

Master's thesis

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Contextual Factors and the Radical Right Vote in Western Europe, 1981-2008

A Multilevel Approach

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This thesis concludes my master in political science. Even though research on the radical right is considered as ‘a minor industry’ in a European context, this field has been mostly absent from the research agenda in Scandinavia since the 1990’s (Jupskås, 2012). Hence, the amount of literature to immerse myself in, have been vast. I have learned a great deal about the radical right, as well as quantitative statistics.

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1. Introduction

“Regardless of how alone he was in his actions, Anders Behring Breivik was not alone in his attitudes. The lone wolf comes from a herd” (Strømmen, 2011, p. 22).

In Norway, on 22th of July 2011, Anders Behring Breivik grotesquely killed eight state officials and 69 youth politicians from the ruling Norwegian Labour Party. Just before he committed the massacre, he distributed a manifesto where he ‘justified’ his actions by spreading fear about how Europe is about to be taken over by Islam (Jupskås, 2012, p. 16; Kumano-Ensby & Sætre, 2011, pp. 16-17). Throughout this manifesto he connects himself with well-known radical right (RR) personalities and movements.¹ Even though these organizations rejects any connection to Breivik, as well as condemn his actions, he is surely not alone in his attitudes: Some of his sentiments are shared among well-known RR organizations, including political parties (Jupskås, 2012; Strømmen, 2011; Sørensen, Hagtvat, & Steine, 2012).² When it comes to political parties, even though most Europeans in the post World War II period associate the RR with the Nazis, a new form of RR activity took shape at the end of the 1970’s (Rydgren, 2005). From that period on and up until the millennia there was a growing number of political parties with strong anti-immigrant sentiments. Some of these groups have remained strong, others have disappeared, and new ones have risen (Ignazi, 1992, 2003; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Carter, 2005; Arzheimer, 2009).

The main aim of this thesis is not to analyze loners like Breivik, nor rightist activist groups, but to investigate the electoral support of radical right parties.³ More specifically, I will try to account for differences in support throughout Western Europe in the period between 1981 and 2008, thus the main question is *what explains radical right parties’ support?* Most previous

¹ Among others, Breivik connects himself to well known radical right organizations and politicians such as the English Defence League, the politician Jussi Halla-Aho of the True Finns and the Dutch politician Geert Wilder of the Party for Freedom.

² However, it should be noted sooner than later that the author makes no assumptions between actors of extreme violence and radical right parties. This distinction is important, as there should be no doubt about the fact that the parties of the far right are in general law-abiding actors that operate within the existing democratic electoral system.

³ The term radical right will be preferred in this thesis. However, alternative labels will be used when this is natural, both with regards to subgroups of the radical right party family or when other studies use a certain term.

comparative studies have either focused on individual level factors, or contextual level factors to explain the success or failure of radical right parties (Arzheimer, 2009). Thus it is obvious that an account of the radical right should include both levels. While most previous studies have failed to include individual and contextual factors simultaneously, this study will hopefully give more answers to how these factors together may affect the support to radical right parties. Further, there is more certainty as to how individual factors influence RR support, in comparison to contextual factors. Research has shown that the ‘typical’ radical right voter belongs to lower social strata. Contextual level findings however, are more heterogeneous.

Apparently, two similar studies have used a multilevel approach to account for both individual and contextual factors and the RR support (Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer, 2009). This thesis will try to complement these studies by bringing in a new dataset, and will mainly focus on how the most central contextual level factors influence the radical right support, while simultaneously controlling for individual level factors (i.e. applying a multilevel method). Further, as previous findings are ambiguous in their findings I will do alterations in the dependent variable (*who* should be included in these studies?). I suggest that some of the heterogeneous findings on contextual level factors could be due to a lack of consensus in defining the radical right. My main analyses test for two alternative definitions of the radical right. It is not inconceivable that sample bias is a missing link. Hence, the alterations will serve as a robustness check of the findings.

The main findings are that it is still to a certain degree predictable *who* votes for the radical right. This thesis confirms previous research’s findings that the most likely voter is a young male with little education and no job. On the other hand, the thesis has provided less certain knowledge on how contextual factors influence the radical right support. For two of the most commonly tested factors, namely unemployment levels and a measure for a large out-group, only the latter seem to increase the likelihood of radical right support. Contrary to my expectations, unemployment level has the opposite effect on the radical right vote. Thus, when countries experience tough economic times, the radical right is commonly not preferred by the electorate. Finally, by making a distinction between two radical right definitions I learned that the findings are to some degree sensitive to particularly one case that

seems to stick out; the Italian National Alliance (AN).

1.1 Motivation

There has been an upsurge of radical right political parties in Western–Europe since the 1970’s, and scientists often refer to this period as the third wave (Arzheimer, 2011).⁴ A wide range of studies has time and again proved *who* the typical voter is. However, there is less certainty as to how contextual characteristics affect the radical right support. This question is naturally interesting, as the largest common denominator for the radical right party family is claimed to be *nativism*, i.e. a homogenous nation-state is preferred (Mudde, 2007, p. 19). While xenophobic attitudes are at the core of nativism, radical right parties should gain support in times of high levels of immigration. Further, theories of social psychology suggest that high levels of unemployment will (further) increase the likelihood of a radical right vote. However, previous empirical findings show that there is little agreement as to how contextual factors affect the radical right vote. Due to this, I will try to bring in new data in an account of how contextual country characteristics are related to radical right party support.

Further, my interest in the radical right partly came by witnessing the Norwegian Progress Party steadily growing in support. The party was initially established as a protest movement against high taxes and too much state involvement in 1973. However, with low support and internal disputes the party changed course and voters have found great interest in this party’s political agenda over the past decades; especially it’s attitudes towards immigration and taxes (Jupskås, 2009; Karlsen & Aardal, 2011). At every national election since 1993 the party have experienced increasing support. They are now without doubt considered as a true government option; in 2005 they received an impressive 22.1 percent of the votes in the national election, and 22.9 percent in the 2009 elections. This made them the second largest political party in Norway, and a major player in the parliament (Aardal, 2011, p. 15).

1.2 Scientific Contribution

As the radical right has a strong foothold in many European states, scientists rush to investigate these movements. RR-parties have experienced varied support in Western Europe over the last 30 years, and scientist are still working on finding the mechanism that can best explain this phenomenon; even though, as Arzheimer (2009) pointed out: “research on the

⁴ The notion of a ‘third wave’ was initially suggested by Beyme (1998).

voters of the radical right in Western Europe has become a minor industry [...]” (p. 259). Especially, there is relative little agreement over why the support for RR parties is often unstable, and why the RR is successful in some countries and not in others (ibid.). There seems to be a general agreement on who the general radical right voter is, and less agreement over contextual characteristics, so this thesis’ main focus will be on how contextual characteristics affects the electoral success or failure for radical right parties across Western Europe. Apparently, the most recent quantitative multilevel study on this subject is Arzheimer’s (2009) multilevel analysis of contextual factors and the radical right vote between 1980 and 2002.⁵ Lubbers et al. (2002) did a similar study a few years earlier, but with a much shorter time span.⁶ Further, since Arzheimer (2009) criticize Lubbers et al.’s (2002) study with regards to the validity and reliability of their data, it is obvious that there is still need for more studies applying a multilevel approach to be able to account for both micro and macro factors simultaneously (p. 262). Another difference between Arzheimer (2009) and Lubbers et al.’s (2002) study is that while the latter uses countries as the second level (and thereby studies cross national differences in radical right-wing voting), the former uses the particular context of the study as the second level which has a potential to better capture changes in the context.

All in all, the scientific need for another multilevel studies is evident, as most previous studies have either focused on how individual factors correlate with levels of radical right support, or they focus on how contextual factors correlates with levels of radical right support. Two multilevel studies with different time spans are probably not enough to consider these findings as robust, and this is where this thesis comes in. By providing a similar multilevel study, the thesis can contribute to either strengthen or weaken previous findings.

Thus, the main change from the two previous multilevel studies is to bring in a new dataset. Further, even though treating all types of RR parties as *one party family* is the most common thing to do in comparative quantitative studies of the radical right, I argue that there is a need

⁵ Additionally, a new similar multilevel study by Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers was published as late as 17th of May 2013 (Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013). Their findings will be commented more in detail in the final chapter.

⁶ While Arzheimer (2009) used Eurobarometer data between 1981 and 2002, Lubbers et al. (2002) based their analyses on a mix of six national election surveys and three supranational projects covering the years 1994-1997. Werts et al. (2013) used ESS data between 2002 and 2008.

to test whether alterations in the definition of the radical right could substantially change the outcome of the analysis. In one of his early works, Mudde (1995) argued that a definitional debate within the field was unfruitful, and that all of the relevant parties shared a set of characteristics, namely nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and a strong state (p. 206). Golder (2003) on the other hand, found that there are distinct differences between what he calls populist parties and neo-fascist parties. However, even though I find Muddes' definition persuasive, I still claim that it could be interesting to check whether the findings will differ by applying a more narrow definition.⁷ Further, the fact that previous studies are ambiguous in their findings could possibly be related to this issue; alterations in the dependent variable will serve as a robustness check of my findings. Consequently, parallel analyses will be carried out to investigate whether some of the findings of how contextual factors correlate with the RR's success or failures are dependent upon how the RR is defined.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

The next chapter starts by presenting the most common definitions of the radical right. First, I offer a review of how recent research has handled the RR as one party family. Following Mudde (1995) I agree that most parties within the radical right party family are similar on a set of issues. At the same time I account for some of the discussions regarding alternative definitions of the RR, which leads me to the conclusion of parallel analyses. The definition of the radical right is followed by a presentation of some general theories on the radical right vote, with Eatwell's (2003) summary of ten theories of the extreme right as a point of departure. I argue for a distinction between micro (individual) and macro (contextual) factors, and present theories on ethnic competition theory, political opportunity structures, social disintegration theory and protest vote. Thus, theoretical explanations for the radical right are presented within a two-level framework; together these represent economic, socio-cultural and political determinants for the radical right support. The theoretical account ends with a set of predictions and hypotheses. In Chapter 4 the data source and methods are presented. In Chapter 5 the hypotheses are tested with a mixed effects logistic multilevel method, using Stata version 11.2. First I present how the radical right intention to vote has varied across time and across countries, before I lay out the result from the multilevel analysis. I discuss the

⁷ The fact that Mudde himself has changed his view on which parties should be counted as radical right, strengthens my argument. Mudde's most recent work on the definition of the radical right can be found in Mudde (2007, pp. 11-60).

theory with regards to my findings underway, while finally Chapter 6 further discusses the findings and the way forward.

2. A Definition of the Radical Right

What is really ‘the radical right’? Can the term extreme right, radical right, populist right and far right be used interchangeably? Is it reasonable to put the Norwegian Progress Party the French Front National or the German People’s Union within the same ‘box’? The first question I address is *what* are we talking about? Is it the ‘radical right’ the ‘extreme right’ or something else? Secondly I define *who* they are. Hence, I present some of the most common definitions of the radical right. The chapter ends in an account of how I define the radical right party family throughout this thesis.

2.1 Labeling the Party Family

The first issue to address is *what* are we talking about? The literature interchangeably uses terms like ‘extreme right’, ‘radical right’, ‘populist right’ or ‘far right’ as nametags for the party family.⁸ As Jupskås (2012) indicatively point out, even some of the most central studies of the field reveal different nametags for virtually the same phenomenon (p. 228). In this context, Mudde (1996) is often cited: “we know *who* they are, even though we do not know exactly *what* they are” (p. 233). Several attempts have been made to argue for one or the other label. Yet, a decade later he still describes a “terminological chaos” (Mudde, 2007, p. 12). Ennser (2012) on the other hand, describe a radical right party family that is in fact more homogeneous than for instance the liberal party family (p. 151). In his seminal book *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Mudde (2007) present a new framework as the foundation for a new definition. He argues for a ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’ definition of the radical right, where ““maximum” group being a subgroup of the “minimum” group” (ibid., p. 15).⁹ The term *nativism* reflects a minimum definition due to the fact that nativism is the lowest common denominator for all of the parties in question. On the other hand, the term *populist radical right* reflects the maximum definition, which is defined as the greatest possible number of similarities within (part of) the radical right family. To be more specific it should be a combination of nativism (states should be inhabited by the ‘native’ group), authoritarianism (strictly ordered society), and populism (politics should be expression of

⁸ This list is by no means exhaustive, however it reflects som of the most commonly used labels. For an exstensive litany, I suggest chapter 1 in Mudde (2007).

⁹ Mudde (2007) made this minimum-maximum framework on the basis of previous work by Eatwell (1996) and Przeworski & Teune (1970) (p. 14).

general will) (ibid., p. 23). Further, he claims that the term *extreme right*, which he consistently used in previous studies, should be reserved for anti-democratic parties. Mudde does not only account for *one* party family, i.e. the populist radical right, he claims there are *several* party families within the nativist-concept. Arzheimer (2011) on the other hand, is less concerned with definitional challenges, and chooses the term extreme right on the notion that this “is currently the most popular label” (p. 37). Mudde’s arguments are important because the selection of parties under study will naturally be different. If I choose a ‘maximum’ definition, the selection will be narrower than with a ‘minimum’ approach that essentially provides a broader set of parties. An initial definitional conciseness is advantageous when one has to argue for either leaving out or including borderline cases. Due to this, I disagree with the way Arzheimer (2011) effectively dismisses Mudde’s definitional attention: “While Mudde’s proposal is remarkably clear and was very well received in the field, it matters most to students of parties. Scholars of voting behaviour, on the other hand, tend to go with a rather pragmatic approach [...]” (p. 36). Even though it is true that students of parties is, and should be, more updated on and concerned with each parties’ ideology, those doing comparative electoral studies should demonstrate greater awareness of the study's most important concept, as Mudde seeks.

On the basis of this I agree with Mudde’s concerns. I find the label *radical right* or more appropriate than i.e. *extreme right*.¹⁰ First of all, the term ‘extreme’ wrongly might imply lawless conditions. The parties under study are in general law-abiding actors that operate within the existing democratic electoral system. It is probably more appropriate to reserve the term, as Mudde (2007) did, to parties with distinct anti-democratic features. Further, while the terms *far right* or *radical right* does not necessarily exclude groups of parties, the term *populist right* ultimately is too narrow.¹¹ This is also reflected in the fact that some see populist parties as either a subgroup of the overarching party family, or wholly as a different group of parties (Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2000, 2007). Still, when concluding on a term for the party family, I do have in mind that there will probably always be those that disagree, as “it can be concluded that the radical right is the party family hardest to assemble under a common name” (Ennser, 2012, p. 157).

¹⁰ It might seem as the overall field is moving in this direction as well, as several authors have switched label to radical right in recent years (i.e. Mudde, 2007; Werts et al. 2013).

¹¹ Though the term *far right* can be criticised for being too vague.

2.2 The Party Family Debate

In close relation to the question of correct label, is the question of *whom* we are talking about. Arzheimer (2011) highlights the fact that there is by large a broad agreement as to which parties are normally included. So despite some disagreement over labeling, there is supposedly a broad consensus about the fact that the term radical right describes an ideology in one form or another, hence most comparative studies today handle the radical right as one party family. Underpinning this statement, I recall Ennser's (2012) findings that suggested there is a surprising amount of homogeneity within the ideology of the radical right party family. Mudde (2007) however, is not convinced, as he claims there are great diversities. To further investigate whether there actually is a unity, I compare and examine the selection of radical right parties done by five RR-studies.¹²

As presented in Table 1, even though the radical right party family is quite diverse in some aspects, most scientists seem to have a somewhat diffuse agreement on which these parties are. Kitschelt and McGann's (1995) list of RR parties from his seminal book on radical right voting in Western Europe is quite similar to those of later years, however there are mentionable differences. The table includes parties as diverse as the British National Party in Britain, which is known for its direct racist attitudes and violent associations, to the radically less radical Norwegian Progress Party.

Before I discuss the contents of the table, a few issues regarding the comparison of the studies should be highlighted. Some of the variance in the selection is in some regards because the authors use different timespans and different methods in their studies: Arzheimer (2009) and Lubbers et al. (2002) make use of quantitative comparative analyses while Carter (2005) and Mudde (2000) are qualitative comparative studies. Qualitative studies usually go deeper into the question of defining the radical right party family, and have a better overview of parties of smaller sizes as well (for those using quantitative studies, these parties may be overlooked). Further, the differences are much due to different selection criterions.

¹² These studies were selected on the basis that they represent a relatively wide timespan, hence Kitschelt (1995) seminal work from the mid 1990's; Carter (2005) and Mudde (2000) due to their particular attention towards the parties' ideology; Lubbers et al. (2002) and Arzheimer (2009) on the fact that these studies are recent quantitative comparative analyses, in addition to using quite different selection criterions for the RR.

Table 1. The Radical Right Party Family as Presented by Selected Authors*

Country	Radical Right parties	Arzheimer (2009)	Lubbers et.al (2002)	Carter (2005)	Mudde (2000)	Kitschelt (1995)
Austria	FPÖ	X	X	X	X	X
	VB	X	X	X	X	X
	FNb	X	X	X	X	X
Belgium	Agir			X	X	N/A
	FNB			X	X	
	PFNb			X	X	
	Rad/UDTR			X	X	X
Denmark	FrPd	X	X	X	X	X
	DF	X	X	X	X	N/A
Finland	SMP/PS	X				
	IKL		X			
France	FNf	X	X	X	X	X
	MNR			X	X	N/A
	AP				X	
	PFNf				X	
Germany	Rep	X	X	X	X	X
	DVU	X	X	X	X	X
	NPD	X	X	X	X	X
	BNP	X	X	X	X	X
Great Britain	NF			X	X	X
	EPEN	X		X	X	X
Greece	EM	X	X			
	PA	X				N/A
	KP			X		
	EK			X		
Ireland	CA				X	
	EN.E.K.				X	
	NPI		X			
	ANi	X		X	X	N/A
Italy	LN	X	X	X	X	X
	MS-FT		X	X	X	N/A
	MSI			X	X	X
	LL				X	
Luxembourg	LV				X	
	NB	X	X		X	
	CP	X		X	X	X
	LPF	X			N/A	N/A
Netherlands	CD		X	X	X	X
	NVU			X	X	

Norway	FrPn	X	X	X	X	X
	FP					X
Portugal	PDC	X				X
	ANp		X			X
	PSN					X
	MIRN					X
Spain	Fal	X	X	X	X	X
	ADN		X			X
	FNs ₁			X		X
	FNs ₂			X		X
	AUN					X
	UN					X
Switzerland	SA			X		X
	FPS			X		X
	LdT			X		X
	NAVH			X		X
	SD			X		X
	SRB					X
Sweden	Vig					X
	NyD	X	X	X	X	X
	SD		X			X
	DNP					X

Note: **Austria** – FPÖ: *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Austrian Freedom Party). **Belgium** – *Agir* (To Act), FNb: Front National (National Front), FNB: *Front Nouveau de Belgique* (New Belgian Front), PFNb: *Parti des Forces Nouvelles* (Party of New Forces), RAD/UDTR: *unknown* (Democratic Union for the Respect of Work), VB: *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish Blok/Interest). **Denmark** – DF: *Dansk Folkeparti* (Danish Peoples Party), FrPd: *Fremskridtspartiet* (Progress Party). **Finland** – IKL: *Isänmaallinen Kansallis-Liitto* (Patriotic National Alliance), SMP/PS: *Soumen Maaseudun Puolue/Perussuomalaiset* (Rural Party/True Finns). **France** – AP: *L'Alliance populaire* (Popular Alliance), FNf: *Front National* (National Front), MNR: *Mouvement National Républicain* (National Republican Movement), PFNf: *Parti des Forces Nouvelles* (Party of New Forces). **Germany** – DVU: *Die Volksumion* (German People's Union), NPD: *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (National Democratic Party of Germany), Rep: *Republikaner* (Republicans). **Great Britain** – BNP: *British National Party*, NF: *National Front*. **Greece** – CA: *Χρυσή Αυγή-Chrysi Avgi* (Golden Dawn), EK: *Ethniko Komma* (National Party), EM: *Eθνικό Μέτωπο-Ethiko Metopo* (National Front), EN.E.K.: *Ενιαίο Εθνικιστικό Κίνημα-Ενιαίο Εθνικιστικό Κίνημα* (United Nationalist Movement), EPEN: *Ethniki Politiki Enosis* (National Political Union), KP: *Komma Proodeftikon* (Progress Party), PA: *Πολιτική Ανοχή- Politiki Anixi* (Political Spring). **Ireland** – NPI: *unknown*. **Italy** – ANi: *Alleanza Nazionale* (National Alliance), LN: *Lega Nord* (Northern League), MSI: *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social Movement), MS-FT: *Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore* (Social Movement-Tricolour Flame), LL: *Lega Lombarda* (Lombard League), LV: *Lega Veneto* (Veneto League). **Luxembourg** – NB: *National bewegong* (National Movement). **Netherlands** – CP: *Centrumpartij* (Centre Party), CD: *Centrumdemocraten* (Centre Democrats), LPF: *Lijst pim fortuyn* (Pim Fortuyn List), NVU: *Nederlandse Volks-Unie* (Dutch Peoples Union). **Norway** – FrPn: *Fremskrittspartiet* (Progress Party), FP: *Fedrelandspartiet* (Patriotic Party). **Portugal** – ANp: *unknown* (National Alliance), FN-NM: *Forca nacional-Nova monarquia* (National Force – New Monarchy), PDC: *Partido da Democracia Crista* (Christian Democratic Party), PSN: *Partido de Solidaridade Nacional* (Advantage of National Solidarity), MIRN: *Movimento Independente para a Reconstrução Nacional* (Independent Movement for National Reconstruction). **Spain** – ADN: *Alternativa Democrática Nacional* (National Democracy Alternative), Fal: *Falange Española Auténtica de las JONS/ Falange Española Independiente* (Phalanxes), AUN: *Alianza por la Unidad Nacional* (Alliance for National Unity), FNs: *Fuerza Nueva* (New Force), FNs₂: *Frente Nacional* (National Front), UN: *Union Nacional* (National Union). **Switzerland** – SA: *Schweiser Autopartei/Parti Suisse des Automobilistes* (Car Party of Switzerland), FPS: *Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz* (Swiss Freedom Party), LdT: *Lega del Ticinesi* (Ticino League), NAVH: *Nationale Aktion für Volk und Heimat* (National Action for People and Homeland), SD: *Schweizer Demokraten* (Swiss Democrats), SRB: *Schwweizerische Republikaner Bewegung* (Swiss Republican Movement), Vig: *Vigilance* (Vigilance). **Sweden** – DNP: *Det nya partiet* (The New Party), NyD: *Ny Demokrati* (New Democracy), SD: *Sverigedemokraterna* (Sweden Democrats). N/A: Not applicable; not formed by the time of the study. *The shades refer to how often the party is mentioned (the darker the more often it is mentioned). Source: Arzheimer (2009, p. 266), Lubbers et al. (2002, p. 357), Carter (2005, pp. 4-5), Mudde (2000, p. 185), Kitschelt & McGann (1995, p. 52).

