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An analysis of the Norwegian Shipping Association in shaping Norwegian foreign policy towards South Africa 1984-1987

Master's thesis in historie - Femårig lektorutdanning

Supervisor: Micheal J. Geary

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Abstract:

This master's thesis examines the influence of the Norwegian Shipping Association in the context of the boycott law sanctioned on the 20th of March 1987. The law was a result of decades of heated debate and in the process prelude to the law several actors tried to influence foreign policy decisions, amongst them the NSA.

The influence of the NSA before the boycott law have been assumed but the boycott law of 1987 and the debate prelude to this political decision provide an opportunity to analyse this and gain further insights.

The sanctioning of the boycott law was influenced by several actors and the analysis of the influence on Norwegian foreign policy decisions needed to be based on material from a lot of different sources to get an understanding of conceding and contradiction interest to be found in the actual proposal for the law.

Prelude

I finally found the end of the road for this thesis and would like to thank all the people that have helped on the way.

Thanks to my supervisor, Micheal J. Geary for all help and patience in the process to finish this thesis and guidance as I deep dived into Norwegian foreign policy on the 1980s. Thanks to Arthur for helping be with the framework of the thesis that would prove to be a foundation I really needed. Thanks to Raymond, Vebjørn and for revising the thesis and giving constructive notes. Thanks to my friend in the NTNUI main board supporting me and trying to keep my spirit up in the final stages of the effort to finish the thesis. Thanks to the help I got in the archive of the Norwegian Shipping Association, I have only a positive impression from your hospitality.

I have enjoyed the investigation the influences on Norwegian foreign policy decision making mot I now look forward to finishing my education and start teaching the youths of tomorrow.

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Introduction

“Does the Shipping Association rule?”¹ The question is raised by Theo Koritzinsky, member of parliament representing the Socialist Left party in Dagbladet the 18th of December 1985. The government conference had that the Norwegian oil transports to South Africa would not yet be prohibited and that the names and owners of ships making calls on South Africa will not be published. The Socialist Left MP categorise the decisions as the government taking a knee to the Norwegian Shipowners Association (NSA) and that it have now become a decision-making body in Norwegian policy making.

The Norwegian Shipowners Association have been an important actor in Norwegian society for almost a decade because of its important part of the national income and the rich and powerful shipowners. Accusations against politicians of just doing the NSAs bidding have been thrown around before, but probably never as often as in the debate of the boycott law in the 1980s. Even with accusations of “ruling”, 20th of March 1987², a law of economic boycott against South Africa and Namibia was sanctioned. The law prohibited transport of crude oil on Norwegian Ships to South African ports and the NSA had lobbied for decades to avoid limits on the shipping operations. Trade bans and other limitations could prove to be and competitive disadvantage that could be devastating for the shipping industry.

The boycott law attacked the freedom to operate the shipping industry had been enjoying and the NSA fought hard to protect the interest of the shipping industry. The debate made the NSA launch a campaign to inform and influence the politicians to decide on measures that did not limit the shipping industry or make exceptions that would avoid major competitive

¹ Koritzinsky, “Regjerer Rederiforbundet?”.

² Besl. O. nr 39. (1986-87), *vedtak til lov om økonomisk boikott av Sør-Afrika og Namibia for å bekjempe apartheid.*

disadvantages on the international shipping market. The NSA where challenge by certain actors to achieve these aims.

This thesis will explain and analyse the influence of the Norwegian foreign policy in the context of the boycott law of 1987. The influence of the NSA can be traced in media coverage, debates at Stortinget and in the actual law sanctioned in 1987 and the cross referencing of sources from NSA archive, newspapers, and secondary literature will provide the basis to get an understanding of the influence of the NSA. The influence will be analysed by comparing NSAs aim for the debate, the traces of influence that can be found in the sources and the actual boycott law. To getting an understanding of the NSA influence the thesis will approach the topic from the research question; *how did the Norwegian shipping Association influence Norwegian foreign policy in the context of the boycott law of 1987?*

The NSA strategic aims will be deducted from sources extracted from the NSA archive and then analysed to get an understanding of the most vital interest of the shipping industry. Then actors working against the NSA were investigated to find some of the most important actors to influence contradicting foreign policy decisions and as challenges to the NSA. The aims and challengese of the NSA will be presented in the background chapter. The NSAs reaction to these challenges will be analysed comparing sources from the NSA archive and newspaper articles to the strategic aims of the association in each individual chapter. Then the thesis with a chapter summarizing the key argument of the thesis and drawing a conclusion.

Historiography

The influence of the Norwegian Shipping Association and the shipping industry have been analysed both in context of the measures against apartheid and in more general terms to understand the NSA as an actor in Norwegian politics. This thesis aims to gain new insights on the importance and influence of the Norwegian shipowners Association by investigate and analyse its influence in context of sanctioning the boycott law as approach to address the topic.

The campaign of the NSA and the final sanctioning of the boycott must be viewed in the context of a wider international perspective, with the situation in South Africa being the most fundamental. *The Cambridge history of South Africa* edited by Robbert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager and Bill Nasson, provided the chronology of events in South Africa, and this paper will highlight the specific period. The first being after the Sharpeville massacre, the second being the aftermath of the Soweto³ uprising and the third being the period of Marshall Law and the brink of civil war.⁴ *The Rise and fall of Apartheid* by Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger provide a more specific knowledge of the antiapartheid movement and the African National Congress (ANC). The book argues that economic sanctions were pushed for by the ANC in the UN and other international for.⁵ This was again salient conditions for the antiapartheid movement in Norway which used the ANCs call for sanctions as an important argument in the sanctions debate in Norway. Furthermore, to get a notion of the economic development in South Africa and of the relevance of sanctions this thesis has used *economic history of South Africa – Conquest, discrimination, and development* by Charles H. Feinstein.⁶ Feinstein argues that the sanctions made an impact in the 1980s but the financial sanctions, for instance bans

³ Mager and Mulaudzi, *Popular response to Apartheid 1948-1975*.

⁴ Lodge, *Resistance and Reform, 1973-1994*.

⁵ Clark, Nancy L., and William H. Worger. *South Africa – The rise and fall of apartheid*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016).

⁶ Feinstein, Charles H. *An economic history of South Africa – Conquest, discrimination and development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

on bank loans where the most crucial to the South African economy. Still the total effect of sanctions had such an impact on the economy that major restricting was need after the abolishment the apartheid regime, and the powershift in favour of the ANC in 1994. This argument is reinforced in *A new South Africa in the Making – Role of the United Nations*⁷ by Eric Molobi. The book explains inequalities that was a big part of issue of apartheid. Moreover these inequalities are connected to the events described in *A Cambridge History of South Africa*. To further supplement these works, and to get a better understanding of whether or not the South African freedom movement had relevance for the apartheid debate in Norway, this thesis has used Tore Linné Eriksens' book *Sør-Afrikas Historie – Førkoloniale samfunn, Apartheid og Frigjøring*.⁸ Eriksen states that the events in South Africa and the African National Congress efforts to put apartheid on the agenda in the United Nations contributed to increasing the pressure on governments to take action and endorse sanctions against South Africa. To put this in a wider context I used *National implementation of United Nations Sanctions*.⁹ Strydom and Huaraka give a summary of how resolutions have been adopted by the UN against South Africa. Moreover, the author's reinforces the impression that the apartheid regime was an important issue in the UN from the sheer number of resolutions adopted on South Africa and the efforts made to abolish the regime.

To United Nations in Norwegian politics needed to be established, and to get the foundation for understanding the relationship between the United Nations and the Norwegian foreign policy I based this on three main works. In *Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 1980s*¹⁰ edited by Johan Jørgen Holst, Olav Stokke argues that Norway's foreign policy is based on

⁷ Molobi, Eric "Socio-economic inequalities and priorities for development".

⁸ Eriksen, *Sør-Afrikas Historie – Førkoloniale samfunn, apartheid og frigjøring*. (Kristiansand: Portal Forlag, 2016).

⁹ Strydom, Hennie and Tunguru Huaraka "South Africa and Namibia".

¹⁰ Stokke, Olav "Norwegian Development-Cooperation Policy: Altruism and International Solidarity".

“altruism and international cooperation” and makes a case for that the sanctions debate was to be an important part of the political discussion. In *Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State*¹¹, Egeland reinforces that the sanctions debate was of great importance in Norway. He compares Norwegian Foreign policy to the US. Egeland argues that Norway, opposite of the US, condemned South Africa and had a consistency in their foreign policy on this particular matter. Norway worked for sanctions against South Africa and prohibited the sale of Norwegian oil and sanctioned a boycott against the apartheid regime to help abolish it. Olav Riste reinforces Stokke and Egelands arguments in *Norwegian Foreign Policy – A History*¹². Riste emphasizes the role of the UN from the second world war and describe the Norwegian tendency to be at the front of humanitarian work as a foreign policy and referred to it as “An ethical foreign policy”. In contradiction to the former three sources Hallvard Kvale Svenbalrud argues in *Fundament or ornament: FN som «hjørnestein i norsk utenrikspolitikk», 1970-2005*¹³ that the Norwegian United Nations policy have several clear contradictions. Norwegian politicians to champion both national sovereignty and security and humanitarian aid and intervention on the international political arena. These works arguably prove that the topic of political measures against apartheid is an important issue for Norwegian foreign policy.

This thesis investigates the influence on the Norwegian Foreign Policy from the antiapartheid movement and from the Norwegian Shipping industry. Two main works have given the literary foundation for the analysis of the influences sanctioning of the boycott law. First, in *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa* edited by Tore Linné Eriksen analyses the efforts of the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa (NOCOSA), the Council for Ecumenical and International Relations (CEIR)

¹¹ Egeland, *Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1988).

