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Does diversity within nonviolent campaigns affect the prospects of democratisation?

A comparative case study of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions during the Arab Spring

Master's thesis in Teacher Education with Political Science
Supervisor: Charles Butcher
June 2020

Master's thesis

NTNU
Kunnskap for en bedre verden

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Abstract

This master thesis examines the effect of diversity in nonviolent campaigns on the prospect of successful democratisation. This is explored through a comparative case study of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions during the Arab Spring. These revolutions are favourable for comparison because both were successful in terms of achieving their maximalist goals (regime change) and are similar in a number of other aspects such as previous regime type, colonial history and socio-economic factors. Yet only Tunisia succeeded in achieving successful democratisation, while Egypt experienced an authoritarian reversal to a regime even more oppressive than the previous one. The thesis aims to explore whether variations in the campaign's diversity were a decisive mechanism explaining this result.

I argue that these cases show that diversity in nonviolent campaigns may be an effective mechanism in generating regime change and to initiate democratic transitions. Furthermore, it is also argued that this mechanism is only short-term beneficial, because diversity, and particularly religious diversity, complicates the democratic transition through a reduced ability to compromise and an increased likelihood of polarisation and political fractionalisation.

Key words: diversity, nonviolent campaigns, democratic transitions, democratisation, Tunisia, Egypt

Denne masteroppgaven undersøker hvilken effekt mangfoldet i en ikke-voldelig kampanje har på utsiktene for suksessfull demokratisering. Dette undersøkes gjennom en komparativ case studie av den tunisiske og den egyptiske revolusjonen under den arabiske våren. Disse revolusjonene er gunstige for sammenligning fordi begge var suksessfulle når det gjaldt oppnåelsen av deres maksimalistiske mål (regimeforandring), og ligner hverandre også ved en rekke andre aspekter som tidligere regimetype, kolonihistorie og sosioøkonomiske faktorer. Likevel var det kun Tunisia som lyktes i å oppnå suksessfull demokratisering, mens Egypt opplevde en autoritær tilbakegang til et regime nesten mer undertrykkende enn det foregående. Oppgaven undersøker derfor om eventuelle variasjoner i kampanjenes mangfold kan ha vært en avgjørende mekanisme for dette resultatet.

Jeg argumenterer for at disse casene viser at mangfold i ikke-voldelige kampanjer fungerer effektivt for å generere regimeforandring og initiere demokratiske overganger. Videre argumenteres det også for at denne effekten kun er kortsiktig, fordi mangfold, og da spesielt religiøst mangfold, vanskeliggjør den demokratiske overgangsperioden gjennom redusert evne til inngåelse av kompromisser og økt sannsynlighet for polarisering og politisk fraksjonalisering.

Nøkkelord: mangfold, ikkevoldelige kampanjer, demokratiske overganger, demokratisering, Tunisia, Egypt

Preface

As a future social science teacher, the process of writing this master thesis has given me a number of lessons. Firstly, I have gained important insight into the enormous power inherent in the mobilisation of broad non-violent movements in situations where change is desired. I have also certainly realised how privileged we are to live in a country with a strongly protected freedom of expression, where the right to protest against political decisions we do not agree with is a matter of course. As a bonus, I have also gained much knowledge about the important historical events of the Arab Spring. These are lessons and knowledge I hope to pass on to my future students.

In connection with this project, there are several people who deserve to be thanked. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Charles Butcher, who has provided me with good feedback and crucial support throughout the entire process. I would also like to thank my family and my friends for their motivating words and support through what has been a locked-up, different and challenging time.

Last but not least, a big thank you to all my fellow students from the teacher education with social science programme. Thank you all for the nice conversations and experiences we have had together both on and off campus, I am so grateful that I got to spend these last five years with you!

Oslo, June 2020
Ingrid Helene Holberg Marthinussen

Acronyms

General

CSO:	Civil Society Organization
NAVCO (data project):	The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes
SWAB:	The Second Wave Arab Barometer

Tunisia

LTD:	Tunisian Human Rights League
NDP:	National Democratic Party
UGGT:	Union Generale Tunisenne du Travail
UTICA:	l'Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisana

Egypt

MB:	The Muslim Brotherhood
FJP:	The Freedom and Justice Party
EFITU:	Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions
ETUF:	Egyptian Trade Union Federation
SCAF:	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

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1.0 Introduction

In recent decades, nonviolent civic action has emerged as one of the most effective methods citizens can use to realise their political desires and demands. The People Power Revolutions in East Asia, the Color Revolutions in the 2000s and the Arab spring of 2011, marked how civilian-led resistance may work "as an important avenue of transition to political democracy" (Bessinger, 2013:574). When nonviolent resistance initiates a political transition in a non-democratic regime, successful democratisation becomes much more likely compared to transitions initiated from the top or by violent resistance (Pinckney, 2018; Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2004; Celestino & Gleditch, 2013). Nonviolent revolutions rely primarily on the disruption generated by massing hundreds of thousands of civilians and therefore benefit from the fact that they are more likely to attract larger and more diverse groups of participants (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2014). Major nonviolent campaigns also spread norms of political engagement, thus increasing civil society's capacity to pressure the political elite long after the nonviolent resistance campaign that overthrew the old regime has ended (Pinckney, 2018:19).

However, the use of nonviolent resistance to initiate a political transition is no guarantee of democratisation. Several nonviolent campaigns that have succeeded in the removal of an incumbent regime still fail to consolidate democratic change and experience authoritarian reversal (Pickney, 2018). This became especially evident in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and made scholars question how such differences could be explained. What mechanisms are activated that lead to successful political transitions, and what is essential in order to push toward a victory that results in long-term political freedom? Diversity within the mobilisation period has been emphasised by several researchers as such a possible mechanism (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2014; Gawrec, 2019; Pinckney, 2018). Chenoweth & Stephan (2014:96) find that historically, the larger and more diverse a campaign is, the more likely it is to succeed. Namely, diversity in a campaign increases the protesters' legitimacy, impact and capacity to put pressure on the regime. However, several other scholars (e.g. Van Dyke & Amos, 2004; Bessinger, 2013) find that diversity might also inhibit political transitions. Diversity has the potential to create barriers between participants, which in turn can lead to polarisation and political deadlock that prevents the establishment of democratic institutions (see Chapter 2.2). These contradictory findings are the starting point of my thesis, where I argue that while the quantitative associations linking nonviolent protests to democratisation are well established, it is less clear whether diversity is a causal mechanism that drives this link in one direction or

another, or whether other mechanisms drive it. Thereby, the research question for my thesis is:
Is diversity a decisive mechanism in explaining whether or not democratisation occurs after nonviolent campaigns succeed?

I aim to test what effect diverse participation in nonviolent revolutions has on the process of democratisation through a case study of Egypt and Tunisia. Egypt and Tunisia are two reasonably similar countries within the same region that both experienced nonviolent revolutions during the Arab Spring. Both revolutions succeeded in terms of their maximalist goal of overthrowing the incumbent regime. Nevertheless, only Tunisia succeeded in sustaining democracy, while Egypt experienced an authoritarian backlash to a regime almost more brutal than the Mubarak regime that preceded it. The explicit goal of this thesis is not to explain all the potential causes of these outcomes, but instead to examine whether diversity as a mechanism can explain some of this variation. The thesis seeks to answer questions such as (a) was it differences in protester diversity that led to democratisation in Tunisia and not in Egypt, and (b) do particular types of diversity (such as religious or ethnic) matter more than others (class or political) when it comes to explaining democratisation?

The thesis is structured as follows; I start by defining key concepts used throughout the thesis. In Chapter 2, a literature review is conducted where I first outline general explanatory factors and theories of democratisation. This is important to ensure that diversity is not interpreted as a causal mechanism in cases where other factors may be affecting political transitions. Furthermore, I will review previous research on nonviolent resistance and democratisation, as well as review the effect researchers believe diversity has in this context. Chapter 3 (Theory) explains how diversity might serve to both reinforce and inhibit a democratic transition. The two hypotheses of the thesis will also be presented in this section. Chapter 4 describes the method and case selection used in this thesis. Chapter 5 is an empirical review of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, where important background factors for the revolutions will be outlined. Followed by this, Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the empirical chapter against the theories presented in the theory chapter, seeking to confirm or reject my two hypotheses. In the final chapter, I present the conclusion of the thesis and considerations for further research in the area.

1.2 Defining key concepts

Democracy

Democracy is a contested concept, and the literature generally distinguishes between substantive and procedural definitions of democracy (Satori, 1987; Sørensen, 2008). The substantive definitions are the most demanding as they emphasise the substance or content of democracy, concerning characteristics such as the economic distribution of resources or the opportunity to participate in rational deliberations (Møller & Skaaning, 2013). Power is to be distributed in society in such a manner that everyone can participate on equal terms, meaning that democracy is to some extent defined by its results (Møller & Skaaning, 2013:41). One of the most acknowledged substantive definitions of democracy comes from Robert Dahl. For him, a democracy is "a political system, one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens" (Dahl, 1973:2).

The procedural tradition - often also called the realistic approach - instead equates democracy with a political regime or a political method. The procedural approach contains relatively few defining characteristics, which makes it possible to operationalise and measure democracy without more serious problems of vagueness (Møller & Skaaning, 2013:42). One of the most widely used definitions within this tradition comes from Joseph Schumpeter (1942), who presented democracy as a regime defined by the presence of a specific set of procedures. His definition of democracy is "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1942:241).

Democratisation

Democratisation is a process whereby the political institutions of a country become more democratic. However, democratisation is complicated, and social scientists have employed various theoretical and methodological approaches in order to explain this phenomenon (Teorell, 2010). This has resulted in several different approaches that explain mechanisms for democratisation, as will be further explained in chapter 2.1. However, the general definition of democratisation to be used in this thesis is as a process where a society or a country becomes more democratic. In regard to nonviolent resistance, this means that democratisation in this analysis stretches from the successful removal of a regime, through the democratic transition (see below) and to the establishment of sustainable democratic, political institutions whose

main job is to ensure free and democratic elections and guarantee the essential freedoms and rights of the citizens of a country.

Nonviolent resistance

Chenoweth & Cunningham (2013:271) define nonviolent resistance as "the application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent". Nonviolent resistance is also known as civil resistance, and civilians challenging the state through nonviolent struggle employ irregular political tactics, working outside the defined and accepted channels for political participation defined by the state (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013). Nonviolent revolutions, movements and campaigns mentioned in this thesis are understood as examples of nonviolent resistance.

Diversity and diverse nonviolent movements

In this thesis, diversity is understood as the extent of variations in the social, cultural and economic backgrounds of the protesters. For a specific description of diverse nonviolent movements, I follow Chenoweth & Stephan (2014:101), who define them as "including men and women from different political groups, classes and ages", but I also include variations in some other potential factors generating diversity. Therefore, the diversity of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt is defined as the extent to which the participants varied in age, gender, class, ethnicity, religion and political affiliation as well as whether the campaigns included participants from different regions and both urban and rural populations. In the empirical part of this thesis, the protester diversity in these different categories will be measured in three levels; not significant, somewhat significant and significant. For example, diversity in age is *not significant* if a non-violent campaign mainly consisted of people between the ages of 20 and 25. On the other hand, if it includes people between the ages of 20 and 45, but not other age groups beyond that, the age diversity would be considered to be *somewhat significant.* If a non-violent campaign includes a substantial proportion of participants from a variety of age groups, including young, middle-aged and older people, diversity would be measured as *significant*.

Democratic transition and authoritarian reversal

In their purest form, transitions are the periods between one form of political rule and another (Pinckney, 2018:15). Democratic transition begins with the removal of an authoritarian regime, and it ends when free and fair competitive elections (made meaningful through the provision of fundamental civil liberties) have delivered successive alternations of power in government (Bellin, 2018:439; Whitehead, 2001:26). Regarding nonviolent resistance, countries enter a transition period when the challengers succeed, and the system of rules that was keeping the political regime in power no longer operates (Pinckney, 2018:15). Within the transition period, the rules of the political game are unclear, and political actors will seek to establish a new set of rules that will advance their own interests. A transition ends when this period of struggle is resolved into a consistent pattern of politics, in the case of a *democratic transition* - the establishment of democratic institutions and a democratic regime (Pinckney, 2018:15).

The establishment of any consistent pattern of politics marks the end of a transition, and it need not end with the establishment of democracy. It may also lead to *authoritarian reversal*, which Bellin (2018:440) refers to as "the process following authoritarian regime deposal when a country attempts political opening but founders because of the failure of elections to deliver true alternation of power (or because civil liberties are so compromised as to make the election a farce)". An authoritarian reversal may, for example, occur by coup d 'état when an unelected actor unconstitutionally removes a democratically elected government (Svolik, 2009:18). It may also happen through incumbent takeovers when a democratically elected incumbent subverts democracy and becomes a dictator (Svolik, 2009), or because a country fails to construct or establish democratic institutions (Pinckney, 2018)

2.0 Literature review

2.1 Democratisation theory

As mentioned above, democratisation is a highly contested phenomenon, and scholars have developed various theories trying to explain why democracies emerge and survive. These theories point to several different factors, which I have divided into socioeconomic, historical, institutional, and international factors. Due to the scope of this thesis, the review of these theories will be brief, but necessary in order to later understand and isolate what role diversity and mobilisation played in the outcomes of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in relation to other factors established by previous research as important determinants of democratisation.

2.1.1 Economic development

Economic development (often called modernisation theory) is highlighted as central to democratisation. One of the most influential theorists is Seymour Lipset, who established a theoretical link between democracy and economic development in *Some Social Requests of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Development* (1959). Lipset (1959:75) believed that the more developed a country is, the higher are the chances that it will be able to establish and maintain democracy.

