Master's thesis

NTNU
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences
Department of Sociology and Political Science

Maj-Lisa Lervåg

Does International Media Coverage Matter?

A quantitative study of the effect of international traditional media coverage on the success of nonviolent campaigns.

Master's thesis in Political Science

Supervisor: Charles Butcher

June 2020

NTNU
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Maj-Lisa Lervåg

Does International Media Coverage Matter?

A quantitative study of the effect of international traditional media coverage on the success of nonviolent campaigns.

Master's thesis in Political Science
Supervisor: Charles Butcher
June 2020

Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences
Department of Sociology and Political Science

NTNU

Kunnskap for en bedre verden

Abstract

This thesis explores the impact of international traditional media coverage (ITMC) on the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. The research question asks: What is the effect of international traditional media coverage on the success of nonviolent campaigns with maximalist goals? This thesis attempts to systematically answer a question few others have approached in a quantitative manner, and I argue that ITMC increases the likelihood of success for nonviolent campaigns in two ways. First, I argue that ITMC can be beneficial to nonviolent campaigns as it can increase levels of external support granted to the campaign. Second, I argue that nonviolent campaigns benefit from ITMC as the opponent regime may lower its repression in response to ITMC, anticipating external support to the campaign. Using data on nonviolent campaigns between 1945 and 2013 from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.1 project, I run a series of logistic regression models to test these claims empirically. The results point to a weak general link between ITMC and success. I do find that ITMC in the post-Cold war era (1990-2005) increased the likelihood of the success of nonviolent campaigns, meaning that the effect of ITMC is likely to be conditional of time and developments in the functions of media in society.

Sammendrag

I denne masteroppgaven undersøker jeg om internasjonal medieoppmerksomhet har en effekt på utfallet av ikke-voldelige kampanjer. forskningsspørsmålet lyder som følger: Hva er effekten av internasjonal tradisjonell mediedekning (ITMC) på utfallet av ikke-voldelige kampanjer med maksimalistiske mål? Jeg forsøker å systematisk adressere et spørsmål få andre har undersøkt kvantitativt, og argumenterer for at ITMC kan være fordelaktig for ikke-voldelige kampanjer fordi det kan øke graden av ekstern støtte kampanjen mottar. Jeg argumenterer også for at ikke-voldelige kampanjer kan dra nytte av ITMC ved at kampanjens statlige motstander kan redusere undertrykkelsen av kampanjen. Ved bruk av data på ikke-voldelige kampanjer fra 1945-2013 kjører jeg en rekke logistiske regresjonsmodeller for å teste forventningene empirisk. Resultatet fra disse peker mot en svak generell sammenheng mellom ITMC og suksess. Jeg finner at ITMC i perioden etter den kalde krigen (1990-2005) økte sjansen for at ikke-voldelige kampanjer ville lykkes, noe som indikerer at ITMC fungerer ulikt over tid og varierer med utviklingen av media og dens funksjon i samfunnet.

Acknowledgements

Five wonderful years in Trondheim have come to an end.

The process of writing this master's thesis was tougher than anticipated and many thanks are in order. I want to start by thanking my supervisor, Charles Butcher. He believed in me from the moment I mentioned my interest in nonviolent protest, and his extensive knowledge and steady guidance has been of great help.

Writing this thesis has given me the opportunity to take a deep-dive into a topic I have taken great interest in both personally and professionally. As a teacher in the social sciences, my insight into methods of protest, democracy and the functions of media is of great value.

The support from my family and friends has been invaluable. As a consequence of 'you-know-what', two months of this semester was spent quarantining with my family. Mette, Alfred, Mia, and Petter - you are the best. Weekend phone-calls to 'mormor' and videos of Tulla have also injected much needed positivity and joy into this semester of isolation.

Daily lunches and video-lunches, pep-talks, and evening walks with Hilde, Maja and Mari has been brilliant. Sharing our common experiences in this process has been a great relief, and I feel thankful for having them in my life.

Maj-Lisa Lervåg

Trondheim, 15.06.20

List of Figures

List of Tables

Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction

What is the role of international traditional media coverage on the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns? In literature on nonviolence there has been a significant effort aimed at identifying determinants of success. While it is often pointed out that the most important efforts are made at the local level in nonviolent conflict (e.g. Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 59; Dudouet, 2015, p. 194), scholars continue to cite outside attention as vital to successful nonviolent campaigning (Bennett & Segerberg, 2015; Bleiker, 2000; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Hunt & Gruszczynski, 2019; Nordenson, 2018; Shock, 2005; Tarrow, 2015). Publicising the nonviolent struggle is expected to potentially activate foreign allies of the campaign (Bob, 2005, p. 4), which in turn can tip the balance of power in favor of challengers in nonviolent struggles (Schock, 2005, p. 20).

International media coverage has been researched through combinations of case studies and theoretical discussions (Martin & Varney, 2003a; 2003b), but there has yet to be conducted a quantitative study directed at researching international media coverage as a determinant of success or facilitator of other factors of success in nonviolent campaigns. Moreover, some studies even question whether international support is beneficial to nonviolent campaigns. For example, Bob (2005) warns that nonviolent campaigns that attract international attention and allies run the risk of "potentially alienating a movement from its base" (p. 4). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) further characterise external support as a 'double-edged sword' (p. 11), with risks like free-rider problems and issues with legitimacy.

The inconclusive findings regarding external support and the lack of substantial research linking international media coverage to success raises important questions of if and how international media attention is beneficial to nonviolent campaigns. While several studies have examined the impact of media coverage on specific cases (e.g. Hunt & Gruszczynski, 2019, Martin & Varney, 2003b), there exists, to the best of my knowledge, no studies that quantitatively test whether international media attention contributes to the success of nonviolent campaigns or not. This thesis therefore examines the relationship between international media coverage and the success of nonviolent campaigns. The contribution of this thesis project is to systematically examine the impact of international traditional media coverage across a large number of cases, through

the following research question: *What is the effect of international traditional media coverage on the success of nonviolent campaigns with maximalist goals?*

In order to test the relationship between international traditional media coverage (ITMC) and likelihood of success I build two arguments describing important mechanisms. First, I argue that ITMC can generate international sympathies and awareness of atrocities, which in turn can force policy change and increase beneficial external support to campaigns. Second, I argue that ITMC can lead to responses at the domestic level. The anticipation of external support can arguably lead the state in question to lower its repression in an attempt to reduce damaging foreign responses, thus creating more room for the nonviolent campaign to operate. Both arguments build on the 'Iron Cage of Liberalism' by Ritter (2015). I argue that both increases in external support and the anticipation of increased external support is facilitated by ITMC, and further that these responses increase the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding. Using data on nonviolent campaigns between 1945 and 2013, I run a series of logistic regression models to test these claims empirically.

Through the regression models I find a somewhat weak link between ITMC and success at the general level. More interesting, I find strong support for the expected relationship between ITMC and success in the period of 1990-2005. The results from the empirical analysis also confirms the effects of previously established determinants of success, such as campaign size and security force defections. It is important to note that while I expect ITMC to increase the likelihood of success for nonviolent campaigns, I do not believe that ITMC will have an effect in every case. The research design is limited and thus holds no guarantee to what future research might find. Additionally, this thesis does not speak to whether some factors enhance or depress the effects of media attention, such as for example social media technology.

1.1 Conceptualization

In this thesis, there are some central concepts that need to be defined. This includes a clarification of how nonviolent campaigns are defined, in addition to establishing a firm

understanding of what international traditional media coverage is. Finally, I will clarify how the concepts of success and external support are understood and applied in this thesis.

1.1.1 Nonviolence and Nonviolent Campaigns

Nonviolence can be defined as both a philosophy and an approach to conflict and change characterised by its lack of violence. Sometimes described as a soft power (Galtung, 1996, p. 122), nonviolence can be understood as "an alternative view of political power, a means of transforming state repression, a strategy for revolution, and a moral philosophy" (Kurtz & Nepstad, 2012, p. xi). Nonviolence is based on efforts by civilians and serves as a method of waging conflict through "social, economic and political means without the threat or use of violence" (Sharp, 2005, p. 2). There exist varied understandings and practices of nonviolence, with a key distinction between a moral and strategic practice.

There are several traditions that contribute with insights regarding nonviolent resistance, and I will engage with literature from both the civil resistance tradition and the social movements and revolutions tradition. Nonviolent campaigns are social movements, but the category of social movements is simply broader as it also includes movements with primarily violent protest behaviour. While these literatures address many of the same phenomena (Schock, 2014, p. 31), a central difference can be seen in how the civil resistance literature has focused mostly on struggles in authoritarian contexts while the social movement studies have mostly "focused on challenges in developed democratic contexts" (Schock, 2015, p. 13). Nepstad (2015) illustrates the differences further by pointing to how civil resistance researchers have been more occupied by outcomes and trying to identify factors explaining whether or not a movement succeeds, while social movement researchers have emphasized processes such as recruitment and coalition building (p. 416). Still, there are valuable insights concerning outcomes of campaigns and the function of media within both.

The literature on nonviolence employs varying terminology, with somewhat interchangeable terms being unarmed insurrections (Shock, 2005), nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth &

Stephan, 2011) and unarmed revolutions (Ritter, 2015). The varying terms are to a large extent similar in meaning but are believed to cover some specific nuances better than others. Within quantitative research in studies of civil resistance, the unit of observation is often the 'nonviolent campaign'. In this thesis, I therefore accompany Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) by employing the term 'nonviolent campaign'. Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) use the term 'campaign' instead of "conflict' is because it clarifies how one party employed primarily nonviolent tactics, rather than implying that the whole conflict was nonviolent. When applied in this thesis, 'nonviolent campaigns' refers to any civilian-based group who applies primarily nonviolent methods when challenging a state-actor. Campaigns have clear goals, overt tactics, and a form of leadership (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013, p. 416). The aims of the nonviolent campaigns mentioned in this thesis are always maximalist, meaning that they are directed at regime change, self-determination, or secession (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). It is also essential to take note of the term 'primarily', as distinguishing between campaigns that are violent and nonviolent can be problematic (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994, p. 9, Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 16). Campaigns are rarely strictly violent or nonviolent, so by referring to the primary method of resistance it allows for some violence in nonviolent campaigns.

1.1.2 International Traditional Media Coverage

In this thesis, I limit my scope to international traditional media coverage (ITMC). I understand traditional media as media that "encompasses newspapers, television, and broadcast radio" (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013, p. 21). International traditional media today is heavily dominated by a number of newswire companies such as Reuters, Agence France Presse (AFP), Associated Press (AP), Xinhua, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Cable News Network (CNN). In this thesis ITMC primarily refers to these outlets. The reason why I look only to traditional media is twofold. Firstly, traditional media is the only type of media that can be researched in datasets ranging more than 20 years back in time. In order to research the role of international media in relation to the success of nonviolent campaigns for a large sample of cases, traditional media becomes the most suitable variable through its long-lasting existence. Second, traditional media outlets have existed and been a stable channel of communication since the second half of the 20th century. Newspapers, TV, and radio broadcasts are still

relevant sources of information in modern societies (Djerf-Pierre & Shehata, 2017; Hunt & Gruszczynski, 2019). Although new media outlets and social media have become well-established in the past decades, the reliance on traditional media has continued (Hunt & Gruszczynski, 2019, p. 13). To escape the 'echo chambers' constructed within the social media sphere (Sunstein, 2009), movements can use ITMC as source material to communicate messages to broader and more diverse audiences than those of the specific new type of media. Movements benefit from leveraging both media forms (Hunt & Gruszczynski, 2019, p. 13), indicating that ITMC is still highly relevant when researching media effects.

While some argue that traditional media has lost its impact on public opinion in an increasingly digital world, several recent studies point to how traditional media still plays a large role in determining information-seeking behaviour (Hunt & Gruszczynski, 2019) and agenda-setting (Djerf-Pierre & Shehata, 2017). By combining public opinion surveys with media content analyses spanning from 1992-2014, Djerf-Pierre and Shehata (2017) assessed the common argument of the diminishing impact of traditional media. They found that there is a continued and somewhat stable reliance and usage of traditional news media in today's high-choice era (p. 732).

Media coverage as an external element and source of power to nonviolent campaigns is of interest in this thesis. According to Gilboa (2006), national and global media broadcasting represent different approaches and content. While the national media "represent the perspectives of a particular state, the global media claim to represent no particular national viewpoint (Gilboa, 2006, p. 597). As domestic media can be state-controlled and does not necessarily reach external actors, or is heavily censored, focus will be on international and global media coverage. By limiting my scope to these geopolitical categories of media, any reference to ITMC will refer to journalistic coverage originating from outside of the country being covered. When discussing international media coverage, or simply media coverage, I am referring to the concept of ITMC unless otherwise stated.

1.1.3 Success

The main dependent variable is whether a nonviolent campaign succeeds in achieving its goals. Success for a nonviolent campaign is defined as a situation where the outcome of a nonviolent campaign is identical to one or more stated maximalist goals of the campaign within one calendar year of the campaign end-date. Success in reaching smaller campaign goals will not qualify for a campaign to be labelled successful as a whole. Additionally, unwanted developments in the aftermath of conflict will not retrospectively mean that a campaign did not succeed. A campaign with regime change as its primary goal is thus defined as successful if the regime is forced to withdraw following e.g. mass protest. Examples of successful nonviolent campaigns in recent history includes the Otpor movement in Serbia (2000) and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, both of which succeeded in reaching their maximalist goals (Johansen, 2010, p. 105). The Bahraini uprising from 2011-2013 (Davies, 2014) is an example of a campaign that is considered failed according to this understanding of success, as the campaign did not result in its stated goal of the abdication of King Hamid.

1.1.4 External Support

External support refers to resources supplied to a nonviolent campaign by third-parties and encompasses all types of cross-border action with the potential to support nonviolent campaigns. External resources aimed at supporting the regime is not of interest in this thesis. As a consequence, I take note of external support targeting the opposing regime when it is carried out by a foreign actor who either wants to distance itself from the regime or who actively aims to support a nonviolent campaign. External support can be initiated from official state sources, but also social organisations, non-governmental organisations, or the public in a country. Dudouet (2015) describes how external actors can lend support through mechanisms of promotion, capacity-building, connection, protection, and pressure. To exemplify the breadth of the term external support, external support can encompass moral, strategic, technical, diplomatic, practical participation, media coverage, education and financial contributions made by foreign actors (Johansen, 2010, p. 105-106).

1.2 Outline of the thesis

The thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the existing literature on determinants of the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns in addition to research on ITMC and protest outcomes, thus identifying the key knowledge gap motivating this thesis. Chapter 3 builds and frames the main argument that ITMC is beneficial to nonviolent campaigns through two key arguments related to external support and lowered repression. Chapter 4 describes the quantitative research design and how I operationalize the variables in the statistical analysis. In Chapter 5, I report on the results of the main analysis. This chapter also includes robustness checks as well as an in-depth exploration of the mechanisms behind the link between ITMC and success. In Chapter 6 I discuss the findings in relation to the theory presented in Chapter 3 and attempt to understand the results at greater depth. Finally, I provide some concluding remarks in Chapter 7.

2.0 Literature Review

In this chapter, I present findings from relevant existing literature within both the civil resistance tradition and the social movements and revolutions tradition. The chapter does not serve as a complete overview of research on nonviolence, but rather as a presentation of research on key areas and topics that are central to the research question. First, I review findings in the literature regarding determinants of the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. Second, findings related to the role and influence of external support to nonviolent campaigns is presented. Third, I explore findings on the role and function of media coverage in relation to nonviolent campaigns. Finally the main research gaps in the literature are identified.

2.1 Determinants of Success

Research on the determinants of success of nonviolent campaigns has been a recurring and continuous topic in research on nonviolence. I begin this section by discussing the divide between structural-based and agency-based explanations of outcomes. This is followed by an exploration of specific findings explaining success through mobilization and momentum, organizational traits, security force defections, violent flanks, and identity.

2.1.1 Structure and Agency

When discussing the determinants of success, both structural conditions and the revolutionary strategy behind a movement are relevant (Nepstad, 2011, p. 7). Traditionally, the literature on social movements and revolutions have emphasized structure, while the literature on civil resistance have emphasised strategy (Schock, 2015, p. 181). This means that while studies in the civil resistance literature have mostly highlighted the "roles played by human actors in nonviolent movements" (Ritter, 2015b, p. 9), structural conditions have been at the centre of attention within the social movements and revolutions literature. Structural conditions represent "the macrolevel factors that can tip the balance of power in favour of the movement or the regime (...)" (Nepstad, 2011, p. 6). Fixed structural conditions can, for example, be the pre-

existing, established features of a nation, such as the political system. Fluctuating structural variables can be observed when, for example, new elections are called or if regime change in a neighbouring country generates protest at home (Nepstad, 2011, p. 7). Structural factors hold the power to "weaken a regime or provide greater momentum to a revolutionary movement" (Nepstad, 2011, p. 7), but several scholars also warn against attributing too much weight and causal power to structural conditions (Bob, 2005, p. 3: Nepstad, 2011, p. 7).