¹² Rise, *Norway's Foreign Relations* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005).

¹³ Svenbalrud, “Fundament og ornament: FN som «hjørnestein i norsk utenrikspolitikk», 1970-2005”.

and the Norwegian Shipowners Association in dealing with Southern Africa. In the fifth Chapter "*Fuelling the Apartheid War Machine*": A case study of Shipowners, Sanctions and Solidarity Movements, Tore Linné Eriksen and Anita Kristensen Krokan analyses the development of the sanctions debate in Norway and concludes that the NSA to a degree succeeded in their lobbying campaign and protected most of its vital interests.¹⁴ The conclusions of Øystein Gudim in *Defeat for the Shipping Lobby?* his contribution to the book, *Embargo – Apartheid's oil secrets revealed* concedes with those of Eriksen and Krokan. Gudim argues that even if the Shipping lobby managed to protect its closest interests the boycott law was moral victory for the solidarity movement. The antiapartheid movement managed to use the media and spin the public opinion in addition to cooperating within strategic alliances between the several organisations of the movement and hence force the politicians to sanction the boycott law.

The existing literature on the topic of the boycott law tend to focus on the antiapartheid movement and how they achieved the sanctioning of the boycott against the will of the Shipping lobby. My thesis analyses the sanction of the boycott law through the scope of the Norwegian Shipping lobby. Eriksen and Krokan did not investigate the aspect of international politics or the aims of the NSA but investigate how they responded to the political debate. Gudim focus on the solidarity movement in his analysis and concludes that the sanctioning of the Boycott law was a moral victory and thereby a defeat of the NSA. This thesis analyses the NSA and the strategies, obstacles, and success for the Norwegian Shipowners Association in its aim to avoid devastating economic impact to the shipping industry. The analysis is based on secondary literature, archival material, public documents, and newspaper articles.

¹⁴ Eriksen, Tore Linné og Anita Kristensen Krokan, ""Fuelling the Apartheid War Machine": A Case Study of Shipowners, Sanctions and Solidarity Movements".

Methodology

This thesis investigates the Norwegian Shipowners Association influence on Norwegian Foreign policy decisions and its efforts to avoid economic measures that would be devastating for the shipping industry. To answer the research question, I used secondary literature and reports from Stortinget and material from the Norwegian Shipowners Associations archive. Cross referencing of the material from the NSA archive against reports from debates at Stortinget (Norwegian Parliament) and arguments from the secondary literature provides the base for the analysis of the thesis.

The thesis aims to gain new insights on the NSA influence on the Norwegian foreign policy decisions in context of the boycott law of 1987 and in addition supplement what we know of Norwegian Foreign Policy decisions making and actors affecting these decisions. The approach to achieve these aims have been a qualitative analytical method, where I have examined a selection of sources from the NSA archive, analysed the strategy of the NSA lobbying campaign and cross referenced them against reports from debates at Stortinget and the secondary literature. The conclusion of the thesis is drawn from the context or contradiction between these sources and in relations to the boycott law.

The choice of topic and sources provided a few challenges. Firstly, the amount of sources provided a great challenge. Restrictions on travelling and other infection control measure connected to the pandemic lead to the visit to the NSA archive being delayed and when given the opportunity, pictures were taken of everything possible which caused an immense number of resources to sort out afterwards. This led to a find the needle in the haystack situation and made it more difficult to find the relevant sources to use in the thesis. Eventually the needed sources was obtained, and this thesis is based on those findings. Secondly, the secondary literature on the United Nations role in Norwegian foreign policy and the Norwegian foreign policy itself have contradictions. For example, are the

Norwegian foreign policy in the UN portrayed as both altruistic by Egeland and pragmatic by Svenbalrud. The thesis still managed to draw a conclusion from both sources that the issue of apartheid would be an important debate and made an impact on foreign policy, even with the contradictions.

The thesis main section is structured in four chapters. Chapter one explains the background for the sanctions debate to provide the necessary foundation for the analysis included the development in South Africa and the situation in the shipping market. The chapter explains the stance of the Norwegian Shipping industry on the issue of economic sanctions as measures to fight apartheid. Based on the background and strategic documents and report from the NSA archive I have deducted aims for the NSA in context of the sanctions debate and three issues for the NSA to achieve their aims: *International politics, public opinion and influencing political decision makers*. Chapter two explains the international political arena with focus om the United Nations and the UNs role in Norwegian foreign policy before analysing the how the NSA relates to the international political arena. Chapter three explains the Norwegian NGOs and their campaign trying to influence public opinion and how the NSA dealt with the morality of the sanctions debate from the solidarity movements side. Chapter four analyses the political milieu in Norway and the NSA lobbying campaign. The structure of the thesis by actors are done consciously to help sort out the sources and archive material. Both the newspaper articles and the notes and material from the NSA archive could be overwhelming to work with as already mentioned and it helped be to try and keep track of one section at the time to keep some overview.

The relevance of the thesis

It all begins at school. The ability to understand the context of past, now and future, and to have historical consciousness is an important skill.¹⁵ Not just to make it through school and have good results in the subject of history, but also to understand the society around you and how it is built. The history consciousness is developed when working with and developing the understanding of the connection between historic events.¹⁶ If the skill is developed, you will be able to see the connection between political decisions and events in the future or historical roots for current issues.

The thesis explains aspects of the background for a global issue that argued for decades and how it affected public opinion and political debate in Norway. The boycott law aimed to force the apartheid regime in South Africa and would be a relevant example to investigate the ripple effect of political decisions and this thesis could also supplement such a discussion.

The issues of apartheid, discrimination, and racism are not just in the past, but are relevant today. That the Black Lives Matter movement are fuelled by some of the same thoughts as apartheid is an important lesson for everyone and something that is good to reflect on.

As a teacher it is my experience that the curriculum in the subject of history have Eurocentric tendencies. This thesis and the issue of apartheid could provide an opportunity to discuss history from a different angle and from the eyes of Africans. This thesis will be an addition to literature on the treatment of indigenous people as well as when discussing racism and nationalism. It can also be connected more directly to the curriculum and the learning aim "investigate two or more international conflicts after 1945 and assess the conflict from several perspectives."¹⁷

¹⁵ Lund, *Historiedidaktikk* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2016).

¹⁶ Naastad, Nils og Lise Kvande, *Hva skal vi med historie?* (Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 2012)

¹⁷ Utdanningsdirektoratet, Læreplan i Historie – fellesfag i studieforberedende utdanningsprogram (HIS01-03), (2020).

Chapter 1 – Background

As the sanctioning of the boycott law of 1987¹⁸ grew nearer, Norway saw an increase in antiapartheid arguments at parliament and a vocal solidarity movement questioning the morality of politicians, calling for sanctions and trying to sway public opinion. The first calls for sanctions came in the 1960s, but it was not until the 1980s that a specific proposal for political and economic action against South Africa were actually on the table. The development in South Africa and the situation in the shipping market are vital background if one wish to understand the debate of the boycott law of 1987.

This chapter give a brief introduction to the freedom movement in South Africa and the development here from the Sharpeville massacre until the 1980s where the situation in South Africa had become so heated that the international community was forced to do something. The next section will explain the situation in the shipping industry in the period just before the sanctioning of the boycott law to give an impression of why the NSA invested so many resources to avoid measures that would give a competitive disadvantage for an already pressed industry. In 1984, the debate about sanctions started to close in on legislative action in form of the boycott law of 1987. The third section will explain the building of pressure on the politicians from the antiapartheid movement and the public opinion. Based on important events up until 1984 the fourth section will map the situation for the Norwegian Shipowners Association and highlight their aims and objectives in the case of South Africa and economic sanctions.

¹⁸ Besl. O. nr 39. (1986-87), *vedtak til lov om økonomisk boikott av Sør-Afrika og Namibia for å bekjempe apartheid.*

The freedom movement in South Africa

“Never, never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world”¹⁹ The struggle against political apartheid in South Africa ended with Nelsons Mandela’s inauguration as president in 1994. He was elected president by the majority of the people of South Africa, and the quote above is from his inauguration speech.

The freedom struggle, the resistance to the systematic racism and suppression by the National Party begin after the second world war. The effort was fronted by the African National Congress (ANC) and were initially peaceful. The ANCs programme of action decided in 1949 showed resistance based boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience and non-cooperation modelled on Gandhi’s independence movement in India.²⁰

The Sharpeville massacre in 1960 signified the end of ANCs peaceful approach. Police fired on a peaceful demonstration killing at least 69 people and wounding several hundreds and then banned the ANC and other black organisations. The massacre showed the freedom movement that equality could not be achieved with peaceful means, which led to a change of strategy and it became militant. ANC established the militant wing *Umkhonto we Sizwe*²¹ in 1961 and continued to fight the regime in South Africa through sabotage and guerrilla warfare from the neighbouring countries like Angola.²² The ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe was the spearhead of a movement to fight racism and segregation in South Africa which developed into a global effort to end the apartheid regime. The movement steadily developed into a worldwide collaboration and included among others trade unions, churches, human-rights

¹⁹ Clark, Nancy L., and William H. Worger. *South Africa – The rise and fall of apartheid*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016).

²⁰ Clark and Worger. *South Africa – The Rise and fall of apartheid* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

²¹ The name “Umkhonto we Sizwe” comes from the native South African languages Zulu and Xhosa and translate to “Spear of the Nation”.

