the three Chinese initiatives and institutions. Conversely, the further a state is from Beijing (and further away from its sphere of influence), the more *rejective* that state is of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. Like the previous effect, this implies that when small and medium powers are faced with a threat from China (threat by Walt's definition), they tend to bandwagon with it, *ceteris paribus*.

I see from the graph that Japan (JPN), and to a lesser degree India (IND), are highly influential outliers. Both lie close by Beijing, but, going against the general trend, are very rejective of the Chinese initiatives and institutions, thus making the correlation much smaller than it would have been without them. This of course has to do with the two being relatively powerful, but it also has to do with something I mentioned as a pitfall above; given their historical enmities and ongoing territorial disputes with China, Japan and India have more reason than most others to perceive aggressive intentions from the Chinese, and thus, by Walt's logic, are unlikely to bandwagon with China, and will balance against it instead.

Japan is the clearest illustration of this; Japan and China have a long, troublesome history of repeated wars, invasions, and conflicts. Perhaps the worst wound between them stems from the Japanese invasion and occupation of China between 1937 and 1945. By the most

conservative estimates, fourteen million Chinese were killed over the course of this occupation, including the more than 300,000 that were killed in the infamous Nanjing Massacre (Merkel-Hess and Wasserstrom 2010). These wounds are visible, in many ways even open, to this day. Illustrative of today's strained relationship between the two are the at times intense territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a group of uninhibited islands in the East China Sea, which Japan and China (and Taiwan) have formally disputed since 1972.[42] The disputes have remained stable to this day, despite constant speculation of militarized escalation.

This is only one example from a long list of reasons why China and Japan mistrust and dislike each other. "A lot of Chinese nationalist anger toward Japan, which emerges from time to time, is therefore real" (Mahbubani 2020a: 224). The negative sentiments go both ways; in a *Pew Research* survey from December 2019, *85 percent* of Japanese said they held unfavorable views of China; globally, this number is 41 percent.[43] It is not far-fetched, then, to suggest that Japan perceives aggressive intentions from China much more often and to a larger degree than any other state on my panel. That strengthens the general threat Japan perceives from China, which again makes Japan rule out bandwagoning, making it more rejective of Chinese initiatives and institutions (score *17* on the aggregated Y).

Even though this goes against the general trend of the correlation-analysis above, this further strengthens the idea that threat perception strongly influences states' stances on China. However, the case of Japan points to hypothesis 1a and not 1b; the perceived threat from China pushes Japan to be more *rejective* of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. In other words, if perceived aggressive intentions are also in the mix, a perceived threat from China might, *ceteris paribus*, make states counterbalance against China instead of bandwagoning with it.

Finally in this model, I will examine the third subvariable of X1, for which I draw up the graph in the same way:

---

[42] This is when the US handed the islands back to Japan after WW2. The dispute actually stems back to 1895, when Japan first annexed the island. The deepest roots go even further back (Togo 2014).

[43] As I noted previously, poll numbers only reflect various public's stances, which are not necessarily the same as the officials' or the state's stances. It does, however, give us some important indicators of state preferences.

*Figure 4: The correlation between X1.3 Offensive capabilities relative to China (*offcapchn*) and the aggregated Y.*

This graph is pointing only slightly upwards; the correlation-coefficient is 0.1064, a rather weak effect compared to the two previous. In general terms, the (weak) tendency is that the more a state's offensive capabilities are dwarfed by China's, the more *acceptive* that state is of the three Chinese initiatives and institutions. Conversely, the more a state's offensive capabilities approach China's, the more *rejective* that state is to Chinese initiatives. So, even though this effect is very modest, it supports the impression I got from the other two correlations in this model; that those most threatened by China (by Walt's definition), tend to bandwagon with it, all else being equal. Because this subvariable is so strongly skewed to the right (see section 3.3.2 for an elaboration), I tried to run the numbers using the natural logarithm of offensive capabilities attempting to bolster the result. Now, the correlation-coefficient is 0.1645. This is more distinct, but still weaker than the two previous.

From the graph, it is obvious that Russia (RUS) is the main reason this effect is so modest. Its offensive capabilities are actually *larger* than China's (1.014 in relation). Yet, Russia is very acceptive of the three Chinese initiatives and institutions (scores *3* on the aggregated Y). The reasons behind this are complex and multifaceted. For example, Russia's trade with the West is sorely restricted. "Russia is still subject to economic sanctions for its annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, as well as its interference in the 2016 U.S. election" (Ellyatt 2019a). In this light, it should come as no surprise that Putin and Russia are

currently turning toward the East for a new economic and geopolitical partner and friend. In other words, *convenience* may be a keyword in this relationship.

China and Russia have had deepening ties on multiple areas for several years. Polyakova (2019) notes that Putin has long since accepted that Russia is no longer a true challenger to the US in and of itself. Therefore, he instead pursues a general strategy of weakening the US little by little by allying with others who want the same. Thus, a united Eastern Front against the US would be in both Russia and China's interests, as an essential way of balancing against the US. In sum, besides illustrating that the geopolitical landscape is always far more complex than what I can describe with Walt's easily measurable proponents of threat perception, Russia's great acceptance of the three Chinese initiatives and institutions also illustrates that there is always a multitude of ways to interpret any result. The results of this first bivariate model may imply that bandwagoning with China is the trend, and as noted previously, the traditional understanding of bandwagoning is that it is something tiny states do out of fear. Yet, as the case of Russia shows, the reason can also be another, be it convenience, balancing against the US, or something else entirely.

Finally, I carried out a simple robustness-check for this model. To make sure that the results I get are not only driven by China's closest neighbors and those most dwarfed by its power, I did some conditional correlations, using thresholds that only about 15 states exceed. The same trends hold up for all three subvariables, which further strengthens my hypothesis 1b as the general trend.

<center>*****</center>

In sum, this first bivariate model reveals some important trendlines. The correlation between states' aggregate power relative to China and the aggregated Y is quite distinctly positive, suggesting that more power makes a state more rejective of China. The correlation between states' geographical proximity to Beijing and the aggregated Y is less positive, but still distinct, suggesting that the further a state is from Beijing, the more rejective it is to China. Finally, the correlation between states' offensive capabilities and the aggregated Y is positive, albeit fairly weak, suggesting that the more offensive capabilities a state has, the more rejective it is to China. Note that, using the natural logarithm of offensive capabilities, the correlation becomes stronger, but it is still quite weak compared to the others.

Of course, there are numerous alternative ways to interpret these results, as the cases of Japan (JPN), India (IND) and Russia (RUS) illustrate. For now, however, I am content with

being able to establish a link and to say that yes, there *is* a marked influence here, in the direction of more rejective stances for those less threatened by China. This amounts to solid supporting evidence for hypothesis 1b.

On first glance, it appears obvious what is happening in terms of balancing. Following Walt's recipe for what constitutes a threat from one state to another, *ceteris paribus,* those states most threatened by China tend to bandwagon with it, while those who are less threatened by China tend to gather around the US to balance against it. As I mentioned in the theory chapter, if this is the case, and bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, the world is likely to be intensely competitive, as great powers will think they can attract more allies through belligerence and brinkmanship (Walt 1987: 27). In other words, if the first model is really displaying bandwagoning tendencies, the US-China rivalry is likely to keep escalating.

This picture may be overly simplistic, however. What Walt would immediately dismiss as bandwagoning might have much more to it; it might even point to a sort of balancing against the US. Malaysia (MYS) serves as a good example here. The Southeast Asian state is relatively acceptive of the Chinese initiatives (it scores 6 on the aggregated Y), and it is also a Chinese neighbor who is dwarfed by its power. In other words, it is on-the-line or near it in all three graphs of this model. Yet, it would be wrong to think of Malaysia's response simply as cowardly bandwagoning with China. In some ways, Malaysia can be said to display a "small state-mentality", that is, supporting the Chinese initiatives and institutions simply because it is a small state with no other reasonable options, but the Malaysians might also be playing a much higher game. In the words of one commentator: "The days of developing states pandering to Western powers are ebbing away and Malaysia is at the vanguard" (Saddiq 2019).

That became evident at the *25ᵗʰ International Conference on the Future of Asia* in 2019, when Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad called out the US on its "playground-style tactics in controlling the tech industry" (ibid.). By doing that, he showed clearly that he is not afraid to enter the boxing ring with bigger fighters. In fact, Mahathir has held this stance for a long time. At a 1992 meeting with the leaders of the Nonaligned Movement, he pointedly stated that a "unipolar world is every bit as threatening as a bipolar world" (in Wallace 1992: 4). On that meeting, Mahathir was far from the only leader expressing such concerns, which suggests that several of the states on my panel might have similar tendencies as Malaysia. In this light, it is conceivable that, on some levels and to some degrees, those states we think of as simply China's bandwagoners might be using China as a main pole to gather around or perhaps even a tool with which to balance against the US.

As I described in the theory (chapter 2), if this is the case, and balancing is the dominant trend instead of bandwagoning, the world is likely to be quite another. Aggression will be discouraged, because those who contemplate it will anticipate widespread resistance. In other words, if a majority of states think like Malaysia does, then it would be unwise for both China and the US to keep pursuing confrontational foreign policies. This is a much more hopeful future. That said, one could argue along the same lines that what we automatically think of as balancing against China, can also be thought of as bandwagoning with the US. Which of the two worlds we inhabit is fundamentally a question of interpretation.

Either way, this remains, to a large degree, speculation. Again, in realism, states' true intentions must always be treated as an unknown. What the example of Malaysia makes even more obvious, however, is that states' motives behind accepting or rejecting the Chinese initiatives and institutions are often much more complex and multifaceted than Walt's simple recipe would have one think. Of course, this is not really surprising; the real world is endlessly complicated. Still, Walt's prescriptions have given me some important indications.

4.2 Second Bivariate Model: The Effect of Having the US as a Patron

In this section, I will examine the second bivariate model, which consists of the X2-subvariables of patron-client ties to the US. I will also assess the related hypothesis 2, which predicted that having the US as a patron would have a marked influence on how rejective states are of the three Chinese initiatives and institutions.

I begin by checking the influence of the categorical subvariable X2.1, which denotes different types of treaty alliance with the US:

*Table 4: The mean scores of the dependent variables when paired with X2.1 Types of treaty alliance with the US (*allyusa*).*

	Observ.	Y_AIIB	Y_BRI	Y_Huawei	Y_aggreg
NATO	17	2.35	2.18	3.88	8.41
ANZUS	2	1.00	3.50	5.00	9.50
Rio Treaty	6	3.50	2.50	2.50	8.50
Bilateral	7	1.57	1.71	2.71	6.00
None	21	1.95	1.57	2.05	5.57

The first dependent subvariable has some "surprising" results; the members of ANZUS and the states with bilateral treaties are more acceptive of China than those with no treaty. The other

two subvariables, stances on BRI and stances on Huawei's 5G, have more straightforward results; those states with no treaty are more acceptive of China than any of those with treaties, *ceteris paribus*.

Still, as I have mentioned several times above, the three dependent subvariables may not be that telling in and of themselves. One possible explanation for the apparent irregularities of *Y_AIIB* is that the US simply does not fear AIIB as much as it does BRI and Huawei, and it therefore has not put as much in this pressure campaign as it has with the two others. In a theoretical term, the US's clients do not face as tough a demand for compliance with their stance on AIIB. Along the same lines, *Y_BRI* also has markedly smaller differences between the categories than does *Y_Huawei*. This might be further explained by the fact that both AIIB and BRI were announced at a time when China represented a less direct threat to the US's continued primacy. The Huawei/5G issue, on the other hand, comes at a time when the world, and the US's friends and allies in particular, is much more aware of the potential challenge from China and consequently more hesitant to commit to it. Therefore, the US expects more compliance from its clients on Huawei's 5G.

In other words, internal differences between the dependent subvariables are, in many ways, to be expected. Either way, the numbers of real significance are the five marked in green; the mean scores of the aggregated Y. These show that all states with all types of treaties are more rejective of China than those with none, although for those with bilateral treaties, this is just barely the case. When I put everyone with *some* treaty together, they have a mean score of 8.03; quite a lot more rejective those with no treaty. In sum, all else being equal, this first subvariable of X2 appears to be very influential on states' stances.

Arguably the most illustrative example of this comes from the UK (GBR), who, as I mentioned above, recently put a full ban on Huawei in place. The ban is predicted to cost the UK up to $2.5 billion, and to delay the implementation of 5G by three years (Sandle and Faulconbridge 2020). A senior Chinese research fellow captured the essence of my second model: "By reversing its decision on Huawei, the UK government has placed loyalty to the U.S. above the interests of its own people" (CGTN 2020). In other words, the UK has chosen compliance with its patron over its own interests.

This mechanism becomes even clearer when extended to NATO, whose category scores much higher than both those states with bilateral treaties and those with no treaties. In my interview with NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg (see Appendix C), he noted how Trump has been an influence in pushing the NATO countries to recognize the potential threat coming from China. The NATO leaders even signed a joint statement on this in December

2019, officially recognizing that the rise of China poses both opportunities and challenges (AFP 2019). Stoltenberg also told me he thought the UK had made a bold move in banning Huawei, stressing that he wants all NATO countries to do what is necessary to secure their 5G networks. He did not mention Huawei explicitly for this wish, but I do not think it is far-fetched to say that NATO wants a tougher line on China. So, it seems like, for the NATO countries in particular, having the US as a patron makes states distinctly more rejective of China in general (and particularly of Huawei's 5G).

Next up are the effects of X2.2, the dichotomous subvariable for whether or not a state has a strategic partnership with the US, and of X2.3, the dichotomous subvariable for whether or not a state has a strategic dialogue with it:

*Table 5: The mean scores of the dependent variables when paired with X2.2 Strategic partnership with the US (*partnerusa*) and X2.3 Strategic dialogue with the US (*dialogueusa*).*

	Observ.	Y_AIIB	Y_BRI	Y_Huawei	Y_aggreg
partnerusa=0	30	2.20	2.13	2.80	7.13
=1	23	2.13	1.74	3.00	6.87
dialogueusa=0	27	2.15	1.96	2.56	6.67
=1	26	2.19	1.96	3.23	7.38

These results are far less convincing than those from the previous subvariable. In both cases, neither of the three dependent subvariables nor the aggregated Y have particularly large differences between *1* and *0*. Moreover, they generally point in both directions. This implies that, all else being equal, having a strategic partnership and/or strategic dialogue with the US is not that influential, and it does not have much of an effect on how states stand on Chinese initiatives and institutions.

Of course, this can have numerous reasons. The one I see as most likely/plausible is a simple one; the US generally does not think of its strategic partnerships and dialogues as particularly important compared with its treaty-alliances. As a result, Washington does not target its (dialogue) partners as explicitly in its pressure campaigns against Chinese initiatives and institutions as it does its treaty-allies. That would explain why these two subvariables have only weak effects on states' stances.

Next is the effect of the two continuous subvariables X2.4 Number of US military personnel in a state, and X2.5 Arms imports from the US on the dependent variables:

	Y_AIIB	*Y_BRI*	*Y_Huawei*	*Y_aggreg*	*lnusmltprsnc*	*armsimpusa*
Y_AIIB	1.0000					
Y_BRI	0.2513	1.0000				
Y_Huawei	0.1866	0.4903	1.0000			
Y_aggreg	0.5696	0.8242	0.7977	1.0000		
lnusmltprsnc	0.0058	0.2242	0.3446	0.2815	1.0000	
armsimpusa	0.0006	0.1023	0.3584	0.2261	0.3962	1.0000

These two seem promising. As seen from the six yellow numbers, the correlations between these two independent subvariables and the three dependent subvariables all point in the same direction. In other words, *ceteris paribus,* when these subvariables grow in value, the stances on the Chinese initiatives and institutions grow accordingly (state becomes more rejective).

Three of the effects are very weak, however; the one between US military presence and stance on AIIB, the one between arms imports from the US and stance on AIIB, and the one between arms imports and stance on BRI. As I touched upon above, this might well be because AIIB and BRI came at a time when China was less of a direct threat to the US, and so its pressure campaign against these two has not been as intense as the one against Huawei. Consequently, the US's friends, the foremost targets of that pressure, might not be as wary of the first two as they are of the third. There might be numerous other reasons, tied to certain special circumstances around any one of the initiatives and institutions. The other three effects of the six in yellow are more marked.

However, as I have explained, the numbers of real significance – the most stable measurement of how states stand on China – are the two in green. On first glance, I note that these two correlation-coefficients are distinctly positive, suggesting that, *ceteris paribus,* these two aspects of a patron-client relationship make states more rejective of Chinese initiatives and institutions. Or, in the precise theoretical terms; when the US displays its commitment to guarantee its clients' security, it has a marked influence on the clients' stances. To get a closer look at these correlations, I draw up the graphs, scatter the results, and draw lines of best fit:

---

[44] The natural logarithm of X2.4 Number of US military personnel in country (*lnusmltprsnc*) and X2.5 Arms imports from the US (*armsimpusa*).

*Figure 5: The correlation between the natural logarithm of X2.4 Number of US military personnel in a state (lnusmltprsnc)
and the aggregated Y.*

This graph is pointing quite distinctly upwards; the correlation-coefficient is 0.2815. This
implies that, all else being equal, the more US military personnel that is present in a state, the
more *rejective* that state is to the three Chinese initiatives and institutions. Conversely, *ceteris
paribus,* the less the presence of US military personnel in a state (i.e. the "freer" of the US it
is), the more *acceptive* that state is of the three. Again, I can identify the same tendency; having
the US as a patron influences how a state stands between the US and China.

Germany (DEU) is virtually on-the-line in this graph, and it serves as a good illustration
of this effect. The US military currently has 46,606 troops and personnel stationed there.[45] By
the logic of patron-client theory, this should make Germany more rejective of China. And,
based on Germany's relatively high scores on the dependent variables (*10* on the aggregated
Y), that effect is definitely in place for Germany.

Finally in this model, I will examine the influence of the fifth subvariable of X2, for
which I will also draw up the graph in the same way as I have done before:

---

[45] For now, at least. In late July 2020, Trump announced plans to pull 12,000 of these troops out or Germany, as he wants to
punish Berlin for low defense spending (Berger 2020).

*Figure 6: The correlation between X2.5 Arms imports from the US (*armsimpusa*) and the aggregated Y.*

This graph is pointing notably upwards; the correlation-coefficient is 0.2261. This is weaker than the previous correlation, but it is still quite distinct. This implies that, all else being equal, the more of a state's arms imports are from the US (i.e. the more reliant it is on the US for military backing), the more *rejective* that state is to the Chinese initiatives and institutions. Conversely, *ceteris paribus,* the less of a state's arms imports are from the US, the more *acceptive* that state is of China. Once again, the same general tendency can be identified; close patron-client ties to the US has a marked influence on how rejective states are to Chinese initiatives and institutions.

Israel (ISR) is close to on-the-line in this graph, and it may serve as an interesting illustration of this effect. It gets 96.77 percent of its arms imports from the US; this is but one example of Israel's heavy reliance on the US as a security partner. Previously, I wrote that Israel had recently shut Huawei out of a major tender for 5G contracts. Obviously, there can be numerous reasons behind such a decision, but, following the logic of this model, having the US as a patron and relying on it for security might have made Israel more susceptible to the US's pressure campaign. The US has repeatedly shown its commitment to guaranteeing Israel's security, and can therefore expect compliance from it.

******

67

In sum, the second bivariate model reveals some important trendlines, which suggest that having the US as a patron has a marked effect on how states stand on the Chinese initiatives and institutions. First, all else being equal, having a treaty-alliance with the US makes states more rejective of China. Having a strategic partnership or a strategic dialogue with the US do not seem to be that influential, however. Finally, the more US military personnel in a state and the more arms that state imports from the US, the more rejective it is to the three. Of course, there are likely numerous alternative ways to interpret this. For now, however, I am content with being able to establish a link and to say that yes, there *is* a marked influence here. This amounts to solid supporting evidence for my second hypothesis.

That this model is as influential as it is, makes sense given the prescriptions of the patron-client theory I outlined previously. The US's friends and allies (its clients) are, of course, the primary targets of the US's pressure campaigns against China, and a degree of compliance are therefore expected of them. In these cases, compliance naturally translates to clients being more rejective of Chinese initiatives and institutions, and then to gathering around the US to help contain the rise of China. Of course, this is all but a strict rule; as seen from Table 2, there have been numerous examples of the US's friends and allies going against it in accepting certain Chinese initiatives and/or institutions. What I describe here are merely general trends; exceptions can always be distinguished.

On a more speculative note: In terms of balancing, these results give the general impression that states who are more tied to the US and can count on its backing in security, thus feeling more equipped to face any threat they might perceive from China, tend to gather around the US to balance against the Chinese, *ceteris paribus*. Alternatively, this can also be thought of as bandwagoning with the US. On the other end, states with less security ties to the US, who in turn may feel more vulnerable on the global stage, tend to bandwagon with China, all else being equal. Alternatively, following the example of Malaysia from the previous section, these states might actually be "using" China in an effort at balancing against the US. In sum, like I found in the first bivariate model, these findings point to *both* the theoretical endpoints of balancing behavior, depending on the values of the independent variables.

4.3 Third Bivariate Model: The Effect of Economic Relations

In this section, I will examine the third bivariate model, which consists of the X3-subvariables of economic relations to China and/or the US. I will also assess the related hypothesis 3, which said that having a disparity in economic ties to China compared to the US would have a marked influence on whether a state is acceptive or rejective of three Chinese initiatives and institutions.

I begin by checking the effects of the first two subvariables, the natural logarithms of X3.1 Relative imports and of X3.2 Relative exports:

Table 7: The correlations between the dependent variables and two subvariables of economic relations to China and the US.[46]

	Y_AIIB	Y_BRI	Y_Huawei	Y_aggreg	lnrelimp	lnrelexp
Y_AIIB	1.0000					
Y_BRI	0.2405	1.0000				
Y_Huawei	0.2542	0.4717	1.0000			
Y_aggreg	0.5998	0.8016	0.8095	1.0000		
Lnrelimp	-0.2816	-0.3231	-0.0728	-0.2931	1.0000	
Lnrelexp	-0.3952	-0.1611	-0.1865	-0.3112	0.4296	1.0000

As seen from the six yellow numbers, the correlations between the natural logarithms of the two X3-subvariables and the three dependent subvariables all point in the same direction. In other words, when these subvariables grow in value, the stances on the Chinese initiatives and institutions grow accordingly (state becomes more rejective). One of the correlations is fairly weak, however; the one between relative imports and stance on Huawei's 5G. The other five are more distinctly negative.

