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DISCOURSE ON POWER

An analysis of the academic discourse on Pashtuns in North-West Pakistan

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A long, challenging period of my life has come to an end. Despite the odds, 2020 has been the year I finally finished my thesis. My years at NTNU have exposed me to research and perspectives which have inspired my commitment to learning. This thesis stems from my interest in the study of Islam and Women, which I was first introduced to at the University of Roehampton. Initially, I wished to focus on education and extremism in North-West Pakistan. Through the guidance of my supervisors, I directed my attention to the developments within the academic discourse.

I would first like to thank my supervisor Barbara Krawcowicz and Asbjørn Dyrendal. Barbara inspired me to look past my aversion to theory and embrace the challenge. Asbjørn dragged me kicking, screaming, and crying past the finish line. Thank you both for motivational and educational conversations and sound advice. Special thanks to Lydia Kay Douglas and Sam Leverton for proofreading and comforting me when I was at my lowest.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis compiles and analyses academic research on the developments in power and gender in the Pashtun regions of North-West Pakistan. The focus of this study is on the discursive developments from the 1960s until 2020. This thesis takes inspiration from Kocku von Stuckrad's discourse-historical analysis as a research perspective, as well as *traditional*, *conceptual,* and *scoping* literature reviews. The study applies these perspectives by organising the research chronologically, applying historical context, and critically exploring trends in the discourse.

The thesis aims to identify the most dominant focus of a given research period, and to discuss how the research has been influenced by the reproduction of stereotypes, colonial legacy, as well as western media and political discourse. The analysis identifies four main topics of discussion in the academic material: Pashtun social structure, gender, the "war on terror", and Islamic doctrine. In the latest decade, the discursive developments trend towards introspection and focusing on intersectional realities when approaching questions on Pashtuns in North-West Pakistan.

To highlight some of the intersecting factors which future research should build upon, the thesis focuses on two areas of study. The analysis of previous models of power allows the thesis to build on earlier research and construct a model of Pashtun power distribution. The "Pashtun Leadership Trinity"-model highlights the continued influence of tribal, religious, and administrative leadership. By analysing the intersection between *Pashtunwali* and orthodox Islam the thesis shows how those with authority legitimise and reproduce their power.

As North-West Pakistan continues to keep the attention of international interests, the production of academic literature will continue to flourish. The thesis concludes that the study of intersecting influences is vital to understand the factors which continue to prohibit lasting advancement in gender parity and peace in North-West Pakistan. Although previous research has been prone to negligent descriptive reduction, new academic production is trending towards the study of intersecting realities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

Academic researchers have long been fascinated with Pashtuns, their society, and the balance of power between individuals and groups. Early anthropological work created a foundation which has influenced most research since. Old models and analyses have continued to affect how international interests approach taking action in North-West Pakistan. Through the re-examination of academic literature, the production and reproduction of stereotypes, expectations, and assumptions become visible. Research on power and gender have dominated the discourse and will be the focus of this thesis.

Despite increased progression towards gender equality in recent decades, women and girls still face significant barriers to leading healthy, productive lives. Change has been uneven and incremental (United Nations, 2020), which is especially apparent in Pashtun dominated regions in North-West Pakistan. To understand why gender equality is still a theoretical concept rather than a reality in these predominantly rural areas, it is necessary to analyse a variety of intersecting factors that determine the everyday lives of their inhabitants. Pashtun society is highly patriarchal and tribal (Jamal, 2015), and Pashtuns consider themselves to be devout Sunni Muslims (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 833). The tribesmen of these rural regions have resisted enduring attempts of transformation and inclusion from the central government. They have instead relied on tribal and religious affiliation as the basis for identity and solidarity (Mann, 2006). Developments in gender equality in this region can be understood through the academic discourse and the historical developments on the borders of the Middle East and South-Asia.

In this thesis, I create an overview of research history on power and gender and analyse the structures of power described in previous research. This thesis sheds light on structures of power that both establish and limit women's autonomy. As Pashtuns consider themselves devout Sunni Muslims, Islam plays a dominating role in their lives. Discussions of religious doctrine, religious representatives and various interpretations of Islam are, therefore, necessary to understand the intersecting factors visible in the research material.

The limitations placed on girls and women are evident when evaluating education statistics. Achieving equal primary education opportunities in West-Pakistan has been a focus in academic research for decades. In 1973 Rodney Åsberg presented a formula which suggested that universal primary education was achievable by 2015 (Åsberg, 1973, p. 255). Data from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) shows that in 2018, the out-of-school rate for children of primary school age in Pakistan was at 19% for boys and 27% for girls[1] (UNICEF Data Warehouse, 2020, appendix 1). In conjunction with this, numbers from the Pakistani National Education Management Information System (NEMIS) from 2016-2017 show that in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) 25% of girls were out of school compared to 2% of boys. In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 51% of girls

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[1] In addition to this, only 64% of boys completed a primary school education, whilst the number for girls was at 55.4% (UNICEF Data Warehouse, 2020, appendix 1).

compared to 13% of boys were out of school[2] (NEMIS, 2018, p. 25, appendix 2). These numbers show that Åsberg's prediction did not come to fruition in West-Pakistan. Instead, the areas with a high Pashtun population have continuously performed statistically worse than other regions and provinces in Pakistan on the Gender Parity Index (GPI). Pashtun dominated districts in KPK and FATA will be the focus of this thesis because of this disparity, and because of the continued academic interest shown towards these regions.

The report from NEMIS claims that the low gender parity "is due to the socio-cultural constraints prevailing in tribal areas" (NEMIS, 2018, p. 27). The socio-cultural constraints implied are, amongst others, gender inequality, socioeconomic factors, tribal identity, and religious affiliations. These assumptions are observable in most academic research on gender and power in North-West Pakistan. Internal factors have dominated academic literature. Enduring external forces have not received much attention. Factors such as government education policies, colonial legacy, international government intervention, and the historic geopolitical situation (Jamal, 2016) have also played a significant role. By collecting, organising, and analysing trends in academic research, this thesis will show why both internal and external factors need to be examined.

I was interested in analysing the developments in Pashtun power structures over time. Most academic research has not accurately depicted the intersecting realities of the Pashtun power distribution. This thesis, therefore, focuses on developments within the academic discourse on power, Pashtuns, and gender. By using an intersectional approach, this thesis serves as an organised compilation on academic research and the historical developments in power and gender in the Pashtun regions of North-West Pakistan.

1.2 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND REFLECTIONS ON MATERIAL

1.2.1 RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE

Although no field of research can inherently claim that a method is theirs alone, the academic study of religion has always prided itself on borrowing from all disciplines. Stausberg & Engler claim that it is a "misconception to think that the study of religion\s is significantly different from other disciplines in its use of a variety of methods" (Stausberg & Engler, 2011, p. 4). Nevertheless, throughout our education we are presented with the idea that as scholars of religion, we are uniquely qualified to use intersectional approaches in our studies. The notion that scholars of religion borrow from other research fields, and the lack of methods distinctly related to the academic study of religion, has made space for a practice of not relying on one distinct method. In these cases, reflections on the research perspective become necessary.

My approach was inspired by Kocku von Stuckrad's critique of the academic study of religion. In Stuckrad's opinion, the academic study of religion is negatively affected by its ties to theology, colonial agendas, and an Eurocentric view of non-Western cultures (Stuckrad, 2013, pp. 5-6). While the legacy of theological study of religion and its critique

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[2] The Balochistan province also shows low gender parity rates with 44% of boys and 65% of girls out of primary school (NEMIS, 2018, p. 25, appendix 2).

is not directly relevant to my project, the colonial entanglements emphasized by Stuckrad are. The majority of research on Pashtuns reflects deeply embedded Eurocentric assumptions. Many early depictions created an image of Pashtun tribesmen as a barbaric and defensive population. As Ernest Gellner described it: "the popular Western stereotype of the Muslim as a fanatical turbaned tribesman on a camel – what one may call the T.E. Lawrence, North West Frontier or Beau Geste image" (Gellner, 1981, p. 100)[3]. It reduced Pashtun tribesmen to something distinctly "other" from "us Europeans" and categorised Pashtuns within the Western European value system (Smith, 2012, pp. 44-45). This image of Pashtuns became a lasting stereotype which is recognisable in academic and media discourse on tribesmen today. Due to the academic discourse having the potential to produce stereotypes, which influence political discourse and action (Stoddard, 2017), research on the scholarly literature on Pashtuns and the geopolitical context has been of interest to this thesis.

Stuckrad highlights that there is a need to transform the academic study of religion into a "discipline that operates within a rigorous and self-reflective interpretational framework" (Stuckrad, 2013, p. 5). I kept this critique in mind when collecting material. It motivated me to search for literature which either came from outside the Eurocentric framework, or research that directly challenged placing Pashtuns within a Western European value system (McCutcheon, 1999).

I was also inspired by Stuckrad's presentation of the discourse-historical analysis, not as a method, but as a "research perspective" (Stuckrad, 2013, p. 5). Stuckrad states that discourse analysis addresses "*the relationship among communicational practices and the (re)production of systems of meaning, or orders of knowledge*" as well as "*the social agents that are involved, the rules, resources, and material conditions that are underlying these processes, as well as their impact on social collectives*" (Stuckrad, 2013, p. 15). In my research, the (re)production of systems of meaning and the social agents involved were especially noteworthy when analysing how the limitations placed on women are legitimised and continuously produced. This approach allowed me to consider the production of power and gender amongst the Pashtuns in the context of the individual, and the broader collective.

Stuckrad goes on to explain that a "'Historical discourse analysis' explores *the development of discourses in changing sociopolitical and historical settings, thus providing means to reconstruct the genealogy of a discourse*" (Stuckrad, 2013, p. 15). Through my initial research, I realised that a historical perspective was necessary to understand the enduring factors in the academic discourse on Pashtun regions of Pakistan. By utilising the discourse-historical analysis as a "research perspective", I could rely on literature from multiple academic disciplines and place the literature in a sociopolitical and historical setting. I did not follow Stuckrad's recommendation for choosing a method. I will, therefore, not claim that I fully embraced the discourse-historical analysis. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that I am part of the discourse and that this thesis is a contribution to the overall academic literature on Pashtuns. By implementing this research perspective, I have

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[3] Sir Olaf Caroe, who served as the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) from 1946-47, published *The Pathans* in 1958. The book helped to solidify this romanticised view of Pashtun life, especially amongst the British. See Saigol for a discussion on how the British romanticised Pashtuns (2012, p. 201).

been able to study the construction and maintenance of meaning-making in the Pashtun community and how it has been represented in academic literature.

I also took inspiration from the literature review methodology. I found that *traditional*, *conceptual*, and *scoping* literature reviews all offered valuable perspectives for this thesis. As explained by Jesson, Matheson & Lacey, traditional reviews "usually adopt a *critical approach* which might assess theories or hypotheses by critically examining the methods and results of single primary studies, with an emphasis on background and contextual material" (Jesson et al., 2001, p. 76). Conceptual reviews "aims to synthesise areas of conceptual knowledge that contribute to a better understanding of the issues" (Jesson et al., 2001, p. 76). A scoping review "documents what is already known, and then, using a critical analysis of the gaps in knowledge, it helps to refine the questions, concepts and theories to point the way to future research" (Jesson et al., 2001, p. 76). Although I have not followed either of these literature review methods directly, the descriptions above illustrate the aims I had in mind when writing this thesis. I aimed to be critical of the material I collected, to present the discourse in a manner which could help peers more accurately untangle the complexities of the situation, and to contribute to the further expansion of the research field.

1.2.2 APPROACH

Initially, I started my research on the Pashtun dominated regions of North-West Pakistan by focusing primarily on education and the rise of the Taliban and the ideologies that supported their growth. As I read additional literature, I began to realise that the discourse within the academic research necessitated a closer inspection. In this process, my area of interest continued to widen to the extent where a topic for my thesis was no longer apparent. I narrowed the scope of my project to focus on power and gender as represented by academic research. By distancing myself from the sole focus on terror groups, my approach was now determined by what has been studied previously. This allowed me to show how early anthropological debate, developments in intersectional gender discourse, and political and media discourse on the "War on terror", dominated the approaches to academic research of the people and events on the borders of the Middle East and South Asia.

Considering the perspectives and aims presented above, academic literature on Pashtuns, from multiple fields of study, became the focus when gathering material. The collection of information began with two sources representing different perspectives on the lives of Pashtun tribesmen. This literature pointed me in the direction of more expansive areas of study. After this initial broadening of perspectives, I considered suggestions from supervisors and colleagues and expanded the base of my research. References in books, general searches on archives, and material alluded to as crucial in reviews, helped to broaden my list of literature. As stated, initially, I primarily focused on collecting research texts. As the process continued, government documents such as briefs and reports, as well as newspaper articles, became a part of my material. I found that most early research was primarily ethnographic, and the majority of newer research focused on extremism. Subsequently, I have considered other perspectives in PhDs or master theses to broaden my understanding of the academic discourse. Once I had gathered my material, I

categorised it into four overarching themes (power, gender, Islam, and education), which helped me present the developments within the discourse.

I tackled this thesis from two angles. One was an approach to the historical discourse of power amongst Pashtuns themselves, and the second was a critical and conceptual approach to the scholarly discourse. My contribution lies in the systematic presentation of historical perspectives, the discussions of structures of power presented by scholars, and the further development of these models. I also contributed to the development of new contexts relevant to the research on power, gender, religion, and education in North-West Pakistan.

1.2.3 REFLECTIONS ON MATERIAL SELECTION

As stated above, during the collection of material for this thesis, I focused on multiple fields of research and scholars with varied backgrounds. The collected literature comes from research conducted in fields such as anthropology, sociology, political science, as well as religious studies. This research came from people with either (or both) global and local perspectives who have a wide range of qualifications. The material needed to represent multiple perspectives, so it avoided exemplifying only one voice. As the issue of girls' education gained international attention with the attack on Malala Yousufzai in 2012, research on gender in North-West Pakistan intensified. It meant that the production of academic literature about the region and its people increased. To create some limitations for this thesis, I have only included research published before 2019.

I have attempted to approach my research from a gender-sensitive perspective. As little literature existed explicitly on Pashtun women, I have included material that broadly covers gender and Islam in the Middle East and South Asia. Most of this literature covers the effects of a colonial past and offers a historical context to the legal status of women in Pakistan. Developments within the field of gender studies have had a significant impact on the material produced on women in Asia, which will be explored further in chapter 2. I have, therefore, included a discussion and presentation on gender in 1.3.3 to highlight the perspective on gender used in this thesis.

In the process of conducting my research, I found opposing theories and interpretations in the literature. In some cases, the author seemed to have willingly avoided including certain factors as it would counteract the argument they were presenting. I found that some research had either limited itself to a narrow timeframe, ignored religious aspects, or misinterpreted the consequences of power shifts in the region. As I started questioning some of the conclusions drawn and arguments made in some of the material I was reading, I did not find literature that presented the historical and sociopolitical setting on Pashtuns in a broad enough context. Hence, I needed to collect and critique an extensive amount of research and introduce the framework in a chronological and thematic order that showed the development in a comprehendible format.

As I had chosen two intermingled areas of study, I needed to decide how I would present these approaches clearly and concisely. The majority of the presentation on the academic discourse takes place in chapter 2: The Field of Research, and in chapter 4: Models of Power. The historical and geopolitical context is presented in chapter 3 and 5, while chapter

6 offers concluding remarks. I have outlined the thesis this way because the discussion on the academic discourse serves as a context for the stereotyping of Pashtuns. The historical and geopolitical context must be presented to understand the complexities that produce power and gender in the region.

1.3 EXPLAINING THE CENTRAL TERMS

1.3.1 POWER

In general terms, power in its most basic form, "is the production of causal effects" (Scott, 2001, p. 2). Causal effects can be seen in everything from natural disasters to electrical currents. Foucault stated that "power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" (Foucault, 1995, p. 194). Wartenberg, however, defined "the power which one agent has over another as the ability that the dominant agent has to control the situation within which the subservient agent acts" (Wartenberg, 1988, p. 3). When I discuss power, I am talking about the context of the production of power in and through social relations. In this thesis, therefore, I am talking about *social power* (Isaac, 1987).

In broader society, power does not operate only at the level of the individual. Gramsci discussed the different ways groups gain superiority: "the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 57). A supreme group is not hegemonic just through economic or political means, but also through cultural power (Gramsci, 1971, p. 57). A dominant group uses cultural power to manufacture consent and legitimacy through media, universities, and religious institutions (Heywood, 1994, pp. 100-101). Within this also lies a constraining element, where the dominant agent controls the choices a subservient agent has. Scott claimed that "cultural representations constrain the alternatives that people consider and lead them to consent to their own subordination" (Scott, 2001, p. 90). By creating a representation of what is considered "proper", hegemony can be produced, and the "status quo" can be legitimised and reproduced, allowing the supreme group to *hold* power (Dahl, 1968).

The position of the agents in these social relations can be separated into 'principals' (Scott, 2001, p. 3) and 'subalterns' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 52). I am adhering to Scott's description that "a principal is the paramount agent in a power relationship, while a subaltern is the subordinate agent. The principal has or exercises power, while the subaltern is affected by this power" (Scott, 2001, p. 3). These firm lines between the principal and the subaltern create an incomplete image of power relations. Context is essential to understand how the relationship between a principal and subaltern may operate differently when other agents are involved. Further, intent, autonomy, physical ability, and possibilities to resist, play a role in a social power relation (Scott, 2001, pp. 3-4). If power permeates everything and everyone has and uses power to some extent (Foucault, 1991, p. 93), subalterns have power of their own. A subaltern's power lies in their ability to resist. In contrast, a principal's power lies in their ability to pursue intentions and interests, and in limiting the extent of choices a subaltern can make (Scott, 2001, p. 3).

In this thesis, my concern is with social power. The word power has been used exclusively in its social sense unless stated otherwise. I am defining power as *the production of causal effect in a social relation, where principal agents produce a limited number of choices for the subaltern to select from. Although the subaltern has some agency and ability to resist, the level of this agency is determined by the principal's ability to establish and legitimise 'normative' courses of action which favour the principal*.

I have relied primarily on John Scott's mapping of power relations because it focuses on the social power that can be found in society and within politics. Scott built this model by synthesising research within 'the mainstream'[4] and 'the second stream'[5] of power research (Scott, 2001, p. 6). While the 'mainstream tradition' has primarily focused on power as a winners and losers game played within hierarchical organisational structures such as a state, the 'second stream' has focused more on the "dispositional capacity to do something" (Scott, 2001, p. 6), and "strategies and techniques of power, in which language is given a central role" (Mayr, 2008, p. 13). Scott argued that work on power must use and discuss both streams to enrich one another (Scott, 2001, p. 12).

Elementary forms of power	Corrective influence		Persuasive influence	
	Force	Manipulation	Signification	Legitimation
Developed forms of power	Domination			
	Through constraint		Through discursive formation	
	Coercion	Inducement	Expertise	Command
	Counteraction			
	Protest		Pressure	
	Interpersonal power			

Figure 1A: "A map of power relations" (Scott, 2001, p. 16).

1.3.1.1 Elementary forms of power

Elementary forms of power refer to core ideas of power found within the mainstream and second-stream approaches. Corrective causal influence and persuasive causal influence rely on different uses of resources to either establish sanctions or permit action (Scott, 2001, p. 12). Scott has suggested that "concrete patters of power combine corrective and persuasive influence in various ways, forming both stable and enduring structures of domination and more fluid structures of interpersonal power" (Scott, 2001, pp. 12-13).

In practice, corrective influence, at its simplest, may operate through resources which are tied to physical strength in face-to-face encounters. Within the structure of social power,

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[4] See: Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. In *Power*, vol. 2. Edited by J. Scott. London: Routledge, 1994.; Mills, C. W. (1956). *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
[5] See: Gramsci, A., et al. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, International Publishers; Arendt, H. (1959). *The Human Condition*, New York: Anchor Books.; Foucault, M. (1991). *The History of Sexuality*. London, Penguin.

the resources are socially constructed and related to reward and punishment. Through *force*, negative physical and emotional sanctions, such as prisons or abuse, prevent the actions of subalterns. *Manipulation*, on the other hand, uses positive and negative sanctions, such as access to employment or propaganda, to influence how a subaltern considers which outcome is better for them. "It is through force and manipulation that subalterns can be caused to act or be prevented from acting by direct restraint or by influence over the conditions under which they make their calculations" (Scott, 2001, p. 13).

Persuasive influence relies on shared cognitive and evaluative symbols, which offer plausible reasons for action. It also rests on a principal's personality and ability to present themselves favourably to others. *Signification* is in play when persuasion draws the subaltern into the principal's interpretive frame of reference, with ideas and representations that lead people to define situations in specific ways. *Legitimation* operates through the building of value commitments to particular ideas or conditions (Scott, 2001, pp. 13-15). Principals with the ability to produce cultural representations have a more substantial influence over the subaltern since they create a cultural context which presents the subalterns' choices for action as something normative. Signification and legitimation influence the options subalterns view as plausible choices and how they choose to act after deliberating on these choices (Wartenberg, 1988). If principals can present themselves and a set of values positively, subalterns who commit to these values are likely to defer to those who are recognised as representatives of these principles (Scott, 2001, p. 15).

1.3.1.2 Developed forms of power

According to Scott, developed forms of power occur through specific extensions to corrective causal influence and persuasive causal influence. A complex interdependence between the forms occurs in concrete structures of power, but a description of the distinct features is necessary to understand how they operate together. Developed power relations form structures of *domination* or *counteraction*, and include patters of *interpersonal power*, which takes place in face-to-face interactions (Scott, 2001, pp. 16-17).

Scott has focused his description of domination within the basis of leadership rather than social stratification (Scott, 2001, p. 17). He acknowledges that leadership and stratification cannot be separated, but that "it is through leadership that some agents are constituted as principals with enduring powers over particular subalterns" (Scott, 2001, p. 17). Through corrective influence such as *force*, a principal must continuously extend energy and resources to stay dominant. By establishing a structure of leadership through *coercion*, principals can secure the continued obedience of subalterns. Obedience occurs if the subalterns believe that the use of *force* is likely to take place in the face of resistance. Conformity can also be obtained through *inducement* by offering varying levels of incentives to act in one way or another (Scott, 2001, pp. 18-19). *Coercion* and *constraint* can fail if the threats of force are not believed, or if expected rewards are not delivered.