²² Mager and Mulaudzi, “Popular response to Apartheid 1948-1975”.

activists. People from all over the globe, worked together to fight the racist regime on the southernmost tip of the Africa.²³

Sixteen years later came the beginning of the end for apartheid. In June 1976, the students in the district of Soweto began protesting a discriminating school system. The South African government spent 259,2 million rand on the non-white school districts compared to the 611,4 million rand spent on the white school districts in 1974/75. This equals about 70% of the spending on education benefitting 15% of the population.²⁴ The students protest led to the police shooting which catalysed a chaos affecting the whole country of South Africa. During the next few months several thousands were killed and as a reaction Umkhonto we Sizwe increased their efforts. Furthermore, local rebellions throughout the country and brough South Africa to the brink of civil war and this did not go unnoticed by the world community.²⁵ The situation escalated in further into the 1980s when South Africa went into armed conflict with several of its neighbouring states in addition to implementing Marshall law.

The Shipping industry

During the course of history Norway has been largely dependent on trade and commerce and this was still the case in the 1980s being so vital that in the first part of the 1980s, almost half the GNP was based on income from export. The shipping still declined dramatically from the mid-1970s. As the decade turned, national income from shipping had gone from almost half of the annual earnings on the national budget to just about one-fifth in about five years.²⁶ The Norwegian economy were dependent on foreign trade and advertised free trade in the international political

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Molobi, "Socio-economic inequalities and priorities for development".

²⁵ Lodge, "Resistance and Reform, 1973-1994",

²⁶ Fredriksen, "Norway and the World: The Economic dimension".

arena. This would benefit the Norwegian merchant fleet which was one of the world's largest and provided foreign currency earnings to finance huge import needs.²⁷

As the Shipping Industry declined dramatically in the years before the boycott law was sanctioned in 1987 it is natural that the NSA fought tooth and nail to avoid sanctions that could be devastating to the trade. The Norwegian shipowners competed on a tough international market and in the 1980s there was a lot of competition for the transport contracts. The sanctions debate in Norway was therefore a huge red flag for the NSA as most of the measures that were considered would give Norwegian shipowners a huge disadvantage. A publication of information about shipping contracts or cargo would be considered a breach of confidentiality for many employers. South African ports are part of the trading network and one the ports most fit for change of crew and maintenance for weeks in both directions, the loss of ports here would force Norwegian ships from operation in the region. The possible loss from the measure proposed by the government was estimated at about 4 billion dollars in addition to about 3000-4000 thousand jobs being in danger and probable repercussions amongst the 80-90.000 people in the industry.²⁸

The pressure for sanctions building

The Council for Southern Africa (NOCOSA) started a watershed when they initiated "action against apartheid – 84" on the 12th of March 1984. The measures included information campaigns, fundraisers, and general solidarity work in more than 60 places in the country. In connection to the action, there was an international consultation about South Africa's warring against its neighbouring states on 22-24th of March.²⁹ The event

²⁷ Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005).

²⁸ 231 S.Afrika. Arild Wegener, *Konsekvenser for ensidig norsk boikott av alle former for skipsfart på Sør-Afrika*. 14.10.1986.

²⁹ Author's translation.

was opened by the minister for foreign affairs, Svenn Stray. The NOCOSA division in Oslo did in addition attempts to clean the capital for South African goods.³⁰ The action got a lot of attention in the media and gave public opinion a nudge towards acting against South Africa. As the members of parliament walked through the streets of Oslo and were surrounded by a huge amount of engagement it is only logical to assume they started to feel the pressure of acting against apartheid.

The lead taken by the action against apartheid was soon followed by politicians and on the 27th of March Hanna Kvanmo and Theo Koritzinsky, both from the Norwegian Socialist Left Party, proposed a law implementing sanctions against South Africa.³¹ The law was never passed but the snowball had started rolling and was seriously picking up speed. The Socialist Left Party was one of the most antiapartheid oriented parties at Stortinget and kept the iron hot for several decades. In the middle of the 1980s they began to gain momentum for their views and along with the other opposition parties they criticized the government for not doing enough against the regime in South Africa.

A couple of months later another key event put more wood on the fires of anti-apartheid. On the 18th of October Stortinget was informed that the Nobel Peace prize committee awarded Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa the prestigious award.³² The Bishop had been in Oslo earlier the same year and confronted the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, Svenn Stray about the Norwegian oil transport to the South African regime.³³ The Norwegian churches, which was an important part of the antiapartheid movement both international and domestic embraced the

³⁰ NTB, "Bred aksjon mot apartheid".

³¹ Innst. O. nr. 81., (1983-1984) *Innstilling frå utanriks- og konstitusjonskomitéen om privat lovforslag.*

Innst. O. nr. 112., (1984-1985) *Innstilling frå utanriks- og konstitusjonskomitéen om privat lovforslag.*

³² S.tid 342., (1984-1985) *Den Norske Nobelkomité melder at Nobels Fredspris for 1984 er utdelt Biskop Desmond Tutu, Sør-Afrika.*

³³ Ottesen, "Stray sier fortsatt nei til Syd-Afrika-boikott".

award going to one of their own and the resolution for getting things done grew.

The 1980s saw several of the most important antiapartheid actors pushing their agenda to force the Norwegian government to take action against the regime in South Africa. A report assembled by the administration of the NSA and presented at a board meeting on 12th of June 1984 clearly states several aspects of the situation were view as especially challenging. The ministry for foreign affairs diffuse handling of the South Africa question in the United Nations General Assembly made people ask questions about the Norwegian policies on South Africa. This put unnecessary exposure of the shipping industry's interests and turned the debate into one about morality and not about logic and economy. The moral debate suited the antiapartheid movement which was fighting against racism and economic arguments against sanctions tended to be view as based on greed or support of the South African regime. Furthermore, the political situation was also described as difficult on several accounts. For instance, the minister for Commerce and trade being a member of Norwegian Christian Peoples Party and thereby had close ties to the church, which in turn were a vital part of the movement for sanctions. Additionally, The labour-side being in opposition in parliament reinforced all the other elements, as they could freely criticize and expose the lack of action from the government for their political gain.³⁴ The pressure on the foreign policy decision-makers was clearly mounting during 1984 and for the NSA to avoid economic sanctions that could cripple the shipping industry started to seem inevitable.

³⁴ 231 S.Afrika, Per Hoff, *Norsk Skipsfart og Sør-Afrika – Det siste års utvikling*. 06.06.1984.

The aims of the NSA

The boycott debate in Norway was one with a focus on morality and severely emotional for a lot of actors. Arguments against boycott could easily be seen as support of the regime in South Africa. The NSA and the shipping industry for this reason still hesitated to join the debate about sanctions and political-economic measures against South Africa. The effort was made quietly and selective as the NSA stance on boycott was based on logical and economic arguments and a wish not to sacrifice the shipping industry in the struggle against the regime in South Africa. A boycott with one-sided restrictions on Norwegian trade calls on South Africa were simply not acceptable. This would only mean to give transport contracts to foreign competition unless the sanctions would be a part of a broader international agreement including the most important shipping- and industrial countries.

The Norwegian Shipowners Association tried to keep out of the spotlight to not get attacked by supporters of apartheid as the NSA was the most visible opposition to sanctions and therefore the easiest target. Their efforts were made quietly lobbying, trying to inform and make logical and economical arguments that could have influence in private discussions but seemed cynic and greedy in public.³⁵ The NSAs stance on the boycott of South Africa was that only broad international sanctions, based on a binding resolution in the United Nations Security Council would have any real impact on the apartheid regime. If sanctions where inevitable, they should at least include all economic connections to South Africa and not target the shipping industry and sacrifice it to make a moral point towards South Africa.

The NSA lobbying campaign aimed to impact the foreign policy decisions to agree with the shipping industry on three points. First, for the boycott to be logical and realistic and consider the effect economic sanctions have

³⁵ 231 S.Afrika, Per Hoff, *Norsk Skipsfart og Sør-Afrika – Det siste års utvikling*. 06.06.1984.

on both the apartheid regime and the Norwegian shipping industry. Second, to not limit and affect Norwegian economic interests to the advantage of international competitors. Third, to have a somewhat significant effect on the regime of South Africa.³⁶

To achieve their aims in the debate about political actions and economic measures against South Africa, the NSA face three main challenges. First, the International Political arena and the economic interest of other states related to South Africa differentiating to the Norwegian, for example the oil producing states without any relevant shipping industry. Second, the public opinion in Norway being a pillory for the NSA. The anti-apartheid movement progressed their cause by using the media and moral arguments to discredit the Shipowners and affect public opinion. Third, for the lobbying efforts and arguments actually having any influence on the foreign policy decision makers. The Politicians were under pressure from all sides in the debate and several other actors in addition to the NSA tried to bring out their views. The next three chapters will address these three challenges and examine how the NSA faced them in the context of the prelude to the sanctioning of the boycott law of 1987.

³⁶ 231 S.Afrika, Per Hoff, *Oljeleveranser til Sør-Afrika*. 28.02.1984.

Chapter 2 – The United Nations and sanctions

The United Nations and international politics were an important yet challenging arena for the Norwegian shipping industry. The South African question both coincides and contradicts several important aspects of Norwegian foreign policy. This made the issue of Apartheid a challenging one for the Norwegian foreign policymakers. Both the humanitarian aspect of Norway's ethical foreign policy and the national security and national sovereignty of the member states of the United Nations that Norway championed are important in the context of South Africa. In addition, the economic interests of other states differ from the Norwegian in the debate of action against apartheid.