Subsequently, several different scholars have linked successful democratisation to economic development through correlates such as industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth and educational level (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003; Huntington, 1991; Teorell, 2010). As a country develops, social structures become more complex, labour processes begin to require the active cooperation of employees, and new groups emerge and organise. As a result, society is too complex to be effectively run by command, and various groups mobilise and rise against the dictatorial regime, causing it to fall (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997:177). The importance of economic development is also emphasised by more Marxist-inspired theorists (e.g. Moore, 1966). However, they place greater weight on economic development leading to the emergence of strong, social groups such as the middle class and the working class (Bellin, 2018). The emergence of such classes is essential because they are more likely to champion democracy and democratic values when their economic interests put them at odds with the authoritarian state. Another socioeconomic factor affecting democratisation is inequality. High levels of economic inequality can potentially hinder democratisation because it increases the elite's fear of democracy's possible

redistribution consequences (Boix, 2003). Taken together, democracies may be more likely to emerge as countries develop economically, or they may be established independently of economic development but may be more likely to survive in developed countries (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997).

2.1.2 Oil dependence

Social scientists have also found oil wealth to be a socioeconomic factor that affects democratisation in several ways. Researchers such as Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Ross (2001) found that higher dependence on primary commodity exports (oil revenues) for national income creates weaker state institutions that may hinder democracy. This can happen in three ways; (1) when governments derive sufficient revenues from the sale of oil, they are likely to tax their population less and the public, in turn, will be less likely to demand accountability from and representation in their government, (2) oil wealth might lead to higher spending on patronage[1], which in turn dampens latent pressure for democratisation and, (3) when oil revenues provide the government with enough money, the government will use its wealth to prevent the formation of social groups that are independent of the state, and that may demand political rights (Aslaksen, 2010:4). This is also similar to Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier's (2004) findings that higher resource rents make it easier for dictators to buy off political challengers. It is also found by scholars such as Ross (2001) and Svolik (2009) that fuel exports raise the risk of incumbent takeovers while in a transition period.

2.1.3 Historical and institutional legacy

Historical legacies may also influence the prospect of democratisation. One factor is colonialism. Whether a country is a former western colony has been shown to influence democratisation in several areas. Diamond (1988:7) has found that colonial economic development distorted the social structure in ways that (a) increased the power of classes that have been resistant to democracy, while (b) weakening those classes whose struggles for political influence and incorporation have been historically associated with the establishment of democracy. Colonialism has also been associated with high levels of ethnic and religious fractionalisation – which in turn, have been shown to complicate the establishment of stable democracy (Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1995). However, British colonialism has been linked to

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[1] Patronage is understood as a mutual exchange of services between individuals of unequal status and position of power such as a patron and a client (Fukuyama, 2015:86). Often services are given by the patron in exchange for support (ibid.).

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increased democratization (Weiner, 1987; Abernethy, 2000; Lange, 2004). Scholars such as Woodberry (2012) and Lankina & Getachew (2012) argues that this relationship appears because British colonies tended to be more influenced by Protestant missionaries. Higher levels of education and a stronger civil society both came as a result of these missionaries (Woodberry 2012:255; Lankina & Getachew, 2012:466). Resembling findings are made by Hariri (2012), who argues that specific colonial-era actors caused democracy rather than inherent features of different empires.

Toward the end of the 1990s, political scientists began to draw attention to how a country's previous institutional structures influenced the chances of democratisation (Bellin, 2018). Previous regime type was emphasised, especially the type of authoritarian regime that preceded the current regime (patrimonial, single-party, militaristic) (Linz & Stepan, 1996:46). Legacies of military rule have been found to undermine democratization, shaped by the military's institutional profile, culture and historical role (Bruneau & Matei, 2008). Svolik (2009:15), for example, found that "democracies governed by the military before their transition are about five times more likely to revert to a dictatorship than democracies who used to be civilian dictatorships".

2.1.4 International factors

The focus on international factors emerged by the mid-1990s, with some of the most central contributors being Levitsky & Way (2006). They argued that international pressure for democracy was mediated through two channels: linkage and leverage. Linkage refers to ties and cross border flows that existed between the given country and Western democracies (e.g. economic/political ties, trade, communication). Leverage refers to the degree to which the government of a given country was vulnerable to external democratising pressure. This could, for example, be through security allies, aid dependence and trade (Levitsky and Way, 2006)

Democracies have also been found to diffuse across borders (e.g. Starr, 1991). Greater linkages to more democratic states can both make transitions to democracy more likely and provide more incentives for elites to support democratic reform when an autocratic regime falls (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). Svolik (2009:15) finds that the presence of neighbouring democracies lowers the risk of authoritarian reversal once in transition.

2.2 Nonviolent resistance, diversity and democratisation

In 2011, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan published *Why Civil Resistance Works*, a book that was ground-breaking within the field and presented the first large-N analysis that provides statistical evidence for why nonviolent struggle is more likely to be successful against repressive regimes than armed resistance. They found that nonviolence resistance succeeds in promoting democratisation because "such campaigns are more likely to attract a larger and more diverse base of participants and impose unsustainable costs on a regime" (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2014:96). Massive campaigns have a higher chance of seriously disrupting the status quo, raising the costs of government repression, and provoking defections among a regime's pillars of support. In other words, civil resistance campaigns that work enjoy mass participation, they produce regime defections, and they employ flexible tactics. If all these mechanisms are in place, nonviolent resistance also increases the chances that the overthrow of a highly authoritarian dictatorship leads to peace and democratic rule (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, 2014).

Chenoweth & Stephan's findings have been confirmed by several other scholars who have also found that nonviolent protests substantially increase the likelihood of transition to democracy (e.g. Celestino & Gleditcsh, 2013, Bayer, Bethke & Lambach, 2016, Bethke & Picnkney, 2019, Kim & Kroeger, 2019). These scholars also find the main mechanism for the success of nonviolent direct action to be that such campaigns attract a greater number of participants than any form of violent resistance (Bayer et al., 2016). Nonviolent resistance campaigns are open to larger segments of the society regardless of age, gender and physical ability due to their less extreme means of affecting political change (Bethke & Picnkney, 2019; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Such large and diverse campaigns do increase the costs of repression leaving leaders more vulnerable for protesters challenging the autocratic authorities through either a direct deposition of the authorities or by inspiring challengers to arrange a coup (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013, Kim & Kroeger, 2019).

As can be seen above, common to the studies of Chenoweth & Stephan (2011, 2014), Pinckney and Bethke (2019) and Celestino & Gleditsch (2013) is that they all highlight how lower thresholds for participation in nonviolent movements lead to more diverse, mass-mobilised campaigns. As the size and diversity of a nonviolent movement grows, so does their perceived legitimacy, making it more difficult for the regime to respond with violent repression (Kim & Kroeger, 2019; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2013). Brutal repression against normal

citizens with moderate demands may reduce the legitimacy of the regime, increase solidarity among protesters and further encourage mobilisation against the regime (Gawerc, 2019; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Thus, such diverse mass protests can be an effective method of disturbing the status quo and initiating a democratic transition (Gawerc, 2019).

Diverse nonviolent resistance also promotes democracy following a successful campaign, through what is seen by Bethke & Pinckney (2019:7) as a "spillover effect". This means that the democratic organizational culture of nonviolent campaigns spills over to the post-transition political environment (della Porta & Diani, 2006). When nonviolent campaigns are diverse and composed of broad segments of society, they often develop a culture of compromise to protect the diverse interests of the participant groups (Betkhe & Pinckney, 2019; Celestino & Gledtisch, 2013). In this way, nonviolent movements "encourages the development of democratic skills and fosters expectations of accountable governance" (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011:207). This is also emphasized by Pinckney (2018), who argues that nonviolent uprisings spread norms of political engagement and increase civil society's capacity to pressure political elites long after the nonviolent resistance campaign that overthrew the old regime has ended.

Others, however, have also identified that diversity may create barriers to effective resistance. Diversity makes it substantially more challenging to build a collective identity among the participants of the nonviolent campaign and may also pose significant complications when it comes to forging a common agenda, tactical agreement and a shared framing strategy (Gawerc, 2019). In a significant number of cases, diverse mass-mobilised revolutions have led to unstable democratic results, providing an only temporary increase in civil and political freedoms, followed by authoritarian backtracking (Bessinger, 2013:575). Researchers suggest some of the reasons for this are likely built into the processes underlying a diverse, nonviolent revolution; its reliance on a rapidly convened negative coalition of hundreds of thousands, distinguished in particular by fractured elites, lack of consensus over fundamental policy issues and weak commitment to democratic ends (Bessinger, 2013). These obstacles make analysts' say that diversity endangers democracy and that more homogeneity is often considered an advantage when seeking the emergence of practices and institutions that promote open politics (Fish & Kroenig, 2006:840).

There is, in other words, an emerging consensus that when nonviolent resistance initiates a political transition in a non-democratic regime, democracy becomes much more likely than if

other means initiated the transition (Pinckney, 2018). However, the use of nonviolent direct action in itself does not guarantee that democracy will emerge if dictators fall, there is also a likelihood that irregular transitions to new authoritarian regimes may occur. Celestino & Gleditsch (2013:395) also find that nonviolent campaigns increase the risk of "one existing autocracy being replaced by a new autocracy, especially compared to countries that have not been exposed to any kind of campaign". While some link the failure of social movements to a lack of participation diversity (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Bethke & Pinckney, 2019), others find diverse mass mobilisation to be a potential impediment to democratic transitions due to the increased probability of polarisation and authoritarian backlash (Gawerc, 2019; Bessinger, 2013). Whether promoting or inhibiting, quantitative studies do find an apparent link between diversity in nonviolent movements and democratisation. However, few have directly tested this link. Researchers such as Gawerc (2019) and Van Dyke & Amos (2017) have tested how organizational diversity affects the protest outcome in rich democracies, but few have analysed how diversity directly influences democratic transitions initiated by nonviolent movements in autocratic regimes. Based on the conflicting quantitative research reviewed in this section, this is the gap my thesis aims to address.

3.0 Theory

3.1 Diversity as a positive mechanism for democratisation

As mentioned in chapter 2, much of the previous research in this area emphasises the role of diversity in nonviolent movements, and especially in cases where democratic outcomes are the primary goal of the campaign. However, most of the literature is not explicit on how diversity within the revolution itself may lead to democratisation – but has a stronger focus on how diversity drives regime change. Because of that, the first part of this section will focus on how diversity in nonviolent movements can increase the likelihood of regime change and initiate a democratic transition. In the next section, I will look at how a democratic transition initiated by diverse nonviolent campaigns can be said to increase the probability of establishing a sustainable democracy.

3.1.1 Diversity as a mechanism in initiating regime change

Diversity in nonviolent resistance campaigns can be a forceful mechanism in initiating regime change and democratic transitions. One of the main reasons for this, emphasised by several researchers, is diverse nonviolent movements' ability to mobilise large numbers of participants and demonstrate widespread support for an issue (Van Dyke & Amos, 2017; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). When people from several different backgrounds participate in a nonviolent campaign, the phenomenon known as bandwagoning or meso-mobilisation may occur (Wang et al., 2018; Van Dyke & Amos, 2017). By being able to mobilise large groups of civilians into united coalitions, such diverse coalitions have the potential to further increase the mobilisation by drawing in and including new groups, and thus building an even broader coalition (Gawerc, 2019:3). Such meso-mobilisation is vital because it helps to increase the legitimacy of the opposition group and thus put more pressure on the regime. Authorities often expect opposition from certain groups, so when unexpected others join in and signal their support for the opposition, the authorities are more likely to recognise that they are not just dealing with routine opposition, but something potentially more threatening (Gawerc, 2009:3).

The increased threat creates what is considered to be the central tactical advantage of diverse nonviolent campaigns; they raise the cost of government repression. As the size and diversity of nonviolent movements grow, so does their perceived legitimacy, making it more difficult for the regime to respond with violent repression (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2013). It is generally easier for a government to order or justify repression against ethnically distinct

rebels or groups with extreme demands than ordinary, unarmed citizens with moderate demands (Celestino & Gleditcsh, 2013; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2014). Repression against what seems to be a legitimate movement may raise awareness of the regime's brutal nature, and thus increase the solidarity among protesters encouraging further meso-mobilisation against the regime (Kim & Kroeger, 2019; Levitsky & Way, 2010, Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014). Furthermore, diverse nonviolent movements also hold the tactical advantage of increasing their strategic capacity by having participants with different experiences, networks and repertories for collective action (Gawerc, 2019). Having individuals with diverse perspectives and experiences can strengthen everything from strategy to decision making and problem-solving and make the opposition more adaptable for repression (Gawerc, 2019; Diani & Bison, 2004).

Broad-based support for a nonviolent campaign may also complicate the repression through their ability to foster loyalty shifts which in turn can create rifts among the regime's pillars of support (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2014:96). The more diverse a movement is, the easier it is for nonviolent activists to leverage their existing relationships with their neighbours, classmates, relatives, and colleagues in ways that shift their loyalty away from the regime leadership (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015:300). Such loyalty shifts can, for example, make security forces reluctant to follow orders of repression and use violence against the dissidents based on moral apprehension, fears of international prosecution or concerns about public retribution (Kim & Kroeger, 2019; Nepstad, 2013). This could force the regime to surrender to the demands of the opposition. It may also lead to military coups where the military sees the regime losing its legitimacy and popularity - and oust the sitting regime to protect its interests (Kim & Kroeger, 2019; Nepstad, 2013). Regardless, security defections and the unwillingness to use force against a nonviolent mass opposition is found to be among the most critical processes in many successful nonviolent revolts (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2004; Nepstad, 2011).

