

The radical right populism in Germany and Portugal, a comparative study

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Abstract

The debate and definition on radical right populism is an elusive and difficult topic.

The radical right having evolved in a staggering way the last decades have broken its previous definition. Before mainly seen as a xenophobic party strongly opposed to anti-immigration many parties have today become complete political parties.

The two radical right-wing parties in Germany and Portugal, the alterative for Germany and Chega have presented new challenges to the ruling governments. In this thesis I take on the definition of radical right wing parties, I further seek to understand how one can explain its rise in popularity the recent years as well as comparing the parties. Seeking to further bring the debate on how to create a more generalized theory on the radial right-wing movements I seek to look on demographic and geographical explanations in each of the countries. Contributing a comparative study between the German and Portuguese party.

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1. Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic can be seen as Europe's and the modern world's biggest challenge so far. From mid-March 2020 the western world has been in an everlasting lockdown. Families separated, business gone bankrupt and over 3 million people dead in addition to over 143 million people infected worldwide. Out of these Europe has almost a third dead with 982 thousand as of 21. April and 43 million infected (WorldoMeter, 2021). The European Union (EU) and its new leadership with commission president Ursula Von der Leyen and President of the European Council Charles Michel have had a difficult start to their periods in office. With an optimistic view one can argue that we are getting closer to the finishing line, but what will the pandemic mean for the future of Europe and the EU.

Already previously to the pandemic the EU experienced a difficult time with a growing Euroscepticism and right-wing populism wave entering Europe. The radical right-wing parties has experienced a steady grow in support since the 1990s in Europe, especially Norway, France, and Austria. Since the 1990s to 2015 their elections results went up with 4.5 per cent from 8 to 12.5 (Akkeman, Lange & Rooduijn, 2016, p. 1). In the European elections one could see a steady growth in far right parties` representation in the European Parliament. Today the newly formed European far right party Identity and Democracy (ID) holds 73 out of 751 seats, 9.72 per cent. It is now the fourth largest party in the European Parliament which can pose a challenge to the Union as its way of thinking is very Eurosceptic. ID has on its official website released a statement where they aim to uncover and reveal the mistakes and lies of the EU and the leaders of Europe. Stating they have been unprepared and handled the pandemic poorly (ID-Party.Eu, 2021).

Historically there is reason to believe that the trust and support in the EU likely will decrease after the pandemic. In retrospect to the two previous challenges of the modern EU, the Euro crisis in 2009 and the Migration crisis in 2015. A study published by the European Parliament shows that after the Euro crisis the public trust in the EU fell from 48 per cent to 42, whereas the distrust in the EU increased from 40 to 47 per cent. This was also the case after the Migration crisis when it peaked in 2015 with trust in the EU dropping to 32 per cent from 40, as well the distrust rising to 55 per cent from 46 (Nancy, 2016, p. 15). All over the trust in the EU was relatively stable around 50 per cent before the Euro crisis but has never fully recovered since. The Eurosceptic populist movement has hit Europe in the last decades, both from the right and left side.

Germany has been a corner rock member of the EU and Angela Merkel has been my many, seen as the leader of Europe. She has been the chancellor of Germany since 2005, but in September 2021 she resigns after 15 years in office. Merkel led the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany which is the biggest party in the country. However, they now enter the election without one of the most successful politicians in European history (Tøllefsen, 2021). Will they endure or will the country undergo a change in leadership. Germanys far right party Alternative for Germany (Afd) is the most successful far right party in Germany since the end of the second world war and is currently the third biggest party in the nation ahead of the federal elections in September 2021. In a special and extreme time, the CDU may need to worry about the Afd.

Portugal has long been a country free from far-right parties in parliament and government. That was until 2019 when the newly founded Chega party scarcely got enough votes for one seat on the parliament in the 2019 general election (Fernandes &

Magalhães, 2020, 2046). Even though one member in parliament necessarily do not have to be of great significance it marks a shift in Portuguese politics. Portugal is no longer an exception to the representation to radical right-wing parties. Led by Andre Ventura, Chega wishes to be seen as the people's party against the political elite which they see as corrupt and to gripped on political correctness.

I seek with this thesis to get a better understanding and learn how the far-right parties in Germany, Afd and Chega in Portugal has gained traction in the latest years. Do the Afd pose a real threat and poses as a challenger to the CDU and are the Chega party on the verge of finding the same traction as the Afd did in the years after 2013? Through a comparative study I intend to compare the parties' political position and rise in popularity. How similar are the two parties in reality as they are part of the same party in the European Parliament?