While structural conditions can offer the potential for revolutionary change, there is still a need for agency - opportunities must be turned into action (Nepstad, 2011, p. 7). Shock (2005, 2015) has made seminal contributions where he arguably bridges the structure-agency divide in the literature when comparing successful and failed campaigns. Discussing both approaches as important, Shock (2005) argues that the shifting between methods of concentration and methods of dispersion, tactical innovation and a decentralized structure are important factors in explaining the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns (p. 43). The discussion I have outlined above explains how research contains both agency-based and structural-based determinants of success, and that both are considered relevant contributions.

2.1.2 Specific Findings

The search for determinants of success has inspired a large amount of scholarly writing, and among the classical contributions, Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) argue that leadership and strategy are important factors contributing to the success of nonviolent protest. Small-n, comparative, studies of successful and failed cases have been a recurring methodological approach (Ackerman & Kruegler 1994; Nepstad 2011; Schock 2004). Following the novel contribution of 'Why Civil Resistance Works' (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), an increasing number of scholars have also tested the determinants of success through quantitative means. In their studies, Chenoweth and Stephan (2008, 2011) find that mobilization, campaign size, regime loyalty shifts, and security force defections are influential determinants of campaign success. In the following I explore a variety of factors considered as determinants of success.

2.1.2.1 Organizational Traits

Organizational variables and the question of whether hierarchically organized movements are the most successful, have been at the centre of much scholarly writing in the social movements' literature (Etzioni, 1970; Gamson, 1990; Shorter & Tilly, 1974). While providing an overview of literature form the social movements tradition on determinants of success, Giugni (1998) recognized research on organizational structure as a main line of investigation within previous research (p. 374). In 'The Strategy of Social Protest' Gamson (1990) analysed the success-rate of 53 protest groups in America between the years 1800-1945. He found that the organisation and tactics of protest groups strongly influenced the likelihood of success. In a more recent example, Butcher, Gray and Mitchell (2018) look to organizational traits and find that participation in National Trade Unions increases the likelihood of short-term success for nonviolent campaigns, while at the same time decreasing the chances of short-term failure.

2.1.2.2 Mobilization and Participation

A number of studies have linked success to mass-participation (DeNardo, 1985; Somma & Medel, 2019). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that the barriers to participation are lower within nonviolent campaigns than within violent campaigns (p. 77). This is because participation in nonviolent protest has fewer requirements related to participants' physical strength or skills, meaning that nonviolent campaigns can generate broad-based mobilization more easily. In turn, broad-based mobilization can increase the incentives of security forces to defect, due to the increasing chances of kinship ties (Binnendijk, 2009; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Jaafar & Stephan, 2009; Schock, 2015). Security force defections have been found to be an especially influential determinant of success, increasing the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding by almost 60 percent (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 58).

Chenoweth and Belgioioso (2019) argue that the *momentum* of mobilization is a more suitable indicator of movement potential rather than simply mass participation. The momentum of dissent is understood as the product of participation and the number of protest events in a week. In their study, Chenoweth and Belgioioso (2019) find that high levels of momentum in mobilization are significantly correlated with the likelihood of a social movement succeeding,

with success measured through the likelihood of a leader exiting through irregular means (p. 1090). An implication of their findings is that social movements can increase their disruptive potential by concentrating their activities in time.

2.1.2.3 Violent Flanks and Identity

Chenoweth and Shock (2015) consider the effects of violent flanks, where they systematically evaluate the effects of simultaneous armed resistance on the success rate of unarmed resistance campaigns. They find an indirect negative effect between contemporaneous violent flanks and the outcome of nonviolent campaigns, suggesting that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to succeed without the presence of violent flanks (Chenoweth & Shock, 2015). Another contribution is made by Pischedda (2020), who points to how the field of nonviolence studies has failed to consider the aspect of ethnic identity. Pischedda's (2020) research reveals that nonviolent ethnic campaigns draws fewer participants and government defectors than nonethnic counterparts, indicating that ethnically motivated campaigns are less likely to succeed. Additionally, Svensson and Lindgren (2011) have found that campaigns that are polarized along ethnic lines are less likely to succeed.

Previous research reveals how aspects of organizational strategy, mobilization and mobilization momentum, security force defections, violent flanks and ethnicity have been found to influence the likelihood of success for nonviolent campaigns. These determinants are also intertwined, in that an increase in one factor can bring about beneficial changes in another factor, such as mobilization increasing the likelihood of security force defections. While the majority of research presented in this section is focused on local factors, it is also interesting to take note of literature discussing external factors of success. Since ITMC is outlined as a key link in the chain that generate external responses to nonviolent campaigns, the following section focuses on the varied findings on external support in existing literature.

2.2 External Support to Nonviolent Campaigns

The influence of external support on nonviolent campaigns has been examined in several studies since the turn of the millennium (Bob, 2005; Boothe & Smithey, 2007; Coy; 2011; Dudouet, 2015; Johansen, 2010). The focus of these studies has been on an array of aspects, often with a methodology consisting of in-depth comparative case studies (e.g. Nepstad, 2011) or in combination with systematic quantitative approaches (e.g. Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Many scholars find that international involvement can be beneficial to nonviolent campaigns when applied cautiously, but simultaneously link external tools of support to negative or uncertain impacts on the legitimacy and outcomes of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Dudouet, 2015; Marinov, 2005; Zunes & Ibrahim, 2009). With a quantitative approach, Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) find that foreign state support and international sanctions neither positively nor negatively affect the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 58-59). In the following sections I will explore findings that point to benefits of external support (Section 2.4.1) and potential disadvantages of external support (Section 2.4.2).

2.2.1 Positive Effects of External Support

External support is a central topic in several contributions, such as in 'The Marketing of Rebellion' (2005) by Clifford Bob. Here, Bob (2005) points to how external support can deter state violence and additionally strengthen challengers through "infusions of money, equipment, and knowledge" (p. 4). This builds on categories of external support including financial, material, and educational support. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) further find that nonviolent campaigns are more likely than violent campaigns to receive international diplomatic support, for example through denunciation and sanctions against state repression (p. 53). Another interesting finding is made by Jackson, San-Acka and Maoz (2020), who found that the likelihood of uprisings are larger in cases where the violent or nonviolent campaigns expect external support to be favourable of the campaign rather than the target government. Thus, the anticipation of favourable external support is a determinant in the actual onset of nonviolent campaigns.

Sanctions represent a relatively common type of external response. While INGOs can provide a form of tactical and educational support, sanctions can function as a form of financial support in that it deprives its recipient of relevant resources. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that sanctions and state support for nonviolent campaigns can be effective when they are supporting the activities of local opposition groups without acting as a substitute for local participation (p. 27). This requires coordinated multinational efforts, and this argument is built on how civil resistance movements in South Africa and Eastern Europe were helped by a combination of positive and negative sanctions to "isolate egregious rights violators" (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 27). In this respect, previous findings point to how external support can be effective when being comprehensive and specific.

Studies noting the benefits of external support to nonviolent movements are often presented with the caveat that external support can have drawbacks for nonviolent campaigns. Previous research makes it clear that external support can be beneficial when carried out in a well-planned manner, but also reveals that this balance might be hard to find. While Dudouet (2015) firmly believes that successful nonviolent campaigns must be homegrown and well planned in order to succeed, she believes there to be room for a secondary role played by outside assistance (p. 194). Following this, Dudouet (2015) proposes a golden rule of intervention for third-party support, where external involvement remains a secondary supportive force for domestic activism (Dudouet, 2015, p. 194). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) have made a similar statement, where they express that external support is never a substitute for local efforts (p. 225). They rather point to how for example "sanctions and state support for nonviolent campaigns work best when they are coordinated with the support of local opposition groups" (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 27).

While it is often pointed out that the most important efforts are made at the local level (e.g. Dudouet, 2015, p.194, Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 59), external support from international actors has historically provided nonviolent campaigns with valuable support. An example of this is how the US contributed with strategic support to the Otpor movement in Serbia, who in 2000 succeeded in replacing Milosevic (Johansen, 2010, p. 105). Diplomatic external support was also thought to be crucial in the Philippines in 1986, when the People Power Movement

was aided by U.S president Reagan when he distanced himself from the Marcos regime (Johansen, 2010, p. 106).

2.2.2 Negative Effects of External Support

When nonviolent campaigns receive external support it can initially be considered positive for the campaign. However, this support also introduces a new set of dilemmas, resulting in external support being labelled a double-edged sword (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Stephan, 2010). Using sanction as an example, they run the risk of providing the opposing regime with the opportunity to delegitimize the campaign by characterising the opposition as foreign agents (Stephan, 2010, p. 225). Nepstad (2011) further argues that sanctions can decrease the likelihood of the success of nonviolent campaigns, especially if the regime has alternative funding available (p. 136). International sanctions thereby run the risk of hurting the citizens of a country rather than the dictators they are intended to harm (Nepstad, 2011, p. 136). It is also worth noting that Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) found sanctions to have no influence on the outcome of conflicts involving a nonviolent campaign (p. 22).

External financial support has been found to have no measurable effect on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). To explain this finding, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) suggest that direct financial assistance can become part of a scheme to further delegitimize nonviolent campaigns. As with sanctions, the regime facing the campaign can claim that the funding reveals how the campaign promotes foreign interests. With nonviolent campaigns being more dependent on active participation than violent campaigns, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) then consider foreign support to be of less value, especially with the potentially delegitimizing effects it can have on a local nonviolent campaign and its ability to mobilize broadly (p. 23-24). Relying too heavily on foreign contributions means that the campaign run the risk of neglecting important efforts to "build local support that can translate into mass mobilization" (Nepstad, 2011, p. 14). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) point to how external support can be "unreliable, inconsistently applied to opposition groups around the world, and sometimes ineffective in helping campaigns" (p. 54).

An interesting contribution concerning privilege was made by Boothe and Smithey in 2007. Discussing third-party nonviolent intervention, Boothe and Smithey (2007) argue that efforts to intervene made by people with relative privilege run the risk of "hindering the empowerment of the local movements they aim to assist" (p. 39). Coy (2011) supports this claim and adds that this is an issue that has affected all international accompaniment organizations. External actors may rely upon and reinforce prejudice, and they can "never operate completely outside the prevailing dynamics of race and privilege that still permeate the social and political systems (Coy, 2011). Pattison (2017) further discusses how Western states are behind most international involvement, and "with it follows underlying dynamics of race, colonial legacy and the systemic privilege of the West" (p. 142). Issues related to privilege may add weight to arguments of how external support can be of less benefit to nonviolent campaigns than intended, decreasing the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding.

Underlining the value of local supporters over external allies and support, mobilization among local supporters is argued to represent a more stable and reliable source of power than what external allies offer (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 7). Schock (2005) further argues that the "benefits of third-party support must be weighed against the possibilities that it will undermine the challengers" (p. 34). With unclear findings regarding the value of external support, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) call for further research on types of external assistance in order to find answers to when and how "outside support either complements or diminishes the activities of local nonviolent activists» (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 225). Set to be released in 2020, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan have an ongoing research project where they examine the effects of different forms of external aid on the outcomes of civil resistance campaigns (ICNC, 2020). This suggests that research into the impacts of external support on nonviolent campaigns is at the current research frontier.

The review of existing literature on external support reveals a debate about the value of external support and its potential role in determining the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding. The findings are mixed, suggesting that the various types of external support is a highly conditional element in nonviolent protest. External support is urged to be applied with caution, as it has been found to be effective in some contexts where it is part of targeted and well-coordinated operations. While there are examples of various forms of external support being

granted successfully to nonviolent movements, the role of ITMC specifically as a potential gateway to external support has not previously been examined. Studies in the civil resistance tradition and social movements tradition have not quantitatively examined ITMC in relation to nonviolent campaigns as the cause of external support or as a factor with independent effects on the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. The following section discusses findings from the existing studies of media coverage in relation to nonviolent campaigns, where contributions from the social movements' literature contain the most substantial amount of contributions regarding aspects of media.

2.3 Media and the Outcomes of Nonviolent Campaigns

Media coverage is labelled a central determinant of success for nonviolent campaigns because it connects campaigns to outside audiences and allies (e.g. Andsager, 2000; Bob, 2005; Bleiker, 2000; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Nojeim, 2004; Schock, 2005; Ryan, Carragee & Meinhofer, 2001; Tarrow, 2015). In this section, I begin by reiterating the overall view of how media coverage is considered a central component in successful campaigns. I then examine findings concerning media as a determinant of success before I discuss findings on the determinants of media attention.

2.3.1 Media Attention as a Determinant of Success

On a general level, Tarrow (2015) points to how scholars of nonviolence often hold the view that the success of nonviolent movement hinges on "getting positive messages based on framing into the mass media" (Tarrow, 2015, p. 369). Bleiker (2000) argues that "global media networks have provided nonviolent campaigns with possibilities of a worldwide audience" (p. 32). Shock (2005) further states that the likelihood of a nonviolent movement succeeding decreases if the campaign fails to receive favourable media coverage (p. 170). The other way around, international media coverage can increase the power of nonviolent campaigns, as "the leverage of a struggle can increase" (Shock, 2005, p. 170). The above statements reveal an understanding of media coverage that is seemingly present both in the minds of scholars and participants in

nonviolent campaigns, namely that media coverage is necessary in order to secure external allies and build foreign support to the campaign (Ramos, Ron & Thoms, 2007, p. 386). The link between media coverage and external support is further provided by Schock (2005), who points to how third-party support is "often crucial in tipping the balance of power in favor of challengers in nonviolent struggles" (p. 20).

More specifically, media coverage is expected to aid nonviolent campaigns through building international awareness that can result in increased in external support to the campaign (DeMeritt, 2012, p. 604) or by influencing the degree of repression nonviolent campaigns face (Hopgood, 2006). However, most contributions on media coverage and protest outcomes is largely case-based works and anecdotal. The actual effect of international media coverage is rarely evaluated or researched in its own right in the existing literature. The question of leaving whether there is a more general relationship between international media attention and the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns is therefore rather open.

Martin and Varney (2003a, 2003b) have made some interesting contributions concerning media attention and success. In the book 'Nonviolence Speaks: Communicating Against Repression' Martin and Varney (2003a) combine an examination of case studies of failed and successful nonviolent campaigns with theoretical considerations from communications theories in light of nonviolence. Through this work, Martin and Varney (2003a) find that attention from international mass media can be challenging to attain in the first place. Additionally, they conclude that news coverage is an unreliable source of power as consumers of broadcast TV and radio function as spectators with little personal interest in addition to their lack of power to respond (p. 108).

2.3.2 Determinants of Media Attention

Within the social movement's literature, there is an extensive amount of research considering determinants of media attention (i.e. framing). Work on political agenda setting has found that governments "tend to react immediately to mass media coverage" (Walgrave & Vliegenthart,

2012, p. 134), and that political actors adjust their attention to media raised issues within days (Vliegenthart & Walgrave 2008; Walgrave, Soroka, & Nuytemans, 2008). With an underlying understanding of media as a tool for building favourable international responses and policy changes (Rucht, 2011, p. 190), ways in which movements work to secure media attention has been of much interest in previous research. Much of the work is focused on content analyses of national newspapers and more or less detailed and systemic data about movements. For example, Andrews and Caren (2010) found that news media is prone to report more on movements that are more geographically proximate and use conventional tactics to target media (p. 856-857). Entman (2004) introduced the cascading activation model, in which he attempts to connect policy, media and public opinion. Mostly applied to show how "framing fighting" occurs, Entman (2004) argues that some actors hold more power to push frames than other, with the model showing who is more or less likely to win media attention. As previous research has found that external support is only partially beneficial, and that securing positive media frames can be difficult, there is a need to establish whether the expected link between media coverage and success actually exists.