Arzheimer (2009) include those countries that were part of the EU before the eastern European enlargement (plus Norway). However, Switzerland is left out for “substantial reasons as well as lack of data”, the UK and Ireland are left out due to no RR support, and Luxembourg due to lack of data (ibid., pp. 265-266). Lubbers et al. (2002) on the other hand, base the inclusion of RR parties on an expert judgment survey; parties who scored higher than 8.5 on a ten-point anti-immigration scale were included (p. 355). Carter (2005) includes all RR parties who have contested in a national election since the late 1970’s. She excludes the borderline cases of the Finnish SMP/PS, the Dutch LPF, and Swiss SVP, but includes the Italian LN and AN (ibid., pp. 8-9). Mudde’s (2000) list is made on the basis of being generally considered ‘extreme right’ by various researchers in the field. Further, they must have contested national elections at least once in the period between 1980 and 1995 (ibid., p. 7). Finally, Kitschelt and McGann (1995) include those right wing parties that 1) have been excluded from government coalitions, and 2) have been established since 1965 (though still including the Austrian FPÖ and Italian MSI), hence naming them New Radical Right (NRR) parties (ibid., p. 49).

Not surprisingly then, Table 1 show that especially Mudde (2000) and Carter (2005) bring in parties of smaller sizes as well. In line with this knowledge, the table also reveals that Arzheimer (2009) and Lubbers et al. (2002) actually are quite similar in their selection of parties, as are Carter (2005) and Mudde (2000). Hence, there are notable differences due to different selection criterions. As regards to different timespans; those marked N/A in the last column are due to the fact that these parties did not exist at the time. However, by looking at table it is obvious that there is more unity with regards to some of the parties, as they are mentioned by all five studies (the rows marked with the darkest blue colour).¹³ These are the following parties; the Austrian FPÖ, Belgian VB and FNb, the Danish FrPd and DF, the French FN, the German Rep, DVU, and NPD, the Italian ANi and LN, the Norwegian FrPn, the Spanish Fal, and the Swedish NyD. However, it should be noted that despite being ‘unquestionable’ RR parties, there is still a broad ideological span within this group.

The same goes for the second strand of parties, which is generally thought to be incorporated within the party family, i.e. those included three or four times (medium blue): the British BNP

¹³ Mentioned *four* times if the party in question did not exist at the time of Kitschelt’s study.

and NF, the Greek EPEN, the Italian ANi, Ms-Ft, and MSI, the Luxembourgish NB, Portuguese PDC, The Spanish FNs₂, The Swiss SA, NAVH, and SD, and finally the Swedish SD. Eventually, there are much greater doubts regarding the final bulk of parties only listed once or twice (bright blue)

So, the lesson is: The brighter the blue the more marginal or questionable the radical right party? This answer is not straightforward. Initially in this chapter I presented two conflicting views on whether the radical right party family is homogenous or not. Obviously, there is no easy answer, especially when my judgement is based solely on the works and judgement of other scholars. So far I have revealed that there is no clear consensus on *who* the parties are, yet it seems as if it is quite common for large quantitative comparative studies to follow a less exclusionary and more pragmatic approach. Table 1 showed that there is some unity, especially among those doing quantitative studies, as well as among those doing qualitative studies. All in all, the differences in the selection of parties are mostly due to different selection criterions. This leads me to the question of how important the definitional question of the RR is. Does it matter whether one uses one or the other definition of the RR? Could this somehow be related to the occasionally contradictory findings on how contextual factors influence radical right support? This exact question is highlighted by Golder (2003); he find that the success of ‘populist parties’ and ‘neo-fascist parties’ is dependent upon different factors (in other words; suggesting that the respective voters have different motivations) (p. 432). This is rarely tested for in quantitative statistics, despite the fact that qualitative studies time and again have pointed to the diversity of the far right. Hence the following analyses are twofold. On the one hand, I follow a pragmatic approach, where the radical right includes both main and so-called *borderline* political parties of the radical right party family of Western Europe. A second approach applies a more narrow definition of the RR, where the most extreme parties (those with neo-fascist ideology) are left out. These are presented in the following section.

2.1.1 The Radical Right Defined

In what follows I present two ways of defining the radical right. The reason for this is *not* to come up with a new and ‘better’ way of defining it. That could be a thesis in itself. First and foremost I present differing definitions of the radical right to test and highlight the importance of these tasks. Both approaches are based on others’ assessments of what the RR is.

The most reasonable way of applying a substantial definition of the radical right in this case is to follow the ‘minimum’ approach of Mudde (2007). This is particularly appropriate as its purpose is to embrace *all* possible parties; hence recall that the term nativism is the lowest common denominator for all of the parties in question. Nativism thus reflects the core of the ideology of the larger party family. Mudde defines it like this:

Nativism is defined here as *an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by member of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state* (Mudde, 2007, p. 19).

The most salient issue is thought to be nationalism. What Mudde (ibid.) defines as the minimum approach, is to some degree similar to what other call ‘anti-immigrant’ parties (Fennema, 1997). The latter developed a typology of ‘anti-immigrant’ parties that precisely was supposed to catch all that; “runs from the general and diffuse (protest parties) to the specific (racist) and ideologically articulate (extreme right)” (Fennema, 1997, p. 473). By applying a pragmatic approach, I cannot exclude parties on more or less small differences; all parties who are commonly thought to be included in the RR will be included, including so-called borderline parties. Even though nativism is not at the peak of their ideology, most parties can still be embraced with this definition. Following this wide definition, where nativism (or immigrations skepticism) is thought to be at the core of the parties, would be in line with Arzheimer (2009), Fennema (1997), Ivarsflaten (2008) and Van der Brug and Fennema (2003).

Regarding the second definition of the radical right, it is by no means obvious how it should degenerate. Recall that some see specific types of parties as either a subgroup of the overarching party family, or wholly as a different group of parties; (Carter, 2005; Fennema, 1997; Golder, 2003; Ignazi, 2003; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Mudde, 2000, 2007). Golder (2003) was one of the first to statistically test the different effects of two definitions of the RR, as he claimed that there could be notable differences in what affects the radical right support when one makes the distinction between ‘populist parties’ and ‘neo-fascist parties’ (p. 443). He found that the success of the respective party families was depended upon different factors. For instance, he found that immigration and unemployment levels mattered more for populist parties, than for neo-fascist parties. Even though he was not able to make general

conclusions about voter preferences (one cannot make judgments on individual voter preferences on the basis of aggregate level data; also known as ecological fallacy), he found differences in their relation to the specific electoral institutions; there is concurrence between populist votes and the possibility to affect electoral outcomes, but not for neo-fascist votes (ibid., p. 459). Hence the first substantial distinction will be to separate the parties with so-called neo-fascist legacy, leaving me with a somewhat more narrow radical right party family. This thesis can only test for a definition *without* neo-fascist parties, as the number of neo-fascist parties alone is too low to provide unbiased estimates.¹⁴ Thus Golder will serve as a point of departure for this distinction. In terms of the latter he writes; “[...] I prefer to label parties as neofascist based on their ideology and programmatic statements” (ibid., p. 446). He bases his classification of parties on that of Kitschelt (1997). Some of the main distinctions between ‘new radical right’ (NRR) and the ‘old fascist right’ is as followed:

- First, fascism expresses an anticapitalist, corporatist thrust, whereas the NRR endorses free market capitalism with a strong but small state.
- Second, [...] the NRR’s authoritarianism derives from its defence of capitalist governance structures, not the fascist rejection of free market economy, and therefor at least implicitly draws on the thinking of conservative apologists of liberal market capitalism.
- Third, whereas racism and ethno cultural parochialism were contingent phenomena in fascism that were in some movements replaced with militarism and nationalism, they are central components of the NRR appeal (Kitschelt, 1997, pp. 30-31).¹⁵

With regards to the populist parties, Golder (2003) states: “it is defined by two characteristics: first, its appeal to the people. Populists tend to be advocates of direct democracy [...]. Second, populism is antisystem. [...] it challenges the established power holders and elite values” (pp. 446-447). In his table of populist and neo-fascist parties however, he unfortunately omits the Italian Ms-Ft and the AN, which I regard as a central part of the overall radical right party family (i.e. Carter, 2005). Further, he is unspecific as to which parties are neo-fascist in France (he only refers to ‘Other extreme right’). To weigh up for these flaws I present Carter’s (2005) new and more up to date typology of different types of ‘right-wing extremist’ parties to separate the neo-fascist parties. Her typology was based on three divisions; 1) the

¹⁴ Det ultimate design would be to compare the findings of the ‘populist’ and ‘neo-fascist’ parties. As this is not appropriate, I compare the findings of a pragmatic approach and an approach leaving out neo-fascist parties, i.e. thus leaving me with the group of parties which Golder (2003) characterized as ‘populist’.

¹⁵ A more thorough review can be found in Kitschelt (1997), pages 27-42.

importance attached to the immigration issue (the parties are either ‘central’ or ‘not central’); 2) the nature of the parties’ racist attitudes (‘classical racism’, ‘culturism’ or ‘not racist’); and, 3) their attitudes towards democracy, parliamentarism and pluralism (‘rejection of existing system’, ‘reform: less democracy, more state’, or ‘reform: more democracy, less state’) (ibid., p. 28). On the basis of these divisions, she maps five different types of radical right parties which are thought to be “jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive” (ibid., p. 50). The new typology of the radical right is divided between neo-Nazi parties (radically xenophobic, classic racism, reject existing democratic system), neo-fascist parties (not xenophobic or racist, but reject existing democratic system), authoritarian xenophobic parties (radically xenophobic, culturist, wants reform of existing system: less democracy, less pluralism and more state), neo-liberal xenophobic parties (radically xenophobic, culturist, wants reform of existing system: more democracy and less state) and finally neo-liberal populist parties (not xenophobic or racist, but wants reform of existing system: more democracy and less state) (ibid., p. 50).¹⁶ Even though Carter makes a distinction between neo-fascist and neo-Nazi parties, for my purpose it is reasonable to group these together. These groups have historical bonds, as well as they are separated from the others in their outright rejection of the existing system. Further, this is substantiated by the fact that Golder’s (2003, p. 448) listing of neo-fascist parties resembles that of Carter’s (2005, pp. 50-51) neo-Nazi and neo-fascist parties. While Carter (2005) define neo-fascist/neo-Nazi parties as the German People’s Union (DVU), the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), the Italian National Alliance (AN), Social Movement-Tricolour Flame and the Italian Social Movement, Golder (2003) also include (among others) the Dutch Centre Party and the Centre Democrats as neo-fascist parties (which are considered as authoritarian xenophobic parties by Carter (2005, p. 51)).¹⁷ This chapter has presented two central debates within the field. First the debate over which label is correct to use. I landed on the term radical right, which I argue is neither too vague nor too specific. Next out was the debate over which parties belong to the RR. I showed that there are considerable differences in how authors define the radical right. Hence, I finally argued that I should follow a twofold approach; A *pragmatic* radical right approach and

¹⁶ Another plausible approach would be to separate those parties that are distinctively more moderate than the bulk of radical right parties, and then compare the findings of the moderate parties vs the others. However, the number of moderate populist parties alone is too low to provide unbiased estimates.

¹⁷ However both definitions will be tested for, hence I can see how robust my findings are. Further I will also do a robustness check where I include the Finnish PS within the narrow definition, in line with the arguments of Arter (2010).

Golder's populist right approach was presented.¹⁸ Exactly *which* parties belong to either of the approaches throughout this thesis is presented in Chapter 4.

¹⁸ The term 'populist' parties is adopted from Golder (2003). I simply use term to separate the two approaches. Despite of this I'm more convinced that Mudde (2007) provides the best arguments of why the party family should be named *populist radical right*. A common critique of the term *populist* for instance, is that it can include parties from both the 'left' and 'right', and cannot be confined to the party family under study.

3. Theoretical Accounts of the Radical Right

In this chapter, I introduce several theories that are used to explain radical right support¹⁹. First, Eatwell's (2003) summary of the literature on theories of the radical right provides an insight into the complexity of the field. In order to simplify, thus making it easier to actually test the various propositions that are put forward within the literature, I make a distinction between micro (individual) and macro (contextual) factors that I expect influence the RR support. Hence, the most common theoretical explanations for the radical right are presented within a two-level framework. At the contextual level I present theories on economic interest (ethnic competition theory) as well as political opportunity structures to explain RR support. At the individual level I rely on economic interest, social disintegration as well the notion of protest vote to explain the same. Thus, macro level explanations include economic, social and political country conditions, while micro level explanations include economic, social and political individual conditions. As a result, my hypotheses as well as my testing of them follow the same theoretical framework separating between the two levels. After I have summed up the theory and presented a theoretical model, I briefly sum up the arguments for why I do parallel analyses and come up with an innovative hypothesis.

3.1 Theories of the Radical Right

There is a large selection of theories that separately claim to explain the support for contemporary RR parties. In an effort to summarize and review the diverse theoretical explanations, Eatwell (2003) lists ten theories of the radical right support. This overview can be used as a point of departure in trying to map the various explanations of the radical right, and gives the reader a clue of the field's complexity.²⁰ As Eatwell (ibid.) correctly point out,

¹⁹ Traditional voting models, such as the Michigan model (which focus party identification), the rational choice model (the rational actor), or the sociological model (which focuses more on social cleavages), provides general implications for why someone would vote for any party. The theories I present are more specific to the radical right, but certainly have traces of these model within them.

²⁰ The *political opportunity thesis* claims that RR parties' success depends on political factors such as how the electoral system is outlined, and how the overall political environment in questions is. The *mediatisation thesis* argues that the RR will benefit from the media in at least two ways: First, the media promote certain national stereotypes, which fit the radical right agenda. Second, the media often focus on problematic cultural differences, criminals etc. The *national tradition thesis* on the other hand, claims that the RR is successful when it can portray itself as part of a national tradition. However, fascist or extremist links will limit their support. The *programmatically thesis* asserts that politics in general are becoming more issue-based, and the RR takes advantage of this. Further, the RR seems to have adopted a "winning formula" (anti-immigration and pro-capitalism). Finally, the *charismatic leader thesis* recognizes that many successful RR parties have charismatic leaders and

many of the theories presented reveal a one sidedness that today is abandoned. For instance, even though we know that most voters of the radical right are xenophobic, radical right success doesn't necessarily simply follow new waves of immigration, as *the single-issue thesis* claims (2003). Further, even though *the charismatic leader thesis* claims that a charismatic leader is essential in explaining RR support, this is probably only one of a range of factors that influence the RR. Without doubt, "[...] no one factors can explain such a diverse pattern of radical right voting" (ibid., p. 50). Hence I should follow the advice and practice of both Eatwell (ibid.) and several others; to explain the radical right one has to lean on several theoretical perspectives.²¹ However, running through all ten theories presented by Eatwell (ibid.) is not particularly thought efficient. Instead I present five theoretical perspectives that are often highlighted as particularly relevant (i.e. Lubbers et al. (2002) or Arzheimer and Carter (2006)). These are economic interest theory, psychological interest, social disintegration and group conflict theories as well as the notion of a political opportunity structure. These theories are highly relevant and provide me with testable factors.²² I simply divide the theories within another two level framework; individual (micro) and contextual (macro) level factors. By doing this I follow the approach of both Arzheimer (2009) and Lubbers et al. (2002).²³ As the main aim of this thesis is to analyze how contextual factors influence the RR support, as previous studies show ambiguous findings, these are presented first.

claims that this is a determining factor for success. This depicts the five supply-side theories. Next, the five demand side theories: The *single-issue thesis* argues that RR parties' success depends on one factor – increased immigration. The *protest thesis* however, claims that parties' success is not dependent on the specific ideology or politics of the RR parties: people vote RR because of resentment against the political establishment. The *social breakdown thesis* asserts that traditional social structures, especially class and religion, are breaking down. As a result, individuals lose a sense of belonging and turn to ethnic nationalism, which gives a renewed sense of self-esteem. The *(reverse) post-materialist thesis* resembles in the sense that they also see important social changes; they claim that support to the RR is caused by a backlash against post-materialism: Environmentalism, cosmopolitanism, new left politics, feminism etc. Altogether they see a growing interest in issue-based and protest politics. Finally, *the economic interest thesis* argue that RR support comes from "losers" in a competition over scarce resources, or from those who fear they may lose out (eg. the young and the unskilled). For more information on each of the theories, see Eatwell (2003, pp. 49-67).

²¹ For an overview, see Arzheimer's chapter in Backes & P. Morea (2011) *The Extreme Right in Europe*, or part III in the radical right 'bible' of Cas Mudde (2007).

²² My statement of 'highly relevant' put in perspective: It should be noted that the field commonly uses classical theories to describe contemporary phenomena (though in combination with more contemporary ones). In fact, the field is rather underdeveloped when it comes to theoretical explanations, according to Mudde (2007, p. 201).

²³ Eatwell (2003), Norris (2005) and Mudde (2007) make a distinction between demand and supply side explanations.

3.2 Theories on Contextual Factors and Radical Right Support

The following section will try to outline how previous studies and classical theories suggest *which* particular context is most likely to experience high levels of RR support. Contextual factors can possibly include a wide range of short- or long-term structural economic and political characteristics, and is frequently used to help explain the RR support, both in the popular media as well as among scientists. First out are claims within ethnic competition theory, then political opportunity structures are laid out.

3.2.1 Ethnic Competition Theory

Within the field of *economic interests* lays the theory of *ethnic competition*. The *ethnic competition theory* is considered as an intertwining of *realistic conflict/realistic group conflict theory* and *social identity theory* (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002). In short, the realistic group theory's main assumption is that different social groups are in a state of constant competition over scarce resources and values, which again may lead to conflict, as well as serve as an catalyst for antagonist attitudes. The theory assumes that people are self-interested and led by a "bounded, yet instrumental rationality" (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 260). Even though this line of thought stems from a wide range of authors, it is often linked to the classic works of Coser (1956), Levine and Campbell (1972), Sherif and Sherif (1979), and Blalock (1967). Sherif and Sherif (1979) is particularly known for the so-called 'Robbers Cave Experiment' where they studied intergroup behavior and the origins of prejudice. Two groups of young boys with similar backgrounds were kept apart, then gathered to compete in various sports competitions. This resulted in intense hostility, as well as prejudice and antagonist views, while at the same time it provided solidarity within the respective groups. Hence, even though the two groups had similar backgrounds, they experienced hostility towards the 'others'. This led them to the conclusion that negative attitudes towards the other group arise when they compete for scarce resources (in this particular experiment, the groups won a prize if they won the sports competitions). While most authors claim that actual competition was a necessary condition for prejudice and unfavorable out-group sentiments to arise, Blalock (1967) distinguished between actual competition and perceived competition in his studies of relations between races in the US; "With actual competition he referred to [...] socioeconomic conditions, such as the availability of scarce resources and market mechanism regulating the distribution of these scarce resources" (Scheepers et al., 2002, p. 18). Hence, in case of actual competition, this could lead to aggregated perceptions of competition, which

again could lead to negative views of the out-group. Ultimately, the larger the relative size of the minority, the higher the risk of negative perceptions of the out-group due to more intergroup competition. This stands in contrast to Allport's (1954) intergroup contact theory which states that *more* interaction between different groups will lead to more positive belief of each other, possibly reducing prejudice. Hence, opposite to Blalock, he depicts a situation where a large out-group opens up for positive intergroup contact. However, he still realizes that several requirements of the contact situation need to be present for it to have a positive outcome (Jakobsen, Isaksen, Skavhaug & Strabac, in press).