When power is legitimated through the *right* to give orders, willingness to obey those who occupy positions through elections or appointment, takes the shape of *command*. In these positions of leadership, explicit and overt action ensure orders are followed. In instances where a principal has superior resources, they can restrict the autonomy of a subaltern

without showing direct intent through *inducement* and *coercion* (Scott, 2001, p. 22). *Expertise* "occurs when cognitive symbols are structured into organised bodies of knowledge in terms of which some people are regarded as experts and others defer to their superior knowledge and skills" (Scott, 2001, pp. 22-23). An element of trust in a principal's specialised knowledge and skill, rather than a specific social position, is the base for power through *expertise*.

Counteraction is dependent on subalterns' access to resources, such as information or ability to take collective action. It is most effective when revealing the hidden transcripts utilised by subalterns (Scott, 2001, p. 27). *Pressure* comes from the demand and desire to be recognised and heard by those who dominate. Subalterns who apply pressure do not have the right of command but use persuasive influence and forms of inducement within the social hierarchy to push for their views to be considered (Scott, 2001, p. 27). *Protest*, on the other hand, resists the existing structure of domination through counter mobilisation. *Protest* becomes a trial of strength and is expressed most forcefully through organised collective action (Scott, 2001, p. 28).

Patterns of *interpersonal power* are, according to Scott, "rooted in face-to-face contexts of interaction" (Scott, 2001, p. 28). The perception of personal attributes, such as physical strength or discursive abilities, and the capacity to grant or withhold resources, primarily determine how individuals relate to one another. Through these attributes and gatekeeping of resources, one person can become the principal over the other.

Scott reiterates that personal traits and capacities cannot be separated from broader forms of domination and counteraction (Scott, 2001, p. 30). Interpersonal relationships are affected by legal rights, economic structures, individual responsibilities, as well as cultural and religious expectations. These external factors mean that "interpersonal power has to be seen in relation to the production and reproduction of structures of domination" (Scott, 2001, p. 30). Scott's reflections are reminiscent of Foucault's observation that structures and mechanisms of power can only be evaluated if one accepts that some people exercise power over others (Foucault, 1983, p. 217).

1.3.2 AUTHORITY

Broadly speaking, the word *authority* refers to the legal and formal right to give orders and commands and to make decisions on behalf of others. Lindblom stated that what is usually called *authority* exists "whenever one, several, or many people explicitly or tacitly permit someone else to make decisions for them for some category or acts" (Lindblom, 1977, pp. 17-18). These definitions do not, however, cover the complexities of how principals continuously work to stay dominant by establishing a hegemony (Gramsci, 1971), nor include *why* and *how* subalterns "consent to the existing social order" (Mayr, 2008, p. 14).

According to Mayr, authority is built and maintained in three stages, and each of these stages relies on language and communication. First, dominant groups construct "a 'ruling group' through building and maintaining political alliances" (Mayr, 2008, p.14). People use interpersonal relationships to create connections through, for instance, their oratory skills and their access to physical resources. Secondly, they "generat[e] consent ('legitimacy')

among the population" (Mayr, 2008, p.14), the generation of consent is necessary to limit the capacity the subalterns has to resist. Cultural power, such as the portrayal of expertise through media, religious institutions, and universities, is used to generate consent. Lastly, according to Mayr, they build "a capacity for coercion through institutions such as the police, the courts and the legal system, prisons, and the military to create 'authority'" (Mayr, 2008, p.14). The formal and legal right to give orders and commands is the product of an initial active legitimation-process by the principal. When the institutions and positions of authority are in place, these positions are continuously reproduced through cultural power, even if the individual in the position changes.

When I use the term authority in this thesis, I am referring to *positions of power which, through produced legitimation, allow some agents to make decisions on behalf of others or give commands that are expected to be followed because of the social order*.

1.3.3 GENDER

What is known as 'first-wave'[6] feminism took place in the 19th and early 20th centuries and focused on overturning legal inequalities. 'Second-wave'[7] feminism, which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, expanded beyond political disparities and focused on the social and cultural inequalities ensured by the patriarchal society. The majority of the critique of the early waves of feminism is related to the prioritisation of the struggles of white middle-class women. In 1989, Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term 'intersectionality', which sought to exemplify how people experience unique combinations of injustices based on, for instance, their race, education, and sexual orientation (Crenshaw, 1989). Feminism led the way for the academic study of gender, and talking points within gender studies have mostly followed the evolution within the feminist discourse. Today the academic study of gender has moved beyond the feminist discourse.

Opposing the essentialist view that there are some static, intrinsic, innate qualities to women and men that reside in the individual, constructivist formulations present gender as a product of social interaction (Pannikot & Pannikot, 2018). The psychologist Robert Stoller introduced the distinction between sex and gender in 1968, in his book *Sex and Gender: On the Development of Masculinity and Femininity*. Ann Oakley further developed this distinction in *Sex, Gender and Society* in 1972. Oakley saw 'gender' as defined by the socio-cultural aspects of being a man or a woman where society set the rules for what is considered masculine or feminine (Oakley, 1972). 'Sex', however, refers to the underlying biological differences which distinguish male and female (Oakley, 1972). Harriet Bradley simplified this distinction and described the differences: "gender is cultural and socially constructed, sex natural and biological" (Bradley, 2007, p. 15). Oakley, Kate Millet (1970), Juliet Mitchell (1971) and Gayle Rubin (1975) further linked gender to a theory of inequality and oppression of women in a social system of male dominance, known as patriarchy. The distinction between 'sex' and 'gender' opened for the critique of the functionalist approaches to gender, which hold that gender differences come from genital and genetic variations and are thus static and intrinsic[8]. This naturalist view of gender

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[6] See: Wollstonecraft, M. (1792). A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects.; Fuller, M. (1845). Woman in the Nineteenth Century.
[7] See: De Beauvoir, S. (1949). *The Second Sex*.; Millet, K. (1970). *Sexual Politics*.
[8] See for example: Parsons, T. & Bales, R. F. (1956). *Family Socialization and Interaction Process.*

stood in stark contrast to those who argued that since gender was a cultural construction, gendered forms of behaviour could be unlearned (Bradley, 2007, pp. 16-17).

During the 1980s and 1990s, the distinction between socio-cultural gender and biological sex faced criticism because of the assumption that sex and biology are fixed and static (Birke, 1986), and because a binary categorisation is in itself a form of oppression which compels someone to *act* or *be* a particular way (Haraway, 1990). Judith Butler argued there was no difference between gender and sex, as they are linked and acted out in daily tasks which produce male or female identities (Butler, 1990; 1993). The discourse on gender and sex has also intersected with discourse within the LGBTQ+ community (Stryker, 2017). The concept of genderfluidity has transformed the discussion on masculine and feminine traits and increased acceptance for people who do not conform to "traditional" views on sex and gender (LeSavoy, 2016). The establishment of a theory of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989) affected the discourse on gender because it opposed the idea of binary causes for inequality and attempted to broaden the perspectives and voices heard in the conversation. Bradley has critiqued Butler for approaching sex and gender from a western perspective that does not give space for non-westerners who have not had the same evolution in the discourse on gender and sex (Bradley, 2007, p. 21). Women who live in areas where gender awareness is low, struggle to approach socially constructed inequalities with a deconstructed gender/sex distinction. When intersectional voices are given space in gender discourse in academia, local conditions must determine which approaches are best suited.

Three propositions presented by Bradley in *Gender* (2007) informs my use of the category of gender in this thesis. First, gender is a social construct and a categorisation used by people to divide the world and to understand their place in it. Gender is not fixed and materialises differently depending on time, place, and culture (Bradley, 2007, p. 3). Secondly, gender as a construct is used politically and socially and is a persistent factor in power relations between women and men (Bradley, 2007, p. 4). Third, even though the term gender is a construct, it is still a lived experience and impacts the individual through sociological relationships (Bradley, 2007, pp. 4-5). Bradley explained how gender:

> refers both to the lived experiences of men and women in relation to each other and to the ideas we develop to make sense of these relations and to frame them. Material experiences inform cultural meanings, which in turn influence the way lived relations change and develop (Bradley, 2007, p. 4)

The approach to gender in this thesis, therefore, relies on intersectional approaches and the analysis of intersection factors.

When viewing gender as a social construction and as produced in social relations, the question of power, agency, and choice becomes visible. Merete Lie, Ragnhild Lund and Zaireeni Azmi have discussed the importance of viewing women as actors instead of victims, and how there is value in studying gendered transformations over time when researching gender and social change (in Lund, Doneys & Ressurección, 2015, pp. 33-34). They have also addressed that gender relations are only one factor amongst many that influence the production of gender, as the production of gender takes place through media, politics and in local communities. Lie, et al. have addressed that by emphasising women as actors and focusing exclusively on women, one could potentially end up "blaming the victim" for gender inequalities. By focusing on the manners in which gender is produced,

women's choice and actions are not seen as the only means of changing gender relations (Lie, et al. in Lund, et al., 2015, p. 35). Subsequently, in this thesis, I view women as *independent agents basing their choices on the external forces which produce and maintain gender in their local context*.

1.4 STRUCTURE

The structure of this thesis is based on four questions: 1. Who are the actors? 2. What social or civil networks do those with authority operate in? 3. How is the structure of power legitimised? 4. How have these structures been represented in academic research?

In chapter 2: *Discursive Developments Within the Field of Research*, I have presented discursive developments within multiple academic fields which are relevant to this thesis. I have placed the discourse in its historical context and shown the leading discursive argumentation of each period. I approached the field of research in this way because Western narratives have dominated academic studies in the region. These narratives have, in turn, influenced how international governments and non-governmental organisations (NGO's) intervened at a local level. The academic literature is, in itself, one factor of the historical geopolitical developments in the region. Academic discourse and socio-political factors influence each other, and by placing the discursive developments in a historical framework, the chapter offers valuable perspectives to the presentation of the following chapters.

Chapter 3: *The Tribesmen of North-West Pakistan* presents a systematic and chronological overview of the geographical and socio-political developments of Pashtun dominated regions in Pakistan. The subchapters describe characteristics of Pashtun tribal organisation, as well as historical developments in gender relations and social structure in North-West Pakistan. Through this chapter, I present the broader sociopolitical context of the region.

Chapters 4: *Models of Power* and 5: *Balancing Intersecting Values* introduces the majority of the discussion on the structures of power in the region. In the fourth chapter, I present three models of power from Barth, Ahmed and Kilcullen and discuss the merits and faults of each model. Together with material from chapter 3, these models are used to examine the social and civil networks those with authority have operated in and how the balance between three groups of authority has shifted through time. In the fifth chapter, the structures and arguments used to legitimise the power structure is presented and explored.

Chapter 6 serves as a concluding discussion, which sets the findings in a larger research context and offers suggestions for future research. In the last chapter, I present the conclusions introduced in the previous chapters and analyse the progression in recent studies.

2. DISCURSIVE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE FIELD OF RESEARCH

As I stated in the introduction, I will analyse two distinct areas of discourse in this thesis. One is the discourse of power amongst Pashtuns themselves, and the second is a critical and conceptual approach of the scholarly discourse. In this chapter, I will present a chronologically structured overview of scholarly research on Pashtun tribes as it developed in varied historical circumstances. I have distinguished four historical periods, and in my description of each I will show how political and media discourses have impacted the academic literature. Although periodisation (Kadi, 2006) can oversimplify and ignore fluid transitions, it is a useful analytical tool for showing some overarching themes within the discourse. Throughout, I will explain how the research has inspired this thesis in different ways, and why I have chosen to focus on this material.

A great deal of research conducted on tribes has come from the field of anthropology (Béteille, 1986), which laid the foundation for broad scholarly discussion of Pashtun society. Early research was conducted soon after the British withdrawal from the region, and the ensuing partition of India in 1947 (Barth, 1959, 1981 & 1985; Ahmed, 1976; Lindholm 1979). In contrast, later literature was produced while there were developments within gender studies, and as religiopolitical groups[9] increased their influence on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Zaman, 1981; Mumtaz & Shaeed, 1987; Ahmed, 1992; Edwards, 1998). In the new millennium, as international media and political forces increasingly focused on Islam and terrorism, scholarly material responded to diversify the discussion (Nasr, 2000; Stern, 2000; Haeri, 2002, Jaffrelot, 2004; Ahmed, 2006; Ahmed, 2007 & 2013; Kfir, 2009). A focus on historical contexts revitalised the production of scholarly material. In more recent research, multiple fields, such as sociology, gender studies, political science, and religious studies have increasingly shown an interest in Pashtuns, their society, and their response to globalisation (Ginsburg, 2011; Hopkins & Marsden, 2013; Jamal, 2016 & 2018; Khalid, 2016; Haroon, 2017; Zaman, 2018). This chapter is divided into four chronologically ordered sections, with emphasis on the themes of 'social structure', 'gender', 'education', and 'Islamic doctrine'.

2.1 AFTERMATH OF THE PARTITION OF INDIA

Social anthropologist Fredrik Barth completed one of the first and most in-depth research projects on social structures amongst Pashtuns. In 1959 he released the first edition of *'Political Leadership among Swat Pathans'*. His work aimed to describe aspects of authority amongst the Pashtuns of Swat Valley, in the province today known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Through ethnographic data collection and sociological interpretation, he gathered material in 1954 but prioritised describing the authority structure present before the foundation of Swat state in 1917. Barth serves as a starting point for my research because he influenced later discourse. Although he faced criticism, academic literature on Pashtuns reference Barth's studies to this day (Noelle, 2012; Marsden & Hopkins, 2013;

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[9] When I refer to *religiopolitical groups* in this thesis I am referring to *groups of people who identify themselves as members of, and/or carries action out on behalf of, an organisation whose ideology and motivation for action stems from distinct interpretations of Islamic doctrine*. Examples are the groups Al-Qaeda or the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.

Jamal, 2014; Elahi, 2016). The scholarly discussions between Barth, Talal Asad and Akbar Ahmed, together with the sociopolitical context of the time of their writing, has significantly influenced how people in politics and academia have approached the Pashtun social structure, making the presentation of this discursive development relevant to this thesis.

According to Barth, the Pashtun's social structure was built by tribal agents systematically manipulating the contractual relationships between tenants and landlords (*khans*) to create positions of authority (Barth, 1959, p. 2). These relations resulted in a variety of politically corporate groups, with a chief in a central island of authority, who had contractual obligations between himself and his tenants and followers (Barth, 1959, p. 91). Barth combined this system of "social stratification" with the patrilineal context of the Swat social structure and labelled it *Quom*. This model will be discussed further in chapter 4. A system of revolving allotments of fertile land (*wesh*) meant, according to Barth, that it was in the interest of the *khans* to maintain a positive relationship with his tenants and followers to ensure their continued allegiance. In this manner, an individual's choice was a central operating principle of Swat society. Barth asserted that individuals "clearly recognize the distinction between private and group advantage, and when faced with a choice, they tend to consider the former rather than the latter" (Barth, 1959, p. 2). Barth claimed that even with the end of the *wesh* system, individuals could choose to shift their allegiance to a different leader and in this process, change the fortune of individual *khans*.

In '*Market Model, Class Structure and Consent: A Reconsideration of Swat Political Organisation*' (1972) the cultural anthropologist Talal Asad, fiercely criticised Barth's focus on free choice and the claim that *khans* convinced freely consenting agents to become their political followers. Asad argued that the landholding Khans were in a position where they could dominate and exploit, not because the participants had assented, but because they held ownership of the land and were members of a dominant class. (Asad, 1972, p. 82).

A further critique of Barth came from the anthropologist Akbar Ahmed in *Millennium and Charisma among Pathans* (1976). Ahmed critiqued Barth for disregarding the rise of a hierarchical state system under the Wāli of Swat. By doing so, Barth ignored the distinction between urban and rural Pashtuns which Ahmed presented as the ideal types *qalang* (payers of taxes and rents) and *nang* (honour-bound) (Ahmed, 1976, pp. 73-83). According to Ahmed, the hierarchical land cultivating *qalang* tribesmen of Swat, in opposition to the *nang* tribesmen who predominantly lived in the hillside, had a market-based economy[10] which lent itself to patron-client bonds and a hierarchical structure. Additionally, Ahmed criticised Barth for disregarding *Pashtunwali* (tribal honour law), and socio-religious Islamic values, which he claimed came from Barth's understanding of developments within western political thought. As an example, Ahmed mentions Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. By coming from this perspective, Barth ignored the complexities of how Islam intermingled with tribal values to build identity and influence how Pashtuns lived their lives (Ahmed, 1976, p. 9).

Barth responded to these critiques in *Features of person and society in Swat* (1981) and *The Last Wāli of Swat: an autobiography* (1985), where he explained that he intended to carry his analysis further and correct his own mistakes and omissions (Barth, 1981, p.

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[10] In this instance a market-based economic system refers to an economy that relies on various sellers offering goods and services in exchange for monetary gain.

121). In his response, Barth took care to acknowledge that if other researchers intend to apply his model elsewhere, local prevailing historical, political, and environmental realities must be acknowledged. He applied restrictions to his model of power, admitting that his model is not definite or complete. Additionally, he described society as an empirical phenomenon which is immensely complex. Barth, therefore, claimed that his model would not cover every aspect of society (Barth, 1981, p. 179). Nevertheless, Barth's research has highly influenced later research on Pashtuns, and his model has been used to analyse Pashtun tribesmen in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This first academic period of study focused primarily on the male-dominated Pashtun social structure. In the process, little space was given to the position of women in society. If women were acknowledged, it was through the perception of men in the context of seclusion or the segregation of the sexes. Consequently, an image of the secluded Pashtun woman was produced, where Pashtun women only existed in the context of men's honour, or in social engagements such as weddings or funerals. In addition, Barth primarily focused on those in positions of power, limiting the perspectives from non-Pashtuns or the Pashtuns in lower classes. This period of discourse does, however, offer discussions on structures of power among the Pashtuns in North-West Pakistan. It also provides historical context on Pashtuns and describes how they became a dominant group in the region, and this is crucial for me to incorporate from this literature.

2.2 MUSLIM GENDER STUDIES AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

From the 1980s, developments in the sociopolitical sphere led to an increased interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan as an area of study. When Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line defied the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they received increased attention from political interests and international media. This attention led to the discourse on people on the borders of The Middle East and South-Asia evolving from primarily covering the social structures of Pashtuns, to include areas of gender and Islam. The developments within this discourse are especially relevant to this thesis because it affected how state-sponsored organisations and NGO's approached women and education in North-West Pakistan.

Historian Christine Noelle-Karimi argued that the media portrayal of veiled female refugees in Pakistan "fueled the Western debate over gender segregation as a human rights violation" (Noelle-Karimi, 2002, p. 3). With the influx of refugees into Pakistan throughout the 1990s because of continual instability in Afghanistan, the image of the veiled Pashtun woman continued to be produced in Western academic and media discourse. These "oppressed women" served as political legitimation for continued involvement in conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This discourse only acknowledges limited perspectives on Middle Eastern and South-Asian people[11], further limiting women's agency.

Some feminist voices in the broader context of gender and Islam did appear in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1980, Egyptian-American scholar of Islam Leila Ahmed challenged the Western perspectives in her publication *Encounter with American Feminism: A Muslim Woman's View of Two Conferences*. In it, she critiqued American feminism for being one-

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[11] For a discussion on studies of people in Asia primarily through European scholarly production without exploring the significance of native scholars see Tavakoli-Targhi, M. (2001). *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and historiography*. New York: Palgrave.

dimensional and claimed that if Muslim women were seen by western feminist academia, they were always seen as "Other" (Ahmed, 1980, p. 8). Ahmed continued to broaden the discourse on Islamic women with her 1992 publication of *Women and Gender in Islam*, where she described changes in penal code in Pakistan under General Zia ul-Huq and the consequences of having discussions on women's place in society aired on television and in the press. According to Ahmed, working women were depicted as the root causes of lax morality and the disintegration of social values, producing a discourse that encouraged the segregation of the sexes (Ahmed, 1992, p. 233).

Publications from women in South Asia continued to expand the discourse on women. Women's rights activist Khawar Mumtaz and sociologist Farida Shaheed published *Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back* in 1987 from the perspective of the women's movement in Pakistan. Shaeed and Mumtaz presented the realities of the restrictions placed on Pakistani women, by tribal customs, specific interpretations of Islam, or the reliance on security through marriage (Shaeed & Mumtaz, 1987). Bina Agarwal's publication *A field of one's own: Gender and land rights in South Asia* (1994), argued that land ownership determined women's economic well-being, social status and agency. Agarwal claimed that ideological and material barriers to women's ownership of land stem mainly from patrilineal inheritance traditions (Agarwal, 1994).

While there were developments within Western academia through Crenshaw's coining of the term *intersectionality*, the discourse on Muslim women in Africa or Asia saw advancement primarily from Muslim women in academia. As these publications were few and far between, the veiled Pashtun woman continued to dominate political and media portrayals until the end of the millennium. Although these perspectives cover the broader topic of Muslim women rather than the specifics of women in Pashtun dominated regions, they serve an analytical purpose. In this thesis, Agarwal's focus on land ownership offers a broadening perspective on Barth's reflections on the *wesh* system, and how it affects women. The publications by Ahmed and Shaeed & Mumtaz, on the other hand, broaden the perspectives on Muslim women, as well as highlighting the intersectional effects on women's agency in North-West Pakistan.

2.3 THE DISCOURSE ON THE "WAR ON TERROR"

With the increased influence of religiopolitical groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout the 1990s, and with the American led invasion after the September 11th attacks, political and media discourse emphasised the "terrorists who wage global *jihad*"[12]. With an increased focus on religiopolitical groups, some academic research continued to portray Pashtuns as 'other', highlighting the influence of Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In opposition to this rhetoric, a small number of publications from primarily non-western academics broadened perspectives and the areas of study. Both approaches questioned if the situation could be fixed or understood. This approach limited the studies of the complex interaction between horizontal inequalities (Malik, 2009), state-sponsored actions, and tribal customs. One consequence of this approach was an increase in

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[12] For more on the rhetoric of "war on terror" and "global jihadists" see: Tankel, S. (2018). *With Us and Against Us: How America's Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.;
Bazinet, K. R. (2001). A Fight Vs. Evil, Bush and Cabinet Tell U.S. *Daily News*. Accessed: 02.08.2020: https://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/fight-evil-bush-cabinet-u-s-article-1.919650.

academic research of religious education opportunities in North-West Pakistan and historical research on the rise of terrorist movements.