The literature review has shown various determinants of the success of nonviolent campaigns have been researched. The determinants are to a large extent intertwined, and both internal and external factors have been researched. The review has also shown how previous findings on the effects of external support to nonviolent campaigns are inconclusive and characterised by mixed findings. Although many find potential benefits from external support when it is performed in coordination with local efforts, external support is of less value than local efforts. Concerning media, several contributions have considered how campaigns strategically interact with media to potentially secure favourable frames and coverage. This is revealed to be a resource-demanding process, one in which campaigns do not always see results from. Furthermore, I have shown how research considering media as a determinant of success link it to international audiences and external support, thus revealing the research gap motivating this thesis.

The review reveals how there is a need for a study establishing whether international media coverage influences the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. This thesis will contribute with a quantitative study of whether or not nonviolent campaigns can expect to benefit from devoting heavy resources in the search for international media attention. In the next chapter I will build

on theories of media attention and effects, external support and repression in order to construct theoretically sound arguments as to why ITMC should increase the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding.

3.0 Theory: ITMC and Successful Nonviolent Campaigns

This chapter presents a theoretical framework for understanding how ITMC affects the likelihood of the success of nonviolent campaigns. I begin by discussing how ITMC functions as a gatekeeper to an international audience. Further, I discuss categories of external support and the potential effects it can have on the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns. I then discuss how ITMC can bring about external support through building sympathy and naming and shaming processes. Following this, I build the main argument of how ITMC can increase the likelihood of the success of nonviolent campaigns through two processes.

3.1 International Traditional Media Coverage

In this section I discuss how ITMC functions and influences its audiences. I first discuss how ITMC acts as a gatekeeper before I elaborate on the idea of the mediated society. Then, I tap into media framing and media-location. The understanding of ITMC as outlined in section 1.1.2 still applies.

3.1.1 ITMC as a Gatekeeper

The media is an important gatekeeper to information. Tarrow (2015) names mass media actors 'communication gatekeepers', indicating their dominance in deciding what is communicated to international audiences (p. 370). Mass media functions as a filter that decides "what comes on the agenda, who has standing, and which positions and claims are supported or criticized in which way" (Rucht, 2011, p. 190). Global media networks carry and reframe ideas and information and choose which stories to cover and which stories are omitted (Gardner, 2001, p. 301). These frames are further inserted into various policy debates, the enforcement of international norms, and pressure for regime formation (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 200). Through this filtering, the media holds power to shape public opinion, force policies on policymakers and thereby effectively shape the course of a conflict (Gilboa, 2006, s. 617).

Receiving ITMC and favourable coverage then means tapping into a resource which ultimately may result in policy change and favourable international response (Rucht, 2011, p. 190).

ITMC is important to protest groups by virtue of its reach. Global media networks provide a worldwide audience to a conflict (Bleiker, 2000, p. 32). Media coverage can link a campaign to sympathetic neutral observers, which is beneficial as "they can be converted into active adherents or members of the group" (Nojeim, 2004, p. 38). With the increasing global interdependence in focus, Zunes (2015) points to how "the non-local audience for a conflict may be just as important as the immediate community" (p. 80). Nonviolent campaigns can therefore be expected to work towards getting "(...) an issue on the media's agenda and affect its framing once it is there" (Jasper, 1997, p. 288-289. In this sense, receiving ITMC can represent a very important threshold for nonviolent campaigns.

The idea of the 'mediated society' as introduced by Cottle (2008) is relevant in order to discuss the role of international media. Mediated societies are characterised by a continuing struggle for public recognition, where "the staging of demonstrations and protests is inextricably bound up with the struggle to circulate messages and meanings, and therefore to shape and condition news media reporting" (Cottle, 2008, p. 867). News media is the central outlet in which the politics of protest is conveyed to new audiences, and Cottle (2008) argues that it is through media that "wider support and legitimacy for their actions and aims can be potentially won – or lost" (p. 853-854). Media coverage offers nonviolent campaigns an opportunity to seek allies and external support outside of the domestic level as the 'complex media ecology' of today holds the potential to create widespread awareness of protest events, moving from the local to the global (Cottle, 2008, p. 855). In today's media ecology, media attention is sought by a variety of organisations, movements and campaigns in order to secure "the wider dissemination and legitimation of their aims and claims, and they do so in a more complex media ecology and network of communication flows" (Cottle, 2008, p. 867). By transmitting events and goals of nonviolent campaigns, ITMC can stimulate international responses and the anticipation of such responses. Living in an increasingly mediated society, the struggle for beneficial ITMC seems necessary if nonviolent campaigns are to activate foreign allies and external support.

3.1.2 Favourable Media Attention?

Although desirable, ITMC is not necessarily easily accessible to nonviolent campaigns. Relations between nonviolent actors and the media are not always harmonious and nor are their interests always aligned, meaning that attracting favourable media coverage is not a straightforward process (Tarrow, 2015, p. 369). Johansen (2010) points to a central weakness in media coverage being that it always involves reductions and simplifications. As a consequence of this, media coverage will always describe processes with a certain distance (p. 103). Johansen (2010) further argues that the media have been "very selective in their coverage of nonviolent struggles" (p. 106). What is reported varies, and the coverage is often biased (Johansen, 2010, p. 106). This makes the case of securing media coverage a tricky path for nonviolent campaigns seeking external support.

The mass media functions according to a zero-sum logic, where it seeks to attract as many people as possible to watch TV, buy newspapers and listen to the radio (Rucht, 2004, p. 27). The goal is fulfilled when it reaches a large audience that can also contribute to its economic survival. The media does not depend on nonviolent campaigns and can treat them in many different ways. Traditional media can ignore nonviolent campaigns, respond only under particular circumstances, comment positively or negatively to movement goals and activities or take interest only in the sensationalistic topics when available (Rucht, 2004, p. 30). In addition, Rucht (2004) points to how structural changes over time within both mass media and social movements will have great impact on how they interact (Rucht, 2004, p. 25). The rapid changes in communication have changed the way in which international audiences are told of events but also "how we as publics and policymakers understand, interpret, and respond to conflict situations" (Gilboa et.al., 2016, p. 671).

Without media attention any campaign will remain unknown to large audiences and be limited only to the immediate environment (Rucht, 2004, p. 28). Referring to social movements and how they desperately depend upon media, Kenix (2011) points to how movements often "find themselves in a perplexing position" (p. 43). While on the one hand movements need the media to spread their struggle to larger audiences, they have minimal control "on the quality or quantity of how reporters will frame their organization and their cause" (Kenix, 2011, p. 43).

Gaining access to positive media frames is a constant struggle (Kenix, 2011, p. 45). The media strategies of nonviolent campaigns vary, and it can be influenced by the campaign's overall impressions of media, the location of the campaign, past experiences with ignored attempts at outreach and so on. Nonviolent campaigns can employ a variety of strategies to gain media coverage. When describing the media strategies of social movements, Rucht (2004) introduced the four A's of movement strategy. These are abstention, attack, adaptation, and alternative media. Abstention refers to how a movement has become frustrated with negative coverage or the lack of coverage. This results in the movement to give up on its efforts to influence mass media. Attack is a similar approach, where the lack of influence leads to the campaign attacking the mass media for its bias. This can occur if a movement feels ignored or grossly misrepresented by mass media. On the other hand, adaption represents the strategy where a movement decides to 'play the media game' and stage events to fit the narrative and favourable media logic. This is the strategy most established movements choose, where they for example mobilize in rallies or collections of signatures, find politically relevant allies or carry out innovative protests (Rucht, 2004, p. 26). The final strategy is to create an independent alternative media in order to compensate for the lack of interest and positive frames in mass media (Ruch, 2004, p. 30).

3.1.3 ITMC and Western Perspectives

The global media sphere comes with an often western perspective and agenda, meaning that the location of the opponent can be important in determining whether a campaign receives attention in the first place, and whether the coverage actually brings about support or criticism of the campaign. On the whole, I expect the nonviolent campaigns that obtain ITMC in the first place to receive supportive ITMC. This is based on how the contrast of nonviolent methods when facing violent oppressors invokes the sympathy of international audiences (Hubbard, 1990, p. 118). The goals of nonviolent campaigns taking place in authoritarian regimes and the lower level of violence is generally looked upon as favourable, where movements towards democracy are singing to the tune of western media. In NAVCO 2.1, many of the campaigns are pro-democracy, largely nonviolent and taking place in authoritarian contexts (Ritter, 2015a, p. 472). Reporters in the western, democratic media is likely to report these nonviolent campaigns favourable or at least neutrally (Chang, 1998). The norms of peaceful protest and democracy in

western states are strong, meaning that even neutral reporting might resonate favourably for nonviolent campaigns. In the next section I explore the developments within ITMC and how it can co-exist with new media.

3.2 External Support

Nonviolent campaigns with maximalist goals largely operate within the national level. There is, however, much room for substantial involvement from third parties and external actors. External support can benefit campaigns as it brings about money, knowledge or training that can strengthen the campaigns "capacity to mobilize and sustain action" (Nepstad, 2011). External support can consist of a variety of contributions, and in the following section I will explore these categories at greater depth and consider how it can benefit nonviolent campaigns.

3.2.1 Categories of External Support

Johansen (2010) is one of few scholars who has attempted to systematize and organise types of external support available to nonviolent campaigns (See also; Dudouet, 2015). Johansen (2010) points to how peacemaking processes are complex and thus in need of tools for analysing and understanding the impact of external support to nonviolent campaigns. For this reason, Johansen (2010) presents nine categories of external support (p. 105). The external interventions that can be found in nonviolent revolts and events are "strategic, technical, diplomatic, practical participation, training, media coverage, and education" (Johansen, 2010, p. 105). Together these categories make up a variety of situations and considerations of contributions that may systematize evaluations of external support.

Understanding and evaluating the effect of external support is a complex issue (Johansen, 2010). The effects of external support, and especially how it is viewed with regards to legitimacy, will be different if the supporter is a small NGO compared to an allied state or a state with an aggressive foreign policy. Johansen (2010) points to how it is important to take note of the potential expected returns, as the true motives behind providing external support are

rarely grounded in pure solidarity and altruism (p. 112). The multi-layered agendas adds to the complexity of external support and, as a consequence, these relationships "cannot easily be analysed, and are often described in much simpler terms than they should be" (Johansen, 2010, p. 113). This reveals why evaluations of external support are limited in scope with regards to recipient, supporters, and outcomes. I run the risk of oversimplifying external support in this thesis. However, the main goal is not to establish exactly what type of external support or exactly what type of ITMC that might influence the success of nonviolent campaigns. It is rather to establish the plausibility of the claim that nonviolent campaigns receiving ITMC are more likely to succeed. In the following section I will explain how external support can benefit nonviolent campaigns.

3.2.2 How is External Support Beneficial to Nonviolent Campaigns?

The literature review revealed how research on external support is generally underdeveloped, and that the findings regarding the effects of external support are mixed. External support is often referred to as a 'double-edged sword' (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), for example because identity of the provider of outside support can damage a campaign through how it raises questions of whether the campaign represent foreign interests rather than those of the people (Stephan, 2010, p. 225). In addition, the lack of a direct causal relationship between donors and the outcome of conflicts makes it difficult to be certain of the effects of external support to nonviolent campaigns. However, scholars have also argued that external support is of benefit to nonviolent campaigns when applied in a cautious way (Bob, 2005; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Marinov, 2005; Nepstad, 2011; Zunes & Ibrahim, 2009). External support can contribute with much needed "infusions of money, equipment, and knowledge" (Bob, 2005, p. 4) to campaigns that have been worn down by state repression and resource-depleting protests over time.

Previous research makes it clear that external support can be beneficial when carried out in a well-planned manner, but also reveals that this balance might be hard to find. Dudouet (2015) proposes a golden rule of intervention for third-party support where external involvement remains a secondary supportive force for domestic activism (Dudouet, 2015, p. 194).

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) further argue that sanctions and state support for nonviolent campaigns can be effective when they are supporting the activities of local opposition groups without acting as a substitute for local participation (p. 27). This requires coordinated multinational efforts, but overall this reveals that external support can be effective when being elaborate and specific.

3.3 How ITMC Leads to Success

In this section I connect the dots between ITMC and external support in order to build the main argument of how ITMC can increase the likelihood of the success of nonviolent campaigns. First, I discuss how media can build sympathy in foreign audiences, and also how naming and shaming contributes to favourable external support and regime behaviour. Additionally, I consult with understandings and mechanisms outlined in the CNN-effect (Robinson, 2005), the Boomerang-effect (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) and the iron cage of liberalism (Ritter, 2015b). Overall, I argue that ITMC leads to success because (1) nonviolent campaigns benefit from ITMC through how it increases external support to a campaign and that (2) the anticipation of external support, induced by ITMC, leads the regime to lower its repression. The main argument will be summarized and presented as a hypothesis in the final section of this chapter.

3.3.1 Sympathy

As a gatekeeper to information, media coverage can function both as a mirror of events and as a tool for outside recruitment and support. When external observations of a regime applying excessive force against nonviolent campaigns are made, often communicated through news media, this can increase the likelihood of external support being initiated (Hamid, 2009, p. 71). Hubbard (1990) argues that nonviolent campaigns should be able to secure more favourable media attention than their violent opposites as violence often draws attention to the violent acts rather than the cause itself (p. 118). The fact that nonviolent activists willingly risks arrest and imprisonment to fight for their cause "should not only publicize the issue but also enlist the sympathies of potential supporters" (Hubbard, 1990, p. 118). Through publicizing nonviolent

protest, ITMC can spread awareness of the struggle and build sympathy for the cause. As the motives for initiating external support are rarely only linked to sympathy alone (Johansen, 2010), one can ask whether ITMC of nonviolent campaigns rather function as an excuse for foreign involvement. Regardless of motivations, ITMC still initiates the external support.

3.3.2 Naming and Shaming

Naming and shaming is a tool for spotlighting abusive states through publicity (DeMeritt, 2012, p. 604), and it is labelled a powerful tool for protecting human rights (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Indirect support of nonviolent campaigns, such as processes of naming and shaming and international diplomacy is helpful in making nonviolent campaigns reach their goals (Jackson et.al., 2020, p. 4). Naming and shaming can be done through media coverage but also by NGOs and the United Nations (Ramos et.al., 2007). Media coverage of atrocities can stimulate activism by raising "global awareness of atrocities, increasing the probability of international legal and/or economic punishment" (DeMeritt, 2012, p. 604). While researching NGOs, DeMeritt (2012) finds that shaming by the media has no significant impact on the likelihood of killing. However, DeMeritt (2012) argues that media coverage can function as an amplifier that can make other shaming efforts more effective as media coverage can broadcast efforts of NGOs and the United Nations (DeMeritt, 2012, p. 617).

Much of the literature on 'naming and shaming' expects the exposure of oppressors, partly through ITMC, to result in reduced repression as the shamed state will seek to get out of the unfavourable spotlight (Hopgood, 2006). Exposing regime crackdowns and repression can result in "sympathy and a possible increase in legitimacy" (Hamid, 2009, p. 71). Shaming can further reduce violence because it brings about the "attention of other international actors capable of inducing tangible costs" (DeMeritt, 2012, p. 602). Potential costs suffered by states shamed for abuse are lost "aid donations, trade relationships, and FDI" (DeMeritt, 2012, p. 603). ITMC can thereby force the behaviour of regimes, as they are likely to want to avoid the consequences following shaming through ITMC. ITMC as a gatekeeper to potential external responses can thereby affect the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns because it can moderate the behaviour of the opposing regime as well as build sympathies.

At a general level, increased international sympathies and state-responses to naming and shaming can be argued to motivate external responses to nonviolent campaigns receiving favourable ITMC. Substantial international media coverage can help raise awareness and foreign engagement to the benefit of nonviolent campaigns. ITMC has been established as a gatekeeper which potentially holds the power to influence the outcome of nonviolent conflicts. ITMC can connect protesters to foreign audiences and allies, and thereby link the nonviolent campaign to new sources of support. ITMC is then the bridge that links nonviolent campaigns to outside aid and involvement than can benefit the campaign. In the next two sections I build the two arguments that together generate one main hypothesis regarding ITMC and success.

3.3.3 ITMC Increases Beneficial External Support

In this section I construct an argument proposing that favourable ITMC of a nonviolent campaign can increase the likelihood of the campaign succeeding through increases in external support. This happens as ITMC broadcasts the contents and struggles of conflict, which in turn increase the sympathy of foreign audiences and relevant external actors, in addition to putting pressure on potential patron states.