To summarise, diverse and large nonviolent campaigns have a greater chance of initiating regime change in authoritarian regimes by enjoying mass participation, raising the cost of government repression and provoking defections among a regime's pillars of support. Once the incumbent regime is ousted, movements with democratic goals have the opportunity to continue pushing for democratic demands through continued mobilisation and the culture of compromise and cooperation built up throughout the diverse campaign. Democratic transitions initiated through nonviolent resistance often generate more sustainable democracy than if other means

initiated the transition (Pinckney, 2018). How the diversity within a nonviolent campaign may affect the transition will be further elaborated in the next section.

3.1.2 Diversity as a mechanism in democratic transitions

Bayer et al. (2016) argue that those democratic regimes that come into being as a result of nonviolent resistance campaigns are less prone to democratic breakdowns. The primary mechanism that produces this effect is that large and diverse campaigns must develop a culture of compromise to balance their constituent interests, which helps to shape a democratic political culture that values compromise and cooperation. This political culture spills over to the subsequent democratic transition fostering conditions favourable for democratic survival by reducing the possibility for political polarisation and power struggles (Bayer et al., 2016; Bayer & Pinckney, 2018). The significance of this spill-over effect is also supported by Celestino & Gleditsch (2013) who finds that nonviolent uprisings have democratising effects because of its ability to disperse power and increase the incentives for compromise and concession.

These incentives for compromise and cooperation emerges because diverse campaigns must employ democratic practices in order to combine individuals' experiences and resources to create a prevailing direction for the campaign (Gawerc, 2019; Pinckney, 2018). This is important because if a social movement succeeds in creating a joint identity, will and a common desire to hold political actors accountable for state affairs, the participants will in term feel more obligated to commit to the values presented in the campaign even after the removal of the incumbent regime (Diani & Bison, 2004, Gawerc, 2019). This will cause the spill-over effect because the shared commitment to these values will cause participants to continue to use their tactical skills to find opportunities for involvement in political decision-making and keep pushing the transition in a democratic direction (Pinckney, 2018; Martin, 2014).

The emergence of this political culture is also essential for democratisation because it helps to spread skills and attitudes of civic engagement (Pinckney, 2018). It boosts enthusiasm among ordinary citizens and "adequately prepares massive parts of the citizens for political and civic activity" (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2004:11). This political culture will also lead the civil society prepared to defend democracy against any signs of erosion (Bayer et al., 2016). In other words, keeping people mobilised and politically engaged in the process of building a new democratic regime is crucial to bring new leaders with democratic preferences into positions of power. Nevertheless, it is also important to create accountability mechanisms keeping the

leaders committed to democratic values and to avoid a power shift back to the elites (Pinckney, 2018). Periods of transition characterised by this culture for compromise and cooperation, itself created by the broader diversity of nonviolent campaigns, will build more inclusive regimes where "all relevant groups are included in the democratic process as long as they commit to the norms and rules of democracy" (Bayer et al., 2016:763). It will also spread ideals of mass mobilisation, which will facilitate peaceful demonstrations in the future and hold leaders accountable if they do not commit to the democratic rules (Sharp, 2008).

H1: More diverse nonviolent campaigns lead to democratisation through the ability to generate increased and continued mobilisation and the commitment to a culture of compromise and cooperation

3.2 Diversity as an impediment to democratisation

Despite all of the arguments favouring diversity above, there is no broad consensus among researchers that diversity has only positive effects on the democratic outcomes of nonviolent movements. A diverse nonviolent campaign is no guarantee of successful democratisation, and researchers have also identified that diversity might endanger democracy or create barriers to effective resistance (Fish & Kroenig, 2006, Pinckney, 2018). The main mechanisms linking diversity negatively to democratisation run through the fragmentation or polarisation of different groups, where different ideologies, goals, and interests eventually lead to conflict. In this part of my thesis, I will outline theory describing how different mechanisms may cause diversity to have a negative impact on democratisation and nonviolent campaigns.

3.2.1 Challenges in generating diverse movements

Even with shared dissatisfaction with the status quo, the participants of a nonviolent movement may differ in multiple dimensions including ideologies, goals, preferred strategies, and tactics, which will create difficulties for establishing a united, broad movement (Gawrec, 2019, Levi & Murphy, 2006). Such differences may cause tension and division, and "are often embedded in identities, which might make it even harder to discuss and address them within the coalition" (Gawrec, 2019:6). In order to act collectively, the participants of a nonviolent movement are required to measure their resources, become aware of and seize opportunities, frame their demands in ways that enable them to join with others, and identify common targets (Tarrow, 2011). To do this, the movement needs to build a collective identity and a common agenda, and the obstacles and differences posed by diversity are likely to make this difficult.

Building a collective identity means reaching a shared definition of who "we" are, including a mutual understanding of goals, strategies, and the environment in which the nonviolent movement operates (Grawec, 2019, Diani & Bison, 2004). Building a collective identity and bridging divisions takes time and is especially challenging in diverse coalitions given that peoples positions often shape their content of grievances (Gawerc, 2019). Another problem with collective identities in massive, diverse mobilisations against autocracy is that the movement often lacks consensus over fundamental political issues and even weak commitment to democratic ends (Bessinger, 2013). Achieving unity among widely divergent political and social groups might work for the overall goal of getting rid of the current regime, but once the dictator or regime is gone, it is likely that the different interests and goals of these groups will come to the fore and might eventually lead to conflict and division (Pinckney, 2018; Van Dyke & Amos, 2004). This is especially problematic in terms of democratisation, considering that people from different backgrounds and social groups might have had different motivations for removing the regime. Some may have wanted democratic freedoms and rights, while others may have been more motivated by economic grievances, making it difficult to reach a consensus on decisions and processes necessary to further the democratic transition. Such motivational differences among the participators can also lead to rapid demobilisation and even fractionalisation, as described in the next section.

3.2.2. Demobilisation and fractionalisation

As mentioned in section 3.1, continued mobilisation and keeping people politically engaged in the process of building a new and democratic political regime after a successful nonviolent resistance campaign is "crucial for keeping decision-makers accountable as a country's new political institutions are being created" (Pinckney, 2018:24). If the participants in a diverse nonviolent movement mainly have been motivated and united by a shared desire to overthrow the current incumbent regime, it might be difficult to keep people in the streets to continue to push for major changes after the campaign successfully removed the dictator. If a movement lacks a political consensus and overarching goals keeping the participants in the streets, and rapid demobilisation takes place, this increases the possibility for the balance of forces to shift back to the elites, particularly to the remnants of the old regime (Pinckney, 2018).

If the unity of a diverse nonviolent campaign breaks down, demobilisation is not the only threat to the democratic transition. Whenever people from different backgrounds and social groups

come together in a massive nonviolent movement, there is also always a chance that polarisation and fractionalisation will occur. Fractionalisation emerges when involved groups or individuals are sectoral and exclusive in their membership and advance private interests focused on maintaining or achieving their own privileges and rights (Pinckney, 2018:58). Fractionalisation can also take the form of one or more members holding more privileged positions than others. Uneven risks, such as difference in potential participation costs among the various groups, may further confound attempts at cohesion as they underscore differences between activists, hinder the ability of more at-risk individuals to identify with those less at-risk, and in this way, provoke fragmentations among different identities (Grawec, 2019).

Such fractionalisation may not align with, and can, in fact, contradict the public good in a newly emerging democracy. It will disrupt the process of institutionalising a new political system and can also derail the transition and lead to a fractious regime that falls short of democratic ideas and is ultimately unstable (Pinckney, 2018). Fractionalisation also holds the potential of leading to violent uprisings, especially if various political groups competing against one another see themselves as engaged in winner-takes-it-all-struggles in which one side's victory means the other side's total and complete defeat (Pinckney, 2018; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2004). Since this is the attitude toward politics, it is only natural that the most extreme tactics are justified to achieve one's goals (Pinckney, 2018:60). This is especially critical in terms of democratisation, since violent uprisings are generally considered to be damaging to democratic transitions and make transitions to new autocracies relatively more likely (Celestino & Gledtich, 2013).

H2: More diverse participation in nonviolent uprisings lower the probability of democratisation due to fractionalisation and polarisation during the transition period

4.0 Methodology

As seen in chapter 2 and 3, many theorists emphasise the importance of diversity in resistance movements as well as the ability to maintain unity during the transition phase as essential mechanisms that influence the democratic outcome of a nonviolent campaign. Quantitative studies have found a correlation between nonviolent dissent and democratisation, where diversity in participation is often seen as a crucial factor. I aim to conduct an in-depth study of the link between diversity in nonviolent resistance movements and democratisation with a comparative case study. By using this method, I can closely observe the proposed causal mechanisms and test whether it was, in fact, diversity during the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia that explains variation in their democratisation outcomes, or if other factors were more decisive. This analysis is based on a deductive-inductive logic. Deduction involves the use of laws and theories to establish hypotheses to test whether the laws or theories are correct, while induction is about using facts to establish laws or theories (Moses & Knutsen, 2007:45-47). Since this thesis primarily seeks to test how well pre-existing theories work to explain the different outcomes of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia, the deductive approach is foremost. However, to test causal relationships, both deductive and inductive methods must be used, hence the order of deductive-inductive logic (Moses & Knutsen, 2007).

4.1 Qualitative comparative case studies

There is potential for confusion among the terms comparative methods, case study methods and qualitative methods. In one view, the comparative method (the use of comparisons among a small number of cases) is distinct from the case study method, which involves the internal examination of single cases (George & Bennett, 2005:18). However, case study methods might also be defined to include both within-case analysis of singe cases and comparisons of a small number of cases, since there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or research program (George & Bennett, 2005).

This study is a comparison of a small number of cases, examined qualitatively. A qualitative approach allows for an in-depth analysis of a given topic, unlike quantitative analyses where one seeks to generalise relationships between variables on the basis of a large number of cases (Ragin, 1987). Qualitative comparative studies often enable researchers to identify and measure relevant factors and underlying variables with greater precision, because more contextual

information exists about each case and the different variables, enabling researchers to better map causal chains (Bryman, 2016). However, comparative case studies can be used both quantitatively and qualitatively but are primarily used as a qualitative strategy.

Using comparative case studies makes it possible to observe how the independent variable (X) affects the outcome of the dependent variable (Y) if you choose cases with variation on X and Y – in this case, diversity among participants in the chosen revolutions (X) and democratisation in Tunisia and Egypt (Y). The cases serve a theory-testing purpose but can also be the basis for further theory-building. By comparing two or more cases, one is in a better position to establish the circumstances in which a theory will or will not hold (Bryman, 2016). It is nevertheless important to remember that problems with influence from underlying variables still occur in qualitative comparative studies, making it essential to make systematic comparisons in order to distinguish cases where a third variable affects the outcome from where X clearly leads to Y. Solid theory can also reduce the problem related to potential third variables (Moses & Knutsen, 2007).

4.2 Case selection

The cases in this thesis are two states, more specifically, Tunisia and Egypt. No matter how a case is defined, it must compromise the phenomena to be described or explained - and to do this; it is often useful to assign temporal and spatial boundaries thus making the cases equivalent units (Gerring, 2016). This is particularly important when cases consist of discrete events such as, in this case, revolutions. The boundaries set for these cases are the period from when the individual revolutions broke out, through the transitional period and until the regimes either sustainably democratised or experienced an authoritarian reversal.

When making case selection, the most fundamental question is whether a case aims for descriptive or causal inference (Gerring, 2016). A case study is understood as causal if it is oriented around a central hypothesis about how X affects Y, the causal effect symbolised as X➔Y (Gerring, 2016). However, most case studies do not attempt to estimate a precise causal effect and an accompanying confidence interval, as would be expected from large N-research (Bryman, 2016). A causal case study seeks to find causal inference encompassing any statement about the impact of X on Y; precise (e.g. an increase of one unit in X generates a two-unit increase in Y), or imprecise (e.g. an increase in X causes an increase in Y). To explore such casual inferences, I use the *Most Similar Method* (also known from Mill as the Method of

Difference). When using the most similar method, the cases exhibit similar background conditions (Z) and different outcomes (Y) as described in table I below, where I investigate variation in my independent variable (diversity) across the cases as a possible explanation for the outcome, Y.

Table I: Case Selection

Variables		X(diversity)	Z(background)	Y(democracy)
Cases	Tunisia	?	0	1
	Egypt	?	0	0

In order to use the most similar method, the countries analysed must have different outcomes on the dependent variable (Geddes, 2003). In addition, the cases must also be as similar as possible on known Z variables, despite the fact that it is generally extremely difficult to find two cases that resemble each other in every respect but one. The similarities between Tunisia and Egypt are summarised in Table II, where the most important factors highlighted in studies of democratisation are summarised (see Chapter 2.1). The table shows variables that on a general basis could explain variation in the degree of democratisation in different societies. These variables are measured in 2010, the year before most protest activity[2], and vary little between Tunisia and Egypt. Where they do vary, however, as in colonial history and democratic neighbours, the differences between the cases would lead us to believe that Tunisia would not democratize while Egypt would (e.g Woodberry, 2012; Celestino & Gleditch, 2013). Therefore, these possible explanations probably do not explain the different outcomes in the two countries and will not be part of the main analysis because they are unlikely to generate the variation in Y (George & Bennett, 2005).

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[2] The protests in Tunisia began in December 2010, while the protests in Egypt started in January 2011.