Yet, as I have now said quite a few times, the three dependent subvariables are not necessarily as interesting in and of themselves. Instead, the most interesting numbers are the two in green; the correlation-coefficients between the independent subvariables and the aggregated Y. At first glance, I note that they are both distinctly negative. This indicates support for hypothesis 3; that states with closer economic ties to China than to the US become more *acceptive* of the Chinese initiatives and institutions.

To get a closer look at these two, I draw up both graphs, scatter the results, and draw up lines of best fit:

---

[46] The natural logarithms of X3.1 Relative imports (*lnrelimp*) and the natural logarithm of X3.2 Relative exports (*lnrelexp*).

*Figure 7: The correlation between the natural logarithm of X3.1 Relative imports (*lnrelimp*) and the aggregated Y.*

This graph is pointing distinctively downwards; the correlation-coefficient is -0.2931. This implies that, all else being equal, if a state has disproportionately more imports from China than from the US (by Hirschman's logic, when China wields power and influence over a state), that state becomes more *acceptive* of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. Conversely, *ceteris paribus,* if a state has disproportionately more imports from the US than from China, it becomes more *rejective* of the Chinese initiatives and institutions (and vice-versa).

Next up is the effect of the second subvariable of X3, for which I draw up the graph in the same way:

*Figure 8: The correlation between the natural logarithm of X3.2 Relative exports (*lnrelexp*) and the aggregated Y.*

This graph has an even steeper downwards turn; the correlation-coefficient is -0.3112. This implies that, all else being equal, when a state has disproportionately more exports to China than to the US (again, by Hirschman's logic, when China wields power and influence over a state), that state becomes more *acceptive* of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. Conversely, *ceteris paribus,* if a state has disproportionately more exports to the US than to China, it becomes more *rejective* of the Chinese initiatives and institutions.

Iran (IRN), being almost exactly on-the-line in both of these graphs, is an excellent illustration of these trends. As I have described previously, because the US is the frontrunner of economic sanctions against Iran, whereas China trades quite a lot more with it, Iran's numbers for relative imports and relative exports are very high. By Hirschman's logic, then, this gives China remarkable power and influence over the Iranians. This is at least one factor explaining Iran's relative acceptance of the Chinese initiatives and institutions (Iran scores *4* on the aggregated Y).

Next, I check the influence of the two dichotomous subvariables for free trade agreements:

*Table 8: The mean scores of the dependent variables when paired with X3.3 Free trade agreement with China (*ftachn*) and X3.4 Free trade agreement with the US (*ftausa*).*

	Observ.	Y_AIIB	Y_BRI	Y_Huawei	Y_aggreg
ftachn=0	41	2.29	2.12	2.95	7.37

71

=1	12	1.75	1.42	2.67	5.83
ftausa=0	44	2.07	1.86	2.77	6.70
=1	9	2.67	2.44	3.44	8.56

These results are remarkably unanimous; all of them are in the direction that theory predicts. For all three dependent subvariables, and for FTAs with both countries, there are marked differences in stances between those with one and those without one. Once again, the most interesting numbers are those in green, and these also show marked differences in stances. Generally speaking, the results imply that, all else being equal, having a free trade agreement with China makes states more *acceptive* of the Chinese initiatives and institutions, whereas having a free trade agreement with the US makes states more *rejective* of them. This makes perfect sense when following Hirschman's prescriptions.

I should note that the effects I have examined here often stand in contrast to those of the second bivariate model. In quite a few cases, the effect of the patron-client relationship appears to weigh heavier than the economic ties do. Australia (AUS) is a good illustration of this. It trades much more with China than it does with the US; in 2019, Australia's total trade with China was $89.2 billion, while its trade with the US was $10 billion (Workman 2020). It is obvious that a decoupling from China would have a heavy toll on the Australian economy. Australia should therefore, by Hirschman's logic, be subject to heavy influence from China

Nevertheless, Australia is one of the states on my panel with highest scores on the dependent variables, having banned Huawei and working closely with the US on the FOIP (Australia score *13* on the aggregated Y). This, I suspect, can be explained by its close relationship with the US. In terms of defense and culture, particularly, "it is tied almost completely to America" (Mahbubani 2020a: 214). Australia enthusiastically supported the US throughout the entire Cold War. For example, Australia sent almost 60,000 military troops and personnel to the Vietnam War (Australian War Memorial 2020). Illustratively for the close ties, in 2003, Bush proudly described Australia as the US's "deputy sheriff". Given their tough stances on Chinese initiatives and institutions, Australians apparently give primacy to their ties to the US (its patron) over the economic benefits of maintaining a good relationship to China.

Along similar lines, as I mentioned above, the UK (GBR) recently did a full ban on Huawei, to the great pleasure of its patron, the US. The UK will now have a *much* longer and more expensive road to 5G (Sandle and Faulconbridge 2020). This is just another example of how displaying compliance with one's patron weighs heavier than (short-term) economic gain from going with China. Put another way; the second bivariate model may be more important than the third, especially for those with close patron-client relationships to the US.

Of course, I cannot dismiss the effects of the third bivariate model based on some exceptions. The truth is, I can never know for sure how much weight states place on their economic ties to China. For all I know, for the states that lie closer to the line or more to the right in these graphs than Australia or the UK do, the economic influence China hold over them as a consequence of trade may be the main reason why they are generally acceptive to the Chinese initiatives and institutions.

A good illustration of a time when Hirschman's prescribed effects were dominant came from the Philippines (PHL) in 2012. Following a stand-off between Filipino and Chinese ships near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, China unleashed its punishment on the Philippines' banana industry, its second biggest agricultural export. The Chinese suddenly seized imports of Filipino bananas, a move which seriously hurt the Philippines' economy (Higgins 2012). Using Hirschman's terms, the Philippines had become too reliant on both the supply effect and the influence effect of trading with China, and China could take advantage of that to impose its will. By his logic, this might be a major reason as to why those states who trade disproportionately more with China than with the US are relatively acceptive of Chinese initiatives and institutions. Because of these and similar examples, then, I must trust that there is truth lying in the findings of this model, and that Hirschman's logic really has a marked influence on states' stances.

The story of Norway (NOR) and China in 2010 serves as ample illustration of how the effects of *both* the second and the third bivariate model may work together. In October 2010, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded by the Norwegian committee to a prominent Chinese dissident.[47] As a result, China boycotted Norway, dropping all contacts. Norway stood its ground remarkably well, and it never apologized or retracted the prize. I see two primary reasons behind this. First, because Norway is a member of NATO, it could stand up to China with more confidence, knowing it had the backing of the West and the US. This speaks for the second bivariate model. The second reason is Norway's economic strength and relative economic independence of China. NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg puts it well in his autobiography: "Norway is one of the few states in the world who can afford to be on bad terms with the Chinese. The Norwegian economy is rock solid. We can look them in the eyes and say: "We're not dependent on China"" (Stoltenberg 2016: 436, my translation). By Hirschman; Norway is fortunate and wealthy enough that China struggles to use the two's trade as a power

---

[47] The Chinese pro-democracy campaigner Liu Xiaobo, who was imprisoned in China at the time, won the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his long and non-violent struggle for human rights. China condemned this as a grand insult from the whole of Norway (Coonan 2010).

tool, which again leaves the Norwegians freer to oppose the Chinese. This speaks for the third bivariate model.

Finally in this section, a robustness-check I did for this model was a test of endogeneity. In a thesis like this one, the results are only unbiased as long as all the regressors are exogenous (e.g. Flores-Maciás and Kreps 2013: 364).[48] However, most of my independent variables may in some scenarios be endogenous to the dependent variable. For example, it is plausible that China chooses to trade more with those states who are already positive to and acceptive of the Chinese initiatives and institutions, and/or that the US chooses to restrict trade with those same states. The general point is that for many of my variables, particularly those on the economic relations, I can never be certain as to *which direction* the causal relationship between the dependent and the independent variable really points.

Most often, this is only a big problem in time series cross-section analyses. My three dependent variables are all relatively new; especially Huawei's 5G is too novel to ever face problems of endogeneity. However, AIIB and BRI are both some years old now, and I want to check the numbers to be sure that there have been no significant changes over time. I compare some of the more important economic variables, measured in 2018, with numbers from 2011, one year before any of my dependent variables entered the game. All changes are rather modest, and they generally go in both directions. Thus, I can establish that none of the subvariables show clear signs of endogeneity.

******

In sum, a state's economic relations to China relative to its economic relations with the US appears to have a marked influence on whether it is acceptive or rejective of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. More specifically, trading disproportionately more with China than with the US, all else being equal, makes states more acceptive of the former, and having FTAs with China or the US makes states more acceptive or more rejective, respectively. As is always the case with such issues as this one, there are numerous ways to interpret these findings. For now, I am content with establishing that yes, economic relations do have a marked influence on how states stand between the US and China. This amounts to solid supporting evidence for my third hypothesis.

---

[48] In statistics, an endogenous variable is determined by its relationship with other variables in the model, i.e. dependent variables. An exogenous variable is an outside force, i.e. independent. The problem of endogeneity arises if the causations go more ways than one (Kenton 2019).

That this model is as influential as it is, while based on solid theoretical works, comes as a bit of a surprise in light of my theoretical baseline in political realism. As I wrote in the theory chapter, I had expected that while economic relations might be interesting to examine, it would inevitably end up in the shadow of power and power calculations. This turned out to be a largely wrong prediction from my end; in the question of how states stand in the tug-of-war between the US and China, one cannot get around economic factors. In my interview with him, NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg noted that what has kept (and to a large degree, still is keeping) many states from fully recognizing the challenges of China's rise is that their economies are so dependent on cooperation with China. This is also very much in accordance with Hirschman's predictions.

On a more speculative note: In terms of balancing, these results give similar impressions as the two previous bivariate models. It seems like states with closer economic ties with the US than with China, that is, who stand freer of it, generally tend to gather around the US to balance against China, *ceteris paribus*. Again, this can also be thought of as bandwagoning with the US. Vice-versa, states with closer economic ties with China than with the US, that is, who are more under its influence, generally tend to bandwagon with China, all else being equal. Or, as I discussed in the Malaysia-example above, this tendency might also be interpreted as balancing against the US.

4.4 Multivariate Regression

In this final part of the analysis, I conduct a multivariate regression analysis, with the goal of observing the various interactions between the subvariables of my three models. Which of the effects I discovered in the bivariate models hold up when I account for other variables at the same time? To what degree will the independent variables get in the way of each other? As I mentioned in the potential pitfalls (section 3.4), this thesis faces the challenge of a relatively small *N*. This challenge is particularly prominent in regression analysis, as the probability of random effects grows disproportionately with *N*. I therefore use a significance level of 0.10 as a cut-off point.[49]

In statistical analysis, there has been a lot of debate about how many independent variables can be in a single multivariate model.[50] While I will not take a strong stand in this

---

[49] In the models, one star (*) denotes a significance at the 0.1-level, two stars (**) denote significance at the 0.05-level, and three stars (***) denote significance at the 0.01-level.

[50] For arguments that problems of confounding results can best be alleviated by constructing models in an incremental fashion, with few independents at a time, see Achen 2005; Clarke 2005; Ray 2005. For an argument that there is little need to place

debate, the nature of my data induces me to limit the number of independents; each of my multivariate models contains at most five subvariables. Here, I only show three of them - those that gave the best and most telling results – but know that I have run virtually every imaginable combination of the most promising subvariables.

The first model contains two subvariables from the first bivariate model (aggregate power relative to China [*powerchn*] and geographical proximity to Beijing [*distchn*]), one subvariable from the second bivariate model (treaty alliance with the US, here recoded to a dichotomous variable [*d_allyusa*]), and two subvariables from the third bivariate model (relative imports [*relimp*] and relative exports [*relexp*]).

Table 9: The first multivariate regression model, containing five of my subvariables.[51]

	b-coefficient	Standard error	p-value
powerchn	19.534	5.861	0.002***
Distchn	0.000141	0.000103	0.179
d_allyusa	2.083	0.812	0.014**
Relimp	-0.0436	0.137	0.751
Relexp	0.0147	0.157	0.926
Constant	3.871	1.043	0.001***
	N = 52	*R-squared = 0.3243*	*Prob > F = 0.0023***

On first glance, I note that the model as a whole is significant at the 0.01-level (*Prob>F* is well below 0.01, meaning that the probability of random effects is low). The *N* of this model is 52; Iraq falls out of the sample, because its exports to the US is 0, and division by 0 is not a valid operation. I also note that the model has a relatively high *R-squared* of 0.3243, that is, these five subvariables explain more than 32 percent of the variance in stances on the three Chinese initiatives and institutions.

Next, I note that all five subvariables point in the same direction as they did in the bivariate models; a reassuring sign that the trends hold up. Two of the subvariables, aggregate power relative to China (*powerchn*) and the dichotomous version of treaty alliance with the US (*d_allyusa*), also have fairly low standard errors compared to their b-coefficients. Therefore, the probability that these two effects are random is very low, giving them low p-values; *powerchn* is significant at the 0.01-level, and *d_allyusa* is significant at the 0.05-level. The other three subvariables in this model are not even significant at the 0.1-level.

---

such limits as long as sound theory guides the choice of variables, see Oneal and Russett 2005. For further discussion of this issue, see Jakobsen et.al. 2016.

[51] Aggregate power relative to China (*powerchn*), geographical proximity to Beijing (*distchn*), treaty alliance with the US (recoded, *d_allyusa*), relative imports (*relimp*), and relative exports (*relexp*).

I therefore scrap these three subvariables for the next model, while I keep the two that were significant. In their places, I include three other promising subvariables, one from the second bivariate model (the natural logarithm of US military presence [*lnusmltprsnc*]), as well as the two dichotomous subvariables from the third bivariate model (free trade agreement with China [*ftachn*] and free trade agreement with the US [*ftausa*]):

Table 10: The second multivariate regression model, containing five of my subvariables.[52]

	b-coefficient	Standard error	p-value
powerchn	21.441	6.008	0.001***
d_allyusa	1.865	0.867	0.039**
lnusmltprsnc	-0.0589	0.193	0.762
Ftachn	-2.144	0.878	0.019**
Ftausa	2.156	0.995	0.039**
Constant	5.427	0.924	0.001***
	N = 49	*R-squared = 0.4235*	*Prob > F = 0.0002***

On first glance, I note that the model as a whole is significant at the 0.01-level. The *N* of this model is 49; the four states with *0* on US military presence fall out, as the logarithm of 0 is undefined. I also note that this model has an even higher *R-squared* than the previous: 0.4235. This means that these five subvariables explain more than 42 percent of the variance in the dependent variables. This is a clear improvement from the previous multivariate model.

Next, I note that four of these subvariables point in the same direction as they did in the bivariate analysis. That is reassuring; their effects hold up together with other subvariables. These four are also significant at the 0.05-level, and *powerchn* is once again significant at the 0.01-level; the chances that their effects are random are very low. The b-coefficient of the natural logarithm of US military presence (*lnusmltprsnc*), however, is now negative, as opposed to its direction in the bivariate model. This subvariable is so "disturbed" by the inclusion of other variables that it changes its most basic characteristic. That this subvariable is not particularly sturdy is most likely a sign that its explanatory power is only limited. This one is also not significant at any level; another sign of its relative weakness.

I therefore scrap this one from the next model. In its place, I include another promising subvariable from the second bivariate model: arms imports from the US (*armsimpusa*). I also keep the four promising subvariables from the second multivariate model:

---

[52] Aggregate power relative to China (*powerchn*), treaty alliance with the US (recoded, *d_allyusa*), the natural logarithm of US military presence (*lnusmltprsnc*), free trade agreement with China (*ftachn*), and free trade agreement with the US (*ftausa*).

Table 11: The third multivariate regression model, containing five of my subvariables.[53]

	b-coefficient	Standard error	p-value
powerchn	16.448	5.571	0.005***
d_allyusa	1.966	0.805	0.018**
armsimpusa	0.00891	0.0117	0.448
ftachn	-1.931	0.909	0.039**
ftausa	1.960	1.031	0.063*
Constant	4.879	0.684	0.000***
	N = 53	*R-squared* = 0.3814	*Prob > F* = 0.0000***

On first glance, I note that, as a whole, this model is significant at the 0.01-level. The *N* of this model is 53; all states are included. I then note that this model has an *R-squared* of 0.3814; slightly less than the previous model, but more than the first. This means that these five subvariables explain more than 38 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Considering that my *N* is as low as it is, this is a remarkably high number, far more than what I expected. Previously, I raised the challenge that these issues have virtually endless lists of potentially important variables. The high R-squared imply that my selection of variables is a good one.

Next, I note that all five subvariables point in the same direction as they did in the bivariate analysis; their effects apparently hold up. Four of the subvariables are also significant; *powerchn* at the 0.01-level, *d_allyusa* and *ftachn* at the 0.05-level, and *ftausa* at the 0.1-level. In other words, the chances that these effects are random are very low. *armsimpusa* has the right direction, but its standard error is high, which again makes its p-value high. It is not significant at any level, and so I scrap it as a relatively weak subvariable in terms of explanatory power.

I am left with four subvariables that stand as the strongest: aggregate power relative to China (*powerchn*); treaty alliance with the US (*allyusa*); free trade agreement with China (*ftachn*), and free trade agreement with the US (*ftausa*). This is not a surprise; these four also showed the most distinct effects in their respective bivariate models. This is also a sign that the three theoretical dimensions of this thesis indeed work together and interact to generate outcomes. It does not make sense, really, to ask *which* of the three bivariate models is best; all three are needed in order to truly understand why states stand as they do in the tug-of-war between China and the US.

As I said at the beginning of this section, because of the relatively small *N* in this thesis, I should be careful about reading too much into this. Still, these are intriguing findings, which all give important indications as to my research questions.

---

[53] Aggregate power relative to China (*powerchn*), treaty alliance with the US (recoded, *d_allyusa*), arms imports from the US (*armsimpusa*), free trade agreement with China (*ftachn*), and free trade agreement with the US (*ftausa*).

5 DISCUSSION OF TRENDS

In this second-to-last chapter, I turn my eyes forward and discuss what I see as the two most important trends transpiring around the US and China. First, I look at the how the trend of US's declining attractiveness as a strategic partner may have been accelerated by Trump's presidency and the ongoing pandemic, examining whether Trump himself has changed the US's China-strategy and whether we can expect a change with a new president. Second, I examine in more detail Xi Jinping's "Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy", and discuss the global backlash it has created and will continue to create; will this call for a downward spiral in how the world perceives China? These two trends are, I believe, absolutely crucial to the continued development of the subjects of this thesis, and their impact may carry on for decades to come.

5.1 What Is the Impact of Trump's Policies?

In the second bivariate model, I found that having the US as a patron makes its clients more rejective of the Chinese initiatives and institutions, just as patron-client theory predicts. This finding implies that the US's friends and allies tend to gather around the US to balance against China. In this section, I discuss whether and how this tendency might change going forward.

Walt (1997) examines in which situations alliances are most likely to collapse, and one of those is when the credibility of the ally is declining. In some ways, this is what is happening to the US today; as I mentioned in the introduction, the US's image around the world has been in steady decline for decades. Certain events, such as the unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003, have done their parts in gradually tarnishing the reputation of the world's leading superpower (e.g. Voeten 2004).

Trump's presidency plays another major role in this slow and steady decline. NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, being characteristically diplomatic, described him as a different and more direct politician (see Appendix C). Going a bit further, it is hardly a controversial statement to say that Trump, throughout his soon-to-be four years in office, has upended many of the political norms that are the foundation of the US's political system. Putting nothing in between, Acemoglu and Robinson (2019) argue that Trump is turning the US into a "Paper Leviathan", meaning a near-autocratic state that offers little room for democratic input or criticism of government, and that exhibits paper-thin policymaking competence as a result.

The ongoing coronavirus crisis, which, in the words of one commentator, has been "a true Black Swan if there ever was one" (Hulsman 2020),[54] has only made this situation more apparent and more dire than ever. By most indicators, the US has had the world's biggest and deadliest outbreak of the virus. In the midst of it all, the Trump administration's response has been messy, to put it lightly. A former CIA officer said in April that the US's "gross mishandling" of the pandemic revealed major national security weaknesses (Walder 2020; see also Haass 2020). Moreover, Trump has shown few signs to help other states during the pandemic, not even the US's own clients. In fact, he has at certain points done the exact opposite; effectively hijacking shipments of medical supplies meant for other states, and strong-arming private healthcare-firms to prioritize the US over the rest of the world (Toosi 2020). This and similar things might do significant damage to the US's general image abroad and its relationship to other states (e.g. Donfried and Ischinger 2020; Goldgeier and Jentleson 2020).

The consequences of Trump's style of conduct have been evident for a long time. Several polls from *Pew Research* reveal remarkably low confidence in Trump around the world (in early 2020, only 29 percent of 37,000 respondents in 33 countries had confidence in Trump, Wike et.al. 2020). A crucial question going forward is whether this is only a passing Trump-phenomenon or something more fundamental. Will it blow over, or will it contribute to a further weakening of the US's image as a global leader to look to and learn from? In the same polls, despite the bad scores for Trump alone, confidence in the US's foreign policy in general has remained much higher (54 percent favorable in early 2020, ibid.; see also Silver and Devlin 2020). This might be a sign that Trump is just a passing storm. Also, a general lack of confidence around the world is one thing; one might even say that is to be expected of Trump. Another, arguably more important thing is what impact this will have on how the world stands in the tug-of-war between China and the US. For example, will the fact that so much of the world generally does not trust Trump drive them away from the US and leave them freer to accept the Chinese initiatives and institutions? This is very much conceivable.

Yet, looking at how the states on my panel score on the dependent variables (see Table 2), it is clearly apparent that the pressure campaign against Huawei's 5G, intensified by Trump, has yielded *much* more results than the pressure campaigns against both AIIB and BRI, started by Obama. This obviously has a wide array of reasons, but I note that the states of the world apparently put their suspicion and fear of China above their mistrust (and even, in many cases, dislike) of Trump. NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg told me that Trump deserves

---

[54] Taleb (2007) defines a Black Swan as a highly improbable event that has enormous consequences.

credit for convincing many of the Western leaders that China is a potential threat. This probably has more to do with China's recent assertive turn than with Trump's diplomatic skills. However, it *does* indicate that for all the damage Trump might be doing to the US, both internally and internationally, he is not enough to drive states away from his country. In other words, patron-client theory proves to be stronger and more influential than Trump himself.

Given my theoretical baseline in realism, this should not come as a surprise. After all, Trump is only one man, and in realism, *states* are what really matter. As bad a president as Trump may be, he remains in the shadow of the state level, where he is bound to be little more than a superficial disturbance. In taking their stances on the three Chinese initiatives and institutions, the states on my panel will let the US itself weigh heavier than Trump. That said, as I mentioned in the theoretical baseline (chapter 2, section 2.1), neoclassical realists advocate taking individual leaders into account on the global stage. Leaders vary greatly in their abilities to read and interpret the system's signals, which in itself can have a major impact. One commentator observes that: "[Trump's handling of] the pandemic is going to reinforce that the United States is simply not the highly functional, advanced role model it used to be" (Matthews 2020), So, perhaps one should not completely dismiss the effect that Trump can have?