If a nonviolent campaign receives favourable ITMC, regardless of how and why, the coverage will receive a public response. The coverage and response can be both positive and negative, but I argue that the attention rewarded to nonviolent campaigns will be mostly positive. With the nature of nonviolent protest involving a struggle and tactics that stand in stark contrast to its violent opposite, it is plausible that media coverage underlines these contrasts and the moral high-ground of the campaign (Bob, 2005). I argue that the nonviolent campaigns that receive favourable ITMC will benefit from it, meaning that I do not consider the consequences of negative framing or audience rejection of a campaign.

Nonviolent campaigns might face harsh oppression or fail to build local support. When this happens, it is likely that the campaign starts looking for outside allies (Dudouet, 2015, p. 3).

Local activists can then decide to engage the media in an attempt to create foreign interest in the conflict. In order to understand the motivations and considerations behind seeking ITMC, I look to the Boomerang-effect presented by Keck and Sikkink (1998). This understanding of campaign strategy outline what is generally expected to be the result of involving international audiences in conflicts with a nonviolent party. The route of the 'boomerang' begins with a campaign that is weak when compared to the forces it is in conflict with. The campaign then throws the 'boomerang' and moves the conflict to the international level in an attempt to trigger forms of international leverage back at the domestic level (Dudouet, 2015, p. 171-172). When looking for outside support, the campaign attempts to curve "around local state indifference and repression to put foreign pressure on local policy elites" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 200). The nonviolent campaigns then attempt to secure global media attention in order to "publicize local atrocities or to secure external allies that pressure targeted states" (Kurtz & Nepstad, 2012, p. 214).

ITMC is the gatekeeper making the mechanisms of the Boomerang-effect possible, as it connects worn-out nonviolent campaigns with potential external support and infusions of resources. The benefits from such efforts can be that the international attention and responses "can amplify the demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo back these demands into the domestic arena" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 171). The idea of the Boomerang-effects is suitable to illustrate how nonviolent campaigns expect ITMC to instigate international attention, but less how this attention will translate into external response to the conflict.

To understand how ITMC brings about international responses and external support to conflicts, the CNN-effect offers an interesting perspective. The CNN-effect is a theory of media influence, suggesting that media attention can lead to policy change through public outrage and demands for action (Robinson, 2005). The model serves as a comprehensive way to approach how media interacts with conflicts, functioning as a hypothesis in which one assumes that "the media determine the national interest and usurp policy-making from elected and appointed officials" (Gilboa, 2006, p. 605). Television, in particular, is considered to have an influence on policy through the formation of public opinions and public. Originating in the post-Cold War era, the CNN-effect has been greatly debated and the concept has not been sufficiently

validated (Gilboa, 2006, p. 607). However, the framework suggests mechanisms by which international media directly influences responses to conflict. This is based on how politicians and officials have "testified that pictures of humanitarian crises forced them to intervene militarily in conflict regions to prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing" (Gilboa, 2006, p. 607).

Although the CNN-effect points to how ITMC builds awareness of world-wide events and conflicts, the direct effects of public demands seem exaggerated and oversimplified. As a supplementary argument to the CNN effect, I propose that ITMC can bring about international responses through other means than public outrage itself. One way of understanding this is by looking to the origin of the international media coverage. Western democracies, and followingly western media, is particularly inclined to be attentive to public demands. While there is no straight line between public response and policy, a system characterised by polls and elections put some restrictions on policymakers with regards to their ambitions of re-elections and party affiliations. The primarily Western location of many news broadcasters coincides with how many authoritarian regimes depend on western, democratic patron states, both vulnerable to the iron cage of liberalism (Ritter, 2015b). In this sense, ITMC and the potential attention granted to a conflict can put pressure on relevant decision-making actors, making external support more likely to be initiated when ITMC takes place.

In especially democratic states, calls for justice and the right to vote, can inspire to greater NGO presence and for example financial external support – either through economic sanctions targeting the regime or through financial aid to nonviolent campaigns. Nordenson's (2018) example illustrates this effect, as he refers to how the US became unable to ignore the calls for democracy during the Arab Spring due to international sympathies (p. 186). The likelihood of external support through for example financial means, is therefore likely to increase as a nonviolent campaign receives ITMC. In a mediated society, democratic leaders can have a hard time justifying continued support to regimes that have been revealed as repressive through ITMC. Although I do not suppose that this effect is likely to be as clear as what is described within the CNN effect, the reliance on the public through elections and polls is likely to be considered by policymakers and elected officials.

I find that the ideas of Ritter (2015b), regarding the 'Iron Cage of Liberalism', is in support of my argument. Ritter (2015b) builds an argument of how alliances between authoritarian regimes and democracies can limit both parties' room to manoeuvre. Authoritarian regimes with relations and alliances to western states have made a rhetorical commitment to democratic rights and are therefore in violation of these rights if they apply violent means to stop nonviolent protests (p. 7). An authoritarian regime can then be caught in the 'iron cage' when facing a nonviolent campaign, as it has to balance the commitment to democratic principles with the need to limit the power of a nonviolent campaign. Because the regime in question acts with its dependency and reliance on Western patronage in mind, the nonviolent campaign is more likely to succeed (p. 215). Within the 'iron cage', the authoritarian regime's ability to suppress nonviolent campaigns is lowered, as it involves undemocratic actions which in turn makes it harder for patron states to continue their support (Ritter, 2015b, p. 217).

If international media were to transmit messages of overt repression in authoritarian regimes through naming and shaming processes, Ritter (2015b) argues that Western leaders have limited options. It would also be difficult for the patron state to continue its support of an authoritarian regime while a nonviolent campaign attempts to install democracy. ITMC might therefore force democratic patron states to withdraw its official state support, which is a type of external support that will benefit nonviolent campaigns because it involves loss of for example economic cooperation. Although the agenda of the patron state is not necessarily to aid the nonviolent campaign, the end result is still that the campaign will receive better conditions or success as a consequence of external support. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) have further pointed at how the withdrawal of support from patron states can create a situation where the campaign forces regime elites to choose sides in the conflict (p. 197). In such cases, "persistent media coverage may be a necessary element in drawing attention to and galvanizing support for a campaign" (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 197-198).

The relationships described within the 'Iron Cage of Liberalism' can be seen in connection with how the international system is organised. The international system was previously dominated by liberal-democratic states, such as the USA and the EU (Roberts, 2011, p. 776). Today, we see that an increasing number of states are dependent on support from China and Russia. As more regimes depend on authoritarian patrons, it represents a world order potentially less

vulnerable to the 'Iron Cage of Liberalism'. These states can function as more accepting patrons with regards to authoritarian behaviour and repression of nonviolent campaigns.

A comparison of means within the NAVCO 2.1 data reveals that campaigns receiving higher levels of media attention see withdrawal of official state support more often and the implementation of sanctions directed at the opposing regime. This is in accordance with my expectations. This can be seen in Table 1A in Chapter 9.0. It is important to note that these numbers are just explanatory and that they do not reveal a causal direction. It is however consistent with my argument, as the correlation reveals a connection between elements of external support and ITMC.

Figure 1. Causal diagram of how ITMC increases the likelihood of success through external support.



3.3.4 ITMC and Lowered Repression

Building on the processes outlined in the previous argument, I propose that ITMC of nonviolent campaigns can result in the opponent regime lowering its repression. Through for example the Boomerang-effect (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), there is an expectation that involving the international community can breathe new life into a struggling campaign by increasing external support. If a nonviolent campaign receives ITMC, the goals and the potential hardships of the campaign will be communicated to foreign audiences. As the previous

argument establishes how external support to nonviolent campaigns have damaging effects on the opposing regime, it is important to consider the responses made by the opposing regime when a nonviolent campaign receives favourable ITMC.

I argue that in situations where nonviolent campaigns receive favourable ITMC, regimes are likely to lower the repression of nonviolent campaigns in an attempt to stall the expected responses to naming and shaming through ITMC. Authoritarian regimes with western patron states are within the logic of the 'Iron Cage of Liberalism' bound by democratic commitments (Ritter, 2015b). The naming and shaming through ITMC can broadcast potential repression and violations of democratic ideals. As a democratic patron state cannot accept this behaviour, an authoritarian regime should expect repercussions if its actions are shamed and exposed through ITMC. By virtue of having a western patron, a regime may therefore change its behaviour when it is exposed through ITMC. The authoritarian regime would have to suspend the repressive actions in order to sustain the cooperation with a potential patron state.

I argue that the opposing regime wants to avoid the public scrutiny because of the costs of losing support from its patron state and other relevant supporters. Authoritarian regimes often depend on support from western states (Ritter, 2015b, p. 17), and the withdrawal of support from a patron state can be a huge cost. Subtle state withdrawals of military aid or economic aid can be dramatic, leaving lowered repression to be an acceptable price to pay. There are trade-offs to consider and retaining the backing of patron states can be considered more important for the viability of the regime than the nonviolent campaign it faces.

Lowering repression can then be a tactic to reduce the incentives of further ITMC and to assure a potential patron of continued commitment. Through domestic media it can be possible to control the information within the authoritarian state, but through ITMC and especially in combination with social media an authoritarian regime will have less power to shape the narrative. The most functional option, besides engaging in an information war, is to actually act in ways that change the situation being reported on through ITMC.

By lowering its repression of the campaign, the regime removes the moral advantage of the nonviolent campaign and decrease foreign incentives for involvement. Lowered repression can signal that the conflict is de-escalating and possibly reduce demands for international involvement. This can reduce further ITMC, as the behaviour is no longer in stark contrast with democratic ideals. However, as lowered repression involves less strain on campaign resources, this move increases the likelihood of success of the nonviolent campaign. Lowered repression induced by ITMC can have positive effects on nonviolent campaigns. Citizens can be more likely to participate, as the expectation of less bad repression removes a threat. Thus, the adherence to democratic ideals can damage the regime, as protest size is a key mechanism to success. As efforts at the local level are more effective than outside involvement (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Dudouet, 2015), nonviolent campaigns might gain more from reduced repression than external support. The loss of potential external support through a reduced amount of ITMC is a less 'painful' cost than sustaining heavy regime repression.

In addition, it is interesting to consider what authoritarian regimes do in cases where nonviolent campaigns receive little favourable ITMC. In these cases, repression can be performed without international outcry and repercussions with regards to patron states. In this situation, one could argue that a movement that fails to attract ITMC is less likely to be succesful because the regime will face few international constraints on repression and does not really risk international support for the movement. This reveals how ITMC is at the center of my arguments.

Figure 2. Causal diagram of how ITMC increase the likelihood of success through lowered repression.



3.4 Summary of hypotheses

H0: High levels of ITMC do not increase or decrease the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding compared to cases that receive lower levels of ITMC.

H1: High levels of ITMC increase the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding compared to cases that receive lower levels of ITMC.

4.0 Research Design

In this chapter, I present a quantitative research design built to test the main expectations from Chapter 3, which suggest that ITMC increases the likelihood of success for nonviolent campaigns through motivating increased external support and reduced regime repression. First, I present the main properties of the datasets utilised in the analysis. Second, I describe the dependent and main independent variable, followed by a discussion of the control variables. Third, I present the methodological approach, namely logistic regression analysis. This is followed by a discussion of methodological challenges related to data inclusion and endogeneity.

4.1 Data

To test the main hypothesis from Chapter 3, I use the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) 2.1 dataset, version 2.0 (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019a). This dataset contains yearly data on 384 violent and nonviolent campaigns that are or have been active between the years 1945-2013. The NAVCO 2.1 dataset is organized as campaign-year data, which allows researchers to investigate changes over time within nonviolent campaigns. As the goal of this thesis is to understand how the level of ITMC influences the outcome of nonviolent campaigns, I excluded primarily violent campaigns from the dataset. From an original total of 384 campaigns in NAVCO 2.1, I kept the 183 cases registered as nonviolent campaigns for the analysis, resulting in 510 total campaign-year observations.

Campaigns must meet criteria related to goals and participation in order to be included in the NAVCO 2.1 dataset. First, the dataset only includes campaigns that "at one time or another held "maximalist" goals of overthrowing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupations, or achieving self-determination" (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b, p. 2). Second, campaigns must have had a total number of "at least 1000 observed participants in at least one calendar year, and a coherent organization linking episodes of activities to one another over time" (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b, p. 2). This criterion also ensures that only nonviolent protests that are functioning

as campaigns, meaning observable and recurring events with overt and documented tactics (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b, p. 3), are included in the dataset.

4.2 Dependent Variable

The main dependent variable in this thesis is a binary indicator denoting whether a nonviolent campaign is successful in a given year (1) or not (0). This is a variable from the NAVCO 2.1 data (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019a). Success is measured by whether a campaign achieved at least one stated maximalist goal within 1 calendar year after its end date. There are 419 observations within the 0-category, and 91 observations within the 1-category. The imbalance between these categories can be explained by how a campaign is only potentially registered as successful in the final campaign-year, meaning that campaign-years prior to the final year are registered as not successful.

4.3 Main Independent Variable

As I am interested in the effects of ITMC on success, the main independent variable in the analysis is the *in_media* variable from the NAVCO 2.1 dataset (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019a). The variable measures the extent of international traditional media coverage of a campaign, organized by three categories. The categories indicate whether a campaign received little to none (0), moderate (1) or high (2) levels of international traditional media coverage (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b, p. 25). The descriptive statistics reveal that there are 119 campaign-year observations of little to no ITMC, 178 observations of moderate ITMC and finally 209 observations of high levels of ITMC. For example, the Albania Anti-Communist protests (1989-1991) is coded as successful in the final year (1991) and shows an increase in ITMC from 0 (1989) to 1 (1990) and finally to 2 (1991). There are also variations in ITMC throughout a campaign, such as the within the Anti-Mubarak movement (2007-2011), where ITMC is registered as 0 (2007), 1 (2008), 0 (2009), 2 (2010) and 2 (2011). The Ukrainian Orange Revolution, lasting from 2001-2004, is coded as successful in the final campaign year and

ITMC is coded as 2 (2001), 1 (2002), 1 (2003) and 2 (2004). This illustrates how the ITMC of a campaign can increase in an ordered manner, but also fluctuate throughout a campaign.

4.4 Control Variables

I have included several control variables that may explain the success of nonviolent campaigns and why nonviolent campaigns attract high levels of media attention. The first set of control variables capture aspects of nonviolent campaigns and local events. These variables are derived from the NAVCO 2.1 dataset and consist of campaign-year data on campaign size (*camp_size*), degree of domestic media coverage (*dom_media*), violent flanks (*violent_flank*), security force defections (*sec_defect*) and campaign goals (*camp_goals*) (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). In addition, I control for structural factors through measures of GDP per capita, population size and political region. The control variables are included because previous studies have established them as important determinants of success, and they are also likely to drive the level of media attention. In the following I will provide theoretical explanations of how these variables are suitable controls for alternative explanations, and additionally describe relevant re-coding.

4.4.1 Campaign Characteristics and Local Events

Widespread participation is believed to increase the likelihood of success of civil resistance campaigns as increased participation can lower the cost of collective action and increases the chances for social ties between protesters and the elite opponent (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 46). Increased participation then make regime change more likely as the opposition reaches a critical level where concessions become less costly for the regime than repression (Kuran, 1989). I therefore include a measure of campaign size in the regression models. *Camp_size* is an indicator of the general size of the campaign organized in categories ranging from 0 (1-999 participants) to 5 (>1 million participants) (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b). The mean value of this variable is 2.29. Additionally, it is worth noting that high levels of participation reflected through the campaign size can make the campaign more likely to receive ITMC as large

nonviolent demonstrations are more likely to be covered by the mass media than smaller ones (Somma & Medel, 2019, p. 233). According to Tilly (1993) a display of numbers is one of four defining aspects of social movements, as a convincing display of numbers will communicate that the movement is influential and noteworthy (p. 8).

I further control for domestic traditional media coverage. Domestic news media can be state controlled, and it is likely that television and radio "will be put to full propaganda purposes when repressive regimes are challenged" (Cottle, 2011, p. 653). This will provide the population with information that can be faulty and incorrect. However, the emergence of new types of media and the development of ICT's can be expected to somewhat neutralize these effects, as the use of social media can circumvent traditional domestic coverage. Controlling for domestic media can reveal whether traditional media coverage at the local level succeeds in bringing about narratives that weaken nonviolent campaigns. Although unlikely, it is possible that international media coverage is reflective of local media coverage, as international newswires often draw upon local sources. The variable I use, *dom_media*, measures the degree to which campaigns were covered by domestic traditional media sources, ranging from 0 (little to none) to 2 (high), with a mean of 1.16 (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019b).