2. Literature

The Radical right has in the last 30 years seen a rise in popularity in Europe. Despite varying levels of success and support the radical right has become a critical actor on the political scene in Europe. The question as to why the right-wing populist movement is an interesting research topic, which many scholars have aimed to unravel. Even with the extensive research on the field, the definition of a radical-right wing party has been elusive and difficult to clarify.

2.1 Defining Radical right-wing parties

Maybe one of the most popular personalities applied to radical right-wing parties is xenophobia, emphasizing on the radical rights negative position against foreigners. Even though xenophobia is applicable to most European right-wing parties it is an outdated and aged definition. The radical right-wing parties' political program and policies today is larger and more complex. Political platforms as anti-Islamism, nationalism, authoritarianism, populism, anti-Europeanism, and cultural monism is also important (Stockemer, 2017, 42).

A second and easily definable definition of the radical right is that it is the political party located furthest right on the political sphere (Stockemer, 2017, p. 43). A definition that is easily misinterpreted and flawed as it does define what radical right-wing politics are and the ability to explain what it is. Making it possible for central-right parties to be labeled as radical right if there are not any parties further to the right on the political sphere.

A newer attempt to define radical right-wing parties aim to separate between the parliamentary parties and non-parliamentary. Defining parliamentary as the radical right-wing parties which abide by and respect the constitutional frameworks. In addition, they accept democratic procedures and institutions. Simultaneously the parliamentary right-wing parties disagree with liberal features, for example minorities rights, social equality and multiculturalism and checks on authority (Stockemer, 2017, p. 43). Their more radical relative, the non-Parliamentary right-wing parties are viewed as extremist. Having a more fanatical position they operate in the political areas as cultural monism, Neo-Nazim and historical revisionism combined with higher plausibility of welcoming violence (Stockemer, 2017, p. 43).

Despite giving a more nuanced picture of the far-right parties and their differences it does not make it easier to place them on the political sphere. Most radical-right parties' ideologies are dynamical and fluid. Making the differentiation between and extreme and

radical party extremely difficult and next to impossible to draw a line. In addition, there exist parliamentary radical right-parties within parliaments making the theory contradictory. (Stockemer,2017, p. 43).

Jens Rydgren in his studies of radical-right in Europe view the radical right as group that believes in ethno-nationalism. Emphasizing the importance of nation and the goal to strengthen it, often through traditional values and ideals (Rydgren, 2007, p. 242). Rydgren argues that the radical right sees the goals of the nation first and individual rights second. They are generally opposed to globalization and internationalism and blames the political elite for prioritizing their own interests and in front of the nation. Leading over to the radical rights maybe most characteristic political trait, its steadfast position in opposition to the ruling parties on the center and left side of the political sphere.

2.2 Theories to rise of Radical-right populism

The theoretical debate concerning the rise of the radical right is a difficult and complex topic. The majority of the research on the field has been concentrated to individual national studies, giving detailed and comprehensive research on the field. While it gives a nuanced and thorough picture, it is also limited by the singular national case. Rydgren argues that the lack of recognition of other studies on the field makes the theories vulnerable of ad hoc theorizing (Rydgren, 2007, p. 247). It does not make the national case studies worthless as the radical right often share a general set of ideologies and political personalities. Rydgren distinguishes between two main groups of explanations to the radical rights rise. The supply factor and the demand factor, the latter being the most commonly used (Rydgren 2007, p. 247).

On the demand side factor there is a variety of explanations to the rise of radical right parties. The theories have evolved and progressed over the last 50 years, however they all stem from grievances theories, taking a macro perspective to changes in the society that has affected election results. The social breakdown theory was one of the first theories that tried to explain the rise of fascism and Nazism in the interwar period. It argued that voters living in closed and isolated societies were probable supporters of ethnonationalist and populist parties (Rydgren, 2007, p. 247). This theory was questioned, and later lost influence as newer studies found that support for Nazism and fascism did not necessarily stem from individuals in socially isolated societies.

The second demand side factors presented by Rydgren is the relative deprivation/modernization loser theories. The first theory, relative deprivation theory, puts emphasis on how individuals cope with disappointment regarding how one perceives their life and status (Rydgren, 2007, p. 248). The economical challenge has often been the main focus as market declines poses a threat to individuals' future economy. However, the importance of loss of status has been argued to be as important by Bell, Lipset and more theorists as reasons to radical right support. When the individuals economic or social trajectory differs from what was expected support for the radical right might rise (Rydgren, 2007, p 248).