Also, that Trump cannot do it all by himself does *not* clear the US of any risk that the world might drift away from it in the foreseeable future. As mentioned, the US's image has been in decline for decades. I suspect that its primacy will not last for very long without fundamental changes. Even those scholars who argue that the US is so nonbelligerent it will not provoke counterbalancing (see chapter 2, section 2.1) have to admit that the US's alliances are not indestructible (Walt 1987: 285). But Trump, while an accelerator, maybe even a catalysator, of this trend, need not be a causational reason behind it.

A final point: Mahbubani (2020a: 70-71) notes that the US's obsession with attacking every initiative or institution that comes from China, and the general lack of a long-term strategy in dealing with China is not exclusively Trump's fault; it is partly a result of a deeper structural flaw in how the US view the world. At this point, then, Trump's conduct may be in accordance with the US' legacy. In other words, analysts, scholars, and people in general might have to realize that the faltering of the US's image, which has been an overarching theme throughout this thesis, is not really an exclusive Trump-phenomenon, but indeed a more general phenomenon of the US.

This implies that we cannot be sure that things will change when Trump leaves the White House in either four months or four years. Indeed, the Democrats' Joe Biden, who started his campaign in 2019 downplaying fears that China was out to "eat our lunch", has grown

increasingly hawkish over time (Edelman 2019; Walt 2020). For example, he recently said he would sanction China over Hong Kong (Reuters 2020b). So, the trend of the US fighting Chinese initiatives and institutions, effectively limiting the world's options, might well continue for a long time.

5.2 The Backlash Against China's "Wolf-Warriors"

Where the US has grown to be a less attractive and reliable strategic partner over the years, China under Xi Jinping might have gone in a similar direction, at least in some ways and in certain parts of the world. In the bivariate models, I found tendencies that states are more acceptive of China if they are threatened by it, stands without a security-guarantee from the US, or if it is subject to Chinese influence through economic leverage. However, as I will show in this section, China's assertive turn over the past few years (particularly the past few months) has sparked a global backlash which is pushing the world towards more rejective stances.

In the introduction, I wrote about China's "Charm Offensive", which has been going on since the early 2000s (Kurlantzick 2007). Over the past years, however, this seems to have been pushed aside, and China appears to have grown *less* image conscious. Xi Jinping does not seem to mind the reputational damage he gets from his ultra-nationalistic approach, dubbed "Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy".[55] One pair of analysts observes that Xi has probably calculated that "China will gain more by flexing its military and economic muscles even if it loses some of its soft power along the way" (Campbell and Rapp-Hooper 2020). Even before the virus outbreak, Beijing displayed a fierce approach to foreign relations. With clear encouragement from Xi and his Propaganda Department, a young generation of Chinese diplomats have been proving their loyalty with defiantly nationalist and sometimes threatening messages wherever they are based. Reportedly, the "Wolf-Warriors" have gotten into fights with numerous European countries, insulting and alienating each of them (Erlanger 2020; Westcott and Jiang 2020).

This line has only toughened since the virus outbreak, further damaging China's diplomatic relationships. To begin with, China has adopted a much harsher tone of rhetoric. Several reports claim that Chinese officials have routinely pressured their European counterparts to make positive statements about China's "superior" handling of the outbreak in order to receive shipments of medical supplies (Allen-Ebrahimian 2020; Weiss 2020).

---

[55] Named after two ultranationalist Chinese films featuring the evil plots and fiery demise of foreign mercenaries from the US (Erlanger 2020).

Moreover, Chinese diplomats have criticized several Western democracies harshly for mishandling the crisis, while blowing off any attempts to criticize China after it was found to have delivered substandard medical supplies to several states (Kuo 2020; Erlanger 2020; Satter et.al. 2020).

Bolder rhetoric is not the only change in China's conduct. Fravel (2008) illustrates how China has long had a habit of prioritizing among its territorial disputes, pressing ahead with some and putting others on the back burner to avoid too much tension at once. Now, however, China is escalating nearly *all* its territorial disputes at the same time: China has stepped up its patrols near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea; doubled down on its maritime claims in the South China Sea, sending vessels to linger off the coasts of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam; conducted aerial reconnaissance near Taiwan, sparking speculation that Beijing may take Taiwan by force; ginned up a new border dispute with Bhutan, and has had violent clashes with India in the Himalayas (Green and Medeiros 2020).

China has also grown less tolerant of internal diversity. In late June 2020, China stepped in and passed a wide-ranging new security law for Hong Kong which made it easier to punish protesters and keep control, effectively reducing the city's autonomy dramatically (Tsoi and Wai 2020). In the Western province of Xinjiang, the CCP's decades-long crackdown on the Muslim Uighur minority has escalated sharply after 2017, and has lately, at least by many indicators, turned into a campaign of ethnic cleansing (*Al Jazeera* 2019; Maizland 2020). At least one million Uighurs are currently detained in re-education camps that human rights activists have condemned as Orwellian, and for breaking human rights (ibid.).[56]

Even beyond its immediate neighborhood, China seems to have grown more confrontational and less risk averse. In mid-June, China charged two Canadian citizens with espionage in a move many saw as retaliation for the arrest of Meng Wanzhou in 2018 (Katkov 2020). China's recent treatment of Australia is another case in point; after Canberra called for an independent investigation into the origins of the pandemic, Beijing issued a harsh rebuke imposing trade sanctions on Australia, most notably tariffs of up to *80 percent* on Australian barley (Hunter 2020; Tangen Jr. 2020). China has also been linked to a series of cyber-attacks against Australian government servers (Australian Associated Press 2020).

---

[56] More recently, they have been joined by UN officials, international organizations, and many foreign governments in condemning the crackdown. In July 2019, a group of mostly European nations (and no Muslim majority ones) signed a letter to the UN with an official condemnation of China's action. Shortly after, more than three dozen states, including 12 from my list (Algeria, Bangladesh, Cambodia, South Korea, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) signed an alternative letter praising China's "remarkable achievements" in human rights and its "counterterrorism" efforts in Xinjiang. It might seem like these states prioritize their economic ties and strategic relationships with China over human rights concerns (further strengthening my third hypothesis).

"Any one of these moves by Beijing might have been unsurprising on its own. Put together, however, they amount to a highly unusual full-court press" (Campbell and Rapp-Hooper 2020). Of course, it is way too early to say with certainty what all these shifts amount to; perhaps it is wrong to think of this as a fundamental change of style? China could simply be taking advantage of the US's "stunning abdication of global leadership in a moment of crisis." Indeed, this is a historically well-known move from rising powers (ibid.). Indeed, concerns like these have come up before, perhaps most notably in the wake of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, when several scholars reacted on what they saw as an increasingly assertive China (e.g. Swaine 2010).[57] Looking back at this period, today's trend might just be China once again making the most of a moment of Western weakness. If this is the case, things will likely calm down once the pandemic is under control in the entire world.

Regardless of the explanation behind it, what is already clear is that China's recent fiery approach is costing it in lasting ways, scaring off potential partners and "undermining China's desired image as a generous global actor" (Erlanger 2020). In other words, Beijing's new wave of nationalism is turning out to be self-defeating (see also Weiss 2020). As I have touched upon at several points throughout the thesis, several states might be turning away from China. This has already manifested itself in markedly higher scores on my dependent variables, especially stances on Huawei's 5G, for several states on my panel.[58] That is, they are moving closer to the US and becoming more rejective of the Chinese initiatives and institutions.

As is also obvious from Table 2, this backlash has been most evident among those on my panel with close security ties to the US. In terms of patron-client theory, this is because, seeing an increasing threat from China, the US's patrons will cling even harder to their patron, complying more with its interests. One of Walt's (1987) hypotheses on when states choose balancing over bandwagoning is highly relevant here: "The more unalterably aggressive a state is perceived to be, the greater the tendency for others to balance against it" (ibid.: 33). In other words, if China carries on with its "Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy", it may well ruin its own prospects, driving others to balance against it rather than bandwagoning with it. So far, the backlash over these past months has mostly changed states' stances on the third dependent subvariable, Huawei's 5G, but I would not be particularly surprised if some states were to adopt more rejective stances on BRI and AIIB, as well, sometime in the foreseeable future.

---

[57] Critics cast this as a myth, saying that those raising concern grossly overestimated the amount of change in China's policies (Johnston 2013; Jerdén 2014).

[58] I originally measured the dependent variables in March 2020. Since then, numerous scores have jumped up in value.

6 CONCLUSIONS

In this final chapter, I go through the conclusions I have drawn throughout the thesis. First, I assess the thesis' main research question and my three hypothesized answers to it, briefly summarizing my findings. Then, I recap my discussions about where the world is in terms of balancing. I finish with some nods to the future development of China and the US's battle over influence, including a policy recommendation to both China and the US.

6.1 Summarizing the Results

The main research question of this thesis was: Which factors influence how 53 small and medium powers respond to and stand on growing Chinese influence, given pressure from the US to avoid Chinese initiatives and institutions? This is, I believe, an intriguing question, both because the rivalry between the US and China is *the* defining question of twenty-first century international politics, and because this take on it is far less common in existing literature. On a more general note, this thesis has also been an important attempt at gathering or unifying a very non-cumulative alliance literature.

With a baseline in various realist thinkers, I derived three main clusters of independent variables where each would suggest a possible answer to the research question. For the first hypothesis, I used Stephen M. Walt's (1987) balance-of-threat theory and his recipe for when states perceive threats from others to suggest that perceiving a threat from China would have a marked influence on whether states are acceptive or rejective of Chinese initiatives and institutions. Walt identifies two distinct routes states can take in the face of threats; balancing or bandwagoning. Therefore, I decided to split the first hypothesis into two; one for more rejective stances and one for more acceptive stances, each implying one of Walt's recipes.

For the second hypothesis, I used various scholars' patron-client theory (e.g. Carney 1989) to suggest that having the US as a patron would have a marked influence on how rejective states are of Chinese initiatives and institutions. For the third hypothesis, I used Albert Hirschman's (1945 [1980]) theory of using economic relations as power tools to suggest that having closer economic relations with China than with the US would have a marked influence on whether states are acceptive or rejective of Chinese initiatives and institutions – and vice-versa.

Forming the basis for my dependent variables were states' stances on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative, and Huawei's role in 5G implementation (see Table 2 and/or Appendix A for a full list). Could any of the three hypotheses explain the variations in states' stances on these three? Using standard correlation-analysis, I first analyzed this through three bivariate models:

In the first bivariate model, I found that, all else being equal, the more threat (by Walt's definition) a state perceived from China, the more acceptive it became of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. On the other end, the less that perceived threat was, the more rejective that state became of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. In particular, I saw this effect distinctively from the subvariable aggregate power relative to China. The two other subvariables displayed similar, but weaker effects. In sum, all three subvariables of X1 supported hypothesis 1b to varying degrees. The case of Japan, however, illustrated that I cannot completely dismiss hypothesis 1a.

In the second bivariate model, I found that, *ceteris paribus,* having close ties to the US as one's patron made states more rejective to the Chinese initiatives and institutions. Conversely, the less states were tied to the US in this way, the more acceptive they became of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. In particular, I saw this effect distinctively from treaty alliance with the US, from presence of US military personnel, and from arms imports from the US. Strategic partnerships and strategic dialogues with the US turned out to have little, if any, effect on the dependent variables. In sum, three of five subvariables of X2 strongly support hypothesis 2.

In the third bivariate model, I found that, all else being equal, if states had disproportionately more trade with China than with the US, they became more acceptive of the Chinese initiatives and institutions. If that disproportion was the other way around, that state became more rejective of the three. In particular, I saw this effect from relative imports, relative exports, *and* from free trade agreements with both China and the US. In sum, all the subvariables of X3 offer strong support for hypothesis 3.

One thing that all three bivariate models show, is that the effects of my variables on stances on AIIB and, to a lesser degree BRI, are often less pronounced than the effects on stances on Huawei's 5G. This is likely a sign that the two former are generally seen as less of a direct threat to the US's continued primacy than the latter is perceived to be. Consequently, the US's pressure campaign against these two have likely been less intense than the newest of these campaigns.

There was also a second aspect to my research question, one of a more speculative nature; what is happening in today's world in terms of balancing? Where are the results of my three bivariate models pointing? For this purpose, I mapped out two theoretical endpoints (see Figure 1). Are states today doing as Mearsheimer (2006, 2014) predicts, gathering around the US with the goal of balancing against China? And could this alternatively be called bandwagoning with the US? Or are they doing what some balance-of-power theorists have been waiting for since the end of the Cold War, balancing against the US by gathering around China (what Walt would have called bandwagoning with the Chinese)?

All three bivariate models showed similar tendencies in terms of balancing; in all three, *both* theoretical endpoints could be distinguished at once, one in each end of the graphs. The difference lies in the characteristics of the states, that is, their values on the independent variables. The more powerful states, the ones with the closest ties to the US, and the ones who are least in China's palm in economic terms, tend to balance against it, *ceteris paribus*. This can also, for some states at least, be interpreted as bandwagoning with the US. On the other end, the least powerful states, the ones with less connections to the US, and the ones most in China's palm, tend to do one of two things, again depending on how you interpret it. All else being equal, these states either bandwagon with China or balance against the US. On both ends, it is most likely a mix of the two.

As I described in the introduction, these two endpoints do in no way illustrate the only two roads states may be taking in terms of balancing – not even when each endpoint is split into two. There are, to be sure, numerous possibilities in between, hedging being a major one. As Norwegian diplomat Erik Solheim told me in our interview; the overarching trend in today's world seems to be that states try to find ways to avoid picking sides between China and the US (see Appendix D). So, the real answer probably lies somewhere in between the two.

To strengthen the findings of the three bivariate models, I also conducted three multivariate regression analyses in order to see the interactions between the three clusters of independent variables. Here, I found that four subvariables – aggregate power relative to China (*powerchn*), treaty alliance with the US (*allyusa*), free trade agreement with China (*ftachn*) and free trade agreement with the US (*ftausa*), that is, one from the first two theoretical dimensions and two from the third – have impacts on the dependent variables that hold up in combination with all other subvariables. This implies that each of my three clusters of independent variables are absolutely essential in order to fully describe how and why states stand as they do in the tug-of-war between China and the US. Moreover, the three *R-squared*, which measures how much of the variance the independent variables can explain, were remarkably high (around 40

percent). This indicated that, despite there being a virtually endless list of potentially relevant variables for these issues, I have found several central ones.

It should also be noted that, as I have touched upon at several points throughout the thesis, these things might change at any time; country's stances on China are so fluctuant that I cannot be confident that these findings are even relevant in the near future. In many or even most of the cases I have covered, things can take unexpected turns at some point or another. This thesis is merely a snapshot of today's situation; only time will tell for sure how the US-China rivalry will continue to play out in the future.

Indeed, there are signs that things may be changing already. The two trends I discussed in chapter 5 are cases in point. The US's global image, which has been in decline for decades, has been deteriorating more quickly than ever before over the course of Trump's presidency. Even though there are signs that Trump will be a passing storm, he might also have revealed some deeper, systemic flaws about the US. Without fundamental change, the US might keep on deteriorating in the eyes of the world, which would open up for the world to gradually turn to China. Yet, by many indicators, China's conduct has changed under Xi Jinping, growing less risk-averse and more confrontational. Over the course of the pandemic, this seems to have gotten worse than ever, sparking a global backlash against China. This might conceivably drive the world back into the hands of the US. In sum, it is obvious that *a lot* is happening in and around the issues of this thesis; things that will keep influencing the tug-of-war for decades to come.

By consequence, the interpretations I suggest here should in no way be seen as a blueprint for what is really going on in the world concerning the intensifying rivalry between China and the US. Indeed, this is a fundamental principle which has been repeated by scholars throughout the years: "The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible" (Morgenthau 1948: 150). In the words of Porter (2016): The idea that anyone can bring order and certainty to this chaotic world is dangerously over-confident.

Finding solid answers has not been my goal, either; the goal has rather been to shed light on these crucially important issues. By doing that, I have hoped to contribute to a better and more wholesome understanding of how and why states stand as they do in the midst of this tug-of-war, and of how future developments might affect the situation. In this, I feel like I have succeeded.

6.2 Lessons and Policy Recommendations

The idea that the world's small and medium powers generally want "the best of both worlds" should lie as a foundational notion in the back of all readers' minds when interpreting my findings. This has also been a recurring theme of this thesis. In a 2019-interview, Henry Kissinger told a reporter that the US's contest with China is both less dire and much more complex than the Soviet struggle of the Cold War. The world has gone from bipolar to multipolar, the "components of this international system are so much more varied, and the lineups are so much more complex" (in Osnos 2020). In China and the US's tug-of-war over the world's loyalties, the answer is *not* going to be black and white.

Indeed, more and more of today's states are generally capable of making their own choices, independent of pressure from either China or the US to stand on one side or the other: "Many countries and regions have become big enough to walk away from both America and China. Most countries have also become shrewder at weighing and acting on their own geopolitical interests" (Mahbubani 2020a: 213). Asia provides a good example of this; former Singaporean ambassador Chan Heng Chee (2019) observes that many Asian states "are carefully defining their own positions, pushing back against pressure to choose sides between the US and China." Similarly, Ikenberry (2015) points out how the "middle countries" of the world often have strong reasons to want the existing duality to persist. "They will want to receive the security benefits of allying with the United States *and* the economic benefits of allying with China" (ibid.: 3, emphasis added).

However, despite large parts of the world obviously wanting a free choice, and in many ways being better equipped than they were just a handful of years ago to actually have it, it would be wrong to dismiss the effect of the superpowers' pressure campaigns. After all, an important finding of this thesis is that these pressure campaigns do have a marked influence on states' stances. And, as I illustrated with the Melian dialogue in the theoretical baseline (section 2.1), the world's smaller powers are bound to be pushed around by the most powerful.

It is important to note here that *no one* benefits from the ever-intensifying rivalry between China and the US. While visiting Beijing in September 2019, Angela Merkel summed it up well; "[W]e hope that there will be a solution in the trade dispute with the United States since it affects everybody" (Reuters 2019). She referred to the trade war in particular, but I think it is safe to say that this applies to virtually every aspect of the rivalry. Also, she was undoubtedly speaking for many states whose leaders may not be as outspoken; the US and China battling each other at every turn can only really be harmful to the world.

That leads to the final point of the thesis; policy recommendations. I think that both China and the US must get better at letting the world's small and medium powers make up their own minds about where to place their loyalties. This is a fine line to tread. Being too dominating and aggressive will force the middle states into the opposing camp, while being too defensive and careful might harm China and the US's respective "attractiveness" as partners. The two need to work hard to maintain or even strengthen their own positive sides, instead of forcing the third parties' hands or even attacking each other. This, I believe, is the way to avoid an all-out war that no one wants.

In my interviews with them, both NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg and Norwegian diplomat and politician Erik Solheim stressed the essentiality of international cooperation. If the US and China can manage to cooperate, and by that allow the world's small and medium powers to stand freely in the middle, accepting and supporting anything that could objectively help the world, the world would be much better equipped to deal with the enormous challenges facing it. A change in mindset would go a long way; I believe that, if the US can come to accept it, the dual hierarchy that Ikenberry (2015) describes has the potential to be quite durable, not only in East Asia, but in the whole world. The world needs the US to "descend gracefully" from its throne and accept a world in which China is its fellow leader – only in other areas than itself.

Finally, Erik Solheim raised a very important issue standing in the way of cooperation. Everyone spies on each other on the global stage, and no one more than the US. It becomes hypocritical, then, to point fingers at Huawei for mere suspicion of espionage. Along the same lines, Lysne (2018) discusses what he calls the "Snowden-Huawei paradox". The West has shown clearly that it has no problem with espionage. The concern around Huawei, therefore, seems to be about *geopolitics* rather than genuine security. This makes sense, of course. In many ways, my foundation in this thesis has been a zero-sum game; whenever China gains something, the US loses something else. Following a harsh realist logic, this is the way the world normally works. However, in a world riddled by global warming, nuclear weapons, deadly pandemics, and countless other grave problems, cooperation *has* to happen to a much larger degree. I sure hope it can.

REFERENCES

Acemoglu, Daron and James L. Robinson. 2019. *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*. New York: Penguin Press.

Achen, Christopher H. 2005. "Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22(4): 327-339.

AFP. 2019. "NATO recognizes China 'challenges' for the first time." *DW,* December 3. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/nato-recognizes-china-challenges-for-the-first-time/a-53539353 (Accessed 08.12.2020)

Aggarwal, Vijita and Madhavi Kapoor. 2018. "Innovation Growth from knowledge transfer in international strategic alliances." *Journal of Strategic Management.*

Al Jazeera. 2019. "Secret paper reveals workings of China's Xinjiang detention camps." November 25. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/secret-papers-reveal-workings-chinas-xinjiang-detention-camps-191125004212642.html (Accessed 07.17.2020)

Allen, Michael A., Michael E. Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain and Andrew Stravers. 2020. "Outside the wire: U.S. military deployments and public opinion in host states." *American Political Science Review,* forthcoming. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000868.

Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. 2020. "Beijing demanded praise in exchange for medical supplies." *Axios,* May 6. Retrieved from https://www.axios.com/beijing-demanded-praise-in-exchange-for-medical-supplies-16f5383e-589a-42e5-bc25-414eb13841b0.html (Accessed 07.16.2020)

Allison, Graham. 2017. *Destined for War: Can America and China escape Thucydides's Trap?* New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Alon, Ilan and Shan Chen. 2018. "Forging a Canadian notch in the Belt and Road." *East Asia Forum*, November 10. Retrieved from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/11/10/forging-a-canadian-notch-in-the-belt-and-road/ (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Al-Shafi, Khalid. 2020. "Huawei launches 5G mobile WiFi with Vodafone Qatar." *The Peninsula*, January 15. Retrieved from https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/15/01/2020/Huawei-launches-5G-mobile-WiFi-with-Vodafone-Qatar (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Apple Jr., R.W. 2001. "No Middle Ground." *New York Times,* September 14. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/international/no-middle-ground.html (Accessed 04.16.2020)

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 2020. "Members and Prospective Members of the Bank." Retrieved from https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html (Accessed 04.01.2020)

Asif, Saad. 2019. "Long way to 5G in Indonesia." *MTN Consulting,* October 30. Retrieved from https://www.mtnconsulting.biz/long-way-to-5g-in-indonesia/ (Accessed 09.19.2020)

Atkinson, Carol. 2014. *Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy Through Military Educational Exchanges.* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Australian Associated Press. 2020. "Mike Pompeo blasts China's 'coercion' of Australia as cyber-attack likened to Parliament House hack." *The Guardian,* June 20. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/20/mike-pompeo-blasts-chinas-coercion-of-australia-as-cyber-attack-likened-to-parliament-house-hack (Accessed 07.19.2020)

Australian War Memorial. 2020. "Vietnam War 1962-75." Retrieved from https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/event/vietnam (Accessed 06.01.2020)

Ayson, Robert. 2020. "NZ's useful Huawei ambiguity." *Newsroom,* January 16. Retrieved from https://www.newsroom.co.nz/@ideasroom/2020/01/16/988103/the-ban-that-isnt-new-zealand-and-huawei (Accessed 05.29.2020)

Bader, Julia. 2015. "China, Autocratic Patron? An Empirical Investigation of China as a Factor in Autocratic Survival." *International Studies Quarterly* 59: 23-33.