This chapter explains the international debate of actions against the South African government to force change in policy. The first section will address the United Nations role in Norwegian foreign policy to highlight the importance of the efforts made in the international political arena. The Second section will explain the development in the apartheid debate from an international perspective and show aspects influencing Norwegian foreign policy makers. The last section will analyse the NSA potential influence sanctions debate in international politics.

The United Nations' role in Norwegian foreign policy

The United Nations have been of great importance for Norway and a vital part of Norwegian foreign policymaking since the founding of UN in 1946. This reliability and trust were firmly staked out after the second world war. Years of occupation made the Norwegian government realize the need for a system of international cooperation and international law to ensure the security and the rights of small states are taken care of. From a Norwegian perspective, the best solution was the UN, as a system of international law, peaceful conflict resolution, and international cooperation. The United Nations has been such a vital part of Norwegian

foreign policy and national security that Norway has been a campaigned for the UN to have actual power at the expense of national sovereignty.³⁷ The trust in and support of the UN is still fundamental, so much so that the UN is considered to be a cornerstone of the Norwegian foreign policy. Norway's politics in UN shows another important aspect of the Norwegian foreign policy, the "missionary impulse". The outspoken aim to have an ethical foreign policy is another cornerstone in the Norwegian foreign policy. The belief that Norway has an important role to lead the world towards peaceful solutions and humanitarian values has been important since Fridtjof Nansen did humanitarian work for the league of nations in the 1920s.³⁸ In the United Nations, Norway took the position as "bridge-builder" and worked under the assumption that they could provide moral guidance. The idea comes from the assumption that Norway did not have a history burdened by imperialist tendencies, but instead known for contributions to foreign aid and support. What is more, the presumption that smaller states, which have fewer bi- and multilateral connections are less likely to be regarded as having self-interests in dealing with foreign aid are widespread amongst Norwegian politicians. A small state, with less to gain and less colonial history simply easier for a developing country to have relations to than a superpower.³⁹

The importance of the United Nations and the role of the organization in the Norwegian mind are clearly stated in the official political document and the attention shown in the media coverage of Norway's politics in the UN arena. Stortingsmelding (Parliamentary note) nr. 93 from 1977⁴⁰ mentions the UN in the first section and the organization is one of the main themes of the document. The importance of the UN charter and other international documents that protect human rights and fight issues like racial discrimination are highlighted. Further, the aim to be a

³⁷ Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005).

³⁸ Riste, *Norway's Foreign relations* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005).

³⁹ Egeland, *Impotent Superpower – Potent Small State* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1988).

⁴⁰ St. meld. Nr. 93, (1976-1977), *Om Norge og det Internasjonale menneskerettsvern*.

contributor to human rights work in the UN and guidelines for Norwegian human rights effort are outlined. Norway is to contribute to strengthen the international protection of human rights, support volunteer organizations efforts for human rights across borders and if possible, engage directly when human rights are violated.⁴¹ The role of the UN becomes even more evident when the newspapers often highlight Norway's contribution. Norway often spoke loudly for action against the apartheid regime in United Nations fora and promoted several proposals for resolution and binding sanctions with the aim of forcing South Africa to change their policies on race and segregation, on such occasion the Norwegian newspapers often made a great deal out of it.⁴²

Antiapartheid gaining momentum

In the 1980s had the cause of anti-apartheid gained vital momentum in the international arena, but the issue of apartheid had actually been on the agenda at the United Nations since the end of the second world war. Apartheid was formally addressed for the first time in 1948, the same year the Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. The United Nations was created as a political arena for international cooperation and based on the principle of equality for all people.⁴³ This made apartheid a natural issue for the General Assembly to address and from the first resolution adopted in 1950⁴⁴ to the end of apartheid, it passed more than 200 resolutions on South African or Apartheid-related issues. The first decade after the first resolution was passed was characterized by caution towards the government in South Africa. A lot of resolutions were passed, and the

⁴¹ The importance the volunteer organisations and the churches in Norwegian humanitarian work are emphasized in the document. This will be addressed in chapter 3.

⁴² Mentz, "Norge bak FN-vedtak MOT SØR-AFRIKA"

⁴³ Department of Public Information, "Overview".

⁴⁴ General Assembly Resolution 395.

General Assembly continuously appealed to the apartheid regime trying to influence to end their racist policies. This all changed in the 1960s.⁴⁵

From the 1960s the United Nations took a firmer stand on the issue of Apartheid and during the next few decades, the United Nations played an important part in isolating South Africa and damaging the country's economic and political relations. Based on the legal basis of the UN charter the first resolution against a member state of the United Nations was adopted and later a mandatory arms embargo was imposed.⁴⁶ The change of approach towards the Apartheid regime was pushed from 1960 as the Sharpeville massacre made a public outrage. In addition, the change of policy was reinforced by the independence and admission to the United Nations of sixteen African states in the 1960s. The African states became one of the largest blocs of the General Assembly during the decade and pushed firmly towards action against the racist minority rule of South Africa.⁴⁷

The hostilities in South Africa after the Soweto uprising in 1976 and the South African government's military invasion of Angola in 1981 gave the antiapartheid even more momentum in the international political arena. The ANC took advantage and put South Africa on the agenda of the United Nations as often as possible. In the General Assembly, the newly admitted African states shared the same view as the ANC and promoted resolutions and actions against South Africa continuously. This increased the pressure on the governments of the world to take a stance on the issue of apartheid and the stance of the world governments started to lean towards sanctions.⁴⁸ Norway's missionary impulse and being outspoken in

⁴⁵ Department of Public Information, "United Nations consideration of apartheid, 1948-1966".

⁴⁶ Department of Public Information, "International campaign against apartheid 1967-1989".

⁴⁷ Stultz, *The Apartheid issue at the General Assembly*.

⁴⁸ Eriksen, *Sør-Afrikas Historie – Førkoloniale samfunn, apartheid og frigjøring* (Kristiansand: Portal forlag, 2016).

the case of their ethical foreign policy made it natural to follow up when the UN's attitude towards South Africa became harsher.

The international opinion on apartheid gradually changed towards political and economic action against the regime in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. The Norwegian politicians were considering the UN as a part of the foundation for Norwegian foreign policy, therefore when the United Nations were debating action against apartheid it was evident that Norway would support the effort. The change in opinion in the UN eventually resulted in a programme of Action against Apartheid. The programme lists measures like oil embargo, ceasing of economic collaboration and bans on airlines and shipping lines. The government was asked to take effective legislative measures to stop supplying South Africa with strategic material, especially material necessary for warfare. The programme of action was adopted by the General Assembly at the end of 1983 and foreshadows increasing efforts against the apartheid regime of South Africa.⁴⁹

NSA challenges in the international arena

The international opinion on apartheid gradually changed until and this development speeded up in the 1980s. The change in attitude towards the apartheid regime became clear on the 17th of August 1984 when the Security Council of the United Nations adopted resolution 554. The resolution declared the new constitution of South Africa null and void on the argument of it being racist⁵⁰ and marks a firmer stance. The Norwegian support of the UN system has already been established so the stance of the security council was followed up by Norway. Measures against apartheid were presented by the Minister for trade and commerce, Asbjørn Haugstvedt in June 1985 and Norway moved closer to boycott. Norway tried to take lead on the Apartheid question and hosted a seminar

⁴⁹ Department of Public Information, "International campaign against apartheid 1967-1989"

⁵⁰ United Nations, "The United Nations in South Africa".

on an oil embargo in June 1986 before being co-initiator to a resolution in the General assembly in which the Security Council was asked to sanction an immediate binding oil embargo.⁵¹ The declaration from the seminar stated that because of the situation in South Africa comprehensive mandatory sanctions are vital and that the Security Council should adopt such sanctions and that measures against the oil transport are an integral part of such sanction if they were to be effective.⁵²

The NSA contributed to the preparations for the seminar on the government request and both internal communication in this regard and the declaration from the seminar on an oil embargo showed another issue for the shipping industry, the issue of possible sanctions having a focus on the transporters. In a note to Arild Wegener from Ketil Djønne on the 28th of April⁵³ he expresses concerns the seminar will most likely focus on the oil transporters and that it could be that in taking part in the seminar was a "sale of the rope we ourselves are to be hanged in". The declaration from the seminar reinforced this fear as it has a clear focus on oil transports and in the sixth bullet point reads:

The seminar is concerned that some international shipping companies have deliberately engaged their ships in supply of oil to South Africa from oil exporting countries which have banned such exports, by issuing false documents, and by concealing the final destination of the oil cargo in question. It deeply deplores such practices and urges all shipping nations to adopt measures aimed at prohibiting ships under their flag to engage themselves in such clandestine supplies of oil to South Africa.

The declaration from the seminar shows a clear intention of pointing a finger at the transporters and blame shipping companies for the continuation of oil supplies going to South Africa. The NSA stance on

⁵¹ 231 S.Afrika, Arild Wegener, *Sør-Afrika*.

⁵² 231 S.Afrika, *Declaration of the United Nations Seminar on an Oil Embargo against South Africa, Oslo Norway 4-6 June 1986*.