Violent flanks represent branches of nonviolent campaigns using violence. Previous research on violent flanks is somewhat inconclusive, presenting both positive and negative effects. Within the social movements' literature, one view is that radical flanks can positively affect the level of public support a movement receives, as such flanks make the nonviolent component of the campaign look like the reasonable and more appealing alternative (McCammon, Bergner, & Arch, 2015; Nepstad, 2015, p. 421). The literature on civil resistance, however, mostly supports the view that violent challengers undermine the leverage of the nonviolent struggle. Chenoweth and Schock (2015) argue that maximalist nonviolent campaigns rarely succeed because of violent flanks, but rather in spite of them (p. 447). Chenoweth and Shock (2015) find an indirect negative effect between contemporaneous violent flanks and the outcome of nonviolent campaigns, suggesting that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to succeed without the presence of violent flanks. As violent flanks represent the extreme and are in contrast with the main choice of protest of nonviolent campaigns, I expect the presence of violent flanks to have a negative effect on the likelihood of success for nonviolent campaigns. As I only include

primarily nonviolent campaigns in my analysis, the violent_flank variable indicates whether a campaign had no violent flank (1) or if it had a violent flank (2) in a given campaign-year. Violent flanks should also increase the potential ITMC a campaign can receive, as violence is found to attract media attention (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 36). However, this media attention may not be in favour of the campaign.

The security forces are a crucial pillar of support to the opponents of nonviolent campaigns (Merriman, 2009, p. 23). The *sec_defect* variable indicates whether a regime lost support from the military and/or the security forces through defections or loyalty shifts, coded as yes (1) or no (0). Nonviolent campaigns that have grown to a notable size can induce loyalty shifts as soldiers become more likely to share a collective identity with the resisters (Hathaway, 2001; Nepstad, 2011, p. 129). Security force defections weaken the regime as it represents a withdrawal of consent from a physical and central pillar of support. Security force defections can be a result of increased ITMC. This can happen if the media highlights the momentum of a campaign, possibly because the campaign has grown rapidly in size, which can affect security forces and their sense of loyalty.

Finally, I control for campaign goals (*camp_goals*). This is a variable with six categories, denoting whether the campaign goals were 'regime change' (0), 'significant institutional reform' (1), 'policy change' (2), 'territorial secession' (3), 'greater autonomy' (4), or 'anti-occupation' (5). I re-coded this variable into a dummy, where I combined goals 3, 4 and 5 into the reference category 'territorial goals', and goals 0, 1 and 2 into a category named 'political goals' (0). Svensson & Lindgren (2011) find that conflicts over territory are less likely to succeed than conflicts over government and regime. Campaigns with goals related to self-determination, with regards to both full independence and greater autonomy, challenge the horizontal legitimacy of the state. The objective is to achieve some degree of self-governance, meaning that the goal communicates dissatisfaction with the state as the representative of the community (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011, p. 103). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that maximalist campaign goals does not significantly influence the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns, but that both violent and nonviolent campaigns seeking secession are unlikely to succeed (p. 72-73). I therefore expect nonviolent campaigns with territorial goals to be less likely to succeed than those with political goals.

Relevant to all controls I have presented above is the potential links between the controls and media coverage. This reveals how media coverage potentially links the controls to each other, and that they partially function through media coverage in increasing the likelihood of success. To control for these relationships, I have performed commands to test the in-model correlations. These are presented in section 5.3.

4.4.2 Structural Controls

The second set of control variables are of a structural nature. In order to control for structural influences, I merged the NAVCO 2.1 data with data from V-DEM version 10.0. This allowed me to include measures of population size (*e_wb_pop*), log GDP per capita (*e_migdppc*), polyarchy (v2x_polyarchy) and political region (*e_regionpol_6C*) from V-dem (Coppedge et.al., 2020). In order to avoid potential bias produced by skewed distributions, I have log-transformed GDP per capita. I expect poorer countries with less developed economies to struggle with producing organizations that are effective in civil resistance, i.e. trade unions. Economic modernization may increase the relative strength of groups that are likely to participate in nonviolent campaigns, such as the urban middle class or organized labour (Ansell & Samuels, 2010). Additionally, the media tend to focus on events in richer countries, justified through the greater political, economic, and cultural influence in these areas (Chang, Lau & Xiaoming, 2000; Chang, 1998; Ramos et.al., 2007, p. 396). The variables has also been lagged by one year, in order to account for the relative effects of GDP.

Because participation is key to nonviolent protest (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), I have included a measure of total population size. Population is log-transformed according to the same logic as with GDP per capita. Population represents the available pool of participants in a nonviolent campaign, with a large population representing an equally large mobilization potential. Larger populations represent greater possibilities for diverse participation, where people of different age, ethnicity, language, gender, and socioeconomic background together make it harder for the oppressor to target the campaign (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 40). A larger population also means that the pool of available participants is higher, thus also making the campaign more likely to receive ITMC (Somma & Medel, 2019, p. 233).

I also control for quality of institutions using the polyarchy-variable from V-dem (Coppedge et.al, 2020). I expect democratic countries to receive more attention, and countries with more developed institutions in general (Chang, 1998). This variable is also lagged by one year. Finally, I include a control for political region, containing six political-geographic regions. These are built from a combination of geographical proximity and characteristics contributing to regional understandings (Coppedge et.al., 2020). I include this control because both international news media and other efforts fronting for example human rights concerns are imbalanced with regards to geography (Bob, 2005). It is also possible that there are region-specific reasons why countries experience successful nonviolent campaigns. For example, the middle-east has previously been considered a region where it is hard for nonviolent campaigns to succeed, although the Arab Spring partially proved otherwise. It is therefore worth considering whether different political geographical regions reveal different likelihoods of success.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables from the main logistic model.

Statistic	*N*	*Mean*	*St.Dev*	*Min*	*Max*
Success	*563*	*0.1616*	*0.369*	*0*	*1*
ITMC	*559*	*1.12*	*0.790*	*0*	*2*
Campaign Size	*494*	*2.229*	*1.267*	*0*	*5*
Domestic Media	*525*	*1.162*	*0.875*	*0*	*2*
Violent Flank	*558*	*1.611*	*0.488*	*1*	*2*
Security Force Defections	*552*	*0.1558*	*0.363*	*0*	*1*
Campaign goals	*562*	*1.690*	*2.030*	*0*	*5*
Campaign Duration	*562*	*8.689*	*5.416*	*1*	*52*
Polyarchy	*492*	*0.187*	*0.244*	*0.012*	*0.906*
GDP per capita logged, t+1	*415*	*8.540*	*0.975*	*6.340*	*10.891*
Population, logged	*402*	*16.540*	*1.670*	*12.620*	*20.840*
Political geographical region	*485*	*3.593*	*1.782*	*1*	*6*

4.5 Statistical Model

I use binomial logistic regression to examine the association between ITMC and the success of nonviolent campaigns. Logistic regression is appropriate because the dependent variable is dichotomous. This allows me to effectively model the probability of a categorical response variable with two outcomes. The logistic model assumes an S-shaped relationship between the independent variables and the probability of an event, which allow the effects to vary over different levels of the independent variables (Long, 1997, p. 39). The coefficient represents the effect of a unit change in the independent variable on the natural logarithm of the odds of the dependent variable (Kwak & Matthews, 2002, p. 406).

4.6 Methodological Challenges

An overall issue when studying nonviolent campaigns is that of missing information and underreporting. This issue is present in the NAVCO 2.1 dataset, where a concern is how the nonviolent campaigns included are biased towards success (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 6). The campaigns that are most commonly reported are large and mature campaigns, whereas would-be nonviolent campaigns that are crushed at their early beginnings are underreported in the data (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 7). The implication of this limitation is that the findings in this thesis are applicable only to 'major' campaigns, with sustained participation over time. Short-lived campaigns that are excluded from the dataset are also likely to not have received media coverage, meaning that this bias is potentially problematic with regards to the link to ITMC as well. Empirical findings in this thesis regarding the effect of ITMC on success will therefore only apply to 'major' nonviolent campaigns.

There are some potential issues to address related to endogeneity. A key threat to the validity of the analysis is that of reverse causality. Does ITMC cause success, or does success bring about increases in ITMC? The risk of reverse causality is present, as it is possible that campaigns can receive more ITMC because they are successful. This can happen as the media starts paying more attention to campaigns that are gaining momentum and looking to become successful. However, I address this issue by controlling for campaign size and security force defections - variables with the strongest association with nonviolent campaign success in

previous research. Indeed, the estimates are likely to be conservative because ITMC could cause higher levels of participation or make it more likely that the security forces defect. Such indirect effects on success generated by ITMC are 'controlled' for and removed by the models. As such, these are likely to be conservative estimates.

Regarding the potential risks of reverse causality, it is also important to take note that the independent variable is measured before the dependent variable. The ITMC variable captures aggregate yearly media coverage, and coverage after a campaign's end date is not included. When ITMC post success is ignored, the dataset and models will only reveal the relationship between ITMC and success before the point of success (C. Shay, personal communication, May 21, 2020). As I control for probability of success and know that ITMC is measured before success, I have minimized the risk of reverse causality.

Logistic regression models are sensitive to omitted variable bias (Kennedy, 2003, p. 268), and this can result in coefficient estimates that are significantly biased towards zero. If I fail to control for a necessary alternative explanation, this can lead to the coefficients being too large. This means that the potential benefits from building a restricted model comes at the expense of committing type II errors, meaning the failure to reject a false null hypothesis. By leaving out relevant variables the model can attribute the effect of the omitted variable to those that are included. In order to avoid this, I have attempted to include controls that previous research have pointed to as relevant in influencing the dependent variable. I also add additional controls in the robustness checks in Chapter 5.

5.0 Results

In this chapter I present the results from the statistical analysis. The theoretical framework suggested one main hypothesis, where I expect higher levels of favourable ITMC to increase the likelihood of the success of nonviolent campaigns. The presentation of the empirical results will proceed in four stages. First, I present some descriptive statistics to provide a preliminary look at the data. This is followed by a presentation of the main results from the logistic regression models. Further, I assess the robustness of the findings in the main model. Finally, I perform an empirical extension where I investigate the effects of ITMC on campaign outcomes over different periods of time.

5.1 Descriptive statistics

Before exploring the main analyses, a preliminary look at the data can contribute with some initial insights. Table 2 and 3 present the average level of ITMC in failed and successful nonviolent campaigns organised by campaign years (Table 2) and aggregated campaigns (Table 3). The comparison of means level of ITMC across successful and failed campaigns reveals that campaigns that are successful have an overall higher mean level of ITMC. This is in line with my expectations and main hypothesis. Although the tables reveal that the mean level of ITMC is higher in campaigns that are successful, the model does not control for alternative explanations and does not serve as a basis for any causal inferences.

Table 2. Comparison of average level of ITMC across successful and failed campaigns in campaign-years.

Success	Mean ITMC
0 (failed)	0.912
1 (successful)	1.372

Table 3. Comparison of average level of ITMC across successful and failed aggregate campaigns.

Success	Mean ITMC
0 (failed)	1.058
1 (successful)	1.444

5.1.1 Success

The dependent variable in this thesis is success. The percentage distribution of campaign-years within the dependent variable reveals that 82.16 % of all campaign years are registered as not successful while 17.84 % of campaign years are labelled successful. Roughly half of all nonviolent campaigns in the data are registered as successful within 1 year after the campaign ended, with a mean of 0.499. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of success over time and reveals the that the success-rate of nonviolent campaigns have varied over time, with periodic spikes in the success-rate. The recent decline in the average success rate of nonviolent campaigns is visible and has been recorded elsewhere (Chenoweth, 2016).

Figure 3. The success-rate of nonviolent campaigns over time.



In Figure 4 I combine data on the success rate over time with the number of active nonviolent campaigns per year. This allows me to identify the proportion of all campaigns that were eventually successful each campaign year. Around the year 1990 there were many active nonviolent campaigns, and from the year 2000 there has been a steady increase in the number of active campaigns. Figure 3 and Figure 4 together show how a proportionally lower number of nonviolent campaigns have succeeded each year from around the year 2000, revealing that the increasing numbers of active nonviolent campaigns are failing more often than they succeed. It is however important to note that several campaigns were registered as ongoing in 2013, the final year registered in NAVCO 2.1.

Figure 4. The number of active nonviolent campaigns combined with yearly success-rates.



5.1.2 ITMC

The independent variable in this thesis reveals the level of ITMC received by nonviolent campaigns per campaign-year. The percentage distribution by campaign-years within the independent variable reveals that a total of 23.52 % of all campaign-years are coded with little

to no ITMC, while 35.18 % of campaign-years have moderate ITMC registered, and 41.3 % have seen high levels of ITMC. Figure 5 reveals the ITMC rate over time, organized by campaign-years.

Figure 5. Plot of ITMC rate over time, organized by campaign-years.



From Figure 5 one can observe that the mean level of ITMC per campaign-year is slightly lower after around the year 2000 up until 2013, compared to previous campaign years. However, the average level of ITMC is fairly stable over time. Combining this information with the insights from the figures on success and ITMC, they together reveal how it is unlikely that the results are generated by an escalating success rate over time and better coverage of campaigns over time. Although the number of active nonviolent campaigns are increasing after the year 2000, the figures reveal that both the ITMC rate and the success rate is dropping. While Figure 4 reveals a significant increase in the number of active nonviolent campaigns, Figure 5 reveals that ITMC is not rising significantly over time and Figure 3 shows that these campaigns are not becoming systematically more successful over time. It is very unlikely that campaign success and ITMC are trending in the same positive direction.

5.2 Binomial Logistic Regression Results

This section presents the results from the main logistic regression models, where I test the association between ITMC and the success of nonviolent campaigns. As explained in Chapter 4, all estimates are based on logistic regression models of nonviolent campaigns from 1945-2013. The results are presented in Table 4, and all regression models are estimated using RStudio and R version 3.6.3. Table 4 contains the main results from the regression model. Model 1 present the effects of ITMC on success without controls, while Model 2 includes controls of campaign-level features. In Model 3 I add security force defections and campaign years. These controls have been established as strong determinants of success in previous studies and were added in a separate model because higher levels of ITMC could also cause higher participation rates or security force defections. Model 4 includes controls for structural explanations, with these being a measure of polyarchy, GDP per capita, population and political region.

In the models in Table 4 I have treated ITMC as a factor. This is done because we do not know whether the movement from little to none ITMC (0) to moderate ITMC (1) coverage is of the same magnitude as the as the movement from moderate ITMC (1) to high ITMC (2). With the same logic, I have also treated domestic media as a factor rather than using linear specifications. I have also run a model where I treat campaign size as a factor, but in Table 4 I am using the linear term as it provides similar results. In order to balance the risk of making a type I error, I set the level of significance for my hypothesis test at 5 % (Ringdal, 2013, p. 268). In cases where the p-value is less or equal to 0.5, I consider the results statistically significant. There is a risk of 5 % of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true.

Table 4. ITMC and the success of nonviolent campaigns, 1945-2013.

	Success			
	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
ITMC, Moderate Levels	1.680***	1.363***	1.320**	1.232*
	(0.454)	(0.473)	(0.588)	(0.631)
ITMC, High Levels	1.859***	1.209**	0.847	0.850
	(0.449)	(0.476)	(0.603)	(0.667)
Domestic Media, Moderate Levels		0.029	-0.058	0.328
		(0.383)	(0.446)	(0.491)
Domestic Media, High Levels		0.628*	0.163	0.083
		(0.325)	(0.390)	(0.446)
Violent Flank		-0.143	-0.258	-0.266
		(0.256)	(0.313)	(0.366)
Goals, Territorial		-2.021***	-1.528***	-2.193***
		(0.420)	(0.517)	(0.758)
Campaign Size			0.292**	0.350**
			(0.117)	(0.143)
Security Force Defections			1.747***	1.999***
			(0.318)	(0.388)
Polyarchy, t+1				3.193***
				(0.959)
GDP per capita, logged t+1				-0.238
				(0.246)
Population, logged				-0.242*
				(0.144)
Political Region, East Europe Central Asia				0.895
				(0.659)
Political Region, Latin America Caribbean				-0.489
				(0.686)
Political Region, Sub-Saharan Africa				0.174
				(0.734)
Political Region, Western Europe North America				0.410
				(1.013)
Political Region, Asia and Pacific				0.910
				(0.730)
Constant	-3.143***	-2.370***	-3.195***	1.444
	(0.417)	(0.596)	(0.773)	(3.315)
Observations	559	518	454	346
Log Likelihood	-233.536	-203.751	-150.034	-120.540
Akaike Inf. Crit.	473.073	421.502	318.068	275.081

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

5.2.1 ITMC and Success

I hypothesised that higher levels of ITMC would increase the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding. A preliminary look at the direction and significance level of the logits does to some extent confirm my expectations in H1. Throughout all models, both moderate and high levels of ITMC have positive coefficients, suggesting the expected increase in likelihood of success following increases in ITMC. Moderate levels of ITMC is significant within the set 5 % level in Model 1, 2, and 3. This suggests that campaigns receiving moderate ITMC are more likely to succeed than campaigns that receive low levels of ITMC. In Model 4 the results are significant to the 10 % level, which is outside of the set preferred 5% significance level in this thesis.