Balasubramaniam, Madhura. 2016. "AIIB: Regional and Global Responses." *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, January 21. Retrieved from http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=4967 (Accessed 03.08.2020)

Bangar, Ravi. 2020. "Will Huawei weather 5G storms in Latin America?" *Financial Express,* July 27. Retrieved from https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/will-huawei-weather-5g-storms-in-latin-america/2036098/ (Accessed 09.16.2020)

Bangla News 24. 2020. "Huawei to present 5G show first time in Bangladesh." January 14. Retrieved from https://www.banglanews24.com/index.php/business/article/82206/Huawei-to-present-5G-show-first-time-in-Bangladesh (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Bassist, Rina. 2020. "China apparently left out of Israel's 5G network tender." *Al-Monitor,* June 5. Retrieved from https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/06/israel-us-china-g5-wireless-network-tender-communication.html (Accessed 08.07.2020)

Beckley, Michael. 2018. "The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters." *International Security* 43(2): 7-44.

Beckley, Michael. 2020. "Rogue Superpower: Why This Could Be an Illiberal American Century." *Foreign Affairs,* November/December.

Bei Yi, Seow. 2018. "Asean has to work with the world as it is: PM Lee Hsien Loong." *The Straits Times,* November 15. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/asean-has-to-work-with-the-world-as-it-is-and-hope-that-it-does-not-have-to-take-sides-pm (Accessed 06.25.2020)

Belt and Road News. 2019. "Mexico and China can be Stronger Together: Mexican Gov't." June 7. Retrieved from https://www.beltandroad.news/2019/06/07/mexico-china-can-be-stronger-together-mexican-govt/ (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Belt and Road Portal. 2020. "List of countries that have signed a cooperation document on co-building the 'Belt and Road' with China." January 31. Retrieved from https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?tm_id=126andcat_id=10122andinfo_id=77298 (Accessed 05.23.2020)

Benkeroum, Amine. 2019. "Huawei to deploy 5G during CAN-19, a first in Egypt." *Wired Africa*, June 11. Retrieved from https://wired.africa/huawei-to-deploy-5g-during-can-2019-a-first-in-egypt.html (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Bennett, Colin J. 1991. "What Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It." *British Journal of Political Science* 21: 215-233.

Berger, Julian. 2020. "US to pull 12,000 troops out of Germany as Trump blasts 'delinquent' Berlin." *The Gurdian,* July 29. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jul/29/us-germany-troop-withdrawal-donald-trump (Accessed 08.29.2020)

Bienkov, Adam. 2020. "Trump accused Boris Johnson of 'betrayal' after slamming the phone down on him in a moment of 'apoplectic' fury." *Business Insider*, February 24. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-alone-world-stage-boris-johnson-betrayal-huawei-uk-merkel-2020-2?r=USandIR=T (Accessed 03.25.2020)

Bird, Mike. 2015. "The White House is slamming Britain for appeasing China's rising power." *Business Insider*, March 13. Retrieved from: https://www.businessinsider.com/us-attacks-britain-constantly-accommodating-china-2015-3?r=USandIR=T (Accessed 11.28.2019)

Blanchard, Ben. 2016. "Duterte Aligns Philippines with China, Says US Has Lost." *Reuters,* 20 October. URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS (Accessed 04.30.2018)

Bowden, John. 2019. "Pompeo warns Europe against letting 'Chinese tech giants' build 5G networks." *The Hill*, February 12. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/policy/international/472576-pompeo-warns-european-countries-against-letting-chinese-tech-giants (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Brands, Hal. 2016. *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Brazys, Samuel and Alexander Dukalskis. 2017. "Canary in the coal mine? China, the UNGA, and the changing world order." *Review of International Studies*: 1-23.

Britannica. 2020. "Marshall Plan". *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* January 27. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/event/Marshall-Plan (Accessed 09.18.2020)

Broersma, Matthew. 2020. "Austria 'Working With EU Partners' On Huawei 5G Decision." *Silicon*, January 20. Retrieved from https://www.silicon.co.uk/workspace/austria-huawei-5g-330831 (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. "Hard Times for Soft Balancing." *International Security* 30(1): 72-108.

Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2008. *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2016. "The Once and Future Superpower: Why China Won't Overtake the United States." *Foreign Affairs* 95(3): 91-104.

Browne, Ryan. 2017. "Top US General: China Will Be 'Greatest Threat' to US by 2025." *CNN,* September 27. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/26/politics/dunford-us-china-greatest-threat/index.html (Accessed 05.24.2020)

Büchenbacher, Katrin. 2019. "Switzerland joins BRI as the initiative extends further into central Europe." *CGTN*, April 26. Retrieved from https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d534f30556a4d34457a6333566d54/index.html (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and J. David Singer. 1973. "Alliance, Capabilities, and War: A Review and Synthesis." *Political Science Annual*: 237-280.

Buenos Aires Times. 2020. "Argentina holds talks with Huawei over adoption of 5G technology." *Buenos Aires Times,* July 8. Retrieved from https://batimes.com.ar/news/economy/argentina-opens-talks-with-huawei-over-adoption-of-5g-technology.phtml (Accessed 09.16.2020)

Burgess, Philip and David Moore. 1973. "Inter-Nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions." *Political Science Annual* 5.

Campbell, Kurt M. and Jake Sullivan 2019. "Competition Without Catastrophe: How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China." *Foreign Affairs* (September/October).

Campbell, Kurt M. and Mira Rapp-Hooper. 2020. "China Is Done Biding Its Time: The End of Beijing's Foreign Policy Restraint." *Foreign Affairs,* July 15. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-07-15/china-done-biding-its-time (Accessed 07.16.2020)

Canadian Press. 2018. "Canada open to more China trade now that USMCA is done, Trudeau says." *CBC News*, October 15. Retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canada-china-trudeau-1.4864177 (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Canadian Press. 2020. "Huawei still hopes to sell 5G equipment to Canada despite pressure from Five Eyes." *Global News*, July 15. Retrieved from https://globalnews.ca/news/7180895/huawei-5g-canada-five-eyes-pressure/ (Accessed 09.13.2020)

Carney, Christopher P. 1989. "International patron-client relationships: A conceptual framework." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 24: 42-55.

Carr, E. H. 1939 [1962]. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,* 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.

CGTN. 2020. "UK asks Japan for Huawei alternatives in 5G networks." *CGTN News,* July 19. Retrieved from https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-07-19/UK-asks-Japan-for-Huawei-alternatives-in-5G networks-SfpqYScBxK/index.html (Accessed 09.15.2020)

Chee, Chan Heng. 2019. "Resisting the Polarising Pull of US-China Rivalry." *Straits Times,* June 18. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/resisting-the-polarising-pull-of-us-china-rivalry (Accessed 06.01.2020)

China Internet Information Center. 2020. "China's Free Trade Agreements." Retrieved from http://www.china.org.cn/business/node_7233287.htm (Accessed 03.22.2020)

Chomsky, Noam. 2001. *11/9 [9/11].* Oslo: Forlaget Oktober.

Chomsky, Noam. 2016. *Who Rules the World?* London: Penguin Books Ltd.

Chomsky, Noam. 2017. *Global Discontents.* London: Penguin Books Ltd.

Chrysoloras, Nikos and Richard Bravo. 2019. "Huawei Deals for Tech Will Have Consequences, U.S. Warns EU." *Bloomberg,* February 7. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-07/huawei-deals-for-tech-will-have-consequences-u-s-warns-eu (Accessed 06.02.2020)

Churchill, Owen. 2018. "Mike Pompeo Warns Panama and Other Nations About Accepting China's 'Belt and Road' Loans." *South China Morning Post,* October 20. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2169449/mike-pompeo-warns-panama-and-other-about-accepting (Accessed 06.04.2020)

Cigaral, Nicolas. 2020. "Globe not cutting ties with Chinese tech giant Huawei." *PhilStar Global,* July 16. Retrieved from https://www.rcrwireless.com/20191004/5g/huawei-malaysia-5g-rollout (Accessed 09.19.2020)

Clarke, Kevin A. 2005. "The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in Econometric Research." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22(4): 341-352.

Cohen, Raphael S. and Andrew Radin. 2019. "Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat." *RAND Corporation,* Research Reports. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1793.html (Accessed 08.30.2020)

Collins, Katie. 2019. "US takes showdown with Huawei on the road. First stop: Europe." *CNET*, February 7. Retrieved from https://www.cnet.com/news/the-us-takes-its-showdown-with-huawei-on-the-road-first-stop-europe/ (Accessed 03.15.2020)

Cong, Wang and Li Xuanmin. 2019. "Netherlands could play bigger role in BRI: analyst." *Global Times*, April 25. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1147489.shtml (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Cook, Malcolm and Ian Storey. 2018. "A Southeast Asian Perspective." *The Asan Forum,* December 21. Retrieved from http://www.theasanforum.org/hedging-harder-southeast-asia-and-the-us-china-rivalry/ (Accessed 03.20.2020)

Coonan, Clifford. 2010. "China condemns 'insult' of award to jailed dissident Liu Xiaobo." *The Independent,* October 9. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/china-condemns-insult-of-award-for-jailed-dissident-liu-xiaobo-2101810.html (Accessed 09.18.2020)

Cornwell, Alexander. 2019. "U.S. flags Huawei 5G network security concerns to Gulf allies." *Reuters,* September 12. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-security-usa-gulf/u-s-flags-huawei-5G network-security-concerns-to-gulf-allies-idUSKCN1VX241 (Accessed 08.09.2020)

Cortéz, Victor. 2019. "Huawei rolls out 5G tests in Peru." *Contxto*, May 27. Retrieved from https://www.contxto.com/en/peru/huawei-rolls-out-5g-tests-in-peru/ (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Curan, Enda. 2016. "China's Marshall Plan." *Bloomberg,* August 7. Retrieved from www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-07/china-s-marshall-plan (Accessed 04.12.2018)

Cureton, Demond. 2018. "BRI Express: China, Belgium Sign Pact to Connect via Diamond Silk Road Railway." *Sputnik International*, March 2. Retrieved from: https://sputniknews.com/business/201809281068427277-Antwerp-Shanghai-Railway-BRI/ (Accessed 03.10.2020)

Czuczka, Tony and Steven Arons. 2019. "China Threatens Retaliation Should Germany Ban Huawei 5G." *Bloomberg*, December 15. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-14/china-threatens-germany-with-retaliation-if-huawei-5g-is-banned?mod=djemDailyShotandmod=djemDailyShot (Accessed 03.10.2020)

Daly, Robert. 2018. "China's Global Dreams Give Its Neighbors Nightmares." *Foreign Policy,* March 12.

De Soysa, Indra and Paul Midford. 2012. "Enter the Dragon! An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Versus US Arms Transfers to Autocrats and Violators of Human Rights." *International Studies Quarterly* 56: 843-856.

Department of Defense. 2019. "Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency." December. Retrieved from https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp (Accessed 04.06.2020)

Development Reimagined. 2019. "Countries Along the Belt and Road: What Does It All Mean?" September 26. Retrieved from https://developmentreimagined.com/2019/09/26/countries-along-the-belt-and-road-what-does-it-all-mean/ (Accessed 03.08.2020)

Devonshire-Ellis, Chris. 2019. "Boris Johnson Praises the Belt and Road Initiative – Could An EU Exit Mean A UK BRI Deal?" *Silk Road Briefing*, July 25. Retrieved from https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2019/07/25/britains-new-pm-boris-johnson-praises-belt-road-initiative-eu-exit-mean-uk-bri-deal/ (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Dikov, Ivan. 2019. "Countries 'Wake Up in Dependency', Germany Warns after Italy's BRI Deal with China." *European Views*, March 24. Retrieved from https://www.european-views.com/2019/03/counties-wake-up-in-dependency-germany-warns-after-italys-bri-deal-with-china/ (Red 03.09.2020)

Doffman, Zak 2019a. "Huawei Just Launched 5G In Russia With Putin's Support: 'Hello Splinternet'." *Forbes,* September 1. Retrieved from: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/09/01/hello-splinternet-huawei-deploys-5g-in-russia-with-putins-support/ (Accessed 11.01.2019)

Doffman, Zak. 2019b. "Huawei Soars In Russia As Putin Engages In New Technological Leap." *Forbes,* November 3. Retrieved from: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/11/03/huawei-soars-in-russia-as-putin-engages-in-new-technological-war/#3a3a9a58765c (Accessed 11.10.2019)

Donfried, Karen and Wolfgang Ischinger. 2020. "The Pandemic and the Toll of Transatlantic Discord." *Foreign Affairs,* April 18. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-18/pandemic-and-toll-transatlantic-discord (Accessed 05.11.2020)

Doucet, Lyse. 2020. "Afghan conflict: US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war." *BBC,* February 29. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443 (Accessed 08.20.2020)

Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. 2017. "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset." *AidData,* Working Thesis #46.

Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele. 2008. "Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis." *Public Choice* 136: 139-164.

Duke, Jennifer. 2019. "No way on Huawei: Morrison doubles down on ban on Chinese telco supplier." *The Sydney Morning Herald,* July 10. Retrieved from https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/no-way-on-huawei-morrison-government-doubles-down-on-ban-of-chinese-telco-supplier-20190709-p525i8.html (Accessed 05.29.2020)

Dutch News. 2020. "'We are not making threats': US ambassador to NL reconfirms position on Huawei." June 22. Retrieved from https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2020/06/we-are-not-making-threats-us-ambassador-to-nl-reconfirms-position-on-huawei/ (Accessed 09.15.2020)

ECO News. 2020. "Huawei outside the 5G core in Portugal." March 6. Retrieved from https://econews.pt/2020/03/06/huawei-outside-the-5g-core-in-portugal/ (Accessed 09.15.2020)

Ecofin Agency. 2018. "Algeria: Mobilis successfully tests 5G network in Oran with technical support from Huawei." November 15. Retrieved from https://www.ecofinagency.com/telecom/1531-39275-algeria-mobilis-successfully-tests-5G network-in-oran-with-technical-support-from-huawei (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Economic Times. 2020. "China uses trade as weapon to silence virus criticism." May 15. Retrieved from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-uses-trade-as-weapon-to-silence-virus-criticism/articleshow/75757845.cms (Accessed 09.30.2020)

Edelman, Adam. 2019. "Biden's comments downplaying China threat to U.S. fire up pols on both sides." *NBC News,* May 2. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/biden-s-comments-downplaying-china-threat-u-s-fires-pols-n1001236 (Accessed 08.04.2020)

Egyptian Streets. 2019. "5G to Launch in Egypt at the African Cup of Nations." April 24. Retrieved from https://egyptianstreets.com/2019/04/24/5g-to-launch-in-egypt-at-the-african-cup-of-nations/ (Accessed 09.17.2020)

Ellyatt, Holly. 2019a. "Are Russia and Chine the best of friends now? It's complicated, analysts say." *CNBC*, September 27. Retrieved from: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/27/russia-and-chinas-relationship--how-deep-does-it-go.html (Accessed 11.05.2019)

Ellyatt, Holly. 2019b. "Russia is dominating the Arctic, but it's not looking to fight over it." *CNBC,* December 27. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/27/russias-dominance-in-the-arctic.html (Accessed 06.14.2020)

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ireland. 2018. "Ireland willing to deepen cooperation with China under BRI." May 14. Retrieved from http://ie.china-embassy.org/eng/zagx/t1559894.htm (Accessed 03.10.2020)

Enterprise Talk. 2019. "Huawei Gets Mexico Against US Support." *ET Bureau,* May 11. Retrieved from https://enterprisetalk.com/featured/huawei-gets-mexico-against-us-support/ (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Erlanger, Steven. 2020. "Global Backlash Builds Against China Over Coronavirus." *The New York Times,* May 3. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/world/europe/backlash-china-coronavirus.html?auth=login-email&login=email (Accessed 07.16.2020)

Etzioni, Amitai. 2016. "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: A Case Study of Multifaceted Containment." *Asian Perspective* 40(2): 173-196.

Etzioni, Amitai. 2017. *Avoiding War with China: Two Nations, One World.* Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1): 68-90.

Fengming, Qin. 2005. "'Hou huashengdun gongshi' yu zhongguo moshi" ["'Post-Washington Consensus and the China Model"]. *Taipingyang xuebao [Pacific Journal]* 6: 40-45.

Fermann, Gunnar. 2013. *Utenrikspolitikk og norsk krisehåndtering [Foreign Policy and Crisis Management]*, 1. utgave. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk.

Flores-Maciás, Gustavo A. and Sarah E. Kreps. 2013. "The Foreign Policy Consequences of Trade: China's Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992-2006." *Journal of Politics* 75(2): 357-371.

Fouquet, Helene and Albertina Torsoli.2020. "Huawei in European 5G Heaven as Swiss Thumb Their Noses at Trump." *Bloomberg,* March 4. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-04/huawei-finds-5g-heaven-in-switzerland-with-fitbits-for-cows (Accessed 09.15.2020)

Fravel, M. Taylor. 2008. *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Friedberg, Aaron L. 2011. *A Contest for Supremacy*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Friedberg, Aaron L. 2018. "Competing with China. Survival, Global Politics and Strategy." *Survival* 60(3): 7-64.

Friedman, Lisa. 2019. "Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement." *The New York Times,* November 4. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreement-climate.html (Accessed 09.11.2020)

Friedman, Uri. 2020. "America Is Alone in Its Cold War With China." *The Atlantic,* February 17. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/02/us-china-allies-competition/606637/ (Accessed 04.02.2020)

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16: 3-18.

Gabuev, Alexander. 2020. "Huawei's courtship of Moscow leaves West in the cold." *Financial Times,* June 21. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/f36a558f-4e4d-4c00-8252-d8c4be45bde4 (Accessed 08.18.2020)

Galindo, Jimena. 2019. "Peru to join China's Belt and Road Initiative." *Global Americans*, May 1. Retrieved from https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/05/just-the-facts-peru-to-join-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/ (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Gates, Robert M. 2020. "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs,* July/August.

Ghosh, Rudroneel. 2020. "Economy is the most powerful weapon for China, not its missiles: Joel Zhengyi Shon." *The Times of India,* October 23. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGpOO_owKTg (Accessed 09.30.2020)

Gilbert, Paula. 2020. "African Operators, Governments Show Faith in Huawei." *Connecting Africa,* July 26. Retrieved from http://www.connectingafrica.com/author.asp?section_id=761&doc_id=753041 (Accessed 09.16.2020)

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Glaser, Charles L. 1996. "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help." *Security Studies* 5(3): 122-163.

Global Firepower. 2020. "2020 Military Strength Ranking." Retrieved from https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp (Accessed 03.22.2020)

Goldgeier, James and Bruce W. Jentleson 2020. "The United States Is Not Entitled to Lead the World: Washington Should Take A Seat at the Table – But Not Always at Its Head." *Foreign Affairs,* September 25. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-09-25/united-states-not-entitled-lead-world (Accessed 10.02.2020)

Goldman, David P. 2020. "South Korea is the pivot in the Huawei wars." *Asia Times,* May 30. Retrieved from https://asiatimes.com/2020/05/south-korea-is-the-pivot-in-the-huawei-wars/ (Accessed 09.28.2020)

Goodier, Michael. 2020. "The definitive list of where every country stands on Huawei." *NS Tech,* July 29. Retrieved from https://tech.newstatesman.com/security/where-every-country-stands-huawei (Accessed 08.07.2020)

Green, Michael and Evan S. Medeiros. 2020. "Is Taiwan the Next Hong Kong? China Tests the Limits of Impunity." *Foreign Affairs,* July 8. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2020-07-08/taiwan-next-hong-kong (Accessed 07.14.2020)

Grotto, Andrew. 2019. "The Huawei Problem: A Risk Assessment." *Global Asia* 14(3): 13-15.

Haass, Richard. 2020. "The Pandemic Will Accelerate History Rather Than Reshape It." *Foreign Affairs,* April 7. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-07/pandemic-will-accelerate-history-rather-reshape-it (Accessed 04.20.2020)

Hamilton, Daniel S. 2014. "The American Way of Partnerships." *European Strategic Partnerships Observatory*, Working Thesis, June 6: 1-23.

Harris, Gardiner. 2018. "Trump Administration Withdraws U.S. From U.N. Human Rights Council." *New York Times,* June 19. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/politics/trump-israel-palestinians-human-rights.html (Accessed 09.11.2020)

Hart, Andrew F. and Bruce D. Jones. 2010. "How Do Rising Powers Rise?" *Survival* 52(6): 63-88.

Hatton, Barry and Kelvin Chan. 2019. "Portugal resists US appeal to bar Huawei from 5G network." *AP News*, December 5. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/e0a8229846154d6ba27094e042db1abd (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Henderson, Isaiah M. 2019. "Cold Ambition: The New Geopolitical Faultline." *The California Review,* July 18. Retrieved from https://calrev.org/2019/07/18/cold-ambition-the-new-geopolitical-faultline/?v=c2f3f489a005 (Accessed 05.27.2020)

Higgins, Andrew 2012. "In Philippines, banana growers feel effect of South China Sea dispute." *Washington Post,* June 10. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-philippines-banana-growers-feel-effect-of-south-china-sea-dispute/2012/06/10/gJQA47WVTV_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.13e0622d2da7 (Accessed 04.11.2018)

Hirschman, Albert O. 1945 [1980]. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Holsti, Ole, Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan. 1973. *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances.* New York: John Wiley.

Holzinger, Katharina and Christopher Knill. 2005. "Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence." *Journal of European Public Policy* 12: 775-796.