The rhetoric of the "prolific spread" of religious schools (*madrasas*)[13] was used at the beginning of the 2000s to explain the rise of religiopolitical groups on the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja & Zajonc, 2006). Terrorism expert Jessica Stern (2000) and political scientist Vali Nasr (2000) focused on the increase in violent militancy in Pakistan and the role religious education played in this advancement. Khalid Ahmed focused on the outcome of *madrasa* education, claiming that graduates from *madrasas* are more likely to be reactionists, oppose Western influences, and reject governmental forces who do not exclusively follow Sharia (Ahmed in Alam, 2006).

Professor of education Rukhsana Zia concentrated on the historical development that led to the proliferation of *madrasas*, highlighting the Pakistani state's reliance on the private sector, which includes religious schools, to increase education availability (Zia, 2003). Matthew J. Nelson's research (2006) showed that international and domestic observers did not share the same perception of religious education as local citizens. He found that most local citizens had a favourable view of religious education and that most parents believed Islamic studies should be part of their child's curriculum (Nelson, 2006, p. 719). In contrast, Andrabi et al. (2006) questioned the assumed proliferation of *madrasas*. They found that of three school types, public, private and religious schools, parents in Pakistan preferred sending their children to a public option. The decision on which school to send their children to was based on intrahousehold considerations (Andrabi et al., 2006, p. 467). This view is in line with multiple contributors to *Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror?* (ed. Malik, 2008), where they addressed socioeconomic factors and highlighted the intersection between class struggle, power, and distribution of wealth as causation for school selection. In some cases, the availability of school options left children with no schools to choose between. In most cases, a religious curriculum was in reality only a small factor in school selection, especially in regions where the number of schools was low.

Throughout the decade, a growing focus on the historical developments in the region is observable in the discourse. Colonial legacy, international intervention and socioeconomic factors were increasingly mentioned as contributing components to the religiopolitical situation in Afghanistan and North-West Pakistan (Sullivan, 2007; Haroon, 2008; Johnson & Mason, 2008; Ghufran, 2009; Kfir, 2009). Political scientist Olivier Roy, anthropologist Aminah Mohammad-Arif, and historical anthropologist Marc Gaborieau focused on the historical developments of political and religious ideologies in India and Pakistan which led to the partition of India. They claimed that these ideologies still influenced local and state action at the time of publication (Jaffrelot, 2004[14]). During this period, journalist Ahmed Rashid published *Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond* (2010[15]) in an attempt to explain the Taliban's rise to power. These two publications were republished after the 9/11 attacks, with new introductions added to contextualise the material in the light of these events. By republishing, the historical research was placed in

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[13] Religious schooling is split into *maktabs* (primary education) and *madrasas* (secondary and higher education) but are commonly only referred to as *madrasas* in the discourse, I therefore use *madrasas* as an overall description of religious education.
[14] *A History of Pakistan and its Origins* was first published as *Le Pakistan* in 2000 by Librarie Arthème Fayard, in this thesis I am referencing the English version first published in 2002, with a new afterword added in 2004.
[15] First published in 2000.

the western context of the discourse on terror groups. Akbar Ahmed later published *Journey into Islam: the crisis of globalization* (2007), which explored the historical influence of the Islamic schools of thought Deobandi and Wahhabism. These publications highlighted how separate schools within Islam, combined with the tribal code (*Pashtunwali*) influenced religious teachers (*ulamas*) and the education available in *madrasas*.

Although there was an increase in publications with a broadened historical focus, most publications focused on single 'causes' instead of highlighting intersecting influences and events. While some scholars in the 2000s highlighted the intersection between the Wahhabist schools from Saudi Arabia or Deobandi schools from Deoband, India, some scholars published literature which used Wahhabism and Deobandi interchangeably or excluded one or the other. Few discussed the Sufi and Hanafi influenced school of thought Barelvi, as most focused on either Deobandis or Wahhabists because of the schools' links to Pashtuns. Although both Deobandis and Wahhabists adhered to scriptural interpretations of Islamic doctrine, the theological influence and their political ties varied. Deobandis were influenced by Sufi principles, formed political parties in Pakistan, and had close relations with Pashtun tribesmen from the establishment of the first school in Deoband in the 19th century. Contrary to this, Wahhabists have always had strong links to the Saudi government and preached a strict scriptural approach that on paper left little space for tribal aspects. They first secured significant ties to Pashtuns from the 1960s (Kfir, 2009; Zaidi: 2009; Jaffrelot, 2004).

A clear example on how some academics knowingly excluded either Wahhabist or Deobandi influences can be seen in David Waterman's publication *Saudi Wahhabi Imperialism in Pakistan: History, Legacy, Contemporary Representations and Debates* (2014). In the article, Waterman referenced *A History of Pakistan and it's Origins* (Roy in Jaffrelot, 2004) when discussing *madrasas* as "the first step in the process of recruiting and training fighters for the *jihad*" (Waterman, 2014, p. 250). While Roy unambiguously discussed both Deobandi and Wahhabist influences on those being trained for *jihad*, Waterman only mentioned Deobandis in one footnote. Another example can be found in *Shaping a Nation: An Examination of Education in* Pakistan (Lyon & Edgar, 2010), where the contributors mostly focus on Deobandis, barely mentioning Wahhabists or Barelvis. This neglect exemplifies how the avoidance of discussing intersecting ideologies create issues for academics relying on secondary material when studying religiopolitical influences in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although these publications offer valuable information and discussion, their exclusion or attempts at simplification continue to produce a misleading image which does not improve our understanding of the historical context. Many scholars did not sufficiently explore the complex intersection between tribal custom, colonial legacy, state intervention, or different schools of thought because they focused on either Deobandis or Wahhabists.

A further critique of the academic study of Deobandis came from the social scientist Akbar Zaidi who argued that historical scholarship has tended to see a continued link from Deoband in India to the *madrasas* of Pakistan. This approach is, according to Zaidi, flawed because it conflates the *ulama* of the 19th century with their 20th-century counterparts (Zaidi, 2009). Historian Sana Haroon stated that, after the partition in 1947, Pakistani scholars trained at Deoband were separated from Indian Deobandi theologians (Haroon, 2008). This assertion was also commented on by Roy, who argued that after the partition, new *madrasas* were "independent of their parent schools in India" (Roy in Jaffrelot, 2004,

p. 139). Nevertheless, NWFP Deobandi *ulama* preserved their authority by establishing *madrasas* and mosques, creating a 'Deobandi community' in the process (Haroon, 2008, p. 47). These 'Deobandi' *ulama* never finished their training in India and took inspiration from Pashtun customs, Wahhabist and Barelvi schooling, in addition to Deobandi principles. This understanding of the separate developments within the Deobandi movement in Pakistan and India informs my view of Deobandis in Pakistan after the partition.

In the academic discourse on gender in this decade, Muslim women were still predominantly discussed as someone 'other' or in the context of human rights violations. A few scholars argued against this perspective. Noelle-Karimi explored how this rhetoric was prolific in Western political and media discourse (Noelle-Karimi, 2002, p. 3). Social anthropologist Amineh Ahmed studied the familial and social contexts of wealthy Pashtun women, challenging assumptions of contemporary Pakistan society, and the rural and urban divide (Ahmed, 2008). While legal scholar Mary Ann Franks discussed how women's standing in Afghanistan and Pakistan was used to create a dichotomy between "good and evil", which was in turn used to justify American intervention against the Taliban (Franks, 2003). Instead of exploring how Afghan women's agency could be improved, the women were used as a discursive tool to legitimise American intervention (Franks, 2003). Franks also described how, in the 1960s, *ulama* in Afghanistan strongly opposed the idea that women would benefit from higher education because they "believed that the spread of non-traditional education eroded morals and undermined social values" (Franks, 2003, p. 138). This depiction highlights religiously justified opposition to women's education.

In the same period, some scholars explored the developments within the women's rights movements and the consequences of globalisation for women's role in Pakistani society. Ingrid L. P. Nyborg offered new perspectives on how men and women have negotiated for resources. She also explored the history of the women's rights movements in India and Pakistan (Nyborg, 2002). In doing so, she offered a counterargument to the idea that women's rights movements were ultimately a Western phenomenon (Nyborg, pp. 30-36). Shahla Haeri interviewed Pakistani women who were in the workforce and placed their perspectives in a historical and societal context to explore how women becoming a part of the public domain was perceived by male relatives, religious leaders, and politicians (Haeri, 2002). These scholars continued the trend from the previous decade of women, especially women with a Muslim background, in academia being the ones who explored the complex interactions that influenced women's standing and opportunities in society.

In the 2000s, scholars rarely separated the discourse on education from the discourse on extremism. Multiple publications focused on "jihadist" or "Islamist"[16] and sought to explain where they received their education instead of the complex intersection of motivational factors. This approach limited the studies of those under the influence of religiopolitical groups and affected the historical developments in the region. Despite the controversial interchangeable use of Wahhabism and Deobandi, the literature on the schools of thought from this period offer valuable information when analysing the religious influences affecting women's education. Some intersectional approaches were more apparent in the studies on women in Pakistan, but these publications rarely influenced western political

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[16] Unless stated otherwise the use of the terms "jihadist" and "Islamists" references discursive usage by politicians or media. Although this discursive usage influenced academic production, most academic literature has not approached these groups from the colloquial usage, they have instead used and debated academic categories.

and media discourse. These publications did nevertheless advance gender-specific studies in Pakistan and are valuable sources in the study of women and education in Pakistan. In this thesis, a historical approach to the intersection between *Pashtunwali*, Deobandi, Wahhabism, and state legislation will be used to explore how those with authority have limited women's access to education.

2.4 CHALLENGING PREVIOUSLY KNOWN "TRUTHS"

In the last decade, although still present in some publications, the rhetoric on violent Jihadists and the "war on terror" began to face opposition because of continuous American intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Opposition to Americans was especially prominent because of the increased use of drones in aerial attacks, which caused significant civilian casualties. Although American media and political discourse continued to focus on jihadists and terrorist, a rise in academic interest from multiple fields started to challenge previous academic discourse. While themes from the previous decades of study continued to dominate academic publications, this period did not have a similar singular predominant focus. Although academic literature built on previous research, it also re-examined previously known "truths" as historical intersections received further attention.

Within historical areas of study, anthropologists have continued to debate Barth's seminal work on Pashtuns in Swat. They have attempted to place the scholarly debates it generated in the socio-historic settings of Pakistan (Hopkins & Marsden, 2013). Through revisiting previous academic material, Urs Geiser questions the reductionist readings of the motivations of Swatis to play a part on either the side of or against, the Taliban (Geiser in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 164). Geiser also challenged the academic tendency to present all Swatis as Pashtuns, passing over the importance of the activities of the Pakistani state or failing "to account for a great deal of local social and economic complexity" (Geiser in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 164). This perspective significantly affected my understanding of the problems with the material collected for this thesis, which lead me to focus on the historical developments within the discourse.

Journalist and Pakistan scholar Zahid Hussain's *Pakistan's Most Dangerous Place* (Hussein, 2012) exemplifies biased language in the discussion of religiopolitical groups in Pakistan. Despite the use of loaded words such as "draconian" (Hussain, 2012, p.16), his analysis offered valuable insight into the intersection between *Pashtunwali* and Islamic rhetoric by highlighting the history of the rise of the TTP and the local support they have received. Pakistani feminist scholar Rubina Saigol challenged the scholarly and journalistic tendency to equate Pashtun nationalism with Talibanization. She did so by examining the historical developments and interfaces between Pashtun nationalism and religious conflict in North-West Pakistan (Saigol, 2012). The Taliban cannot, according to Saigol, be limited to a merely Pashtun ethnic movement, because its membership does not consist only of Pashtuns, nor does it base itself on the tribal code *Pashtunwali* (Saigol, 2012). Professor of International Law and Political Science Tom Ginsburg analysed *Pashtunwali* from a political-economic perspective and challenged those who have a simplistic view of *Pashtunwali* and perceive it to be a "barbaric" law that is detrimental to civil society (Ginsburg, 2010). Ginsburg concluded that the norms and institutions of *Pashtunwali* seem to minimise further escalation of private violence and that the elder council (*jirga*) is necessary to enforce norms of honour (Ginsburg, 2010, p. 20). Hussain, Saigol, and Ginsburg offer valuable perspectives on the intersection between Pashtuns, Pashtunwali,

the TTP, and Islam. They show how local outcomes are a product of intersecting realities and exemplify the importance of being critical of previous "knowledge".

Akbar Ahmed (2013) and counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen (2017) have both presented models of power structures amongst Pashtuns. These models posit a triangular division of power between groups based on either religious, tribal or state affiliations. Ahmed and Kilcullen placed these models in a historical context and wrote their books themed to the interaction between the US and local tribesmen in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their publications focused on "solutions to the problem", but offered a more complex historical analysis than those from the previous decade. Together with Barth's description of the Swat authority structure, Ahmed's and Kilcullen's models of power work as the base for my discussion of models of power in chapter 4 of this thesis.

In 2018 religious scholar Muhammad Qasim Zaman published 'Islam in Pakistan: A History' which presented Islam's evolution in the region over the past century and a half. Zaman offered a historical account on the rise and gradual decline of Islamic modernist thought in Pakistan and how the state of Pakistan has intervened in conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan because of international relations (Zaman, 2018). Zaman considered the developments in the region from a religious studies perspective and expanded the discussion of religiopolitical groups and the state of Pakistan beyond the "war on terror" rhetoric.

A significant shift in the discourse on gender came with the enhancement of local female voices such as Malala Yousufzai and her 2009 blog on BBC Urdu's platform, which drew the attention of the TTP. The subsequent assassination attempt led to local voices on gender and education receiving international media attention and helped shift media discourse on gender in North-West Pakistan. Yousufzai published *I am Malala* in 2013, and in 2014 received the Nobel Peace Prize with Kailash Satyarthi "for their struggle against the suppression of children and young people and for the right of all children to education" (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2014). Within academia Abda Khalid, in her doctoral thesis, focused on the gendered dimensions of land ownership and access to resources in Swat, and found that Pashtun women and men have different views on the intersection of *Pashtunwali* and Sharia (Khalid, 2016). Through multiple publications, Aamir Jamal studied Pashtun male perspectives on gender justice and girls' education, and how school enrolment can be significantly increased by securing the collaboration of male relatives (Jamal, 2014; 2015; 2016; 2018). These publications indicate a shift in the discourse, where women are not viewed primarily through the eyes of men as we see in the first period. Instead, women either actively engaged with their own voice or gendered perspectives were tackled head-on to understand the underlying causes affecting women's agency.

In the last decade critique of previous publications, historical perspectives, and intersectional studies have increased the understanding of the complex realities of power, religion and gender in North-West Pakistan. Although the last decade of academic production broadened the areas of study, the academic period was still dominated by the consequences of the interaction between local religiopolitical groups, the Pakistan state and international actors. This period of discourse also saw an increase in publications from local Pakistani voices, expanding the discussion beyond western perspectives. The further development of the discourse on the intersection between *Pashtunwali*, Islam, gender, and power, is an aim of this thesis.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Throughout the periods discussed above, several themes have been prominent in the discourse. Social structure and authority dominated anthropological studies after the Partition in 1947, while the 70s and 80s saw the rise of gender studies. The early 2000s were dominated by the rhetoric on the "war on terror", and the latest decade saw the improvement of intersectional approaches in multiple fields. While western male academic voices have dominated much of the discourse, new voices have brought local perspectives and diversified the discussion. Still, only a small section of the material examines the history of intersectional realities. In the following chapter, therefore, I present an extensive historical overview of intersecting factors. The presentations of the actors and events, at both a local and international level, show shifts in authority, changes in interpretations of religious doctrine, and transformations in the understanding of gender. This context is necessary for the further discussion of models of power and plurality in social and civil legislation, which will culminate in an analysis on how the educational realities in North-West Pakistan developed.

3. THE TRIBESMEN OF NORTH-WEST PAKISTAN

The geographical and socio-political developments on the borders of the Middle East and South Asia have influenced gender relations, social structure, and religious doctrine through the centuries. By placing these developments in their historical context, it is possible to show why education parity has not been achieved. Historically, Pashtuns have been the domineering population within the province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and this is especially apparent in the districts of North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and Swat[17]. Through this dominance, Pashtuns have significantly impacted the social structure of these societies and held key authority positions. Much of this chapter will, therefore, centre around the dominating Pashtuns of Waziristan and Swat. In addition to historical developments in the region, tribal structure and characteristics of Pashtuns will be discussed in this chapter. The historical context presented here will show how Pashtuns have been a dominating force in the region, and it will serve as a foundation for the later discussions on models of power and plurality in legislation.

3.1 PASHTUN HISTORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The following subchapters present the dominant insiders' and outsiders' narratives regarding the origins of the Pashtun tribes and their ties to Islam. Throughout their history, Pashtun tribesmen have adhered to the Pashtun narratives described below.

3.1.1 PASHTUN ORIGIN AND HISTORIC TIES TO ISLAM

Contesting ideas have been presented by scholars regarding the origins of the Pashtun tribes who populate the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Hanif & Jaed, 2011, pp. 45-54). Some theorists have suggested that Pashtuns stem from the East Iranian tribes who had migrated to the area around the middle of the 1st millennium CE (Gankovskij, 1985), or that the tribes evolved from the Indo-Aryan people who had lived in the area since the Vedic Aryan period (Barth, 1981, p. 19). Until the creation of modern-day Afghanistan and the Durand line, many Pashtuns have been referred to as *Afghans* in historical records. This referral has created some confusion as to their origins. Barth and Lindholm have claimed that the Yusufzai, the most prominent Pashtun tribe in Swat, arrived from areas in Kabul Valley in the 16th century, and conquered Swat in 1515 (Barth, 1959, p. 7; Lindholm, 1982, p. 33). These tribesmen were part of a substantial migration by *Pashto* speaking people into North-Western Pakistani territory from areas today recognised as Afghanistan (Barth, 1959, p. 7).

Knowledge of their heritage and patriline is valuable to Pashtuns. Lafrance explained that "the notion of the extended family is at the heart of all the ethnic groups in Pakistan" (Lafrance in Jaffrelot, 2004, p. 192). The knowledge of their ancestry has, for instance, defined a Pashtun's place in society, determined whom they can marry, and justified whom

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[17] South and North Waziristan were previously districts in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and Swat was a district in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). In 2010 the NWFP's name was changed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and in 2018 FATA was merged with KPK.

they would fight with, or against, in conflicts. Although ancestry does not affect Pashtuns in all aspects of life today, Pashtuns still widely accept the narrative which places Qais Abdur Rashid, an Afghan tribesman, as the common ancestor of the Pashtun tribes in North-West Pakistan (Ahmed, 1976, p. 7; 2013, p. 28). Through this narrative, Pashtuns are linked by birth across borders and share some common framework, which allows for cooperation in conflict even when separated by international borders.

The contesting historical backgrounds and narratives, whether authenticated by academic research or not, show that the region has seen many conquests, dynasties, and large movements of people. Pashtun lineage has, therefore, been recognised as being a complex amalgamation of descendants (Lafrance in Jaffrelot, 2004, pp. 199-201). The spread of Pashtuns through Afghanistan and Pakistan created recognisable genealogical links between the population over a larger geographical area. In modern history, these links have been used as justification for a united front against outsider influence.

Government reports, academic theories, and Pashtun narratives contest how Pashtuns were introduced to Islam. A government report from the US Department of State claimed that the introduction of Islam to the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan came with the Arab invasions of Persia, and further territories, during the 7th century (Public Services Division, 1959, p. 11). Multiple academic publications have stated that Pashtuns in Pakistani areas were converted through repeated invasions by Mahmud of Ghazni into India in the 11th century (Public Services Division, 1959, p. 11; Barth 1965, p. 7; Lindholm, 1982, p. 33; Ahmed, 2011, p. xv). Pashtuns contest this view through their genealogy narrative, which they use to explain that their common ancestor Qais Abdur Rashid was personally converted to Islam by the Prophet in Medina (Ahmed, 1976, p. 7). Pashtuns claim that it was Qais Abdur Rashid who later converted his fellow tribesmen to Islam, thus creating a direct conversion link to the Prophet. According to Ahmed, tribesmen establish genealogical ties to the Prophet because they view him as an example of an ideal tribal chief (Ahmed, 2013, p. 28). These links are integral to tribal unity and, in turn, their connections to Islam because it establishes a narrative of a direct link to the Prophet. Pashtuns trace their genealogy back to the foundation of the Islamic community to legitimise their position in the social structure. This narrative has also ensured that Muslim tribesmen, who recognise the Prophet not only as a religious leader but as a "tribal chief par excellence", have defended the honour of the Prophet as they would the honour of another tribesman (Ahmed, 2013, p. 28). With this belief, any perceived offence or attack on the Prophet becomes personal, ensuring an emotional response.

Pashtuns in Swat have explained the role of women in Pashtun society through their interpretations of Islam. As described by Lindholm: "the people of Swat consider themselves to be devout Sunni Muslims, and they explain local practices of strict female seclusion, veiling, polygamy, denial of inheritance to women, prohibition on divorce, and so on, as enjoined by Islam" (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 833). Although Pashtuns have legitimised the limitations placed on women's rights through their faith, it does not align with all interpretations of Islam. For instance, those who adhere to scriptural interpretations of the Qur'an consider the denial of inheritance un-Islamic because it ignores the way inheritance is ordained in Surah An-Nisa (Qur'an, 4:11, Oxford World Classic's Edition). Pashtun tribesmen, however, have leaned on their connection to the Prophet to defend their social structure (Ahmed, 2013, p.28). The intersection between scriptural interpretations of Islam and Pashtun interpretations of Islam have significantly impacted women's position in Pashtun society and will be discussed further in chapter 5.