Table II: Similarities Among the Cases

Case	Name	Outcome (Y)	Potential Democracy Promoting Factors (X's)					
		Regime type 2020	*Economic develop-ment[3]*	*Demo. neighbours*	*Oil depend-ence[4]*	*Regime type[5] 2010*	*Ethnic fraction.[6]*	*Colonial history[7]*
1	*Tunisia*	Flawed Demo.	10.441 $	None	210.98 USD	Authorit-arian	0.039	French Prot.
2	*Egypt*	Authorit-arian	10.081 $	Israel[8]	266.96 USD	Authorit-arian	0.164	British Col.

By excluding all of these potential democracy-promoting factors that could have impacted the outcomes in the two countries, the use of a most similar design enhances the possibility of clearly focusing on whether differences in diversity help explain the variation in Y - or whether any other possible X's are detected to be more important. As Table II shows, both countries were categorised as lower-middle-income countries in 2010, which is an indeterminate zone, where the democratic momentum could go either way (Bellin, 2018:443). Both countries had also had an increasing degree of privatisation, as well as significantly improved educational opportunities for both populations. The countries overall performance on several significant modernisation indicators such as literacy, urbanisation and life expectancy are also so similar that these differences are unlikely to explain variations in democratisation (see chapter 5).

Although a part of the same region, Tunisia had no neighbouring democratic countries in 2010, while Egypt shared borders with Israel, which in 2010 was categorised as a flawed democracy. This, as well as the British heritage of Egypt, would indicate that Egypt was more likely than Tunisia to succeed in terms of democratisation, which we know was not the case. Tunisia and Egypt also resembled each other in terms of regime type, both countries being strict

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[3] Economic development as a potential democracy-creating factor is based on assumptions that economic development in the population leads to increased desires for democracy (Huntington, 1991). This is measured in terms of GDP per capita (constant 2011 international $). Further justification for this can be found in footnote 9.
[4] Oil dependence is measured as oil rents per capita in constant 2000 USD, the numbers are retrieved from Harvard Dataverse: Oil and Gas Data 1932-2014.
[5] Before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, both countries had historically had strict authoritarian regimes with dictators who had been in power for a long time.
[6] From Fearon's (2003) Ethnic Fractionalisation Index
[7] Tunisia was a French Protectorate until 1956, whilst Egypt was a British Colony until 1922 (but dominated by British influence until 1956)
[8] In 2010, Israel was ranked as a flawed democracy, number 37 on the global rank (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010).

authoritarian regimes with long-sitting dictators, and both had quite a low level of ethnic fractionalisation. To summarise, the countries' overall performance on all of these potential X's makes it unlikely that any of these mechanisms explain the variation in democratisation.

Since the phenomenon of investigation is explicitly nonviolent movements, it is also essential to use cases that were as similar as possible in the revolution phase itself. This is especially important because the democratic outcome is also fundamentally affected by factors such as whether the movement evolved to become violent and the degree of repression (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Karatnycy & Ackerman, 2004). Table III addresses movement-level aspects of both revolutions with data from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes data (NAVCO 2.1; Chenoweth and Shay 2019). NAVCO 2.1 includes campaign-year data for 384 campaigns during the period 1945-2013. Most of the variables in the dataset are coded as dummy-variables (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019), and the measurements of all variables in the table below are done only in 2011 as this was the when most of the protests took place and the campaigns reached their peak.

Table III - Key Aspects of the Revolutions

Variable Name	Description	Tunisia	Egypt
Start_date	First date on which campaign is observed	2010	2011
End_date	Last date on which campaign is observed	2011	2011
Prim_method	Primary type of resistance method used in campaign 0=primarily violent 1=primarily nonviolent	1 (100%)	1 (100%)
Camp_goals	Started goals of the campaign 0=regime change, 1=significant institutional reform, 2=policy change, 3=territorial secession, 4=greater autonomy, 5=anti-occupation	0 (100%)	0 (100%)
Repression	The degree of state repression in response to campaign activity. 0=none; 1=mild repression; 2=moderate repression; 3=extreme repression	3 (100%)	3(100%)
Camp_backlash	What was the effect of state repression on the campaign: 0=no visible effect 1=movement suppressed 2=decreased domestic mobilisation 3=increased domestic mobilisation	3 (100%)	3 (100%)
Sec_defect	The regime loses support from the military and/or security forces through major defections or loyalty shifts 1=yes 0=no	1 (100%)	0 (100%)

State_defect	The regime loses support from the civilian bureaucrats and/or civilian public officials through major defections or loyalty shifts 0=no 1=yes	0 (100%)	0 (100%)
Wdrwl_support	Former state supporters have explicitly withdrawn support from the regime as a result of state repression. 0=no 1=yes	0 (100%)	1 (100%)
Success	Campaign's maximalist goal ultimately achieved as a direct result of the campaign. 0=not successful 1= successful	1 (100%)	1 (100%)

As can be seen from the table, several features of the revolutions were very similar. They took place during the same period, they were both primarily nonviolent with the goal of regime change, and they were both met with brutal repression from the regime. Both revolutions also had about the same duration, which thus cannot explain the difference in democratisation as researchers (e.g. Kadivar, 2008) argue that democracies are more stable when preceded by longer periods of resistance. They do, however, vary on the presence of security defections according to this table. However, these results are debatable. Tunisia's military withdrew and refused to help the regime defeat the demonstrators. Egypt's military also sided with the protesters and eventually carried out a coup against Mubarak and his regime (Brown, 2013:52). It is possible that this coup is what creates the varying results on sec_defect and wdrwl_support in the table above, but as elaborated in Chapter 5, there are indications of security defections and state supporters who withdrew their support from the regime in both Tunisia and Egypt.

4.2.1 Reliability

In qualitative research, the reliability of a study is often seen as an indicator of quality (Tjora, 2012: 203). Reliability revolves around how the position of the researcher may influence the research work, making it essential for the researcher to reflect on how the collection of data has taken place and thus becomes aware of possible sources of error (Ringdal, 2001). It is essential to have a wide range of sources for data collection, and arguments and claims from different points of view should be brought into the discussion and thus make the measurement of the variables more reliable and thereby also the conclusions of the study. In this study, I have used multiple sources to measure the diversity of participants in both revolutions, specifically secondary sources such as scholarly descriptions of the revolutions and primary sources such as individual-level surveys and newswires.

One of the secondary sources particularly used is Bessinger, Jamal & Mazur's (2013) processed data from the Second Wave Arab Barometer (SWAB). SWAB is a dataset that includes a survey conducted in Tunisia and Egypt shortly after the Arab Spring, mainly centred around attitudes concerning political life, government and values. The data set was not originally designed to investigate the Arab Spring. However, questions were added to make it possible to identify who participated in the revolutions, as well as the individual attitudes that reflected on the revolutions. The survey was conducted on 1,220 respondents in Egypt and 1,196 respondents in Tunisia. It is, therefore, a small sample in relation to the protests themselves, especially in Egypt, where millions of people are estimated to have participated in some demonstrations. The SWAB survey is, however, designed to be nationally representative. Due to the small size of the SWAB sample, the NAVCO 2.1 dataset is also used, as in Table III above (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019). Other types of data (such as The Economist Intelligence Units' Democracy Index, World Bank and United Nations Human Development Report) have been used, as well as scholarly analysis of the revolution and news sources that can help shed light on protesters and mobilisation in both revolutions.

4.2.2 Transparency and replicability

Transparency refers to openness about the research process and how it unfolded over time, and replicability means that someone other than the original researcher can access the data and repeat the procedures of the original analysis (Gerring, 2016). Transparency and replicability are closely related insofar as greater transparency enhances replicability (Gerring, 2016: 209). In order to ensure transparency, it is crucial that all choices and problems are explained, so that the reader can gain as a good an insight into the research such that they can decide on its credibility (Tjora, 2012). In this way, replicability can be "ensured in the form of the analysis being reproducible, thereby helping to strengthen the validity of the analysis" (Gerring, 2016: 210). In this analysis, transparency is largely related to the sources used to make the measurements of participant diversity in the discussion chapter. The data obtained from the Second Wave Arab Barometer and NAVCO 2.1 is publicly available, the same goes for the information obtained from the previous scholarly analysis, articles and online newspapers. The measurements used in the analysis can, therefore, be replicated, and further analyses with the same data may also be done if desired.

4.2.3 Generalisation in comparative case studies

There have been several discussions among researchers centred around the external validity or generalizability of comparative case study research (Bryman, 2016; Gerring, 2016; Tjora, 2012). Case study research is difficult to generalise because it includes, by definition, only a small number of cases of a more general phenomenon (Gerring, 2016:221). In addition, the possibility of controlling for third variables outside of the sample that might make the conclusions of a study spurious is more challenging than in larger-N studies. Claims to representativeness based solely on case study research should be cautious and probably strengthen or weaken pre-existing theories, rather than test them in a statistical sense (Gerring, 2016). Nonetheless, limited generalisations for similar types of cases are possible and valuable due to the improved measurement validity and ability to observe causal mechanisms that case studies facilitate. For example, this study may say something about how diverse participation in nonviolent revolutions affects the transition to democratisation, which may apply to other states that have experienced similar revolutions without it escalating to civil war.

5.0 Historical Background:
The Arab spring in Tunisia and Egypt

This Chapter delves into the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt. The chapter is divided into two main sections, one for Tunisia and one for Egypt, each of which consists of four different subsections. The first subsection will deal with the countries' background and history, where I discuss the countries' situation before the uprisings according to regime type, economic development and various civil and political freedoms. This information is necessary to understand why the revolutions occurred, as well as to be able to elucidate which background variables may have affected the transitional outcome. The second subsection provides a closer look at the protests and demonstrations themselves; what happened and how did it happen? The third subsection deals with the transition periods after the previous regimes were overthrown, where the countries wanted to establish change and the necessary institutions for a democratic society. In the fourth subsection, the focus will be on highlighting what diversity can be found among the people and the groups that were a part of the protests. Finally, the chapter concludes with a section where the differences and similarities of the participant diversity in the two revolutions are summarised in a conceptual framework. This is important to establish an understanding of any differences and similarities in terms of diversity before the analysis.

5.1 Tunisia

Tunisia was ruled by a succession of Islamic dynasties and empires until coming under French protectorate rule in the late 19th century. After achieving independence in 1956, Tunisia's first president Bourguiba established a strict one-party state and dominated the country for 31 years until he was removed from office in 1987 and replaced by Ben Ali in a coup. With Ben Ali, Tunisia remained an authoritarian state with an all-powerful ruling party and no significant institutions of representative government until 2011 (Stepan, 2012).

In 2010, Tunisia had a population of 10,635,244 million people with a median age of 29,7 years. Sixty-seven per cent of the total population was categorised as urban, living in cities and urban areas of the country (World Bank, 2020). As for the economy, Tunisia falls into the category of lower-middle-class-income countries (Bellin, 2018). It is a diverse economy, with important agricultural, mining, tourism and manufacturing sectors. The regime has traditionally had firm governmental control of economic affairs, but in 2010, there had been a gradually increasing

privatisation through the last decade. Tunisia has long enjoyed the Arab world's best educational system, largest middle class and most robust organised labour movement (Perkins, 2012).

However, Tunisia faced economic difficulties during the years leading up to the Arab Spring. This was mainly because of economic contraction and the slowing of import demand in Europe - which is and was Tunisia's largest export market. This, in turn, led to high levels of unemployment, inflation and trade deficit (Bellin, 2018). Some crucial figures on Tunisia's financial situation and economic development in 2010 are presented in Table IV below.

Table IV – Economic Indicators for Tunisia in 2010

GDP (growth)	3.511%*
GDP per capita (PPP $)[9]	10,441*
Unemployment rate (youth 15-24)	29.449*
Life expectancy at birth	75.0**
Expected years of schooling	14,5**
HDI Value	0.717**
Military expenditures	1.4% of GDP***

Sources: World Bank Data*, United Nations Human Development Report 2010**, CIA World Factbook 2011***

As can be seen in Table IV, Tunisia's unemployment rate among young people was high in 2010, where about 1/3 of all young people aged 15-24 were unemployed, despite a relatively high level of expected years of schooling. Another essential aspect to note is that Tunisia's military accounted for a relatively small share of the country's total budget. As the table shows, only 1.4% of GDP was spent on military expenditures in 2010. A possible explanation for this might be the fact that the Tunisian military played a marginal role in Tunisian politics and had "always been small - whether measured in personnel or resources" (Bellin, 2018: 447). Tunisia's geostrategic location, far away from the Arab-Israeli conflict, had spared the country from routine engagement in foreign wars. This had deprived the military of an essential path to popular legitimacy and status among the nation (Kienle, 2012). Another critical factor is that

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[9] Measured in constant 2011 international $. An international dollar would buy in the cited country a comparable amount of goods and services a US dollar would buy in the United States (World Bank, 2020). This measurement is used for better accuracy, as there was high inflation and high food prices in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010 (Achy, 2011; World Bank).

both of Tunisia's presidents had embraced a strategy aimed at marginalising the military and excluding it from politics, including starving it of resources and (unintentionally) encouraging it to create an identity distinct from the regime in power (Bellin, 2018).

The Arab Spring started in Tunisia, with large and growing parts of the population sick of suffering from the wide gap between their living conditions and expectations derived from better days, the false promises of official propaganda and comparisons with the outside world (Kielne, 2012:530). Besides, the country was also heavily dependent on food imports, so Tunisia was strongly affected by record-high food prices as a result of floods and droughts in the fall of 2010 (Sternberg, 2012). Poverty, high unemployment and low economic growth caused discontent that was targeted at Ben Ali and his regime. The friends and allies of the regime were continually increasing their wealth, while the population was struggling (Nordenson, 2018). In November / December 2010, WikiLeaks also revealed secret messages from the US Embassy in Tunis that painted an unflattering picture of Ben Ali and his inner circle. In particular, it was revealed that his wife and her family used their positions to enrich themselves at the expense of the country and the population (Black, 2010), which created even more anger - an anger that would prove to have enormous consequences for the country in the time to come.