The modernization loser theory argues that the ones who cannot keep up with and adapt to the modernization will feel left behind. According to Minkenberg, radical right-wing parties attempt to counteract or negate modernization and the social changes brought along. Radical right parties with traditional roles and ethnonationalistically homogeneous communities becomes an appealing party for people that feel out of place in the globalized world.

The ethnic competition thesis differs from the three previous theses. It brings up one of the main aspects when theorizing radical right-wing populism, immigration. Anti-immigration is a key part of radical right-wing politics and a substantial majority of the voters share an anti-immigration stance. Because of limited funds and resources in the labor market, welfare benefits and housing, anti-immigrants want to reduce the competition. The two main groups where the radical right will gain support from based on this thesis, is primarily from areas that have experienced a large increase in immigrants, threatening people's welfare benefits. The second group that is theorized to support the radical right is the workers in lower-educated professions that is in competition with immigrants, challenging them on wages for example. There have been findings that supports the theory of more immigrant resulting in higher radical right election results. In both Pia Knigge and Marcel Lubbers with more, there has been a positive correlation between immigrants and asylum seekers are radical right-wing party's election turnout (Knigge, 1998) (Lubbers Gijssberts & Scheepers, 2002)'

At the same time, Rydgren argues that these number does not explain well enough why the radical right gain voters in countries with a significant number of immigrants. He argues that the support for the thesis is weak and shows to Norris research from 2005 that failed to show substantial evidence to the correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and positive result for the radical right (Rydgren, 2007). Rydgren argues that more studies need to narrow their demographic group. Immigrants do not make up the majority of a country, and to conclude that all radical right-wing voters live in close proximity to areas highly populated by immigrants is a mistake (Rydgren, 2007). One study by two French researchers, Bon and Cheylan however did exactly this. They showed how radical right election turnout was significantly higher in areas close to highly populated immigrant areas. Rydgren also references his own work where he found people living in high migration areas had a higher chance of voting for radical right-wing parties in Netherlands and Denmark, but not in Austria, Belgium, France or Norway. Clearly showing how difficult it can be to find a general thesis to the radical right growth with different results in relatively similar western countries.

However, in the root of almost all radical right-wing theories lies xenophobia. The majority of the radical right are anti-immigrants and hold negative values towards immigrants. Reasons for the anti-immigration attitudes differs. Knigge theorizes that moderation and the multicultural societies threat on the national identity is of concern and radical right-wing parties that are generally negative towards immigration gain voters from this. The German Professor Kai Arzheimer shows to a number of studies where anti-immigration is the most important factor for voting on the radical right. He emphasizes how anti-immigration often can be stigmatized in the political landscape, which I will come back to later.

Arzheimer references to a study made by Rydgren that differentiates between three group of anti-immigration voters. In this study Rydgren differentiates between three groups of anti-immigrants. He sees the three groups as connected to one and another where the main group is the immigration-skeptics. Immigration-skeptics mainly want to reduce the number of immigrants in the country based on different ideas. They are firstly skeptical and do not wish more immigrants (Arzheimer, 2018, p. 147). This main group differs from its subgroup's xenophobes and racists, which is a subgroup of xenophobes. Xenophobes in Rydgren definition "have a latent disposition to react with fear and aversion to outsiders". However, this latent disposition is only a concern when the immigration groups become too great or poses a threat. In his final subgroup Rydgren puts racists. This subgroups negative and hostile attitude towards immigrant are immutably. This distinction helps to differentiate

between anti-immigrants where not everyone is a racist or xenophobe. Creating more room for radical right parties to also gain voters from less extreme anti-immigrants with a less radical stance on immigration. For example, can anti-immigrants or xenophobes be voters that feels their welfare benefits are threatened by immigrants and racist be voters that believes the country is under in cultural siege by foreigners.

A challenge most radical-right wing parties are faced with is stigma. Radical-right wing parties can often be categorized as neo-fascist and violent (Mendes & Dennison, 2020). Social stigmatization will alienate the public of voting for the party because it is not perceived as acceptable. And in studies done by van Spanje and Azrout showcased exactly how the stigma can kill a parties election result (Mendes & Dennison, 2020, p. 758). According to Rydgren modern radical-right wing parties have adopted a new strategy to pass the social test. In basic justifying their view and ideology with anti-liberal ideas rather than anti-democratic and justifying ethno-nationalism in cultural heritage rather than biological terms (Mendes & Dennison, 2020, p. 758).