Huawei. 2019. "Huawei Facts; Cybersecurity." Retrieved from: https://www.huawei.com/en/facts (Accessed 11.11.2019)

Hulsman, John C. 2020. "Xi risks losing his Mandate of Heaven." *Cap X,* February 13. Retrieved from https://capx.co/over-the-coronavirus-xi-loses-the-mandate-of-heaven/ (Accessed 04.19.2020)

Hunter, Fergus. 2020. "Huawei ban a 'thorny issue' hurting China-Australia relations, says ambassador." *Sydney Morning Herald,* February 17. Retrieved from https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/huawei-ban-a-thorny-issue-hurting-china-australia-relations-says-ambassador-20200217-p541ic.html (Accessed 06.12.2020)

Huntington, Samuel P. 1999. "The Lonely Superpower." *Foreign Affairs*, March/April.

Husein, Sayed. 2020. "Russia Emerges; An Indispensable Partner to Belt and Road Initiative." *Belt & Road News,* May 5. Retrieved from https://www.beltandroad.news/2020/05/05/russia-emerges-an-indispensable-partner-to-belt-road-initiative/ (Accessed 08.18.2020)

Ikenberry, G. John. 2004. "The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment." *Survival* 46(1): 7-42.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2015. "Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia." *Political Science Quarterly* 20(20): 1-35.

International Monetary Fund. 2019. "World Economic Outlook." Retrieved from http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-by-gdp/ (Accessed 03.15.2020)

Iwamoto, Kentaro. 2020. "Huawei 5G dominance threatened in Southeast Asia." *Nikkei Asian Review,* July 20. Retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Huawei-crackdown/Huawei-5G-dominance-threatened-in-Southeast-Asia (Accessed 08.08.2020)

Jacques, Martin. 2009. *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the end of the Western World.* London: Penguin Books.

Jakobsen, Jo, Tor G. Jakobsen, Eirin Rande Ekevold. 2016. "Democratic Peace and the Norms of the Public: A Multilevel Analysis of the Relationship between Regime Type and Citizens' Bellicosity, 1981-2008." *Review of International Studies* 42(5): 968-991.

Jakobsen, Jo. 2018. "Is European NATO *really* free-riding? Patterns of material and non-material burden-sharing after the Cold War." *European Security* 27(4): 490-514.

Jee, Charlotte. 2019. "The UK will let Huawei provide 'non-core' equipment in its 5G network." *MIT Technology Review,* April 24. Retrieved from https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/04/24/1025/the-uk-will-let-huawei-provide-non-core-equipment-in-its-5g-network/ (Retrieved from 09.25.2020)

Jerdén, Björn. 2014. "The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought Into It." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 7(February): 47-88.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30(2): 167-214.

Jiamel, Wang. 2019. "German business enthusiasm for Belt and Road Initiative to prompt pragmatism from Berlin." *Global Times*, April 2. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1144461.shtml (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Jing, Fu. 2017. "Belt and Road Initiative on agenda for Danish PM's China visit." *China Daily*, May 1. Retrieved from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-05/01/content_29153931.htm (Accessed 03.10.2020)

Johnson, Simon. 2019. "Pompeo: Russia is 'aggressive' in Arctic, China's work there also needs watching." *Reuters World News,* May 6. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-arctic-council/pompeo-russia-is-aggressive-in-arctic-chinas-work-there-also-needs-watching-idUSKCN1SC1AY (Accessed 06.14.2020)

Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2013. "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security* 37(4): 7-48.

Jolly, Jasper. 2018. "New Zealand blocks Huawei imports over 'significant security risks'." *The Guardian,* November 28. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/nov/28/new-zealand-blocks-huawei-5g-equipment-on-security-concerns (Accessed 05.29.2020)

Kang, David. 2007. *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kang, David. 2010. *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute.* New York: Colombia University Press.

Kastner, Scott. 2010. ''Buying Influence: Assessing the Political Effects of China's International Economic Ties.'' Thesis prepared for the 2010 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC.

Katkov, Mark. 2020. "China Charges 2 Canadians With Espionage In Case Tied To U.S. Prosecution Of Huawei." *NPR,* June 19. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2020/06/19/880741322/china-charges-2-canadians-with-espionage-in-case-tied-to-u-s-prosecution-of-huaw (Accessed 07.19.2020)

Keall, Chris. 2020. "Spark's 5G contract with Samsung another blow to Huawei." *New Zealand Herald,* March 5. Retrieved from https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=12314042 (Accessed 08.25.2020)

Keane, Sean. 2020. "Huawei ban timeline: Chinese company's Harmony OS may hit phones next year." *CNET,* September 11. Retrieved from https://www.cnet.com/news/huawei-ban-full-timeline-us-restrictions-china-trump-android-google-ban-harmony-os/ (Accessed 09.17.2020)

Kennan, George F. 1947. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 25(4): 566-582.

Kennan, George. 1954. *Realities of American Foreign Policy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kennedy, Paul. 1987. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.* New York: Random House.

Kennedy, Scott. 2010. "The Myth of the Beijing Consensus." *Journal of Contemporary China* 19(65): 461-477.

Kenton, Will. 2019. "Endogenous Variable." *Investopedia,* August 22. Retrieved from https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/endogenous-variable.asp (Accessed 08.30.2020)

Kirshner, Jonathan. 2010. "The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China." *European Journal of International Relations* 18(1): 53-75.

Kirshner, Jonathan. 2015. "The economic sins of modern IR theory and the classical realist alternative." *World Politics* 67(1): 155-183.

Kissinger, Henry. 2011. *On China.* New York: Penguin Books.

Knutsen, Torbjørn L. 2016. *A History of International Relations Theory.* Third Edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Krauthammer, Charles. 1990. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* 70(1): 23-33.

Kuo, Lily. 2020. "China sends doctors and masks overseas as domestic coronavirus infections drop." *The Guardian,* March 19. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/china-positions-itself-as-a-leader-in-tackling-the-coronavirus (Accessed 04.20.2020)

Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2007. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2016. "Let China win. It's good for America." *Washington Post*, January 15. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/let-china-win-its-good-for-america/2016/01/14/bfec4732-b9b6-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html (Accessed 11.30.2019)

LABS. 2020a. "5G may bring $300 billion to Latin America by 2023." *Latin America Business Stories*, March 6. Retrieved from https://labs.ebanx.com/en/news/business/5g-may-bring-300-billion-to-latin-america-by-2023/ (Accessed 03.11.2020)

LABS. 2020b. "Colombia says it won't ban Huawei 's 5G as the company forges ahead in Latin America." *Latin America Business Stories*, March 10. Retrieved from https://labs.ebanx.com/en/news/technology/colombia-wont-ban-huawei-5g-firm-advances-in-latin-america/ (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Lake, David A. 2013. "Legitimating power: The Domestic Politics of US International Hierarchy." *International* Security 38(2): 74-111.

Lam, Oiwan. 2020. "Netizens from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand brew 'Milk Tea Alliance' against Chinese speech police." *Global Voices,* May 4. Retrieved from https://globalvoices.org/2020/05/04/netizens-from-hong-kong-taiwan-thailand-brew-milk-tea-alliance-against-chinese-speech-police/ (Accessed 07.15.2020)

Lande, Carl C. 1983. "Political Clientelism in Political Studies, Retrospect and Prospects." *International Political Science Review* 4: 435-454.

Lanteigne, Marc. 2019. "China and Finland: The Ice Road Cometh?" *Over the Circle*, March 17. Retrieved from https://overthecircle.com/2019/03/17/china-and-finland-the-ice-road-cometh/ (Accessed 03.10.2020)

Laskar, Rezaul H. 2017. "CPEC route through Kashmir could create tension with India: UN report." *Hindustan Times,* May 25. Retrieved from https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/cpec-route-through-kashmir-could-create-tension-with-india-un-report/story-05fDgjtdFmATT6K13ZJffN.html (Accessed 05.27.2020)

Layne, Christopher. 1993. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Powers Will Arise." *International Security* 17(4): 5-51.

Layne, Christopher. 2006. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment." *International Security* 31(2): 7-41.

Leeds, Brett Ashley and Burcu Savun. 2007. "Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?" *The Journal of Politics* 69(4): 1118-1132.

Leger, Donna L. 2017. "What is the 'One China' policy?" *USA Today*, June 13. Retrieved from https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/06/13/what-is-one-china-policy/102806774/ (Accessed 03.14.2020)

Lemarchand, Rene and Keith Legg. 1972. "Political Clientelism and Development, A Preliminary Analysis." *Comparative Politics* 4: 149-178.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. "Balancing on Land and Sea." *International Security* 35(1): 7-43.

Lieber, Keir A. and Gerard Alexander. 2005. "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back." *International Security* 30(1): 109-139.

Lieberman, Evan S. 2005. "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 435-452.

Lim, Darren J. and Zack Cooper. 2016. "Are East Asian states really hedging between The US and China." *East Asia Forum,* January 30. Retrieved from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/30/are-east-asian-states-really-hedging-between-the-us-and-china/ (Accessed 06.16.2020)

Lin, Christina. 2020. "China might take Iran's side in a war with US." *Asia Times,* January 5. Retrieved from https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/could-china-take-irans-side-in-a-war-with-us/ (Accessed 03.27.2020)

Liska, George. 1962. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Liska, George. 1978. *Career of Empire: America and Imperial Expansion Over Land and Sea.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Liu, Natalie. 2020. "After Britain, Germany Emerges as Next 5G Battleground." *Voa News,* July 23. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voa-news-china/after-britain-germany-emerges-next-5g-battleground (Accessed 09.15.2020)

Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds. 2009. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Loong, Lee Hsien. 2020. "The Endangered Asian Century: America, China, and the Perils of Confrontation." *Foreign Affairs,* July/August.

López, Mariana. 2020. "The state of 5G rollout in Latin America." *Contxto,* July 1. Retrieved from https://www.contxto.com/en/mexico/5g-latin-america/ (Accessed 08.08.2020)

Lucey, Catherine and Drew Hinshaw. 2019. "U.S. Signs 5G Agreement With Poland Amid Huawei Concerns." *The Wall Street Journal,* September 2. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-signs-5g-agreement-with-poland-despite-huawei-concerns-11567434905 (Accessed 09.15.2020)

Lysne, Olav. 2018. *The Huawei and Snowden Questions: Can Electronic Equipment from Untrusted Vendors be Verified? Can an Untrusted Vendor Build Trust into Electronic Equipment?* DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74950-1.

Ma, Alexandra. 2019. "Xi Jinping's dream to connect the entire world with Chinese infrastructure just claimed one of its biggest victories yet." *Business Insider*, March 23. Retrieved from https://www.businessinsider.com/italy-china-belt-and-road-initiative-biggest-economy-yet-2019-3?r=USandIR=T (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Mackinder, Halford J. 1904 [2009]. *Democratic Ideals and Reality.* London: Faber and Faber.

Madan, Tanvi. 2020. "China Is Losing India: A Clash in the Himalayas Will Push New Dehli Toward Washington." *Foreign Affairs,* June 22. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-22/china-losing-india (Accessed 06.23.2020)

Mahbubani, Kishore. 2020a. *Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy*. New York: Public Affairs.

Mahbubani, Kishore. 2020b. "How China could win over the post-coronavius world and leave the U.S. behind." *Market Watch,* April 18. Retrieved from https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-china-could-win-over-the-post-coronavirus-world-and-leave-the-us-behind-2020-04-14 (Accessed 04.19.2020)

Maizland, Lindsey. 2020. "China's Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang." *Council on Foreign Relations,* June 30. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang (Accessed 07.18.2020)

Marek, Jonathon and Ashley Dutta. 2019. "A Concise Guide to Huawei's Cybersecurity Risks and the Global Risks." *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, October 3. Retrieved from: https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-concise-guide-to-huaweis-cybersecurity-risks-and-the-global-responses/ (Accessed 12.03.2019)

Matthews, Chris. 2020. "China will emerge from the coronavirus crisis stronger than the U.S., experts warn." *Market Watch,* March 28. Retrieved from https://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-will-emerge-from-the-coronavirus-crisis-stronger-than-the-us-experts-warn-2020-03-24?mod=article_inline (Accessed 04.20.2020)

McGregor, Grady. 2020. "As U.S.-Iran Tensions Flare, China Emerges as Tehran's Last-Ditch Lifeline." *Fortune*, January 10. Retrieved from: https://fortune.com/2020/01/10/us-iran-sanctions-china/ (Accessed 03.14.2020)

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* New York: Norton.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2006. "China's Unpeaceful Rise." *Current History* 105(690): 160-162.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. "Can China Rise Peacefully?" *The National Interest,* October 25. Retrieved from http://www.eastlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Can-China-Rise-Peacefully_-_-The-National-Interest.pdf (Accessed 08.17.2020)

Merkel-Hess, Kate and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom. 2010. "Nanjing by the Numbers". *Financial Times,* February 9. https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/09/nanjing-by-the-numbers/ (Accessed 06.04.2020)

Middle East Monitor. 2019. "Huawei denies spying on Algeria opposition for government". August 17. Retrieved from https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/category/opinion-pieces/ (Accessed 09.17.2020)

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1948. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* New York: A. A. Knopf.

Morris, Scott. 2016. "Responding to AIIB". *Council on Foreign Relations*, September 1. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/report/responding-aiib (Accessed 03.08.2020)

Morrow, James D. 1994. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4):904–33.

MT-Tech. 2020. ""Elisa replacing Nokia 5G towers to Huawei in Helsinki – over gigabit speed in 4G network." *RSS,* February 14. Retrieved from https://mt-tech.fi/en/elisa-replacing-nokia-5g-towers-to-huawei-in-helsinki-over-gigabit-speed-to-4g-network/ (09.19.2020)

Murdoch-Gibson, Sebastian. 2018. "Scandinavia's Unlikely Link in the Belt and Road Initiative." *Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada*, May 30. Retrieved from https://www.asiapacific.ca/blog/scandinavias-unlikely-link-belt-and-road-initiative (Accessed 03.10.2020)

Musil, Steven. 2019. "US reportedly receives 130-plus requests for Huawei licenses." *CNET*, August 27. Retrieved from https://www.cnet.com/news/us-reportedly-receives-130-plus-requests-for-huawei-licenses/ (Read 25.03.2020)

Myre, Greg. 2020. "In Battle For Europe's Phones, U.S. Suffers Setback, Huawei Notches A Win." *NPR*, January 29. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2020/01/29/800899104/in-battle-for-europes-phones-u-s-suffers-setback-huawei-notches-a-win (Accessed 03.10.2020)

Nambiar, Shankaran. 2019. "Why Malaysia's Prime Minister is Warming to China's Belt and Road." *War on the Rocks*, June 11. Retrieved from: https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/why-malaysias-prime-minister-is-warming-to-chinas-belt-and-road/ (Accessed 11.01.2019)

NATO. 2020. "Jens Stoltenberg." Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/who_is_who_49999.htm (Accessed 08.09.2020)

Nicola, Stefan. 2019. "Merkel Takes a Stand Against U.S. Pressure to Bar Huawei From 5G." *Bloomberg*, March 19. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-19/merkel-takes-a-stand-against-u-s-pressure-to-bar-huawei-from-5g (Accessed 03.23.2020)

Nicolas, Francoise. 2019. "France and China's Belt and Road Initiative." *Italian Institute for International Political Studies*, April 8. Retrieved from https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/france-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-22787 (Accessed 03.09.2020)

O'Grady, Vaughan. 2020. "Nigerian Communications Commission denies 5G claims." *Developing Telecoms,* May 12. Retrieved from https://www.developingtelecoms.com/telecom-business/telecom-regulation/9530-nigerian-communications-commission-denies-5g-claims.html (Accessed 08.08.2020)

Oates, John. 2020. "There's no Huawei we're taking this lying down: Chinese mobe maker denies US govt racketeering charges." *The Register*, March 5. Retrieved from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/03/05/huawei_denies_racketeering/ (Accessed 03.14.2020)

OBOReurope. 2018a. "A Belt, a Road and a Bridge in Norway." *Belt and Road Europe,* December 16. Retrieved from https://www.oboreurope.com/en/belt-road-bridge-norway/ (Accessed 03.10.2020)

OBOReurope. 2018b. "Spain, Europe and the BRI." *Belt and Road Europe*, November 30. Retrieved from https://www.oboreurope.com/en/spain-europe-bri/ (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2020. "Free Trade Agreements." Retrieved from https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (Accessed 03.22.2020)

Oliver, Dan. 2020. "Pakistani operator Jazz trials 5G in Islamabad." *5G Radar,* January 6. Retrieved from https://www.5gradar.com/news/pakistani-operator-jazz-trials-5g-in-islamabad (Accessed 09.19.2020)

Oneal, John R. and Bruce Russett. 2005. "Rule of Three, Let It Be? When More Really Is Better." *Conflict Management and Peace Research* 22(4): 293-310.

Onishi, Tomoya. 2020. "Vietnam carrier develops native 5G tech to lock out Huawei." *Nikkei Asian Review*, January 25. Retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Telecommunication/Vietnam-carrier-develops-native-5G-tech-to-lock-out-Huawei (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Onyedika-Ugoeze, Nkechi and Sodiq Omolaoye. 2019. "5G network will ensure fastest internet, says Huawei boss." *The Guardian*, November 28. Retrieved from https://guardian.ng/technology/5G network-will-ensure-fastest-internet-says-huawei-boss/ (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Organski, A. F. K. 1958. *World Politics.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Organski, A. F. K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. *The War Ledger.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ospanova, Aygul. 2019. "5G Network Goes Live In Kazakhstan." *Caspian News,* October 24. Retrieved from https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/5G network-goes-live-in-kazakhstan-2019-10-23-49/ (Accessed 03.17.2020)

Pandey, Ashutosh. 2019. "EU-Japan take on BRI with own Silk Road." *DW,* October 4. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/eu-japan-take-on-chinas-bri-with-own-silk-road/a-50697761 (Read 10.06.2020)

Pape, Robert A. 2005. "Soft Balancing against the United States." *International Security* 30(1): 7-45.

Parameswaran, Prashanth. 2019. "Assessing the New US Free and Open Indo-Pacific Progress Report." *The Diplomat*, November 5. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/assessing-the-new-free-and-open-indo-pacific-progress-report/ (Accessed 03.08.2020)

Paul, Thazha V. 2005. "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.." *International Security* 30(1): 46-71.

People's Republic of China. 2005. *Position Thesis of the People's Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms.* Retrieved from http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/zzhgg/t199101.htm (Accessed 05.21.2020)

Pollina, Elvira. 2020. "EXCLUSIVE – TIM excludes Huawei from 5G core equipment tender in Italy, Brazil – sources." *Nasdaq,* July 9. Retrieved from https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/exclusive-tim-excludes-huawei-from-5g-core-equipment-tender-in-italy-brazil-sources-2020-0 (Accessed 09.15.2020)

Polyakova, Alina. 2019. "Are U.S. and Russia in a new Cold War?" *Brookings,* January 20. Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/are-u-s-and-russia-in-a-new-cold-war/ (Accessed 11.29.2019)

Porter, Patrick. 2016. "Taking uncertainty seriously: Classical realism and national security." *European Journal of International Security* 1(2): 239-260.

Power, John. 2020. "Australia boosts defense spending by 40 percent as China tensions rise." *South China Morning Post,* July 1. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3091356/australia-boosts-defence-spending-40-cent-china-tensions-rise (Accessed 07.19.2020)

Ramo, Joshua Cooper. 2004. *The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power.* London: Foreign Policy Centre.

Rao, Rajiv. 2020. "Huawei allowed to participate in India's 5G trial phase, but will it be allowed to win?" *ZD Net*, January 7. Retrieved from https://www.zdnet.com/article/huawei-allowed-to-enter-5g-trial-phase-but-will-it-be-allowed-to-win/ (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Ray, James Lee. 2005. "Constructing Multivariate Analyses (of Dangerous Dyads." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22(4): 277-292.

Reuters Staff. 2020a. "Factbox: Deals by major suppliers in the race for 5G." June 17. Retrieved from https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-telecoms-5g-orders-factbox/factbox-deals-by-major-suppliers-in-the-race-for-5g-idUKKBN23O2G4 (Accessed 09.13.2020)

Reuters Staff. 2020b. "France won't ban Huawei, but encouraging 5G telcos to avoid it: report." July 15. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-huawei-5g/france-wont-ban-huawei-but-encouraging-5g-telcos-to-avoid-it-report-idUSKBN2460TT (Accessed 09.15.2020)

Reuters. 2019. German Chancellor Angela Merkel Hopes US-China Trade War Will Be Over Soon." *Straits Times,* September 7. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/merkel-hopes-us-china-trade-war-will-be-over-soon (Accessed 06.01.2020)

Reuters. 2020a. "NATO's Jens Stoltenberg sounds warning on China's rise." *DW,* June 13. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/natos-jens-stoltenberg-sounds-warning-on-chinas-rise/a-53795384 (Accessed 08.11.2020)

Reuters. 2020b. "Top campaign advisor says Biden would sanction China over Hong Kong." *CNBC,* May 27. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/28/top-campaign-advisor-says-biden-would-sanction-china-over-hong-kong.html (Accessed 08.04.2020)

Reuters. 2020c. "EU deals another blow to US, allowing members to decide on Huawei's 5G role." *CNBC*, January 29. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/29/eu-deals-blow-to-us-allowing-members-to-decide-on-huaweis-5g-role.html (Accessed 03.24.2020)

Riker, William H. 1962. *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rinke, Andreas. 2020. Merkel's conservatives stop short of Huawei 5G ban in Germany." *Reuters,* February 11. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-usa-huawei/merkels-conservatives-set-to-stop-short-of-huawei-5g-ban-in-germany-idUSKBN205346 (Accessed 05.28.2020)

Ripsman, Norrin M., Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell. 2016. *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rogers, Mike and Dutch Ruppersberger. 2012. "Investigative report on the US national security issues posed by Chinese telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE." *U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.* Retrieved from https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:rm226yb7473/Huawei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf (Accessed 04.07.2019)

Rose, Gideon. 1998. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics* 53(1): 144-172.

Ross, Robert. 2006. ''Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia.'' *Security Studies* 15(3): 355–395.