5.1.1 The Arab Spring in Tunisia

The Arab Spring in Tunisia began in December 2010 when Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest the arbitrary seizing of his vegetable stand by police over failure to obtain a permit (Perkins, 2014). Bouazizi's actions soon came to symbolise the frustrations of millions of Tunisians with the difficulties of everyday life and their disgust towards the government. On the evening of December 17, large crowds gathered in the city of Sidi Bouzid to protest what had happened to Bouazizi and to show their support. The inhabitants were appalled by what had happened, and the frustration in the country was increasing (Nordenson, 2018). As the number of people protesting in Sidi Bouzid grew, so did the number of police and security forces deployed in the city. They first surrounded the protesters, then encircled the entire city to cut it off from the outside world. The regime's instinctive response was to repress the protests with violence, and to physically prevent it from spreading by closing the city completely (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh & Zahar, 2012). However, this did not prevent the demonstrators from spreading news of the protests, as they uploaded videos of protest events on Facebook. In this way, people on the outside also were able to obtain information about what

was happening in Sidi Bouzid and the protests were quickly replicated in other regional centres, where youth unemployment and a general sense of malaise was as acute as it was in Sidi Bouzid (Perkins, 2014).

The protests were often organised through the work of local union representatives in the Tunisian trade union, *Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail* (UGTT), who had almost 600,000 members (Nordenson, 2018:157). In Tunisia, the rulers relied on the support of strong unions, which meant that they had given them some freedom - and in particular, local branches of the UGTT were quick to organise demonstrations and strikes in increasingly more extensive parts of Tunisia. The authorities were caught off guard, and the intensity and scope of the reaction overwhelmed them (Perkins, 2014:223).

The regime tried to repress the protests with overwhelming power, but the violence did not have the effect the regime wanted. The violence, presumably intended to have a deterrent effect on the population, was counterproductive when people saw how the police treated the protesters through social media and websites such as al-Jazeera (Lynch, 2013). This led others to see how the police attacked ordinary people like themselves, causing anger rather than fear (Nordenson, 2018). In this way, police violence radicalised the opposition and raised their demands. Initially, most of the slogans of the demonstrations were about financial difficulties and demands for work. However, these demands gradually became explicitly linked to the need for reform, and soon regime change. This interconnection was no coincidence, the regime that failed to provide people with jobs was now connected as the same regime that repressed them when they demanded one. This interconnection also spread demonstrations from inhabitants of a relatively poor part of the country to the middle class and the inhabitants of more affluent areas (Nordenson, 2018).

The regime and Ben Ali no longer knew what to do with the growing demonstrations. The violence seemed ineffective, and in a speech on December 28, Ben Ali condemned the protesters and stated that they were a small minority that would hurt the country (Zayani, 2015). On January 10, Ben-Ali gave a new speech condemning the protesters as hostile elements and terrorists (Zayani, 2015). Ordinary Tunisians who were out in the streets perceived, however, that the demonstrations were massive and consisted of ordinary people, not terrorists or enemies paid by foreign states (Nordenson, 2018:158). When Bouazizi died at the hospital on January 4, the protests had grown so large that the regime was about to lose control. Protests took place

all over the country, and the central leadership of the UGTT had permitted general strikes across the country (Bellin, 2018). In desperation, Ben Ali turned to the army for help, but the commander-in-chief refused to shoot at the protesters. Ben Ali then realised that the battle was lost, and on January 14, 2011, he left Tunisia for exile in Saudi Arabia. The Parliament took over Ben-Ali's position, and a transitional government was appointed (Nordenson, 2018).

5.1.2 The transition phase and the aftermath of Ben Ali

When Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, the country's then-prime minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, formed a transitional government. Ghannouchi had been Tunisia's prime minister since 1999 and was a crucial part of Ben Ali's regime for many years (Nordenson, 2018). Many of the ministers he appointed had prominent positions under Ben Ali, and Ghannouchi's choices indicated that he wanted to quickly prepare for a new presidential election to save some of the structures of the old regime (Stepan, 2012). This resulted in strong reactions from those who had participated in the protests as they wanted to change the system and not just the leader (Nordenson, 2018). Massive demonstrations were held outside the prime minister's office, where participants demanded full participation in decision-making and wanted all members of Ben Ali's party to leave the government (Stepan, 2012; Nordenson, 2018). The protesters also received support from the UGTT, and significant strikes erupted in support of these demands. The Prime Minister gave in to the demands on January 27, forming a new government without supporters of Ben Ali's party (Nordenson, 2018: 208).

Some of the protesters were still not pleased and wanted increased representation in government decision-making. From mid-February, leftist parties and the trade unions such as UGTT began mobilisation again, this time demanding Ghannouchi's departure and a more democratic transition process in which an elected assembly would write a new constitution for democratic Tunisia (Nordenson, 2018:208). Up to 100,000 protesters made their way to the square in front of the government buildings, and on February 27, Ghannouchi announced his departure (Willsher, 2011). A new government was established and elections for a constitutional assembly were announced, Ben Ali's party was banned, and more than 100 new parties were allowed (Anderson, 2011:3).

On October 23, 2011, Tunisia arranged their first free and democratic elections since becoming independent from France in 1956 (Stepan, 2014). The Islamist party *Ennahda* won 41% of the 217 seats in Parliament, forming the largest bloc in the institution. The party chose, in order to

gain a majority, to form a government together with two secular parties in an alliance often known as *the Troika*. This government also appointed a respected human rights activist as president rather than a member of the Islamist party - and Ennahda sought to be inclusive and build trust with the other parties rather than taking all positions themselves (Nordenson, 2018).

Despite the secular and Islamist parties' attempts to build trust and come to agreements on the democratic rules of the game, it did not take long before the polarisation between the groups increased. Among several disagreements, Ennahda wanted to refer to Sharia as the country's source of legislation, which was met with resistance in the opposition. Following intense pressure from the opposition and civil society, Ennahda finally withdrew this and other controversial proposals (Nordenson, 2018:209). There was also great dissatisfaction among the opposition with what they considered to be Ennahda's easy-going attitude toward Islamist extremists, who, after the opening of politics, had made a significant mark in the public sphere and recruited with great success among Tunisia's marginalised youth (Boukhars, 2017). The secular opposition considered these groupings a significant security threat and called for them to be suppressed, a criticism that increased in strength as the security situation in the country worsened (Nordenson, 2018). In February 2013, a secular opposition politician was killed by jihadists, which further aggravated the crisis and the mobilisation among the opposition groups increased sharply.

When jihadists killed another opposition politician on July 25, thousands of people took to the streets to protest against the government, blaming the ruling Islamist party and its followers for the politician's killing and calling for the government to go (Gall, 2013). Ennahda refused to relinquish power and reacted by mobilising their supporters in the streets, in what could have become a perilous situation (Nordenson, 2018:210). Fortunately, it did not end with confrontation as the UGTT together with the employers' union l'Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisana (UTICA), the country's advocacy association and the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTD) formed a dialogue quartet, which was able to mediate a solution between the opposition and the government (Nordenson, 2018; Stephen, 2015). This dialogue quartet was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for saving Tunisia as the country was on the verge of collapse and civil war (Stephen, 2015).

In January 2014, a new constitution was signed, and in the autumn of that year, new elections were held, with the secular party *Nidaa Tounes* receiving the most support. Power was

peacefully transferred, and in February 2015, the country's new prime minister announced that a coalition government was in place, including Ennahda (Amara, 2015). By early 2016, Tunisia had experienced three free and fair competitive elections, two of them parliamentary and one presidential (Bellin, 2018:440). These elections delivered governments headed by Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. During the fall of 2019, a total of three elections were held in Tunisia, where voters replaced almost the entire political elite that had led the country through the democratic years. This is closely linked to the population's dissatisfaction with the politician's ability to fight the problems that made the revolution happen in the first place; poverty, unemployment and corruption (Hagvaag, 2019).

During the parliamentary elections, 18 parties and a total of 14 party-less representatives were elected to the People's Assembly. Ennahda was still the largest party, but this time with 52 out of 217 seats (Tharoor, 2019). Nidaa Tounes, the party that was the largest in 2014 elections, was almost wiped out and went back from 84 to 3 seats. Gathering a majority of 109 votes in the People's Assembly to form a government would prove to be complicated. This was the start of a new political crisis in Tunisia where both Ennahda, as the largest political party, and the Parliament rejected various proposals for coalition governments. For some time, it looked like the country would have to hold new parliamentary elections due to their inability to form a government (Laghmari & Karam, 2020). After four chaotic months, all parties were finally able to agree on a coalition government approved by Parliament on February 27, 2020, which governs the country today (Allahoum, 2020).

*The Economist Intelligence Unit'*s Democracy Index for 2019 ranks Tunisia as a flawed democracy, ranked second highest in the Middle East and North Africa region and ranked 53 on a global level. It has an overall score of 6.27 and is above average in all scores. However, the factors they rank lowest on are the functioning of government, political culture and civil liberties (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).

5.1.3 Participants, mobilisation and diversity

In Tunisia, hundreds of thousands of people participated in the various protests and demonstrations against the regime during the Arab Spring (Nordenson, 2018:187). Young people played a crucial role, as in all of the other Arab revolutions. This is not particularly surprising, given that young people make up the majority of the population in the country and

have also been hit hard by the regime's repression and failed policies. The young, appalled by their social and economic oppression, remained at the centre of the movement – and people aged 18-34 made up around 60 per cent of the demonstrators (Bessinger, Jamal & Mazur, 2013:35). However, it was not a pure youth revolution as they were also supported by older residents who saw an opportunity to express their anger towards the regime (Perkins, 2014:223). For instance, the middle-aged group (years 45-54) also constituted around 15 per cent of the participators (Bessinger et al., 2013:35).

In general, the participants in the Tunisian revolution were disproportionately young, secular men, with middle-class occupations such as professionals, public servants, private employees and managers[10](Bessinger et al., 2013). The majority of participants had above-average income and education, but the revolution also had significant mobilisation from groups outside of the middle class like manual workers, students and the unemployed. Out of all students surveyed in the SWAB survey, 35 per cent participated in the demonstrations and students as a group constituted 19 per cent of the demonstrators in total (Bessinger et al., 2013:35). In addition, the unemployed also compromised 21 per cent of participators, making the Tunisian revolution a cross-class coalition. One organisation that played a particularly important role in mobilising these groups was the UGTT. They claimed almost 600,000 members in 2010 and was anchored in every corner of the country through a vast network of local and regional offices (Bellin, 2018). It brought together different geographic regions, different political tendencies and different classes of society (workers, civil servants and even professionals), and was able to mobilise participators across such differences (Bellin, 2018). In total, SWAB shows that 58 per cent of union and professional syndicate members in Tunisia participated in the revolution (Bessinger et al., 2013:15). Furthermore, leftist political parties were also vital actors mobilizing people across age groups, class background and gender (Hamid, 2014).

In terms of motivation for participation in the Tunisian Revolution, economic issues dominated the agendas. Fifty-eight per cent of people surveyed in the SWAB-survey after the revolution claimed that economic issues were their main reason for participation. At the same time, 19 per cent said it was the second most important reason for participation (Bessinger et al., 2013:20). A small proportion of participants prioritised political freedoms as their primary motivation for participation, but 29 per cent identified this as the second most important reason for

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[10] The middle class is often defined (e.g. Huntington, 1991) based on four different occupational categories; professionals, employer or director of an institution, government employee and private sector employee.

participation (Bessinger et al., 2013:20). Participants who considered civil and political freedoms as their main reason for participation were more likely to be middle-aged, in the top two quintiles of income and a member of a civil society association than other participants.

The youngest participants were primarily concerned with the economy and secondarily with corruption, whereas those prioritising civil and political freedoms were disproportionately 35 or older (Bessinger et al., 2013:22). It was also clear that personal income was a crucial factor separating those who prioritised civil and political freedoms from those who were more concerned with economic change (Bessinger et al., 2013:12). Those who had high incomes often tended to prioritise civil liberties, while those with lower incomes often prioritised economic change. However, SWAB also shows that the poorest two income quintiles had the lowest rate of participation in Tunisia, and revolution participants were in general significantly more educated than non-participants (see Table VI).

5.2 Egypt

Egypt became independent from the United Kingdom in 1922. However, it did not get complete sovereignty from the British Empire until 1952 when military officers overthrew the then-monarchy through a coup and created a republic (Nordenson, 2018:80). After the regime change from monarchy to a republic, significant political changes took place in Egypt, introducing far more radical politics and a state with a more substantial regional role. President Nasser reoriented Egypt's economic course towards greater state participation, and what is usually called Arab socialism (Mayfield, 2014). He also banned other political parties and organisations, while gaining control of the media, trade unions and other organisations (Nordenson, 2018). When Nasser died in 1970, President Sadat took over and implemented a cautious political liberalisation in society by opening up for new parties and providing easier access to education - though still under scrutiny (Mayfield, 2014). Hosni Mubarak came to power when Sadat was killed in 1981.