In addition, radical-right parties will seek to legitimize themselves through other high-status politics and avoid being categorized as an only anti-immigrant party. Tax policies can be a popular way to gain voters as in the case in Norway and Denmark, where the radical right became recognized as a more complete political party (Mendes & Dennison, 2020, p. 759). For many countries in Europe the opposition to the Euro and the EU has been a key political area for radical right-wing parties on this front as is the case in Germany. The more complete political approach also makes it easier for the radical right populist to be accepted by mainstream media and receive exposure through socially legitime channels. By avoiding being stigmatized by the media as extreme they can be evaluated on their policies. A clear example of this could be seen in Spain and Portugal where the parties Democracia Nacional and Partido Nacional Renovador connections to extremist group hindered them in their goal to be seen as legitime. Another important aspect to the media coverage in 2021 is the importance and power of social media. Social media has created a new forum for politicians to discuss and speak out about politics. It has decreased the distance between the political elites and ordinary people. Most popular used is Twitter best showcased by Donald Trump. He tweeted daily about different political cases to his followers. The social media can help create digital homogeneous societies where likeminded people find each other and share their values. Possibly leading to a more polarized position in politics where people selectively choose what they believe and listen to. It can create chambers where radical right can gain traction and find more likeminded people as the media traditionally have stigmatized them. Norris and Inglehart argues that when people feel attacked, they seek consolation and security in their own like-minded group.

Seeing the current literature has debated and researched several theories for the rise of the radical right there will be difficult for me to present new theories. However, as Rydgren as mentioned earlier in the thesis argued, the majority of these theories have weaknesses and is often disproved. A theory explaining the radical right populism in France could be disproved by findings in Netherlands for example. Because of this, the theories often at best becomes ad hoc theories.

The need to focus on smaller geographically and demographic groups is needed to better understand why radical right gain voters and the motives for the citizens to vote for them. My research will therefore focus on locating which voting groups that were overrepresented in radical right the German and Portuguese elections. My research will only focus on Germany and Portugal and will therefore be a to small sample to give a

general theory. The thesis can be a step and source for newer research that takes on a larger sample with more countries to give a general theory. Drawing upon my findings and combining them with other countries to see what traits that are applicable in most cases to the rise of right-wing populism.

3. Method

My goal with the thesis is to better understand why the radical right has experienced a rise in popularity in Germany and Portugal. My main focus will lay on the political parties Afd and Chega. I will perform a comparative analysis. Learning about the differences and similarities I will aim to understand trends that nourishes radical right-wing parties. I will mainly analyze the two parties based of their party manifestos. By drawing upon quantitative data from election results I also intend to evaluate how successful the parties have been in the latest election results in comparison to the previous ones.

My research design for this thesis is a comparative case study. The case is a great research design for understanding complex themes and questions. Yin defined the case study as "*an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.*" (Zanial, 2007, p. 2). The case study being a well-suited research design for this thesis has its pros. The case study will let me examine my results and findings within the context of its use. It will also enable me to draw upon both qualitative and quantitative data. Which will be useful as I draw upon the qualitative information in manifestos, but quantitative data in election results.

While the case study will allow me to focus on the areas of Germany and Portugal a common flaw in the radical right-wing research appears in this. When focusing on only two countries I am narrowing my research down to two individual cases, making it difficult to reach a generalizing thesis. This is some of Rydgren critics on the theoretic field where most theories become ad hoc thesis. Secondly, the case study has been criticized for being vulnerable to the biased research.

I have chosen to collect my data in the timeframe from 2015 to 2021. I have chosen this timeframe so I can collect data from parliamentary elections in both Portugal and Germany with Germany having their elections in 2017 and 2021 and Portugal in 2015 and 2019. In addition, within this timeframe I can collect data on how the key political debates as migration have affected Europe radical right-wing parties. What differences in policies did they make as the migration crisis peaked in 2015. A weakness however in this thesis is the lack of data on the Chega party. The Chega party was not founded until 2019, making it an extremely young and new party. In addition, Portugal have been unique with next to no radical right extremism in their political sphere before Chega surprising appearance in 2019. The Afd was founded in 2013 and has experienced a rapid growth in popularity since. Being a Eurosceptic party in the heart of the European Union it will be interesting to see how its policies has changed from 2015 to today.