⁵³ 231 S.Afrika, Ketil Djønne, *Oljeembargoseminaret. Innspill fra vår side*.

sanctions had always been against unilateral measures and in support of United Nations resolutions. The position had not changed when Arild Wegener addresses it in a note to the NSA administration on the 9th of January 1987.⁵⁴ The NSA lobbied for this point of view to avoid getting a devastatingly competitive disadvantage in the shipping market throughout the period and the sanction debate.⁵⁵ In the note, Wegener describes another issue for the NSA, the focus for possible sanctions. In the wake of the Norwegian co-initiated resolution in the general assembly, the sanctions debate was expected to resurface and for it to be focused on oil transporters and shipowners. This reinforces the impression that the shipping industry was afraid of being the scapegoat for South African still getting oil supplies and being targeted for extensive measures. Wegener also states that he has been in contact with one of the relevant officials to stress this issue, but no further mentions could be found in the archival material and have most likely been overshadowed by the domestic sanctions debate and efforts in Norway.

The NSA promoted and argued for broad international sanctions and to avoid unilateral measures against South Africa, but this was not an easy policy to follow. The international political debate was not, like the Norwegian domestic discussion focused on morality versus economic loss. In addition, the international political actors were seeking a scapegoat to blame for South Africa's continuously being supplied with oil. The other oil transporters avoided the debate, but Norway's missionary impulse drove them straight into the efforts on the issue, like the oil embargo seminar in Oslo put to blame. The fact that the Norwegian foreign policy regarding the United Nations were contradictive, made the NSA's position even more challenging.⁵⁶ The disagreement between the security policy aspect of protecting national sovereignty and the humanitarian aspect of it made it

⁵⁴ 231 S.Afrika, Arild Wegener, *Hva skjer i FN med Sør-Afrika-spørsmålet?*.

⁵⁵ The NSA lobbying and specific examples of this will be covered in chapter 4.

⁵⁶ Svenbalrud, "Fundament og ornament: FN som «hjørnestein i norsk utenrikspolitikk», 1970-2005".

impossible for the NSA to take a public stance without being a target of critique. This made the international arena a difficult stage for the Norwegian shipowners to influence public opinion without being a targeted as a part of the issue. The challenge of public opinion was one that was evident for the NSA throughout the sanctions debate, and as the next chapter will show, one of the greatest disadvantages.

Chapter 3 – The challenge of the Norwegian anti-apartheid movement

The issue of apartheid and how to handle the regime ruling South Africa was a vital one in the latter half of the 20th century. The closing of political relations, military intervention, and economic sanctions were all actions considered on the debate was heated both on the international and the domestic arena. To understand and analyse the Norwegian Shipowner's influence on the foreign policy decisions resulting in the boycott law, one needs to have a clear image of the development of the antiapartheid movement and the public opinion up until the final sanctioning of the law in 1987. The support of volunteer organizations was a specified aim the State report explaining the Norwegian humanitarian efforts from 1977.⁵⁷ This is a clear statement of the importance of volunteer organizations in Norwegian foreign policymaking and of the challenge the public arena and the solidarity movement have to the Norwegian Shipowners Association in the campaign against the sanctions and trade limitations.

This chapter explains the development of the antiapartheid movement in Norway and the non-governmental volunteer organizations efforts in solidarity with the suppressed black population in South Africa under the apartheid regime. The efforts of the antiapartheid movement will be examined by investigating the umbrella organizations NOCOSA, CEIR, and LO and explain the development of the three important actors. The last section of the chapter will scope in on the NSAs relationship to the solidarity movement and the public arena and provide examples of interactions between the solidarity movement. Further, it will analyse NSAs efforts in the public arena and assess the importance of this part of the campaign against sanctions.

⁵⁷ St. meld. nr. 93, (1976-1977), *Om Norge og det internasjonale menneskerettsvern*.

Norwegian NGOs in solidarity with South Africa

The solidarity movement in Norway developed like a watershed during the 1980s and several organizations developed strong antiapartheid positions in the Norwegian debate about sanctions. Several such actors started as several small measures struggling to make an impact and work in solidarity to the black majority in South Africa. Then in turn these groups gathered in umbrella organizations to combine their strengths, like the *Norwegian Council for Southern Africa* (NOCOSA) and the Council for Ecumenical and International Relations (CEIR). In addition, already existing organisations like the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) had important positions in the solidarity movement.

One of the most prominent Norwegian champions for solidarity with the people of South Africa was probably the Norwegian council for Southern Africa (NOCOSA). It began with demonstrations at Madserud Tennis Club in 1964 which was initiated by people from most political parties and several organisations under the umbrella "Norwegian action against apartheid". These sorts of sporadic action against apartheid led to several youth organisations and action groups founding the NOCOSA in 1967. The NOCOSA was established with the goal of aiding the liberation movement in South Africa.⁵⁸ The NOCOSA worked to put the issue of apartheid on the political agenda from its beginning but in the first years issues like the Vietnam-war and the EU-referendum got more attention. Still they fought to influence politicians to take action through means like user boycotts and political activism. In 1979 a letter was sent to all municipalities of Norway with the message to take action and boycott South African goods.⁵⁹ The turn of the tide came with the Soweto rebellion in 1976 and the South African wars with its neighbouring states. Both events attracted immense international attention and pushed the solidarity movement

⁵⁸ Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika. LO og kampen mot apartheid* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1998).

⁵⁹ Drolsum, *For et fritt afrika* (Oslo: Solidaritet Forlag, 1999).

forward.⁶⁰ This springboard for antiapartheid were substantial when it came to Norwegian domestic actors like NOCOSA as well and the issue became a more or less constant figure on the political agenda. The struggle for sanctions was an important focus for the NOCOSA and in the beginning of the 1980s it became one of their main focuses, especially with the establishing of the boycott committee in 1982. They collaborated closely with the Shipping Research Bureau (SRB) to shed light on the shipping industries attitude towards the official policy of keeping oil from the North Sea away from South Africa.⁶¹ The attempts to sway public opinion from the NOCOSA were plentiful, and in the 1980s you could often find articles in newspapers about how the greedy shipowners does not care for the suppressed people of South Africa and how they transport large parts of the oil to South Africa and thereby fuelling their war efforts.⁶² The stance of the NOCOSA and effort made to get actions is clearly shown articles like in Aftenposten, January 1986. One of the main contributors to the public critic, Øystein Gudim from the boycott committee of the NOCOSA wrote in a fiery debate post that the Norwegian administration pushes solidarity ahead with the help of the NSA and describes Norwegian South Africa-policy as a disgrace. "The patience is soon running out, and the question is if the administration will keep the breaks on the public opinion".⁶³

The Norwegian churches through the Council for Ecumenical and International (CEIR) relations was another important part of the solidarity movement and pro-sanctions camp. The Norwegian churches had relationships with South Africa for decades before the sanctions debate through missionary work and different sorts of aid. These links made it natural for CEIR to put this on the agenda when fellow Christians in Southern Africa asked for help and solidarity. Another reason for the

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Eriksen og Krokan, "Fuelling the Apartheid War Machine".

⁶² Egede-Nissen, "Bergesen størst på Sør-Afrika".

⁶³ Gudim, "Tålmodigheten snart slutt".

antiapartheid position taken up was the attempt to use theology to legitimize apartheid by the national party. This was condemned by the international church community to correct this misuse of the gospel became an important goal.⁶⁴ The Norwegian churches had strong links to politicians, especially to the Christian people's party and when CEIR took up a strong position for action against apartheid in the 1980s, the Churches became an important actor. CEIR allied itself with the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa (NOCOSA) to try and push for sanctions in parliament. The World Council for Churches (WCC) encouraged domestic churches to work for economic sanctions. In a report from a meeting between Minister for trade and Commerce Asbjørn Haugstvedt in December 1983 and representatives from the Norwegian churches demands for political action are put forward. The issue of apartheid is labelled as morally reprehensible, and the minister are criticized for being a representative from the Christian Peoples Party and still choosing political support and compromise over morality.⁶⁵ The same call came from South Africa and Bishop Desmond Tutu, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984, for his efforts in the liberation movement and against the apartheid regime. The call for sanctions came loud and clear from the churches and was substantiated by public figures in Norway, like Bishop Andreas Aarflot publicly criticising oil transportation to Southern Africa. The bishop Aarflot criticised the government on several occasions, one of the harshest in *Aftenposten* March 1986 when he comments on a member of the department of trades grip on reality⁶⁶ and as mentioned above, Haugstvedt, the Minister for Commerce and Shipping also got a round from Aarflots public criticism.

Equality for everyone, no matter the ethical background is one of the pillars of LO. For this reason, to take part in the struggle against the racist regime in South Africa made perfect sense. The first comprehensive

⁶⁴ Agøy, "The Freedom Struggle of Southern Africa".

⁶⁵ 231 S.Afrika *Notat til samtale med Statsråd Haugstvedt 21.12.83.*

⁶⁶ Aarflot, "Idealet og virkeligheten".

measures from the Trade Unions were to encourage a nationwide consumer boycott of goods from South Africa in 1960. The import of fruits and vegetables plummeted, and a statement were made. In 1976 the efforts were increased, and a LO launched an antiapartheid campaign with two main aims; To influence the Norwegian opinion to use as a leverage for pushing action against the apartheid regime and to raise funds for the liberation movement in South Africa.⁶⁷ LO organized several boycotts for the next decades and in was an important weapon to try and affect the regime and at the same time show disgust for the policies of the South African government.⁶⁸ In addition to hurting the Apartheid regime, LO gave financial aid to the humanitarian aid and trade union in South Africa. Aid was channelled through organisations like Norsk Folkehjelp and added up to almost 10 million Norwegian kroner from 1975 to 1996. The money was used for legal help, humanitarian aid, and seminars and conferences to train black workers to be able to fight for their rights.⁶⁹

The political situation gave wind in the sails of the solidarity movement and gave these actors such great influence that South Africa was almost permanently put on the agenda for the Norwegian foreign policy makers. The amount of pressure from several parts of the movement forces the government to consider sanctions. Norway maintained an important position in both production and transportation of oil and the South Africa's oil supplies were considered one of the most vulnerable parts of the country's economy. The pro-sanction actors in Norway saw this as an opportunity to hurt the white minority rule in South Africa and put oil on the agenda. The transport and supply of oil became the focus, and with it the Norwegian Shipping Association.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Vetlesen, "Trade Union Support to the Stuggle against Apartheid"

⁶⁸ Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika. LO og kampen mot Apartheid* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1998).