Realist group conflict theory was later complemented by what is called *social identity theory*. Both theories apply a sociopsychological perspective to account for negative out-group sentiments, but the latter is said to better account for the psychological mechanisms that lead to ethnic exclusionism (Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma, & Hagendoorn, 2011, p. 743; Scheepers, et al., 2002, p. 18). Within the social identity theory, Tajfel and Turner's work are at the core (1979). They showed that negative out-group attitudes often are related to positive in-group evaluations (Scheepers et al., 2002). Building on the experiment of Sherif and Sherif (1979), they set out to see if competition between groups were a necessary component for antagonist feelings. Hence, in their experiment they did not tell people who the members of 'their' in-group was, still, when faced with the choice of one from in-group or from one from the out-group, they preferred the former (despite the fact that they had nothing to gain from this). Thus, a process of self-categorization is central to this theory. Tajfel and Turner state that people long the belonging of a group, as this helps them systematise the world and identify themselves. Further, to maintain positive thoughts about their in-group, negative characteristics are often ascribed to the out-group (which is referred to as social contra-identification); "[a]ccording to this theory individuals have a fundamental need to perceive their in-group as superior to ethnic out-groups" (Scheepers et al., 2002, p. 18). Hence, in-group and out-group sentiments are a result of social categorizations, and can help explain intergroup behaviour (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Scheepers et al., 2002).

Intertwining the two theoretical perspectives presented has led to the notion of a *ethnic competition theory* (Scheepers, et al., 2002). Scheepers et al. (ibid.) were among the first to link the two theories, arguing that; "under competitive conditions, central to Realist Conflict

Theories, these processes may intensify. Therefore, we consider Social Identity Theory to be complementary to the propositions from Realistic Conflict Theory” (p. 18). With regards to ‘these processes’, they refer to the social identification-process identified in social identity theory. Further, they sum up the theoretical core argument: “Competition, at an individual as well as at a contextual level, may reinforce the mechanisms of social (contra-)identification, the eventual outcome of which is referred to as ethnic exclusionism” (ibid., p. 18). Here, the reason for why ethnic competition theory is particularly useful in explaining radical right success throughout Western Europe is mentioned as well. Ethnic competition theory refers to both the individual level and the contextual level; with emphasis on the latter the theory states that different composition of circumstances (the macro level), will lead to differing out-group sentiments. Hence, economic and social country characteristics are often used to explain radical right wing support between countries. Lubbers et al. (2002) provides a useful introduction to how this is particularly related to radical right support.

[...], increasing competition may result in exclusionary reactions (Olzak 1992; Scheepers et al. 2001). Out-groups could, however, be perceived as a cultural threat too. In this view, out-groups are viewed as a threat to Western values and social cohesion. The cultural and economic threats may however be interwoven. Such threats and the exclusionary reactions towards out-groups are proclaimed in extreme right-wing programmes, and this may increase the likelihood of voting for extreme right-wing parties when competition increases (Lubbers et al., 2002, p. 349).

What Lubbers et al. (ibid.) in practice are saying, is that both economics and culture may be perceived as something limited and subject for competition, which again can lead to an RR vote as this is one of the central features of RR parties.

To sum up, one of the overall arguments is that countries with tough economic conditions (competition), e.g. high levels of unemployment, will experience high levels of RR support; in countries where the job market is tough, people will be more inclined to support the radical right since these parties generally take a tough stand on immigration, which is as we know one of the radical right parties main appeals. When radical right parties offer oversimplified solutions to problems such as ‘immigration should be stopped to halter increased unemployment’, this strengthens the above theoretical claims. The French FN are one of those parties that have uncritically connected levels of immigration to levels of

unemployment (Jupskås, 2012, p. 77). Thinking of jobs as a resource, voters of the RR should think that they are more entitled to available jobs than those not belonging to their out-group (Skenderovic, 2009, p. 43). Thus, people will most likely blame their out-group for the increasingly competitive job markets or overall though economic conditions, than those within their-in group (Lubbers, 2002, p. 349).²⁴

Radical right studies commonly assume that negative out-group values are closely related to radical right support (remember; nativism is at the core of the radical right party family's ideology). Accordingly, there is a considerable amount of studies that emphasizes economic and social country conditions to explain radical right support (e.g. Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998, Lubbers et al., 2002, Scheepers et al., 2002; Golder, 2003; Swank & Betz, 2003; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009). Previous findings from quantitative comparative studies on contextual level factors are quite heterogeneous. However, in line with ethnic competition theory-expectations that higher levels of unemployment (scarce resources) lead to negative out-group attitudes, Jackman and Volpert (1996), Golder (2003) and Arzheimer (2009) find that higher unemployment levels lead to an increased chance of an RR vote. However, only Arzheimers study controlled for micro factors simultaneously. Swank and Betz (2003) and Lubbers et al. (2002) find this trend to be very weak and/or insignificant, while Knigge (1998), and Arzheimer and Carter (2006) has actually found the opposite effect (significant negative effect). Here, only Lubbers et al. (2002) controlled for micro factors as well. The latter finding is sometimes explained by the fact that people in prosperous countries could be afraid to loose what they have gained and 'earned' (Lubbers et al., 2002, p. 371). Thus, in line with ethnic competition theory the first hypothesis states that:

H₁: The higher the relative number of unemployed people in a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

A high level of out-group members in a country is also thought to have a positive effect on

²⁴ Further, some authors points to the fact that a wide range of *group conflict theory* can be implemented within the concept of *relative deprivation* (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 260; Pettigrew, 2002, p. 356). Relative deprivation describes the phenomenon that groups may perceive themselves as deprived relative to other groups (in contrast to absolute deprivation). Hence frustration, anger, and possibly conflict often follow in the wake of the experience of relative deprivation.

radical right support. Both theory and previous research show that as there are more people from the same social strata to compete with, people will be more afraid of their jobs. However, this trend also has some conflicting findings. Knigge (1998), Lubbers et al. (2002), Golder (2003), Swank and Betz (2003), and Arzheimer (2009), found that immigrants have a positive effect on the likelihood of RR support. However, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) found no significant between RR voting turnouts and the proportion of asylum seekers, while Kitschelt (1995) found a negative effect of foreign-born population on the RR. As previous research has used different measurements of the out-group, I will control for both even though I treat asylum seekers as the main measure for a large out-group.²⁵ Even though intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954) would argue that higher levels of out-group should lead to less prejudice, i.e. lowering the likelihood of RR support, following *contact group theory* generates the following statement:

H₂: The higher the relative levels of (2a), asylum seekers or (2b) foreign-born population within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

Further, according to the ethnic competition theory, both high levels of unemployment and high levels of immigration will further increase the competition for the even scarcer resources, hence one should expect an interaction between unemployment levels and immigration levels. Both Golder (2003) and Arzheimer (2009) tested for this interaction. While Golder (2003) found that unemployment increases the effect of RR vote, when immigration numbers are high, Arzheimer (2009) did not find this effect. However, my theoretical basis lead my to the following hypotheses:

H₃: The higher the relative numbers of asylum seekers within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right, when unemployment levels within a country are high.

Studies have also tried to bring in the institutions of the welfare state as a variable in explaining differences in RR voting between countries, as these can be seen as a mediating or dampening effect on RR support. This was first introduced in quantitative comparative studies

²⁵ I consider main measure for a large out-group as 'asylum seekers', hence only this measure will be used in the interaction terms.

by Swank and Betz (2003), which found that high levels of welfare state protection reduces the support for the RR. The theoretical base for this is that if there is competition in the job market (in line with ethnic competition theory), this could be tempered by high levels of unemployment benefits. Kitschelt (1995) had earlier introduced a differing argument, claiming that those experiencing the most competitive society would be more inclined to express so-called “welfare chauvinist” resentment for immigrants (whom they believe threaten the viability of the social security system) (p. 22). Arzheimer (2009) followed up on this, and found that welfare benefits can curb the positive effect of unemployment, if there are high levels of immigration. In line with ethnic competition theory (and Arzheimer (2009)) I argue for a negative relationship; i.e. that countries with low levels of unemployment benefits, will have a higher likelihood of an RR vote:

H₄: The lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

However, more interesting is how the effect of unemployment benefits interacts with high levels of unemployment and asylum seekers, as outlined by Arzheimer (2009). While he tested for a range of different contextual constellations using an advanced technique to illustrate the joint effect of unemployment, asylum seekers and unemployment benefits, I will simply add two additional interaction terms to investigate the conditional effects of unemployment benefits:

H₅: The lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right, when the relative numbers of asylum seekers within a country are high.

H₆: The lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right, when unemployment levels within a country are high.

3.2.2 Political Opportunity Structures

Another well-known line of arguments seen in RR studies is that of *political opportunity structures (POS)*: (Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995;

Koopmans & Statham, 2000).²⁶ The term political opportunity structures refer to a variety of political factors that may influence the possibility of establishment of RR parties. However, exactly *which* factors are included in a political opportunity structure is not certain, as there is no consensus (Arzheimer, 2009).²⁷ Kitschelt (1995) was among the first to relate this to the radical right. In an earlier study of protest movements he describe political opportunity structures as “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others” (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 58). According to Arzheimer and Carter (2006), who implemented political opportunity structures in their study of radical right parties “the majority of studies agree that fixed or permanent institutional features combine with more short-term, volatile or conjectural factors to produce an overall particular opportunity structure” (p. 422). Thus, political opportunity structures could be long- or short-term contextual factors that will either open up for movements such as the radical right, or hinder them; i.e. certain types of political constellations are thought to provide accessibility for upcoming political actors. As there is uncertainty on exactly which factors should be included, only a few will be discussed here (both for convenience and parsimony).

Arzheimer and Carter (2006) narrowed down the concept of political opportunity structures and examined three central features. In addition to examining medium term party system variables, they included two long-term institutional variables; the electoral system and the degree of decentralization/federalism. With regards to the electoral system, they write: “[...], it has long been established that the more proportional the electoral system, the greater the incentives for political entrepreneurs to enter the electoral race and for voters to decide to support a new or small political party” (ibid., p. 423). Hence, more proportional electoral systems should be more receptive towards radical right parties. On the effect of decentralization (federalism) two possible outcomes are suggested: 1) High degree of federalism (i.e. ‘second order’ elections) could lead to increased RR support because “voters

²⁶ Some of the most central works on POS stem from Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi (1992) and Tarrow (1996). Hence, the theory of political opportunity structures was originally developed to explain protest movements, but was eventually adapted to the radical right field (among others).

²⁷ Hence, the term opportunity structure is criticized for being too vague (Arzheimer, 2009; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004): “There is no consensus (yet) on what variables are part of an opportunity structure. [...], the notion of ‘opportunity’ has implications that might be too restrictive: many contextual factors like unemployment and immigration will not only provide the political elite with an incentive to mobilize as entailed by the concept but will also have a direct and possibly more important impact on voters’ preferences” (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 261).

are more inclined to support new and/or radical parties in a second order election (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, p. 423). Arzheimer (2009) further suggest that second order elections could provide the RR with ‘political experience, access to the media, and credibility’ (p. 264). Or, 2) High degree of federalism decrease the likelihood of support to a radical right party because second order elections could ‘catch’ those citizens that are dissatisfied with mainstream parties, without affecting elections substantially at the national level (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006, p. 423). With regards to medium-term party system variables, they assessed the effect of the ideological position of the major party of mainstream right, the distance between the major party of the mainstream left/right and the coalition format in the party systems (ibid.). For the two former factors they had conflicting hypotheses. On the latter they claim that the RR benefits from grand coalitions because of a lack of political alternatives (due to voter alienation). Finally, they examined short-term contextual variables. Including two of the most common context variables, immigration and unemployment, they anticipated that high levels of immigration and unemployment would positively affect the RR support. This coincides with the expectations of ethnic competition theory.

Hence, the idea is that structural conditions such as high level of immigration or foreign populations, country specific voting conditions, factors related to the political landscape, party specific factors, or the overall economic situation, possibly will affect the chances of an establishment of radical right parties. Within this thesis, two possible ‘opportunity structures’ will be tested; long-term institutional variables and short-term contextual variables.²⁸ While the effects of the short-term contextual variables (i.e. immigration and unemployment) are already included, I merely add the long-term institutional variables: the degree of degree of disproportionality (pluralistic vs. proportional representation) and political decentralization (a unified or ‘federal’ state) (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009). With regards to previous research, Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that multipartyism combined with proportional electoral system is associated with high levels of RR. Additionally, Swank and Betz (2003) found that a proportional electoral system is positively correlated to higher levels of radical right voting. However, in contrast to the theoretical expectations, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) find that disproportional elections systems increase the likelihood, while Arzheimer (2009) find that less proportionality in the electoral system does not significantly

²⁸ Initially I wanted to include medium term party system variables as well, but unfortunately these are left out due to lack of data.

affect variation in radical right voting. Still, theoretical arguments lead me to generate the following hypotheses:

H₇: The higher the degree of proportionality in the electoral system within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

Previous studies on the degree of political decentralization in a state (whether the state is 1-‘unified’ or 5-‘decentralized’) show that there is no certainty on how this affects the radical rights’ success. Either, subnational elections (i.e. decentralized state) may function as a ‘safety net’ and prevent the RR’s opportunity structure. Or, local elections (i.e. decentralized state) can increase the RR’s opportunity structure as this provides the parties’ with longed political training and access to the media (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 264). Both Arzheimer and Carter (2006) and Arzheimer (2009) find that decentralization does not significantly affect variation in radical right voting, suggesting that this factor is of little importance. However, if one disregards the statistical significance, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) found a negative trend between decentralization and RR vote, while Arzheimer (2009) found a positive trend. Even though there are uncertainties as to how the effects of decentralized state system affects the opportunities for a radical right vote, the following hypothesis is constructed:²⁹

H₈: The higher the degree of decentralization within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

3.3 Theories on Individual Factors and Radical Right support

The main impetus for this thesis is to investigate how radical right support is affected by contextual circumstances. However, individual factors are inevitable in explaining the radical right support, and I would consider an account of the radical right support inadequate if these factors were left out. Hence, micro factors will be included. However, previous findings are quite unanimous in who the voters are, thus they will merely serve as control variables. Still, I present theories and hypotheses on how I expect individual factors will affect the radical rights support.

²⁹ Thus, a positive relationship would mean that high degree of decentralization within a country increase the likelihood of RR support, a negative relationship imply that high degree of decentralization is less likely to support the radical right.

3.3.1 Ethnic Competition Theory

Theories of economic interest are central in explaining why certain social categories or individuals vote for the radical right. Most notably, this includes both *realist conflict theory* as well as *social identity theory* (intertwined in the notion of *ethnic competition theory*), as already discussed within the contextual level theories. Applying these theories to the individual level it is important to note that the key axiom in realist conflict theory is that actors are rational.³⁰ Thus, people make strategic and rational decisions (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 260). As a result the realist conflict theory suggests that those who resembles immigrants from an economic and social perspective “are more likely to perceive immigrants as an economic threat and will, therefore, be more likely to vote for an radical right-wing party which proclaims to protect the interests of the social strata under threat” (Lubbers et al, 2002, p. 348). Recall that realist group theory’s main assumption is that different social groups are in a state of constant competition over scarce resources and values, which again may lead to conflict, as well as serve as a catalyst for antagonist attitudes. Hence, it is obvious that those social categories that are most vulnerable, more likely will perceive the out-group as threatening.

While rational choice is central in realist conflict theory, social categories are at the core of the social identity theory. In Chapter 3.1.1 I described how negative out-group attitudes often were related to positive in-group attitudes, i.e. people long for a positive self-identity (that is only possible when comparing to another group). Hence, this is where the radical right come in; the radical right offers an ethnocentric ideology that provides people with out-groups to compare themselves with.

Combined, social identity theory and realist conflict theory make up the notion of *ethnic competition theory* also at the individual level. Scheepers et al. (2002) emphasize that this theory is suitable for both levels. On the contextual level, the theory emphasizes which *context* people would experience more competition, and claims that when there are high levels of immigration and unemployment, this will increase the possibility of RR support. On the

³⁰ Further, early theoretical approaches of group conflicts, such as the classical *theory of scapegoating*, argued that minorities become victims of aggression of those that are frustrated by lack of status and other resources. They perceive minorities as different and powerless, and therefore represent an easy target. A classic example of this is Dollard, Doob and Miller (1939). Actors in this theory base their actions on feelings (Arzheimer, 2009, p.263).

individual level thus, the theory identifies which *social strata* are most likely to experience (or perceive) competition against the out-group. The theory assumes that there is a constant competition for scarce resources, hence in line with realist competition theory, those who mostly resemble the out group will be more likely to support the RR (which again holds negative out-group values). Further, for the individual level “competition may be specified in terms of social conditions of members of the dominant group; and it may be specified in terms of a perceived threat of competition that, we propose, mediates the effects of social conditions on ethnic exclusionism” (ibid., p. 18). Hence, in addition to including factors related to social class, one should also include attitudinal measures, as *perceived conflict* is an important notion.

In empirical studies this line of thinking corresponds to a number of findings where lower social strata are found to be more likely to vote for the RR than other social strata's.³¹ Both Lubbers et al. (2002), Arzheimer and Carter (2006), and Arzheimer (2009), found, as many others before them, that young people, those with low education, manual/low skilled worker, the unemployed and those retired to be more likely to vote for the radical right. Finally, negative attitude towards immigrant can be related to a perceived conflict, hence those negative to immigrants are (in line with ethnic competition theory) more inclined to support the RR. Hence, Lubbers et al. (2002) found that those negative to immigrants are more likely to vote for the radical right. All in all, theoretical framework leads me to generate the following hypotheses:

H₉: (9a) Younger people, (9b) lower educated people, (9c) unemployed, and (9d) people with low income, are more likely to vote for the radical right.

H₁₀: People with negative immigrant attitudes are more likely to vote for the radical right.

3.3.2 Social Disintegration Theory

While ethnic competition theory apparently holds many of the answers I seek, *social*

³¹ However, some have found that in some selected countries the radical right also attract voters from other social strata. Kitschelt (1995) for instance, found that the Front National in France, the FPÖ in Austria and the Vlaams Blok in Belgium attracts voters for the middle class.

disintegration theory can hardly be bypassed: Some of the first attempts of explaining support for either fascist or Nazi movements focused on how social breakdown played a crucial role, (Arendt, 1951; Kornhauser, 1960; Parsons, 1942). In a study of why totalitarian regimes arise, Arendt (1951) implied that there was an on-going atomization of the society; people are less bound to institutions (such as churches and/or unions). Hence, as a response to a (perceived) breakdown of the society, people feel alienated from the social system. This has the potential to creating negative feelings such as anxiety, anger and isolation. As a result of this mental state people would long for substitute intermediary structures, including strong leadership and a rigid ideology (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 260). In his seminal book on the politics of mass society, Kornhauser (1960) suggested that parties of the radical right were substitutes for the social breakdown. Lubbers et al. (2002) pointed to the fact that younger people and non-religious people could fall in under the category as disintegrated. Further, one could suggest that people would be disintegrated if they were not a part of the job market (the unemployed). Lubbers et al. (2002) found non-religious voters, the younger and the unemployed all more likely to vote for the radical right. Thus, in accordance with social disintegration theory, I hypothesise that:

H₁₁: Non-religious people are the more likely to vote for the radical right.

3.3.3 Protest Vote

Finally, the notion of a *protest vote* is commonly introduced in explaining radical right success (i.e. Mayer & Perrineau, 1992; Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2000; Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003). In their seminal work on the ‘civic culture’, Almond and Verba (1989) found that both dissatisfaction with government and political efficacy are central conditions for the development of political alienation and aspiration. However, Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) point out: “even though the protest vote hypothesis has had an irresistible attraction for many students of anti-immigrant parties, little evidence exists to support it” (p. 59). On the other hand, Lubbers et al. (2002) point out that most single country studies find a that political dissatisfaction is a relevant predictor for RR success. The main notion is that people have lost faith in politics, and “People who are politically dissatisfied are likely to cast a protest vote and, because extreme right-wing parties position themselves as protest parties, these parties are an attractive option” (Lubbers et al., 2002, p. 348). Further, Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) define a protest vote in the following manner: “*a vote*

primarily cast to scare the elite that is not policy driven”(p. 58, original italics). Hence, the prime motive behind a ‘protest vote’ is to show dissatisfaction with the political elite (ibid., p. 59). In line with the theory of protest vote both Knigge (1998), Lubbers et al. (2002) and Arzheimer (2009) find that those who are less satisfied with the political system are more inclined to vote for the radical right. Hence, I generate the following hypothesis:

H₁₂: People who are unsatisfied with the democracy are more likely to vote for the radical right.