3.1.2 TRIBAL STRUCTURE

Lineage often plays an essential role in the structure and history of tribal societies, and Pashtun tribesmen are not exempt from this. The Pashtun structure can be described as divided into confederacies which are then divided into tribes with each tribe further structured into clans based on lineage. In Waziristan, the Waziri and Mashud tribes trace their ancestry to the Karlani tribal confederation, whereas the Yusufzai tribesmen of Swat trace their ancestry to the Sarbani tribal confederation. Ahmed explained that the patrilineal descent groups:

> exhibit[s] the nesting attributes of pyramid-like structures of clans and subclans on the genealogical charter. The operative level is the subsection, consisting of several extended families, which is part of a larger section, which, in turn, is part of an even larger clan (2013, p. 19).

This structure has allowed for allegiance and cooperation but has also been a source of conflict. Isaac Kfir explained this intricate system by stating that a Pashtun "owes allegiance, first to the family, then to the clan, followed by the tribe and finally to the confederation" (Kfir, 2009, p. 39). This multi-layered level of allegiance has meant that Pashtun tribesmen can come together to face an external enemy, but they are also susceptible to agnatic rivalry. David Kilcullen discussed how:

> cultural norm of collective responsibility and general reciprocity promote clan and group cohesion: each tribal member is collectively responsible for the actions of every other, and kinship group supports other groups in the expectation that the tribe in turn will support it when it needs assistance (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 74).

The ability to look past individual differences when protecting the collective has ensured that Pashtuns come together in a fight, especially when protecting their land and independence from external control (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 75).

Traditionally it was religious leaders, who themselves were patrons of tribal leaders, who gathered tribesmen under one banner of holy war when fighting outsiders (Ahmed, 2013, p. 50). Although Pashtun tribal structure placed close familial relationships first, tribesmen would defend larger groups of Pashtuns, not just their immediate clan members, especially when allegiance was tied to Pashtun interpretations of Islamic principles in the face of an external enemy. When religious leaders were no longer dependent on tribal leaders, because they received funding from outsiders (Marten, Johnson & Mason, 2008, pp. 182-183), they had the authority to call for *jihad* independently. This development was only possible because "religious leaders tend to emerge and assume greater leadership roles and political prominence in times of external threat" (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 79). In the face of an external threat, religious leaders could circumvent both tribal and central government authority and lead tribesmen into combat.

Male elder tribesmen have historically held considerable authority in the hierarchical system, which distinguishes elders into two main groups; The *khan* or *malik*, who gains his prestige through heritage, land ownership and economic strength. Or the *spinzhiray* (white-bearded) who increases his position through personal strengths, such as knowledge, wisdom, and rhetoric skills (Rzehak, 2011, p. 13). In the Pashtun patriarchal society, respectful and honourable behaviour towards the elderly has been considered

mandatory (Karrer, 2012). However, with the rise of religiopolitical groups from the 1980s, opposition to elders became more prevalent. Developments within the presumed authority positions of the elders play a significant role in the discussion on models of power in chapter 4.

Within the tribal structure, extended family has predominantly been defined within a household compound. Lindholm described the household as being ideally "made up of a patriarch, his wife or wives, his unmarried daughters, and his sons and their wives and children" (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 836). The protection of this household unit has historically been tied directly to the patriarch's honour, ensuring a fierce defence of the members within the household and their reputation. The pyramid-like tribal structure also ensures that the honour of the household is attached to the honour of the lineage. The protection of the lineage's honour lies on the shoulders of the patriarch, prompting them to make political and social connections which can give them the resources to do so (Ahmed, 2013, pp. 24-25). The nature of the hierarchical system prioritises the male perspective, and because women are tied to the household, their honour becomes the responsibility of the patriarch. If a woman's honour is diminished, it does not only affect the current members of the house but has the potential to affect new members of the lineage as well (Ahmed, 2013, pp. 24-25). Women represent the potential future of the patriline, and although women's honour is integral to the family, they do not have the agency to defend it. This created a reliance on the patriarchal structure and furthered limited women's agency.

The political manoeuvres and building of allegiances to maintain social positions (Barth, 1959) have been most important for those with elevated positions in the social hierarchy. The actions and motivations of those with significant economic resources cannot wholly represent the efforts of all Pashtun tribesmen; nevertheless, some societal expectations have been acknowledged by most tribesmen regardless of class. The allegiance between the various segments in the tribal structure has led some to recognise Pashtuns as "remarkably egalitarian" (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 833) because they established a social structure that at times has protected those with lesser economic resources. The system has also been recognised as egalitarian because most male tribesmen have had the authority to speak in the *jirga*, giving them agency in the community.

3.1.3 URBAN AND RURAL CIVIL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES

Ahmed separated Pashtuns into ideal types of *qalang* (payers of taxes and rents) and *nang* (honour-bound) (Ahmed, 1976, pp. 73-83). The *qalang* tribesmen can, according to Ahmed, be recognised by their settled nature. They have cultivated lands and built a structural, market based economic system that retains a more significant concentration of people in a smaller area. In opposition, *nang* tribesmen have been described as smaller dispersed groups who primarily live in the hillside and organise their social and political lives based on principles of honour, revenge, and hospitality (Ahmed, 2013, p. 26). While these distinctions are oversimplified, tribesmen in Waziristan can predominantly be identified within the *nang* category, while tribesmen in Swat can primarily be recognized as *qalang*. Despite their shared ancestry, religious affiliation, and adherence to tribal code, Pashtuns in Swat and Waziristan have developed different civil and social structures. These

structures share some qualities but cannot be generalised as one system. It is, therefore, valuable to look at the unique developments of social and civil structures in Swat and Waziristan.

3.1.3.1 SWAT

The fertile and lucrative nature of Swat Valley has given landowners the resources to amass authority and made ownership of property a priority for the inhabitants of Swat. After the Pashtun Yusufzai conquered Swat, they struggled to divide the land amongst themselves in an equitable fashion. According to Barth, traditional stories has claimed that Shaikh Malli, a renowned holy man, "delimited a hierarchy of territorial segments corresponding to the particular pattern of segmentation within the major Yusufzai lineages" (Barth, 1959, p. 9). This form of land ownership created a hierarchy which separated the landless from the landlords. The system (*wesh*) ensured that the allocated areas would be re-allotted periodically, to share fruits of conquest amongst the tribesmen equitably. The re-allotment-system was necessary because the quality of land varied. The inheritance of land was strictly based on patrilineal descent; women were not allowed to inherit land in this process (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 836) and were wholly dependent on their male relatives for housing and protection. The material barriers to women's ownership of land stemmed mainly from patrilineal inheritance traditions and the inability to own land determined women's economic well-being, social status and agency (Agarwal, 1994).

Yusufzai *Khans* gained significant authority and power over other Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns in the region through land ownership. Barth described this hierarchical system by dividing the population into *saints* (those with religious association and power), *Pakhtuns* (landowning Pashtuns), and the rest, who were split into smaller groups based on patriline and occupation (Barth, 1959, p.17). Barth explained that most of the population had to establish their access to a residence, employment, income, and social support, individually or contractually, because they would not receive it through birth or inheritance (Barth, 1981, p. 134). A system of taxes and rents developed through patron-client bonds. This system created a civil structure where, because of their access to land, a limited number of patrons administered the collective through networking and alliances (Ahmed, 1976, p. 42). The system has also been explained as a "mutual interdependence between patron landlords and client workers" (Lindholm in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 20), where loyalty was granted to landlords in exchange for financial protection and safety. A hierarchical structure evolved from the basis of these patron-client bonds, where powerful landlords held significant positions in their local community and made political decisions for their patrons. This structure made it possible for the landowning and domineering Yusufzai tribesmen of Swat to keep lines of communications open with the Mughal empire, and later with the British administration in India (Ahmed, 2013, p. 57). It also made Swat Pashtuns more susceptible to the introduction of a system of central government authority in the future (Ahmed, 1976, p. 78).

Political and social interactions played out in the men's house (*hujra*) or the tribal council (*jirga*), where those with membership, either by owning land or having a patron-client bond, would meet to socialise and resolve community disputes. The *hujra* and *jirga* were male spaces where women did not have access, effectively closing women off from public arenas of power. Lindholm described the separation of the genders as such: "Men

command public life; women are relegated to the lesser world of the compound and children" (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 833). Women did have some chances to affect the prosperity of their household. Although a Pashtun woman's arena was primarily within the home, women had roles in rites and passages such as weddings and funerals (Ahmed, 2008, p. 25). They were as young girls not only taught to take great pride in their lineage and family but to gather information from women's spaces and build connections (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 834). In doing so, women could increase the chances that the men of the family were successful in public life, increasing the resources available to the household. Although this granted some women a form of power, it did not give women more comprehensive agency. Instead, it reinforced women's reliance on their male relatives to act on their collected knowledge.

3.1.3.2 WAZIRISTAN

For the *nang* tribes in Waziristan, close adherence to the lineage structure, a nomadic lifestyle, and arid land, created smaller dispersed groups who firmly adhered to the tribal code *Pashtunwali* and saw honour as a primary quality (Ahmed, 2013, p.26). The central authority came through the egalitarian council of elders, the *jirga,* where the patriarch of the lineage structure represented the patriline (Zahab in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 58). Through acknowledgement of their position on the lineage charter and a favourable reputation, men could lay claim to a seat in the council of elders. The elder council had the authority to make decisions for the descent unit or tribe (Ahmed, 2013, p. 20). A favourable reputation was vital in any Pashtun power relation because "a person who cannot live up to tribal standards is held in contempt - a fate worse than death in a culture where one's very existence depends on the respect of peers, relatives, and allies" (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 833). Through this expectation of honourable behaviour, Pashtuns attempted to ensure cooperation across patrilines for the wider community. Decision-making on the council was dependent on following the tribal code of honour. If one could not adhere to the principles of *Pashtunwali*, they had no place in the tribal council, but also risked being blocked from other areas of Pashtun life. In *nang* tribes, the council's authority to make decisions allowed the members to, according to Ahmed, make "declarations of war, agreements for peace, or the mediation of disputes and blood feuds according to the tribal code of honour that encompasses all areas of tribal life" (2013, p. 20). I will discuss the role and expectations of *Pashtunwali* further in the coming chapters.

Similarly to *qalang* tribes, women in *nang* tribes primarily operated within the household, as potential threats to their honour was seen by the patriarch as a threat to the family and clan's honour (Ahmed, 2013, p. 25). Women played a role in "the making and breaking of social and political alliances through the rites of passage such as funerals and marriage ceremonies" (Ahmed, 2013, p. 25). Although these roles granted women some mobility, their general inability to operate in public spheres limited their autonomy and stopped them from gaining positions of authority. Instead, their communication with other women aided the family by giving their husbands information that could be used to operate in the public sphere. Women in *nang* and *qalang* tribes lived under many of the same expectations. However, women in more rural areas or lower social standing had access to more public spheres as they needed to help with farm work and the running of the household. Although these women had more access to the public sphere, they also faced

the social expectation of wearing head scarves because they more frequently would share spaces with men outside of their household (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003).

Nang tribesmen clung tightly to their tribal identity and prided themselves on their independence from a central authority. Conflict on what it means to be a Pashtun led to distrust between tribesmen in rural and urban areas. Pashtuns in hill areas were particularly sceptical of tribesmen in more urban areas, to the extent where they would not recognise them as Pashtuns (Ahmed 2003, p. 26). Nevertheless, Pashtuns can be identified by their adherence to the genealogy narrative and the tribal code *Pashtunwali*, as well as the shared language *Pashto*.

3.2 CHANGES TO LOCAL AND STATE AUTHORITY STRUCTURES 1890-1969

3.2.1 SWAT

Pashtun tribes have always held a reputation as a collective that should be handled strategically and carefully (Ahmed, 1976, p.7). After the Yusufzai settled in Swat, Akbar, the Mughal emperor, attempted to subjugate them. In 1586, 8000 men reportedly died while trying to gain control over the tribes. The British in India learned from repeated experiences that direct physical conflict with Pashtuns would not help them maintain their interests in the region (Ahmed, 2013, p. 58). It was first after Pashtuns in Swat were gathered under a joint leader in 1915 (Sultan-i-Rome in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, pp. 149-151) that the Pashtuns would recognise a centralised authority in Swat. In 1917 the position of "King of Swat" was held by Miangul A. Wadud after being elected by Yusufzai Khans in response to British expansion towards the north (Ahmed, 2011, p. xvii). After the death of Wadud of Swat, his son Miangul Jahan Zeb took on the position as the Wāli of Swat. According to Ahmed, "The Wāli administered justice through Sharia, but kept tribal customs and traditions in mind" (Ahmed, 2013, p.57), in doing so the Wāli could rely on the support of tribesmen while maintaining a working relationship with authorities outside of the Swat border.

From 1917-1926 "intense State building activity and consolidation of authority" (Ahmed, 2011, p. xvii) was achieved by increasing access to education, building roads and telephone lines, making changes to monetary systems, establishing a local military force, and diminishing the system of revolving allotments. The changes to *wesh*, completed by 1930, had a considerable impact on structures of authority in the region. "The Mianguls gradually subordinated elite Pakhtun khans who for generations had used a monopoly over landholding, crop surpluses, and patron-client relations to dominate the population who were non-Pakhtun" (Nichols in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 137). By establishing a redistributive economic system, the Wāli diminished the resources the elite Pashtun *khans* had at their disposal and consolidated his authority as a centralised figure. This system gathered goods and services upwards to a central point and then distributed the resources downwards to reach multiple people (Ahmed, 1976, p. 124). The Wāli gradually built a state-like structure which made the people dependent on the services provided, but in a way that aligned with Pashtun cultural values (Edwards in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 258).

The state system under the Wāli of Swat based its economy on monetary gain instead of a barter system, which allowed for the further development of a middle class and an elite. Despite these developments, women did not gain greater access to resources. Khalid argued that "women can remain poor even if they are married to a property owner, because they never have free access to resources and are always controlled by their husbands" (Khalid, 2016, p. 54). Without individual access to resources, women remained dependent on male relatives. This relegation of women to the domestic sphere continued when the household increased their resources. Women of higher standing were more susceptible to the patriarch's machinations, partly because the family could rely on others to fulfil the daily household tasks outside of the home. Haroon reflected on how access to the elite in the NWFP was granted through gender, literacy in the Urdu language, and through "religious leadership, political activism, or material prosperity" (Haroon, 2008, pp. 54-55). Literacy in Urdu was necessary to take part in the public debates which were restricted to a small male elite (Haroon, 2008, p. 55). Women's inability to take part in public life outside of home did not just hinder their access to education, but also their ability to participate in public debates, which ensured the preservation of the gender balance.

The unequal access to resources between people of various social standing continued even though the Wāli increased access to education because Pashtuns from wealthier families still retained their connections and experience. As the access to authority became more dependent on state service (Barth, 1981, pp. 139-140) those who previously had power through tribal councils and landownership had to adapt to remain part of the decision-making process. Barth claimed that even though a new state system was established, factors such as opposing blocks and occasional changes in allegiance were still used by Khans and the Wāli (Barth, 1959, p. 132). Although decisions were no longer primarily made for the masses in the *hujra* or *jirga*, the tribal elders and religious leaders who continued "networking" (Ahmed, 2011, p. 42) and collaborated with the Wāli maintained some semblance of authority. The structural changes did not completely change who had access to power; instead it altered how they retained it (Nichols in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, pp. 135-136).

When the British gained greater control in India in the 19th century, it was in their interest to move into Pashtun territory to protect their investments against perceived Russian aggression in "The Great Game"[18]. This concerned areas in northern Afghanistan and its surroundings. British fears were that Russian influence would continue to expand and that they would eventually be able to take over control of India. After bitter fighting against tribes in Afghanistan, according to Ahmed, the British learned that relying "on 'indirect rule' or 'masterly inactivity'" (Ahmed, 2013, p. 58) was more effective. According to Barth, around the time of British expansion, "'Local autonomy' as interpreted in Swat allowed the indigenous population complete freedom to work out their own political problems in any matter they chose" (Barth, 1959, p. 8). This view of Pashtun autonomy highlights the preference for local resolutions. British attempts at influence were met with opposition and they, therefore, needed to secure Pashtun cooperation through means other than warfare. With the establishment of the Malakand Agency[19], the British laid the groundwork for formally recognising the princely state of Swat and the position of "Wāli of Swat". In 1926,

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[18] "The Great Game" was a political and diplomatic confrontation between Great Britain and Russia over Afghanistan and neighbouring territories in Central and South Asia throughout the 19th century.
[19] The Malakand Agency was a group of districts in the NWFP, which were established in 1895.

the district of Swat was incorporated into the Malakand Agency. The Wāli maintained control of Swat while cooperating with the British, which maintained British interests in the region (Ahmed, 2011, pp. xvi-xvii). With the help of a small army, and the continued support of the British, the Wāli balanced tribal values, Islamic laws and "modern development" goals.

After the partition of 1947, the Wāli of Swat managed to limit the official influence of the Pakistani government for some time. Nevertheless, in 1969, Swat formally became a part of the NWFP (Sultan-i-Rome in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 150). By freezing the *wesh* system and encouraging the move to a monetary system, the Wāli had pushed *khans* and landlords to shift their focus to increasing monetary funds. Combined with the gradual increase in cash-crop production such as tobacco (Ahmed, 1976, p. 79), the traditional landlord-tenant bonds changed. As in other regions of Pakistan, "landlords ceased to solely depend upon their local control over the land and the labour force and came to increasingly depend upon their involvement in supra-local politics" (Martin, 2015). Those who traditionally had held power through their holdings became increasingly engaged in politics, both at a local and state level. When the landlords raised their prestige and power through monetary resources and political positions, the reciprocal need of political support from tenants diminished. *Khans* and landlords with extensive resources started leaving Swat for larger Pakistani cities (Ahmed, 2009, p. 21) while still maintaining ownership of their land. Mismanagement and poor conditions under the leadership of absent landowners led to the breakdown of the previous egalitarian bonds, creating mistrust between the economic classes (Ahmed, 2009). As landlords became absent, their authority was challenged, and relationships between landlords and tenants "began to break down" (Ahmed, 2009, p. 21). This led to land disputes becoming more frequent as some tenants claimed they owned the land they worked on (Sultan-i-Rome, accessed 16.04.2020, p. 8). Combined with mistrust towards Pakistani bureaucracy, which was considered inefficient and corrupt, positions of authority shifted and became less stable.

3.2.2 WAZIRISTAN

Tribesmen in Waziristan did not experience similar attempts at subjugation, partly because of their fierce reputation, but also because of the struggles that would be faced traversing the mountains (Ahmed, 1976, p.6). Geographical limitations and the reputation of the tribesmen, as well as their fighting skills, kept the tribes isolated and protected from Indian imperial control (Ahmed, 2013, p. 57). The British, in turn, used a system of political officers who were given substantial autonomy and authority to use in areas considered frontiers. These political agents did not rely on the force but instead used diplomatic approaches which recognised tribal customs to indirectly influence the tribes (Ahmed 2003, pp. 156-157). These types of indirect rule brought a level of stability to the region, which was acceptable to the British. Tribal customs and traditions were, to an extent, maintained because the British only held control indirectly (Ahmed, 1976, pp. 6-7). By collaborating and funding some tribal leaders over others, the British exacerbated disagreements between the most prominent tribes in Waziristan, such as the Wazirs and the Mashuds. In some instances, this was favourable to the British because it ensured that the tribesmen were preoccupied with internal conflict instead of fighting the British.

Another consequence of British interference was an increased interest in central Pakistani policies by the tribesmen of Waziristan. After the partition, tribesmen in the hillsides widely opposed the Pakistani central government. They were eventually gathered under the umbrella of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. This inclusion was accepted because certain levels of autonomy were written into the Pakistani constitution. This form of isolation from central authority was, on paper, maintained until 2018 when FATA merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It did not, however, stop military intervention or measures by the Islamabad government intended to influence various outcomes in the region. Throughout this period, Pashtuns in FATA took pride in being an independent people (Hussain, 2012, p. 18). The isolation made it possible to preserve tribal custom and code, while continued interventions by the state maintained the disdain for centralised authority.

3.3 INCREASED INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION – SOVIET INVASION AND ARAB INFLUENCE

Despite the establishment of an international border through the creation of the Durand line in 1893, Pashtun tribesmen travelled freely between Pakistan and Afghanistan for many years. This ability to move freely ensured that Pashtuns on both sides of the border maintained close links (Ghufran, 2009, p, 1106). Today the international border patrols and surveillance limits this nomadic behaviour (Ahmed, 2013, p. 174), but up until the American invasion of Afghanistan (2001), the migratory behaviour persisted. These close links came into play, especially with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when large groups of Afghan Pashtuns sought refuge on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line (Kfir, 2009, p. 41).

In the 1950s the Afghani leadership rejected the Durand Line in an attempt to create support for the creation of Pashtunistan[20] which had the potential to give Afghanistan access to the sea. The government in Islamabad, on the other hand, sought to develop an idea of a Pakistani national identity, as such "any talk of provincial rights and differences based on culture, language or ethnicity were anathema" (Khan, 2007, p. 10). The Pakistani government, therefore, opposed the idea of Pashtunistan, and largely distrusted the Afghan government.

From the 1960s, intensified wealth after the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations led to an increased exodus from tribal areas to the Arab peninsula in search of employment. This exodus became increasingly prevalent in the period between the 1970s-80s. When these workers lived in Saudi Arabia, they were exposed to Wahhabist interpretations of Islam and brought these principles home to North-Western Pakistan. From the 1960s Saudi money increasingly went into the funding of religious schools in tribal areas of Pakistan to oppose Iranian Shia influence in the region. From the late 1970s, this funding focused on increasing Wahhabist teachings, supplementing or in some cases replacing Deobandi *madrasas*. The increase in religious education led to further development of the understanding of *jihad* as a global holy war best suited to Pashtuns (Haroon, 2008, p. 67). This development will be discussed further in chapter 5.

With the Iranian revolution of 1979, as well as the invasion in Afghanistan, money from Americans and Saudis went into tribal areas disrupting the former power balance between

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[20] *Pashtunistan* refers to the geographical historical region in today's Afghanistan and Pakistan which has been inhabited primarily by Pashtuns people.

authority holders in tribal areas (Johnson & Mason, 2008, p. 70). It benefitted *ulamas* to cooperate with those opposing the central government because they feared that the government would attempt to take over *madrasas* as they had attempted in 1976 (Zaman, 2018, p. 128). This fear, combined with opposition to those collaborating with western forces, created the grounds for a fruitful collaboration between *ulamas*, the *mujahideen*[21] and later the Taliban, disrupting the former power balance. Ijaz Khan stated that "while this has changed Pashtun leadership and also affected the style of leadership, elements of Pashtun traditional style and culture can be seen even in the most Talibanized region of the FATA, Waziristan" (Khan, 2007, p. 7). Although there were developments in the region towards more scriptural interpretations of Islam, Pashtun traditions such as *Pashtunwali* still influenced the ideological developments within the Taliban.