The most important data I will collect for the thesis is the manifestos which will act as my primary sources. The manifestos being the two party's political handbook it will provide me information I need to know about the political positions of the party. The manifestos will be my main source for the analysis of the parties; however, I will also draw upon speeches and publications made by the parties' members. Speeches being a powerful tool in persuading and championing one's political view can bring interesting and

important findings in why right-wing populism has grown. Speeches in election years will be more important as they can tend to be more important for the election results. In addition, national speeches will be prioritized over international ones which are more likely to be influenced by international actors. One minor complication can be the use of Google translate on manifestos and speeches which can lead to misinterpretations, but it should not be a problem. In some cases of Pdf files and other documents on sites google translate will not always be functional which can lead to key sources to being used because of the language barrier.

4. Comparison of Afd and Chega

The Afd and Chega share a common community in the European political ID. Both being established within the last 10 years, Afd, 2013 and Chega, 2019, are new actors on the political platform. The Afd in Germany has evolved rapidly in its eight years and have become one of the main political parties in Germany. Today it is seen as a relatively complete party with a detailed political program in its 90-page long manifesto. The Chega party have only been around for two years since 2019 and have in a much lesser degree than Afd reached a status as a major actor and the same electoral success. Despite only receiving 1.3 per cent of the votes on the legislative election in 2019 it marked the first time a far-right party representation on the Portuguese parliament. Contrary to the Afd, Chega do not have as a complete manifesto and much less detailed plan for their political goals. Chega main message in their manifesto is the opposition to the corrupt elite and wishes to create a change. In addition, Chega as a party is more reliant on its President Andre Ventura than the Afd to its own leaders. Andre Ventura received 11.89 per cent of the votes in the presidential election in 2021, only behind two other representatives (Eleices presidenciais, 2021). In this section I will compare the two political parties' goals and ideas on main political areas.

4.1 Immigration

On one of the most traditionally important policies of the radical-right wing, immigration, the two parties have taken different approaches. Chega in their manifesto do not explicitly talk about immigration. Immigration is almost not mentioned with the exception to illegal immigration. They criticize the sitting government for their poor handling of illegal immigrants with a vulnerable border control (Chega, 2021). Andre Ventura often being vocal in his disapproval of the minority community Roma and believes they live on the welfare system on Portugal without integrating to the Portuguese way of life and its laws (Mendes, 2021). It is clear that Portugal with relatively few immigrants, 480 000 foreign residents in 2018 do not see immigration as the biggest political debate and Chega therefore neither pay much focus on its manifesto (Capela, 2019).

In contrast to Portugal, Germany in 2018 showed that one in every fourth citizen had foreign roots and a total of 19.3 million (Stavanger Aftenblad, 2018). The Afd puts much more focus on immigration and in their manifesto. Afd argues that the topic of immigration has been stigmatized and a clouded by political correctness, that the free speech is threatened. The main problem for the Afd is the mass immigration that Germany has experienced in the last decade and especially in 2015 at the peak of the migration

crisis. Afd believe that there should be stronger rules and laws in place for who can enter the country and get asylum. Arguing that the German welfare system and asylum procedures are too soft (Alternative for Germany, 2016). They aim to better define who categorizes as refugees and who do not. The mass immigration is threatening the welfare system as well as the cultural identity of Germany. It is not solely immigrants with Islamic heritage that threatens Germany. The Afd believes that many East-Europeans travel to Germany under the free movement of workforce and people within the EU to get better jobs and welfare benefits. Often being cheaper workforce, they can pose a threat to the lower educated workforce in Germany together with the African immigrants.

4.2 Economy

The economic policies are for most voter very important. It is important for the individual citizen to know how the economic policies will affect their own wallet. After the Euro-crisis and the following rise in unemployment, creating new jobs has become an important part of the political debate.

The Afd believes that the economy is best served by a free-market competition module. The Afd sees competition as the best option for both the supplier and buyer. State intervention should be kept to a minimum and only in cases for possible monopolies or market failure is a threat (Alternative for Germany, 2016). The Afd believes that a state-directed economy in the end will lead to corruption and misallocation. In the current European and German economy, the Afd considers that the greatest challenge is the Euro bailout policy pursued by Eurozone countries. The European Central Bank (ECB) is also manipulating the monetary policy forcing the fundamental economical mechanics to be weakened. Clearly showing dissatisfaction with the cooperation within the EU and the loss of sovereign powers. International deals should be multilateral and created in an international space where the World Trade Organization (WTO) play a central role in the forming of treaties. Under no circumstances do the Afd believe that national sovereignty and power should be transferred to special arbitration courts (Alternative for Germany, 2016). Despite this, the Afd recognize the arbitration courts value and do say that if there should be a trade-agreement that the arbitration courts always can be appealed in the national court. Keeping the sovereign states power more central than in the current state.