Rothstein, Robert L. 1968. *Alliances and Small Powers.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Rowley, Anthony. 2015. "Rush to Join AIIB Reflects China's Growing Financial Clout." *Institutional Investor*, April 15. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1685379632/9ACB223864414F7BPQ/4?accountid=12870 (Accessed 05.14.2018)

Roy, Denny. 2005. "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27(2): 305-322.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2020. "America's Unholy Crusade Against China." *Project Syndicate,* August 15. Retrieved from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/america-evangelical-crusade-against-china-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2020-08 (Accessed 08.18.2020)

Saddiq, Syed. 2019. "Mahathir is not bowing to China on Huawei. He's standing up to US bully: Malaysian minister Syed Saddiq." *South China Morning Post,* June 7. Retrieved from: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3013585/mahathir-not-bowing-china-huawei-hes-standing-us-bully-malaysian (Accessed 11.01.2019)

Sandle, Paul and Guy Faulconbridge. 2020. "UK to purge Huawei from 5G by end of 2027, siding with Trump over China." *Reuters,* July 14. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-huawei/uk-to-purge-huawei-from-5g-by-2027-angering-china-and-pleasing-trump-idUSKCN24E30P (Accessed 07.15.2020)

Santora, Marc and Hana de Gooeij. 2019. "Huawei was a Czech favorite. Now? It's a National Security Threat." *The New York Times*, February 12. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/world/europe/czech-republic-huawei.html (Accessed 03.12.2020)

Satter, Raphael, Robin Emmott and Jack Stubbs. 2020. "China pressured EU to drop COVID disinformation: sources." *Reuters,* April 25. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-china/china-pressured-eu-to-drop-covid-disinformation-criticism-sources-idUSKCN227030 (Accessed 05.01.2020)

Schelling, Thomas C. 1960 [1980]. *The Strategy of Conflict.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966 [2008]. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schirm, Stefan A. 2010. "Leaders in need of followers: Emerging powers in global governance." *European Journal of International Relations* 16(2): 197-221.

Schroeder, Paul W. 1977. "Quantitative Studies in the Balance of Power: An Historian's Reaction." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21(1).

Schweller, Randall L. 1999. "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory." In Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds. *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power.* London: Routledge.

Scissors, Derek. 2019. "Facts On The BRI's Past and Present." *American Enterprise Institute,* June 12. Retrieved from https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/BRI-Senate-testimony-6.12.19.pdf (Accessed 05.23.2020)

Seawright, Jason and John Gerring. 2008. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options." *Political Research Quarterly* 61(2): 294-308.

Sempa, Francis P. "China and the World Island." *The Diplomat,* January 26. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20190126023844/https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/china-and-the-world-island/#!/web/20190126023844mp_/https://thediplomat.com/ (Accessed 05.23.2020)

Sender, Henny. 2020. "China and Japan should cooperate on infrastructure, not compete." *Nikkei Asian Review*, January 9. Retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/China-and-Japan-should-cooperate-on-infrastructure-not-compete (Accessed 03.08.2020)

Shoemaker, Christopher C. and Spanier, John W. 1984. *Patron-Client State Relationships.* New York: Praeger.

Shoji, Tomotaka. 2019. "'Belt and Road' vs. 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific': Competition over Regional Order and ASEAN." *National Institute for Defense Studies 88*, January 9. Retrieved from http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary088e.pdf (Accessed 03.08.2020)

Silver, Laura and Kat Devlin. 2020. "Around the world, more see the U.S. positively than China, but little confidence in Trump or Xi." *Pew Research Center*, January 10. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/01/10/around-the-world-more-see-the-u-s-positively-than-china-but-little-confidence-in-trump-or-xi/ (Accessed 04.04.2020)

Silver, Laura, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang. 2019. "Attitudes toward China." *Pew Research Center,* December 5. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/12/05/attitudes-toward-china-2019/ (Accessed 07.20.2020)

Singer, David J. 1988. "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985." *International Interactions* 14(2): 115-132.

Sink, Justin and Alyza Sebenius. 2019. "U.S. and Poland Ink 5G Security Agreement Amid Anti-Huawei Campaign." *Bloomberg*, September 2. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-02/u-s-poland-ink-5g-security-agreement-amid-anti-huawei-campaign (Accessed 03.12.2020)

Slezak, Michael and Ariel Bogle. 2020. "Huawei banned from 5G mobile infrastructure rollout in Australia." *ABC News,* August 24. Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-23/huawei-banned-from-providing-5g-mobile-technology-australia/10155438 (Accessed 05.29.2020)

Small, Andrew. 2019. "Why Europe Is Getting Tough on China." *Foreign Affairs*, April 3. Retrieved from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-03/why-europe-getting-tough-china (Accessed 10.31.2019)

Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 39(4): 405–425.

Smith, Alastair. 1998. "Extended Deterrence and Alliance Formation." *International Interactions* 24(4): 315–343.

Snyder, Glenn. 1984. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 36(4): 461-495.

Solheim, Erik. 2020. "Trump wants a cold war with China [Trump vil skape kald krig med Kina]." *Dagens Næringsliv,* August 10.

Speglia, Catherine. 2019. "Huawei lands role in Malaysia 5G rollout." *RCR Wireless,* October 4. Retrieved from https://www.rcrwireless.com/20191004/5g/huawei-malaysia-5g-rollout (Accessed 09.19.2020)

Stecklow, Steve and Babak Dehghanpisheh. 2020. "Exclusive: Huawei hid business operation in Iran after Reuters reported links to CFO." *Reuters,* June 3. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-iran-probe-exclusive/exclusive-huawei-hid-business-operation-in-iran-after-reuters-reported-links-to-cfo-idUSKBN23A19B?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=twitter (Accessed 08.18.2020)

Stoltenberg, Jens. 2016. *Jens Stoltenberg – My Story [Jens Stoltenberg – Min historie].* Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag.

Strüver, Georg. 2014. "'Bereft of Friends'? China's Rise and Search for Friends in South America." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics,* January: 117-153.

Strüver, Georg. 2016. "What Friends Are Made of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with China." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12: 170-191.

Su, Li. 2019. "Colombia seriously considers joining BRI: Ambassador." *Telegraph*, November 7. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/peoples-daily-online/business/colombia-considers-joining-bri/ (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Swaine, Michael. 2010. "Perceptions of an Assertive China." *China Leadership Monitor* 32(May): 10-21.

Syed, Sajeel. 2019. "Huawei's 5G has almost launched in Pakistan." *The Juice*, May 29. Retrieved from https://www.techjuice.pk/huawei-5g-launch-date-in-pakistan-fawad-ch/ (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Szakacs, Gergely and Krisztina Than. 2019. "Hungarian minister opens door to Huawei for 5G network rollout." *Reuters*, November 5. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-telecoms-huawei/hungarian-minister-opens-door-to-huawei-for-5G network-rollout-idUSKBN1XF12U (Accessed 03.11.2020)

Taleb, Nassim. 2007. *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*. London: Penguin Books.

Tanakasempipat, Patpicha. 2020. "Thailand's AIS says Huawei among bidders to build 5G core networks." *Reuters,* July 14. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-telecoms-huawei-5g/thailands-ais-says-huawei-among-bidders-to-build-5g-core-networks-idUSKCN24F1AJ (Accessed 09.19.2020)

Tandon, Shaun. 2020. "Ignoring Outrage, Trump Officially Pulls US Out of WHO During Virus Crisis." *Science Alert,* July 8. Retrieved from https://www.sciencealert.com/trump-formally-starts-process-to-pull-us-out-of-who (Accessed 09.11.2020)

Tangen Jr. Ole. 2020. "Is China taking advantage of COVID-19 to pursue South China Sea ambitions?" *DW,* May 26. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/is-china-taking-advantage-of-covid-19-to-pursue-south-china-sea-ambitions/a-53573918 (Accessed 08.17.2020)

Tao, Li. 2018. "Japan latest country to exclude Huawei, ZTE from 5G rollout over security concerns." *South China Morning Post,* December 10. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-leaders-and-founders/article/2177194/japan-decides-exclude-huawei-zte-government (Accessed 05.29.2020)

Telecom Lead. 2020. "Huawei powers MTN 5G network in South Africa." July 2. Retrieved from https://www.telecomlead.com/5g/huawei-powers-mtn-5g-network-in-south-africa-95788 (Accessed 09.16.2020)

The Correlates of War Project. 2013. "National Material Capabilities, v5.0." Retrieved from: https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities (Accessed 03.21.2020)

The Local. 2019. "Norway telecom operator snubs Huawei for 5G network." December 13. Retrieved from https://www.thelocal.no/20191213/norway-telecom-operator-snubs-huawei-for-5G network (Accessed 07.13.2020)

Thompson, W. Scott. 1977. "The Communist International System." *Orbis* 20(4): 3-21.

Tianyang, Li. 2019. "Belt & Road Initiative expands China-Iran cooperation." *China Daily,* January 25. Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/25/WS5c4aa81da3106c65c34e6912.html (Accessed 08.18.2020)

Togo, Kazuhiko. 2014. "Japan-China-US relations and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Perspectives from International Relations Theory." *Asian Perspective* 38(2): 241-261.

Tomás, Juan Pedro. 2019. "France not planning to exclude Huawei from 5G contracts: Report." *RCR* Wireless News, November 26. Retrieved from https://www.rcrwireless.com/20191126/5g/france-not-planning-exclude-huawei-5g-contracts-report (Accessed 03.10.2020)

Toosi, Nahal. 2020. "US cast as culprit in global scrum over coronavirus supplies." *Politico,* April 4. Retrieved from https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-united-states-cast-as-culprit-in-global-scrum-over-supplies/ (Accessed 06.19.2020)

Tsoi, Grace and Lam Cho Wai. 2020. "Hong Kong security law: What is it and is it worrying?" *BBC News,* June 30. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52765838 (Accessed 07.14.2020)

Tull, Denis M. 2006. "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 44: 459-479.

Tvedt, Knut Are and Stig Arild Pettersen. 2019. "Erik Solheim." *Store Norske Leksikon,* August 20. Retrieved from https://snl.no/Erik_Solheim (Accessed 08.11.2020)

US Department of Defense. 2018. "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge." Retrieved from https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (Accessed 05.25.2020)

Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War." *International Security* 22(4): 5-43.

Voeten, Erik. 2004. "Resisting the Lonely Superpower: Responses of States in the United Nations to U.S. Dominance." *Journal of Politics* 66(3): 729-754.

Walder, Tracy. 2020. "Trump's chaotic response to COVID-19 reveals major national security weakness." *Salon,* April 11. Retrieved from https://www.salon.com/2020/04/11/trumps-chaotic-response-to-covid-19-reveals-major-national-security-weakness/ (Accessed 05.01.2020)

Wallace, Charles B. 1992. "Nonaligned Nations Question New World Order." *Los Angeles Times,* September 2.

Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Walt, Stephen M. 1997. "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse." *Survival* 39(1): 156–179.

Walt, Stephen M. 2020. "Everyone Misunderstands the Reason for the U.S.-China Cold War." *Foreign Policy*, June 30. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/30/china-united-states-new-cold-war-foreign-policy/ (Accessed 08.04.2020)

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. *Man, the State, and War.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics.* New York: McGraw Hill.

Ward, Michael Don. 1982. *Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics*. Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

Way, Lucan A. and Steven Levitsky. 2007. "Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Dance." *East European Politics and Societies* 21: 48-66.

Weckler, Adrian. 2020. "There could be 'implications' for Ireland as Eir adopts Huawei in its 5g network, senior White House official says." *Independent,* February 17. Retrieved from https://www.independent.ie/business/technology/there-could-be-implications-for-ireland-as-eir-adopts-huawei-in-its-5G network-senior-white-house-official-says-38964671.html (Accessed 09.15.2020)

Weidmann, Nils B., Doreen Kuse and Kristian Sklede Gleditsch. 2010. "The Geography of the International System: The CShapes Dataset." *International Interactions* 36(1).

Weiss, Jessica Chen. 2020. "China's Self-Defeating Nationalism: Brazen Diplomacy and Rhetorical Bluster Undercut Beijing's Influence." *Foreign Affairs,* July 16. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-07-16/chinas-self-defeating-nationalism (Accessed 07.19.2020)

Weissman, Mikael and Elin Rappe. 2017. "Sweden's approach to China's Belt and Road Initiative: Still a glass half-empty." *Swedish Institute of International Affairs*: 1-13.

Westcott, Ben and and Steven Jiang. 2020. "China is embracing a new brand of foreign policy. Here's what wolf warrior diplomacy means." *CNN,* May 29. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/28/asia/china-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-intl-hnk/index.html (Accessed 09.04.2020)

Wieland, Ken. 2020. "Denmark's TDC names date for 5G launch." *Light Reading,* August 24. Retrieved from https://www.lightreading.com/5g/denmarks-tdc-names-date-for-5g-launch/d/d-id/763417 (Accessed 09.17.2020)

Wike, Richard and Jacob Poushter. 2016. "As Obama Years Draw to Close, President and U.S. Seen Favorably in Europe and Asia." *Pew Research Center,* June 29. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/06/29/as-obama-years-draw-to-close-president-and-u-s-seen-favorably-in-europe-and-asia/ (Accessed 05.19.2020)

Wike, Richard, Jacob Poushter, Janell Fetterolf and Shannon Schumacher. 2020. "Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable." *Pew Research Center,* January 8. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/01/08/trump-ratings-remain-low-around-globe-while-views-of-u-s-stay-mostly-favorable/ (Accessed 04.02.2020)

Williamson, John. 2008. "A short history of the Washington Consensus." In Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds. *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards the New Global Governance.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wintour, Patrick. 2020. "Europe divided on Huawei s US pressure to drop company grows." *The Guardian,* July 13. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jul/13/europe-divided-on-huawei-as-us-pressure-to-drop-company-grows (Accessed 08.08.2020)

Wohlstetter, Albert. 1968. "Illusions of Distance." *Foreign Affairs* 46(2), January.

Wong, Queenie and Laura Hautala. 2020. "Trump targets TikTok: Everything you need to know." *CNET,* August 5. Retrieved from https://www.cnet.com/news/trump-targets-tiktok-everything-you-need-to-know/ (Accessed 08.06.2020)

Wong, Tommy. 2017. "InfraAsia – AIIB approves 13 new members." *LinkedIn*, March 23. Retrieved from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/infraasia-aiib-approves-13-new-members-tommy-wong (Accessed 03.08.2020)

Workman, Daniel. 2020. "Australia's Top Trading Partners." *World's Top Exports,* July 28. Retrieved from http://www.worldstopexports.com/australias-top-import-partners/ (Accessed 09.26.2020)

World Bank Databank. 2018. "Gross domestic product 2018." Retrieved from https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (Accessed 04.05.2020)

World Bank Group. 2019. "SIPRI trend indicator values." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.MPRT.KD?end=2018andlocations=JP-DE-IN-GB-FR-IT-ID-KR-ES-PT-SE-DK-NO-IL-IEandname_desc=falseandstart=2018andview=bar (Accessed 03.22.2020)

World Bank. 2020. "World Integrated Trade Solution." Retrieved from: https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/JPN/Year/2018/TradeFlow/EXPIMP (Accessed 03.22.2020)

Xiaojing, Deng. 2019. "China-Brazil economic, trade ties further strengthened by BRI drive." *Global Times*, May 8. Retrieved from http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1149089.shtml (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Xinhua. 2020. "Swedish digital minister sees no problem in Huawei used in 5G: report." May 26. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-05/26/c_139089821.htm (Accessed 09.15.2020)

Yongxin, Zhan. 2019. "The Belt and Road Initiative: From Vision to Fruition." *The Jerusalem Post,* May 2. Retrieved from https://www.jpost.com/opinion/the-belt-and-road-initiative-588564 (Accessed 05.27.2020)

Yu, Hong. 2017. "Motivation Behind China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank." *Journal of Contemporary China* 26(105): 353-368.

Yurou. 2020. "Algeria ratifies BRI agreement with China". *Xinhua Net*, March 9. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/10/c_138212879.htm (Accessed 03.09.2020)

Zhou, Mariann. 2019. "Pompeo: Countries that use Huawei tech pose a risk to the US". *CNET*, February 22. Retrieved from https://www.cnet.com/news/pompeo-countries-that-use-huawei-tech-pose-a-risk-to-the-us/ (Accessed 03.23.2020)

Zhu, Zhiqun. 2010. *China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance.* Farnham: Ashgate.

APPENDIX A: DEPENDENT VARIABLES

In the following Appendix, I go through in full detail how the 53 states on my panel stand on the three Chinese initiatives and institutions. Note that much of this is mere repetition of information that is spread out throughout the thesis. This Appendix is therefore mostly meant for especially interested readers.

A.1 Stances on AIIB

Below is a detailed list of how the 53 states on my panel have responded to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, divided into regions. All specific numbers in this section are from the bank's own websites (2020). Some of the more specified information is from various newspapers and magazines, many of which are referenced throughout the main text.

Asia: Almost all are members with large contributions

In Asia and the Pacific, the members include India (0.26 percent of nominal GDP), Russia (0.39), Iran (0.32), South Korea (0.20), Indonesia (0.36), Turkey (0.32), Saudi-Arabia (0.32), Thailand (0.32), United Arab Emirates (0.23), Israel (0.19), the Philippines (0.25), Bangladesh (0.19), Pakistan (0.33), Vietnam (0.23), Qatar (0.31), and the biggest contributor of them all, Kazakhstan (0.41). Interestingly, two of the regional members, Malaysia and Singapore, while contributing, have made very modest contributions of 0.03 and 0064 percent of GDP, respectively. Despite being in the region, Iraq is neither a member nor a prospective member, though it has been sending out some signals of an interest to join (Wong 2017). Japan's response has been quite rejective, even outright negative at times, but recent reports are that the Japanese might eventually grow to accept having a regional competitor to its own Asian Development Bank (Sender 2020). Japan's stance therefore stops short of full denunciation.

Europe: Almost all are members with significant contributions, some exceptions

The European members generally have contributions between 0.10 and 0.13 percent of nominal GDP. These include Germany (0.11 percent), the UK (0.10), France (0.12), Italy (0.12), Spain

(0.11), the Netherlands (0.12), Switzerland (0.10), Poland (0.13), Sweden (0.11), Austria (0.10), Norway (0.13), Denmark (0.10), and Finland (0.11).

There are only a few exceptions to this among the European states on my panel, including Belgium (0.052 percent of GDP), Ireland (0.032), Romania (0.058), Portugal (0.026), Greece (0.0043) and Hungary (0.056). These are all contributing members, but with very small contribution-sums compared to other members. All of these countries joined the bank relatively late in its run, and the smaller sums can in large part be explained by their memberships not being fully ratified yet. Czech Republic is not a member, but according to AIIB officials, it has expressed interest to join (Wong 2017).

Other regions: A few members, most prospective or only positive

Five of the states on my panel – Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and South Africa – are all listed as prospective members of the bank. Colombia and Nigeria are neither members nor prospective members, but they have expressed interest in joining (Wong 2017). Algeria is a new member, with a very small sum (0.0026 percent of GDP). Of the US's neighbors, Canada is a member with a very modest sum (0.054 percent), while Mexico has shown no signs of even considering joining. Common for all of these is that they are geographically far away from China. Egypt, on the other hand, is a major contributor and shareholder in the bank, despite not being particularly close to China geographically. In the Pacific, both states on my panel are members with relatively large contributions; New Zealand (0.21) and Australia (0.25).

A.2 Stances on BRI

Below follows a detailed list of how the 53 states on my panel have responded to the Belt and Road Initiative, divided into regions. All dates and specifications in this section are from the list found on the *Belt and Road Portal* (2020). Some of the more specified information is from various newspapers and magazines, many of which are referenced throughout the main text.

Asia: All have signed deals, but two are working against it

In Southeast Asia, all states on my panel have signed up as members of the initiative. These include Indonesia (Memorandum of Understanding [MoU] with China on advancing construction of the projects, signed in November 2018), Thailand (MoU on jointly promoting, signed September 2017), Malaysia and Singapore (intergovernmental MoU on cooperation,

signed at the Belt and Road Forum [B&RF] in May 2017), Philippines (Joint Statement [JS] on wide cooperation, signed November 2018) and Vietnam (MoU on joint construction, signed November 2017).

In the rest of Asia, the members include Iraq (JS on wide cooperation, signed March 2017), Iran (various deals, signed January 2019), Saudi Arabia (JS on wide cooperation, signed March 2017), Qatar (various cooperation documents, signed November 2014), United Arab Emirates (MoU on jointly building, signed July 2018), Israel (action plan on cooperation, signed at Second Belt and Road Forum in April 2019), Bangladesh (MoU on cooperation and planning, signed October 2016), Pakistan (intergovernmental MoU on cooperation, signed at B&RF in May 2017), Kazakhstan (MoU on jointly promoting, signed October 2016), South Korea (MoU on cooperation, signed November 2015), and Russia (an indispensable partner from early on, see Husein 2020).

Finally, Japan and India are working actively *against* BRI. Specifically, they are working alongside the US on developing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which is generally seen as a direct competitor to BRI (Shoji 2019). The FOIP is far from the only example of how China's competitors are working against BRI, either. In 2019, for example, Japan and the EU signed a pact to boost connectivity, a move that was seen as a riposte to BRI (Pandey 2019). I have examined some of these examples in more detail throughout the main text.

Europe: Many members and cooperative states, some restrained

Of the European states on my panel, the members include Italy (MoU, signed March 2019), Turkey (MoU on cooperation, signed November 2018), Poland (MoU on jointly promoting, signed January 2019), Austria (cooperation document, signed April 2018), Romania (MoU on promotion, signed May 2017), Czech Republic (MoU on jointly promoting, signed November 2015), Portugal (JS on strengthening cooperation, signed December 2018), Greece (MoU on cooperation, signed August 2018), Switzerland (MoU, signed June 2019) and Hungary (MoU on joint preparation, signed at the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017). The Chinese have seen many of these as big wins over the US. Particularly, Italy is the first member in the G7, and having it on the team is of crucial importance for BRI (Ma 2019). Similarly, getting Switzerland was integral in winning over Central Europe (Büchenbacher 2019).

Three of the Nordic states on my panel have also been positive, working actively to enhance bilateral ties with China. Denmark, for example, is quite positive, and both China and Denmark are calling for more cooperation. In 2017, during an official state visit to Beijing,

then-Danish PM Lars Løkke Rasmussen praised BRI as "a future dynamo for growth and prosperity" (Jing 2017). The state leaders of both Norway and Finland met with Xi Jinping around the same time as this, and both expressed a similar optimism on the prospects of cooperation. While neither are signatories or members of BRI, both Norway and Finland are central pieces in China's plan to incorporate the Arctic in BRI, and they are already working with the Chinese on infrastructure projects to that end (Murdoch-Gibson 2018). In December 2018, a Chinese company was central in the building of the Halogaland Bridge, Norway's second largest bridge (OBOReurope 2018a). Finland is building a tunnel from Helsinki to Tallinn with Chinese help. There is also talk of a rail link between Kirkenes in Norway and Rovaniemi in Finland, this one, too, with Chinese assistance (Lanteigne 2019).