Both the Saudi Arabian and United States governments saw the benefit of supporting the Pakistani government with monetary funds. For the Saudis, a relationship with Pakistan was advantageous because of their rivalry with the Iranians. For the US, close ties with fighters in Pakistan was considered beneficial for stemming the flow of communism in Afghanistan (Ghufran, 2009, p. 1106). The Pakistani government, who were cash poor, utilised the increased funding and in turn, supported fighters in Afghanistan through the Pakistani military intelligence agency (Zaman, 2018, p. 84). When an influx of refugees from Afghanistan arrived in 1979, the Pakistani government heavily invested in training camps and schools that trained those who opposed the Afghani leadership (*mujahideen*) to counter ideas of a united Pashtun nation (Kfir, 2009, p. 42). The involvement of international political agents greatly influenced the further growth of religiopolitical groups in the region.

3.4 CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TALIBAN

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, multiple factions within the *mujahideen* competed for positions of authority. Zaman stated that "the end of the Soviet occupation led to a civil war among factions dominated by the Afghan warlords" (Zaman, 2018, p. 84). The civil war was disastrous for the population of Afghanistan. Groups of men who had primarily received education from leaders and religious leaders associated with Deobandi or Wahhabist *madrasas*, banded together and formed what became known as the Taliban. From refugee camps and rural tribal regions in Pakistan, arose a group of students (*Talibs*) who wanted to restore order to Afghanistan through Sharia. Most of these members were students with Pashtun tribal links from either side of the border. From 1994 the Taliban primarily focused its efforts on gaining power in Afghanistan, which led to them having control of the state from 1996-2001.

In this period, close ties between Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan were maintained through tribal links and those who sought refuge in Pakistan. After the attacks in 2001 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, members of both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda sought protection in tribal regions in Pakistan. The consequence was further American attention on the Pashtun dominated areas in North-West Pakistan. Additionally, the Pakistani government changed its focus from supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan to becoming an ally in the American's "War on Terror". This shift resulted in religious leaders in Deobandi and Wahhabist *madrasas*, who had since the 1960s exponentially increased

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[21] The *Mujahideen* were a group of fighters backed by the US, Saudi Arabian and Pakistani governments who used guerrilla-type tactics in the name of jihad to oppose the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.

their authority, turning against the central government. Religiopolitical groups received support from religious leaders and protection from elders under the umbrella of hospitality (*malmastia*). This protection ensured limited possibilities for collaboration between the Pakistani state, the Americans, and Pashtun tribesmen as the principles of *malmastia* would not allow tribesmen to turn in Taliban or Al Qaida members (Ahmed, 2013). If they were to do so, they would bring dishonour to their family and tribe.

Groups operating under the name Taliban continued to focus on the war in Afghanistan. In contrast, other religiopolitical groups who opposed the Pakistani government and old tribal structures focused their attention inside Pakistan's borders. From December 2007, some of these religiopolitical groups started cooperating under the umbrella movement Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan (TTP), led by Baitullah Mehsud (Zahab in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 57). The members and leaders of the TTP were primarily rural tribesmen or religious leaders from Pashtun dominated regions in the NWFP and FATA. However, the continued military operations by American and Pakistani forces, which targeted fighters amongst members of the Pashtun population, and was justified by the rhetoric on the "War on Terror", also drew in recruits from Pakistan's urban middle class (Hussain, 2012, p. 17). Although the TTP mainly recruited Pashtuns it should not be equated to a Pashtun movement as its membership does not consist only of Pashtuns, nor does it base itself on the tribal code *Pashtunwali* (Saigol, 2012). The military attacks, distrust towards the inefficient state management of legal matters, and inadequate handling of social issues by local and state governments, made recruitment easier and boosted the TTP's membership numbers.

The TTP also received support because of the continued diminishment of tribal elders' ability to deal with legal judgement. The TTP could step in to fill a void and make decisions based on the principles of Sharia. When the TTP took control of a district, they would attempt to further limit the authority of the elder tribesmen meeting in the *jirga*, by replacing them with "conservative politico-religious leadership cells" (Johnson & Mason, 2008, p. 53) who were led by *ulamas*. By creating a new system for dealing with legal judgements, the TTP increased their authority in the region.

In the beginning, the TTP received broad support from women, who donated money and jewellery (Khalid, 2016, p. 55) because they assumed the TTP would adhere to the Quran's description of women's right to education and inheritance. As the TTP's hold on Pashtun areas strengthened, so did the limitations they placed on women. The TTP "began controlling women's mobility, forbidding their right to education, and restricting their involvement in development activities" (Khalid, 2016, p. 55). Ultimately Pashtun women's support of the Taliban diminished their resources and autonomy further than had been experienced under tribal leadership. While the TTP's ability to assume control can be explained by their gradual rise, as well as social, economic, and political factors, the TTP's political and religious ideology was also influenced by additional factors such as *Pashtunwali*, Deobandi and Wahhabist teachings. A further discussion on this intersection takes place in chapter 5.

3.5 STATE LEVEL REFORMS

Throughout the historical developments in the tribal regions described above, reform and counter-reforms were undertaken at the state level, which influenced the authority of various political parties and organisations at the local level. From the creation of the state, there were questions on the role Islam should play in official governmental work. Although Pakistan was founded on the principle of being a Muslim state (Lall in Lyon & Edgar, 2010, p. 96), wishes for international cooperation and the legacy of British imperialism encouraged a secularising movement. The modernists, who were educated in Western institutions, wished to rely on international collaboration, technology and to be guided by Islam in ethics and morals. On the other hand, hard-line Islamists reformers opposed rural and Sufi practices, followed scriptural interpretations of Islam, and wanted Islam to be the guiding principle of the Pakistani state.

In Pakistan's infancy, 'founding father' Mohammed Ali Jinnah aimed to establish Pakistan as a secular democracy (Lall in Lyon & Edgar, 2010, p. 96). Nevertheless, successive leaders introduced policies to create an Islamic identity for Pakistan. Following unrest after the 1977 parliamentary elections, which saw the majority of votes go to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq arranged a coup. After declaring martial law, Zia became the President of Pakistan, deposing Bhutto. As President, Zia furthered a policy of Islamisation, which increased the politicisation of Islam in Pakistan. Under the direction of the Islamist political party Jama'at-I Islami, Zia declared Pakistan an Islamic state, furthering the use of Islam to generate national solidarity (Lapidus, 2002, p. 648). This development was especially visible in education policy, where nationalist ideology was promoted through religious doctrine within the education infrastructure and textbooks (Lall in Lyon & Edgar, 2010, p. 97). Although successive political leaders administered from more secular perspectives, remnants of Zia policies within the education infrastructure has had a continued presence.

During Zia's rule, multiple policies determined to influence and control the opportunities and actions of women were implemented. Although there were debates on women's opportunities in public life and rights within family law (Lapidus, 2002, p.647), the media was filled with depictions of women in public life as the cause of "lax morality and the disintegration of family and social values" (Mumtaz & Shaeed, 1987, p. 82). Prominent Islamists within the government directed these depictions to exclude women from decision-making bodies (Ahmed, 1992, p. 233). On a national level, little progress was made in the public visibility of women, attitudes which limited women's autonomy combined with reformist education policies continued to produce gender inequalities.

3.6 SUMMARY

Significant socio-political changes have influenced the history of North-West Pakistan and the people who live there. The people of the region have always been subject to the consequences of the interaction between international and local interests. In many cases, local traditions have been idealised when faced with outsiders, and justification has come through religious affiliation and tradition. Some significant changes in social and civil structures are worth mentioning before discussing models of power in the region in the next chapter.

Up until 1947 Pashtun tribesmen can primarily be recognised by their nomadic nature, or in Swat by the system of *wesh*. Leadership positions were mainly filled by elders and landowners, or religious figures appointed by *khans* or *maliks*. Centralised political institutions were mostly absent (Barth, 1981, p. 122), and the communal *jirga* carried out legal rulings. In Swat, significant changes occurred when the Wāli first came to power in 1915, and again when Swat became part of Pakistan in 1969. Women were primarily confined to the home, reliant on the male members of their family. Education opportunities were tied to religious schools and primarily reserved for men.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan marks the start of a new era. The independence of religious authority and further involvement by the central government of Pakistan indicates a significant increase in attempts made to break down old tribal structures. Positions of authority in this period become increasingly tied to political activity and administrative positions. The increased influence and activity of religiopolitical groups, as well as the impact of international involvement, marks a turbulent time for Pashtun tribesmen which is still observable today.

4. MODELS OF POWER

The academic study of social structures and positions of authority amongst Pashtuns in North-West Pakistan have culminated in multiple models of power. These models place power relations in a local context and can show how dominant groups continue to produce and maintain power. In this chapter, I will analyse Barth, Ahmed, and Kilcullen's models of power through the lens of Scott's model of power relations, and through the definitions of power and authority that was developed in subchapter 1.3. By using these models with the historical outline presented in the previous chapter, a model which allows for the discussion of developments in power structures over time can be produced. I will first offer a summary of the previous definitions of power and authority, and revisit Scott's model of power relations, before exploring the various models offered by earlier academic research.

4.1 MODELS OF AUTHORITY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

As stated previously, I am defining power as *the production of causal effect in a social relation, where principal agents produce a limited number of choices for the subaltern to select from. Although the subaltern has some agency and ability to resist, the level of this agency is determined by the principal's ability to establish and legitimise 'normative' courses of action which favour the principal*. I am also defining authority as *positions of power which, through produced legitimation, allow some agents to make decisions on behalf of others or give commands that are expected to be followed because of the social order*.

Scott's model of power relations serves as a baseline for my understanding of the models of power and authority presented in this chapter, as well as for the language used to describe how principals and subalterns operate in their local context.

Elementary forms of power	Corrective influence		Persuasive influence	
	Force	Manipulation	Signification	Legitimation
Developed forms of power	Domination			
	Through constraint		Through discursive formation	
	Coercion	Inducement	Expertise	Command
	Counteraction			
	Protest		Pressure	
	Interpersonal power			

Figure 1B: "A map of power relations" (Scott, 2001, p. 16).

Although the various forms and resources for gaining and retaining power are separated in Scott's model, it is necessary to remember that a complex intersection between the forms of power occurs in concrete structures of power. When applying Scott's model and descriptions to Barth, Ahmed, and Kilcullen's models, these dependencies can be

observed. It is primarily principals with superior monetary and discursive resources who are dominant in these models. Through the production of cultural representations, a cultural context which presents the subalterns' choices for action as something normative is produced. The superior resources are used to form discourses and reproduce shared cognitive and evaluative symbols, as well as establishing and maintaining a structure of leadership. Principals use the developed forms of power to produce and reproduce their authority, and the social and civil structure, by restricting the subaltern's autonomy and available courses of action.

4.1.1 FREDRIK BARTH'S "*QUOM*" SYSTEM

The research for Barth's model was recorded in the 1960s when Swat was facing considerable changes to their civil structure. It is, therefore, essential to consider that his representation described a system that was undergoing significant changes. His model characterised how the social and civil system operated from the perspective of those in higher standing in Swat society.

Barth presented what he referred to as a "system of social stratification", combined it with patrilineal descent groups and labelled it *quom*. *Quom* can be translated to "tribe, sect, people, nation, family", but has predominantly been used as a term for "hierarchical-ordered social groups" (Barth, 1981, pp. 18-20). Barth claimed this system shared some similarities with both the Indian caste system and European feudal systems, as it was influenced by the proximity to India and the historical presence of Hindus in Swat. However, this system could, according to Barth, be defined, "not by ritual [pollution], but by occupation and division of labour" (Barth, 1981, p. 20). People were divided into groups primarily by patriline, and according to Barth, it was rare for one to see a discrepancy between 'caste' and occupation (Barth, 1981, p. 22). Although one could be a tailor by trade, one could still be recognised as part of the shopkeeper group based on patrilineal descent. According to Barth's research, it was not common practice to take an occupation outside of one's patrilineal group (Barth, 1981, p. 22).

Barth described the role of land ownership as *sine qua non* (Barth, 1981, p. 64) - something one cannot live without. "From title to land springs all political power - wealth, the control of clients, and a voice in the councils. Except for questions concerning the honour of women, and revenge, all conflicts among Pathans boil down to conflicts over land" (Barth, 1981, p. 64). The importance of land ownership in Pashtun society in Swat should not be underrepresented. If a tribesman lost their title to land, they also lost their connection to the descent group. Non-landowners, therefore, become clients of landowners to maintain their connection to the tribe. The protection of land ownership was vital because it determined access to decision-making and, therefore, influenced the decisions made to maintain power and authority.

Outside of the patrilineal descent groups, some groups had an affiliation which was necessary for function in everyday life, such as religious leaders, manual labour workers, and shopkeepers. In Swat, Barth classified some of these people as *clients* of those with membership to a clan (Barth, 1981, p. 60). In contrast to members, clients did not own land, or only held small areas of land, and were reliant on landowners for protection, which created a system of mutual interdependence.

4.1.2 AKBAR AHMED'S "WAZIRISTAN MODEL"

Ahmed introduced what he called "The Waziristan Model" to present how three sources (pillars) of authority were "distinct, overlapping, and in some ways mutually interdependent, though often in opposition" (Ahmed, 2013, p. 49) to one another. His model primarily represented tribal communities in Waziristan, but Ahmed claimed the model had a broader application in other tribal communities. The pillars represented:

(1) the tribal elder, or malik

(2) the religious leader, or mullah

(3) the political agent (PA), representing the central government

These three pillars were dependent on each other whilst also struggling and striving for dominance, which, according to Ahmed, created a non-fixed landscape of authority (Ahmed, 2013, p. 49). In Waziristan, tribal elders in the *jirga* primarily made decisions for tribesmen through the tribal code *Pashtunwali*. Religious leadership has traditionally been appointed by elders and have served the function of teachers, tenders of the mosque and gatherers of tribesmen under one banner of holy war when facing foreign invasion (Ahmed, 2013, p. 50). From the end of the 19th century, the third pillar of authority has been the political agents who have represented the central government. To navigate the tenuous connections with tribesmen, the PA would have to, according to Ahmed, act "with the utmost neutrality, fairness, and understanding" (Ahmed, 2013, p. 50). For all three pillars, legitimacy through tribal connections as well as religious piety was a necessity.

4.1.3 DAVID KILCULLEN'S "TRIBAL GOVERNANCE TRIAD"

Kilcullen's model described an authority system which "was well adapted for maintaining social order and collective security in an inhospitable frontier environment that typically saw little, if any, government presence" (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 77). Although Kilcullen focused his descriptions of Pashtuns on tribesmen in Afghanistan, the model was presented as a broader representation of authority amongst Pashtun tribesmen of "Eastern Afghanistan and the Frontier" (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 80).

In a simplified version, Kilcullen compared the Pashtun authority system to a modern democratic system but specified that the analogy was limited because it could not represent all state functions and because it excluded women (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 77). The structure represented how, theoretically, all tribesmen "hold themselves equal and independent members of a free association based on lineage, rather than slaves of the state or followers of a khan" (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 78). The first description of the "Tribal Governance Triad" can be illustrated similarly to the pillars in Ahmed's "Waziristan model":

(1) Khan, or collectively, the *Jirga* – the legislative

(2) Government-approved political agent (PA) – the executive

(3) Mullah – the judiciary

This simplified version does not, however, show how public opinion, group consensus, and tribal public opinion have confined the action of leaders. Additionally, the model does not

show the effects of "inter-hierarchical roles", where tribesmen shift allegiances and offset the balance between the three poles of authority to gain a favourable outcome (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 78). Kilcullen, therefore, presents the authority structure graphically in Figure 2:


[Ideal-type informal authority structure prior to disruption]

Figure 2: "Tribal governance triad diagram" (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 82).

Kilcullen took the original model one step further, as seen in Figure 3, and showed how the increased prominence of religious leadership disrupted the balance of authority after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While religious leaders gained lasting notoriety and authority after their successes in Afghanistan, tribal leaders saw their influence diminish (Kilcullen, 2017, p.79). Many tribal elders felt dispossessed, which served as motivation for revenge and a desire to reclaim their traditional authority positions (Kilcullen, 2017, p.81). The tribal population who were "seeking security and order" Kilcullen, 2017, p. 82), conformed to tribal or Taliban direction to minimise violence and instability.


Figure 3: "Disrupted governance triad diagram" (Kilcullen, 2017, p. 82).

4.1.4 EXPLORING BARTH, AHMED, AND KILCULLEN MODELS

4.1.4.1 BARTH

Talal Asad's main critique of Barth's model revolved around the issue of a tribesman's ability to oppose the will of the powerful *khans.* He argued that ownership of land gave the *khans* the ability to dominate other tribesmen and inhabitants of the area (Asad, 1972, p. 82). This critique implied that the principals (*khans*) formed enduring structures of domination and used structures of interpersonal power (Scott, 2001, pp. 12-13) to maintain their authority by limiting the subalterns' (tribesmen's) free will.

Barth later conceded that ownership of land was *sine qua non* (Barth, 1981, p. 64), arguing that most arguments amongst Pashtuns came down to the ownership of land. I would claim that both Barth and Asad have valid arguments. The structures of power did not grant the subalterns much choice, because the distribution of land and the patrilineal hierarchy was a form of *signification* and *legitimation* which drew subalterns into an interpretive frame of reference which valued the continuation of the system (Scott, 2001, pp. 13-15). Nevertheless, the subalterns had some measure of choice, because they could, to some extent, shift allegiances if multiple avenues granted some degree of resources.

By acknowledging that land ownership was necessary to have access to a position of authority, it also becomes more apparent why women, who were kept from owning land by the patrilineal inheritance traditions (Agarwal, 1994), were wholly dependent on their male relatives. As women's economic well-being and social status were determined by land ownership, the ideological and material barriers limited women's agency (Agarwal, 1994). The acknowledgement of the importance of land ownership as a resource shows the limited possibilities women had for *counteraction,* which meant that their position in society was continuously reproduced.

Akbar Ahmed's critique of Barth can mainly be summed up in three points, but it should be noted that some of Ahmed's critique is not aimed directly at Barth. He takes issue with how the popularity of Barth's analysis has led to many scholars basing their research on Barth's method and material. When they, in turn, misinterpret this material and use it more widely on the whole Pashtun population, they perpetuate a flawed representation and base their analysis on inaccurate material.

1. "It suffers from a degree of ethnocentricity" (Ahmed, 1976, p. 9)

In Ahmed's interpretation of Barth's work, European concepts were superimposed on Pashtuns. Social action and identity became limited to the act of maximizing social and financial profit through transactional strategies. Consequently, the analysis underplayed or misinterpreted the tribal code *Pashtunwali* as well as the influence of socio-religious Islamic values (Ahmed, 1976, p. 9). By comparing the social structure of Swat to the feudal societies of Europe or the Indian caste system, Barth continued the stereotyping of Pashtun tribesmen. By pointing towards how Barth minimised the effects of *Pashtunwali* and socio-religious Islamic values, Ahmed showed how Barth's work is negatively affected by colonial discourse and a Eurocentric view. In a similar manner to how Stuckrad critiqued the academic study of religion (Stuckrad, 2013, pp. 5-6), the celebration of Barth's work

is indicative of similar behaviour within the academic field of anthropology[22], which highlights why there is a need for interdisciplinary and intersectional approaches when studying Pashtuns.

2. "The Swat analysis is inclined to be reductionist" (Ahmed, 1976, p. 11)

Ahmed argued that Barth exaggerated his description of how Pashtuns were continuously aware of their place on the lineage charter. According to Ahmed, Barth focused primarily on the awareness of tribal lineage ties and broader tribal societal connections, and as a result, disregarded more considerable religio-cultural influences (Ahmed, pp. 11-12). Although Barth did describe the tribal narrative which places Qais as a common ancestor, he limited his description of the Islamic aspects of the narrative, diminishing the influence of socio-religious Islamic values. By doing so, Barth ignored important *discursive formation,* which was used to legitimise tribesmen's position in society.

I agree with Ahmed's argument to an extent. Barth's analysis was a descriptive reduction, which minimised or almost ignored important intersecting factors in Swati power relations. The consequence of this descriptive reduction again highlights the importance of researching intersectional causation when analysing the motivation and argumentation for a specific social structure.

3. "The Swat analysis is synecdochic" (Ahmed, 1976, p. 12)

Although the Yusufzai *Khans* only represented a fifth of the population of Swat at the time, they were exemplified as the standard citizen in Barth's publication. This form of generalisation was a trend which was generally applicable to cultural anthropology research at the time. Selective qualitative data was used to create generalisations, and examples were made with certain conditions to highlight systems of meaning and social structures. Ahmed, nevertheless, made a point to claim that despite their minority, Barth's description of the Yusufzai *Khans* made them the representation of "the ideal" Pashtun, as the goals and lives of almost all men in Swat were presented through the eyes of the *Khans* (Ahmed, 1976, p. 12). The effect of this research was that Barth's model mostly described the perspective of the principals, limiting the point of view of the subalterns. Barth's analysis showed a representation of a society where tribesmen adhered to the inevitability of their station, marrying and choosing a profession within their social group. By presenting the one perspective, Barth limited the further use of his analysis. The prolific use of his work ensured that the lack of focus on intersecting factors continued to dominate the research on Pashtuns for years to come.

Looking past the significant critique of Barth's model and analysis, there is still valuable information to be found in his work. Barth's description of the contractual relationships between tenants and landlords did show how *khans* used *inducement* in the form of contractual obligations to garner positions of authority. A longer historical perspective is also relevant to show significant trends and changes in how those in authority have actualised their domination. This perspective can be achieved by using Barth's model in conjunction with Ahmed's and Kilcullen's models.

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[22] For a further discussion on postcolonial criticism and issues of Eurocentricity see: Prakash, G. (1994). Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism. *The American Historical Review*, 99(5), 1475-1490.