3.4 A Sum Up

Till now I have presented some of the most common theoretical explanations of support to the radical right, as well as previous findings. It illustrates how no single theory can explain variation in support for the radical right alone. However, what is certain is that both contextual characteristics and individual factors seem relevant in accounting for radical right support. Considering previous literature and findings, the most common theories within the field, namely economic interest theory (ethnic competition theory, on both levels), social identity theory, theory of protest vote and theory of political opportunity structures, seems to have relevance. In this sum up of the theory I show how these theories combined consists of economic, socio-cultural and political factors at both the country level and the individual level.

Considering context level variables, the theoretical approach is two-fold. However, the *ethnic competition theory* as well as the concept *political opportunity structures* is considered relevant. Arzheimer (2009; 2011) himself criticized the somewhat vague notion of political opportunity structures, he still argues for a two-level model including a wide range of both micro and macro variables to be modeled jointly. This is spite of the fact that we cannot fully grasp the underlying psychological processes of the RR support; “[...] although data limitations make it impossible to unpack the details of the underlying psychological process, it is clear that the impact of micro- and macro level variables on the support for the radical right Western Europe should be modeled jointly” (Arzheimer, 2009, p. 261). In other words, the macro level have the possibility of promoting changes in individual preferences, which again can lead to (aggregate) changes in individual political behavior (and possibly an

increase in the chances for an radical right vote). To sum up, contextual factors, (including both *economic country conditions* and other *political factors*) is attached to the question of what influences the success and failure of radical right factors. But the trends are not heterogeneous; there are conflicting findings on whether the RR is affected by high levels of immigrations/numbers of asylum seekers or not. Further, the literature has shown that welfare state protection seems to reduce the appeal for radical right. These economic contextual variables will be tested, and due to the theoretical foundations of both ethnic competition theory and political opportunity structures it is expected that high levels of asylum seekers, unemployment levels are likely to increase the support for the ER, while high levels of welfare state protection reduces support for the ER. Other contextual characteristics are that of political country conditions; several studies have tested how a wide range of political factors influence the RR vote. Concerning opportunity structures, it is highly uncertain how these affect the RR.

With regards to the individual level, a combination of ethnic competition theory, social disintegrations theory, and the notion of a protest vote are plausible explanations for the radical right vote. Combined these theories also represent economic, socio-cultural and political conditions, thus as the individual level. Ethnic competition theory presents both economic and socio-cultural conditions, social disintegration theory present a socio-economic condition as well, while the protest vote explanation present a political condition in accounting for the radical right support. Previous research is mostly unanimous on who the typical RR supporter is. The median RR voter has a clear social profile; he is usually a young male, has little education, is either unemployed or otherwise exposed to competition on the job market, not religious and he is generally unsatisfied with the political system (democracy), he is negative towards immigrants and also negative towards the European Union. Below is a sum up of all the stated hypotheses, as well as an illustrative theoretical model (Figure 1).

Sum up contextual level hypotheses

Ethnic Competition Theory I

H₁: The higher the relative number of unemployed people in a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

H₂: The higher the relative levels of (2a), asylum seekers or (2b) foreign-born population within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

H₃: The higher the relative numbers of asylum seekers within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right, when unemployment levels within a country are high.

H₄: The lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

H₅: The lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right, when the relative numbers of asylum seekers within a country are high

H₆: The lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right, when unemployment levels within a country are high.

Political Opportunity Structures

H₇: The higher the degree of proportionality in the electoral system within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

H₈: The higher the degree of decentralization within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right.

Sum up of Individual Level Hypotheses

Ethnic Competition Theory II

H₉: (9a) Younger people, (9b) lower educated people, (9c) unemployed, and (9d) people with low income, are more likely to vote for the radical right.

H₁₀: People with negative immigrant attitudes are more likely to vote for the radical right.


Social disintegration theory

H₁₁: Non-religious people are the more likely to vote for the radical right.

Protest Vote

H₁₂: People who are unsatisfied with the democracy are more likely to vote for the radical right.

Figure 1. An integrated Two-level Theoretical Model of Radical Right Support



3.5 Party Ideology

Finally, as I have already discussed in Chapter 2, party type/ideology is thought to influence the success of radical right. Initially, I suggested that the conflicting findings on the radical right could be dependent upon how the radical right is defined. Here, Golder (2003) and Carter’s (2005) work were emphasized. Previous findings shows that parties with closer ties to the ‘traditional radical right’ (with links to the Nazis and their ‘puppet regimes’) do worse than other radical right parties (Carter 2005). Further, there are conflicting findings on how contextual factors influence the radical right, and this could be related to selection bias. For instance, Golder (2003) finds that the negative effects of immigration are only present for populist parties (leaving out neo fascist parties). Thus, following Golder’s (2003) argument that neo-fascist parties are substantially different from common radical right parties, I have

presented two approaches to the radical right definition. The first approach is inspired by the way of selection that several of the central scientists of the RR vote behaviour use, namely a *pragmatic approach*. At least in their empirical studies, they pay little attention to the work done by those studying the party family and the ideology of the radical right. Next, I follow Golder's (2003) argument, and screen out those parties characterized as neo-fascist, this the second approach is called *Golder's populist parties*. Here I test for both Golder's (ibid.) and Carter's (2005) typology of so-called neo-fascist parties.³² As parties with more moderate views (usually those that are not closely attached the 'old' or 'traditional' radical right) do better in polls than the more radical ones I will examine whether this provides different outcomes: Are previous findings dependent upon how the radical right is defined? The latter is an improvement compared to both Lubbers et al. (2002) and Arzheimer's (2009) multilevel study. Even though this in little degree has been tested substantially in previous research (i.e. in little degree theorized), I argue one could expect that leaving out the most extreme of the radical right parties, in Carter (2005) described as neo-Nazi and neo-fascist parties (i.e. Golder's populist parties), would lead to stronger effects of the contextual economic and socio-cultural and political country factors. Given that those parties left out are more ideologically extreme, could it be that the voters of populist parties are more concerned with the actual economic or social context, while the approach including neo-fascist parties will be less strong because neo-fascist parties are more concerned with ideology, rather than the actual context? However, this is by no means certain. On the other hand one could also suggest that the effects related to economic and sociocultural factors are stronger when including the neo-fascist parties, due to the fact that they are more extreme, and thus even more concerned with the actual context than the voters of populist parties? Further, could it be that long-term political factors related to strategic voting (i.e. proportionality) is of less importance in the pragmatic approach because (when neo-fascist's are included), the most important thing is to actually vote for the RR, not whether their respective votes are transitioned into political influence? However, it is by no means that this finding will be true, due to the fact that the neo-fascist parties are such a small proportion of the total amount of parties in the pragmatic approach. Either way, Golder (2003) found that neo-fascist voters to a lesser extent than populist's take into considerations related to strategic voting (i.e. political

³² She find that neo-Nazi parties and neo-fascist parties are related with less electoral success, while authoritarian xenophobic parties, neo-liberal xenophobic parties and neo-liberal populist parties usually are related to more success (Carter, 2005, p. 61).

institutional features), suggesting that they are more ideologically focused than they are instrumental: “[...] neofascist parties are less concerned with instrumental goals than populist parties” (ibid. p. 451). In fact, he argues that neo-fascist parties are more “expressive” (ibid, p. 453). Hence, I present the following exploratory hypothesis:

H₁₃: Economic, socio-cultural and political factors will have even stronger effects on the RR support, when applying Golder’s definition of the populist parties.

4. Data and Method

First I present the data materials that serve as the basis for my analyses. I begin with the primary dataset, which is the European Values Study Integrated dataset 1981-2008. Next I present data gathered from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)(1999, 2011, no date-a, no date-b), UN (1992, 2002, 2011), Golder (2003) and Comparative Political Dataset I (Armingeon, et al., 2011b). Then I describe how each of the variables are operationalized and coded, beginning with the dependent variables, before I present the operationalization of the context variables and finally the individual control variables. Descriptive statistic of the dependent and independent variables are presented within each subchapter. The chapter ends with an account of the logistic multilevel method. Finally, an evaluation on the study's validity and reliability is done underway.

4.1 The Data Material

The data is collected from a range of sources. The primary dataset is the European Values Study Integrated dataset 1981-2008. This dataset was chosen to complement the two previous multilevel studies by Arzheimer (2009) and Lubbers et al. (2002). The European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research program on Europeans values (i.e. how they think about family, work, religion, politics, or society). The studies draws random probability samples with a net sample size of approximately 1500, which varies from country to country depending on its population size. Citizens were usually interviewed personally (face-to-face) (EVS, 2011, p. 5). The European Values Study is a multi-country survey now covering 47 European countries/jurisdictions (this also included the non-European countries of USA and Canada in the first two waves). However, the number of countries within the study has grown over time. So far it has been carried out four waves. The first study was gathered in the period between 1981 and 1984, this included 16 countries. The second study was gathered between 1990 and 1993, and included 27 countries. The third round was between 1999 and 2001 and included 33 countries, while the final and fourth round was gathered between 2008 and 2008 and included 47 countries (ibid.). Since I study support for radical right parties' from the third wave (which is considered to have started in the 1980's) I I'm interested in all four waves, covering the total timespan between 1981 and

2008.³³ The dataset was gathered from the GESIS Data Archive, through Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. All analyses based on these data are solely my own, and no others are responsible for the interpretation or analysis undertaken in this thesis.

Further, I have gathered and coded state level data from several sources. Data on unemployment levels, asylum seekers and foreign population were drawn from OECD's online library (also referred to as OECD iLibrary) (OECD, no date-a, no date-b).³⁴ To avoid absolute numbers, I calculated the percent of asylum seekers (from OECD) of the population (from UN) for the given year. Population numbers were drawn from the UN's demographic yearbook(s) (UN, 1992, 2002, 2011).

Numbers on foreign populations for the two first waves were taken from Golder (2007). The foreign populations numbers are measured as the percentage of foreign citizens in each country. He mainly gathered the data from individual national statistics, though supplementing from the OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook publications for the years missing. At the time of the data gathering, Matt Golder was a Ph.D. candidate employed at the New York University. For additional information on the data, I refer to the codebook.³⁵ The foreign population numbers for the final two waves (1999 and 2008) I gathered from OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook (OECD, 2010). All numbers on foreign population are given in percentages of the total population. Most of the data published through the OECD are taken from the individual contributions of national correspondents appointed by the OECD Secretariat with the approval of the authorities of Member countries. Although the International Migration Outlook compiles national data, it has no authority to impose changes in the data collection procedure or to correct government statistics (ibid.). Hence, the quality of the data depends on the quality of the national data collection procedures, meaning that there could be differences in quality and comparability of the data. Thus, even though there are challenges concerning the reliability of these data, I still regard

³³ The data file "EVS 1981-2008, Longitudinal data file" is available through the GESIS - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences webpages. For more information on metadata and study descriptions, see; <http://zocat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zocat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5> [last accessed 26.07.2013].

³⁴ However, it should be noted that the latest available data on unemployment benefits is for 2007. Therefore, numbers unemployment benefit on the fourth EVS round (2008) have been given 2007-numbers in the dataset.

³⁵ The codebook belonging to the dataset is available through Matt Golder's Dataverse.: <http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mgolder> [last accessed 26.07.2013].

them as reliable enough to use in this thesis.

Data on unemployment benefit rates (through OECD referred to as the gross replacement rate) is also extracted from the OECD (2011). The OECD summary measure on gross replacement rates is defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment (ibid.). The numbers represent the percentage of previous gross earnings.

And finally, new numbers on opportunity structures (disproportionality and decentralization) is drawn from on the Comparative Political Dataset I (Armingeon, et al., 2011b). While the original numbers on disproportionality stems from the Gallagher Index, the numbers on federalism stems from Lijphart (1999). Both numbers are available in the latter piece. In his study of the radical right vote, Arzheimer (2009) included numbers on both disproportionality and federalism extracted from Lijphart (1999), however, those numbers were not updated since 1996. I use updated numbers including recent years as well (up until 2006) from Armingeon et al. (2011a). The work on the dataset is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, and is suited for cross national, longitudinal and pooled time series analyses. As a final remark I emphasize that none of the organizations or authors mentioned is responsible for the result or the interpretations of my analyses. These are solely my own.

4.2 Operationalization of Variables

In this chapter I describe how each variable is operationalized and coded. First, the dependent variables are described. Initially I present which radical right parties I consider as part of the pragmatic approach, before I lay out which parties are a part of Golder's populist approach. Secondly, the main independent variables, namely the contextual level variables, are laid out in detail. Finally I explain how the control variables at the individual level are operationalized and coded.

4.2.1. The Dependent Variables

This study will make use of the country specific EVS-variable e179 [which party would you first vote for: first choice] to study the individual and contextual effects on the radical right

support (EVS, 2011).³⁶ Each country within Western Europe where at least one respondent entered support for a radical right party is included in the study.³⁷ This leaves me with a selection of 11 countries (see Table 2 below). Immediately, one can imagine that it is wrong to leave out those countries where there is no radical right support. Basically this could lead to biased estimates, as the context in those countries where there are factors that discourage radical right support will be systematically underrepresented; this fact is particularly highlighted by Golder (2003, p. 434). However, his approach of including so-called ‘failed-cases’ is by no means clear-cut when dealing with micro data, according to Arzheimer (2009, p. 266). First of all, if there are very low levels of radical right support within a country, strong effects of social desirability may bias the measurement of the intention to vote for an RR party.³⁸ Even though the problem of social desirability is constantly an issue when trying to measure political support, including failed-states could bias the estimates even more. Additionally, those with RR sentiment may be prevented from yielding their support, as there might be no candidates in ‘failed cases’ with no RR support. Hence, the measurement of RR will be underestimated (ibid). Based on the arguments outlined by Arzheimer (2009), I have chosen to exclude failed-cases. These countries are Great Britain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Further, radical right parties often fall in under categories such as ‘others’ in large-scale quantitative studies. The RR support is then often underestimated, as it will be in this study as well (this is a well-known problem within RR studies). While failed cases is said to be countries where not one respondent claimed to support a radical right party, this could actually be due to the fact the EVS does not report any RR parties in those countries. Hence, including these countries could also lead to biased estimates. For instance, we know that the ‘New Democracy’ and recently the ‘Sweden Democrats’ usually would be counted as radical right parties in Sweden, but in the EVS data none of these parties are given their own category (though probably included in the category ‘other’). The same goes for Great Britain, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain (for a reminder, look back at Table 1, p. 10).³⁹

³⁶ By comparison, Arzheimer (2009) used Eurobarometer (EB)-data and the variable ‘vote intention’ as the main dependent variable. Lubbers et al. (2002) on the other hand, made use of EB-data, EES-data, ISSP-data and national election studies to measure the support to RR parties. His dependent variables resembles that of Arzheimer (2009) (i.e. vote intention), however with some variations as he has several sources.

³⁷ Because this study spans back to the early 1980’s it is confined to Western Europe, due to political, social and economic differences.

³⁸ Social desirability refers to the tendency to rotate responses towards socially acceptable answers (Ringdal, 2007, p. 331).

³⁹ Portugal is excluded because not a single respondent had an intention to vote for the radical right party ‘Christian Democrats’.

Only people above 18 years old are included. Consequently, the total number of respondents in the EVS study for all four waves in the countries in question is 50.104. However, only 34.045 answered question e179 in one way or another, which means that 32,06 percent of the sample falls out. Further, those who did not have a right to vote, those who would not vote, and others are left out. Those who said they would cast a white vote are given the value 0 (not radical right party). This further decreases the sample by 1421 respondents, leaving me with a total sample of 32.642 valid respondents (which is 65,11 percent of the total sample of 50.104). Considering the fact that the average voting turnout in Western Europe is somewhere near 80 percent, this figure is somewhat low (IDEA, 2004). Additionally, to avoid large numbers of missing, I could alternatively code those who did not know what to answer on e179 into 0. Further, if there are systematic similarities between the respondents who are missing, this may affect the results. To find out whether the missing respondents are systematic among certain group of the society, I could have compared the demographic characteristics of each country with that of the demographics of the EVS data (Ringdal, 2007, p. 198). However, this was not done. Either way, the EVS data still provides a high number of respondents to perform a multilevel analysis with relatively high validity.

Table 2 column 1 show of how I, based on the well-known work of previous researchers of the radical right, define the party family throughout this thesis. The definition of an RR party in this study is based on previous scholarly judgments using a pragmatic approach (see Table 1, p. 10), but it is naturally limited to the parties that are included in the EVS-studies. Further, the selection of parties is naturally confined to the period under study. Hence, in column I, the dependent variable e179 'radical right_prag' is coded as 1 if a respondent intends to vote for the Freedom Party or the Alliance for the Future of Austria in Austria, the Flemish Blok/Interest, National Front or Agir in Belgium, the Danish People's Party or the Progress Party in Denmark, the True Finns in Finland, the Republicans, National Democratic Party of Germany or the German People's Union in Germany, the National Front or the National Republican Movement in France, the Social Movement-Tricolour Flame, National Alliance or the Northern League, The Lombard League and Veneto League in Italy, the Centre Party, the Centre Democrats, the Party for Freedom or Group Verdonk/ Proud of the Netherlands in the

Table 2. Dependent Variables; Two Definitions (I and II) of Radical Right Parties.

Country	Radical Right Parties	Definition I	Definition II
		Pragmatic Approach	Golder's populist parties
Austria	FPÖ	X	X
	BZÖ	X	X
Belgium	VB	X	X
	FNb	X	X
Denmark	Agir	X	X
	FrPd	X	X
Finland	DF	X	X
	PS	X	
France	FNf	X	X
	MNR	X	X
Germany	Rep	X	X
	DVU	X	
Greece	NPD	X	
	LAOS	X	X
Italy	ANi	X	
	MS-FT	X	
	MSI	X	
	LN	X	X
	LL	X	X
	LV	X	X
Netherlands	CP	X	X
	CD	X	X
	PVV	X	X
	GV/ToN	X	X
Norway	FrPn	X	X
Switzerland	SVP	X	X
	SD	X	X
	LdT	X	X

Note: **Austria** – FPÖ: *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Austrian Freedom Party). BZÖ: *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* (Alliance for the Future of Austria). **Belgium** – Agir (To Act), FNb: Front National (National Front), VB: *Vlaams Belang* (Flemish Blok/Interest). **Denmark** – DF: *Dansk Folkeparti* (Danish Peoples Party), FrPd: *Fremskridtspartiet* (Progress Party). **Finland** – PS: *Perussuomalaiset* (True Finns). **France** – FNf: *Front National* (National Front), MNR: *Mouvement National Républicain* (National Republican Movement). **Germany** – DVU: *Die Volksunion* (German People's Union), NPD: *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (National Democratic Party of Germany), Rep: *Republikaner* (Republicans). **Greece** – LAOS: *Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós* (Popular Orthodox Rally). **Italy** – ANi: *Alleanza Nazionale* (National Alliance), LN: *Lega Nord* (Northern League), MSI: *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social Movement), MS-FT: *Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore* (Social Movement-Tricolour Flame), LL: *Lega Lombarda* (Lombard League), LV: *Lega Veneto* (Veneto League). **Netherlands** – CP: *Centrumpartij* (Centre Party), CD: *Centrumdemocraten* (Centre Democrats), PVV: *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Party for Freedom) GV/ToN: *Group Verdonk/Trots op Nederland* (Group Verdonk/Proud of the Netherlands). **Norway** – FrPn: *Fremskrittspartiet* (Progress Party). **Switzerland** – LdT: *Lega dei Ticinesi* (Ticino League), SD: *Schweizer Demokraten* (Swiss Democrats), SVP: *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (Swiss People's Party).

Source: EVS 1981-2008.

Netherlands, the Progress Party in Norway, the Swiss People's Party (since 1990), the Swiss People Party, Swiss Democrats or Ticino League in Switzerland.⁴⁰ All other parties received

⁴⁰ Party for Freedom (PVV), Proud of the Netherlands/Group Verdonk (GV) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP) are not listed by any authors in table 2.1. The reason for this is that these parties either was founded later than 2002, which means that they are too new to be included in any of their studies, or there has been some uncertainty to whether they should be counted as an RR party. The PVV was established in 2006 and is run by the somewhat controversial politician Geert Wilders. They are considered as an RR party because of their distinct anti-immigrant and anti-EU attitudes (Art, 2011; West, 2010). Group Verdonk/Proud of the Netherlands was formed in 2007 but was dissolved already in 2010 due to a low electoral score in the general elections (Vossen, 2010).

the value of 0. In Table 1 column II the dependent variable is recoded to distinguish between the two definitions of radical right parties. I separate those parties that do not have an evident neo-Nazism or neo-fascism ideology, based on Carter's (2005) RR typology, and Golder's (2003) arguments. Carter (2005) provides a five-fold typology, narrowing 18 different types of RR parties down to either neo-Nazi (radically xenophobic, classic racism, reject existing democratic system), neo-fascist (not xenophobic or racist, but reject existing democratic system), authoritarian xenophobic (radically xenophobic, culturist, wants reform of existing system: less democracy, less pluralism and more state), neo-liberal xenophobic (radically xenophobic, culturist, wants reform of existing system: more democracy and less state) or neo-liberal populist (not xenophobic or racist, but wants reform of existing system: more democracy and less state) (pp. 28-50). I further simplified this typology down to include only those radical right parties without neo-Nazi or neo-fascist ideology. These two latter categories are similar to Golder's (2003) definition of the neo-fascist parties. The main difference between the two authors is that Golder (*ibid.*) also includes the Dutch Centre Party and Centre Democrats. Those parties left out of the variable 'Golder's populist parties' are the German People's Union and National Democratic Party from Germany, and the Italian parties National Alliance, Social Movement-Tricolour Flame and the Italian Social Movement. The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that there is a difference of 1.554 respondents within the two dependent variables.