In parts of Western Europe, too, the responses have also been quite positive. At a bilateral meeting between China and the Netherlands in October 2018, the two signed a general MoU to strengthen cooperation in third markets. Ever since, Dutch officials and people from Dutch business have been sending positive signals, emphasizing the opportunities which lie in BRI and calling for the Netherlands to play a bigger role in the initiative (Cong and Xuanmin 2019). Along similar lines, Belgium's response has been among the most positive of the Western Europeans. Although not officially a member of the initiative, it is working very closely with China under the framework of BRI. In September 2018, Beijing and Brussels inked a major bilateral agreement to initiate a passenger train service between the two (Cureton 2018). Both the UK and Ireland have also been generally positive and acceptive of BRI, opening for deepening cooperation under its framework (Devonshire-Ellis 2019; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ireland 2018).

Certain European responses have been more restrained. France is an example: Many French people are relatively positive – the city of Lyon, for example, welcomed a train connecting it to Wuhan as early as 2016, and President Macron has indicated some support for the initiative. As a state, however, France is still not a member or signatory of BRI, but it is instead seeking cooperation on a project-by-project basis. However, no nation-wide project has yet materialized, as the French government is firmly principled, setting strict demands and in general remaining quite suspicious of the Chinese and BRI (Nicolas 2019).

Germany is even more moderate, at times being outright negative to BRI, warning the world about the dangers of getting entangled in the Chinese initiative. One example came after Italy signed its MoU, when the German foreign minister said that countries who followed the Italians' lead risked "waking up in dependency [of China]" (Dikov 2019). At the same time, there has been some early signs that Germany is opening up, at least for a *consideration* of a

106

deal; not long after the warning from the foreign minister, Angela Merkel said that BRI is an "important project" in which Europeans want to participate in, though with care and pragmatism (Jiamel 2019).

Spain's response to BRI has also been mixed. While it has expressed a wish for closer cooperation and more trade with China, the Spanish have expressed clearly that they will prioritize developing *European* projects in their ports (OBOReurope 2018b). Therefore, Spain and its ports remain a key roadblock for the Chinese initiative.

Among the states on my panel from Northern Europe, Sweden has had the harshest response, but even this one has not been *too* harsh. Swedish officials have, for the most part, been highly cautious about BRI, maintaining a wait-and-see policy (Weissman and Rappe 2017). At the same time, the Swedish business sector has been "cautiously optimistic', but little concrete has happened so far. Weissman and Rappe (2017: 1) concludes with something I feel sums up many of the European responses amply; the "approach to BRI has been too reactive and too passive".

Other regions: Most are members or positive, three skeptics

All four African states on my panel are members, including South Africa (intergovernmental cooperation memorandum, signed November 2018), Egypt (cooperation documents for joined construction, signed January 2016), and Nigeria and Algeria (intergovernmental MoU, signed September 2019; see also Yurou 2020). In Oceania, New Zealand signed an MoU on strengthening cooperation in March 2017. The only holdout in these regions is Australia, who's working alongside the US on the FOIP.

In South America, Chile is a member of the initiative (MoU on co-building, signed November 2018). Peru has also signed on to BRI (MoU on joint construction, signed at the Second Belt and Road Forum in April 2019), a move which significantly strengthened bilateral ties between China and Peru (Galindo 2019). Neither Brazil, Argentina, nor Colombia are members, but all have expressed interest in joining at some point. Reportedly, they might even join sometime in 2020 (Devoshire-Ellis 2019a; Su 2019).

The US's closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, are both quite hesitant to join the initiative; both are being very careful not to anger either the US or China. Canada has not said much directly about any intention to join BRI (Alon and Chen 2018). However, Trudeau has hinted that with Trump's US as introverted as it is, Ottawa might seize this opportunity to strengthen its bonds to Beijing (Canadian Press 2018). Similarly, in the face of upcoming international trade problems following Trump's tariffs, officials from both Mexico and China

have been flirting with the idea of banding more closely together (Belt and Road News 2019). Still, close to nothing has been said directly about Mexico's participation in BRI.

A.3 Stances on Huawei's 5G

Below is a detailed list of how the 53 states on my panel have responded to Huawei's role in the implementation of 5G, divided into regions. Most of the information is from *NS Tech*'s infographic (Goodier 2020), and the more specified is from various newspapers and magazines, many of which are referenced throughout the main text

Asia: Positive, but more and more exceptions

In the Middle East, Saudi-Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iraq are all using Huawei's 5G technology more or less freely (Goodier 2020; Al-Shafi 2020; Syed 2019). Huawei has also had a major role in 5G trials in Turkey, and a ban there is highly unlikely. Israel seemed positive for a long time, but it was recently reported that the Israelis had kept Huawei out of their tender for 5G contracts (Bassist 2020). Because of the international regime of economic sanctions on Iran, Huawei has not been able to operate fully there. However, there have been several reports that Huawei has close links with a company operating in Iran (Stecklow and Dehghanpisheh 2020). China's neighbor to the north, Russia, has been working very closely with Huawei for a long time, and the company has already launched 5G in some Russian cities (Doffman 2019a, 2019b). My representant from Central Asia, Kazakhstan, has been using Huawei in 5G trials (Ospanova 2019).

Turning to the states on my panel from South Asia, Bangladesh is using Huawei freely (Bangla News 24 2020). Even though Pakistan's government is yet to announce a national framework for 5G, several of its operators have been running 5G tests using Huawei (Oliver 2020). India's response is a bit harder to pin down. The Indians were relatively positive for a long time; in January 2020, it was reported that Huawei would be allowed to participate in India's 5G trial phase (Rao 2020). However, in light of the recent border clash between India and China, the Indians are reportedly weighing up a full ban and exclusion of Huawei from the Indian trials (Iwamoto 2020).

In Southeast Asia, many states are using Huawei. The Philippines are using Huawei actively for its 5G, and it also reaffirmed the partnership as recently as July 2020 (Cigaral 2020). Several operators in Malaysia have already given 5G contracts to Huawei (Speglia 2019).

Indonesia is still a long way from even beginning its 5G implementation, but it has said that a ban is highly unlikely (Asif 2019).

However, even though Huawei seemed dominant in 5G for a long time, today this seems to be starting to change. Recently, Singapore's two major telecom operators chose Ericsson and Nokia (ibid.). With this move, they joined the ranks of Vietnam, who has collaborated with Nokia for some time. Also, a leading Vietnamese company has developed its own 5G equipment, enabling the country to bypass Huawei (Onishi 2020). Although no official ban is in place, Vietnam is obviously letting its long-standing distrust of Beijing rule out the use of Huawei. Thailand has been using some Huawei in its 5G for a long time, and Bangkok has said that it will not try to hinder Huawei's role. However, it recently stated that it will "stay mindful of security issues," and it has opened for more alternative vendors (Tanakasempipat 2020).

In East Asia, South Korea has used *some* Huawei in its 5G networks, giving the company a relatively strong foot there. It has also actively defended the company from the US's attacks, reportedly telling Washington that restrictions on semiconductor sales to Huawei were "unacceptable" (Goldman 2018). Japan, on the other hand, put a full ban on Huawei in place as early as December 2018 (Tao 2018). Today, there are no signs of a loosening of the ban. Following its own ban, the UK has even turned to Japanese companies for alternatives to Huawei – and Japan seems to be stepping up to the occasion, which showcase<n's continued resistance to Huawei (CGTN 2020).

Europe: Gradually "falling in line" with the US

A few European states, notably Ireland and Switzerland, see no significant risk with it, and are using Huawei more or less freely in their 5G implementation, to the great annoyance of the US (Weckler 2020; Fouquet and Torsoli 2020). In Sweden, too, telecoms operator Tele2 is building 5G using some Huawei equipment, and the Swedish digital minister has expressed that he sees no problem with the Chinese company (Xinhua 2020). Huawei has also been used in 5G trials in Finland, and Helsinki has even replaced some of its 5G towers from Nokia to Huawei (MT-Tech 2020). In Spain, the national security service has certified the company, and the Spanish will apparently keep using Huawei in its implementation of 5G (Wintour 2020). Hungary does not consider Huawei a risk, and it has committed to using the company in implementing its 5G (Szakacs and Then 2019).

The rest of the European states on my panel is gradually becoming more careful. In November 2019, a high-ranking French official stated that: "The government will not exclude anyone. We are *not* following the position of the United States. We will proceed on a case by

case basis" (Tomás 2019, emphasis added). But while France has no explicit ban, its main cybersecurity agency is reportedly pushing telecom firms quite firmly to make them avoid using Huawei for 5G (Reuters Staff 2020b). In Germany, the government has been split for a long time. Merkel has been against a full ban, but she has many who are more skeptical to Huawei in her government (Nicola 2019). For now, Germany has no explicit ban, but has imposed stricter laws on its networks (Rinke 2020). After the UK, Germany has emerged as the next major battlefield for Huawei, and its final decision will come sometime in the near future (writing in September 2020; Liu 2020). In waiting for the decision, China has at several points threatened Germany with retaliation, should Huawei be banned (Czuczka 2019). As I mentioned at several points throughout the thesis, the UK recently changed course, putting a full ban on Huawei in place and promising a complete phase-out of its equipment (Sandle and Faulconbridge 2020).

Italy, following its good relations to Beijing on many fields, was positive and acceptive of Huawei for a long time, saying it would not try to ban the Chinese giants. Yet, the company was recently shut out of a tender for 5G contracts (Pollina 2020). Even though the Italians have later asserted that the decision was technological and not political, it may be seen as an early sign that Italy is complying with the US. Portugal was also positive to Huawei for a long time, but it recently confirmed that Huawei would not be used, at least not in the core parts of its 5G network (Hatton and Chan 2019; ECO News 2020).

Belgium and Austria remain on the fence about Huawei's role in 5G. They are awaiting a unified European response, that is, passing the buck to the EU. On its end, the EU has shown a general unwillingness to take charge of a unified response (Reuters 2020c; Broersma 2020). Greece recently left that fence, picking Ericsson. Norway, too, recently picked Ericsson (The Local 2020). Denmark has done the same, saying publicly that it would prefer a 5G network built by a company from a close ally. Following this line, Denmark's major operator recently swapped Huawei with Ericsson (Wieland 2020). While the Netherlands has said that it *may* use some Huawei antennae, it has agreed to keep Huawei out of the core parts of its 5G networks (Dutch News 2020).

The US has also had some success in pushing for a tough line on Huawei in central and eastern parts of Europe, particularly in countries reliant on protection and security from the US and/or NATO. Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania have all signed joint statements with Washington on 5G security, pledging that they will not allow companies subject to foreign state interference to build their networks. Despite not mentioning Huawei directly, these agreements will most likely affect the Chinese giant most of all (Lucey and Hinshaw 2019; Santora 2019).

Other regions: Many positive, but some exceptions

At this point, Canada is the only member of the Five Eyes (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) which is yet to make up its mind about Huawei. It is reportedly weighing up a full ban, but Trudeau recently postponed the final decision because of the pandemic. Some of Canada's telecom operators have already chosen Ericsson and/or Nokia, significantly upping the chances of a full ban in the foreseeable future (Reuters Staff 2020a; Canadian Press 2020). The US's other neighbor, Mexico, has been harsh in its stance on Huawei as well. The Mexicans have limited Huawei's role to non-core parts of the 5G network, granting the core parts of the network to Nokia and AT&T instead. There is no ban, however, and Huawei is still in quite a few of the races for Mexico's smaller contracts. Moreover, it obviously has a pretty strong foot in Mexico, and it is reportedly ready to test its equipment alongside local operators in parts of the country (Enterprise Talk 2019; López 2020).

The South American states on my panel are more positive and acceptive of Huawei and its 5G, even despite immense pressure from the US to avoid the Chinese company. In Peru, Huawei rolled out 5G tests as early as May 2019 (Cortéz 2020). In Chile, Huawei is directly involved, and it is reportedly ready to invest US$100 million in national infrastructure. Moreover, the pandemic has pushed Colombia to announce that it will test 5G using Huawei (López 2020). Argentina and Huawei are even in official talks about the implementation of 5G, and a top Argentinian official recently said about Huawei that: "For us it's essential to work together with a company of this magnitude" (Buenos Aires Times 2020).

Similarly, Brazilian officials have expressed that the country would have a lot to lose if it imposed a barrier on Huawei's 5G network. During a recent visit to Washington, Trump told Bolsonaro that Brazil will have to become a trusted ally in limiting China's influence in South America; a clear reference to Huawei's 5G. The US has even offered financial help if Brazil is to pick Ericsson or Nokia, as these are more expensive options than Huawei. So far, however, Brazil has not made any attempts to hinder Huawei's role. And considering Brazil's current healthcare crisis, it is considered unlikely that the Bolsonaro government will make any decisions on 5G in the foreseeable future (LABS 2020b; López 2020; Bangar 2020).

"Huawei still has a strong relationship with most African governments, which don't seem to be bowing to global pressure to blacklist the Chinese company" (Gilbert 2020). Of the four African states on my panel, South Africa is using Huawei more or less freely, and its 5G network has already launched in several major cities. Moreover, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has fiercely defended Huawei from the US's attacks, holding that the company has

become "a victim because of its successes" (ibid.; Telecom Lead 2020). Egypt and Algeria have both been running 5G trials using Huawei, and they seem to be all but ready to launch their networks (Ecofin Agency 2018; Egyptian Streets 2019; Benkeroum 2019). In August 2019, Huawei was accused of helping the Algerian government spy on the opposition. The company denied the claims, but it nevertheless shows that Huawei has *some* links in Algeria (Middle East Monitor 2019). In Nigeria, Huawei was reported to be running tests in 2019 (Onyedika-Ugoeze and Omolaoye 2019). However, the country denied that in May 2020, maintaining that Nigeria would remain neutral to Huawei's 5G, that is, it remains on the fence (O'Grady 2020).

In the Pacific, Australia put a full ban on Huawei in place as early as August 2018, which was later reinforced by Australia's new government in July 2019 (Slezak and Bogle 2018; Duke 2019). New Zealand did what many experts thought to be a full ban in November 2018, but it has since opened slightly (Jolly 2018). Now, however, Huawei's prospects are again shrinking, major contracts were recently given to Ericsson (Ayson 2020; Keall 2020).

APPENDIX B: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

In the following Appendix, I display the fully detailed tables of my various independent variables. How I have found the values, as well as explanations of what each of the subvariables entail are in the methodology chapter in the main text (chapter 3).

B.1 Threat Perceived from China

Table 12: Values on the three independent subvariables of the first bivariate model, the one on threat perception from China.[59]

Country	Country code	*Powerchn*	*distchn*	*offcapchn*
Japan	JPN	0.2422	2125	0.46
Germany	DEU	0.0821	7441	0.32
India	IND	0.3711	3780	0.73
United Kingdom	GBR	0.0702	8225	0.40
France	FRA	0.0653	8337	0.41
Italy	ITA	0.0587	8219	0.33
Brazil	BRA	0.1153	16911	0.35
Canada	CAN	0.042	10544	0.19
South Korea	KOR	0.1064	959	0.46
Russia	RUS	0.1838	5790	1.014
Spain	ESP	0.0372	9307	0.20
Australia	AUS	0.0335	8901	0.21
Mexico	MEX	0.0688	12538	0.11
Indonesia	IDN	0.0661	5310	0.27
Netherlands	NLD	0.019	7912	0.12
Turkey	TUR	0.0697	6915	0.33
Saudi Arabia	SAU	0.0628	6629	0.23
Switzerland	CHE	0.0066	8199	0.13
Poland	POL	0.0252	6999	0.20
Taiwan				
Sweden	SWE	0.0098	6792	0.13
Belgium	BEL	0.0134	8080	0.07
Thailand	THA	0.0343	3283	0.19
Argentina	ARG	0.0259	19275	0.11
Nigeria	NGA	0.0417	11070	0.11
Iran	IRN	0.0723	5598	0.315
Austria	AUT	0.0133	7529	0.07
United Arab Emirates	ARE	0.0132	5972	0.10
Norway	NOR	0.0078	7146	0.13
Ireland	IRL	0.0025	8379	0.04
Israel	ISR	0.0195	7161	0.22
Hong Kong				

---

[59] These subvariables are X1.1 Aggregate power relative to China (*powerchn*), X1.2 Geographical proximity to Beijing (*distchn*), and X1.3 Offensive capabilities relative to China (*offcapchn*).

Malaysia	MYS	0.0208	4275	0.11
Singapore	SGP	0.0138	4417	0.09
Philippines	PHL	0.0258	2816	0.09
South Africa	ZAF	0.0318	11562	0.14
Denmark	DNK	0.005	7306	0.09
Colombia	COL	0.0306	15021	0.11
Bangladesh	BGD	0.0343	3017	0.10
Egypt	EGY	0.0454	7561	0.37
Pakistan*	PAK	0.067	3910	0.29
Chile	CHL	0.0124	19083	0.09
Finland	FIN	0.0071	6399	0.081
Vietnam	VNM	0.0391	3290	0.194
Romania	ROU	0.0108	7124	0.112
Czech Republic	CZE	0.0083	7533	0.125
Portugal	PRT	0.0078	9784	0.080
Iraq	IRQ	0.0284	6333	0.087
Peru	PER	0.0156	16718	0.111
Greece	GRC	0.0124	7658	0.130
New Zealand	NZL	0.004	10691	0.050
Qatar	QAT	0.0069	6166	0.041
Algeria	DZA	0.0192	9216	0.148
Hungary	HUN	0.0052	7411	0.084
Kazakhstan	KAZ	0.0142	3280	0.076

B.2 Having the US as a Patron

Table 13: Values on the five independent subvariables of the second bivariate model, the one on having the US as a patron.[60]

Country	Country code	*allyusa*	*partnerusa*	*dialogueusa*	*usmltprsnc*	*armsimpusa*
Japan	JPN	4	0	1	57094	96.98
Germany	DEU	1	0	0	46606	14.21
India	IND	5	1	1	37	1.62
United Kingdom	GBR	1	0	0	9299	36.40
France	FRA	1	0	0	89	25.53
Italy	ITA	1	0	0	12486	77.49
Brazil	BRA	3	1	1	58	19.74
Canada	CAN	1	0	1	169	56.28
South Korea	KOR	4	0	1	26643	46.46
Russia	RUS	5	0	0	0	0
Spain	ESP	1	0	0	3525	8.97
Australia	AUS	2	1	1	306	58.40
Mexico	MEX	3	1	1	75	69.23
Indonesia	IDN	5	1	1	27	25.42
Netherl	NLD	1	0	0	401	17.14
Turkey	TUR	1	1	0	1725	42.78
Saudi Arabia	SAU	5	1	1	354	88.01
Switzerland	CHE	5	0	0	19	0.00
Poland	POL	1	1	1	175	42.11
Taiwan						
Sweden	SWE	5	0	0	14	0.00

---

[60] These five are X2.1 Treaty alliance with the US (categorical, *allyusa*), X2.2 Strategic partnership with the US (dichotomous, *partnerusa*), X2.3 Strategic dialogue with the US (dichotomous, *dialogueusa*), X2.4 Number of US military personnel in state (*usmltprsnc*), X2.5 Arms imports from the US (*armsimpusa*).

Belgium	BEL	1	0	0	1859	100.00
Thailand	THA	4	0	1	105	8.48
Argentina	ARG	3	0	0	26	16.67
Nigeria	NGA	5	1	1	35	8.16
Iran	IRN	5	0	0	0	0.00
Austria	AUT	5	0	0	24	0.00
U. A. Emirates	ARE	5	1	0	206	72.57
Norway	NOR	1	0	0	678	64.43
Ireland	IRL	5	0	0	13	0.00
Israel	ISR	4	1	1	99	96.77
Hong Kong						
Malaysia	MYS	5	1	0	17	0.00
Singapore	SGP	5	1	1	216	10.98
Philippines	PHL	4	0	1	182	32.00
South Africa	ZAF	5	0	0	47	0.00
Denmark	DNK	1	0	0	20	64.00
Colombia	COL	3	1	1	85	18.75
Bangladesh	BGD	5	0	1	10	0.00
Egypt	EGY	4	1	1	327	13.27
Pakistan*	PAK	4	1	1	64	1.54
Chile	CHL	3	1	0	41	62.86
Finland	FIN	5	0	0	19	58.46
Vietnam	VNM	5	1	1	30	0.00
Romania	ROU	1	1	1	131	43.33
Czech Republic	CZE	1	0	1	0	100.00
Portugal	PRT	1	0	0	248	25.00
Iraq	IRQ	5	1	1	0	6.71
Peru	PER	3	1	0	49	0.00
Greece	GRC	1	0	0	482	90.77
New Zealand	NZL	2	1	1	14	100.00
Qatar	QAT	5	0	0	580	53.84
Algeria	DZA	5	0	1	10	0.23
Hungary	HUN	1	0	0	80	0.00
Kazakhstan	KAZ	5	1	1	25	0.00

B.3 Economic Relations to China and to the US

Table 14: Values on the four (six to begin with) independent subvariables of the third bivariate model, the one on economic relations to China and to the US.[61]

Country	Country code	*impchn*	*impusa*	*expchn*	*expusa*	*ftachn*	*ftausa*
Japan	JPN	23.20	11.17	19.50	19.05	0	0
Germany	DEU	9.80	6.06	7.07	8.60	0	0
India	IND	14.63	6.30	5.08	16.02	0	0
United Kingdom	GBR	9.44	9.42	5.64	13.44	0	0
France	FRA	8.95	6.31	4.33	7.97	0	0
Italy	ITA	7.25	3.75	2.82	9.11	0	0
Brazil	BRA	19.16	16.19	26.76	12.16	0	0
Canada	CAN	12.68	53.13	4.74	75.03	0	1

[61] First, imports from China (*impchn*) and imports from the US (*impusa*), who together form the basis for X3.1 Relative imports (*relimp*). Second, exports to China (*expchn*) and exports to the US (*expusa*), who together form the basis for X3.2 Relative exports (*relexp*). Finally, the two dichotomous subvariables X3.3 Free trade agreement with China (*ftachn*) and X3.4 Free trade agreement with the US (*ftausa*).