Under the Mubarak regime, Egypt experienced challenging economic conditions. There was growing dissatisfaction in the country, especially as a result of rising unemployment among young and educated people. From 2004, the regime began increasing privatisation, which affected workers and the middle class by driving lost job security, lower wages and falling standards of living (Benin, 2011:6). The patriarchal structure of the country also contributed to dissatisfaction, with adults and older men dominating at the expense of women and younger

men. This held young people socially and economically marginalised while also being excluded from addressing their problems politically (Nordenson, 2018). In 2010, the median age in Egypt was 24 y/o with people under the age of 25 making up 60 per cent of the population. Around 24 % of these had no job (Nordenson, 2018; World Bank, 2020). In the fall of 2010, Egypt also experienced record-high food prices, and the discontent in the authoritarian regime approached its peak (Sternberg, 2012).

In 2010, Egypt, which is the most populated country of the Arab region, had 80,471,869 inhabitants. The urban population was 46% of the population in total (World Bank, 2011). Some socioeconomic indicators for Egypt in 2010 are presented in the Table below.

Table V – Economic indicators for Egypt 2010

GDP (growth)	5.147%*
GDP per capita (PPP $)[11]	10,081*
Unemployment rate (youth 15-24)	24.443*
Life expectancy at birth	70.3**
Expected years of schooling	12.0**
HDI Value	0.666**
Military expenditures	3.4% of GDP***

Sources: World Bank Data*, United Nations Human Development Report 2010**, CIA World Factbook 2011***

At the beginning of the 21st century, Egypt had some economic growth as can be seen in Table V, with a GDP growth rate of more than 5% in 2010 and GDP per capita of 10,081$. Still, Egypt faced some difficulties with large parts of the population being poor and a high unemployment rate among youths, despite people being more educated than ever before. An essential difference between Egypt and Tunisia is that Egypt spent a significantly larger share of GDP on military expenditures. The country's military had traditionally commanded an outsized presence, and in terms of manpower, expenditures and the scope of its economic empire, the military was enormous (Bellin, 2018:448). Historically, the military has played a commanding role in Egyptian politics ever since the free officers ousted the monarchy in 1952. Egypt's geostrategic position as a frontline state in the Arab-Israeli conflict also conferred stature and legitimacy on the Egyptian military (Bellin, 2018:448). The military and their

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[11] Measured in constant 2011 international $.

political involvement would also prove to play a significant role when the Arab Spring protests started in Egypt.

5.2.1 The Arab Spring in Egypt

The massive Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt are rooted in many of the same causes as in Tunisia. People resented the governments' apparent indifference to the widespread unemployment and poverty that alienated tens of millions of Egyptians (Anderson, 2011). This sentiment was exacerbated by increasingly conspicuous consumption among a business elite linked to Mubarak's son Gamal (Anderson, 2011:4). In addition, Egyptians were horrified by the death of the young Khalid Said at the hands of Egyptian police. Inspired by the uprising in Tunisia, Egyptian activists began planning a similar uprising in Egypt in a Facebook group in memory of Khalid Said (Nordenson, 2018:134). *The Muslim Brotherhood* (MB) was a significant part of organizing and mobilising these protests, and they were supported by both Christian and secular groups (Ketchley & Barrie, 2019). In contrast to the Tunisian uprisings, which erupted as a more spontaneous reaction, the Egyptian demonstrations were well planned and organised in advance.

However, it was not only the activists who were well prepared; the regime was also determined that the demonstrations that had taken place in Tunisia not would be repeated in Egypt. On January 25, the activist groups all agreed that the goal was to reach Tahrir Square in central Cairo. In order to make it as difficult as possible for the police to prevent them, they set up several demonstrations and rallies to meet in Tahrir Square (Nordenson, 2018:134). The demonstrations were a success, they reached Tahrir Square, and far more people showed up than the organisers had expected. Hundreds of thousands demonstrated in Cairo, Alexandria and several other cities (Lynch, 2015:88-89). The protesters were met with heavy police presence, and the brutal battles fought between the police and the demonstrators were carefully documented by the activists and spread on social media (Lynch, 2015). This helped inform other Egyptians that significant protests were taking place, and also spread information about the police advancing and that the cost of participating could be high. Nevertheless, as in Tunisia, the violent crackdown by the police did not have the desired effect, and the protests became more radicalised and aimed at regime change (Nordenson, 2018).

After several more days of continued demonstrations and fighting against the police, the activists set out for a new, massive mobilisation on Friday, January 28. The demonstrators

succeeded once again in taking over Tahrir after violent clashes with the police, and this time they stayed, despite the regime's ever-increasing brutality (Nordenson, 2018:162). Independent challengers to the state-controlled trade union organisation also began a strike, and on February 5, about 55,000 workers stopped work (Benin, 2011: 8). The strike and the cost of repression started to cost the regime, and Mubarak's desire to hold on to his power began to cause frustration both with Egypt's main supporter, the US, and the country's military. Both the army and the United States began working on getting Mubarak to step down (Nordenson, 2018:163). On February 11, 2011, Egypt's Vice President stated that Mubarak had resigned and that the *Supreme Council of the Armed Forces* (SCAF) now ruled the country.

5.2.2 The transition phase and the aftermath of Mubarak

The Egyptian military quickly took control of the country and dissolved the Parliament (Brown, 2013). They suspended the constitution, before setting up a committee of ten legal experts to propose constitutional amendments that would, in turn, facilitate the transitional period in Egypt (Nordenson, 2018). This committee proposed that a parliamentary election should be held first, and the Parliament should then elect a committee to propose a new constitution to be put to referendum. SCAF supported this proposal and promised that a presidential election would take place shortly after the parliamentary elections, thus proposing a process for transitioning to a civil, democratic government (Nordenson, 2018). The Islamist parties and MB supported this proposition as well. They had demobilised largely after Mubarak's resignation, and were focused on securing a place in the parliament (Ketchley & Barrie, 2019). More secularly oriented parties disagreed and felt that the rules of the new Egypt had to be agreed on first through a constitution *before* parliamentary elections, such as in Tunisia (Nordenson, 2018:214).

The following months were characterised by constant postponements of the elections and arguments about the electoral law (Sika, 2017). However, it did appear as SCAF had facilitated some of the essential changes demanded in the protests, with the state-owned media turning around and paying tributes to the revolution and the young activists. The country's Ministry of Information, which under Mubarak operated with censorship, was also closed down (Abdulla, 2014). Restrictions on the formation of political parties were removed, and several new ones were created. Mubarak's party, the *National Democratic Party* (NDP) was banned, and Mubarak and his allies were brought to trial accused of corruption and violence against protesters (Nordenson, 2018:215).

Despite these changes, Egypt was still far from being a free society. The country's leadership was still influenced by several representatives and components of the old regime, primarily through the bureaucracy and to some extent, the judiciary (Kienle, 2012:538). Nor did it take long for the divide between Islamist parties on the one hand and the secular opposition on the other to deepen and the situation between the opposition parties was already inflamed when the first parliamentary elections took place in November 2011 (Nordenson, 2018). The Islamist parties were the winners of the election, where the MB party alone won over 40% of seats and conservative Salafists close to 25%. In total, Islamists controlled about 70% of the Lower House. In the Upper House, it was even more dominant, with the Islamists controlling 90% of the seats. *The Freedom and Justice Party* (FJP) and MB dominated much of political Egypt, and people were angry that FJP had broken its promise not to run for elections on more than 30% of the seats in Parliament not to dominate parliament (Brown, 2013). This led to increased distrust between the Islamist and the non-Islamist parties, making the transition process even more difficult. When the presidential election was held in late May 2012, MB had promised not to nominate a presidential candidate with the intention not to monopolise power, but they still did. Their candidate, Morsi, eventually won, and his one year in power was characterised by conflict (Nordenson, 2018.).

Gradually, the relations between the Islamist parties and the military also deteriorated, mainly due to the military's fear of losing some of their interests (Nordenson, 2018). In fear of being overthrown by SCAF, Morsi declared a legislative amendment where he practically put himself above the law, which created much anger and resentment among the opposition parties (Brown, 2013:48). The opposition parties joined together in *the National Rescue Front* to demand that this declaration be withdrawn and demanded a more representative coalition committee set up. Massive demonstrations were organised against MB, who responded by sending their supporters against the protesters (Nordenson, 2018:217). Egypt's security situation deteriorated sharply during Morsi's rule, and violent demonstrations and street fighting took place on a regular basis. MB received much criticism for not taking the situation seriously, and the dissatisfaction with them and Morsi was massive (Nordenson, 2018:217).

In April 2013 the secular protesters formed a group called *Tamarrud* (rebellion), which aimed to collect 15 million signatures - more than the number of votes Morsi got in the election - in support of Morsi leaving (Hubbard & Kirkpatrick, 2013). Activists and the opposition formed

this group, but there is little doubt that the group received various forms of support from the military and the supporters of the old regime (Hubbard and Kirkpatrick, 2013). The secular opposition parties supported Tamarrud and a host of opposition groups mobilised for a massive demonstration on the anniversary of Morsi's inauguration - demanding he relinquish power. At the same time, Tamarrud claimed to have collected 22 million signatures (Nordenson, 2018:219). The army finally issued an ultimatum demanding that Morsi reach an agreement with the opposition within 48 hours; otherwise, they would intervene. Morsi refused, and on July 3, the army followed through and deposed the president in a military coup (Kirkpatrick, 2013). The military coup had considerable support with the Egyptian people, but it was still a severe disruption of the democratic transition as Morsi was elected in free elections. Egypt's democratic period was virtually over, and al-Sisi - the leader of the military coup - became the president of the country (Nordenson, 2018:219).

Since al-Sisi has assumed power, his regime has struck down hard on all opposition, introduced a law that in practice bans demonstrations, imprisoned activists and opposition actors and shut down independent media and websites (Nordenson, 2018). His regime is often referred to as even more authoritarian than Mubarak's, and since 2014 he has run for president twice, receiving more than 96 per cent of the votes each time. He has also changed the constitution and is now able to remain in the presidency until 2034 (Walsh, 2019). In *the Economist Intelligence Units* Democracy Index of 2019, Egypt is ranked 137th globally with an overall score of 3.06, which is below average for the Middle East and North Africa region, where they are ranked 11th. It is categorised as an authoritarian regime, with values down to two on both electoral process and pluralism as well as civil liberties (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).

5.2.3 Participants, mobilisation and diversity

In the revolution of January 2011, millions of Egyptians took to the streets to voice their demands and protest the government's deteriorating ability to provide essential services (Anderson, 2011:4). While youth played a key role in organising the protests, the Egyptian revolution were to a large extent dominated by middle-aged people, with almost 50 per cent being aged 35-54 (Bessinger et al., 2013:35). In general, participants were disproportionately middle-aged, middle-class, professionals, and religious (Bessinger et al., 2013). They were significantly more educated than non-participants, and often had more than average income. The Egyptian revolution clearly represented a middle-class revolution, in which the participants

were disproportionately from a professional or clerical background. In fact, participants from such backgrounds represented as much as 55% of the total participants in the revolution, whereas it represented only 25% of the Egyptian population taken as a whole (Bessinger et al., 2013:35). However, the Egyptian Arab Spring was diverse in the sense that it was able to mobilise across social, ideological and religious divides. Women contributed from the beginning (Nordenson, 2018:188), and there was remarkable religious diversity in Egypt, with key actors being both Muslim, Christian and non-religious (Bessinger et al., 2013).

Despite diverse mobilisation concerning gender and religiosity, the vast majority of participants came from middle-class professions and were middle-aged. The workers in Egypt were quick to mobilise in the early stages of the revolution, and soon after the uprisings began, they formed an independent trade union called the *Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions* (EFITU), which would help to further mobilise in the time to come (Benin, 2012). Only in February 2011, it is estimated that approximately 150,000 workers participated in strikes and other forms of civil resistance and that during the whole year, approximately 600,000 workers participated (Benin, 2012: 8). Out of these workers, the SWAB-survey shows that 21 per cent of them were government employees, and 17 per cent were professionals – both defined as middle-class occupations (Bessinger et al., 2013:35). People with typical working-class occupations such as manual labourer participated to a significant lesser extent, accounting for only 4.1 per cent of the participants and 5 per cent of the population in total. This can be explained by the increased privatisation of public enterprises in the country in the early 2000s, which had led many workers to achieve wealth and middle-class status (Benin, 2012).

The economic challenges facing the country had threatened the standard of living of the middle class, and they now wanted to be able to influence the political agenda. This was reflected in the revolution, in which people who prioritised civil and political freedoms as the primary motivation for participation usually had high education, were over 35 years old, were participants in a CSO and the top two income quintiles (Bessinger et al., 2013). According to Bessinger et al. (2013:22), many of the people who were related to CSOs, such as EFITU often prioritised political and civil liberties rather than economic change. Membership of a CSO or a trade union increased the odds of identifying with and prioritising civil and political freedoms over other reasons by more than 200 per cent (Bessinger et al., 2013:22). However, this only applied to those parts of the middle class that participated in CSOs, and it was not the case that

the whole middle class generally viewed civil and political freedoms as the main reason for participation, the majority was in fact driven by economic grievances.

Among younger and less educated participants, there was a clear priority of ending corruption and economic change (Bessinger et al., 2013:24). There was also a distinction on the motivation among the genders, where the primary motivation of female participants often was civil and political freedoms. They had been hit particularly hard by the regime's repression and failed policies, unemployment was high, and frustration was high. This was also true for the youth, but in Egypt, young people did not constitute an equally significant proportion of participants as in Tunisia. Only 8% of students asked in SWAB participated in the demonstrations, which is far less than in Tunisia, where 35 per cent of the students participated (Bessinger et al., 2013). Furthermore, despite high unemployment in the country, the unemployed only constituted 5 per cent of the demonstrators, and the poorest segments of the population were the ones least likely to participate in the Egyptian revolution (Bessinger et al., 2013:17).