Barth's model serves as one representation of how some Pashtuns perceived the tribal authority structure, as well as the discursive formation which allowed them to reproduce the structure. Although Barth's representation focuses primarily on those of higher social standing, it presents a society that prioritises a patriarchal structure, limits women's resources and access to public spheres, and uses landownership as a measure to gain and reproduce authority.

4.1.4.2 AHMED

Ahmed presented an attempt at a generalised model of the Pashtun power structure. In his 2013 publication *The Thistle and the Drone,* Ahmed claimed that the model could have a broader use when studying *nang* tribes in Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013, p. 49). Nonetheless, the titles of the pillars, and what Ahmed presented as the "ideal" Pashtun tribal structure, limited their wider historical use. The simplicity of the categories represented a specific historical period, notably before the increased influence of the religious pillar, and constrained authority to individual positions of power. Geo-political events since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have significantly altered the balance of power between the pillars, which restricts the model to a bygone era. Additionally, Ahmed's descriptive reduction had the same effect as that which he critiqued in Barth's work. The pillars represented the perspective of the principals, while it largely ignored the perspective of the subalterns.

Ahmed's life experience also plays into his representation of this model. From 1978-1980 he served as the Political Agent for the South Waziristan Agency and served as one of the pillars on his authority model, something which undoubtedly coloured his representation. On multiple occasions in his book *The Thistle and the Drone,* Ahmed's nostalgia to a time where the closest representation of his model could be found is evident. This nostalgia led to Ahmed presenting his model as an ideal that should be regained, instead of a simple description of a power structure. Nevertheless, Ahmed has stipulated that if an attempt should be made to reintroduce the old balance between the pillars, women's autonomy and education must be kept in mind, as women's place in society should move forward not backwards (Ahmed & Houtman, 2009, pp. 20-21).

While the three pillars are somewhat limited, they can be a useful tool for discussing how principals in Pashtun society produced a cultural context which limited subalterns' courses of action. Principals within the three pillars produced shared cognitive and evaluative symbols through their interaction, whether through cooperation or opposition. These symbols were used to produce and reproduce their power. Together the authority figures in the pillars represented almost all authority in the Pashtun social structure and could therefore produce cultural representations which were used to legitimise their *expertise* and *command*. By including a representation of state and religious authority, Ahmed broadened the area of research on Pashtuns social structure.

Despite the issues of descriptive reduction and limitations on historical developments, the separation into pillars of power is a valuable tool when attempting to organise the motivation and symbols of multiple actors operating in the same period. The model is also relevant because it does not exclude the influence of the tribal code *Pashtunwali* or socio-religious Islamic values in the balancing of authority.

4.1.4.3 KILCULLEN

In his initial model in Figure 3, Kilcullen expanded on the ideas presented by Barth and Ahmed in their models, the model from Figure 4 included modern context to explain developments since the formation of the Taliban. The inclusion of the second model ensures that Kilcullen avoids some of the historical restrictions of Ahmed's model. At the same time, the addition of the category of the tribal population broadens the perspective on how the tribal population have responded to authority.

Through the inclusion of the tribal population in the model, Kilcullen shows how the subalterns use counteraction through *pressure* to be heard by those who dominate (Scott, 2001, p. 27). They use the persuasive influence and forms of *inducement* that is available to them within the social hierarchy to make principals consider their views, by shifting allegiance among the poles of authority. Although land ownership and heritage is still a significant resource which grants legitimacy and access to authority, the abolition of the *wesh* system has granted more tribesmen the opportunity to own land, and it is no longer a sole determiner of access to power.

The model in Figure 3 does suffer from some restrictions related to Kilcullen's approach in the writing of *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. As indicated in chapter 2, the focus on terrorism and "solutions to the problem" has limited the description of intersection factors in academic literature. Kilcullen's second model exaggerates the total control the Taliban had over the Pashtun population. Although more accurate amongst Afghan Pashtuns, especially regarding government representatives, Pashtuns in Pakistan did not respond collectively to the Taliban's rise in power. A significant number of the population in North-West Pakistan did not react favourably to the TTP's takeover, and this opposition increased with the introduction of further restrictions and attempts to delegitimise tribal leadership. Nevertheless, the model offers a useful perspective on how the population reacted to *corrective influence,* such as *force* through physical strength or *manipulation* through propaganda, in the face of new agents within the religious leadership.

Kilcullen's models have offered a visual cue to the fluidity between the three pillars of leadership and introduced the perspective of the subaltern. Despite the focus on Afghan Pashtuns, especially in Figure 3, the models are useful for the further analysis of the historical developments in authority in Pashtun tribal society.

4.2 PASHTUN LEADERSHIP TRINITY

Looking at the models from Barth, Ahmed, and Kilcullen, a few common traits can be extrapolated. There have continuously been recognisably broader groups of authority holders discernible amongst Pashtuns in North-West Pakistan. Although Barth did not point towards all of these groups directly, tribal elders, religious authority, and administrative leadership were all mentioned in his research. Ahmed and Kilcullen also highlighted the distinction between these leadership roles. Their models, however, were limited to specific timeframes and did not allow for a broader historical view because of their descriptive reduction. Nevertheless, this separation, with the addition of the subaltern perspective, is beneficial for the analysis of historical developments in Pashtun authority.

Inspired by Ahmed and Kilcullen, I have separated authority amongst Pashtuns into the three broad categories of (1) tribal leadership, (2) religious leadership, and (3) administrative leadership, with the addition of the subaltern category (4) tribal population. While Ahmed and Kilcullen limited themselves to specific positions of power (Ahmed, 2013, p. 49; Kilcullen, 2017, p. 80), the broader categories of leadership in Figure 4 allow for the analysis of developments over time as well as the inclusion of new roles and agents in the future.

Pashtun Leadership Trinity
Pashtun tribesmen of North-West Pakistan

Collaboration/Competition

Tribal Leadership
[*Khan, Malik, jirga*]

Religious Leadership
[*Mullah, ulama, Taliban*]

Tribal Population
[*Subalterns who use
counteraction to be
recognised and heard*]

Collaboration/
Competition

Collaboration/
Competition

Administrative Leadership
[*District governor, political agent,
military, politician at state level*]

Figure 4: "Pashtun Leadership Trinity"

The model in Figure 4, comes with the stipulation that it only represents the groups and positions of authority available to those with access to the public sphere. This condition highlights the significant limitations to women's autonomy in North-West Pakistan because of their seclusion from the public sphere.

Although it would seemingly be easy to assign specific tribesmen or groups to one leadership-branch, I will highlight some of the complexities of this system of power. The people identified within specific groups have all lived their lives being influenced by their ancestry, religious symbols, as well as local and international governments. Through these intersecting realities, complex affiliations have developed. Collaboration/Competition comes into play when individuals or groups from one leadership-branch through *discursive formation* gain the resources to either put the other branches up against each other to reach a favourable outcome for themselves or collaborate with another branch to diminish the thirds position. There can also be fluid transitions of an individual between the leadership-branches. Many of the people who traditionally have kept power through the Tribal and religious leadership-branches have engaged in state and local administrative politics, moving into the administrative leadership-branch. Additionally, although restrictions on the patriline have historically limited who has had access to the leadership-branches, the rise of religiopolitical groups, economic development, and the ability to acquire resources has expanded the opportunity of moving from the subaltern tribal population into one of the leadership-branches. Finally, although the Taliban is mentioned

under the religious leadership-branch, this primarily refers to those with leadership positions within the TTP, not all individuals with an affiliation to the religiopolitical group.

Before discussing the significant historical developments seen within the leadership-branches, a summary of the framework described in chapter 3 is useful. Depending on their geographical location, Pashtuns primarily lived in rural villages as farmers or had a nomadic lifestyle up until the mid-20th century. Leadership positions were mainly filled by elders and landowners, or religious figures appointed by *khans* or *maliks*. The British Empire officially operated in the tribal regions in opposition to Soviet expansion until the Partition of 1947. At the beginning of Pakistan's creation, the development of a shared national identity and the arguments between reformers and modernists dominated national politics, which influenced the state's approach to the tribal regions. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marks the start of a new era. The involvement of countries such as the US and Saudi Arabia influence the resources available for guerrilla groups and religious leaders. Continued conflict in Afghanistan and North-West Pakistan continue throughout the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, which marks a turbulent time for Pashtun tribesmen which is still observable today.

4.2.1 TRIBAL LEADERSHIP

Throughout the history of North-West Pakistan, tribal leadership has adapted and changed because of various socio-economic and religiopolitical factors. After studying Barth and Asad, Nichols discussed how previous scholarship influenced his analysis: "nominally competing anthropological interpretations of Pashtun and Swat society, including the choice-based modelling of Barth and the class sensibility of Asad, are viewed as representing different aspects of evolving, but enduring, social processes of power competition and distribution" (Nichols in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 135). After exploring the models of Barth, Ahmed, and Kilcullen, I reached a similar conclusion to Nichols. Although there were significant changes to the structure of the groups and positions of authority within the tribal leadership-branch, many of the agents from the same families maintained control over significant social and economic resources. Through this control, they asserted dominance over the tribal population, maintaining their positions as principals.

The first Pashtun leadership in Swat could primarily be found through the egalitarian elder council. With the development of the *wesh* system, major landholders who received support from their clients (smaller landowners or tenants) would use this support to achieve their will in the *jirga*. After the appointment of the Waduds' by the Yusufzai *Khans*, the *Khans* and landholders who were favoured and cooperated could maintain their positions of authority. Throughout the Waduds' leadership, there were developments towards an administrative structure, where leaders made civic decisions for the people of Swat. By moving into these positions, *Maliks* maintained their access to power by straddling the line between tribal leadership and administrative leadership.

The administrative structure developed under the Wadud Wāli cannot easily be placed in one leadership-branch because it relied heavily on tribal tradition and support. The Wāli received support from other Tribal Leaders and the Pashtun Population because he seemingly adhered to local expectations of leadership, which helped to maintain Swat's

independence from the Pakistani state government structure. The Wāli and his supporters produced *legitimation* by building value commitments to his authority when the Yusufzai *Khans* elected him and gave him the right to give orders. Through the production of cultural representations, they ensured that the subaltern tribal population willingly obeyed (Scott, 2001).

After the incorporation of Swat into Pakistan, there was further development of new local and state political parties, which led to political engagement and administrative positions with connections to the central government. In all these stages, the developments in the economic system led to new people gaining resources which would previously have been denied to them based on their patriline or access to land. Economic opportunities from trade, working abroad, and tourism benefited some tribal population and those who already had significant resources. The gradual development, however, did mean that several Pashtun heritage lines still maintained their privileged positions. For instance, the tribal name Yousufzai still has prominence in Swat today. Nevertheless, economic inequalities persisted and contributed to later political instability (Nichols in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 135), which maintained the distinction between tribal leadership as principals and tribal population as subalterns.

In Waziristan, interference by the British Empire and later by the Pakistani government increased the position of some elder tribesmen. By supporting one tribe over the other, the British and later the Pakistani state used internal strife amongst Pashtun tribal elders to get their will. By increasing the access to resources and connections to the outside world, the outside interference upset the balance of the *jirga*, but still maintained the authority of tribal leadership. As in Swat, some tribesmen straddled the line between tribal leadership and administrative leadership by engaging with the Political Agent and the central government. This cooperation increased their access to resources and their authority, which continued to produce their principal position.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, tribal leadership lost significant influence because of the increased prominence of religious leadership. The continued ministrations and support for alternative authority figures led to the decline in the overall influence of tribal leadership. While some moved into administrative leadership, tribal leadership continued to exist through the *hujra* and the *jirga*. Although diminished, the cultural signification of 'the elder' endured, allowing some to use *expertise* to maintain a principal position over the tribal population. This development has ensured that the tribal leadership still has authority to this day.

4.2.2 RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP

In the original establishment of Pashtun tribal dominance in the NWFP and FATA the religious leadership was granted legitimacy through appointment by a *Khan* or *Malik*, teaching in religious schools, or when calling together tribesmen in the name of religion to oppose an outsider opponent. After the Partition, Deobandi *ulamas* gradually politicised, extending their influence towards administrative leadership at both state and local levels (Haroon, 2008, p. 69). religious leadership continued to primarily have power in the periphery until the significant increase in funding for religious schools which began in the mid-20th century.

With increased calls to oppose the invasion of Afghanistan, religious leaders could preach a new form of global *jihad* and gather tribesmen from both sides of the Durand Line. With American, Saudi and Pakistani funding the *mujahadeen,* and later *Talibs,* received training and education in *madrasas* and built strong relationships with their religious leaders and teachers. After the Soviet withdrawal, these religious leaders did not step aside for the tribal leadership-branch as they had previously done in earlier smaller conflicts. They had gained a significant authority position and would not be side-lined. After the withdrawal, infighting between the *mujahideen* and mistrust of these fighters eventually led to the creation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP), which ensured the continued authority of *ulamas*.

After gaining more resources after the Soviet invasion, religious leadership created legitimation for some of the tribal population to oppose the former balance of authority. Subalterns used *protest* (Scott, 2001, p. 28) to resist the existing structures of domination. Religious leadership had the necessary resources to use *inducement* and *coercion* to organise the collective action of subalterns without showing direct intent. This *manipulation* was possible because of their perceived *expertise* to articulate and represent the faith. Through *manipulation,* religious leadership influenced the conditions under which the tribal population made their calculations on which outcome was more favourable for them (Scott, 2001, p. 13).

Cooperation between religiopolitical groups, political parties, and *ulamas* have ensured that religious leadership has a significant hold on power amongst Pashtuns. Post 9/11, and with the increased use of drone attacks in tribal regions, religious leaders who were already held in high regard could preach opposition both against the Pakistani administration and Western powers. The increased influence of Wahhabist teachings on the tribal population and religious leadership also created animosity towards those within the tribal leadership-branch who adhered to "un-Islamic" principles by still following Sufi practices or *Pashtunwali*. This opposition ensured the continued competition between the three branches.

Throughout the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, religious leadership have increased their access to resources and used them to influence administrative leadership and tribal population. In some instances, individual and groups within the religious leadership-branch have straddled the border between or moved into, the administrative leadership-branch, strengthening their authority and their ability to influence subalterns' courses of action.

4.2.3 ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERSHIP

Multiple factors such as the significant influence of foreign nations, the creation of the Durand Line as an international border, the partition from India, as well as the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, have had an impact on how administrative leadership could actualise their power. It is in this branch that we also see some of the most considerable differences between Swat and Waziristan.

While the tribal population in Waziristan mostly engaged with Political Agents appointed by the British or the Pakistani government, the tribal population in Swat faced first the

system developed under the Wadud Wāli, then the state apparatus of Pakistan. Although they used different administrative positions, the goal was primarily the same, establishing cooperation with Pashtun tribesmen to secure political goals of groups and individuals in the administrative leadership-branch. Subalterns in the tribal population have had the best chance of achieving a principal position through this branch because it primarily requires the acquisition of enough monetary and education resources to run for a political office.

After the integration of tribal regions such as Swat into Pakistan, challenges arose when the tribal population had to reckon with the Pakistani legislative structure. The tribal population and tribal leadership deeply opposed what they saw as a corrupt and inefficient system. By moving from a social structure that primarily relied on swift decisions made in the *jirga* to avoid disproportionate retribution, to a system that moved slowly, the administrative leadership faced opposition. Additionally, to participate in the new legislative system, specific knowledge was needed to reach a favourable outcome, which disenfranchised the tribal population. The administrative leadership could not ensure shared cognitive and evaluative symbols, which limited their ability to use *signification* and *legitimation* (Scott, 2001, pp. 13-15). These issues have still not been fully addressed today and are routinely used by tribal leadership and religious leadership to maintain authority over the tribal population.

As seen in the other branches, the development of political positions led to gradual changes where participation in local and state politics became increasingly important. By producing *legitimation* for the position in the branch, the groups and individuals in the administrative leadership-branch expanded their authority. It became challenging to oppose some of the people within the branch because their positions become institutionalised. Nevertheless, these positions require many resources to maintain, as well as the generation of a favourable perception of personal attributes, such as physical strength and discursive abilities (Scott, 2001, p. 28). There has, therefore, been more changes to who holds the positions at any given time. Despite these challenges, some principals with large amounts of resources have been able to ensure that their family or collaborators keep the positions within their circle.

After the increased influence of the TTP in North-West Pakistan, the Military and the State government at times worked independently of each other to oppose religiopolitical groups in the region. Depending on the ongoing opinion of the tribal population and the sway of the religious leadership-branch, this intervention was received with support or opposition. Despite adverse opinions toward the government's stance on Pashtun and Islamic interests, the understanding that cooperation with, and participation in, administrative leadership can be beneficial, has led to the increased authority of this branch. This increase was especially apparent when FATA was incorporated with KPK in 2018 because it enshrined administrative influence in legislation.

4.3 CONCLUSION

Elements of the models of power discussed in this chapter can be used together to show the evolution of authority structure amongst Pashtuns in North-West Pakistan. Authority is developed when groups have shared symbols that create legitimacy for acting on behalf of others. Principals must continuously work to maintain their domination, and this becomes easier when the subaltern population perceive them to have a combination of *legitimation*, *expertise* and *command*, which allows them to reproduce the patterns of

power. Although the models presented by Barth, Ahmed, and Kilcullen suffer from descriptive reduction, they offer valuable insight into the historical developments in authority amongst Pashtuns in North-West Pakistan.

The three branches of tribal, administrative and religious leadership can be observed in Pashtun society clearly from the Partition in 1947 but are discernible from the end of the 19th century. The intersection between ancestry, tribal code of conduct, religious teaching, foreign interference, warfare, and socio-economic factors have influenced how principals have legitimised their power. Throughout these developments, the same groups, and in some cases families, have maintained their positions of authority by producing and reproducing systems of meaning which have ensured the co-operation of the tribal population. Although the balance of power between the branches has shifted and it has become easier to move from a subaltern to a principal position, the basic structure of three leadership-branches has endured.

Despite changes to who has authority within the leadership-branches, the fluctuation in authority has not altered the ideological discursive elements which ensure that women have limited access to the public sphere. In none of the developments within the branches did women gain significant lasting autonomy because women have not had access to enough collective resources to place principals under sufficient pressure to change societal power structures.

5. BALANCING INTERSECTING VALUES

As seen in the previous chapter, power resides in those with access to enough resources to achieve domination. They maintain this domination by using symbols and language that legitimise their decisions and positions. This chapter will focus on these symbols and how those with power in Pashtun society legitimise the continuation of women's position in the community. In this chapter, we will look at the complicated relationship between the Pashtuns tribal code *Pashtunwali* and the emergence and influence of orthodox Islam in North-West Pakistan. This chapter will also look at how this interplay have continuously limited women's rights and opportunities. Through discussing these two interplays and the consequences of their reaction together in the context of the previous chapter, the continued disenfranchisement of women in North-West Pakistan throughout the last 150 years can be discussed.

5.1 PASHTUNWALI

Before going into what *Pashtunwali* is and how it has been used, some qualifiers need to be explained. It is crucial to understand that *Pashtunwali* has been affected because it is not a written code. Differences can, therefore, be found in interpretation and practice (Khalid, 2016, p. 54). Its fluid nature (Ginsburg, 2011, p. 91) has allowed it to be adapted and modified even when significant changes have occurred in the regions where *Pashtunwali* is and has been followed. These changes have come in the form of who has had the dominant authority, reactions to meeting and making connections to the world outside of tribal regions, as well as social and political events.

There have been changes to the consensus that considered following *Pashtunwali* necessary for being an "ideal" tribesman. For most of *Pashtunwali's* existence, it was recognised that a man who follows it diligently is greater than one who does not. In later years the strengthening of the religious leadership-branch came at some cost to the elevation of *Pashtunwali*. This subchapter will show that although *Pashtunwali* now "compete with other value systems" (Karrer, 2012), the tribal code is still seen by some as the ultimate identifier of Pashtuns. With these qualifiers in mind, it is therefore important to acknowledge that although adherence to *Pashtunwali* is not consistent or permanent, it has historically been held in high regard by most Pashtuns.

5.1.1 DEFINING PASHTUNWALI

Definitions of what *Pashtunwali* is and how big of an influence it has had and continues to have, has been a part of most academic discussions on the topic. The saying: 'one does not speak *Pashtunwali*, one does *Pashtunwali* has been widely reported and recognised[23], this has the effect of differentiating between those who speak the language *Pashto* and those who live life as a Pashtun. According to Lutz Rzehak, 'doing *Pashto*' "means to bring one's behaviour in line with the ideals and moral concepts of the Pashtuns'' (Rzehak, 2011, p. 9).

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[23] For more details see Ahmed, (2011), p. 57; Ahmed, (2013), pp. 54 and pp. 73; Barth, (1965), p. 81; Barth, (1981), pp. 106-107 and p. 115; and Khalid, (2016), p. 55.

While some have described *Pashtunwali* primarily as a "code of honour" (Lindholm in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 17), others have described it as a "local customary practice" (Khalid, 2016, p, 54). Some have said *Pashtunwali* "is an ethical-normative frame of reference that applies to all Pashtuns" (Karrer, 2012), while others have said *Pashtunwali* is "about a man's conduct while balancing honour and the need to live in this world" (Ahmed, 2013, p. 53). Common to all these descriptions is how *Pashtunwali* defines what is considered an honourable life and honourable behaviour. It has also been recognised, not as an abstract code of law, but as a code that permeates all areas of a Pashtun's life (Ginsburg, 2011, p. 97); Ahmed (2013, p. 53) argued that *nang* (honour) is at the core of *Pashtunwali* and holds both a social and spiritual function which affects, amongst others, hospitality and revenge.

Pashtunwali can be organised by some basic principles that should guide the behaviour of an "ideal" tribesman. Some of these are: "*badal* (revenge), *melmastia* (hospitality), *nanawatee* (refuge), *tor* (female honour) and *tarberwali* (agnatic rivalry)" (Khalid, 2016, p. 55). As Pashtuns are seen in the eyes of others through the filter of *Pashtunwali*, these principles guide a tribesman's behaviour. By following *Pashtunwali*, a man is seen as honourable and is respected by other tribesmen. Being perceived as honourable is necessary to gain access to land, trade and authority. A man who does not follow *Pashtunwali*, or whose family members do not, will lose social and financial access which can mean the undoing for the entire family.