Concerning high levels of ITMC, the results in the model without controls (Model 1) and with basic-campaign level controls (Model 2) are significant within the 5 % level and reveals the expected positive coefficients. The positive value suggests that the likelihood of a nonviolent campaign succeeding is higher when a campaign receives high levels of ITMC compared to low levels of ITMC. In Model 3, where I add campaign size and security force defections, high levels of ITMC is no longer significant. Testing whether this was caused by adding security force defections or campaign size revealed that the significant effect remained when security force defections was added in the model. Adding campaign size made the significant result go away. ITMC might still have an effect if it drives campaign size, but I cannot disentangle these effects within this research design.

Up until the final model (Model 4), the results are supportive of the expectations within H1. The models provide significant results, revealing that moderate and higher levels of ITMC increase the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding. In order to understand the results at greater depth, I have interpreted the odds rate. This is the anti-logarithm of a logistic regression coefficient, and from the odds rate one can predict the percentage change in odds through the formula [100*(OR-1)] (Skog, 2017, s. 366). Because ITMC is treated as a factor, the interpretation is linked back to the reference category. The odds ratio represent the constant effect of a predictor on the likelihood that a specific outcome will occur. Calculating the odds based on Model 3, I find that the odds of success for nonviolent campaigns is 1.32 times higher when the campaign receives moderate ITMC rather than little to no ITMC.

In Model 4, neither of the ITMC-values are significant. In order to understand the null-effect in Model 4 regarding ITMC, it is valuable to consider if ITMC only matters for some cases, perhaps those cases with connections to the west. This study does not deal with who the patron is, but the explanation is plausible when considering the mechanisms within the iron cage of liberalism (Ritter, 2015b), as it suggests that liberal values and state-cooperation are central to external responses to conflict. If this is the case, the fact that I do not unpack these conditional effects might explain the 'null' results when all controls are included. Another consideration relates to the way ITMC is measured and organised, as it is possible that there is not enough variation at the 'top' level of ITMC to be able to differentiate between cases that received a huge amount of attention versus those who received a lot. The threshold for an effect could thus be higher than what is covered in the level of '2' in ITMC in NAVCO 2.1.

5.2.2 Controls

I control for several alternative explanations in my models. The first variable I control for is domestic media. With the exception of moderate levels of coverage in M3, the coefficients reveal the expected positive direction. The results are not significant. The violent flank variable reveals the expected negative direction on the coefficient, but the results are not significant either. The next variable I control for, campaign goals, is a dummy variable split between territorial goals and goals of regime change. The results are significant to the 1 % level in Model 2, 3 and 4, and the negative direction of the coefficient indicates that campaigns with territorial goals are less likely to succeed. This means that movements with the goals of regime change are more likely to succeed.

In Model 3, I control for campaign size through a variable organised in five categories of participant numbers. Campaign size is significant at the 1 % level, and the positive direction of the coefficient is in line with the expectations from the literature. Security force defections are also significant to the 1 % level, and the positive direction indicates an increased likelihood of success when security forces defect. As campaign size and security force defections is often found to be a strong indicator of outcomes, calculating the odds ratio is interesting for the purpose of the analysis. The odds of success is 7.382 times higher in campaigns where security

forces defect. Additionally, the odds of success is 1.42 times higher in campaign-years with one unit increase in campaign size. The effect of security force defections is very strong and is in accordance with previous findings (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 48).

I also measure strength of institutions through the polyarchy variable lagged by one year, which reveals a positive coefficient significant to the 1 % level. This is in accordance with the expectations concerning institutional strength and arenas of protest. The control for economic conditions, log GDP per capita lagged by one year, is not significant. I expected higher levels of GDP per capita to increase the likelihood of success, but Model 4 reveals a non-significant negative coefficient. The logged population variable does not satisfy the demand for significance at the 5 % level, and the negative direction of the coefficient is different from what I theorized. The political region variable holds no significant coefficients. It is factorised with Northern Africa and the Middle East as the reference category, where I was interested in contrasting political regions with a region that is traditionally expected to hold less beneficial conditions for nonviolent campaigns. With the exception of Latin America and the Caribbean, the positive direction of the coefficients indicate that the likelihood of success is larger for nonviolent campaigns located in other regions than Northern Africa and the Middle East.

5.2.3 Average Marginal Effects

Figure 6 shows the confidence intervals of both the independent variable and the controls. In the cases where these intervals do not cross the ‘zero’ effect line, we can be confident that the association is significantly different from ‘zero’. This is the case for campaign size and security force defections, variables that in Model 4 also had notable effects on success as calculated through the odds rate. Conversely, the variables measuring ITMC, domestic media and violent flanks cross the ‘zero’ effect line, and we cannot be sure that the ‘true’ effect is not in fact zero given the variation in the data.

Figure 6. 95 % confidence intervals of campaign-level variables.



5.2.4 Predicted Effects Model

Figure 7 and figure 8 illustrate the predicted effect of ITMC on success with confidence intervals and is based on Model 3 and Model 4 from Table 4. Within moderate levels of ITMC, the probabilities range between 7.5 % and 25 % and within high levels of ITMC they range between 6 % and 19 %. Little to none ITMC ranges from around 2 % to 9 %. The range of probabilities with 95 % confidence is slightly elongated in Figure 8, revealing the effect of including structural controls in Model 4. Overall, the figures reveal a rather limited effect of ITMC on success, and thus helps to understand the non-effect in the final model regarding higher levels of ITMC (Model 4). The maximum probability is at about 28 % in Figure 8.

Figure 7. Predicted effects of ITMC on success in Model 3.



Figure 8. Predicted effects of ITMC on success in Model 4.



5.3 Robustness Checks

In order to test whether or not my findings are merely a result of model specifications and the choice of data, I run a number of robustness tests to evaluate the sensitivity of the results. First, I included an additional control variable, campaign duration. This variable measures the number of years a campaign has been ongoing. It is interesting to control for time as it can be argued to be of benefit to nonviolent campaigns as more active years allows more elaborate strategies and the building of participation and organizational structure. On the other hand, the benefits of the momentum of mobilization also indicates that performing protests in a limited time window is beneficial (Chenoweth & Belgioioso, 2019). Adding campaign duration allows me to control for whether case media attention fluctuates over time in a predictable way. I also present a model with campaign fixed effects (Model 6). This allows me to isolate within-case variation and eliminate all the cross-case variation of previous models. The robustness checks are built on Model 4 from Table 4, and the results are presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Robustness checks.

	Success		
	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)
ITMC, Moderate Levels	1.232*	1.248**	0.055
	(0.631)	(0.632)	(0.067)
ITMC, High Levels	0.850	0.859	0.023
	(0.667)	(0.670)	(0.079)
Domestic Media, Moderate Levels	0.328	0.360	-0.080
	(0.491)	(0.496)	(0.079)
Domestic Media, High Levels	0.083	0.072	-0.085
	(0.446)	(0.448)	(0.074)
Violent flanks	-0.266	-0.255	-0.043
	(0.366)	(0.366)	(0.055)
Goals, Territorial	-2.193***	-2.490***	-0.094
	(0.758)	(0.858)	(0.234)
Campaign Size	0.350**	0.364**	0.065***
	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.020)
Securty Force Defections	1.999***	2.059***	0.452***
	(0.388)	(0.396)	(0.088)
Polyarchy	3.193***	3.356***	0.085
	(0.959)	(0.986)	(0.417)
GDP per capita, t+1	-0.238	-0.296	0.132
	(0.246)	(0.250)	(0.149)
Population, logged	-0.242*	-0.255*	0.569
	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.348)
Political Region, East Europe, Central Asia	0.895	0.889	-2.535*
	(0.659)	(0.660)	(1.298)
Political Region, Latin America, Caribbean	-0.489	-0.595	-0.631
	(0.686)	(0.693)	(0.581)
Political Region, Sub-Saharan Africa	0.174	0.087	-1.136
	(0.734)	(0.729)	(0.709)
Political Region, Western Europe, North America	0.410	0.475	1.453
	(1.013)	(1.032)	(1.110)
Political Region, Asia and Pacific	0.910	0.874	-0.754**
	(0.730)	(0.718)	(0.369)
Campaign Duration		0.044	
		(0.044)	
Constant	1.444	1.923	-9.567*
	(3.315)	(3.338)	(4.886)
Observations	346	346	346
Log Likelihood	-120.540	-120.126	33.171
Akaike Inf. Crit.	275.081	276.252	225.658
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Comparing Model 5 with the main results in Model 4 reveals that adding the additional control of campaign duration does not change the coefficients and significance levels drastically. The directions of the coefficients remain the same, and the most visible change is found in how moderate levels of ITMC is now significant to the 5 % level, rather than the 10 % level in the original model (Model 4). I consider this a minor threat to the validity of my results, as I do not draw strict conclusions regarding the effects of different levels of ITMC based on the final model alone.

In Model 6 I run a campaign fixed effect. The model only includes cases that were successful as it analyses whether changes over time within those cases can explain success. ITMC is not significant when I use campaign fixed effects (Model 6). This could be because of the limited within-case variation and the fact that unsuccessful cases are dropped. The full fixed effects model is available in Chapter 9.0 (Table 1B).

A central issue relating to the fit of the model is that of multicollinearity. If there are high correlations between my covariates this can lead me to accept false null hypotheses (type II error) as it produces imprecise standard errors. I have controlled for this by running a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test on Model 4. If the VIF scores exceed 10 it can indicate problematic correlations (Kennedy, 2003, p. 213). In my case, all VIF values are below 3, with the exception of political region with a score of 3.052. Performing this sensitivity check leads me to consider multicollinearity to be a minor threat to the validity of my results.

Table 6. VIF-scores of variables included in Model 4.

	GVIF	Df	GVIFDf
ITMC	1.633	2	1.130
Domestic Media	1.536	2	1.113
Violent Flank	1.201	1	1.096
Goals, Territorial	1.678	1	1.295
Campaign Size	1.397	1	1.182
Security Force Defections	1.238	1	1.113
Polyarchy	1.230	1	1.109
GDP per capita	1.439	1	1.199
Population	1.526	1	1.235
Political Region	3.052	5	1.118

5.4 Empirical Extensions

It is possible that the effects of ITMC have changed over time? As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a possibility that the effect of ITMC on nonviolent campaign outcomes may have changed over time, especially when considering the rise of social media. ITMC is not a stable force, and its role in society is ever-changing. Social media has through its quick pace and ability to bring live feeds from conflicts to a large extent become a relevant part of most campaign media strategies (Hunt & Gruszczynski, 2019). ITMC and social media often function in combination, but the growth in social media is still likely to affect how ITMC function and what effects it have. Exploring differences in the effect of ITMC on success over time allows me to reveal potential changes in the effect of ITMC in the era of new, digital media (Tufecki, 2017). Additionally, the media society described by Robinson (2002) through the CNN-effect, draws a picture of traditional media in the 1990s that supports the idea that ITMC was especially influential in this period of time.

As the main regression models do not find conclusive evidence for a general positive effect of ITMC on success over the time period of 1945-2013, I run a logistic regression model where ITCM is split into three groups based on periods of time. The first group reflects cases from the cold war era, spanning from 1945-1989. The second group is ITMC in the post-cold war period

from 1990-2005. This is in the period in which broadcast media was at its height, and the US and the EU dominated world politics. The last group captures the period with new media from 2006 to 2013, reflecting on the period in which social media came about. The results are presented in Table 7. In these models I have used the linear version of ITMC. This is because I get a perfect prediction problem when I treat ITMC as a factor. The issue is caused by how I get no successful cases without media attention, as the number of observations runs low when making the divide between time periods.

Table 7. ITMC organized by different periods of time.

	Success		
	Cold War (1945-1989)	Post-Cold War (1990-2005)	Social Media (2006-2013)
ITMC	-0.636	1.306**	-0.985
	(0.531)	(0.509)	(0.628)
Domestic Media	0.193	-0.888**	0.877*
	(0.459)	(0.441)	(0.518)
Violent Flank	-0.640	-0.763	2.678**
	(0.700)	(0.615)	(1.305)
Goals, territorial	-0.935	-2.144*	-21.377
	(1.501)	(1.199)	(2,464.545)
Campaign Size	0.746***	0.210	0.005
	(0.275)	(0.254)	(0.356)
Security Force Defections	2.389***	2.648***	2.965**
	(0.721)	(0.751)	(1.167)
Polyarchy, t+1	1.095	2.572	4.971*
	(2.250)	(2.048)	(2.560)
GDP pc, log t+1	-0.296	0.251	-0.223
	(0.416)	(0.417)	(0.421)
Population, log	-0.035	-0.566**	0.367
	(0.290)	(0.252)	(0.302)
Constant	-0.608	5.347	-12.610
	(6.860)	(3.936)	(8.144)
Observations	113	111	122
Log Likelihood	-35.126	-44.047	-28.004
Akaike Inf. Crit.	90.251	108.095	76.008

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7 provides several interesting results that may be basis for future studies. ITMC in the post-cold war era is significant, with a positive relationship between ITMC and success. This result is in line with the understanding of media outlined above, as mass media and the broadcast media was at its peak in this period. This period saw the introduction of 'heavy' media-theories such as the CNN-effect (Robinson, 2005), in a time where especially western households used TV and radio as main sources of information. Additionally, this period saw the US and the EU as global hegemons. Assuming that the expectations of my arguments holds truth with regards to the 'Iron Cage of Liberalism', liberal hegemons could increase the amount of external support received by campaigns or ensure lowered repression of nonviolent campaigns. The post-Cold war era represents a period before new media came into the picture. The association between ITMC and success here, where ITMC has different effects at different time periods, does not just reflect bigger protests or protests that received security force defections. The effect is likely to be independent of these major drivers of success.

The null-effect of ITMC in the social media era (2005-2013) could be explained by how the international system today is no longer dominated by the US and the EU as liberal-democratic states (Roberts, 2011). Russia and China have become autocratic backers of many states, meaning there are less democratic patron states and authoritarian recipients to be caught in the 'iron cage'. However, it is important to note that these understandings do assume some conditionality. I incorporate some understandings into the model, such as the expectation that external regimes should put pressure on other regimes not to repress protestors when there is a lot of media coverage. It is also interesting to see how campaign size is only significant in the time period prior to 1990. This could be something future research might unpack.

5.5 What are the Results?

The results from the main regression models in Table 4 reveal that there is a difference between receiving no ITMC and moderate levels of ITMC on the likelihood of the success of nonviolent campaigns. The general expectation in H1 is met. Moderate coverage is the level of ITMC with the strongest effect, and high levels of ITMC is not significant when adding established determinants of success and structural controls. In the robustness test where I add campaign

duration, moderate levels of ITMC also becomes significant. Overall the results point to a connection, but the intervals revealed in Figure 7 and 8 also tells us that we are talking of rather small effects. This is also clear when comparing the effect of ITMC with the strong effects of security force defections through the log odds. The results reveal that ITMC is likely to be one of several areas in which nonviolent campaigns benefit from, but that it is not the most effective. The regression models organised by time periods further revealed how increased levels of ITMC increased the likelihood of success in campaign-years in the post-cold war era (1990-2005). I have attempted to explain this by the rise of social media and the changes in the former hegemony of liberal powers in the international system.

To summarize, the findings of this empirical analysis are not completely consistent with the theoretical stipulations from Chapter 3. The main hypothesis is not confirmed in the main regression model with all controls, as I expected higher levels of ITMC to bring about higher likelihoods of success. Although the general link between ITMC and success does not exhibit significant results in the final model, I do find that ITMC had the expected effect on success in the post-cold war era (1990-2005). In the following chapter I will discuss the findings in light of previous research and theoretical insights.