Further, Table 1 in the Appendix show that there are high levels of radical right support in Austria (ranging from 15.30 to 17.96 percent of the sample yielding support) and Norway (particularly in 2008, with a peak of 21.38 percent). Italy apparently had a peak in both 1981 and 1999 (respectively 13.84 and 20.28 percent), while Switzerland also show high levels (21.39 percent) of radical right support (they are only present for the 2008 EVS wave). The number for Italy is significantly lower applying the Golder's populist right definition, as the percentages of radical right support then ranges between 0 and 8.16 compared to a range of 8.84 and 20.28 applying the pragmatic approach. Germany also experience decrease in the level of radical right support applying the second approach, however, this decrease is not as

The Swiss People's Party on the other hand experienced a renewal in the 1990's and can today be counted as an RR party. For more information on this, study chapter 5 in Skenderovic (2009). Arzheimer (2009) includes both the Rural Party and True Finns, however this is only due to the fact that these parties are treated as one in the EB. I have yet to see others including the Rural Party as a radical right wing party of the third wave, hence they are left out in my analyses.

substantial as in the Italian case. The levels of radical right support in Germany is either way quite low; by applying a pragmatic approach the EVS data show a high peak of 2.09, while leaving out the neo-fascist parties Germany only reaches a peak of 1.77 percent support for the radical right.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables

Dependent variables	Min	Max	Mean	S.d.	N
Radical right_prag	0	1	0.071	0.258	32.624
Radical right_Golder	0	1	0.062	0.241	31.070

Source: EVS 1981-2008.

4.2.2 State Level Variables

Even though the countries in question are considered quite similar with regards to economic, political and social conditions, and therefore are often grouped in as one unit in large quantitative studies, there are still notable differences between them. For instance, one could assume that there are differences in the unemployment benefits when comparing one of the Scandinavian countries and Greece. While the Scandinavian countries are well-known for their well-developed welfare state, Greece is known for their restrictive unemployment benefits (Kieler, Lutz, & Vamvakidis, 2001, p. 43). At the same time, Greece is known for their high unemployment levels, while for instance Norway is particularly know for their low levels of unemployment (SSB, 2008, p. 215). It is therefore important to take into account various economic, social and political differences when comparing radical right support between them.

Unemployment

Unemployment levels in each country are measured as the number of unemployed persons divided by the civilian labor force. The numbers are given in percentages of the population. This variable is a ratio level variable, and Table 4 show that the variable ranges between a minimum of 2.6 percent of the population and a maximum of 12.5 percent of the population. A more thorough look at the allocation shows that, as expected, the country with the lowest levels of unemployment was Norway in 2008. Further, the country with the highest levels of unemployment was Greece, in 2008.

Asylum seekers

Further, this thesis set out to see how the effect of high levels of immigration within a country (recall; large out-group) increases the likelihood of radical right support. However, different studies use different measures for 'immigration' (i.e. Kitschelt & McGann (1995) and Golder (2003) uses the foreign population measure, Swank and Betz (2003) and Arzheimer (2009) uses the asylum seekers measure). Hence, both variables are included. The number of asylum seekers is given in percentages of the population, as the actual numbers of asylums seekers are divided by the population numbers. This is also a ratio level variable, spanning from 0.024 percent in Denmark in 1981 to 3.695 percent of the population in Denmark in 1990.

Immigration

Further, numbers on foreign population consists of persons who still have the nationality of their home country. This number may include persons born in the host country (often referred to as second generation immigrants) (OECD, 2010). This numbers is also a ratio variable, and is reported as the percent of the population. The lowest level of foreign population is found in Italy in 1981, while the highest level of foreign population is found in Switzerland in 2008. I control for both out-group variables, even though the variable asylum seekers is considered the main measure. Finally, an important note should be made about the measurement of immigrants. Considering the fact that there possibly is large numbers of unmeasured immigrants within certain countries, these measurements can be highly underestimated or biased. For instance, Italy and Greece have long had problems of high numbers of illegal immigrants (Nomikos, 2013). Still, there is little I can do about this than keeping it in mind when discussing the findings. Further, the fact that I include two different measures for the size of out-groups can hopefully contribute to decrease the margin of error.

Unemployment Benefits

As studies of the radical right have tried to bring in the institutions of the welfare state in accounting for the radical right support, this will be controlled for in the same manner as Arzheimer (2009). By including a variable that measure the percent of the gross replacement rate within a country, I will check whether welfare institutions have the ability to dampen the negative effects of a competitive environment. Numbers on *unemployment benefits* is defined as "the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rate for two earnings levels,

three family situations and three durations of unemployment (OECD, 2011). Table 1 in the appendix show that the highest levels of unemployment benefits are registered in Denmark in 1999, while Italy had a lowest measure of 0.680 in 1981. However, while the theoretical expectations is that the lower the level of unemployment benefits increase radical right support, this variable has been reverse coded, to ease the interpretation of the results. Hence, instead of expecting a negative coefficient I expect a positive coefficient. Substantially, a positive coefficient would mean that low levels of unemployment benefits within a country increase the likelihood of a citizen's support the radical right.

Proportionality

Finally, I include two opportunity structure variables, namely *proportionality* and decentralization to account for how political factors influence a person's likelihood of supporting a radical right party. The original variable disproportionality is based on the Gallagher Index, and is useful to measure the disproportionality of an electoral outcome. That is, the difference between the percentage of votes received and the percentage of seats a party gets in the legislature. The lower the index value the lower the disproportionality (Lijphart, 1999, p. 189). Hence, the variables are given in percentages of electoral disproportionality (i.e. implying a majority electoral system). The variable ranges from a minimum of 0.346 in Denmark in 2008, to a peak of 17.651 in France in 1999. This variable is expected to increase the likelihood of radical right support when levels of disproportionality (majority system) are low. Accordingly, to ease the interpretation of the results this variable has been reverse coded, and thus named *proportionality*. So, instead of expecting a negative coefficient I expect a positive coefficient. Substantially, a positive coefficient would mean that low levels disproportionality (i.e. suggesting *proportional* electoral system) within a country increase the likelihood of a citizen's support the radical right.

Decentralization

The variable *decentralization* is based on Lijphart's (1999) index of federalism. Each country is given a value between 1 and 5, where the value 1 represents a unified and centralized state, 2; a unified and decentralized state, 3; a semi-federal state, 4; a federal and centralized state and finally, 5; a federal and decentralized state. The general idea is that this variable could capture whether federalism (most notably through the option of second or third level

elections) could increase or decrease the likelihood of a radical right vote at the national level. The sample ranges between the lowest value 1 in Greece and the highest value 5, which is observed in both Germany and Switzerland.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for the Main Independent Variables*

Level 2-predictors	Min	Max	Mean	S.d.	N
Unemployment	2.6	12.5	7.067	2.918	32.624
Asylum seekers	0.024	3.695	1.461	1.094	32.624
Immigration	0.5	21.430	6.255	3.357	32.624
Low unemployment benefits	0.680	61.067	27.443	12.117	32.624
Proportionality	0.346	17.651	13.924	3.980	32.624
Decentralization	1	5	3.000	1.336	32.624

Source: EVS 1981-2008.

*These statistics are based on the main analysis with the dependent variable 'radical right_prag'.

4.2.3 Individual Level Variables

As gender is commonly controlled for in studies of the radical right support (i.e. Lubbers et al. 2002); I include a control for this as well. The variable for gender originally had the value 1 for men and 2 for females in the EVS Integrated dataset 1981-2008. To ease the interpretation the variable has been coded into a dummy variable, where men have the value 1 and females the value 0, thus females are left out as the reference category. The variable is named *male*. The variable has 5 missing values.

Age

Ethnic competition theory and previous findings suggest that the younger, those with low education, those unemployed, and those with low income are more likely to vote for a radical right party. *Age* is represented by a continuous variable as in the original dataset, where those over 18 are included. Table 3 shows that the mean age for the respondent in the analysis is 47 years.

Education Level

To measure the education level I include a variable that measures the age the respondent finished their education; the wording of the question is 'what age did you finish your education'. This variable originally had the values if 1 (12 years or less) through 9 (20 years) and finally 10 (21 years or more). The variable was recoded into a dummy set of three variables, distinguishing between lower, middle and high education. Those completing at 15 years or less were recoded into *lower level education*. The variable *middle-level education*

consist of those completing their education at the age between 16 and 19 years, while the variable high-level education consist of those completing their education at 20 years age or older. The dummy variable high-level education is left out as the reference category. The reference category high-level education represents 35.3 percent of the sample; those with low-level education represent 26.6 percent while those with middle-level education represent 38.1 percent. Hence, based on the frequency distribution this recoding is not a significant problem from a methodological standpoint. The variable education level has 652 missing values. This represents 1.9 percent of the sample in the analysis, and is not considered problematic.

Employment

To measure whether lower social strata (and particularly those unemployed) are more likely to support a radical right party, a variable measuring employment status is included. The original question in the EVS Integrated dataset 1981-2008 was 'Are you yourself gainfully employed at the moment or not? Please select from the card the employment status that applies to you', where the respondent could answer 1) Fulltime (30h a week or more), 2) Part time (less than 30h a week), 3) Self-employed, 4) Retired/pensioned, 5) Housewife (not otherwise employed), 6) Student, 7) Unemployed or 8) Other (EVS, 2011). Even though I'm mostly interested in those unemployed, I choose to recode the variable into a dummy set of seven dummies, only leaving out those employed full time.⁴¹ However, as there are few observations in value 8) 'other', it will be merged with those unemployed. Hence, those employed fulltime are the reference category, while those working part-time, those self-employed, those retired/pensioned, those housewife, and students are represented by a separate dummy. The final dummy variable to be included are those unemployed (merged with others). All sort of dummy coding could be problematic, as there could be variations in how the different values affect the radical right support. Alternatively I could have recoded the variable into two dummies, one for those employed, and one for those unemployed. However, by merging these categories I risk to loose information and variation in the analysis (Ringdal, 2007). The employment variable has 176 missing values, equivocal to 0.53 percent of the sample in the analysis.

⁴¹ Thus, following the approach of Lubbers et al. (2002).

Income

Further, income is commonly an important measure in an account of the radical right vote, where those with low income have a higher likelihood of RR support (i.e. lower social strata have a higher likelihood to support a RR party according to ethnic competition theory). The EVS Integrated dataset 1981-2008 have one variable that measures the respondent's income in all four waves.⁴² This variable has the value of 1) Low income, 2) medium income, and 3) High income. In my analysis I recode this into three dummy variables, where only *low income* and *medium income* are included, while high income is left out as the reference category. The variable however, has 4.390 missing values, which is a relative high number (13.4 percent of the sample). Hence, the variable will be controlled for, but not included in the main model.

Immigrant Attitudes

Finally, according to ethnic competition theory, negative attitude towards immigrant can be related to a perceived conflict; hence people with negative immigrant attitudes should have a higher likelihood of supporting a radical right party. To measure *negative immigrant attitudes* I have created a scale based on five variables. These are; 1) Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality], 2) Immigrants undermine country's cultural life, 3) Immigrants are a strain on welfare system, and 4) immigrants will become a threat to society. The respondents were asked to place these statements on a scale between 1 and 10, where 1 equals agreement and 10 equals disagreement. Based on these, I have created a scale. According to Eikemo and Clausen (2007) a scale can be created when we have at least two categorical variables measuring some of the same and have equal values. To assess the scales internal reliability, I have performed a Cronbach's alpha test. The Cronbach alpha ranges from 0 to 1, where numbers above 0.7 is considered the lower limit for a satisfactory internal reliability (Ringdal, 2007, pp. 330-331) Thus, a score of 0.8692 indicate a reliable scale. As the theory suggest that negative immigrant attitudes more likely will lead to a radical right vote, the scale is created with values from 1 through 10, where high values represent negative immigrant attitudes. Unfortunately, these questions were only asked in the final EVS wave, leading to a large amount of missing values (22.022). Hence, the variable will be controlled for, but not included in the main model.

⁴² The variable x047r is constructed on the basis of two other variables (x047 and x047_c01) too cover all four waves. For more information on how they have constructed this variable, see the EVS Variable Report (EVS, 2011, pp. 723-724).

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Control Variables*

Level 1-predictors	Min	Max	Mean	S.d.	N
Male		0	1 0.488	0.499	32.619
Female (ref.)					
Age	18	98	46.680	17.243	32.624
Low education	0	1	0.265	0.441	31.972
Middle education	0	1	0.385	0.486	31.972
High education (ref.)					
Full time employed (ref.)					
Part-time employed	0	1	0.078	0.268	32.448
Self-employed	0	1	0.062	0.241	32.448
Retired/pensioned	0	1	0.222	0.415	32.448
Housewife	0	1	0.095	0.294	32.448
Student	0	1	0.058	0.234	32.448
Unemployed	0	1	0.062	0.241	32.448
Religious (ref.)					
Not religious	0	1	0.357	0.479	30.895
Low income	0	1	0.306	0.461	28.234
Medium income	0	1	0.376	0.484	28.234
High income (ref.)					
Satisfied wit democracy (ref.)**					
Not satisfied with demo.**	0	1	0.404	0.490	19.677
Neg. immigrant attitude**	1	10	5.929	2.172	10.602

Source: EVS 1981-2008.

*These statistics are based on the dependent variable 'radical right_prag'.

** These variables are only included in Table 6 (not the main model), as they are not available for the first three EVS waves (1980-2000).

Religion

In accordance with social disintegration theory I control for whether those not belonging to any religion is more likely to support the radical right. In the EVS Integrated dataset 1981-2008 there are several variables meant to measure religiosity. The variable f034 specifically ask whether the respondent is religious: 'Independently of whether you go to church or not, would go say you are a religious person, not a religious person or a convinced atheist. I recode f034 in to a dummy variable, and those religious are given the value 0 (i.e. reference category), while those not religious and convinced atheist are given the value 1. The dummy variable based on f034 has 1747 missing values (which represent 5.35 percent of the sample in the analysis). Still, I argue that the number of respondent still is large enough to draw certain conclusions from the analysis

Not Satisfied with Democracy

Finally, the protest explanation suggests that the support for the radical right can be

considered a protest-action. Thus, the original variable ‘satisfaction with the way democracy develops’ was recoded into a dummy variable named *not satisfied with democracy*. The original variable consisted of a scale from 1) very satisfied, 2) rather satisfied, 3) not very satisfied, to 4) not at all satisfied. In the new dummy variable those with values 1 and 2 were recoded to 0 (i.e. satisfied with the democracy, which is left out as the reference category), while the values 3 and 4 were given the value 1 (i.e. measuring ‘political dissatisfaction’). The variable has a 12.947 missing values, due to the fact that this question was only asked in the final two waves. Hence, the variable will be controlled for, but not included in the main model.


4.3 Multilevel Logistic Analysis

When combining the effect of both the individual and contextual level I face several specific methodological problems. Most notably, the requirement that the individual characteristics and the contextual characteristics are mutually independent, poses a problem. When the individuals and their context is not randomly assigned to each other, this can lead to a correlation between the individual characteristics and the contextual characteristics; sampled respondents interviewed in the same context will obviously have equal values for contextual variables. So, since the observations in the dataset are nested, this calls for a multilevel analysis (Eikemo & Clausen, 2007, p. 174). Further, since my dependent variables are dichotomous, this calls for multilevel logit analyses. In this study, the respondents in the EVS Integrated Data File 1981-2008 represent the level-1 units. These are necessarily nested within a country (which the samples are drawn from), leading me to set countries as the second level. However, there are only 11 countries present in my analysis. One of the assumptions in multilevel analysis is that there are enough units at the highest level (in this instance, the second level). Snijders and Bosker (1999, p. 44) suggest that the number of level-2 units should *at least* be 10. While level-2 units above 100 are the most preferable option, level-2 units between 10 and 100 is also acceptable. But as a general rule they say that the higher the number of second level units, the better. Now, since each survey corresponds to a particular country and time point (i.e., the date the survey was administered), this opens up the possibility of including country years as the second level unit, which I naturally prefer as the number of country-year units are 34. The benefit of using a two level model is not simply confined to methodological issues. In an account of radical right support, I have argued in

favour of a model that takes into account both individual factors, and contextual factors. A two level statistical model is thus preferred both from a theoretical basis and methodological basis.

Regarding the analysis' reliability, possible effects of social desirability in my dependent variable, radical right support, is probably the main statistical challenge. Unfortunately, social desirability is a problem I hardly can control for (Ringdal, 2007, p. 331). Further, by comparing the percentages of actual radical right votes in the selected countries, to that of figure 4 in next chapter (which represent the intention to vote radical right party in the EVS dataset), I can evaluate how well my data fits the reality. Mostly, the two tables resembles, except that the overall radical right levels are lower in the EVS data than the actual election outcome for the parliamentary year closest to the three final EVS study data gatherings (i.e. the years 1990, 1999, 2008). Sometimes the differences are worryingly high, for instance in Austria in 2008, where the actual outcome for radical right parties are nearly 10 percent higher than the EVS study measures (28.24 in while only 18.68 the EVS study). On the other hand, in Norway the EVS measures are very much similar to the real election outcome. Finally, what strengthens this thesis's reliability and further its qualifications to generalize from the sample to the population is it's large sample size. A sample of approximately 30.000 in the analyses could certainly reduce the margin of error for the results significantly.

Figure 2. Radical Right Electoral Support in the Selected Countries (% of total)*



Source: European Election Database.⁴³

* Years for the elections vary across countries. The parliamentary election year closest to 1990-1991, 1999, 2008, or 2010/2012 where chosen. Thus the numbers should be considered approximate.

⁴³ These numbers are gathered from the European Election Database (EED) available through the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Data are collected from national election authorities, national statistical agencies and other official sources. NSD are not responsible for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here. Available through http://www.uib.no/european_election_database/election_types/parliamentary_elections.html [last accessed 03.06.2013].

5. Analysis

This chapter present and discusses the findings from the multilevel logistic analyses. The analysis is two-fold. First I present the findings applying a pragmatic definition of radical right parties. Second I present the findings applying Golder's (2003) definition of the populist parties, i.e. leaving out those that are defined as neo-fascist parties. Applying a pragmatic approach corresponds to the arguments posed by Golder (ibid.), who suggested that there are substantial differences among certain subgroups within the radical right party family. Although I am unfortunately unable to test radical right parties vs. neo-fascist parties, I test a pragmatic approach vs. an approach were I leave out the neo-fascist parties. However, before I present the multilevel logistic analysis, I introduce basic information on the levels of radical right support. First I present a figure that shows how the intention to vote for a radical right party has developed in Western Europe between 1981 and 2008. Second I present a figure that shows how the intention to vote for a radical right party varies across countries and years.


Figure 3 gives a simple description of the trend on the intention to vote for the radical right across the four observation points in the EVS longitudinal data, 1981-2008. According to these data, there is an increasing trend to support radical right parties across Western Europe.⁴⁴ The top full line describes the trend in radical right support when applying a pragmatic approach. The middle dotted line describes the trend applying the second approach, leaving out the most 'extreme' neo-fascist parties. The lower dashed line describes the trend for the neo-fascist parties.⁴⁵ There are only small differences when comparing the two approaches, and both show a distinct positive trend. The change between the two approaches is best illustrated by looking at the lower dashed line that represents neo-fascist parties. In comparison to radical right parties, neo-fascist parties have experienced considerably less support. This is not surprising, as this fact is pointed out by both Golder (2003) and Carter (2005). This figure merely emphasizes the fact that the most interesting research design would be to compare moderate vs. the neo-fascist parties. However, this is not possible to do

⁴⁴ This could be due to an overall considerable smaller sample size; as the EVS survey has gradually included more and more countries, the first wave was confined to only a few. Hence, in the first wave there are no data on Austria, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway or Switzerland. Still, by only looking at the trend between 1990 and 2008, the data still show a significant increase in the radical right support.

⁴⁵ The 'extreme' neo-fascist parties include the German DVU and NDP, and the Italian ANi, Ms-Ft, and MSI. Head back to Table 2 on page 42 for an update on which parties are included in the different definitions.

applying a multilevel method.

Figure 3. Intention to Vote for the Radical Right, 1981-2008 (% of Total).




Source: EVS 1981-2008

Figure 4 however, gives more detailed information on how the intention to vote for a radical right party varies across countries and across the four waves. The figure divides between countries; hence it is easy to see both within-country and between-country variance.