Ginsburg argued that "Preserving honour is essential in a stateless society, particularly one that is segmentary. The risk of stateless societies is that stronger actors will prey on weaker ones" (Ginsburg, 2011, p. 96). The importance of honour in Pashtun society is not just an expectation for everyone's behaviour. It also serves as a protective mechanism between subalterns and principals. While the skewed balance of resources ensures that some have power over others, the honour code works as a mitigating tool. The potential for maltreatment explains the necessity for *badal*, where actors show that infringements on honour will be met with an aggressive defence. *Pashtunwali* gives subalterns the resources to apply pressure on principals and therefore makes it possible for Pashtuns to strive towards the ideal of an egalitarian society.

As the previous chapters have shown, Pashtuns have primarily organised their communities in hierarchical structures, where social inequality, age and gender all play a role. In the face of these unequal resources, the concept of "equality in dignity" (Karrer, 2012) ensures a Pashtun's right to "preserve and defend one's personal honour" (Karrer, 2012). It allows for pressure to be applied in breeches of honour. Although women are taught from childhood to take pride in their heritage and their identity as Pashtuns (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 835), this equality does not extend to them. Instead, their honour is tied to the male head of the family and breeches of *tor* can lead to some of the most severe reprisals. Ahmed stated that women, in particular, are vulnerable to how *Pashtunwali* is interpreted because the "actual practice often strays from the original intent of upholding honor" (Ahmed, 2013, p. 54).

The idealised egalitarian *Pashtunwali* has rarely been practised. On the one hand, we see the ideal of an egalitarian honour code that should protect subalterns as well as principals. In actuality, the upholding of *Pashtunwali* is subject to shifts in an individual's resources, as well as social and political changes.

5.1.2 THE FLUCTUATING REACH OF THE ELDER COUNCILS

The nomadic life of Pashtuns naturally ensured that there was no need for comprehensive legislation. Instead, contact between tribes and within clans led to the development of shared principles which governed their behaviour. Ginsburg claimed that "law in stateless societies must be enforced by communities and individuals themselves" (Ginsburg, 2011, p. 93). Pashtuns did not recognise the authority of a state, someone, therefore, needed to enforce codified expectations of behaviour.

As some conflicts and breaches of *Pashtunwali* necessitated consultation and coordination, institutionalisation came in the form of the *jirga*. The *jirga* is an egalitarian council of elders, where the patriarch of the lineage structure holds a place and represents the patriline (Zahab in Hopkins & Marsden, 2013, p. 58). In the ideal *jirga* procedure, all council members have equal status, and deliberation is open to everyone except for women and children (Ginsburg, 2011, p. 97). However, tribesmen operate with various resources, and some actors have the discursive ability or means of pressure to ensure that in some cases, the outcome is in line with their wishes. No matter an individual's resources, formality should ensure that within the procedure, tribesmen have equal time and space to deliberate.

Decision-making on the council is dependent on following the tribal code of honour. If one could not adhere to the principles of *Pashtunwali*, they had no place on the tribal council. The pressure to conform to the principles of *Pashtunwali* is tied to what Rzehak called the "dichotomy of honour and shame" (Rzehak, 2011, pp. 9). This separation is evaluated by other people, and influences the interaction between Pashtuns, thus ensuring a need for a council who could offer judgement. A second consequence of the institutionalisation was the creation of a base of common knowledge. As the *jirga* is a collection of representatives from the entire community, their decisions are a public declaration of expected behaviour (Ginsburg, 2011, pp. 99-100), furthering the legitimacy of *Pashtunwali*.

In an attempt to establish contact with tribesmen, the leaders in British India at various times either strengthened the reach of the *jirga* or diminished it by favouring individual *Maliks*. After the Partition, legislation from the state of Pakistan ensured some legal independence for tribesmen in FATA and the NWFP (Ginsburg, 2011, p. 93). Consequently, in Waziristan, benign neglect by the state ensured the strengthening of the decision-making rights of the *jirgas*. In the same period, the *jirgas* in Swat saw their reach diminished some by the Wāli. It was first with the increased interference by the state, post the 1960's, that the legitimacy of the elder councils was seriously called into question.

Pashtunwali has not only been tied to the tribal leadership-branch discussed in the previous chapter. As will be seen in the discussion on the interplay between *Pashtunwali* and scriptural Islam, actors within both the tribal and religious leadership branches are influenced by *Pashtunwali*. In contrast, actors within the administrative leadership branch, especially in Swat, have had to contend with the balance between *Pashtunwali* and the enforcement of state legislation. *Jirgas* have played a crucial role in the continued production of the Pashtun community's expectations and knowledge of *Pashtunwali*. Although *Pashtunwali* has not been a written code, the development of an institution that could enforce it ensured that most Pashtuns had an understanding of their expected behaviour.

5.1.3 HONOUR OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND HONOUR OF THE TRIBE

Since a Pashtun's interaction with others and their place in the community is directly tied to their lineage and their connections to their tribe, the honour of the tribe becomes predominant. Dishonour to the tribe affects the member's ability to garner support and allies, which is vital for the strength of the tribe as a whole, but also the individual households. According to Lutz Rzehak:

> *Nanga* is the call to defend one's personal honour, which is based on an individual's dignity and trust in oneself. But the call for *nanga* is not limited to personal honour because the honour of an individual and the honour of the lineage or tribe one belongs to are interdependent (Rzehak, 2011, p. 9).

A person's honour is not an individual trait; a Pashtun who breaches the honour code affects "the sub-clan, the clan and the tribe" (Kfir, 2009, p. 39). Honour breaches can primarily be divided into two main categories: (1) a person commits a dishonourable offence which affects the entire patrilineal line, or (2) a person has a dishonourable offence committed against them which demands revenge. At its most extreme this can mean that a dishonourable action can be interpreted as an offence against the honour of the Prophet himself. Offences that threaten one's honour are therefore always met with a severe response or retaliation. "Transgressions against honor necessitate revenge, which can often get out of hand" (Ahmed, 2013, p. 54). Multiple transgressions between different families over time can lead to disproportionate responses. Pashtuns pride themselves on their long memory and do themselves recognise that when it comes to revenge, a Pashtun's memory is long (Ahmed, 2007, p. 93).

When authority structures such as the *jirga* or the Wāli of Swat have been in place, swift decision making has been favoured to avoid blood feuds that can last for generations (Ahmed, 2011 and 2013, pp. 53-54). The imposed legal authority from the British or the Pakistani government, often seen as inefficient and corrupt, have led tribesmen to seek swift justice offered by either the *jirga*, the Wāli or, since the 1990s, the Taliban (Ahmed, 2007, p. 90). The notion of waiting for a legal process that could potentially take years, assumptions of corrupt leadership, and not considering tribal concepts of honour, has made swift decisions through *Pashtunwali* or Sharia preferable. This view was only enhanced by the fact that Pakistan's judicial system continues to use English as its official language. Low literacy levels in English and Urdu have contributed to the opposition towards the central government's legal authority. Although tribal and Taliban judgements could be brutal justice, they were swift and more comprehensible to the local population because of the use of local languages (Zaman, 2018, p. 246).

The patriarch of the family is left with a particular responsibility to ensure those in their care follow the principles of *Pashtunwali* because honour is tied both to the individual and to groups. This responsibility significantly affects women and girls, as gendered dimensions are especially apparent in *Pashtunwali*. In Swat, according to Khaled, "the sole authority or power lies with a senior male member in the family, in the majority of cases the father, or the elder brother if the father is deceased" (Khalid, 2016, p. 12). The shame brought on any member of the household is shame on him and the clan because the patriarch represents the household in the public sphere. As women are seen as likely to

bring shame unto themselves and the easiest to disgrace, women and girls are restricted to a sheltered life within the household.

Priscilla Offenhauer in her studies of women in Islamic societies points out that "the honour of women - and by extension, the honour of the family - depends in great measure on the good conduct of female family members" (Offenhauer, 2005, p. 57). Islam is not the only determining factor for women's social status in Pashtun regions. Rzehak described how:

> In the world view of Pashtunwali, the honour of a Pashtun man and the honour of all females for whom he is responsible are interdependent. Defending their honour means to provide shelter and to take care of them, and this is the best way to defend one's own honour and reputation (Rzehak, 2011, p. 9).

The role the patriarch serves in safeguarding the household's honour is a core principle of *Pashtunwali*. Not only is the honour or shame of a woman tied to a Pashtun man, but an ideal honourable Pashtun must protect and provide the women and girls in his care. This stance has developed into a practice of seclusion (*purdah*). In the case of Pashtuns, *purdah* does not necessarily mean veiling; instead, it takes on an element of physical restrictions. There's a hope that by restricting a woman's access to geographical spaces (Halvorson in Falah & Nagel, 2005, p. 23), there's a limit to the shame a woman can bring to the household.

According to Offenhauer "the customs of veiling, seclusion or *purdah*, and separation of the sexes are practices intended to protect women's honor" (Offenhauer, 2005, p. 57). When it comes to veiling amongst Pashtuns, it has historically been a class issue, where women of lower standing, have more geographical freedom and fewer restrictions when it comes to veiling. This difference occurs because of a household's limited resources, where some women need to take a more active role in the management of, for instance, the farm. Lindholm described the veiling of women in Swat: "In the village, poorer women wear their shawls when they walk about the street or are in the fields, but women of any social standing never leave their compounds without donning a burqa" (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 834). When it comes to women of higher standing, they are especially affected by the notion that "women are inferior and subordinate but are also a locus of honour, to be protected above all" (Ginsburg, 2011, p. 96). This view has manifested in increased seclusion as the household has the resources to keep women in the home.

No matter the social standing, some qualities have been universal for the "ideal" Pashtun woman. Lindholm described the cultural construction of gender in Swat as such:

> The primary virtues for girls, as for women, are obedience and deference, a capacity for hard work, an ability to bear punishment, and a sense of shame and propriety, all of which are deeply inculcated into them by peer pressure and parental training (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, p. 835).

In his description of the cultural construction of gender, Lindholm has described the different "ideal" life cycles and expectations for women and men growing up in Swat (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003, pp. 833-839). By focusing on the differences between the genders, he has shown that the expected roles of women are enforced and ingrained from early childhood. The expected roles of both men and women are a product of the recognition of honour and shame, which is understood by others in the community through

Pashtunwali. Since women are considered to be the most likely bringers of shame, most arguments for the limiting of women's access to the world are justified in the eyes of Pashtun men.

5.1.4 PASHTUNWALI'S ROLE IN THE THREE BRANCHES

The role of *Pashtunwali* has been a large factor in the struggle for power between the three branches of leadership. However, *Pashtunwali* has faced fierce opposition in the last 20 years, especially by the central government and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). I would argue that this opposition has primarily concerned authority systems detrimental to the influence of administrative or religious leadership, often framed as demands for Islamic purity (Nasr, 2000, p. 180).

The state would oppose tribal leadership because it has been considered a threat to the "one nation" of Pakistan. Groups within the religious leadership branch, however, would point to *Pashtunwali* as being incompatible with Islam. Although this leads to the diminishment of structures such as the *jirga*, as well as some elements of *Pashtunwali*, it did not affect *Pashtunwali* principles of male authority, honour, and revenge. Some have said that *Pashtunwali* is "dead" because the ideals of egalitarianism have easily been subverted by those with resources and authority (Ahmed, 2013, p. 54). I would argue that because of *Pashtunwali's* flexible nature, it has merely undergone a change in normative principles.

According to Mary Anne Franks "The Taliban, like many other fundamentalist groups, claimed that the restrictions placed on women were for the protection of women's own honor and dignity" (Franks, 2003, p. 143). Although the Taliban sprung from the dismay of less privileged men and powerful religious leaders, they grew up in or were educated in, a society that valued the principles of *Pashtunwali*. As Lindholm described, Pashtuns are raised in the eyes of *Pashtunwali* principles of honour, revenge, and gendered expectations. Pashtuns instilled with these ideals through their upbringing and societal expectations could never entirely escape *Pashtunwali's* influence on their lives.

I would argue that though some elements of *Pashtunwali* have not carried over with the increasing authority of religious leadership. Fundamental aspects that coincide with Islamic ideals have not diminished; instead, they have strengthened their hold on Pashtun ideals. Fundamental ideas of male authority, revenge and honour still affect those who claim they oppose *Pashtunwali*, I would argue that because *Pashtunwali* has permeated all areas of Pashtun life, it does affect all leadership branches in some way. Although some Pashtuns argue that they follow Sharia, not *Pashtunwali*, this is mostly in name only. As will be shown in the next sections, the denouncement of *Pashtunwali* has not limited its influence.

5.2 SCRIPTURAL ISLAM ON THE BORDER OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

The status of orthodox schools of thought such as Deobandi and Wahhabism has dramatically increased since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Their prominence was determined by their initial contact with tribesmen of North-West Pakistan, funding, and the adaptability of their *ulamas*. The adaptability of the Deobandi *ulamas* was possible

because of their reformist background, while the Wahhabist used their funding and the socioeconomic inequalities in the region to gain support. These factors determined how successfully the religious leadership-branch could supersede the authority of the tribal and administrative leadership-branches.

5.2.1 CREATION OF DEOBANDI

For the creation of the school of Deobandi, we need to go as far back as the Mughal empire to provide a proper context. With the expansion of the Mughal Empire, there was an increased inclusion of more people with varied cultural backgrounds and religious beliefs. Through this expansion, orders such as the Sufi order became more prevalent. Allegiances "to schools of law, Sufi orders, and to the teaching of individual shaykhs, scholars, and saints" (Lapidus 2002, p. 374) became increasingly common. This development led to a stronger movement of those opposing certain mystical elements in Islam, such as the veneration of saints and shrines. One type of opposition within Sunni Islam is especially interesting in the context of Deobandi. Lapidus describes them as "those committed to scipturalist Islam – to the beliefs and laws set out in the Quran, the hadith of the Prophet, and the Shari'a" (Lapidus 2002, p. 374). This group included the various *ulamas*, the organised schools of law, as well as Sharia minded Sufi orders. It was in this environment that the Deobandi schools first developed.

One of the most openly spoken opponents against what was seen as a weakness of the Mughal leadership, was the reformist Sufi, Shaykh Ahmad Sirihindi (1564-1624). Sirihindi "urged the reform of Sufi religious practices" (Haroon, 2008, p. 48), "such as worship of saints, sacrifice of animals and religious festivals" (Lapidus 2002, p. 377). His objective was to influence the Mughal authorities into creating a state based on the principles of Sharia and the Qur'an, only in this way could the Mughal Empire be a true Islamic state.

In the early eighteenth century, as the British were gaining more control over trade and land in India, Shah Waliallah (1702-1763) wanted to stabilise and secure the Muslim presence in the area that had formerly flourished under the Mughal rule.

> [Waliallah] stressed the importance of returning to the Prophet's teachings and the need to purge Islam of saint worship, which was subsequent to and inconsistent with the true meaning of the Prophet's life. He translated the Quran into Persian and made an argument for the use of independent scholarly judgement in the adaption of the law to local conditions (Lapidus 2002, p. 378).

Waliallah saw what he considered to be a watering down of Islam, both within the policies of the state as well as within the Sufi community, he spoke for a form of Islam that focused more heavily on scripture and the Prophet's teaching, whilst he also "attempted to synthesize the different schools of law and reduce the legal divergences among Muslims" (Lapidus 2002, p. 378). By translating the Qur'an, he opened the opportunity for more scholars to study it and through these actions, he attempted to gather the community and instil unity in law.

In the years following the fall of the Mughal Empire and the establishment of the Permanent Settlement act of 1793, more challenging times would fall upon the Muslim population, both economically and politically. Missionary preachers such as Sayyid Ahmad

Barelwi (1786-1831) allied himself with tribesmen, such as the Yusufzais in Swat. They rallied against the British under the banner of holy war in 1827 (Lapidus, 2002, p. 622). Despite the uprising being unsuccessful, the idea of a common Muslim goal through holy war would persist.

Within *ulama* circles, there was a revival of reformist thinking as a response to the poor conditions for Muslims in India. Before the British crackdown in response to the 1857 Mutiny, *ulamas* in Delhi had enjoyed the benefaction of the Mughal rule. When the last Mughal ruler was exiled, the British seized the mosques in Delhi, forcing the *ulamas* out of the capitol. In 1867 *ulamas* established the reform college Darul Uloom Deoband at the very moment when the British Raj deprived the Indian Muslim community of their state protection and political power (Lapidus, 2002, p. 627). According to Zaman, "the madrasa represented the idea that the Muslim community's beliefs and practices had to be reordered in the light of the foundational texts and rooted in unswerving fidelity to Islamic legal norms" (Zaman, 2018, p. 15). In doing so, the Deobandi curriculum and doctrine followed in the footsteps of Sirihindi, Waliallah, and Barelwi. They could make credible claims to links to past Islamic scholarship and become a continuation of tradition. Through Waliallah, Deobandi *madrasas* created an identifiable link to intellectual authority on scriptural Islam (Zaman, 2018, p. 17), and through Barelwi's missionary role and attempts to gather Pashtuns under one banner Darul Uloom Deoband could gather support and gain influence with Muslims in a wider geographical area.

The links to Sufi philosophers as well as the reputation of the institution helped draw many Pashtun tribesmen to Darul Uloom Deoband at the end of the nineteenth century (Haroon, 2008, p. 48). Through their connection to Pashtun tribes as well as those Muslims who later immigrated to Pakistan, original Deobandi ideas were spread through Afghanistan, India and later Pakistan.

5.2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF CURRICULUM AND SUFI INFLUENCES

Regarding the curriculum, Aminah Mohammad-Arif stated that: 'they took their inspiration from British education methods – the ulamas of Deoband dropped English and "Western" sciences from the education curriculum, and promoted instead the study of the Koran, the Hadith, and Islamic law and science" (Mohammad-Arif in Jaffrelot, 2004, p. 224). Lapidus has stated that "Deoband's curriculum combined the study of the revealed sciences (Quran, hadith, and law) with rational subjects (logic, philosophy, and science)" (Lapidus, 2002, p. 626). By focusing on scripture and Islamic law, they were following directly in the reformist tradition established by Sirihindi in the early seventeenth century (Zaman, 2018, p. 17).

Regarding Sufi influence on the Deobandi curriculum, I want to examine and discuss one statement by Sana Haroon:

> while the Deobandi curriculum abandoned the Sufi premise for the prescriptions of Sirihindi and [Shah Waliallah], and focused entirely on impairing knowledge in relation to the *hadith,* Quran and interpretive method, one Sufi tradition did remain discreetly in place within the institution: the use of the *bait* (pledge or oath) between teachers or *murshids* and their students (2008, p. 48).

Haroon here distinguished herself from Lapidus, Mohammad-Arif (2004), Lyon & Edgar (2010) and Zaman (2018) in her claim that the Deobandi curriculum abandoned Sufi premises. Lapidus stated that "[Deobandi] was Sufi in orientation and affiliated with the Chishti order. Its Sufism, however, was closely integrated with hadith scholarship and the proper practice of Islam" (Lapidus, 2002, p. 626), whilst Mohammad-Arif claimed that "They followed the tradition of certain Sufi orders and emphasized individual spiritual discipline acquired through instruction from a spiritual master, but they strongly opposed the worship of saints" (Mohammad-Arif in Jaffrelot, 2004, p. 224). Both Mohammad-Arif and Lapidus recognised the influence Sufism had on Deobandi, whilst Haroon reduced the influence to one pledge. Although Mohammad-Arif and Lapidus heavily indicated that although the focus of the curriculum was the Quran, the Hadith, and Islamic law and science, one must be careful not to minimise Sufi influence as Haroon does here. The long history of reformism within Indian Sufism, which influenced those establishing Darul Uloom Deoband, should not be disregarded as inconsequential.

5.2.3 DEOBANDI TIES TO PASHTUN POPULATION

According to Lapidus, the school at Deoband followed different foundational principles than previous colleges in India. Darul Uloom Deoband "was organized as an independent institution, not as part of the household of the leading teachers, or as a function of the local mosque" (Lapidus, 2002, p. 636). Through the *bait*, "the reform and standardization of Islamic belief and practice, a program of public education, and a system of affiliated schools and public contributions, Deoband sought to unite Indian Muslims around the leadership of the 'ulama' and the schools" (Lapidus, 2002, p. 626). In doing so, *ulamas* at Deoband helped to define the authority of the *ulama* on religious matters.

The traditional role of *madrasas* was to produce imams and mullahs. Deobandi organisational innovation, however, created a bureaucratic system which allowed Deobandi *madrasas* to franchise themselves throughout South-Asia and reach new students (Lyon & Edgar, 2010, p.xv). Those educated at *madrasas* perceived the teachings of the *ulama* to be the most legitimate and were influenced towards a more scriptural Islam than what had previously been prominent in tribal areas. In India the Deobandis had enjoyed the benefits of ties to urban circles, "in Pakistan the Deobandi attract people - especially students - from more traditional strata, most particularly from rural and tribal communities" (Mohammad-Arif in Jaffrelot, 2004, p. 224). By expanding past the traditional roles of *madrasas*, Deobandi schools secured new followers and attendees.

It was not just through a good reputation and theological legacy that Darul Uloom Deoband gained such a strong connection to the Muslim population of India and those in the tribal regions. During the Mughal Empire *ulamas* had relied on wealthy benefactors to maintain their institutions. When these benefactors saw a decline in fortunes, a new funding model was considered a necessary safeguard in the face of changing times. The Deobandis would not refuse wealthy patronage, but according to Zaman, they primarily relied on the support of "ordinary members of the community" (Zaman, 2018, p. 16). The organisational innovation created a bureaucratic system which allowed Deobandi *madrasas* to franchise themselves throughout South-Asia and reach new students (Lyon & Edgar, 2010, p. xv). In doing so, they created connections with large populations, some in poor socioeconomic situations, and ensured that the local population had a personal interest in maintaining

the institutions. This connection helped establish a new form of financing of religious schools where the funding was dependent on the Muslim community instead of state leadership.

Despite the reliance on local donations, the *madrasas* in Pakistan have since the 1970s received significant funding through wealthy Pakistanis at home and abroad, as well as from NGOs with ties to Saudi Arabia and Iran (Stern, 2000, p. 119). The popularity of the *madrasas* was helped by them offering lodging and food to the students. Families with limited resources could send their children to get an education and at the same time, keep them fed and healthy (ed. Malik, 2008). This popularity and funding model would later come to mean that it was difficult for the Pakistani central government to regulate the *madrasas* as there were no "clearly identifiable sources of funding" (Zaman, 2018, p. 16) to monitor.