S. Korea	KOR	19.90	11.04	26.81	12.08	1	1
Russia	RUS	21.74	5.28	12.41	2.78	0	0
Spain	ESP	8.44	4.12	2.25	4.56	0	0
Australia	AUS	24.50	10.47	34.71	3.78	1	1
Mexico	MEX	17.99	46.59	1.60	76.49	0	1
Indonesia	IDN	24.13	5.41	15.05	10.25	0	0
Netherlands	NLD	9.19	7.89	2.42	4.82	0	0
Turkey	TUR	9.29	5.55	1.74	4.94	0	0
Saudi Arabia	SAU	16.45	13.34	3.30	0.62	0	0
Switzerland	CHE	5.30	7.62	9.74	13.19	1	0
Poland	POL	11.57	2.84	0.96	2.78	0	0
Taiwan							
Sweden	SWE	4.54	2.63	4.63	6.44	0	0
Belgium	BEL	3.97	6.83	1.75	5.18	0	0
Thailand	THA	20.05	6.10	11.95	11.14	1	0
Argentina	ARG	18.45	11.75	6.84	6.95	0	0
Nigeria	NGA	19.41	7.35	1.67	6.08	0	0
Iran	IRN	25.41	0.33	8.56	0.13	0	0
Austria	AUT	5.84	3.81	2.70	7.05	0	0
U. A. Emirates	ARE	15.54	8.55	1.32	1.62	0	0
Norway	NOR	7.73	10.04	4.70	2.10	0	0
Ireland	IRL	5.81	17.47	3.32	27.78	0	0
Israel	ISR	13.67	13.38	7.74	27.11	0	1
Hong Kong							
Malaysia	MYS	19.93	7.40	13.91	9.11	1	0
Singapore	SGP	13.40	11.36	12.24	7.74	1	1
Philippines	PHL	19.63	7.21	12.89	15.63	1	0
South Africa	ZAF	18.45	5.98	9.14	6.79	0	0
Denmark	DNK	7.09	2.85	2.91	4.37	0	0
Colombia	COL	20.58	25.56	9.70	27.07	0	1
Banglad.	BGD	21.53	2.04	2.25	19.35	0	0
Egypt	EGY	14.22	6.75	3.58	5.58	0	0
Pakistan*	PAK	24.18	4.90	7.69	16.09	1	0
Chile	CHL	23.59	18.87	33.50	13.79	1	1
Finland	FIN	6.95	3.17	5.45	6.46	0	0
Vietnam	VNM	27.45	4.38	16.45	19.31	1	0
Romania	ROU	5.32	1.08	1.10	1.96	0	0
Czech Republic	CZE	14.09	2.52	1.28	2.06	0	0
Portugal	PRT	3.14	1.83	1.14	4.94	0	0
Iraq	IRQ	28.35	6.56	N/A	N/A	0	0
Peru	PER	23.33	21.27	27.64	16.71	1	1
Greece	GRC	6.53	1.25	2.69	2.69	0	0
New Zealand	NZL	19.76	10.12	24.23	9.60	1	0
Qatar	QAT	12.15	19.30	12.11	2.17	0	0
Algeria	DZA	18.06	4.00	1.97	9.85	0	0
Hungary	HUN	5.43	1.83	1.91	2.86	0	0
Kazakhstan	KAZ	16.00	3.80	10.32	1.56	0	0

APPENDIX C: Interview with Jens Stoltenberg (in Norwegian)

Jens Stoltenberg (født 1959) er utdannet sosialøkonom, og var Norges statsminister i periodene 2000-2001 og 2005-2013. Han har lenge vært en forkjemper for økt globalt og transatlantisk samarbeid, og fikk stillingen som generalsekretær i NATO i oktober 2014, der han etter planen skal bli sittende til 2022. I dag leder Stoltenberg organisasjonen gjennom en stadig mer sammensatt og utfordrende verden. Han tror på det han kaller «credible deterrence», og har blant annet gjennomført den største styrkingen av NATOs kollektive forsvar siden den kalde krigen (NATO 2020). Jeg fikk sjansen til å intervjue Stoltenberg 9. august 2020 om hvordan NATO og verden generelt stiller seg til Kinas vekst.

I det siste kan det se ut som om du og NATO har «våknet opp» til det faktum at Kina kan utgjøre en trussel. Tilbake i juni, for eksempel, oppfordret du Vesten til å ta Kinas voksende militærmakt på alvor (se Reuters 2020a). Er det noen spesielle land du tenker på som har tatt for lett på Kina?

Gjennom mange år har nok nesten alle land i Vesten tatt for lett på Kina. De har sett potensialet og mulighetene i Kinas vekst, fremfor utfordringene ved den.

Jeg var i Kina første gang i 1985 som AUF-leder, og da var jeg imponert over Deng Xiaoping og reformene hans. Jeg har jobbet mye med utvikling, fattigdom, barnehelse, vaksiner i fattige land og med FNs tusenårsmål. Mitt budskap har alltid vært at verden går fremover; millioner av mennesker kommer ut av fattigdom, barnedødeligheten går ned, levealderen går opp, og aldri før i menneskehetens historie har vi opplevd så stor sosialøkonomisk fremgang. Hovedgrunnen bak det er Kina. I tillegg har Kina utgjort et enormt økonomisk marked for oss alle. Summen av disse tingene har nok gjort at vi ikke har vært bevisste nok på utfordringene knyttet til Kinas vekst.

De siste årene har blant annet USA vært tydelige på hva de mener om Kina, og flere andre land har blitt mer bevisste på utfordringene. Samtidig har nok ikke alle NATO-land fullt ut tatt inn over seg før nå de potensielle negative sidene ved at Kina har vokst. En annen grunn til dette er fordi mange lands økonomi avhenger av samarbeid med Kina.

Kina har lagt et omfattende maktgrunnlag gjennom 40 år med enorm økonomisk vekst, og de siste årene har de virkelig begynt å omgjøre dette til militærmakt. I desember 2019 avdekket Kina for eksempel nye langdistanseraketter som kan nå hele Europa (se AFP 2019). Har det gått for lang tid før man har innsett faren som Kina potensielt utgjør? Har Vesten nå, som man sa om de europeiske maktene i årene før andre verdenskrig, «sleepwalked into disaster»?

Svaret på det er nei, spesielt når du sammenligner med før andre verdenskrig. Vi har ikke gått inn i noen «disaster»; vi våknet i tide. Det blir også feil å bruke ordet «sleepwalking». Da er det snakk om total ubevissthet og totalt fravær av uro, og der har vi aldri vært. Vi har kanskje ikke tatt konsekvensene av Kinas vekst alvorlig nok. Samtidig har vi nok også trodd og håpet at hvis Kina ble en del av verdensmarkedet, ble integrert i internasjonal handel, fikk en sterk middelklasse og åpnet opp internt, så ville det også komme politiske reformer. Det er først de siste årene man har skjønt at veksten ikke har gjort Kina mer liberalt, mer åpent eller mer demokratisk; om noe har det gjort Kina mer autoritært.

Jeg har selv tilhørt den generasjonen som trodde at Kina kunne bli et mye mer demokratisk land. Selv etter 1989 og Tiananmen Square trodde vi, eller kanskje håpet, at Kina sakte ville bli liberalisert. Vi hadde sett den enorme liberaliseringen og demokratiseringen av tidligere Sovjetunionen og Warszawapakt-land, så det var absolutt grunn til å håpe at det kunne gå samme vei med Kina. Det har det ikke gjort, og det må vi ta konsekvensene av.

Men ordet «sleepwalked» blir nok rett og slett for dramatisk for dagens situasjon. I 40 år handlet hele NATOs eksistens om Sovjetunionen. Da Sovjetunionen brøt sammen var det flere som lurte på om vi fortsatt trengte NATO. Etter hvert fikk NATO nye oppdrag, som for eksempel å bidra til å stanse krigene på Balkan, deretter å bekjempe terror i Afghanistan. Og hele tiden har Russland vært der som den store potensielle trusselen og utfordringen, med Kina lenger ned på dagsordenen. Det har forandret seg nå.

Du nevner forandring og nye roller for NATO. Ser du for deg at organisasjonen nå kan bli en motvekt mot Kina, slik den tidligere var en motvekt mot Sovjetunionen?

NATO kan bli en motvekt mot Kina, men ikke på samme måte som det var en motvekt mot Sovjet. Vi er en regional organisasjon, der flere medlemmer grenset til Sovjetunionen. Vi har ikke den samme geografiske nærheten til Kina. Det er en dramatisk forskjell. Vi får også håpe at vi ikke kommer til et like intenst spenningsforhold som det var den gang, hvor det står

kampklare styrker på begge sider, inkludert tusenvis av atomvåpen, og en følelse av virkelig kald krig gjennom nærmest 40 år.

Selv om Sovjetunionen var en klar militær trussel, var de reelt sett aldri en stor økonomisk utfordring for oss. Sovjetunionen på det største utgjorde rundt 60 prosent av USAs brutto nasjonalprodukt (BNP). Kina er allerede, regnet i kjøpekraft, i ferd med å få en større økonomi enn USA. Befolkningsmessig er de også klart større, og de er teknologisk ledende på mange områder. Nå oversvømmes vi av avanserte kinesiske produkter, som mobiltelefoner, PCer, 5G nett, og så videre. Alle disse tingene gjør at NATOs forhold til Kina, på godt og vondt, aldri kommer til å bli som vårt forhold til Sovjetunionen.

I dag må vi være bevisste på farene og utfordringene, men samtidig må vi ikke male oss inn i hvert vårt hjørne, hvor vi ikke greier å få til dialog og samarbeid.

De siste månedene har flere av Kinas handlinger alarmert verden; Beijing har innført strenge lover i Hong Kong, økt sin tilstedeværelse i Sør- og Øst-Kinahavet, vært i grensekrig med India, og ført hard retorikk mot Vestens håndtering av koronaviruset – listen er lang. Dette har begynt å skape reaksjoner, for eksempel forbød Storbritannia nylig Huawei fra sitt 5G nettverk. Er dette riktig vei å gå? Er det denne veien du vil at andre NATO-land skal gå?

Jeg tenker det er viktig at flere land følger etter Storbritannia og iverksetter kraftfulle tiltak for å sikre 5G nettverkene sine. NATO har vedtatt noen retningslinjer for mange typer infrastruktur, inkludert telekommunikasjon og 5G nettverk. Vi lager mer overordnede retningslinjer for trygge systemer for å sikre oss mot utenlandsk innblanding og kontroll, men vi går ikke ned i de tekniske detaljene, det er opp til hvert enkelt land.

Det er potensielt veldig skadelig hvis andre land får kontroll over kritisk infrastruktur, derfor er jeg glad for at Storbritannia er så tydelige og går foran. 5G vil påvirke alt vi driver med og må være trygt. Det er kostbare tiltak for Storbritannia på kort sikt [estimert inntil 2.5 milliarder dollar, red.anm.], men det er selvfølgelig langt mer skadelig og kostbart å ha et 5G nett man ikke kan stole på.

La oss snakke om hovedpersonene, først om Kina. Det er mye snakk om deres «Wolf Warrior»-diplomati, altså at kinesiske diplomater i nyere tid har ført en kompromissløs, aggressiv stil. Hva er dine erfaringer med kinesiske diplomater?

Jeg har hatt en del med Kina å gjøre opp gjennom årene, og vært på flere diplomatiske besøk dit. Blant annet var jeg der to eller tre ganger som nærings- og energiminister, hvor jeg traff flere høytstående politikere. Som statsminister traff jeg både statsminister Wen Jiabao og president Hu Jintao.

Norge ble boikottet av Kina etter Nobelprisen i oktober 2010 og ut min statsministerperiode. De boikottet både laksen vår og møtene våre, og ville ikke ha noen norske politikere på besøk. Jeg ville ikke krype for Kina, så vi bestemte oss for at vi ikke skulle finne oss i oppførselen deres og ikke la oss presse. Jeg er både glad for og stolt av at vi sto imot et massivt press fra Kina. Jeg tror det ble lagt merke til at et lite land som Norge sto opp mot Kina. Vi viste både verden og Kina at uansett hvor mye de truer med økonomiske blokader, boikott og isolasjon, så ble ikke Norge presset til å be om unnskyldning, godta noen avtaler, eller akseptere brudd på menneskerettigheter. Det var også ekstremt viktig for vår egen integritet, selvfølelse og respekt.

[I sin selvbiografi påpeker Stoltenberg at: «Norge er et av de få landene i verden som har råd til å være uvenner med kineserne. Norsk økonomi er bunnsolid. Vi kan se dem i øynene og si: 'Vi er ikke avhengige av Kina'» (Stoltenberg 2016: 436)]

Over til USA. Donald Trump er en utradisjonell politiker, og jeg blir stadig imponert over hvor bra du håndterer ham i diplomatiske sammenhenger. Trump kan kanskje kalles en løs kanon i forhold til NATO, og han svinger stadig i hvordan han omtaler andre statsledere. Hva tenker du at Trump har å si for hvordan verden ser på og stiller seg til Kina?

Trump har en annen, mer direkte stil og formulerer seg ofte sterkere og kraftigere enn andre politiske ledere. Han har vært en sentral pådriver for at NATO nå har en mye tydeligere linje mot Kina. I dag er det mer enighet enn det var for kort tid siden om at Kina må tas på alvor. Det var et viktig gjennombrudd da NATO i desember 2019 for første gang formulerte en offentlig uttalelse om utfordringene knyttet til Kina (se AFP 2019). Kina har en tendens til å prøve å ta enkeltland, og da er det viktigere enn noen gang at vi står sammen.

Avslutningsvis vil jeg spørre deg om framtiden. Flere statsledere har i en årrekke gitt uttrykk for at de ønsker «the best of both worlds»; å ivareta gode forhold til både USA og Kina, og nyte godt av begge. Tror du en fredelig, bipolar verden i det hele tatt er mulig, eller er vi dømt til en framtid fylt med konflikt og rivalisering?

Jeg tror vi skal erkjenne at vi ikke vet det i dag. Det er absolutt en økende rivalisering, og en slik stabilitet du beskriver har vist seg vanskeligere å oppnå enn vi håpet for bare noen år siden, men ting kan endre seg igjen.

Jeg har alltid vært veldig skeptisk til mennesker som spår for sikkert om fremtiden. Noen eksperter sa så sent som i 1988-89 at det var nærmest utenkelig å forestille seg at Sovjetunionen skulle falle. Min erfaring som beslutningstaker er at folk som spår stort sett tar feil. Derfor er min holdning til fremtid og usikkerhet at istedenfor å prøve å forutse hva som vil skje, må vi anerkjenne at det er et enormt utfallsrom, og være forberedt på det uforutsette. Her er internasjonale organisasjoner som NATO de beste virkemidlene for å maksimere sannsynligheten for gode utfall og minimere sannsynligheten for negative utfall. Uten å predikere noe som helst; fredelig sameksistens mellom USA og Kina *er* i dette utfallsrommet, men hva som skal til for å realisere det er et mye vanskeligere spørsmål å svare på.

APPENDIX D: Interview with Erik Solheim (in Norwegian)

Erik Solheim (født 1955) er utdannet historiker og sosiolog. Han har en lang karriere i norsk politikk, blant annet som mangeårig leder i SV, og som miljøvern- og utviklingsminister i Stoltenbergs andre regjering. Han har også en solid karriere innen diplomati, der han blant annet har arbeidet som Utenriksdepartementets fredsmekler på Sri Lanka og som assisterende generalsekretær i FN (Tvedt og Pettersen 2019). Jeg intervjuet Solheim 12. august om hans tanker rundt rivaliseringen mellom Kina og USA, og om hans erfaringer med de to landenes diplomater.

De siste årene har vi sett hvordan en del land ser seg lei av USA, og særlig Trump, og dermed har beveget seg i retning av Kina. Den store entusiasmen rundt BRI er bare ett tegn på dette. De siste månedene har det stormet rundt Kina, og vi ser dermed at land trekker seg unna igjen. Se for eksempel på Storbritannias bannlysning av Huawei nylig. Hvis vi ser på disse to som ytterpunktene i hvordan land stiller seg mellom Kina og USA, hvor tror du utviklingen i denne konflikten kommer til å gå videre?

Jeg tror de trendene du beskriver er sentrale, men jeg tror det mest altoverskyggende for nær alle land i verden er at dette er en konflikt de ikke ønsker. Så godt som alle land ønsker tett forhold til *både* USA og Kina, og kan dra fordeler av politiske dialoger, investeringer, og handel med begge samtidig. Så drivkraften i nær sagt alle land er å prøve å unngå å bli trukket inn i balanseringsspørsmålet. Man kommer under ulike former for press, særlig fra USA, om å velge. Men som jeg skriver om i *Dagens Næringsliv* er dagens situasjon veldig forskjellig fra den kalde krigen (se Solheim 2020). Den gang prøvde både USA og Sovjetunionen riktignok å skaffe seg allierte over hele jorda, men det var også sterk interesse for ulike land i å alliere seg med enten USA eller Sovjetunionen, for da fikk de bøtter og spann av våpen og andre fordeler. Sånn er det jo ikke nå. Det er veldig, veldig få land som ser noen spesiell fordel med å bare alliere seg med den ene.

Du har en lang karriere i diplomati. Hva er dine erfaringer med amerikanske diplomater? Er ideen om «American exceptionalism» sterk; har de rett og slett en dyptliggende overlegenhet?

Min generelle erfaring er at de jevnt over er veldig dyktige. Da vi hadde WikiLeaks-saken, så var det etter min mening en eneste sammenhengende god PR for amerikanske diplomater, fordi den viste at de rapportene de sendte hjem til Washington fra forskjellige land, stort sett hadde høy kvalitet. Det var gode analyser fra et veldig profesjonelt apparat. Det er selvfølgelig noen opplagte unntak; folkene som USA sendte til Irak, for eksempel, var noen av de mest udugelige personene du kan tenke deg. Men i det store og det hele vil jeg si at amerikanske diplomater er dyktige, samtidig som de klarer å unngå å være arrogante. Når det er sagt ligger ideen om at USA er helt eksepsjonelle veldig sterkt i hele den amerikanske politiske kulturen. På noen områder *er* også USA helt eksepsjonelle, og det tror jeg bare man må akseptere.

I maktbalanse-teori er det en del som sier at land balanserer mot potensiale, ikke nåværende intensjoner. Selv om det trolig er få som per i dag frykter en invasjon fra USA, tror du vi kan få en anti-USA koalisjon en gang i overskuelig framtid, rett og slett på grunn av det rå potensialet som ligger hos dem?

Det er nær umulig å spå om framtida, men det er viktig å huske at for stormakter i dag er det ikke det å kontrollere land som er viktig, men å influere økonomi og beslutninger. Afghanistan, Irak og Libya har vist vanskene med krig selv med USAs overveldende militære ressurser. Så per i dag er amerikanske angrep på andre land ytterst usannsynlig. Jeg tror ikke det er noen alminnelig frykt for amerikansk maktmisbruk så lenge de har en anstendig, rasjonell president. Det har de ikke nå, riktignok. Men nå er ikke Trump interessert i verden der ute, og han kan heller ingenting om den. Så selv om han er ustabil går det mest ut over USAs befolkning. Selvsagt kan han tenkes å gå til krig hvis kalkylene endrer seg veldig og han tror det vil hjelpe ham å vinne valget. Men per i dag er Trump i krig ikke det mest sannsynlige.

For kinesernes del er «Chinese uniqueness» et sentralt begrep – ideen om at Kina, med sin lange historiske bakgrunn og særegne kulturarv, er helt ulikt alle tidligere stormakter. Hva er dine erfaringer med kinesiske diplomater? Er de unike?

De har jo mye kortere erfaring som moderne global stormakt enn det amerikanerne har. Sånn som jeg ser det så har Kina historisk sett alltid vært vendt mot seg selv, og det har gjort at diplomati, i den forstand vi ser det nå, er ganske nytt for kineserne. De sliter fortsatt med å finne måter å drive det på på en effektiv måte. Jeg tror også at kinesisk kultur er *så* sterk at den er

vanskelig for mange å trenge inn i. En veldig stor del av verden føler en usikkerhet i forhold til Kina, fordi landet er så stort, så vanskelig å forstå, og man kan lite om det. Vesten gjør alt for lite for å forsøke å forstå Kina. Mange skriver skråsikkert, men uten kunnskap. For å ta et opplagt eksempel – mange av dem som skriver i norske medier om Kina og som blir framstilt som eksperter på Kina, de kan ikke nevne navn på to provinser i Kina, og de kan ikke navn på sentrale personer i kinesisk historie.

I likhet med USA tenker kineserne at deres land er best. Det gjør mange land, så det kan man ikke klandre dem for. Spørsmålet er heller hvordan en slik holdning påvirker hvordan de opptrer overfor andre. Her sliter ofte Kina med å finne den rette måten. USA er vant til å bli kritisert overalt i verden – du kan ikke være amerikansk ambassadør i et land uten å høre stadig kritikk av USA – mens kineserne oppfatter at de gjør mye godt i verden. De er derfor ikke vant til å få mye kritikk, og har ofte problem med å håndtere det på en avslappet måte når den kommer. Jeg tror også Kina må bli bedre på å finne kompromisser om små spørsmål. Sånn som jeg ser det er for eksempel konflikten mellom India og Kina nær absurd. To store land som krangler om noen få kvadratmeter i Himalaya, hvor det ikke er noen ressurser, der det bor få mennesker, som er uten strategisk betydning, og som ikke har noen sterk kulturell eller nasjonal tilknytning til noen av landene. Så Kina trenger å bli bedre på kompromisser om den typen helt bagatellmessige ting.

I en såpas «hard» verden som vi har i dag, der både USA og Kina har vist seg å være kompromissløse på en del områder, tror du det er mulig *å komme fram til gode løsninger? Er for eksempel en fredelig, bipolar verden der USA og Kina eksisterer side om side sammen, en reell mulighet?*

Jeg tror ikke det er mulig med noen verden hvor vi unngår konflikt mellom Kina og USA, men vi må unngå *krig* mellom Kina og USA, og vi må ha en verden hvor man ser at fordelene med samarbeid overskygger konfliktene. Hvis USA og Kina samarbeider så vil det være så utrolig mye lettere å finne løsninger på alle de andre spørsmålene; regionale konflikter, klima, atomvåpen, Midtøsten – alt vil bli mye, mye lettere. Motsatt, hvis det er et spent forhold mellom dem så blir dette mye vanskeligere. En del av dette vil bli lettere når Biden vinner valget, men han vil fortsatt ha mange Kina-skeptiske folk rundt seg, og en tøff holdning ovenfor Kina. Men du vil unngå alle disse meningsløse konfliktene, og de to landene vil begynne å samarbeide på en del viktige områder som for eksempel klima og miljø.

Jeg tror hovedproblemet per nå er USAs manglende evne til å akseptere en ny supermakt som utfordrer deres globale maktposisjon. USA og Kina må rett og slett lære seg å respektere hverandre og å leve fredelig sammen. Vi vet at alle spionerer – det er ikke så farlig. Her må man bare slutte med dobbeltmoralen. Det landet som har spionert mest i verden det siste tiåret er USA; de avlytter til og med Merkel, Bolsonaro, Mohamad bin Salman og andre nære allierte. Da kan du tenke deg hva de gjør med de som ikke er allierte. Så det blir ganske hyklersk og til og med latterlig å rette fingeren mot kineserne for den type ting når USA er den som leder an. Ingen land har blandet seg inn i så mange utenlandske valg som USA.

Christie

The Eagle or the Dragon?

NTNU
Norwegian University of
Science and Technology