The table shows that there are high levels of radical right support in Austria in the period between 1990 and 2008. In Belgium the EVS data show no support for the radical right in 1981, but between 1990 and 2008 the levels of RR support varies between 1.83 percent and 8.18 percent support. In Denmark, the intention to vote for a radical right party seem to be quite stable, ranging between 5.59 and 8.74 percent support. In Finland, the intention to vote for the radical right was not measured in 1981, but in 1990 the EVS show that there are no support for the radical right. In 1999 the level of radical right support has increased to 1.59 percent, and further with a steep increase to 12.24 percent support in 2008. Germany has had a low and stable support for the radical right, ranging from no support in 1981, to a peak of 2.09 percent in 2008. In Greece, the RR support is only measured in the final two EVS waves (1999 and 2008), and the table shows that none yielded an intention to vote for a radical right

party in 1999, however this increased to 3.37 percent in 2008.

Figure 4. Intention to Vote for a Radical Right Party, Across Countries and Years (% of Total) (prag. approach).



Source: EVS 1981-2008.

Italy however, apparently has experienced great variations: In 1981, 13.84 percent voiced an intention to vote for the radical right. In 1990, this number was down to 8.84 percent, while increasing sharp to a peak of 20.28 percent in 1999. Finally in 2008, 9.58 percent had an intention to vote for the radical right. Netherlands has also had a sharp increase in the intention to vote for the radical right. The EVS only had measures for 1990, 1999 and 2008. Hardly anyone voiced support to the radical right in the second or third EVS wave, however 10.52 percent supported a radical right party in 2008. In Norway, the level of support has ranged between 13.11 (in 1990) and 21.62 percent (in 2008). However, there are no available EVS data form 1981 and 1999. Finally, Switzerland, which unfortunately is only included in the final EVS wave, stands out with an all time high intention to vote for the radical right (22 percent) in 2008, compared to all others. Hence, Figure 4 shows that there are great variations

on the intention to vote for a RR party both within and between countries.

5.1 Model Building

Before I introduce the main results on how the contextual factors affect the radical right vote, recall that two of the variables at the individual level was only available for either one or two of the EVS studies (i.e. immigration attitudes and attitudes towards the democracy were only available for the years 2008 and 1999-20008 respectively). Income, on the other hand had a substantial amount of missing. Hence, instead of simply including all Level 1 variables at the same time, (effectively reducing the sample size to approximately 10.000 observations), I will present a table with blockwise inclusion of individual level variables. By doing this I can evaluate which model to proceed with as a basis for the next step; which is to include contextual level variables.

The results of the model building are presented in Table 6. The interpretations of the results are not necessarily intuitive in logistic regression. Actually, a drawback with logistic regression is that it is hard to make substantial judgments about the size of the effects of the coefficients. By reporting the logit, I can only interpret the direction of the coefficient (i.e. whether it positively or negatively affect the radical right support) (Ringdal, 2007, pp. 414-415). Another option is to interpret the odds ration (OR). An odds ratio of 1 means no effect, an odds ratio above 1 means positive effect, while an odd ratio below 1 should be interpreted as a negative effect. The third option is to report from the probability scale. However, this is quite labor intensive. As I am more interested in the direction of the coefficients that the effective size, I report the logit as well as its standard error. Further the table reports the Level-2 variance, the intra class correlation (ICC) and the log likelihood, in addition to observation numbers. The level-2 variance tells how much unexplained variance within the model can be subscribed to the contextual level. The ICC can be interpreted as the proportion of variance that can be attributed to the highest level in the analysis, based on the variance at the individual level.⁴⁶ The $-2 \log$ likelihood ($-2LL$) suggests whether the model improves, as

⁴⁶ The variance on the individual level is not reported in logistic multilevel analysis. This makes the calculation of the ICC difficult, as the variances at both levels are commonly used to calculate the ICC. However, Snijders and Bosker (1999) suggest an alternative way of calculating the ICC in multilevel lgoistic analysis: $(100 * \text{var level2}) / (\text{var level2} + 3.29)$ (pp. 304-305). Further, it is not uncommon that the ICC (as well as the level 2 variance) increase by adding level 1 variables, due to the fact that the variance in the residuals at level 1 is reduced.

well as how good the model fits. A $-2LL$ of zero implies a perfect model.⁴⁷

The table reports the findings from five models, as well as an empty model. The empty model, model 0, is without any explanatory variables. Model 1 includes a number of variables at the individual level, respectively, gender, age, education, and employment status. Model 2 includes income level. Income is then removed from the further models, while model 3 instead include control for immigrant attitudes. The variable measuring immigrant attitudes is also left out from further models, instead a control for religion is included in model 4. Finally, model 5 includes control for satisfaction with the democracy.

The empty model in the first block of the table show an ICC of 0.48, indicating that 48 percent of the variance in radical right wing voting is attributed to countries. Thus, factors explaining the radical right vote are to be expected at both the individual level as well as the contextual level. Model 1 includes control for gender, age, education and employment. Most variables turn out significant; males, younger people, those with low and middle education have a higher likelihood of supporting a radical right party.⁴⁸ Further, those self-employed, retired and unemployed positively affect the likelihood of RR support. Students on the other hand, significantly decrease the likelihood of 1(RR). These variables show the same trend the next model; model 2. The new variables however, low and middle income level, are not significant predictors of the radical right vote (which is surprising). Additionally, including control for income effectively reduces the sample size by 4.141 respondents compared to model 1. Thus, income is left out of model 3. However, control for immigrant attitude is added, showing that negative immigrant attitudes increase the likelihood of a radical right vote. Unfortunately, the numbers of respondents are dramatically lowered, as the variable was only asked in the final EVS study (2008). The most worrying aspect in model 3 is that the level-2 units are reduced to 11, which is considered as the lower bound for carrying out a multilevel analysis (Snijders & Bosker 1999, p. 44). Even though immigrant attitudes could be a highly relevant predictor for radical right support, they are still left out in the next model.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ However, to compare these numbers the sample should be the same. Thus, I will not discuss the $-2LL$.

⁴⁸ Control for curve linearity turns out insignificant.

⁴⁹ As the level-2 variance and ICC is drastically lower including control for immigrant attitudes, this is probably a particularly good predictor in accounting for the radical right support.

Model 4 includes control for religion. Being not religious significantly improves the likelihood of RR support, thus this variable is not left out in the next block. The final model, model 5, also includes control for political dissatisfaction. This variable turns out positive and significant but dramatically reduces the sample size due to high numbers of missing (only asked in the two final EVS studies, 1999 and 2008).

Table 6. Model Building: Individual Factors and Radical Right Support (Pragmatic Approach)

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)
Constant	-3.356***	-3.462***	-3.470***	-5.128***	-3.532***	-3.557***
Male		0.547*** (0.051)	0.563*** (0.055)	0.421*** (0.080)	0.506*** (0.052)	0.505*** (0.062)
Age		-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.003)
Low education		0.604*** (0.070)	0.620*** (0.078)	0.271** (0.119)	0.589*** (0.073)	0.647*** (0.087)
Medium education		0.628*** (0.059)	0.651*** (0.064)	0.379*** (0.089)	0.629*** (0.060)	0.623*** (0.070)
Part-time employed		-0.026 (0.096)	-0.041 (0.105)	-0.105 (0.147)	-0.010 (0.098)	-0.047 (0.113)
Self-employed		0.269*** (0.085)	0.233** (0.095)	0.315** (0.137)	0.272*** (0.087)	0.205* (0.107)
Retired		0.202** (0.083)	0.170* (0.092)	0.128 (0.133)	0.221*** (0.085)	0.320*** (0.101)
Housewife		0.064 (0.100)	0.014 (0.111)	-0.005 (0.185)	0.049 (0.103)	0.098 (0.130)
Student		-0.388*** (0.121)	-0.536*** (0.146)	-0.483** (0.206)	-0.372*** (0.124)	-0.490*** (0.153)
Unemployed		0.281*** (0.091)	0.258** (0.101)	0.281* (0.149)	0.250*** (0.095)	0.265** (0.112)
Low income			0.061 (0.070)			
Middle income			0.021 (0.061)			
Neg. Immigrant att.				0.463*** (0.022)		
Not religious					0.153*** (0.053)	-0.032 (0.066)
Not satisfied w/democracy						0.776*** (0.059)
Level 2 Variance	3.083 (0.981)	3.156 (1.001)	2.989 (0.952)	1.119 (0.489)	3.048 (0.966)	2.343 (0.898)
ICC	0.48	0.489	0.476	0.253	0.504	0.416
-2LL	-14.948	-14.196	-12.114	-5.208	13.410	-9.140
N level 1	32,624	31,808	27,667	10,360	31,031	18,615
N level 2	34	34	34	11	34	20

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: EVS 1981-2008

Somewhat surprising is the fact that the control for being disintegrated, religion, falls below significance and changes direction when the protest vote thesis is tested.

There are particularly two considerations to be accounted for when deciding which model should serve as the basis for the next step, i.e. including contextual level variables. First, one of the most important preconditions with statistical models is that all possible variables should be included (Ringdal, 2007). Further, the considerations behind every variable included should first and foremost be grounded in theoretical considerations. Secondly, one is forced to adapt to available data, as this rarely fulfill the theoretical requirements. Thus, in an assessment of which model to proceed with one has to carefully consider whether the sample size and the requirements for the model are sufficient, as well as whether the variables included are significant. As the main aim of this paper is to do a multilevel analysis, this effectively leaves out model 3, as I consider the number of level-2 units quite low. Model 5 also reduces the sample size considerably, and effectively leaves out 1981 survey from the analysis. As I'm mainly in doing a multilevel analysis on the radical right support since 1981 (i.e. recall that von Beyme (1988) suggested a 'third wave' of the radical right parties which began in the 1980's), this leaves me with model 4 as the basis for my further analysis.

Still, the main findings from table 6 are that the theory of ethnic competition theory, social disintegration theory as well as the explanation of a protest vote are confirmed (H_9 – H_{12}). Hypothesis 9 (i.e. lower social strata) is mostly confirmed; the only exception is H_{9d} , which relates to low income. However, overall I find that people from lower social strata will more likely vote for the radical right, than others. Low social strata is defined as those that are young, are lower educated, and are unemployed (H_{9a-c}). Thus, in line with ethnic competition theory people experience a conflict over scarce resources which leads them to both positive in-group attitudes, which is closely related to negative out—group attitudes. Additionally, the table showed that those self-employed and retired also increase the likelihood of voting for the RR, compared to those in full time work. Possibly, this could be related to the fact that these people as well experience though economic conditions, or that they somehow feel threatened (i.e. financially or otherwise) by immigrants. Ethnic competition theory argued that people from lower social strata are more inclined to vote for a radical right party, as they are

more prone to the competition over scarce resources than others. Scarce is first and foremost related to economic resources (i.e. the labor market), but can also be applied to competition over cultural resources. Further ethnic competition theory does not only confine negative out-group attitudes to those who experience *actual* competition. Negative out-group attitudes could also occur when somebody *perceives* conflict. Regardless of whether people are in a conflict over scarce resources or not, people could perceive that they are in a state of conflict against the out-group. Negative immigrant attitudes are meant to measure whether people perceive a threat or conflict towards immigrants. Model 3 show that negative immigrant attitudes increase the likelihood of voting for a radical right party, i.e. confirming hypothesis H₁₀. Next, social disintegration theory is confirmed in at least two ways. In chapter 3 I suggested that social disintegration theory could relate to those unemployed, as well as those non-religious. As a response to a (perceived) breakdown of the society, people feel alienated from the social system (possibly causing anxiety, anger and isolation). As a result of this mental state people would long for substitute intermediary structures, including strong leadership and a rigid ideology, which Kornhauser (1960) suggested could be related to radical right parties. The positive effect on RR of being both unemployed and non-religious (H₁₁) is confirmed. Even though the control for being non-religious fall below significance in the next model, being unemployed still has a significant positive influence on the radical right support. Thus, the theory of social disintegration can only partly be confirmed. The fact that being non-religious is not significant in model 5 suggests that there are other measures that are more important in explaining the RR support, than the control for religiosity. Finally, the idea that people who vote for the radical right is generally dissatisfied with the political elite and the democracy in general, is suggested by the explanation of a protest vote. Radical right parties commonly position themselves as some sort of protest parties, and they often negative towards the ruling system. Thus, as the table shows that people who are more dissatisfied with the democracy are more inclined to vote for a radical right party, hypothesis H₁₂ can be confirmed. At the same time, when controlling for a protest vote, the positive effect of being non-religious falls below significance. This suggest that the notion of a protest vote is more important than the notion of being non-religious. However, the table generally confirms findings from previous research.

5.2 Contextual Factors and the Radical Right Vote

5.2.1 A Multilevel Model Applying a Pragmatic Approach

Table 7 controls for the six contextual factors I presented in Chapter 4. The level-2 variables are included blockwise, due to the number of level-2 units. The general rule is to include one predictor for every ten units at the highest level. Thus, I could have included three and three variables at a time (as I have 34 level-2 units). However, by including them blockwise I will be able to see which variables has the most impact on the radical right vote, by comparing the change in both the level-2 variance and the ICC.⁵⁰ Table 8 controls for interaction terms. I will mainly discuss the direction of the variables. Further, in multilevel analysis with large number of observations at level 1 it is fairly easy to get statistical significant results for the level-1 predictors (given that *** = $p < 0.01$). However, as the number of groups included in the analysis is fairly low (34 and 31 respectively), the chances of getting significant results for the level-2 variables are somewhat smaller (Snijders & Bosker, 1999, p. 177-179). However, the appropriate significance level is set; the lower limit is set at 10% likelihood of making a fallacy (to avoid making a type-II error). This should make up for the low level-2 observations, but again could lead to a higher likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis for the level-1 predictors when they in fact are true (type-I error).

The first block in table 7, model 6, is merely a repeat of model 4 in the previous table. This is included to see the effect of each of the level-2 variables compared to this model. Hence I'm able to see which of the variables that has the most impact on the radical right vote, after controlling for level-1 factors. Model 7 includes control for the relative number of unemployed people within a country. According to ethnic competitions theory, a situation with high levels of unemployment within a country is likely to lead to negative out-group values. This is linked to the fact that people are in a competition over scarce resources, and the worse this situation is, the more likely will negative out-group sentiments arise. As radical right parties have deliberately linked high levels of unemployment to the number of immigrants, I assume that in countries with high unemployment levels, there will be a higher likelihood of voting for the radical right (H_1). However, in contrast to my theoretical

⁵⁰ The downside of not including several factors at a time, is that I cannot test different theories up against each other. So, even if I do get statistically significant results, I must be careful with drawing too certain conclusions from them (Ringdal, 2007, p. 162).

expectation, model 7 shows that there is a negative relationship between high unemployment levels and the likelihood for a radical right vote. This means that an increase in level of unemployment within a country will dampen the likelihood of someone voting for a radical right party.

Table 7. Logistic Multilevel Model: Intention to Vote for the Radical Right: Pragmatic Approach

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)
Constant	-3.532***	-2.887***	-4.000***	-3.941***	-3.879***	-4.750***	-3.386***
Male	0.506*** (0.052)	0.506*** (0.052)	0.506*** (0.052)	0.506*** (0.052)	0.506*** (0.052)	0.506*** (0.052)	0.506*** (0.052)
Age	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Low education	0.589*** (0.073)	0.590*** (0.073)	0.590*** (0.073)	0.589*** (0.073)	0.589*** (0.073)	0.590*** (0.073)	0.590*** (0.073)
Medium education	0.629*** (0.060)	0.629*** (0.060)	0.629*** (0.060)	0.628*** (0.060)	0.629*** (0.060)	0.629*** (0.060)	0.629*** (0.060)
Part-time	-0.010 (0.098)	-0.010 (0.098)	-0.010 (0.098)	-0.010 (0.098)	-0.010 (0.098)	-0.010 (0.098)	-0.010 (0.098)
Self-employed	0.272*** (0.087)	0.273*** (0.087)	0.273*** (0.087)	0.273*** (0.087)	0.272*** (0.087)	0.272*** (0.087)	0.272*** (0.087)
Retired	0.221*** (0.085)	0.222*** (0.085)	0.222*** (0.085)	0.221*** (0.085)	0.221*** (0.085)	0.222*** (0.085)	0.221*** (0.085)
Housewife	0.049 (0.103)	0.050 (0.103)	0.050 (0.103)	0.050 (0.103)	0.049 (0.103)	0.050 (0.103)	0.049 (0.103)
Student	-0.372*** (0.124)	-0.372*** (0.124)	-0.372*** (0.124)	-0.372*** (0.124)	-0.372*** (0.124)	-0.372*** (0.124)	-0.372*** (0.124)
Unemployed	0.250*** (0.095)	0.250*** (0.095)	0.250*** (0.095)	0.250*** (0.095)	0.250*** (0.095)	0.250*** (0.095)	0.250*** (0.095)
Not religious	0.153*** (0.053)	0.152*** (0.053)	0.153*** (0.053)	0.152*** (0.053)	0.153*** (0.053)	0.153*** (0.053)	0.153*** (0.053)
Unemployment rate		-0.089 (0.103)					
Asylum seekers			0.367 (0.285)				
Immigration				0.069 (0.079)			
Low unempl. benefits					0.013 (0.023)		
Proportionality						0.089 (0.072)	
Decentralization							-0.052 (0.242)
Level-2 variance	3.048 (0.966)	2.917 (0.934)	2.904 (0.919)	2.972 (0.942)	3.009 (0.955)	2.907 (0.922)	3.039 (0.964)
ICC	0.480	0.469	0.468	0.474	0.477	0.469	0.48
-2LL	-13.410	-13.410	-13.410	-13.410	-13.410	-13.410	-13.410
N level 1	30.131	30.131	30.131	30.131	30.131	30.131	30.131
N level 2	34	34	34	34	34	34	34

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: EVS 1981-2008

However, the finding is not statistically significant, which means that my negative trend cannot be expected to hold in the population. Why this is the case could be subject for discussion. Applying the pragmatic approach, levels of unemployment within a country are apparently a poor predictor for the radical right vote.

Model 8 includes the variable measuring the relative numbers of asylum seekers, while model 9 includes another measure for out-group, namely the relative number of foreign population within a country (named 'immigration'). Ethnic competition theory suggests that high numbers of out groups within a country will increase the likelihood of someone voting for the radical right. The main common denominator for radical right parties of different types and sizes is that their main concern are immigrants; both the increase of the number of immigrants as well as their (apparently) lacking ability to adapt to their new home country. Further, as I said in the previous section, immigrants have also been directly linked to the levels of unemployment within a country, i.e. radical right parties suggest that immigrants take over the native citizens' jobs (Jupskås, 2012, p. 77). Model 8 show that the levels of asylum seekers within a country have a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for a radical right party (in other words, increasing levels of immigrants, thus increasing the likelihood of an RR vote). Model 9 also show a positive direction. Both measures of high numbers of out-groups have the expected positive effect on the radical right vote (H_2), but the results are not statistically significant. This means that I cannot generalize my findings to the population.

Model 10 includes a control for the dampening effects of the welfare state, namely a control for levels of unemployment benefits. Ethnic competition theory suggests that tough economic circumstances could lead to negative out-group sentiments. Thus, high levels of unemployment benefits could dampen the effect of an otherwise competitive environment. This led me to hypothesis H_3 , which suggest that low levels of unemployment benefits increase the likelihood of a radical right vote. The variable low unemployment benefit has the expected positive direction (i.e. low levels increase the likelihood of 1=RR), but the finding cannot be generalized to the population.

Finally, Model 11 and model 12 includes control for political country conditions, namely degree of proportionality and decentralization respectively. The theory of political

opportunity structures has led me to expect that proportional electoral system within a country should increase the likelihood of a citizen's supporting a radical right party (H₇). In line with theoretical expectations I find that more proportional systems increase the possibility of a radical right vote (though not significant). From the direction of this finding, one could suggest that people are strategic voters. In a majority system people could feel that a vote for the radical right is wasted, as most of these fringe parties are relatively small.⁵¹ Further, on the grounds that a high degree of decentralization with a country could dampen the likelihood of radical right opportunities (i.e. support), I expected a positive relationship of the variable in model 12 (H₈). However, the table show that the more decentralized a country is, the less likely is a radical right vote. Though, this finding is not statistical significant. Further, with hardly any change in the level 2 variance (as well as the ICC), this implies that the two long-term political variables is of very little importance in explaining the radical right vote, particularly the latter measure related to the degree of centralization.

So far I have mostly commented on the direction of each of the variables, as well as linked them to the respective theoretical expectations. By looking at how the level-2 variance changes as well as the change in the ICC, I can also see how much impact each of the variable has on the radical right vote (compared to a model without any contextual level variable. i.e. model 6). The smaller the ICC (and level-2 variance), the more impact the factor has on the radical right vote. In other words; the unexplained variance between countries decreases. As the table shows, compared to model 6, model 8 seems to have the most impact on the radical right vote. In model 8, control for the levels of asylum seekers is included. Thus, the control for asylum seekers is a better predictor in an account of the radical right vote, than the other control for large out-groups, namely immigration. Further, the changes in $-2LL$ are so miniscule, that they are not reflected in the table. This is not surprising due to the fact that only one contextual factor is introduced within each model. But overall, since none of the findings turn out statistically significant, the contextual level factors apparently have no impact on the radical right vote. However this is not to say that contextual factors in general is of little or no importance: but the selected economic, socio-cultural and political country

⁵¹ However, with some notable exceptions. In the 2009 elections the Norwegian Progress Party was the second largest party in Norway. Further, in Switerland the Swiss People's Party have long been an influential actor. Further, if radical right parties keep growing in terms of size and influence, the fact that these arguments are laid out for smaller fringe parties to 'break through', the theoretical arguments need revision.

conditions included in this model seems to be of utterly small importance in accounting for radical right support. As a final comment, the level-1 control variables do not substantially change by including level-2 variables. In fact, the changes are only miniscule. This means that previous finding on individual level factors can still be confirmed. So, even though I include control for contextual level factors, individual level factors seem to be far better predictors for the radical right vote.