6.0 Assessing the Evidence: Does ITMC Increase the Likelihood of Success?

In this chapter I evaluate the results from the empirical analysis in light of the theoretical stipulations from Chapter. While the general link between ITMC and success does not exhibit significant results in the final regression model, I did find that ITMC had the hypothesised effect on success in the post-cold war era (1990-2005). In the following I will discuss the relationship between ITMC and success by focusing on three main areas of discussion. First, I consider the time specific findings and discuss the interconnectedness of ITMC and social media. Second, the larger effects of local efforts on the success of nonviolent campaigns is discussed. Finally, I critically examine the chain of events necessary for the expected relationship between ITMC and success to take place.

6.1 ITMC and Social Media

In the empirical explorations section I found support for a time-specific period where the expected relationship between ITMC and success was present. In what I labelled the post-cold war era, spanning from 1990-2005, increased levels of ITMC is significantly correlated with increased likelihood of success for nonviolent campaign. The time-specific findings are largely supported by previous research. I understand this finding in light of how the large media conglomerates were at their height in this period, with linear TV and radio broadcast serving as a key source of information (Robinson, 2002). This can followingly describe the missing effect of ITMC in the following period from 2005-2013, as the use of social media is likely to have taken over some of the past roles of ITMC. Still, as pointed to by (Hunt & Gruszczynski, 2019), ITMC is essential to spread information as it goes beyond the social media echo chambers. It is however likely, both through the empirical findings and the theoretical considerations that the chain of events necessary for ITMC to increase the likelihood of success is even more complex in the final time period as social media is a part of the equation as well.

Another way to understand why this period reveals the hypothesised effect, is through the iron cage of liberalism (Ritter, 2015b) and more generally the dominating liberal world order at the

time. In the 1990s the US and the EU were at its hegemonial peak. Assuming that the mechanisms of the iron cage of liberalism are correct, it is plausible that this system can explain how ITMC increase the likelihood of success in this period. Their period of dominance was likely to be more sensitive to ITMC and the potential ousting of non-democratic behaviour in authoritarian regimes. The results can be understood by looking to the arguments regarding how patron state relationships are jeopardized through the ousting and naming and shaming in ITMC. I have argued that the iron cage is likely to drive the level of external support and the likelihood of repression being lowered. The iron cage can force both reduced repression of nonviolent campaigns because the authoritarian regime fears losing its patron, and increased support to nonviolent campaigns as democratic states become obliged to defend nonviolent campaigns struggling to build democratic developments. The changes in the international system, where Russia and China have become prominent state supporters, can be expected to be less limited by mechanisms such as the iron cage of liberalism.

6.2 Local Efforts and ITMC

By testing the effect of ITMC on success in general, I find some support to the expectation that ITMC increase the likelihood of the success of nonviolent campaigns. However, this effect is low compared to other determinants of success and is only significant when comparing moderate levels of coverage to low levels of coverage. Well-established factors included in previous research on success, such as campaign size, security force defections and campaign goals, have rather been confirmed as key determinants of success for nonviolent campaigns. The main regression model thereby confirmed what has been found in several other contributions, namely that local factors have the greatest impact on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns. This is in line with arguments posed by Dudouet (2015) and Chenoweth & Stephan (2011).

By comparing the odds rate of ITMC and campaign-level controls, I found that the effect of especially security force defections is much greater than the effect of ITMC on success. The results seem to favour those who underline how external support and international involvement should be a secondary priority in the strategy of nonviolent campaigns (Dudouet, 2015). This

can be explained by how the mechanisms that connect ITMC to success are complex. I will discuss this further in the next section. It is also possible to understand the lack of a general effect through the uncertain effects of external support applies by distant states, possibly representing the privilege problematic outlined by Pattison (2017).

6.3 Complex Mechanisms

One plausible explanation as to why the effect of ITMC is weaker than several campaign-level features relates to the amount of uncertainties involved in such a process. There are many links in the chains I have built to argue how ITMC can increase the likelihood of success. First, does the campaign actually manage to secure attention? Second, is the media attention granted positive or negative of the campaign? Third, is the attention only given by international traditional media, or is it also spread through social media? And next, do states and non-state actors get involved in the conflict following the coverage, and is it mostly caused by the coverage? I have explored how external support can be counterproductive as well, meaning that if a campaign sees this whole chain of events happen in their favour – there is still an element of insecurity regarding whether the external support received actually functions to the benefit of the campaign. This reveals a long chain of events that is vulnerable to unforeseen events, making the link between ITMC and success somewhat rocky at best. The mechanisms and chain of events necessary for ITMC to be of value to nonviolent campaigns is thereby uncertain, resource-demanding and a potential gamble.

It is important to note the possibility that ITMC increase the likelihood of success also through motivating domestic mobilization or that they further inspire to security force defections through building the sense of momentum and size of the campaign. This is somewhat problematic, in the sense that the logistic regression models are built with ITMC, campaign size and security force defections in the same models. The potential relationships between these variables can tamper with the results and are somewhat problematic controls that introduce post-treatment bias to my analysis. There is not much that can be done to reduce this issue, with the exception of using event level data in future studies. This would allow researchers to sort out what actually comes first.

6.4 Concluding the Discussion

The findings of this analysis are not fully consistent with the arguments proposed in Chapter 3. The results show how statements assuming great benefits accompanying ITMC of nonviolent campaigns should be moderated. I was not able to confirm previous arguments through the main regression model, which might suggest that the relationship between ITMC and success is not as general as previously thought. There could however be problems with the data available and selection bias. This analysis has shown how ITMC is not necessarily a vital key to nonviolent success, as there are several other more local processes that determine whether or not nonviolent campaigns succeed. Although I can confirm H1 when isolating the period of 1990-2005, the general link between ITMC and success reveals weak effects.

7.0 Conclusion

In this thesis, I have investigated a largely unexamined question in quantitative research on nonviolent campaigns: What is the effect of international traditional media coverage on the success of nonviolent campaigns with maximalist goals? Previous studies have largely asserted the importance of ITMC in securing attention vital to success or make claims based on a small number of cases. Building on previous work on the determinants of success, external support, and media theories, I have advanced two explanations of how ITMC can increase the likelihood of success for nonviolent campaigns. First, I have argued that ITMC can build sympathy and awareness that can increase external support to nonviolent campaigns, for example as patron states are inclined to withdraw its support of authoritarian regimes. Second, I have argued that the opposing regimes' anticipation of increased external support will motivate a lowering of repression in an attempt to disincentivise external support – thus securing more favourable conditions for the nonviolent campaign to operate.

Having established two plausible ways in which ITMC can increase the likelihood of nonviolent campaigns succeeding, I performed a logistic regression analysis. The results of the main logistic model point to ITMC having little general effect as a determinant of success to nonviolent campaigns. Well-established factors included in previous research on success, such as campaign size, security force defections and campaign goals, have rather been confirmed as key determinants of success for nonviolent campaigns. This is in line with arguments posed by Dudouet (2015) and Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) regarding how efforts at the local level have the greatest impact on outcomes.

I conclude that there is not enough evidence in this thesis to label ITMC as a stable determinant of success to nonviolent campaigns in the future. ITMC seems to have played the hypothesized role in the past, more specifically from the 1990s up until the social media era around the mid-2000s. My analysis suggests that ITMC as the gatekeeper of information to an international audience does not function solely as outlined in my arguments. This can be explained through how ITMC functions in combination with new types of media and through the increasing diversity of state actors dominating the international order. The mechanisms outlined in my

arguments hold water when applied to ITMC in the post-Cold war era, prior to the introduction of social media.

7.1 Implications of the Findings

This thesis has implications for the academic study of civil resistance because it suggests that the international media have played a fairly minor role in determining the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns, and that the effects of traditional media might not be as strong today. The very claims that motivated this thesis are therefore somewhat supported by my findings, as it is limited to the time period from 1990-2005. This means that nonviolent campaigns today, or those researching modern nonviolent campaigns, cannot expect that campaigns seeking and successfully receiving positive ITMC have a significantly larger likelihood of success than those campaigns who do not achieve ITMC.

The findings within this thesis may potentially also hold some value to those involved in nonviolent protest. My results indicate that ITMC has played a role in determining the success of nonviolent campaigns, but at the same time this effect is weaker than campaign-level features and is limited in time. It is possible to draw from the findings that nonviolent campaigns should primarily focus their efforts on local factors. My findings also suggest that statements concerning international media attention should be revisited as the evidence provided in this thesis suggest that ITMC is not actually functioning as the expected bridge between nonviolent campaigns and beneficial external support today. This is not to say that ITMC does not have a positive effect in some cases. These conditional relationships should be the subject of future research.

7.2 Limitations

There are several limitations within this study that requires some attention. As previously noted, the NAVCO 2.1 dataset only provides coverage until 2013. This means that the majority of the

campaigns included in my research operated within a time where TV and radio were the most commonly consulted sources of information. Additionally, many of the campaigns that were registered in 2013 were not completed and therefore may have been successful in later years. Another limitation within this study is how it only applies to nonviolent campaigns of a certain size due to the inclusion criterion in NAVCO 2.1, as well as the difficulty in registering all would-be campaigns that are "stopped" in their early days. It is also important to note that my hypotheses does assume some conditionality, as I expect the target regime to lower its repression of nonviolent campaigns because it fears international support of the campaign due to ITMC. I do not incorporate these expectations and this conditionality in my models.

Another issue relates to post-treatment bias. In order to fully estimate the effect ITMC, it would be necessary to know the effect of ITMC on participation rates and security force defections. This is unfortunately not possible using the NAVCO dataset, as these are measured in the same year. There could be an indirect effect between these. It is also possible that ITMC only matters for some cases, potentially cases where the regime is dependent on Wester states. Although I have not tested this, it is a plausible and theoretically grounded explanation to the partially weak findings.

7.3 Future Research

Quantitative work linking ITMC and success has been practically absent prior to this analysis, and further inquiries should continue researching ITMC over different periods of time. With the upcoming NAVCO 2.2 dataset it will be possible to test assumptions regarding ITMC on data up until 2019. This opens up for a more detailed investigation into the potentially changing role of ITMC in the social media era. The results in Table 7 reveals a need for further understandings of how traditional media interacts with new media, as the period of social media (2006-2013) did not find ITMC to have a significant effect on the success of nonviolent campaigns.

Overall, the functions and effects of ITMC still remains an interesting and valuable area of research, especially regarding how it functions along with new types of media. Further explorations of several dynamics related to ITMC is needed, for example with regards to political regions and the effect of campaign size at different periods of time. There is absolutely room for more detailed case-studies going in-depth about the role played by ITMC in specific conflicts with nonviolent campaigns. Another area that merits further exploration is the dynamics of external support. Although this study does not research how external support actually impacts nonviolent campaign outcomes, it reveals the need for further research on how it impacts nonviolent campaigns.

8.0 Literature

Ackerman, P. & Kruegler, C. (1994). *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Andrews, K. T. & Caren, N. (2010). Making the News: Movement Organizations, Media Attention, and the Public Agenda. *American sociological review, 75*(6), 841-866. DOI:10.1177/0003122410386689

Andsager, J. L. (2000). How Interest Groups Attempt To Shape Public Opinion with Competing News Frames. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, *77*(3) 577–592. DOI: 10.1177/107769900007700308

Ansell, B. & Samuels, D. (2010). Inequality and democratization: A contractarian approach. *Comparative Political Studies*, *43*(12), 1543-1574. DOI: 10.1177/0010414010376915

Bennett, W. L. & Segerberg, A. (2015). Communication in Movements. In D. Della Porta & M. Diani (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements* (p. 367-382). New York: Oxford University Press.

Binnendijk, A. L. (2009). *Holding Fire: Security Force Allegiance During Nonviolent Uprisings.* (Doctoral Dissertation). Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Bleiker, R. (2000). *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bob, C. (2005). *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Boothe, I. & Smithey L. A. (2007). Privilege, Empowerment and Nonviolent Intervention. *Peace and Change*, *32*(1), 39-61. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0130.2007.00408.x

Butcher, C., Gray, J. L. & Mitchell, L. (2018). Striking it free? Organized labor and the outcomes of civil resistance. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, *3*(3), 302-321. DOI: 10.1093/jogss/ogy010

Chang, T.K. (1998). All Countries not Created Equal to be News: World System and International Communication. *Communication Research*, 25, 528-63.

Chang, T. K., Lau, T. Y. & Xiaoming, H. (2000). From the United States with news and more: International flow, television coverage and the world system. *Gazette*, 62(6), 505-522. DOI: 10.1177/0016549200062006004

Chenoweth, E. & Belgioioso, M. (2019). The Physics of Dissent and the Effects of Movement Momentum. *Nature Human Behaviour*, *3*(10), 1088-1094. DOI: 10.1038/s41562-019 0665-8

Chenoweth, E. & Lewis, O. A. (2013). Unpacking nonviolent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. Journal of Peace Research, *50*(3), 415–423. DOI: 10.1177/0022343312471551

Chenoweth, E. & Shay, C. W. (2019a). *NAVCO 2.1 Dataset*. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: 10.7910/DVN/MHOXDV

Chenoweth, E. & Shay, C. W. (2019b). *Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project, Codebook.* Retrieved from https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/navco

Chenoweth, E. & Stephan, M. J. (2011). *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chenoweth, E. & Schock, K. (2015). Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns? Mobilization: *An International Quarterly, 2*(4), 427-451. DOI: 10.17813/1086-671X-20-4-427

Chenoweth, E. (2016) The Rise of Nonviolent Resistance, *PRIO Policy Brief*, 19. Oslo: PRIO.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, S. M., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Luhrmann, A., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Seim, B., Sigman, R., Skaaning, S. E., Staton, J., Wilson, S., Cornell, A., Alizada, N., Gastaldi, L., Gjerløw H., Hindle, G., Ilchenko, N., Maxwell, L., Mechkova, V., Medzihorsky, J., von Römer, J., Sundström, A., Tzelgov, E., Wang, Y., Wig, T. & and Ziblatt, D. (2020a). V-Dem Dataset v10.0. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. DOI: 10.23696/vdemds20.

Cottle, S. (2008). Mediatized Conflict: Developments in Media and Conflict Studies. *Media, Culture & Society*, 30(6), 853-872. DOI: 10.1177/0163443708096097

Coy, P. (2011). The Privilege Problematic in International Nonviolent Accompaniment's Early Decades. *Journal of Religion, Conflict, and Peace*, 4(2).

Davies, T. R. (2014). The failure of strategic nonviolent action in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria: 'political ju-jitsu' in reverse. *Global Change, Peace & Security*, *26*(3), 299-313. DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2014.924916

DeLuca, K. M., Lawson, S. & Sun, Y. (2012). Occupy Wall Street on the public screens of social media: The many framings of the birth of a protest movement. *Communication, Culture & Critique*, 5(4), 483-509. DOI: 10.1111/j.1753-9137.2012.01141.x

DeMeritt, J. H. R. (2012). International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives? *International Interactions*, *38*(5), 597-621. DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726180

DeNardo, J. (1985). *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Djerf-Pierre, M. & Shehata, A. (2017). Still an Agenda Setter: Traditional news media and public opinion during the transition from low to high choice media environments. *Journal of Communication*, *67*(5), 733-757. DOI: 10.1111/jcom.12327.

Dudouet, V. (2015). Sources, Functions and Dilemmas of External Assistance to Civil Resistance Movements. In K. Schock (Ed.), *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle* (p. 168-202). Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Entman, R. M. (2004). *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Etzioni, A. (1970). *Demonstration Democracy*. New York: Gordon and Breach.

Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means*. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Gamson, W. A. (1990). *The Strategy of Social Protest.* Belmont, California: Wadsworth.

Gamson, W. & Wolfsfeld, G. (1993). Movement and Media as Interacting Systems. *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, 528(1), 114–25. DOI: 10.1177/0002716293528001009

Gardner, E. (2001). The Role of Media in Conflicts. In L. Reychler & T. Paffenholz (Eds.), *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide* (p. 301-321). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Gilboa, E. (2006). Media and International Conflict. In J. G Oetzel & S. Ting-Toomey (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Communication*, (p. 595-626). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Gilboa, E., Jumbert, M. G., Miklian, J. & Robinson, P. (2016). Moving Media and Conflict Studies Beyond the CNN effect. *Review of International Studies*, *42*(4), 654-672. DOI:10.1017/S026021051600005X

Giugni, M. G. (1998). Was it worth the effort? The outcomes and consequences of social movements. *Annual review of sociology*, *24*(1), 371-393. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.371

Hamid, S. (2009). Islamists and Nonviolent Action. In M. Stephan (Ed.), *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East* (p. 65-78). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hathaway, J (2001). *Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in comparative perspective*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Hopgood, S. (2006). *Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Hubbard, A. S. (1990). "Killing the Messenger": Public Perceptions of Nonviolent Protest. In V. K. Kool (Ed.), *Perspectives on Nonviolence* (p. 118-127). New York: Springer.