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰ Vetlesen, *Frihet for Sør-Afrika. LO og kampen mot Apartheid* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1998).

The debate of economic sanctions was raised and became more heated in the 1980s, but not all supported sanctions against South Africa. Several prominent actors with great influence on the foreign policy makers lobbied against sanctions, especially unilateral sanctions. Even if LO had an important position in the solidarity movement, the organisation did not support bilateral sanctions against South Africa. Sanctions that could hurt trading relations could have consequences that would have been critical for industries like the production manganese alloys. Industries which was dependent on imports manganese ore would probably have had to shut down production and immediately put about a thousand people out of work if imports from South Africa were to be prohibited. The facility Elkem, in Sauda was one of the biggest producers of manganese alloys and often in the centre of the debate, and the mayor of Sauda claims that an import prohibition will be a beheading of a society in total dependence of its industry.⁷¹ This did not seem like an acceptable sacrifice when the impact on South Africa would not be significant and enough to force change.⁷² LO for this reason worked for mandatory sanctions in the United Nations and trye to force the international community to join forces and together and adopt mandatory sanctions. The union organised seminars, workshops, and conferences on several kinds of action against the South African regime. Like the international conference on transport and export of oil that LO took initiative to in 1986⁷³ and which were held in Oslo, June the same year.⁷⁴ The LO stance of protecting jobs coincided with some of the NSA campaign, both indirectly because of the statement that jobs should not be sacrificed and directly as the Sailors union was under the LO umbrella.

⁷¹ Andrassen, "Som en klam hånd over Sauda"

⁷² Vetlesen, "Trade Union Support to the Stuggle against Apartheid"

⁷³ "LO tar opp Syd-Afrika"

Godager "LO-forslag vurderes"

⁷⁴ Vetlesen, "Trade Union Support to the Stuggle against Apartheid"

The NSA and public opinion

The general strategy of the Norwegian Shipowners Association where to keep a low profile because of the uphill battle a debate against moral argument would be. The NSA and the shipowners had become a more visible target, closer to home than the white minority government in South Africa and was often the focus for the efforts from the antiapartheid movement. Because of this the NSAs representatives had to make public appearances despite the wish to avoid it. The was dragged into public debate on several occasions and had to try to make their arguments without looking cynical and greedy, which was what the solidarity movement tried to picture the shipowners as. After 1984 the NSA was forced to take more of these battles as the public opinion were moving towards sanctions and the foreign policy decision makers would not be able to cross their voters completely. The debate in the media tended to be one-sided and portray the Shipowners as greedy and portraying indifference for South Africa or in the worst cases insinuating support of apartheid. The NSA administration had to counter these accusations or insinuations in the media and inform the public of the negative effect sanctions could have on the industry. After the report from the consulting firm Arthur D. Little the NSA often used data from the report to argue their case, the report was used as argument in Arild Wegener's post in Dagbladet in November 1985. In the text, Wegener criticise the newspapers articles from the week before and sum up some of the negative impacts on the shipping industry before he advises the newspaper journalists to read the report to avoid future misunderstandings. Further it states that the only wish for the shipowners is for the Norwegian shipping industry not to be crippled by unilateral measures and make them uncompetitive and threaten bankruptcy.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Wegener, "Rederne og Sør-Afrika"

The strategy for the NSA was in trying keep a low profile but it was also necessary to inform the public of the negative impacts sanctions would have in the shipping industry and alle the people employed in jobs connected to shipping. The NSA tried to keep their efforts to neutral and academic events. Seminar in the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs was one such event and here Vikøren had a lecture on the problems, follow-up, and costs of the Norwegian Shipping industry in connected to South Africa the 5th of March 1986.⁷⁶ In the lecture Vikøren highlights the reasons for the NSA efforts in the debate and the negative impacts sanctions and register could have on the shipping industry. In addition he raises questions about the frame of the possible sanctions, and to what end the measures are aimed.

The key tactic for the solidarity movement was to publicly address the apartheid, sanctions and oil transport and often publicly criticise the shipowner's part of the issues. The public criticism from Bishop Andras Aarflot was not limited to the government but the shipowners also were object to his attentions in the media. In the aftermath of Bishop Aarflots new year's speech in 1986, a heated debate occurred in the media between David Vikøren, the CEO of the NSA and Bishop Aarflot.⁷⁷ Bishop Aarflot had publicly stated that economic considerations and the shipowners were more important than "the call from the blacks" and that Norway should adopt unilateral sanctions to answer the call. Vikøren states that Norwegian shipowners not always are in the position to choose their destinations but that the calls on South Africa are gradually being reduces. He also argues that more than just the shipowners will be affected if the shipping industry should take the whole take the cost of economic sanctions, but others employed in the industry such as sailors would lose their jobs.

⁷⁶ 231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Norsk Skipsfart og Sør-Afrika: Problemer, oppfølging og kostnader*.

⁷⁷ Kaarbø, "Reder mot Biskop".

The Norwegian council for Southern Africa developed to be one of the biggest antiapartheid umbrella organisations and where frequently attacking the NSA in the media. One such occasion was in June 1986, just weeks before the government presented measure against South Africa. The NOCOSA issued a press release on the 3rd of June demanding that Norwegian politicians make the "fight for basic human rights in South Africa count for more than the wallet in the South Africa politics."⁷⁸ The press release resulted in some correspondence between the NOCOSA and the NSA about wrongful information about the NSA sabotaging the register of Norwegian ships making calls on South Africa. In the wake of the press release the debate of sanctions the issue was again on the agenda and several newspaper articles followed. An article from Dagbladet from the 4th of June 1986 provides a prime example of the efforts discredit the Shipowners. The headline reads "Shipowners don't care"⁷⁹ and states that Oil transports to South Africa continue as before and that Norwegian owned ships probably carries between 25 and 30 percent of the oil supplies to the apartheid state. Further, Øystein Gudim is quoted saying that "it is really disappointing that the new labour government at least go further than their predecessors. At least it should adopt full publicity of ships making calls in South Africa"⁸⁰ Gudim also claims that the NSA sabotage the register.⁸¹

A lot of the efforts from the NSA were to try and publicly correct such errors, misunderstandings and insinuations that portrayed the Shipowners being pro-apartheid as shown above. Shipowners giving less strategic statements that gave the impression of being less empathetic for the South African cause reinforced this view of Shipowners. The article about Peter C. G. Sundt from Sig. Bergesen in Dagbladet on the 17th of January 1986, where he was quoted saying that the company would not stop calls

⁷⁸ 231 S.Afrika, Fellesrådet for de Sørlege Afrika (NOCOSA), *Presse informasjon*.

⁷⁹ Author's translation

⁸⁰ Author's translation.

⁸¹ Tystad, "Rederne gir blaffen".

in South Africa is one such example. The NSAs argument where economic and where ill-suited for public debate against the moral argument of the antiapartheid movement. In addition, the medias' view in the matter of South Africa when Bishop Andreas Aarflot was awarded name of the month for January in Dagbladet for "Not selling morality cheap⁸²" and taking a stance against Prime Minister Willoch and the NSA.⁸³

The public debate was a minefield for the NSA and one the administration avoided if they could, but as it was an important for a for the solidarity movement, they still were dragged in. The NOCOSA they did a good job making their case and portraying the shipowners as greedy and less empathetic for the suppressed black majority in South Africa the NSA had to join in the uphill battle of public debate. The NSA tried to focus their statements to academic and more neutral fora but from time to time they had to join in newspaper to put out fires and correct wrongful information or accusations. The focus on the NSA strategy was still increasingly based on quite selective lobbying and tried to keep a low profile in the media.

⁸² Author's translation.

⁸³ Bøhm-Pedersen, "Glad Biskop".

Chapter 4 – Political foreign decision makers

The development of 1984 gave clear indications that economic sanctions against South Africa could be near and the NSA did not plan to roll over. It was certain to that efforts were needed to be kept up and this is clear in the report from the main board meeting on the 16th of January 1985.⁸⁴ The board addresses the expected flare-up of the South Africa question and evaluate their options. The report shows that they feared measures that would be devastating for the shipping industry like register to make a pillory of ships to call on South Africa and trade bans that would make the Norwegian shipowners less competitive on the shipping market and cripple their business opportunities. How the NSA dealt with the sanctions debate had to adjust after the changes in government. For this reason, the vote of confidence that threw the Conservative led coalition government in 1986 turned out to be a turning point, but still the NSA continued their efforts to avoid such devastating measures. The NSA administration had to navigate in the Norwegian political landscape to protect the shipping industry, as the last two chapters have shown the lobbying of foreign policy decision makers had to be the road to achieve their aims.

This chapter will explain the NSAs attempts to influence the foreign policy decision makers and avoid economic measures that would have negative impact on trade relations and thereby the shipping industry. The first section will address the NSA strategy during the Conservative government until the change of government to Labour in 1986. Then the second section would explain the change to labour government and the impact this upheaval had on the sanctions debate. The third and last section of this chapter will examine the NSA lobbying under the labour government and until the sanctioning of the boycott law to try and discover if the efforts had any impact.