Next, I have included controls for three interactions terms (H_3 , H_6 and H_7). First, I suggested that the positive effects of high unemployment levels and large out-group on the radical right vote should reinforce each other (H_3). Thus, in countries where there are both high levels of unemployment and a large out-group, this would further increase the likelihood of someone voting the radical right. Model 13 in table 8 however, show a negative effect of the interaction-term, and it is not statistical significant. Further, model 14 includes for the interaction between low unemployment benefits and high numbers of asylum seekers.

In chapter 3 I suggested that the higher the levels of unemployment benefits would dampen the positive effect of large out groups on the likelihood of a radical right vote (H_5). Thus, the interaction between low unemployment benefits and high numbers of asylum seeker should show be positive direction (i.e. that these two factors should further increase the likelihood of a radical right vote).

Model 14 show that the interaction term is positive. However, the finding is not statistically significant. Finally, I suggested that low levels of unemployment benefits would increase the likelihood of $RR=1$, when unemployment levels are high (H_6). Thus, the interaction between low unemployment benefits and high numbers of unemployed people within a country should be positive (i.e. that these two factors should further increase the likelihood of a radical right vote). However, model 15 show a negative trend that is not statistically significant. Overall, the true meanings of the interaction terms are not easy to detect unless they are graphed in a conditional effect plot. However, since none of the expected terms are statistically significant i.e., they cannot be expected to actually exist in real life.

Table 8. Logistic Multilevel Model, Intention to Vote for the Radical Right: Interaction Terms (Pragmatic Approach)

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
	L(S.E.)	L(S.E.)	L(S.E.)
Constant	-3.882***	-4.146***	-5.220**
Male	0.506*** (0.052)	0.506*** (0.052)	0.506*** (0.052)
Age	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Low education	0.590*** (0.073)	0.589*** (0.073)	0.589*** (0.073)
Medium education	0.629*** (0.060)	0.629*** (0.060)	0.629*** (0.060)
Part-time	-0.010 (0.098)	-0.009 (0.098)	-0.010 (0.098)
Self-employed	0.273*** (0.087)	0.272*** (0.087)	0.272*** (0.087)
Retired	0.222*** (0.085)	0.221*** (0.085)	0.221*** (0.085)
Housewife	0.050 (0.103)	0.049 (0.103)	0.049 (0.103)
Student	-0.372*** (0.124)	-0.372*** (0.124)	-0.372*** (0.124)
Unemployed	0.250*** (0.095)	0.250*** (0.095)	0.250*** (0.095)
Not religious	0.152*** (0.053)	0.152*** (0.053)	0.152*** (0.053)
Unemployment rate	-0.010 (0.158)		0.134 (0.279)
Asylum seekers	0.522 (0.747)	-0.089 (0.629)	
<i>Asylum seekers*unemployment rate</i>	-0.031 (0.104)		
Low unemployment benefits		0.004 (0.030)	0.089 (0.079)
<i>Low unemployment benefits*asylum seekers</i>		0.020 (0.022)	
<i>Low unemployment benefits*unemployment rate</i>			-0.008 (0.009)
Level-2 variance	2.838 (0.908)	2.756 (0.872)	2.760 (0.886)
ICC	0.463	0.455	0.456
-2LL	-13.408	-13.406	-13.408
N level 1	30.131	30.131	30.131
N level 2	34	34	34

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: EVS 1981-2008

5.2.2 A Multilevel Model Applying Golder's Populist Approach

Table 9 uses the same approach as table 7 in the previous section. Model 17 show that there is

a statistically significant negative effect of high levels of unemployment on the likelihood of voting for a radical right party. This means that the higher the relative number of unemployed people within a country, the less likely is a vote for the radical right. This is contrary to my theoretical expectation (H_1), which argues that high levels of unemployment should increase the likelihood of a radical right vote. Further, the decrease in the ICC (as well as level-2 variance) implies that this model has the most impact on the radical right vote, compared to the models. Overall, the argument posed by ethnic competition theory that tough economic conditions (i.e. high unemployment levels) should lead to negative out group attitudes which again should lead to a vote for than radical right, is definitely not confirmed. Considering that (at least at the time of the final EVS wave), there was an ongoing financial crisis, combined with steadily increasing levels of radical right support across several countries; I find this result even more surprising (that is, if the ethnic competition argument should be true). On the other hand, could it be so that people living in countries with high levels of unemployment prefer other parties than the radical right? An increase in unemployment levels can instead increase the support for leftist-parties, due to the fact that these parties often have issue ownership on employment (i.e. Jakobsen & Listhaug, 2012). In fact, there is a considerable amount of research that suggests that economic factors, such as high unemployment levels, provide outcomes that is not related to radical right parties. The effect of unemployment levels on the RR vote has the same direction for both definitions of the radical right. However, it is only when I apply the slightly more narrow that this finding is significant. The fact that Finland is left out of this approach, could possibly temper the findings. However, by looking closer at the descriptive statistics in table 1A in the appendix, I suggest that Italy is probably the source of this change. Italy, which shows levels of RR support at approx. 20 percent in 1999, show only approx. 2 percent support for radical right support applying the more narrow approach. At the time, Italy had very high unemployment levels (11.5 percent unemployment). This is probably one of the reasons why high unemployment levels show statistically significant negative results applying the slightly more narrow definition of radical right parties.

Model 18 show that there is a statistically significant positive effect of high levels of asylum seekers on the likelihood of voting for the radical right. This finding confirms H_2 , which argued that the higher the level of asylum seekers (i.e. large out-group), the more likely is a

vote for a radical right party.

Table 9. Logistic Multilevel Model, Intention to Vote for the Radical Right (Golder's Pop. Approach).

	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22
	L(S.E.)	L(S.E.)	L(S.E.)	L(S.E.)	L(S.E.)	L(S.E.)	L(S.E.)
Constant	-3.820***	-2.348***	-4.587***	-4.659***	-3.190***	-4.841***	-3.981***
Male	0.477*** (0.057)	0.478*** (0.057)	0.478*** (0.057)	0.477*** (0.057)	0.477*** (0.057)	0.477*** (0.057)	0.477*** (0.057)
Age	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Low education	0.655*** (0.080)	0.655*** (0.080)	0.655*** (0.080)	0.655*** (0.080)	0.656*** (0.080)	0.655*** (0.080)	0.655*** (0.080)
Medium education	0.643*** (0.066)	0.643*** (0.066)	0.644*** (0.066)	0.642*** (0.066)	0.643*** (0.066)	0.643*** (0.066)	0.643*** (0.066)
Part-time	-0.098 (0.109)	-0.098 (0.109)	-0.098 (0.109)	-0.098 (0.109)	-0.098 (0.109)	-0.098 (0.109)	-0.098 (0.109)
Self-employed	0.238** (0.099)	0.239** (0.099)	0.238** (0.099)	0.238** (0.099)	0.238** (0.099)	0.238** (0.099)	0.238** (0.099)
Retired	0.244*** (0.093)	0.245*** (0.093)	0.245*** (0.093)	0.244*** (0.093)	0.245*** (0.093)	0.245*** (0.093)	0.244*** (0.093)
Housewife	0.042 (0.114)	0.043 (0.114)	0.043 (0.114)	0.043 (0.114)	0.043 (0.114)	0.043 (0.114)	0.042 (0.114)
Student	-0.481*** (0.144)	-0.480*** (0.144)	-0.480*** (0.144)	-0.481*** (0.144)	-0.481*** (0.144)	-0.481*** (0.144)	-0.481*** (0.144)
Unemployed	0.171 (0.107)	0.172 (0.107)	0.171 (0.107)	0.172 (0.107)	0.171 (0.107)	0.171 (0.107)	0.171 (0.107)
Not religious	0.216*** (0.057)	0.215*** (0.057)	0.216*** (0.057)	0.215*** (0.057)	0.216*** (0.057)	0.217*** (0.057)	0.216*** (0.057)
Unemployment rate		-0.201* (0.106)					
Asylum seekers			0.582** (0.294)				
Immigration				0.134 (0.086)			
Low unempl. benefits					-0.023 (0.026)		
Proportionality						0.075 (0.076)	
Decentralization							0.057 (0.261)
Level-2 variance	3.365 (1.125)	2.823 (0.966)	2.935 (0.981)	3.071 (1.029)	3.294 (1.098)	3.246 (1.087)	3.364 (1.124)
ICC	0.505	0.461	0.471	0.48	0.50	0.496	0.505
-2LL	-11.308	-11.286	-11.286	-11.288	-11.290	-11.290	-11.290
N level 1	28.498	28.498	28.498	28.498	28.498	28.498	28.498
N level 2	31	31	31	31	31	31	31

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: EVS, 1981-2008

The next model controls for immigration levels (also measure large out-group) and shows that an increase in immigration levels increase the likelihood of a radical right vote (in line with H₂). However, this trend is not significant and cannot be generalized to the population. On the other hand, the size of standard error shows that it is just below significance. Either way, as the measure of asylum seekers show a significant increased likelihood of RR vote, ethnic competition theory's argument that a large out-group lead to negative out-group sentiments, and thus increased likelihood of RR support, seem to hold. Again, explanation for why there is a change between the two approaches probably lies in the exclusion of Finland, but even more in the tempering in the definition of radical right parties in Italy: Table 1A in the appendix show that applying a pragmatic approach Italy in 1999 show low numbers of asylum seekers combined with high levels of RR support, while the alternative definition of the radical right show that Italy has low levels of asylum seekers combined with low levels of radical right support.⁵²

Model 20 includes control for unemployment benefits, and the negative sign of the coefficient implies that the lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country decrease the likelihood of a RR support, rather than increase. However, the finding is not significant. Thus, my claim that lower levels of unemployment should increase the likelihood of an RR vote (H₄), is not confirmed. The theoretical base for this argument lies within ethnic competition theory, and within the arguments posed by Swank and Betz (2003) and Arzheimer (2009). The argument is that high levels of unemployment benefits could decrease the likelihood of an RR vote, since people would feel less threatened by an economic though environment, i.e. high levels of unemployment benefits would dampen the supposedly constant state of conflict over scare resources towards the out-group.

Finally, model 21 and 22 includes control for the two long-term political factors proportionality in the electoral system and decentralization in the political system

⁵² Further, when evaluating the effects of large out-groups I must emphasize the fact that these measures unfortunately could be somewhat misleading, as there in some countries is large number of unregistered immigrants. Italy, as well as Greece, is countries particularly related to this issue (Nomikos, 2013). On the other hand, two measures for out-group sizes should to some degree weigh of for the margin of error.

respectively. The proportionality of the electoral system and degree of decentralization of a country is meant to measure whether certain political constellations are more favorable towards radical right parties. The degree of proportionality in electoral systems could be an incentive for people to vote for the radical right, as the theory suggest that majority systems is less favorable to smaller parties and newcomers (H₇). However, this finding was not significant. Neither was the positive effect of decentralization. The latter was meant to measure whether the ability to vote through so called second level election increase or dampen the support for radical right parties. One of the argument was that subnational election could increases radical right parties an opportunity structure for growth as this provides the parties' with longed political training and access to the media. However, the control for these long-term political features has shown insignificant for both definitions of radical right parties, i.e. the theory of political opportunity structures does not hold, at least not with these measures. However, this does not mean that I can simply reject the notion of political opportunity structures. As I said initially, opportunity structures could possibly include a whole range of both meso-level and macro-level structures. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) for instance, emphasized that especially features of the particular political context (and the role of party competition) is of great importance (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). Further, by looking at the change in ICC compared to the ICC model 16, especially the variable decentralization seems to be of no importance.

Table 10 shows the inclusion of the interaction terms. Model 24 show that the interaction term between low unemployment benefits and the number of asylum seekers is statistically significant, while the others two are not. As it is quite hard to grasp the meaning of the interaction term as presented in the table, a graph below show how the effects of various out group sizes changes the likelihood of radical right vote when unemployment benefits decrease. It is important to recall that the variable unemployment benefits is reversed (i.e. a value of 0 on the x-axis implies high levels of unemployment benefits, while 60 on the x-axis implies low levels of unemployment benefits). The two bottom lines show the intention to vote for a radical right party when the levels of asylum seekers are at the minimum and mean respectively irrespective of the change in unemployment benefits levels. These out-group levels do not seem to affect the intention to vote for a radical right party.

Table 10. Logistic Multilevel Model, intention to Vote for the Radical Right: Interaction Terms (Golder's pop. Approach)

	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25
	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)
Constant	-3.316**	-3.014***	-2.499
Male	0.478*** (0.057)	0.478*** (0.057)	0.477*** (0.057)
Age	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Low education	0.656*** (0.080)	0.655*** (0.080)	0.656*** (0.080)
Medium education	0.643*** (0.066)	0.643*** (0.066)	0.643*** (0.066)
Part-time	-0.098 (0.109)	-0.098 (0.109)	-0.098 (0.109)
Self-employed	0.239** (0.099)	0.239** (0.099)	0.239** (0.099)
Retired	0.245*** (0.093)	0.245*** (0.093)	0.245*** (0.093)
Housewife	0.043 (0.114)	0.043 (0.114)	0.043 (0.114)
Student	-0.480*** (0.144)	-0.480*** (0.144)	-0.480*** (0.144)
Unemployed	0.172 (0.107)	0.172 (0.107)	0.172 (0.107)
Not religious	0.215*** (0.057)	0.215*** (0.057)	0.215*** (0.057)
Unemployment rate	-0.144 (0.162)		-0.140 (0.286)
Asylum seekers	0.382 (0.753)	-0.601 (0.627)	
<i>Asylum seekers*unemployment rate</i>	0.006 (0.103)		
Low unemployment benefits		-0.055* (0.032)	0.002 (0.081)
Low unempl. Benefits*asylum seekers		0.045** (0.023)	
Low unempl. Benefits*unemployment rate			-0.002 (0.009)
Level 2 variance	2.819 (0.963)	2.579 (0.854)	2.684 (0.916)
ICC	0.461	0.439	0.449
-2LL	-11.286	-11.282	-11.286
N level 1	28.498	28.498	28.498
N level 2	31	31	31


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: EVS 1981-2008

However, when the out-group size is set at its maximum level (upper line), the intention to vote for the radical right increases as the unemployment benefits levels decreases. The latter seem to confirm hypothesis H₅. The theoretical base for this hypothesis was that Swank and Betz (2003), as well as Arzheimer (2009), argued that in a otherwise competitive environment

with a large out group, high levels of unemployment benefits could provide the citizens with a sense of security (i.e. financial security), which again could dampen the negative out-groups sentiment caused by a conflict over scarce resources. Thus, in situations where there are high levels of asylum seekers, (which should otherwise increase the likelihood of a radical right vote), high levels unemployment benefits should decrease the likelihood of an RR vote, as the figure shows. Recall from chapter 4 that the mean level of asylum seekers is 1.461 percent. Maximum levels of asylum seekers peak at 3.695 percent, which is registered in Denmark. Austria, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland also show high levels of asylum seekers. As do Germany, but only in 1990. Thus, for Germany (which I have shown have very low levels of RR support), there are probably other explanations as to why the radical right support is not affected by high levels of asylum seekers. Considering their history of the Nazi-regime however, this comes of less a surprise.

Figure 5. Conditional Effectplot Between levels of Unemployment Benefits on Min, Medium and Max Levels of Asylum Seekers.



Source: EVS 1981-2008

All in this, the analysis and the effect plot shows that unemployment benefits have little impact on it's own. However, when high levels of unemployment benefits are combined with high levels of asylum seekers, this dampens the support for radical right parties. This confirms the findings of Arzheimer (2009).

To briefly sum up, contextual factors seem to provide little in an account of radical right support. The miniscule changes in the level-2 variance as well as the -2LL have consistently shown that each of the variables has little or no explanatory power. If anything, a large out-group seems to increase the likelihood of the intention to vote for a radical right party. The robust findings from the individual level seem to hold in both approaches, and I can with certainty conclude that factors related to the individuals are much better predictors in accounting for radical right support in my analyses. Below is a schematic overview on the results from my findings.

Table 11. A Sum Up of the Results from the Analyses

Hypotheses	Result*
H ₁ : The higher the relative number of unemployed people in a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right	-
H ₂ : The higher the relative levels of (2a), asylum seekers or (2b) foreign-born population within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right	+/-
H ₃ : The higher the relative numbers of asylum seekers within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right, when unemployment levels within a country are high	-
H ₄ : The lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right	-
H ₅ : The lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right, when the relative numbers of asylum seekers within a country are high	+/-
H ₆ : The lower the levels of unemployment benefits within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right, when unemployment levels within a country are high	-
H ₇ : The higher the degree of proportionality in the electoral system within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right	-
H ₈ : The higher the degree of decentralization within a country, the more likely is a vote for the radical right	-
H ₉ : (9a) Younger people, (9b) lower educated people, (9c) unemployed, and (9d) people with low income, are more likely to vote for the radical right	+/-
H ₁₀ : People with negative immigrant attitudes are more likely to vote for the radical right	+
H ₁₁ : Non-religious people are the more likely to vote for the radical right	+/-
H ₁₂ : People who are unsatisfied with the democracy are more likely to vote for the radical right	+

* + indicates that the hypothesis can be confirmed, - indicates that the hypotheses must be rejected, while +/- indicates that the hypothesis can partly be confirmed.

5.2.3 Pragmatic vs. Golder’s Populist Approach

In chapter 3 I suggested that the effects of contextual factors on the RR vote applying a more narrow approach would be stronger than when applying a pragmatic approach (H₁₃). The general idea is that the most radical parties; i.e. those characterized by Golder (2003) and Carter (2005) as neo-fascist or neo-Nazi parties, are substantially different from the large bulk of ‘mainstream’ radical right parties. Both point to the fact that parties with neo-fascist heritage generally are small parties with little electoral support. Further, I cautiously suggested that voters of populist parties could be more concerned with the actual economic or social context. This argument mainly rests on the idea that neo-fascist parties (which is included in the pragmatic definition of the RR) will be more concerned with ideology, rather than the actual context. Further, as Golder (2003) found neo-populist parties to be more instrumental (i.e. strategic voters) than the neo-fascist’s, I expected especially a high degree of proportionality to be of more importance when excluding the most extreme parties. To control for this I interpret the findings by looking at the odds ratio (OR). By interpreting the OR I’m able to see the size of the effects the variables have on the likelihood of an RR vote. Table 11 provides a schematic overview presenting the OR for all the six variables on both approaches. However, recall that most of the contextual findings on the radical right support are not significant. The only statistical significant findings (unemployment and levels of asylum seekers) were present applying Golder’s (2003) populist approach. Thus, even though I comment on the differences in effect of each variables, these are still of little importance; I discuss the latter point more in detail later.

Table 12. Comparison of the Effects of Contextual Level Variables (OR), Pragmatic vs. Golder’s Populist Definition of the Radical Right.

	Unemploy- mentrate	Asylum seekers	Immigration	Low unempl. benefits	Proport- ionality	Decentral- ization
	OR	OR	OR	OR	OR	OR
Pragmatic approach	0.914	1.443	1.069	1.013	1.093	0.949
Golder’s populist approach	0.817	1.789	1.143	0.977	1.077	1.058

Source: EVS 1981-2008.

First of all, the table shows that the effects of unemployment are negative for both approaches, though slightly stronger for Golder’s (ibid.) populist approach compared to the

pragmatic approach (an OR of 1 implies no effect).⁵³ Even though the finding shows a stronger effect applying the populist approach, this direction is opposite to what I expected. As I have already suggested (on the basis of recent research); in times of high unemployment levels it could be that voters are more inclined to vote for leftist parties, rather than the radical right, as these parties commonly have ownership on issues related unemployment (i.e. Jakobsen & Listhaug, 2012).

Next, control for large out-groups have stronger effects applying the somewhat more narrow definition, compared to the pragmatic approach. In his tripartite approach, testing contextual factors on the overall radical right, the populist right and the neo-fascist parties, Golder (2003) find that the positive effects of immigration on the RR support is only present for populist parties. Thus my finding correspond to that of Golder (ibid.); namely that the positive effect of high levels of asylum seekers is only present when excluding certain factions of the radical right party family. This is in line with my expectations (H₁₃); populist parties could possibly be more concerned with the actual context than the approach including the neo-fascist parties.

The positive effect of low unemployment benefits on the radical right vote in the pragmatic approach turns negative when applying the populist approach. However, none of these approaches were found significant. In general, on it's own, high or low levels of unemployment benefits does not increase or decrease the likelihood of radical right support.