While this political disagreement is a considerable part of their economic policies it be seen as not as important to the everyday citizen. In their labor policies, the Afd puts great emphasis on the dysfunctional labor law which is over complicated and unpredictable. They seek to unify and simplify the existing legislation. In addition, they seek to upgrade municipal job centers to better help people into work. The upgraded centers will also take care of the wage-replacement creating one authority that has control. They wish to further retain the minimum wage to protect low-income workers against the mass immigration. Immigrants often taking work to a very cheap price and thereby outcompeting the low-income workers. In addition, the Afd wants to increase the support to families with children, believing that the economical differences between families with and without kids are too big. By boosting the support to parents, they hope that the low birth-rate in Germany will eventually rise as the economical disadvantages no longer are as prominent.

One of Chega`s main goal is to change the Portuguese economy. In their Manifesto they are in strong opposition to the current government. Stating that the citizens are merely

seen as taxpayers. They will remodel the current tax system that is killing the middle class and all who generates income and wealth (Chega, 2021). Chega will abolish the cumulative and progressive tax system and replace it with single rate system in the first phase before it disappears in the second and last. Like Chega believes that the government should maintain a passive role in an open free market and only operate as a regulator. Seeing the Portuguese government as corrupt and a bureaucratic monster being responsible for the lasting unemployment, emigration, and the poor competitiveness of Portuguese companies (Chega, 2021).

The most common trait for both of the parties is their strong belief in a free open market with a passive state. Both see the bureaucratic complexity as challenges to the economic growth. Afd giving more attention to the challenges of being a part of the EU have stronger focus on the loss of sovereignty, than Chega which is more driven by their disagreements with their own national government. The Afd focuses on the strengthening in support to families with kids, while Chega believing that the middle class is being unfairly treated by the current tax system.

4.3 Cultural Heritage and Identity

One of the most important political battles for the radical-right wing traditionally has been preservation of the cultural heritage and identity. Immigration and especially the Islamic immigration have been a hot topic in European countries since 2015 and the threat it could pose on European identities.

The Afd sees the protection of Germany's identity and cultural for the future generation as one of its most important goals. In a world closer connected through technology and globalization it is important for the Afd to maintain the distinctive attributes that makes a Germany to Germany and goes as far as to suggest that culture preservation should be made a constitutional duty of the state (Alternative for Germany, 2016). Often referred to and connected with European countries today is multiculturalism and is often believed to be the European political elite's goal and dream. Afd however puts the German identity as the predominant culture on basis of its historic value and importance. Something, the Afd believes that multiculturalism lacks the necessary social norms and values created through history, and its dominance would pose a threat to the survival of the nation state as a cultural unit.

Afd openly pledges it "unconditional support" to every faith, worship, and consciousness, as long as it does not break with the German way of life, human rights or public laws. One of Germany's main problem is the illegal construction of courts that follow the Islamic Sharia laws that are not compatible with Germany legal and law system. Afd recognize that many Muslims in Germany live according to the German legal system and values and are respected members of Germany, however they are afraid of the rapid increase of Muslims and see it as a possible threat. Mainly it is the segregated Islamic societies that follows Sharia laws that worries the Afd, and they wish to end the development of radicalized groups with members transforming into violent Salafist or terrorists (Alternative for Germany, 2016). Germany is not for Islam and the Afd are opposed to making the Islamic organization a public body. Also, the controversy of full body veiling in public spaces in Islamic tradition is not acceptable for the Afd. Seeing the niqab and Burqa as Muslim women's submission to men, which does not reflect the women rights and equality values in German society.

Chega puts great weight and importance on the history of Portugal and the time periods that have shaped the nation and its culture. Drawing the lines back to the Greeks with Liberty and Romans with justice and security. Lastly the highlight the moral and dignity inherited from the Christian-roots. Together they create the undisputed and non-negotiable heritage of Portugal. Despite this, Chega opts for the state to be neutral in religious matters, while still paying respects to the Christian catholic church's values and its role in Portuguese and European history (Chega, 2021). Any religious or political practice that breaks with Portuguese legal system should be banned. Explicitly naming anti-Semitism, application of Sharia, female circumcision, forced marriages of minors and ideologies of genders. Chega criticizes the EU and holds the responsible for an ideological and reckless globalist worldview. Forcing migration to European countries and threatening the basic pillars of Western civilization and its culture heritage.