5.3 Summary and conceptual framework

In this section, I will first present a table showing the participation in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions by several different background categories such as education, age and occupation. This table is used to summarise the information obtained from the SWAB survey presented above and shows the variation in occupation, age, gender, education, religiosity and income of the participants in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolution. Following this summary, a table of figures from NAVCO 2.1 is presented, in order to further illustrate variations and similarities among the two countries. Finally, this information will be combined to create a table that classifies the degree of diversity in several different categories. This will eventually constitute the conceptual framework on which the analysis will build.

TABLE VI – Revolution Participation by Category[12]

	Egypt		Tunisia	
	% total population	% demonstrators	% total population	% demonstrators
OCCUPATION				
Employer/director of institution	2.1	5.1	1.8	5.3
Professional	5.3	17.4	3.5	4.7
Government employee	12.5	21.4	6.5	12.1
Private sector employee	5.4	11.2	7.0	7.9
Manual laborer	5.5	4.1	10.5	10.5
Housewife	38.4	12.2	25.4	3.7
Student	3.2	3.1	8.6	19.0
Unemployed	5.4	5.1	17.7	21.6
AGE				
Age 18-24	13.4	13.3	19.1	35.4
Age 25-34	29.3	30.6	23.8	25.0
Age 35-44	21.8	28.6	20.2	15.6
Age 45-54	18.2	18.4	17.7	15.1
Age 55-64	12.3	7.1	10.8	6.3
Age 65 or over	5.0	2.0	8.5	2.6
GENDER				
Male	50.4	76.5	50.3	79.2
EDUCATION				
Elementary or less	38.0	15.5	46.4	20.3
Secondary/technical	42.9	38.1	36.4	51.6
Some BA or above	19.2	46.4	17.2	28.1
RELIGIOSITY				
Religious piety scale (0-15)	9.33	9.70	6.10	6.23
INCOME QUINTILES				
0-20 (poorest)		13.3		9.9
20-40		7.2		17.3
40-60		33.7		20.4
60-80		16.9		24.1
80-100 (richest)		28.9		28.4

As can be seen from the information presented in chapter 5.1 and 5.2, summarised in Table VI, there are several similarities and differences between participants in the Egyptian and the Tunisian revolutions. The Egyptian revolution was what can be categorised as a bourgeois revolution, where the majority of the participants were middle-aged, religious men with above-average income and education. The Tunisian case was more of a cross-class revolution, mobilising participants from both the middle-class, working-class, students and unemployed.

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[12] Numbers in table retrieved from Bessinger, Jamal & Mazur's (2013) analysis of the SWAB survey (p. 35).

The participants were also younger and more secular than the Egyptian demonstrators. However, the least educated and the poorest two income quintiles had the lowest rates of participation in both revolutions. Both the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolutions were also, to a large extent, dominated by men.

In order to illustrate other aspects of the diversity the two revolutions, a table demonstrating some crucial findings in the NAVCO 2.1 dataset is now presented. The NAVCO 2.1 dataset shows whether or not diversity was observed in several different categories. The variables are dummy coded, where 1 = yes (observed diversity) while 0 = none discovered. As can be seen in Table VII, both revolutions were generally categorised as diverse, and diversity was observed in gender, age, ideology and regions in both revolutions. The revolutions were also similar in the sense that none of them had significant diversity in either ethnicity or political ideologies involved. However, the Tunisian revolution included both the urban and rural population – which the Egyptian revolution did not. Another interesting difference is that these figures show that Tunisia did not have religious diversity, while Egypt did.

Table VII – Observed Diversity in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions

NAVCO 2.1		
	Tunisia	**Egypt**
C.divers	1	1
Cdivers_types	1,2,3,4,5,8	1,2,3,5,7,8
Div.gender	1	1
Div.age	1	1
Div.class	1	1
Div.urban_rural	1	0
Div.regional	1	1
Div.ethnicity	0	0
Div.religion	0	1
Div.ideology	1	1

The data from NAVCO 2.1 is an important empirical contribution to this thesis because it shows whether there was observed diversity in the revolutions based on a number of different categories. It also shows the diversity of some categories not explored by SWAB, such as ethnicity, ideology and urban/rural. However, it is important to point out that Table VII only provides information about whether diversity was observed or not and not the possible extent of it. For example, the table shows that there was class diversity in both Tunisia and Egypt but gives no indication that this diversity was more significant in Tunisia than it was in Egypt - as

we know based on Table VI. Therefore, using both of these tables, as well as additional information presented in 5.1 and 5.2, Table VIII classifies the diversity in the various categories graded into not significant, somewhat significant and significant.

Table VIII: Conceptual Framework

Comparison of diversity in Egypt and Tunisia		
	Tunisia	Egypt
Gender	**	**
Age	***	**
Class	***	**
Urban/rural	**	*
Regional	***	***
Ethnicity	*	*
Religion	**	***
Political affiliation	***	***

*not significant, **somewhat significant, ***significant

6.0 Analysis

As presented in Chapter 5, both the Tunisian and Egyptian revolution were diverse on several dimensions. The Tunisian revolution had significant diversity in age, classes, political affiliation and regions - but also showed some diversity in terms of gender, religion and urban /rural. The Egyptian revolution showed significant religious, regional and ideological diversity – but it also had somewhat significant diversity in age, gender and class affiliation. In other words, both the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolution may be measured as diverse nonviolent campaigns, although on slightly different dimensions. This part of the thesis aims to compare the impact of diversity in these two cases and link this to the theoretical mechanisms presented in chapter 3. Due to the method of the thesis being the most similar system design, I am interested in comparing the cases to find out how they vary. Are there essential differences in how diversity played out in the two cases that could have affected the different democratic outcomes? Are there particular types of diversity (e.g. the variation in religious or class diversity) that matter more than others? Or are there other factors that made possible or hindered the democratic transitions in the two countries?

This analysis is structured into three main sections. The first part discusses how diversity as a mechanism affects the prospects of achieving the overall (maximalist) goals of a nonviolent campaign, understood in light of how this took place in Tunisia and Egypt. The second part discusses how the diversity of the nonviolent campaigns in the two countries affected the transitional periods. The last section discusses how the countries' institutional structures influenced which options were available to the actors in Tunisia and Egypt when they faced periods of crisis during transition, and how these available options, in turn, affected the outcome of the diverse nonviolent campaigns.

6.1 Diversity as a mechanism in achieving the maximalist goals of a campaign

In both the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the participants were able to mobilise large and diverse movements that came together for a common goal of political change. The activists used various strategies, and both protests, demonstrations, and strikes were launched in support of the demands. This was, as Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) emphasise, essential for putting pressure on the sitting regimes. Both regimes felt threatened by the widespread support for the massive protests, and desperately tried to repress them by using brutal violence. The spread of

videos that showed how the police suppressed ordinary people led to more people mobilising in solidarity with the protesters, as defined by Wang et al. (2018) as meso-mobilisation.

The campaigns also managed to create loyalty shifts among the regime's pillars of support, and when Ben Ali and Mubarak turned to the military for help to repress the protests, neither was willing to. This is a crucial tactical advantage of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Kim & Kroeger, 2019; Nepstad, 2013), and is often seen as one of the most critical processes in many successful nonviolent movements (Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2004). Diversity in nonviolent campaigns is often considered to be a decisive mechanism in creating loyalty shifts, because it makes it easier for nonviolent activists to leverage their existing relationships with their neighbours, classmates, relatives, and colleagues in ways that shift their loyalty away from the regime leadership (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015). The fact that both the Tunisian and Egyptian campaigns had such significant diversity can thus be thought to have been essential for the occurrence of security defections. The security defections also proved to be critical processes in these uprisings, as the sitting regimes in both Tunisia and Egypt fell soon afterwards.

It can, therefore, be argued that the ability to mobilise large and diverse nonviolent campaigns helped in generating regime change and in achieving the maximalist goals of the campaigns. Through various tactics and broad-based support, enormous pressure was put on the regimes who struggled to suppress the protests. When the regime leaders turned to the military for help, they refused, and the diverse nonviolent campaigns had succeeded in creating security defections. It all resulted in the fall of the regimes, thus initiating a period of political transition. Tunisia's leader, Ben Ali, left the country and the country's prime minister formed a transitional government pending elections. In Egypt, power was seized by the military, who promised a quick and orderly transition to democracy, which gained broad support among the population.

6.2 Diversity as a mechanism in the transitional periods

6.2.1 Continued mobilisation and incentives for compromise

As seen in the theory chapter, one of the main advantages of diverse nonviolent campaigns found by researchers is that they must develop a culture of collaboration and compromise in order to balance all of the different interests (Bayer et al., 2016; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). To develop this culture, they have to adopt democratic practices, which they are likely to bring

over to a transitional period, and which they feel obligated to follow during the establishment of a new political regime (Gawerc, 2019; Bayer & Pinckney, 2018). The consensus that existed among the various parties during the protests against the incumbent regimes in Tunisia and Egypt did, however, break after achieving the maximalist goals, and eventually diversity began to cause significant problems in both countries.

In Egypt, the ability to compromise and the culture of cooperation broke down almost immediately. Directly after the coup, MB allied with the military in virtually all situations where the more secular parties disagreed. They demobilised vigorously and was focused on securing as much political power as possible (Ketcheley & Barrie, 2019). When the first elections finally were held, they broke the promises they had given the opposition parties on not to monopolise power, taking both a vast majority of the seats in parliament and the presidency. This led to significant protests and dissatisfaction from the secular parties, and it became clear that the political consensus and common agenda they had agreed on during the protests were no longer applicable. When MB and the other Islamist parties sought to include the opposition parties, they refused because they were dissatisfied with MB and the scope of representation they were offered. In Tunisia, on the other hand, the parties initially showed more culture for compromise and cooperation. Ennahda, who won the majority of the votes during the elections, formed a coalition government with two secular parties and avoided fielding a presidential candidate.

Ennahada's willingness to cooperate with the opposition parties may have been a result of what Bayer et al., (2016) call the spill-over effect, where the diversity of the campaign had created a culture for democratic practices in order to balance the different interests of the participators. However, it is essential to note that Ennahda had far less support among the population than MB and their cooperative Islamist parties. It is conceivable that Ennahda had to cooperate since they might not have been able to form a government without the support of their opposition parties. MB was not dependent on cooperation with the opposition parties to form a majority government; they had already received enough support to do so without their approval. They, and other Islamic parties, had been highly visible actors during the demonstrations and had thus built up great support among the population. Ennahda, on the other hand, had not entered the protests against Ben Ali until the very end, thereby lacking the extensive support among the population. It may be conceivable that Ennahda's willingness to compromise and cooperation was not rooted in a desire to build trust through a commitment to the democratic values

presented in the campaign (as emphasised by e.g. Gawerc, 2019). It is possible that it was really about cooperation being their only opportunity to gain the power they sought as they were simply not as established as their Egyptian brother party.

6.2.2 Polarisation and fractionalisation

In both countries, the relationship between the various political parties gradually intensified. Instead of staying politically engaged as a unified entity founded on cooperation and democratic principles, the various parts of the revolutions began mobilising against each other. This is what Pinckney (2018) and Levi & Murphy (2006) describe as common pitfalls with diverse campaigns; it is manageable to create a consensus between various political and social groups in an overall goal of getting rid of a dictator, but as soon as the regime falls, it is inevitable that the various interests and goals of these groups will surface. Such difference of interests can, in turn, create divisions and conflicts, as it did in both Tunisia and Egypt. The parties were driven further and further apart, and in the end, it got to the point of what Pinckney (2018) defines as fractionalisation.

One factor that possibly contributed to fractionalisation occurring during the transition period in both countries may have been the duration of the nonviolent campaigns. According to Diani & Bison (2004) and Gawerc (2019), it takes time to build a collective identity that includes a common understanding of goals and strategies. Both the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolutions quickly became large and diverse campaigns, without much time to build any collective identity or a broad unified front. It went quickly from the first demonstrations occurred until the regimes were set aside in both revolutions. It is therefore conceivable that since the protesters agreed on the most overarching goals of the revolutions (setting aside the regime), discussions on other fundamental political issues never occurred. Thus, there was probably a thin, shared, commitment to democratic ends, since the feeling of commitment and a culture of cooperation mainly emerges through such discussions.

Creating a consensus over political issues is also extremely difficult in diverse campaigns because people's positions often shape the content of their grievances (Gawerc 2019). As explained in Chapter 5, SWAB showed that participants in both Tunisia and Egypt had exceedingly different motivations for participation, and their income, occupation and age particularly shaped these motivations. When some wanted to overthrow the regime in order to cope with corruption and improve the economic situation, while others mainly wanted an

increase in political freedoms and rights, these differences had the potential to cause problems as soon as the regimes were set aside. The participants had a common maximalist goal of removing the incumbent regimes, but beyond that, they disagreed on the best way going forward and failed to establish a political consensus regarding the transitional period. Hence, it can be argued, as emphasised by e.g. Pinckney (2018), that this lack of political consensus made the polarisation and fractionalisation of the parties almost unavoidable.

Another factor that may have been a significant driver towards fractionalisation during the transitional periods was the religious diversity. In Tunisia, the divide around religiously rooted issues became more and more visible as the transition period progressed. The secular parties, who already felt marginalized in government decision-making, were dissatisfied with Ennahda's handling of Islamist terrorists who had killed two secular politicians in a short time. This led to fractionalisation where the secular and Islamist party supporters ended up in violent demonstrations against each other in the streets (Nordenson, 2018). In Egypt, which had significantly more religious diversity than Tunisia, such divisions had created problems right from the start, and the distrust between the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular parties was continually deteriorating.