⁸⁴ 231. S.Afrika, Arild Wegener, *Sør-Afrika*.

The NSA and the Conservative-coalition government

The Norwegian Shipowners Associations strategy in questions regarding South Africa had been keeping a low profile in the media and trying to argue their case in more selective meeting and quite lobbying, this was still the case in under the coalition government of Conservative, the Centre Party and the Christian Peoples Party before the change of government in May 1986. The NSA had, as mentioned in chapter 1, several connections in parliament and several prominent members of the Conservative government had ties to the shipping industry and tried to the best of their ability to use these contacts and influence them to look after their interest. The archival materiel clearly indicates NSA influence on several members of the Willoch government as arguments and point of view in support of the shipping industry, but also a more general information campaign to provide arguments for the debate.

The Minister Asbjørn Haugstvedt from the Christian Peoples Party was one of the NSA more specific targets in their lobbying efforts. Haugstvedt was naturally a priority for the NSA as minister for trade and commerce, but in addition because of his party affiliation and the fact that he was under a lot of pressure from other actors in trying to influence the foreign policy towards South Africa. The Christian Peoples Party have deep connections to the Churches, which again played an important role in the antiapartheid campaign. This concern was aired on several board meetings and seen as a problem as early as in January 1984.⁸⁵ Haugstvedt was heavily criticised of the Christian community for not doing enough for South Africa as already described in chapter three, the minister was approach from representatives from the Churches in December 1983. Bishop Andreas Aarflot's new year's speech in 1986 was critical to the government's efforts to help fight apartheid and the speech led to the minister was portrayed as hurt in Dagbladet the 3rd of January⁸⁶ after getting critique

⁸⁵ 231 S.Afrika, Rolf Sæther, *Sør-Afrika. Oljetransport.*

⁸⁶ Thomas Spence, "Haugstvedt sår etter Aarflots Sør-Afrika utspill"

from his own voter base. His own party was not pleased with his efforts either and publicly criticised him for following government policy and expecting the party to do the same without consulting them.⁸⁷ And it that was not enough he was criticised from the shipping industry for possibly putting their jobs in danger.⁸⁸

The NSA lobbying towards the minister for trade and commerce, can be detected in Haugstvedt statement about the government's economic measures against South Africa the 27th of March 1985.⁸⁹ Haugstvedt focused on three key elements, a boycott only hurting the Norwegian shipping industry but not having any notable effect on the South African economy, underlines that the key to having any real impact on apartheid would be to get a binding resolution from the Security Council of the United Nations and that a voluntarily register of calls on South Africa in cooperation with the NSA would be established. The ministers statement coincides with discussion from several interactions between him and representatives of the shipping industry, most notably in letters to Haugstvedt from the Administrative Director of the NSA, David Vikøren dated 29th of March 1984 and 7th of February 1985.⁹⁰ In the letter from March 1984, the importance of broad international support of any possible sanctions, preferably in the form of a UN resolution. Vikøren present in the letter from February 1985, the same estimates for income from the South African Market of about 750 million Norwegian kroner and pushes hard for the register being voluntary and on the NSAs premises. Between the first letter and the Haugstvedts statement in parliament several meetings were mentioned in letters, notes, and reports from board meetings. The agreement between arguments of the NSA from notes and reports and Minister Haugstvedt arguments for limiting the action that affect the

⁸⁷ Thomas Spence, "KrF Refser."

⁸⁸ Heidi Egede-Nissen, "Kraftig spark til handelsminister Haugstvedt"

⁸⁹ S.tid. (1984-1985), 3011-3014

⁹⁰ 231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Letter to Minister Asbjørn Haugstvedt. 29.03.1984.*
231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Letter to Minister Asbjørn Haugstvedt. 07.02.1985.*

shipping industry indicates somewhat successful lobbying. The correspondence and meetings in the period support this view.

In addition to lobbying against specific targets in the government, the NSA carried out an information campaign towards the politicians both in the government and at the Storting. The most important contribution to this campaign was the "Little Report" which was sent to Prime minister Kåre Willoch on the 4th of November 1985.⁹¹ The report was a thorough analysis and evaluation of the impact economic sanctions against South Africa and the proposed register of Norwegian ships from independent consultant firm Arthur D. Little, Boston, US. The report analysed the Norwegian shipping industry and found that the indirect consequences of sanctions and register would possibly be devastating for the shipping industry. Two of the most endangered trade sectors were also some of the most important in Norwegian shipping, the dry-bulk and chemical- and product trade. In addition, the ripple effects would possibly include limiting the Norwegians shipowners' access to shipping contracts due to limitations on call ports. The report was in addition to the prime minister's office, sent to the minister for trade and commerce, to the minister of foreign affairs, to the committee of foreign affairs, the seafarers unions and to the individual members of the committee of foreign affairs and the committee for shipping at the Storting. Thereafter a press conference and the material presented and then used as an economic argument against sanctions.⁹² The NSA lobbying strategy under the Conservative government are portrayed in these two examples. The personal, selective pressure on Minister Haugstvedt and the broad information campaign based on a thorough report that supports economic arguments against sanctions.

⁹¹ 231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Letter to Prime Minister Kåre Willoch*. 04.11.1985.

⁹² 231 S.Afrika, Rolf Sæther, *Arthur D. Little_Rapporten. Aksjonsplan*. 31.10.1985.

The change of government in 1986

The change of government from Conservative to labour limited the NSAs influence on ministers and other key foreign policy decisions makers. The Conservative Willoch government had naturally connection to business owners and amongst them the shipowners because of the party policy of limited governmental intervention and lower taxes on business.

Conservatives position on sanctions were firmly against intervention in Norwegian shipping, so firm that when the boycott law was sanctioned it was portrayed in the media as "The Conservatives bad day" and as defeat.⁹³ The labour party on the other side, sympathize more with workers and aims to distribute resources more evenly. Their solidarity for workers and connections to the trade unions made them more sympathetic to the antiapartheid movement as the LO played a key role.

The labour party criticized Conservative for their stance on sanctions and in debate of the vote of confidence in the government it was claimed from several labour MPs that if in they were to decide they would do more to affect the apartheid regime in South Africa. Sanctions and bans on sale of oil to South Africa had been strongly indicated if labour rule and when the opportunity presented itself, they had to follow through. In addition, the Haugstvedt and the Christian Peoples Party's, which were known for being solidarity minded, pro foreign aid and as the moral police of Norwegian politics moved from government to opposition. This meant that the party did no longer have to make compromises with Conservative, the pressure went of Haugstvedts shoulders and publicly supported sanctions in Dagbladet July 1986 after several years of critic for not taking enough action against apartheid.⁹⁴

The change of government in 1986 was a turning point, and the beginning of the final sprint towards sanctions against South Africa. First because the change in government meant that NSAs had fewer connections and

⁹³ Per Vassbotn, "Høyres dårlige dag."

⁹⁴ "Norsk boikott"

thereby less influence on the foreign policy decision makers. Second because the labour had to follow through with action against apartheid when they had heavily criticised Conservative for doing too little. Third the Christian People's Party new stood free to take a firm stance on sanctions. The party had been under pressure for years from the Churches and from elements inside the party to act.

The NSA were conscious that they had to increase their efforts after the labour party taking power, this appears from internal communications in May 1986, just weeks after the change of government. The flare up of the sanctions debate was expected for several reasons. The change in government had made clear indications of measures as already explained. The situation in South Africa, which were in the brink of civil war and in a state of emergency would increase media attention. UNs apartheid committee were to hold an oil-embargo seminar 4th-6th of June in Oslo and the NSA expected the seminar to highlight the transporters as the villains. In addition, the Danish parliament were debating sanctions in the end of May, and possibly adopt measures against South Africa.⁹⁵

Change in government almost immediately made an impact and showed that the NSA had to increase their efforts, About one month after labour taking power, the 13th of June, a proposal from the foreign and constitution committee containing measures against South Africa was approved in parliament.⁹⁶ The proposal included a register for Norwegian owned tankers making calls on South Africa, the expectation of a full stop of oil transports to the country and the intention for government to promote a law of a prohibition of sale of Norwegian oil to South Africa.

⁹⁵ 231 S.Afrika, Rolf Sæther og Arild Wegener, *Skipsfartssanksjoner mot Sør-Afrika. Det politiske landskapet de nærmeste ukene.* 29.05.1986.

⁹⁶ S.tid. (1985-1986), 3240-3268.

NSA lobbying and the sanctioning of the law

The NSA almost immediately after the change of government, tried to increase their relations to the labour party and to the ministers of the new government. Just days after the appointment, Kurt Mosbakk, the new Minister for trade and commerce received a letter from the NSA reassuring that the association are interest in a cooperation with the new government. It was portrayed as vital to not impact the shipping industry with new limitation that could ruin their competitiveness of Norwegian shipping companies.⁹⁷ Just weeks later Arild Wegener of the NSA administration had a meeting with Knut Frydenlund, the new Minister of foreign affairs. The aims of the meeting were to make sure Frydenlund were up to speed when it comes to the situation for the Norwegian shipping industry. The devastating effects further measures than those presented by the Willoch government and assumption that an insignificant part worlds shipping industry and few of the biggest shipping nations would attend the UN oil embargo seminar. The NSA thereby expected the seminar to point out the transporters as the responsible part when it comes to providing the oil South Africa was dependent on.⁹⁸ The efforts seemed fruitless, as the 13th of June, new measures against South Africa were approved in the Storting. The proposal contained a register, that the NSA had tried to lobby against during the winter and spring. The NSA were to register all Norwegian tankers making calls on South Africa that included number of calls and tonnage and report to the Ministry for trade. The government had a clear expectation that the oil transports to South Africa would stop. On the positive side the government affirmed that they would make efforts for the UN Security council would adopt a binding resolution of sanctions against South Africa.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ 231 S.Afrika, Arild Wegener, *Letter to Statsråd Kurt Mosbakk*. 15.05.1986.