4.4 European Union

Afd and Chega are both part of the EU-septic party ID. The EU being believed to be the political elite's goal has become a major actor in the European and international political stage. EU argued having a democratic shortage in a number of its political institutions have been criticized by both parties. Neither Afd nor Chega want to withdraw from the EU but rather change its current functioning and way of operating. Believing it to have to great influence and power over a state's sovereignty.

Afd sees the rule of law, economic development and social policies as responsibilities for the nation state. Therefore, they are fundamentally in disagreement with the changes done in the Maastricht treaty in 1992. Afd argues that it is only the nation state that can provide the citizens the necessary safety, security and structures for national identity and shelter (Alternative for Germany, 2021). The Afd would rather focus on cooperation between neighbor states in intergovernmental meetings. In addition, the Afd want to withdraw Germany from the Euro, finding it to be a failed project forced by the European elite, arguing that it is creating tension between member countries.

Chega are opposed to a federal Europe. Chega finds the current integrated Europe to be a bureaucratic monster that do not aid the European citizens. Chega wants to take the EU back to a purely economic cooperation between sovereign nation states. Stressing the importance of a state to have sovereignty over borders, security and own self right to protect its own interests in international affairs (Chega, 2021). Contrary to Afd Chega wants the Euro to stay, but as an option for the sovereign state to decide if it wants to be a part of. They advocate Portugal to stay within the EU as long as it returns to its former edition with the four founding freedoms. If the development of Europe is not in this direction and the federalist movements continues, Chega will do everything in their power to withdraw Portugal from the EU.

The Afd and Chega share common ideas and values. They both believe in the sovereign state and wish to protect its cultural heritage. Afd putting more focus on the immigration challenge in Germany than Chega. While the Chega is much more hostile and aggressive in the position towards their own government, calling the elite corrupt. Both parties have radical right populism traits, but Afd being a more complete political party. In the next section I intend to give an analyze of why the two parties have gained traction in the last years and seek to find out which demographic groups that are overrepresented in votes for them.

5. Rise of radical right populism

In 2017, only four years after its establishment the Afd became the third biggest political party in Germany with 11.5 per cent of the votes in the federal election. This was a significant increase from its first election in 2013 where it only received 1.9 per cent of the votes (Der Bundeswahlleiter, 2017). This rise has made it a threat to the CDU in the upcoming federal election in September 2021. There can be a number of reasons for the positive election result. Germany in the period from 2015-2019 experience a minimum of 1.5 million immigrants with the most in 2015 with 2.1 million (Statista, 2020). Taking basic radical-right populism there is reason to believe an anti-immigration party like the Afd would have gained voters in the set timetable. Looking more closely into German immigration most immigrants have settled in the north-west, western, and southern parts of Germany. The core Afd voters are geographically located in the north-western part of the country, the German states with the least amount of immigration (Eiermann, 2017). In states like Sachsen and Thüringen Afd achieved over 20 per cent election turnout. Common for the eastern states in Germany is that the average GDP is lower than the rest of the country and that younger generation is underrepresented (Der Bundeswahlleiter, 2017). This paint a picture of radical right voters is less integrated with immigrants and are older than the average population.

One of the biggest differences in the 2013 and 2017 election for the Afd is the doubling in support in southern states. The southern states are generally seen as "normal" states and similar to the rest of the country in many aspects, only having less unemployment and welfare dependencies. This demographic group makes it harder to find a clear answer to which voters the Afd attracts. Finding higher educated people, people with goods and ext. among the voters of Afd (Eiermann, 2017). One of the strongest demographic's groups for the Afd was people between 30-59 years. The social welfare policies that would give increased support to the families with kids can an explanation for this increase in voters. The Afd managed also to mobilize the vote of 1.4 million citizens that did not vote in the 2013 election. This together with the voters gained from the CDU and SPD have made it the third biggest party in Germany.

The theoretical literature can have a hard time explaining the sudden rise in popularity in Germany. In the less immigrated part of the country there was a clear representation of positive Afd views. One can theorize that the lack of interaction with immigrants and an older demographic population have more anti-immigrant and xenophobic attitudes. Being raised in a less globalized world it is likely they will not be as costumed to other ethnicities and cultures. Limited by the resources I found surrounding this topic I could not find any empirical evidence to support this claim. A number of articles and statistics found were in German and google translate was not available on the website. The raise in immigrants in Germany is likely on of the reason for the Afd growth. Promising a stricter immigration politics and stronger welfare policy it is likely that lower-skilled workers will find safety in the Afd policies. Also being threatened by illegal immigrant on the job market as they are a very cheap workforce.