The fact that religious diversity became a problematic mechanism that threatened to destroy the process of democratisation in both countries is not necessarily unexpected (Kalyvas, 2000). According to Gawerc (2019), differences rooted in identity are often more challenging to discuss and address. Religion can be said to be deeply embedded in human identity and associated with 'hard-line' policy positions, that made it difficult for the various parties to reach compromises and consensus on issues related to religious preferences. This became visible in both countries, but especially in Egypt, where the differences were incompatible. The vast religious diversity of the Egyptian campaign – primarily across the secular/Islamist divide - may have been a critical contributor as to why the polarisation became so extreme in Egypt. As shown in Table VI, the Egyptian participants also scored very high on the religious piety scale, meaning that not only were the participants from many different religions; they also had remarkably strong ties to their religion.

6.3 Differences in the countries' institutional structures

When the division and polarisation between the various parties in Tunisia and Egypt reached its breaking point, it was critical in both countries. The sharp polarisation led to a winner-takes-it-all situation, where all parties were solely dedicated to preserving or gaining their own privileges and rights. According to Pinckney (2018), this is a common side effect of diverse campaigns. Protesters in both Tunisia and Egypt fought against each other in the streets in what could potentially have developed into civil wars. In Tunisia, the parties were finally able to make (forced) compromises that saved the democratic transition. At the same time, in Egypt, it ended in yet another military coup and the establishment of a new authoritarian regime.

A possible explanation for these outcomes lies in the countries' different institutional structures. The Egyptian military had already seized power once before in what was considered a legitimate military coup against Mubarak's regime (Nordenson, 2018). They had for many years, been an integrated and central part of the political regime, and thus built up strong popularity and legitimacy among the population (Bellin, 2018). The fact that SCAF ended up deposing the democratically elected President Morsi also had great support, at least certainly among the more secular part of the population. Besides, the military could also legitimise the coup in saving the country on the brink of civil war, even though, as shown in Chapter Five, it was perhaps mostly influenced by a desire to secure their own political and economic interests.

The fact that the military was so involved in the political life in Egypt may have been a decisive factor for the outcome of the democratic transition. SCAF and the military knew to play on the differences between the secular and the Islamist parties. Instead of these parties being forced to compromise throughout the transition, every step of the way in Egypt led to pulling the various sections of the society further apart. Besides, it was also problematic that both the secular and the Islamist parties were willing to ally with SCAF in order to get their interests through. Had the various parties been able to maintain a unified coalition and continue their mobilisation after SCAF seized power, the military may never have been able to take on the role they ended up getting. It is also conceivable that the lack of unity and consensus on the major political issues was an important part of what enabled the military to seize power in the first place, and that by reinforcing the disagreements, SCAF was able to maintain its role and constantly remain involved and a key player in critical events during the transition period.

The Tunisian military, on the other hand, did not have the same reputable role as SCAF had in Egypt. When Ben Ali asked for the military's help to crack down on the protests, they refused to contribute and resigned. They also retained the withdrawn role throughout the transition period, leaving the political parties responsible for securing the establishment of the new political regime. This can be explained by the fact that the Tunisian military had no history of interfering with political issues and had traditionally been an independent branch separated from the sitting regime. They did not have the same legitimacy and status as their Egyptian counterparts, and perhaps could not even carry out a coup - at least not with the support that SCAF received in Egypt. The military's withdrawal may have led to the Tunisian opposition being forced to compromise in the absence of other opportunities.

However, there was another vital organisation that was present in Tunisia, but not to the same extent in Egypt, which may have also had an essential impact on the outcome of the transition period. Tunisia had highly entrenched trade unions, such as the UGTT, who for many years had built up a stable status among the population in the country. UGTT had been a critical contributor in the mobilisation for both Ben Ali and Ghannouchi's departure and had thereby increased its legitimacy in the country. Once the Tunisian parties had reached the point of fractionalisation and no longer were able to reach compromises on their own, the UGTT joined forces with other unions and mediated a solution. Thus, they managed to force through incentives for cooperation and compromise when this culture had disappeared completely among the parties. UGTT proved to have substantial autonomy and legitimacy when it mattered the most, and their ability to force compromises on the political parties was essential for the establishment of a democratic foundation in what was a very critical period in Tunisia.

ETUF and ETIUF, Egypt's largest trade unions, lacked this autonomy and was unable to force similar solutions. They were considered an extension of the state rather than an organisation that represented the interests of the citizens (Bellin, 2018). Nor had they been as involved and visible in the movement as the UGTT had been in Tunisia and had thereby not built up the same legitimacy to interfere in the political sphere. It is conceivable that Egypt's lack of such a strong organization, independent of the military, was crucial to the outcome, both because it prevented a third party from forcing compromises, and also because it may have opened up for the military to take on the role they ended up taking.

7.0 Conclusion

This study aims to understand whether diversity in nonviolent campaigns can be a mechanism that influences whether or not regimes succeed in democratising after civil resistance campaigns. To explore the impact of diversity in such situations, an analysis was conducted of two nonviolent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, where Tunisia succeeded in establishing a sustainable democracy, while Egypt experienced an authoritarian reversal. The research question developed was as follows: *Is diversity a decisive mechanism in explaining whether or not democratisation occurs after nonviolent campaigns succeed?*

The main finding for this thesis is that the impact of diversity is two-fold. In both Tunisia and Egypt, diversity had a positive impact on the ability to mobilise massive campaigns that showed broad support for political change. The large and diverse mobilisation and the variety of tactics used put considerable pressure on the regimes and made it difficult to defeat the protests. Diversity may have also been a decisive mechanism in the campaigns' successful creation of security defections, with the military refusing to help repress the protesters in both countries. This resulted in both of the incumbent regimes being deposed. It can, therefore, be argued that diversity in nonviolent campaigns seems to be an essential mechanism in generating regime change and the initiation of democratic, political transitions, and thereby appears to be short-term beneficial for democratisation.

However, diversity had a different effect on the democratic transitions. After the regimes were overthrown and the political transition initiated in Tunisia and Egypt, the diversity of the two revolutions soon created problems. It did not take long for the parties' different preferences and motivations for participation to surface, and the unity of the campaign to break down. In Egypt, the irreconcilable differences among the various actors became problematic right after the military coup when MB allied with the military rather than the secular in several discussions. The revolution in Tunisia, on the other hand, was to a greater extent marked by an ability to cooperate and make compromises at the beginning of the transition period, although possibly somewhat involuntary. Still, it did not take long before the divisions among the different political actors blocked the collaboration in Tunisia as well. The polarisation between the various parties eventually became so extreme that it prevented democratic development and could potentially have led to civil war. With this in mind, it can be argued that the diversity of

the nonviolent campaigns almost led to a democratic breakdown in both cases and that it blocked the democratic transition.

Another key finding is that different types of diversity seem to have differing effects. It was the religious diversity in particular that created the polarisation and threatened to undermine the democratic transition in both countries. The parties struggled to compromise among political issues that were linked to religious preferences, which became especially evident in Egypt, where the various sides were also more religious than in Tunisia. When fractionalisation eventually occurred in Tunisia as well, this was also largely due to disagreements among the various religious (and non-religious) actors. Religious diversity can, therefore, be said to harm democratisation, especially due to the increasing probability of polarisation and fractionalisation. The other types of diversity, on the other hand, such as age, class affiliation, gender and place of residence, seemed to have mostly a positive impact on the campaigns. These types of diversity contributed to broad and massive mobilisation, which put high pressure on the regimes and can be said to have helped in generating regime change and democratic transitions.

In addition to Egypt having greater religious diversity and more religious actors in its campaign than what was found in Tunisia, this thesis also finds another possible explanation for why Tunisia became a sustainable democracy, while Egypt did not. When diversity led to conflict and fractionalisation among the parties, it became evident that the institutional structures of the countries had a significant impact on the options available to the actors in Tunisia and Egypt. In Egypt, the military has traditionally had a strong position and a habit of involvement in political issues. They had seized power from Mubarak and his regime when the mobilisation against them was at its highest, and as the various parties eventually became highly fractionalised and unable to come to solutions, they again seized power from Morsi. They were a clear actor who could step in, which was not the case for the military in Tunisia. A military coup was highly unlikely, which may have forced compromises as the only available alternative in the country. In addition, the 'key player' in the Tunisian crisis was not the military but the UGTT – a trade union and civil society actor with little ability or interests in capturing state power. Instead, they helped to force mediation and compromise between the different parties, which was not an alternative in the same way with Egypt's trade union. It is therefore conceivable that the alternatives these institutional structures opened up for were crucial to the

democratic outcome, and that had the situation been the opposite, an authoritarian decline could have been equally likely to occur in Tunisia.

In the theory chapter, two hypotheses about the potential impact of diversity on the outcome of democratisation were established. Hypothesis 1 read as follows: *More diverse nonviolent campaigns succeed and lead to democratisation through the ability to generate increased and broad mobilisation and the commitment to a culture of compromise and cooperation.*

Based on the findings of this thesis, we can now conclude that diverse nonviolent campaigns increase the likelihood of regime change and the initiation of democratic transition periods, at least in these two cases, mainly because large and broad mobilisation puts great pressure on regimes and increases the likelihood of security defections. However, although various actors can come together for the maximalist goals of a campaign, the diversity of preferences and interests quickly generates problems during the transitional period. Such diversity creates discrepancies that make it difficult to hold on to a culture of cooperation and commitment to democratic incentives during the transition period and can potentially hinder democratic development.

This leads to Hypothesis 2, concerning how diversity could potentially be an impeding factor for democracy, read as follows: *More diverse participation in nonviolent uprisings lower the probability of democratisation due to polarisation and fractionalisation during the transition period.* In both Tunisia and Egypt, the diversity of the campaigns eventually led to fractionalisation where the parties no longer were able to cooperate on the establishment of the democratic institutions. In particular, it was one type of diversity that drew the development in this direction; religious diversity. This made it difficult for the actors to reach agreements on political issues that were tied to religious preferences, and the conflicts that surfaced drew the various parties further and further apart. The vast extent of fractionalisation prevented democratic development and almost led to a democratic breakdown in both cases. In neither Tunisia nor Egypt, the parties managed to cooperate voluntarily to reach compromises. In Egypt, the military seized power, while the lack of this alternative led to strong trade unions forcing compromises that furthered democratic development in Tunisia. Diversity led to political deadlock in both countries, and it was the countries' institutional structures and options these made available that led to Tunisia being a democracy today - while Egypt is not.

To summarise, the thesis concludes that diversity is a mechanism that functions in nonviolent campaigns to effectively generate regime change and initiate democratic transition periods. On the other hand, when these goals are achieved, diversity, and especially religious diversity, appears to have a negative impact on further democratic development. Various interests and preferences come to the surface and increase the likelihood of polarisation and fractionalisation occurring. Such polarisation and fractionalisation prevent the ability to compromise and can block democratic development, which may also potentially lead to authoritarian reversals. Furthermore, during crises in which a democratic transition is threatened by authoritarian reversal, the institutional structures and the key players within these structures appear to be crucial. If the military is the dominant player (as in Egypt), democratisation seems to become less likely. This confirms the findings of Bruneau & Matei (2008) who argues that legacies of military rule have been found to undermine democratization. However, if the dominant actors are strong CSOs with no interest in taking power (such as the UGTT in Tunisia), this seems to increase the opportunities for crises to be resolved and thus for sustaining a democratic momentum during such junctures.

7.1 Final considerations

This study aims to test the link found by several scholars between diversity in nonviolent movements and the further process of democratisation. There is a great deal of disagreement among scholars as to whether this link draws the prospect of democratisation in one direction or another, and this is the gap that this task has sought to contribute to. How diversity as a mechanism affects the democratic outcome of nonviolent campaigns has only been tested in two cases, Tunisia and Egypt, and the findings for the thesis cannot be generalised beyond these cases. However, the findings from this study may help to inform how diversity functions as a mechanism in similar nonviolent campaigns.

In case studies, it is virtually impossible to control all the variables that influence a phenomenon (Geroge & Bennett, 2005). Due to both the selected method and the scope of the thesis, this study has only been able to conduct in-depth studies of diversity as a unit in two cases and has not been able to control for all other potential causal effects. To prevent this from becoming a substantial weakness of the study, the most similar system design was chosen, the purpose of which was to select cases that were similar on other potential X's, such that they were unlikely to explain the variation. However, it is clear that, for example, institutional structure and legacy have had an impact on the democratic outcomes of Egypt and Tunisia, and I cannot be certain

that no other of the potential X's has also created variations that this thesis has not been able to capture. Therefore, it is possible that this study uses diversity as an explanatory mechanism in situations where other variables would potentially have greater explanatory power.

In addition, the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 5.3 and used throughout the analysis, is, to some extent, characterised by my own assessments of the empirical data presented. It is also plausible that the use of other, or more varied, data could have contributed to finding more significant variations in diversity than what this thesis have accomplished.

The weaknesses of this study indicate that further research is needed on the impact of diversity in nonviolent campaigns on the outcomes of democratisation. First, it could be interesting to test diversity in a cross-national empirical study in order to gain insight into how diversity has impacted nonviolent campaigns more generally. This would also give a greater opportunity to test the explanatory effect of diversity statistically. Besides, it would also provide greater insight into how any other X's affect the potential explanatory effect. In addition, it would also be interesting to do a more in-depth study of the effect of the various aspects of diversity, such as age diversity, religious diversity and class diversity. Perhaps could this provide further insight into what types of diversity that draw the link between diverse nonviolent movements and democratisation in one or the other direction.

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