⁹⁸ 231 S.Afrika, Arild Wegener, *Sør-Afrika: møte med utenriksminsiter Frydenlund 3. juni*. 04.06.1986.

⁹⁹ Innst. S. nr. 227. *Innstilling fra utenriks og konstitusjonskomiteen om norske tiltak mot Sør-Afrika*.

The measures approved by the Storting in June made the NSA realise they had to change their strategy and increase their efforts to safeguard vital interests. This was reinforced when the newspapers started speculating over boycott on trade with South Africa in October¹⁰⁰. The NSA reacted with planning a comprehensive campaign including mapping and documentation of concrete and actual affect on Norwegian shipping, meetings with the sailor unions to organise cooperation, a political and information campaign to influence further processing of the issue of sanctions at the Storting. The first step of the campaign was to meet with the minister for trade and commerce and the prime minister, before meeting with the head of the political parties and making their case.¹⁰¹ The campaign was adopted on a board meeting on the 17th of October and mobilized large parts of the Shipowners and the shipping industry. The NSA administration targeted ministers and other important foreign policy decision makers while the Shipowners and other local employees tried to influence the local politicians in the districts to try and gain support and affect public opinion.¹⁰²

The campaign had already started when it was adopted and the CEO of NSA, David Vikøren had contacted Ministers Frydenlund and Mosbakk in a letter a letter on the 14th and in meetings on the 15th and 16th of October.¹⁰³ Here he argued that the Norwegian tanker-register had not yet displayed its effect and that it seemed like it could give the wanted decrease in oil transport to South Africa and tried to get sympathy for the shipping industry's case. The report from the meetings gives the impression that Vikøren believes that the Storting is at the edge of sanctioning a boycott and that time is running out for avoiding it.

¹⁰⁰ *Sør-Afrika-boikott med enkelte unntak.*

¹⁰¹ 231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Sør-Afrika*. 15.10.1986.

¹⁰² 231 S.Afrika, Per Morten Vigtel, *Påvirkningskampanje – Sør-Afrika*. 17.10.1986.

¹⁰³ 231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *letter to Minster for foreign affairs Knyt Frydenlund and Minister for trade and commerce Kurt Mosbakk*. 14.10.1986

231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Sør-Afrika*. 15.10.1986

231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Sør-Afrika – Samtale med Statsråd Mosbakk*. 16.10.1986.

The activity of the NSA and were comprehensive the next few months CEO Vikøren met with Frydenlund, Mosbakk, prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and the leader of the Christian People's Party Kjell Magne Bondevik on the 17th of October and where in contact with Frydenlund, Mosbakk, Bondevik and Buttedahl from the centre party on the 29th of October.¹⁰⁴ The reports from all these meetings show to clear aims. First to convince the government and parliament to let the register work at least to the end of 1987 so have enough data to evaluate and second to work out an agreement of cooperation between the government and the NSA. Vikøren even drafted a progress plan with outlines of content for such an agreement.¹⁰⁵ Even with extensive lobbying and pleading to avoid formal sanctions a bill was assigned the Foreign affairs and constitutional committee for assessment on the 24th of November.¹⁰⁶

The last efforts of the NSA were aimed at sharing information about the possibly devastating side effects on the shipping industry sanction would have and to lobby towards the Foreign affairs and constitutional committee to try and influence its members to nominate a law in this regard. NSA voiced concerns for Norwegian shipowners flagging out to the spokesperson for the processing of the law, Kjell Magne Bondevik the 5th of January 1987 and this seems to be the NSAs last effort.¹⁰⁷ There is less evidence of direct contact in the last month before the sanctioning of the law, expect for the providing of arguments to members of the Conservative Party before debates at the Storting.

¹⁰⁴ 231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Sør-Afrika – Samtaler på akershus 17. oktober 1986*, 20.10.1986

231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Sør-Afrika – Samtale med Kjell Magen Bondevik*, 20.10.1986

231 S.Afrika, Arild Wegener, *Sør-Afrika. Møte med Kjell Magne Bondevik og Johan Buttedahl*. 29.10.1986.

231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Letter to Minister of foreign affairs and Minister for trade and commerce Kurt Mosbakk*, 29.10.1986.

¹⁰⁵ 231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Fremdriftsplan for en eventuell samarbeidslinje med regjeringen*, 20.10.1986.

¹⁰⁶ Ot.prp. nr. 14. (1986-1987), *Om lov om økonomisk boikott av Sør-Afrika og Namibia for å bekjempe apartheid*.

¹⁰⁷ 231 S.Afrika, David Vikøren, *Letter to MP Kjell Magne Bondevik*, 05.01.1987.

In a last attempt to limit the scope of the boycott law and thereby the impact on the shipping industry the NSA sent arguments to the representatives from Conservative before the boycott law was debated at Odelstinget the 3rd of March 1987.¹⁰⁸ Despite all the efforts from the NSA, the shipping industry, and from their allies at Stortinget, after being processed in Odelstinget 16th of March and in Lagtinget 19th of March, the boycott law was sanctioned on the 20th of March 1987.¹⁰⁹

Throughout the Norwegian Shipowners Associations campaign against sanctions the aim was to avoid economic measure that would be devastating competitive disadvantages for the shipping industry. The boycott law banned only the transport of crude oil, a relatively small part of the Norwegian shipping business. This shows that the sanctions would not cripple the Norwegian shipping industry on the international market. The archival material shows extensive communication and lobbying from the NSA administration and other actors connected to the shipping industry. When cross referencing towards debates at Stortinget, state reports and other public documents you find traces of the NSAs arguments, especially amongst the Conservative members of parliament but also when investigating Frydenlund and Mosbakk both from the Labour party. This is arguably evidence of influence from the NSA and the shipping industry.

In a circular from the 17th of February the NSA states that "in view of the political base there is no doubt that the industry's arguments have been taken into consideration"¹¹⁰ but also make a point out of underlining that it is still needed to work hard to limit the damages after det sanctioning at Stortinget.¹¹¹ A couple of months later the NSA issued a press release about the register ordered by the government, saying there have been

¹⁰⁸ 231 S.Afrika, Arild Wegener, *Sør-Afrika*, 25.02.1987.

¹⁰⁹ St.tid. (1986-1987), 127-176.

St.tid. (1986-1987), 33-36.

¹¹⁰ Author's translation

¹¹¹ 231 S.Afrika. David Vikøren, *Disponentsirkulære*, 17.02.1987.

developed a good product.¹¹² This indicates that the NSA lobbying resulted in achieving enough of their aims to consider their efforts a success, or at least that the NSA had avoided the worst case result, a result they possibly feared.

¹¹² 231 S.Afrika. David Vikøren, *Pressemelding*, 26.05.1987.

Conclusions

This thesis investigating the influence of the NSA thorough the research question; *how did the Norwegian shipping Association influence Norwegian foreign policy in the context of the boycott law of 1987?* From the investigation, this thesis can conclude that NSAs influence on the process of the boycott law proves relevant influence on Norwegian foreign policy.

The proposal from the Foreign affairs and constitutional committee where published and the debate of the boycott law finished at Stortinget, the antiapartheid reaction did not wait. They were deeply dissatisfied with all the exceptions in the law. The almost immediately launched a “doughnut campaign” protesting the proposal.¹¹³ This indicates that the antiapartheid movement were disappointed, and that the NSA had success in achieving their lobbying. This conclusion is further reinforced by the analysis of the the achievement of the NSA aims presented in chapter one. The NSA aimed to have logical measures after an evaluation of the effect on both the Norwegian Shipping industry and the South Africa government. Furthermore, they wished for the sanction to result in Norwegian Shipping Industry giving up their business to foreign competitors. Last, they wanted the sanctions to have somewhat significant effect on the regime in South Africa to defend sacrificing parts of their business.

The boycott law only prohibited the shipping of crude oil and in addition had other exceptions indicates that government had assess the impacts of the sanctions and taken possible implications the sanctions could have on the affected. This marks the achievement of the NSA aims as the measures did where arguably logical as they took the affected into account, they did not give away business as the shipping of crude oil to South Africa where a small part of their economic relations. To conclude on the last aim and the result of the sanctions one need to further analyse

¹¹³ Thorleif Andreassen, *Forbud mot all oljeeksport*, 17.03.1987.

the topic and go outside the timeframe of this thesis and will therefore not be included in this conclusion.

The three main obstacles for the NSA to achieve their aims; the international political arena, the public opinion, and the influence on Norwegian politicians where and the NSA handling of the challenges they presented gives indications that the NSA influence was not the only reason for the sanctions to be favourable. The contradicting foreign policy, the other parties being affected like the community in Sauda contributed to the solution to challenges of the NSA. In addition, the change of government in 1986 limited the NSAs connections in government and hence their possibility to influence foreign policy decision makers.

To conclude, the Norwegian Shipping Association influenced the Norwegian foreign policy in context of the boycott law of 1987 by spreading information and lobbying against politicians. The influence of the NSA was relevant, but the boycott law ended up being favourable to the NSA where also because of other factors than their lobbying.

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