Hunt, K. & Gruszczynski, M. (2019). The influence of new and traditional media coverage on public attention to social movements: the case of the Dakota Access Pipeline protests. Information, Communication & Society, 1-17. DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2019.1670228

ICNC (2020). *External Support for Nonviolent Campaigns.* Retrieved from https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/external-support-for-nonviolent-campaigns/

Jaafar, R. & Stephan, M. (2009). Lebanon's Independence Intifada: How an Unarmed Insurrection Expelled Syrian Forces. In M. Stephan (Ed.), *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East* (p. 169-184). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Jackson, J. A., San-Akca, B. & Maoz, Z. (2020). International Support Networks and the Calculus of Uprising. *Journal of Peace Research*, 1-16. DOI: 10.1177/0022343319885181

Jasper, J. M. (1997). *The art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jennings, W. & Saunders, C. (2019). Street Demonstrations and the Media Agenda: An Analysis of the Dynamics of Protest Agenda Setting. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(13-14), 2283-2313. DOI: 10.1177/0010414019830736

Johansen, J. (2010). Analysing External Support to Nonviolent Revolutions. In J. Johansen & J. Y. Jones (Eds.), *Experiments with Peace* (p. 103-114). Cape Town: Pambazuka Press.

Johnson, E. W., Agnone, J. & McCarthy, J. (2010). Movement Organizations, Synergistic Tactics, and Environmental Public Policy. *Social Forces*, 88 (5), 2267-2292. DOI: 10.1353/sof.2010.0038

Keck, M. E. & Sikkink, K. (1998). Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Movement Society. In D. S. Meyer & S. Tarrow (Eds.), *The Social Movement Society*, (p. 217-238). Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Kenix, L. J. (2011). *Alternative and Mainstream Media. The Converging Spectrum*. London: Bloomsbury Academic

Kennedy, Peter. 2003. *A Guide to Econometrics*. Boston, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Kuran, T. (1989). Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution. *Public Choice, 61*(1), 41–74. DOI: 10.1007/BF00116762.

Kurtz, L. R., & Nepstad, S. E. (2012). *Nonviolent Conflict and Civil Resistance*. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Kwak, C. & Clayton-Matthews, A. (2002). Multinomial logistic regression. *Nursing research, 51*(6), 404-410.

Long, S. (1997). Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. California, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications

Marinov, N. (2005). Do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders? *American Journal of Political Science, 49*(3), 564-576. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00142.x

Martin, B. & Varney, W. (2003a). Nonviolence and communication. *Journal of Peace Research, 40*(2), 213-232. DOI: 10.1177/0022343303040002005.

Martin, B. & Varney, W. (2003b). *Nonviolence speaks: Communicating Against Repression*. Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press.

McCammon, H. J., Bergner, E. M. & Arch, S. C. (2015). "Are you one of those women?" Within-movement conflict, radical flank effects, and social movement political outcomes. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 20(2), 157-178. DOI: 10.17813/1086-671X-20-2-157

Merriman, H. (2009). Theory and Dynamics of Nonviolent Action. In S. Maria J. (Ed.), *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East* (p. 91-106). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Nepstad, S. E (2011). *Nonviolent Revolutions. Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nojeim, M. J. (2004). *Gandhi and King: The Power of Nonviolent Resistance*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Nordenson, J. (2018). *Fra opprør til kaos: Midtøsten etter den arabiske våren*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Pattison, J. (2017). Unarmed Bodyguards to the Rescue? The Ethics of Nonviolent Intervention. In M. L. Gross & T. Meisels (Eds.), *Soft War. The Ethics of Unarmed Conflict* (p. 134-150). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pischedda, C. (2020). Ethnic Conflict and the Limits of Nonviolent Resistance. *Security Studies*, *29*(2), 362-391. DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2020.1722854.

Ramos, H., Ron, J. & Thoms, O. N. (2007). Shaping the Northern Media's Human Rights Coverage, 1986—2000. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(4), 385-406. DOI 10.1177/0022343307078943.

Ringdal, K. (2013*). Enhet og mangfold: Samfunnsvitenskapelig forskning og kvantitativ metode*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget

Ritter, D. P (2015a). Civil Resistance. In D. Della Porta & M. Diani (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements (p. 467-477). New York: Oxford University Press.

Ritter, D. P. (2015b). The Iron Cage of Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press.

Roberts, J. T. (2011). Multipolarity and The New World (Dis)Order: US Hegemonic Decline and the Fragmentation of the Global Climate Regime. *Global Environmental Change, 21*(3), 776-784. DOI: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.03.017

Robinson, P. (2005). *The CNN effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention.* London: Routledge.

Rucht, D. (2004). The quadruple 'A'. In W. Van de Donk, B. D. Loader, P. G., Nixon & D., Rucht (Eds.), *Cyberprotest: New media, Citizens and Social Movements* (p. 25-48), London: Routledge.

Rucht, D. (2011). Global justice movements and the mass media: conceptual reflections and empirical findings. In T. Olesen (Ed.), *Power and Transnational Activism*, (p. 190 213). Abingdon: Routledge.

Ryan, C., Carragee, K. M. & Meinhofer, W. (2001). Theory into Practice: Framing, the News Media, and Collective Action. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 45*(1), 175–82. DOI: 10.1207/s15506878jobem4501_11

Schock, K. (2005). *Unarmed insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies.* Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Schock, K. (2015). *Civil Resistance Today*. Cambridge: Polity.

Sharp, G. (2005). *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*. Boston, Massachusetts: Porter Sargent Publisher.

Shorter, E. & Tilly, C. (1974). Strikes in France, 1830-1968. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Skog, O. J. (2017). *Å forklare sosiale fenomener: en regresjonsbasert tilnærming*. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.

Somma, N. M. & Medel, R. M. (2019). What makes a big demonstration? Exploring the impact of mobilization strategies on the size of demonstrations. *Social Movement Studies*, 18(2), 233-251. DOI: 10.1080/14742837.2018.1532285

Stephan, M. J. & Chenoweth, E. (2008). Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. *International Security*, 33(1), 7-44. DOI: 10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.7

Sunstein, C. R. (2009). *Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Svensson, I. & Lindgren, M. (2011). Community and consent: Unarmed insurrections in non-democracies. *European Journal of International Relations*, *17*(1), 97–120. DOI: 10.1177/1354066109350049

Tarrow, S. (2015). Contentious Politics. In D. Della Porta & M. Diani (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements* (p. 86-107). New York: Oxford University Press.

Tilly, C. (1993). Social movements as historically specific clusters of political performances. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, *38*, 1-30.

Tufekci, Z. (2017). *Twitter and tear gas: The power and fragility of networked protest*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Vliegenthart, R. & Walgrave, S. (2008). The Contingency of Intermedia Agenda Setting: A Longitudinal Study in Belgium. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *85*(4), 860-877. DOI: 10.1177/107769900808500409

Walgrave, S., Soroka, S. & Nuytemans, M. (2008). The Mass Media's Political Agenda-Setting Power: A Longitudinal Analysis of Media, Parliament, and Government in Belgium (1993 to 2000). *Comparative Political Studies*, *41*(6), 814-836. DOI 10.1177/0010414006299098

Walgrave, S. & Vliegenthart, R. (2012). The Complex Agenda-Setting Power of Protest: Demonstrations, Media, Parliament, Government, and Legislation in Belgium, 1993 2000. *Mobilization*, *17*(2), 129-156. DOI: 10.17813/maiq.17.2.pw053m281356572h

Zunes, S. (2015). Questions of Strategy. In M. C. Hallward & J. Norman (Eds.), *Understanding Nonviolence* (p. 73-97). Cambridge: Polity Press

Zunes, S. & Ibrahim, S. E. (2009). External Actors and Nonviolent Struggles in the Middle East. In S. Maria J. (Ed.), *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East* (p. 91-106). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

9.0 Appendix

Table 1A: Means of sanctions and withdrawal of support relative to ITMC, NAVCO 2.1 data.

ITMC	Sanctions	Withdrawal of support
0	0.05932203	0.008849558
1	0.15819209	0.058139535
2	0.33653846	0.104477612

Table 1B: Logistic regression model with campaign fixed effects in M6.

	Success		
	(M4)	(M5)	(M6)
ITMC, Moderate Levels	1.232*	1.248**	0.055
	(0.631)	(0.632)	(0.067)
ITMC, High Levels	0.850	0.859	0.023
	(0.667)	(0.670)	(0.079)
Domestic Media, Moderate Levels	0.328	0.360	-0.080
	(0.491)	(0.496)	(0.079)
Domestic Media, High Levels	0.083	0.072	-0.085
	(0.446)	(0.448)	(0.074)
Violent flanks	-0.266	-0.255	-0.043
	(0.366)	(0.366)	(0.055)
Goals, Territorial	-2.193***	-2.490***	-0.094
	(0.758)	(0.858)	(0.234)
Campaign Size	0.350**	0.364**	0.065***
	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.020)
Securty Force Defections	1.999***	2.059***	0.452***
	(0.388)	(0.396)	(0.088)
Polyarchy	3.193***	3.356***	0.085
	(0.959)	(0.986)	(0.417)

GDP per capita, t+1	-0.238	-0.296	0.132
	(0.246)	(0.250)	(0.149)
Population, logged	-0.242*	-0.255*	0.569
	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.348)
Political Region, East Europe, Central Asia	0.895	0.889	-2.535*
	(0.659)	(0.660)	(1.298)
Political Region, Latin America, Caribbean	-0.489	-0.595	-0.631
	(0.686)	(0.693)	(0.581)
Political Region, Sub-Saharan Africa	0.174	0.087	-1.136
	(0.734)	(0.729)	(0.709)
Political Region, Western Europe, North America	0.410	0.475	1.453
	(1.013)	(1.032)	(1.110)
Political Region, Asia and Pacific	0.910	0.874	-0.754**
	(0.730)	(0.718)	(0.369)
Campaign Duration		0.044	
		(0.044)	
factor(id)5			2.931**
			(1.252)
factor(id)7			0.546
			(0.436)
factor(id)8			1.143***
			(0.420)
factor(id)10			-1.853**
			(0.853)
factor(id)12			1.532***
			(0.445)
factor(id)15			0.467
			(0.413)
factor(id)16			-0.246
			(0.534)
factor(id)18			0.574
			(0.432)
factor(id)21			-1.428
			(1.116)
factor(id)23			1.976**
			(0.998)
factor(id)24			0.019
			(0.667)

factor(id)25	-1.476*
	(0.774)
factor(id)26	-0.472
	(0.412)
factor(id)29	-1.261
	(1.426)
factor(id)30	-0.968
	(0.926)
factor(id)32	-0.455
	(0.571)
factor(id)33	-0.928
	(0.564)
factor(id)37	-0.937
	(1.274)
factor(id)38	2.541**
	(0.986)
factor(id)39	1.602*
	(0.928)
factor(id)41	0.550
	(0.518)
factor(id)43	0.377
	(0.394)
factor(id)47	2.623***
	(0.982)
factor(id)52	-2.196
	(1.410)
factor(id)53	-0.125
	(0.436)
factor(id)66	-2.514
	(2.026)
factor(id)68	-1.751*
	(0.959)
factor(id)71	-0.562*
	(0.339)
factor(id)73	-3.289*
	(1.749)
factor(id)86	0.916*
	(0.506)

factor(id)89	-2.229
	(1.424)
factor(id)104	-1.617*
	(0.907)
factor(id)106	-1.424*
	(0.808)
factor(id)118	-1.858
	(1.140)
factor(id)119	2.036*
	(1.039)
factor(id)125	-0.012
	(0.606)
factor(id)127	3.324**
	(1.488)
factor(id)130	0.654
	(0.431)
factor(id)132	0.331
	(0.377)
factor(id)133	0.329
	(0.457)
factor(id)138	3.228**
	(1.396)
factor(id)149	-0.022
	(0.927)
factor(id)151	0.886**
	(0.390)
factor(id)152	-1.228
	(0.796)
factor(id)158	-0.884
	(0.800)
factor(id)159	0.813*
	(0.438)
factor(id)163	-1.070
	(1.233)
factor(id)164	0.236
	(0.166)
factor(id)169	-1.114
	(1.006)

factor(id)171	1.154**
	(0.573)
factor(id)172	1.144**
	(0.569)
factor(id)173	2.073***
	(0.554)
factor(id)183	2.862**
	(1.251)
factor(id)185	0.289
	(0.269)
factor(id)190	2.646*
	(1.421)
factor(id)191	0.484
	(0.519)
factor(id)194	-1.033
	(1.048)
factor(id)206	1.024**
	(0.468)
factor(id)210	0.045
	(0.488)
factor(id)211	-0.444
	(0.518)
factor(id)212	-1.018
	(0.845)
factor(id)213	-0.098
	(0.848)
factor(id)214	0.111
	(0.895)
factor(id)222	-0.124
	(0.997)
factor(id)223	-0.202
	(1.002)
factor(id)224	0.727
	(0.870)
factor(id)226	-2.752
	(2.045)
factor(id)227	-2.407
	(1.993)

factor(id)231	3.251***
	(1.128)
factor(id)239	0.266
	(0.670)
factor(id)240	1.923**
	(0.957)
factor(id)242	-1.746
	(1.322)
factor(id)243	0.324
	(0.289)
factor(id)248	0.545
	(0.393)
factor(id)249	1.428**
	(0.643)
factor(id)252	0.151
	(0.531)
factor(id)253	1.230*
	(0.654)
factor(id)254	0.326
	(0.360)
factor(id)255	0.055
	(0.600)
factor(id)256	-1.319*
	(0.704)
factor(id)257	0.416
	(0.459)
factor(id)259	0.228
	(0.452)
factor(id)260	1.831*
	(1.051)
factor(id)261	0.123
	(0.469)
factor(id)262	-1.725
	(1.195)
factor(id)266	-0.195
	(0.380)
factor(id)267	-2.130
	(1.821)

factor(id)268	-0.697
	(1.437)
factor(id)271	1.205**
	(0.466)
factor(id)272	0.673
	(0.453)
factor(id)273	-0.799
	(1.030)
factor(id)274	0.463
	(0.849)
factor(id)276	0.052
	(0.620)
factor(id)277	-0.548
	(1.169)
factor(id)281	1.539
	(1.062)
factor(id)282	-1.765**
	(0.790)
factor(id)283	-0.122
	(1.000)
factor(id)284	-0.182
	(1.004)
factor(id)285	0.937
	(0.581)
factor(id)286	0.749
	(0.502)
factor(id)288	-1.046
	(1.334)
factor(id)289	-0.235
	(0.451)
factor(id)290	1.797
	(1.131)
factor(id)292	0.859*
	(0.444)
factor(id)293	0.541
	(0.418)
factor(id)295	-2.078*
	(1.192)

factor(id)296	0.088
	(0.412)
factor(id)297	0.362
	(0.347)
factor(id)298	
factor(id)302	0.818**
	(0.393)
factor(id)304	-1.342
	(1.337)
factor(id)305	0.968*
	(0.558)
factor(id)308	-1.278
	(0.925)
factor(id)309	0.574
	(0.500)
factor(id)311	-0.678
	(0.547)
factor(id)312	-1.043*
	(0.550)
factor(id)314	0.692
	(0.518)
factor(id)316	-1.977**
	(0.812)
factor(id)317	-1.616*
	(0.873)
factor(id)318	2.362*
	(1.328)
factor(id)320	-0.708
	(0.453)
factor(id)321	-0.117
	(0.357)
factor(id)323	-0.354
	(0.519)
factor(id)324	-1.239
	(0.934)
factor(id)325	1.250**
	(0.602)
factor(id)327	0.588

			(0.359)
factor(id)331			-1.822
			(1.159)
factor(id)332			2.428*
			(1.260)
factor(id)333			-2.143*
			(1.119)
factor(id)335			
factor(id)338			
factor(id)339			1.000
			(0.642)
factor(id)340			
Constant	1.444	1.923	-9.567*
	(3.315)	(3.338)	(4.886)
Observations	346	346	346
Log Likelihood	-120.540	-120.126	33.171
Akaike Inf. Crit.	275.081	276.252	225.658
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

NTNU

Norwegian University of
Science and Technology