Although they did not have the opportunity to influence political authority in the same way as they had during the Mughal empire, through the *madrasas*, *ulamas* influenced rural and tribal Muslims by stressing individual spiritual discipline guided by instructors (Mohammad-Arif in Jaffrelot, 2004, p. 224). In India, they sought to influence the Muslim Personal Law to be more in line with scriptural interpretations of religious legal tradition. Ultimately they were unsuccessful in the face of the combined efforts from colonial officials, estate holders and *ulamas* from the north-west provinces (Zaman, 2018, pp. 42-43). The change to the laws could have ensured inheritance rights for women guaranteed by the Qur'an. Instead, patrilineal inheritance traditions persisted in North-West Pakistan.

After the partition, there was increased political activity amongst Deobandi *ulamas*, where they demanded that "sharia law should be applied both in personal law and in the country's wider legal system" (Mohammad-Arif in Jaffrelot, 2004, p. 224). They did so through the political party Jamiyyat-ul Ulama-i Islam (JUI), who at first opposed the creation of Pakistan, but after the Partition actively engaged with Pakistani politics. The party was founded in 1945 and has represented Deobandis in politics since then, even after 1980, where the party was split into several factions (Mohammad-Arif in Jaffrelot, 2004, p. 224). As such, the JUI is an example of a group from the religious leadership branch seeing the value of having a politically organised arm, in which to put pressure on the state government.

5.2.4 INCREASING INFLUENCE OF WAHHABISM IN TRIBAL REGIONS

Wahhabism had a presence in Pakistani tribal areas in the 1950s but grew in influence post the 1960 influx of Saudi Arabian money. They became especially prominent after tribesmen travelled to Arab nations for employment opportunities. When they came back, they favoured the Wahhabist school of thought and increased its popularity. Saudi Arabia heavily subsidised the *madrasas* in North-West Pakistan, which led to a further increase in Wahhabist influence (Roy in Jaffrelot, 2004, p. 140).

As the Pashtun tribes of North-West Pakistan were drawn into the conflict in Afghanistan, a variety of mujahideen with various ethnic backgrounds were drawn to Waziristan to aid in the fighting (Ahmed, 2013, p. 67). These fighters brought with them orthodox

interpretations of Islam and disapproved of local customs. While the Deobandi's history with Sufism allowed for a more flexible approach to Pashtun customs, especially regarding women's inheritance, the Wahhabist, leaning on their scriptural interpretative heritage, opposed local religious traditions (Roy in Jaffrelot, 2004, p. 140). Deobandis had gained support in tribal areas through a shared history and by making compromises. Wahhabists gained support by, opposing the administrative and tribal leadership-branches who had maintained socioeconomic differences to maintain their authoritative positions.

Throughout the fighting in Afghanistan, Pashtun tribesmen were receiving education and training in schools with a heavy Wahhabist influence. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, closer ties were made between tribesmen, the Taliban and Al Qaeda. *Pashtunwali* principles of hospitality allowed for the sheltering of foreign fighters, even with increased pressure from the Pakistani government and the Americans to hand over their enemies.

5.3 THE MEETING OF PASHTUNWALI AND SCRIPTURAL ORTHODOX ISLAM

5.3.1 PASHTUN TIES TO ISLAM

For many male Pashtuns, there exists no distinction between *Pashtunwali*, Islam and Sharia (Khalid, 2016). Ties to the Prophet have been used to shape identity and grant legitimacy to Pashtuns. Their claim of descent from Qais Abdur Rashid has allowed tribesmen to argue that although they may follow some unorthodox practices, ultimately their links to the Prophet grants exceptions for them (Ahmed, 2013, p. 54). Ahmed has explained that the link between tribesmen and the Prophet gave religious coverage for the lineage system and *Pashtunwali* (Ahmed, 2013, p. 53). "For the tribesmen, the Prophet became - and remains - a kind of tribal chief par excellence" (Ahmed, 2013, pp. 28-29). Emulating the Prophet in conflict, resolution and piety is interpreted in various ways, but encouraged. Because of this view of the Prophet as an ideal tribesman, Pashtun tribal identity and Muslim identity becomes particularly entwined. Pashtun tribesmen, therefore, according to Ahmed, "defines himself by his Islamic faith as much as by blood, clan, and loyalty to code" (Ahmed, 2013, p. 27).

Khalid (2016, pp. 54-55) argued that Islam and *Pashtunwali* are so intertwined because tribal values, to a large extent, already espoused the same values as Islam. When Pashtuns converted to Islam, there were only some Islamic values that could not be integrated seamlessly. These values were regarding female honour, agnatic rivalry and interests on loans (Ahmed, 2013, p. 54). In her research, Khalid interviewed men who claimed that "when we Pukhtoons accepted Islam, we were already very modern and we ruled Islam. We were one step above what Islam preaches; that's why the customs and traditions are more rigid and people follow them more strictly" (Khalid, 2016, p. 55). This response reflects Ahmed's assertion that because of the patrilineal link to direct conversion by the Prophet, tribesmen can confidently disregard Islamic law that does not square with *Pashtunwali* (Ahmed, 2013, p. 54). This conviction of superiority above other Muslims allows Pashtuns to balance the claim that P*ashtunwali*, Islam and Sharia are the same, while at the same time disregarding specific tenants of Islamic law.

As Deobandi influence grew and created ties to the Pashtun population, they showed a willingness to adapt to their circumstances. Mullahs limited the topics of their sermons to those deemed acceptable to *Khans* because they were dependent on their financial and public support. Although Deobandi *ulamas* could not condone for instance the veneration of saints, low literacy rates amongst Pashtuns and fundamental differences in approaches to God (Ahmed, 2013, p. 30) ensured that Deobandis had to adapt if they wanted influence amongst Pashtuns. The difference between the Deobandi and the tribesmen is apparent in the statement: "the tribesmen approach God through the heart, the orthodox through the head" (Ahmed, 2013, p. 30). In the times where the tribal leadership branch held the most authority, orthodoxy and literalism were not prioritised. After the Partition, those educated in Pakistani *madrasas* preached a version of Islam with tribal and orthodox elements. It is important to note that after the Partition, the term 'Deobandi' can only loosely be used to describe the religious movement. According to Haroon, Deobandi "did not refer to a pedagogy but to a system of allies mutually descended from an increasingly distant institution with which they maintained as close a relationship as they could" (Haroon, 2008, p. 58). In the north western tribal areas *ulamas* calling themselves Deobandi were not necessarily full alumni of the institution but had received a limited Deobandi education.

Mullahs trained at schools in Pakistan and went across the border to establish schools in Afghanistan, creating a network of sister schools (Roy in Jaffrelot, 2004, pp. 139-140). In this way, a form of Islam influenced by Pashtun tribal Islam but based on orthodoxy and reformist ideas spread widely amongst Pashtuns. Through the years, these schools would be increasingly influenced by Saudi Wahhabism, creating hostility towards local tribal traditions and the central government which would, in turn, lead to the creation of the Taliban (Roy in Jaffrelot, 20014, p. 140). With the increased influence of the religious leadership branch post the Soviet invasion, acceptance for tribal approaches to Islam diminished. The continued and increased influence from Wahhabist taught younger Pashtuns to approach Islam through orthodox practices.

Through the late '80s into '90s, there was an increased politicisation of Islam in the region. According to Roy, this movement was "both religiously conservative [...] and increasingly radical politically, putting its Saudi sponsors and the Americans at odds with each other. It combine[d] 'Salafism (a determination to go back to Islam as it was at the time of the Prophet) and 'jihadism' (insistence that armed action should be taken against the enemies of Islam [...]) (Roy in Jaffrelot, 2014, p. 145). The enemies of Islam in this context could be anyone not following a particular school of thought or someone seen as having too close ties with Westerners or the central government. These political movements also coincided with socioeconomic factors in the region which could be framed as the consequence of un-Islamic leadership. This development led to the creation of multiple political parties and subgroups from other parties who, especially in Swat, thrived on the support of tribesmen and those who had received an education in *madrasas*.

5.4 INCREASING WOMEN'S AUTONOMY THROUGH EDUCATION

Among the Pashtun, men serve as heads of households and make decisions for their family (Latif, 2010). Women are primarily limited to the domestic sphere, whilst men serve as the public face of the family unit. In this patriarchal society, men hold socio-political and economic power (Jamal, 2015, p. 274). The patriarchal structure has been present for decades in Pashtun dominated regions on both sides of the Durand line (Mann, 2006, p. 3), and has led to gendered distinctions within child-rearing.

From an early age, a girl's life is defined by the decisions made for her by a male relative. Lessons of obedience, deference, shame, and propriety are ensured through peer pressure and parental guidance (Lindholm in Ember & Ember, 2003). While girls are raised with the understanding that after marriage they will belong to another patriline, boys grow up with the knowledge that they are future patriarchs of their own families. As a consequence, the formal education of a male child is prioritised because a boy remains an economic contributor to the household until he becomes the head of his own family. This prioritisation can lead to increased pressure on girls to partake in household work, further infringing on her ability to access other spaces and activities outside of the home, such as education (Halvorsen in Falah & Nagel, 2005). Multiple internal and external factors ensure the prioritisation of boys and men (Barth, 1981, p. 88) and are continually reproduced by structures of power and gender.

Traditionally power was gained by following the honour code and owning land. The protection of the family's honour and access to land has, therefore, been paramount. Through the increased prominence of orthodox schools of thought, the balance of power shifted towards religious leadership. Despite the promise of changes to inheritance rights and women's autonomy, religiopolitical groups such as the TTP ensured that the seclusion of women from the public sphere endured. Although some rights could have been guaranteed through scriptural interpretations of the Qur'an, concepts of honour and inheritance guaranteed by *Pashtunwali* remained partly because the tribal leadership never lost all of their authority.

Additionally, the intersection between *Pashtunwali* and orthodoxy have permeated the education available to Pashtuns in North-West Pakistan. Similarly to how Deobandi *ulamas* in Pakistan should be acknowledged as separate from the Indian Deobandis, education in North-West Pakistan cannot be separated from Deobandi, Wahhabist or *Pashtunwali* influences. The intersection between orthodoxy and *Pashtunwali* has ensured that gender roles and expectations of honour are continuously produced and protected by religious conviction.

The acknowledgement of these prevailing structures of power is necessary when working towards equal rights for women. Without acknowledging these structures, NGO's and the Pakistani government cannot improve access to education without facing opposition (Jamal, 2016, p. 2). Empowerment needs to be a multi-dimensional process that acknowledges the structural issues hindering women from getting an education (Khalid, 2016, pp. 4-5). Gender parity in education is only possible by gaining the support of the three leadership-branches because they control how much access women have to the public sphere.

As has been repeated throughout this thesis, women's seclusion from the public sphere gives them few avenues of power. Although collective counteraction could ensure lasting change, limited economic resources, education and minimal male support limit the possibilities for this to happen. Attitudes regarding honour are prevailing, and because breaches to the honour code are presumed to come mostly from women, it is assumed that with higher secular education they are even more likely to bring dishonour on their family (Franks, 2003, p. 138). Without education opportunities, women will have little access to the public sphere, or the knowledge and resources needed to navigate the intersection of Pakistani legislation and tribal and religious governance.

5.5 CONCLUSION

At no point in recent history has *Pashtunwali* or orthodox Islam been the sole dominant factor in deciding how Pashtuns organise their social hierarchy. Instead, the local cultural frame allows for fluid transitions between interpretations of Sharia and *Pashtunwali*. Despite some Pashtun men stating that Sharia and *Pashtunwali* are one and the same, Pashtun women, especially those from middle-class backgrounds with an education, clearly see the distinctions between the two.

Despite some arguing that *Pashtunwali* no longer influences Pashtun society, its impact on the tribal and religious leadership-branches is evident. After the Partition, the connection between Deobandi *ulamas* and Pashtuns ensured that Deobandis in great numbers took up residence in North-West Pakistan. The influx of foreign fighters and funding from Saudi Arabia expanded the reach of the Wahhabist doctrine. They took part in the discussions surrounding the formation of Pakistan but also educated a new generation of Pashtuns.

The balance of power shifted towards religious leadership through the increased prominence of orthodox schools of thought. Religiopolitical groups such as the TTP ensured that the seclusion of women from the public sphere endured despite promising changes to inheritance rights and women's autonomy. Concepts of honour and inheritance guaranteed by *Pashtunwali* remained partly because the tribal leadership never lost all of their authority.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Throughout this thesis, I have compiled and analysed academic research on the historical developments in power and gender relationships in the Pashtun regions of North-West Pakistan. The discussion and production of the "Pashtun Leadership Trinity" model have shown that the same groups of people have maintained power through discursive formation and legitimised their domination through expertise and command. Barth (1959), Ahmed (2013) and Kilcullen (2017) have all touched on the same leadership groups but have limited their structures of power to specific historical periods, limiting the use of their descriptions. In line with Scott's (2001) map of power relations, I have argued that people in positions of authority in Pashtun society use corrective and persuasive influence over the tribal population to maintain and reproduce their power.

In my research, I was limited by language barriers and the literature available to me. Additionally, by focusing on a historical overview of research material, I limited the perspectives available to analyse. Although I repeatedly critiqued previous research for their descriptive reduction, my decision to cover a long period of history, as well as a wide range of academic material, left me with similar decisions to make. Further avenues regarding the influence of sectarian violence, other schools of thought, and governmental legislation are obvious possibilities for the expansion of my research. Additionally, methods such as discourse analysis, field research, and interviews can produce new perspectives on the current realities of the intersection between *Pashtunwali* and orthodox doctrine.

By organising the research chronologically, trends in research priorities became visible. While the aftermath of the Partition produced primarily anthropological research describing tribal societies from a western perspective, later research was dominated by the discourse on guerrilla warfare and terrorism. American political and media discourse determined which avenues were available to research for the better part of 30 years. At the end of 2010, continuous American intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan, countless civilian casualties, and a shift in the perception of the US as a global leader led to changes in the focus of academic research.

The discursive developments in the research show a trend towards being more introspective and intersectional when approaching questions of Pashtuns in North-West Pakistan. In October 2014, Malala Yusufzai received the Nobel Peace Prize for fighting against the suppression of children and working towards equal education opportunities for girls (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2014). Following the announcement, research on gender in North-West Pakistan intensified, and new voices began studying the underlying causes for gender inequalities in Pashtun dominated areas. The steady advancement of gender research continued from the 1990s and increasingly included perspectives from Muslim women in South Asia. I found that in new research, gendered perspectives were tackled head-on to understand the underlying causes affecting women's agency.

The advancement of intersectional approaches and voices allows for starting new discussions and analyses by looking back at previous research and placing it in its historical context. Colonial legacy, consequences of the "war on terror", patrilineal legacy, state and local government, gender studies, socio-economic standings, developments within religious doctrine such as the development of global Jihad, all play a role. The study of the

intersection between these influences is vital to understand the factors which continue to prohibit lasting advancement in gender parity and peace in North-West Pakistan.

Continued international intervention on the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan actualises the debate on Pashtun power structures. Research from the 1970s to late 2000s was primarily driven by western interest groups and tied to American political goals in the region. Old models and analyses have continued to affect how interest groups approach the situation on the ground. By re-examining earlier research and acknowledging how this literature has produced and reproduced stereotypes which have affected approaches and actions, new tactics can be deployed. Issues of equal education and healthcare are prime concerns for those wishing to stabilise the political situation in the region. By acknowledging the local power structure and the values which reproduce it, cooperation and lasting change become more likely.

Accurate descriptions of the power structure are necessary when attempting to improve health outcomes for the Pashtun population. The race towards a vaccine against the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus bring up questions surrounding the deployment of a vaccine. For years Polio has continued to be a health risk in Pakistan. In August 2020, Africa was declared polio-free, leaving Afghanistan and Pakistan as the only remaining countries with active outbreaks (Javed, 2020). Strategies that engage with and acquire the cooperation of tribal and religious leaders have been more successful in distributing the polio vaccine. Similar measures will be necessary when a vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus is available. Research which describes the motivations and social structure of these communities are necessary to ensure positive health outcomes for the local population.

Intersectional academic research, which expands the focus past one cause or issue, expose the foundations of Pashtun society. Trends in leadership-shifts show how active engagement with the discourse on religious and tribal values influence how tribesmen legitimise their engagement with international interest groups. As international politics continue to influence access to resources and local struggles for authority, intersectional research continues to be necessary. With the withdrawal of US troops and resources from Afghanistan under the Trump-administration, the Taliban and the TTP have significantly increased their sphere of influence (Doucet, 2020). Further research should focus on how the balance between the three leadership-branches continues to develop. Questions regarding the continued influence of the *jirga*, local administration, and state interests will be noteworthy going forward.

Additionally, further withdrawal of American engagement in the region raises questions regarding the international agents who will step in to fill the vacuum. The continuation of the proxy discourse-war between Saudi Arabia and Iran seems likely, as well as the expansion of Russian, Indian, and Chinese commitments. Research on local issues should, therefore, not exclude the influence of further globalisation.

The expansion of education opportunities continues to be the focus of those battling gender disparity in North-West Pakistan. When receiving an education, women are more likely to marry older, have fewer children, and contribute to the family's economic resources. Research conducted by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (2020) shows how women's economic empowerment gives them the power to make decisions and control and benefit from economic gains. Education is, therefore, necessary to reach gender equality. It also raises the question of how the male population, who have enjoyed the benefits of

reproducing the current system, will respond to the changes. The TTP responded by further restricting women's access to education and the public sphere, while tribal leadership used questions of honour to justify their opposition. Very little research has been conducted on Pashtun men's expectations of women's societal roles and their education. When this has been examined, valuable information on how ideas and stereotypes are reproduced have emerged (Jamal, 2014; 2015; 2016). Academic literature that explores a variety of perspectives and data can increase the understanding of current developments and how to include male Pashtuns in changes needed to achieve gender equality.

As has been stated throughout this thesis, approaches in the academic literature are trending towards the re-examination of old "truths" and the acknowledgement of the intersecting realities which affect attitudes and outcomes in North-West Pakistan. The introduction of new voices from various backgrounds and disciplines is an encouraging sign of movement away from wholly western perspectives. The changing balance of power between three leadership-branches, combined with the intersection between Pashtunwali and orthodox Islam, affect Pashtuns willingness to accept foreign influence and consequences of globalisation. As long as the current trend persists, future research will continue to break the pattern of descriptive reduction and examine comprehensive intersections.

APPENDIX 1

COVID-19

LATEST INFORMATION

UNICEF DATA

SEARCH

Cross-sector Indicators

Download   Help

Geographic Area: Pakistan • Time Period: 2018

Indicator		
Sex: Total		
Adjusted net attendance rate for children of primary school age	(✱)	61.9
Out-of-school rate for children of primary school age		23
Completion rate for children of primary school age		59.6
Sex: Male		
Adjusted net attendance rate for children of primary school age	(✱)	64.9
Out-of-school rate for children of primary school age		19
Completion rate for children of primary school age		64
Sex: Female		
Adjusted net attendance rate for children of primary school age	(✱)	58.8
Out-of-school rate for children of primary school age		27
Completion rate for children of primary school age		55.4

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footnotes   ⌃

Observation Confidentaility
Free

Data Source
DHS 2017-18

The period of time for which data are provided
2017-18

https://data.unicef.org/resources/data_explorer/unicef_f/?ag=UNICEF&df=GLOBAL_DATAFLOW&ver=1.0&dq=PAK.ED_ANAR_L1+ED_CR_L1+...

Generated by The United Nations Children's Fund – Data Warehouse on the 11th of May 2020 (UNICEF Data Warehouse, 2020).

APPENDIX 2

Out of School Childern in Primary Education shown below by Province/Region:

Percentage for Out of School Childern from Primary to Secondary Education shown below by Province:

(Pakistani National Education Management Information System, 2018, p. 25).

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SAMMENDRAG

Denne masteravhandlingen samler og analyserer akademisk forskning som ser på utviklingene i makt og kjønn i Pashtun-dominerte regioner i nord-vest Pakistan. Den setter søkelys på utviklingen i diskursen fra 1960-tallet til 2020. Avhandlingen tar inspirasjon fra Kocku von Stuckrad's bruk av «discourse-historical analysis» som forskningsperspektiv. I tillegg hentes inspirasjon fra metodene «*traditional*, *conceptual*, og *scoping* litteratur reviews». Studiet bruker disse perspektivene ved å organisere forskningen kronologisk, tilføre historisk kontekst, og kritisk utforske trender i diskursen.

Avhandlingen identifiserer det dominerende fokuset i forskningsperioder og diskuterer hvordan forskningen har blitt påvirket av reproduksjonen av stereotyper, kolonial arv, og vestlig politisk og media diskurs. Analysen identifiserer fire hovedtemaer som er synlig i den akademiske litteraturen: Pashtunenes samfunnsstruktur, kjønn, «war on terror», og Islamsk lære. I det siste tiåret har forskningen på Pashtunene i nord-vest Pakistan blitt mer introspektiv, og den har tydeligere satt søkelys på overlappende faktorer.

For å peke mot noen av de overlappende faktorene som fremtidig forskning bør sette søkelys på, fokuserer avhandlingen spesielt på to interesseområder. Gjennom analyseringen av tidligere maktmodeller kan avhandlingen bygge på tidligere forskning for å konstruere en modell over Pashtun-samfunnets maktfordeling. «Pashtun Leadership Trinity»-modellen viser til den vedvarende innflytelsen til det religiøse, stamme, og administrative lederskapet. Ved å analysere overlappingen mellom *Pashtunwali* og ortodoks lære viser avhandlingen hvordan autoriteter legitimerer og kontinuerlig gjenskaper deres maktposisjoner.

Produksjonen av akademisk litteratur vil fortsette i stor grad så lenge nord-vest Pakistan er av interesse for internasjonale organisasjoner og myndigheter. Denne avhandlingen konkluderer at forskning på overlappende faktorer er nødvendig for å forstå hva som påvirker endring i likestilling og fredsprosesser i nord-vest Pakistan. Selv om eldre forskning har vist tendenser til uaktsom reduksjon i beskrivelser, viser nyere forskning at trenden i akademisk litteratur går mot fokusering på overlappende faktorer.