The biggest challenge in looking upon Chega`s evolution as a party is its short lifetime. Bursting onto the scene with Andre Ventura which is a pivotal in the party`s popularity. Its main policy and political battle have so far been to be an opposition to the existing government. Believing that the current state is corrupt and taking advantage of the everyday citizen in Portugal. Chega meaning enough directly shows the goal of the party

to stop the current abuse. This is a common trait for radical-right wing parties and people discontent with sitting governments can often lead to voting for oppositions. As a sanctioning and statement from the voters for the central parties to change their current political standings. Even though the election of Chega into parliament in 2019 marked a big change in Portuguese politics, the party only received 1.3 per cent. Chega have not yet as a party gained the traction it may have wanted. However, Andre Ventura in the 2021 presidential election received 11.89 per cent of the votes, putting him at third place, well behind Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, representing the Social Democratic party which obtained 60 per cent of the votes. Contrary to the Afd, Ventura's support does not seem to be affected by geographical location. The support seems to be randomized from all over the country. This can to some degree show how immigration necessarily have not been a major problem in Portugal. Where in Germany one could find geographical areas with higher radical right-wing voting and lower immigration population. The fight for cultural heritage in Portugal, at least in Andre Ventura's mind is against the Roma-community. Which he has often insulted publicly.

To already conclude that right wing populism have gained traction in Portugal may be too early, but it has posed a possible threat for the center and left political parties in Portugal. Unable to find sources on demographics groupings in Portugal on English or which was translatable it will be difficult to draw upon empirical evidence in this thesis. Despite lack of empirical data, it is reason to believe that the frustration with the government and dissatisfaction with ones one situation can be reasons to consider that the grievances theories are applicable to Chega's rise in popularity. People not satisfied with their development in life, whether it be material or socially want a change and Chega can seem like the best option for this.

The Portuguese political elite has been in hard weather the last decades, and with high unemployment in the lower age groups as well as a poor and chaotic tax system it has led the people to lose trust in the government. The election turnouts the last decades have been worrying with around 50 per cent turnout in the last four elections. Chega and Andre Ventura can have entered the political sphere in perfect time. Bringing about a hope for change to the Portuguese political landscape, while also not being stigmatized as undemocratic. Mainly being an opposition to the current government they can gain voters as people find it difficult to identify with political parties or as a consequence of discontent with ruling parties. The next few years will be of great importance of Chega in their goal to become a leading political actor in Portugal.

6. Conclusion

There is no question that the radical right-wing movement have hit Europe. Germany and Portugal have in the last 5 year seen radical right-wing parties rise and gained higher popularity than ever before. Being apart of the ID they both share relatively similar view upon the EU. Finding the supernational superstate to be fundamentally wrong and wanting to reform the cooperation within the Union. Despite this, both parties wish to further be a part of the Union and move it to its former edition before 1992. The immigration crisis that hit in 2015 have had a great impact on Germany, having a fourth of the county's population consist of immigrates. This have created a new problem with social welfare and the Sharia-law. Afd have taken a strong position against the sharia law and wish to reform the German asylum polices to be stricter. Chega and Portugal have not experienced the same impact of the migration crisis. For Portugal the economic crisis

still affects the economy and unemployment rates leading to dissatisfaction with the state.

Trying to generalize a theory for the rise of radical right-wing populism is difficult. In both countries there is evidence for different existing theories. For Germany the immigration problem may be the biggest impact on the AfD's election results, while in Portugal Chega's critique and opposition to the chaotic government can be seen as most important. However in the bottom of most theories there is a underlying discontent and grievances with the status in one's life or country. It is difficult to draw a well informed and empirically supported theory. In this thesis the lack of information as to which demographic groups have been the main supporters of AfD and Chega have made it hard to generalize the key factors to better election results. To bring the literature further along the way to find a generalized theory to explain radical right populism more thorough research needs to be done. Targeting demographic groups in both countries to map what political question is important to them and who they voted for will be key questions. Additionally, it needs to be conducted further and better research on how successful a party's political propaganda and programs are. To what degree are voters being persuaded or do they change parties for other reasons than the political ideologies. Entering the final stages of the Covid-19 pandemic it will be interesting to see how the pandemic has affected the political position of citizens. Germany already in September will hold its new legislative election. If Germany follows in the trend of Portugal where Ventura gained voters during the pandemic the AfD might challenge the CDU. A CDU which is without its main leader Angela Merkel. Radical right populism is likely to stay, and the reason for its traction is a key question for all political actors. In hope to find a generalized theory counting research on smaller geographical and demographics groups in nations could be promising.

7. Bibliography

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