Further, Golder (2003) found that neo-fascist voters to a lesser extent than 'populist's' emphasizes considerations related to strategic voting (i.e. political institutional features). The table shows that the positive effect of proportional elections is in fact stronger when applying the pragmatic approach, compared to the somewhat more narrow approach. However, the differences are small, as well as not statistically significant. The other long-term political country characteristic is that of decentralization; one of the arguments is that subnational election could increase the RR's opportunity structure at the national level as it could provide the parties' with political experience and vital media access. However, the effects are both small and not significant. Further, recall that the size of the level-2 variance and ICC has shows that this variable is of practically no importance in accounting for the radical right

⁵³ One should be cautious when comparing the effects of variables when samples are not equal. However my robustness checks point in the same direction, so I still compare the findings.

support.

Overall I cannot confirm hypothesis H₁₃, which argued that the effects of the contextual factors would be stronger when applying a somewhat more narrow definition of the radical right. Still, the distinction did provide two changes applying the populist approach. The radical right seems to benefit from low levels of unemployment high as well as high levels of asylum seekers. By studying the descriptive statistics (table 1A in the appendix) I claim that the main reason lies in Italy in 1999. The support for the radical right decreases 18 percentages when applying the somewhat narrower definition. Thus, the fact that the National Alliance (AN), Italian Social Movement (MSI) and the Social Movement-Tricolor Flame (Ms-Ft) are excluded significantly changes the outcome of certain contextual factors: There is a significant negative effect of high numbers of unemployed people, as well as there is a stronger and significant positive effect of number of asylum seekers on the intention to vote for a radical right party.⁵⁴ According to the EVS data, the AN stands for approximately 85 percent of the RR support in Italy that year. The Ms-Ft stands for less than 1 percent, and the remaining portion is included in the support for the Northern League, which is part of both definitions of the radical right party family. This leads me to check what other studies of the radical right have done, i.e. have they included or left out the AN from their radical right definition? Arzheimer (2009) do include the AN and still find that the radical right benefits from unemployment levels, but the effects are very limited.⁵⁵ On the other hand Lubbers et al. (2002) do not include the AN on the base of an expert judgment survey (pp. 355-356). Experts are asked to place political parties on a left-right scale ranging between 1 and 10. All parties with a score of 8.5 or higher are defined as radical right (ibid.). Thus, they do not find any significant effects of unemployment levels. At the same time they find that high levels of non-EU citizens increase the likelihood of radical right support. This is also followed up by the most recent multilevel level study which I mentioned in the introduction; Werts et al. (2013) excludes the AN on the base of Lubbers et al.'s (2002) survey, and find that unemployment levels do not positively affect the RR vote. In line with the findings presented here, they find positive effects of high levels of asylum seekers. I have also performed two

⁵⁴ The AN is considered the MSI's successor. The MSI dissolved in 1995, and thus cannot influence the change in the models. Further, the other parties (NPD, DVU) as so small that they most likely have little influence on the change of the outcome of the two analyses.

⁵⁵ Additionally, Arzheimer (2009) uses a more loose limit for significans (he merely looks at the coefficients standard error). This approach is followed by the latest study of Werts et al (2013) as well.

robustness checks to see how fragile the findings from my second approach are: Recall that Golder (2003) argued for an exclusion of the True Finns. By including the True Finns (robustness check I, table 4A in the appendix), only the positive effect of a large out-group is significant. Next, the original neo-fascist definition of Golder (2003) would also exclude the Dutch CP and CD from the populist-definition. Table 5A (robustness check II) in the appendix show that the results are practically identical to my findings in table 9.

All in all my findings suggest that the radical right definition *could* in fact affect whether some of the most commonly tested contextual factors turn out significant or not, i.e. immigration and unemployment. Further, the main reason for this seem to be whether they include the Italian AN in their definition of the radical right or not. This merely emphasizes the fact that political parties are not static; both their ideology and their goals often change over time. The National Alliance was successor to the Italian Social Movement, which was well known for their fascist tendencies. However, the AN over time tried to distance themselves from their fascist heritage, which could point to a direction where they are in fact left out: The renowned Italian radical right expert, Piero Ignazi, is consistent in leaving out the AN from his studies of the radical right, and in fact argues that the AN was becoming more a conservative party than a radical right party (Ignazi, 2005).⁵⁶ Thus, if I had not made the distinction between the two approaches, I would not have learned that the inclusion of the AN was of such impact. This is something to have in mind when evaluation the results from the analysis of other radical right studies.

⁵⁶ The AN was dissolved in 2009.

6 Concluding Remarks

In the following I present a short sum up the structure of thesis. Next I lay out the main findings and conclusions based on my analyses. Finally I make some suggestions for future radical right research.

6.1 Summary

This thesis set out to investigate how contextual factors influence the possibility of a radical right vote. My main motivation for this was that previous studies mostly looked at how either individual or contextual factors respectively influenced the radical right vote. By approaching the radical right with a multilevel method, I was able to see whether how the findings related to contextual characteristics influenced the RR vote, after controlling for individual factors.

Chapter 2 presented the main debate over how to label and define the radical right party family. Without doubt, even though the parties in question have several similar features they are by no means uniform. I argued in favor of the label radical right, (heavily depending on Mudde's (2007) work) as this term is neither too narrow nor too loose. Next, I defined the radical right in two manners; 1) applying a pragmatic approach including all parties commonly mentioned as a radical right party due to their nativism, 2) a somewhat more narrow approach where I excluded the parties characterized as neo-fascist by Golder (2003). The latter distinction was made to see whether there are systematic differences in how contextual factors affect the parties, as the most extreme ones are left out.

Chapter 3 presented the main theoretical arguments commonly used to explain the radical right support. Ethnic competition theory, political opportunity structures, social disintegration theory as well as the protest vote explanation was laid out. On the basis of each theoretical perspective I presented testable hypotheses. This effectively led to chapter 4 where I presented the data and the operationalization of the variables. Chapter 5 presented the results from the analyses. This approach was two-fold: First the results applying a pragmatic definition of the radical right was laid out, and secondly the results applying Golder's (2003) populist approach was laid out. The chapter ended by discussing some of the differences between the two approaches.

6.2 Main Findings

The task of the thesis was two-fold. On the one hand I set out to see how contextual factors influenced the radical right vote, when at the same time controlling for individual factors. On the other hand, I made a point of the fact that radical right experts disagree on how the party family should be defined. Several authors have suggested that there in fact are distinct party families within the overall party family. Thus, I tested for two slightly different definitions of the radical right.

The main conclusion to draw from my analyses controlling for contextual factors, is that contextual factors in fact provide little in accounting for the radical right vote. The miniscule changes in the level-2 variance as well as the $-2LL$ have consistently shown that each of the variables has little or no explanatory power. If anything, high levels of asylum seekers seem to increase the likelihood on the intention to vote for a radical right party. This was in line with my expectations: Ethnic competition theory argues that people are in a constant battle over scarce resources. When the out-group size increases, the battle over resources strengthens, thus negative out-group sentiments arise. As parties of the radical right have are known for their strict immigrant policy, people in these countries are more likely to be attracted to radical right parties than in countries where there are low levels of immigration. Further, the analyses showed that high levels of unemployment in fact decrease the likelihood on the intention to vote. As I have suggested, voters could possibly be more inclined to vote for leftist parties, rather than the radical right, as the former commonly have ownership on issues related unemployment. As Europe is in the midst of a deep economic recession, one should expect that the radical right experience a decline in support. In fact, by looking back at table 2 (p. 55) this could already be a fact. Except from in Finland and Greece, the radical right seems to have lost some support both in Belgium, Denmark, and France compared to previous election.

Further, even though the expected positive effect of low unemployment levels was not seen in it's own; my findings suggest that there could be an interaction between high levels of asylum seekers and low levels of unemployment benefits. This could be explained by the fact that, in an otherwise competitive environment with large out-groups, high levels of unemployment

benefits could provide the citizens with a sense of security (i.e. financial security), which again could dampen the negative out-groups sentiment caused by a conflict over scarce resources (ethnic competition theory). Thus, in situations where there are high levels of asylum seekers, (which should otherwise increase the likelihood of a radical right vote), high levels unemployment benefits should decrease the likelihood of an RR vote.

The other contextual variables however, did not prove to be relevant. Even though contextual factors overall did not show to drastically improve on the radical right account, this is not to say that contextual factors are of less importance. Within this thesis I only controlled for a small selection of contextual characteristics. Further, studies of electoral behavior have consistently shown that the media is an important mediator for voter preferences. For instance, a recent comparative study by Strabac, Thorbjørnsrud and Jenssen (2012) suggest that when people are exposed to commercial TV news, compared to more ‘balanced and informative’ news agencies, they tend to be more negative towards immigrants (p.187). Similarly, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2007, 2009) have in two national studies on news coverage and anti-immigrant attitudes found that the tone of coverage on immigrants in the media significantly affects people’s immigrant’s sentiments, and thus suggest that this could be related to radical right successes. Additionally, it is likely to believe that national preceding event, such as the experiences with the Nazi- or fascist regime, has a considerable amount of impact on the radical right vote in certain countries, as well as other more recent national events and circumstances not included in these analyses.

Additionally, the more robust findings from the individual level seem to hold in both approaches, and I can with certainty conclude that factors related to the individuals are much better predictors in accounting for radical right support in my analyses. However, unfortunately I was not able to include important measures for attitudes in my main analyses. Apparently, negative immigrant attitudes proved important, as well as the measure for a protest vote. In fact, when including the latter, the control for being not religious was no longer significant; i.e. suggesting that dissatisfaction with democracy is a better predictor than religiosity.

Finally, the distinction between the two approaches was only partly successful. First, I would say it was less successful because I was not able to make the distinction the way I initially

intended, i.e. comparing the somewhat more ‘moderate’ parties against the somewhat more ‘extreme’ ones. Due to methodological concerns this was not possible. Merely leaving out the neo-fascist did not lead to considerable changes, except from the fact that two of the variables turned out statistically significant with the somewhat more narrow approach. However, this was more related to the exclusion of the AN itself, than to the exclusion of neo-fascist parties as a group. Thus, sample issues could possibly be a source for differing outcomes. Further, if I had not made the distinction between the two approaches, I would not have learned that the inclusion of the AN was of such impact. Further, my findings cannot lead to the conclusion that a distinction between subgroups within the radical right party family is unreasonable. The fact that authors now point to a possible fourth wave of radical right parties (i.e. Jupskås, 2012, pp. 85-112) strengthen my argument that experts on voting behavior should pay more attention to the work done by experts of party ideology. Parties and ideology is certainly not something immutable.⁵⁷

6.3 Future Research

With regards to future works on the radical right I have a few points to make. I suggest that future studies of electoral behavior should try and implement and put into ‘practice’ the work done by experts of party ideology. A definitional conciseness is advantageous when one has to argue for either leaving out or including borderline cases. Additionally, there is no way around the fact that the composition of the party family and thus the parties themselves evolve over time. If the differences increase, so should the definitional attention of electoral behavior experts. Further, in future multilevel approaches, I suggest that one should not necessarily try to grasp over what is commonly known as the third wave of radical right parties; especially now that researches suggest a fourth wave of radical right parties. This distinction could in fact lead to new insights, as in the example by Werts et al. (2013) who found that euro-skepticism now is of more importance than in previous years.

Additionally, I suggest that contextual factors should still be studied more in detail. Studies should seek to use data fitted for multilevel methods, as I strongly argue that both individual factors and other meso- and macro factors is of importance in an account of the radical right.

⁵⁷ Additionally, the most recent study by Werts et al. (2013) find that euro-skepticism now is an important factor in explaining radical right success. Their study is confined to the period between 2002 and 2008. Previous this finding has shown EU scepticism to be of little importance.

As I discussed in the section above, especially media effects are likely to be of particular importance. Comparable data on these matters would probably drastically increase our knowledge on why the support for radical right parties varies both within and between countries. Recall that I initially said that there is relative little agreement over why the support for RR parties is often unstable, and why the RR is successful in some countries and not in others. In the same way as people's perception of a situation often is more important than the actual situation, it is not unlikely that media effects are of more importance than the actual context.

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Appendix

Table 1A. Descriptive Statistics on the Dependent and Original Main Independent Variables

country	year	level2	RR I* (%)	RR II* (%)	unrate	unbenefits	asylums	Immigr.	disprop	decent
Austria	1990	1	15.30	15.30	3.2	30.326	2.955	5.300	1.369	4.5
Austria	1999	2	19.70	19.70	3.8	32.888	2.483	8.575	3.430	4.5
Austria	2008	3	17.96	17.96	3.8	31.628	1.540	10.410	2.584	4.5
Belgium	1981	4	0	0	10.4	44.638	0.232	8.899	4.058	3.2
Belgium	1990	5	1.91	1.91	8.9	41.833	1.316	9.100	3.111	3.2
Belgium	1999	6	7.88	7.88	8.6	39.000	3.498	8.800	2.925	3.2
Belgium	2009	7	4.51	4.51	7.9	40.048	1.591	9.145	3.290	3.2
Denmark	1981	8	5.45	5.45	10.4	54.200	0.024	2.000	0.871	2
Denmark	1990	9	6.06	6.06	8.4	51.700	3.695	2.900	1.794	2
Denmark	1999	10	6.16	6.16	5.6	61.067	1.333	4.873	0.374	2
Denmark	2008	11	8.77	8.77	3.4	47.689	0.429	5.833	0.346	2
Finland	1990	12	0	-	3.2	36.350	0.550	0.699	4.867	2
Finland	2000	13	1.66	-	9.8	34.190	0.612	1.700	3.021	2
Finland	2009	14	12.66	-	8.3	34.095	1.112	2.696	3.151	2
France	1981	15	0	0	6.8	31.300	0.366	6.800	15.885	2
France	1990	16	4.65	4.65	8	37.263	0.971	6.400	11.793	2
France	1999	17	4.82	4.82	10	36.944	0.522	5.556	17.651	2
France	2008	18	2.15	2.15	9.2	39.021	0.568	5.989	13.685	2
Germany	1981	19	0	0	4.6	29.333	0.800	7.199	0.919	5
Germany	1990	20	1.66	1.22	4.8	28.222	3.053	8.199	4.584	5
Germany	1999	21	1.95	1.77	8.5	26.690	1.159	8.952	2.712	5
Germany	2008	22	2.09	0.69	7.6	23.675	0.268	8.190	1.777	5
Greece	1999	23	0	0	12	12.639	0.145	2.516	6.970	1
Greece	2008	24	3.40	3.40	12.5	17.111	1.769	6.554	9.430	1
Italy	1981	25	13.84	0	8	0.6805	0.064	0.500	2.548	1.5
Italy	1990	26	8.84	5.96	11.5	2.5902	0.083	1.600	2.383	1.5
Italy	1999	27	20.28	2.07	11.5	34.458	0.578	2.170	6.205	1.5
Italy	2009	28	9.85	8.16	7.9	31.676	0.292	6.558	5.174	1.5
Netherl.	1990	29	0.59	0.59	7.7	54.255	1.419	4.199	0.761	3
Netherl.	1999	30	0	0	3.6	52.176	2.702	4.100	1.072	3
Netherl.	2008	31	10.18	10.18	2.8	33.922	0.814	4.374	0.809	3
Norway	1990	32	12.95	12.95	5.3	38.833	0.933	3.300	3.581	2
Norway	2008	33	21.38	21.38	2.6	33.559	3.026	6.354	2.456	2
Switzerl.	2008	34	21.93	21.93	3.2	32.718	2.171	21.430	2.410	5

Source: EVS 1981-2008.

* These figures are based on the sample in the main analyses.

Table 2A. Descriptive Statistics for Unemployment Benefits, Before and After Reverse Coding

Original values unemployment benefits min-max			Reverse coding low unemployment benefits min-max		
country	year	unbenefits	country	year	low_unbenefits
Italy	1981	0.68055	Denmark	1999	0.68055
Italy	1990	2.59027	Netherlands	1990	7.492852
Greece	1999	12.63964	Denmark	1981	7.547989
Greece	2008	17.11111	Netherlands	1999	9.571091
Germany	2008	23.67555	Denmark	1990	10.04799
Germany	1999	26.69017	Denmark	2008	14.05889
Germany	1990	28.22221	Belgium	1981	17.10911
Germany	1981	29.33333	Belgium	1990	19.91466
Austria	1990	30.32638	Belgium	2009	21.69944
France	1981	31.30000	France	2008	22.72643
Austria	2008	31.62883	Belgium	1999	22.74799
Italy	2009	31.67634	Norway	1990	22.91466
Switzerland	2008	32.71885	France	1990	24.48411
Austria	1999	32.88888	France	1999	24.80355
Norway	2008	33.55912	Finland	1999	25.39799
Netherlands	2008	33.92252	Italy	1999	27.28966
Finland	2009	34.09536	Finland	2000	27.55732
Finland	2000	34.19067	Finland	2009	27.65263
Italy	1999	34.45833	Netherlands	2008	27.82547
Finland	1999	36.35000	Norway	2008	28.18887
France	1999	36.94444	Austria	1999	28.85911
France	1990	37.26388	Switzerland	2008	29.02914
Norway	1990	38.83333	Italy	2009	30.07165
Belgium	1999	39.00000	Austria	2008	30.11916
France	2008	39.02156	France	1981	30.44799
Belgium	2009	40.04855	Austria	2990	31.42161
Belgium	1990	41.83333	Germany	1981	32.41466
Belgium	1981	44.63888	Germany	1990	33.52578
Denmark	2008	47.68910	Germany	1999	35.05782
Denmark	1990	51.70000	Germany	2009	38.07244
Netherlands	1999	52.17690	Greece	2008	44.63688
Denmark	1981	54.20000	Greece	1999	49.10835
Netherlands	1990	54.25514	Italy	1990	59.15772
Denmark	1999	61.06744	Italy	1981	61.06744

Source: EVS 1981-2008.

Table 3A. Descriptive Statistics for Disproportionality, Before and After Reverse Coding

Original values Disproportionality Min-max			Reverse coding proportionality Min-max		
country	year	disprop	country	year	prop
Denmark	2008	0.346	France	1999	0.4185
Denmark	1999	0.374	France	1981	2.184
Netherlands	1990	0.761	France	2008	4.384
Netherlands	2008	0.809	France	1990	6.276
Denmark	1981	0.871	Greece	2008	8.639
Germany	1981	0.919	Greece	1999	11.099
Netherlands	1999	1.072	Italy	1999	11.864
Austria	1990	1.369	Italy	2009	12.895
Germany	2008	1.777	Finland	1990	13.202
Denmark	1990	1.794	Germany	1990	13.485
Italy	1990	2.383	Belgium	1981	14.011
Switzerland	2008	2.410	Norway	1990	14.488
Norway	2008	2.456	Austria	1999	14.639
Italy	1981	2.548	Belgium	2009	14.779
Austria	2008	2.584	Finland	2009	14.918
Germany	1999	2.712	Belgium	1990	14.958
Belgium	1999	2.925	Finland	2000	15.048
Finland	2000	3.021	Belgium	1999	15.144
Belgium	1990	3.111	Germany	1999	15.357
Finland	2009	3.151	Austria	2008	15.485
Belgium	2009	3.290	Italy	1981	15.521
Austria	1999	3.430	Norway	2008	15.613
Norway	1990	3.581	Switzerland	2008	15.659
Belgium	1981	4.058	Italy	1990	15.686
Germany	1990	4.584	Denmark	1990	16.275
Finland	1990	4.867	Germany	2008	16.292
Italy	2009	5.174	Austria	1990	16.700
Italy	1999	6.205	Netherlands	1999	16.997
Greece	1999	6.970	Germany	1981	17.150
Greece	2008	9.430	Denmark	1981	17.198
France	1990	11.793	Netherlands	2008	17.260
France	2008	13.685	Netherlands	1990	17.308
France	1981	15.885	Denmark	1999	17.695
France	1999	17.651	Denmark	2008	17.7235

Source: EVS 1981-2008.

Table 4A. Intention to Vote for the Radical Right, Robustness Check I - Including the *True Finns* as 'populist'*

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)
Constant	-3.850***	-2.781***	-4.646***	-4.684***	-3.234***	-4.956***	-4.065***
Male	0.472*** (0.056)	0.472*** (0.056)	0.472*** (0.056)	0.472*** (0.056)	0.471*** (0.056)	0.472*** (0.056)	0.472*** (0.056)
Age	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Low education	0.678*** (0.079)	0.678*** (0.079)	0.678*** (0.079)	0.678*** (0.079)	0.679*** (0.079)	0.678*** (0.079)	0.678*** (0.079)
Medium education	0.674*** (0.064)	0.674*** (0.064)	0.675*** (0.064)	0.673*** (0.064)	0.675*** (0.064)	0.674*** (0.064)	0.674*** (0.064)
Part-time	-0.095 (0.107)	-0.095 (0.107)	-0.095 (0.107)	-0.095 (0.107)	-0.095 (0.107)	-0.095 (0.107)	-0.095 (0.107)
Self-employed	0.257*** (0.096)	0.257*** (0.096)	0.257*** (0.096)	0.257*** (0.096)	0.257*** (0.096)	0.256*** (0.096)	0.257*** (0.096)
Retired	0.241*** (0.091)	0.242*** (0.091)	0.241*** (0.091)	0.241*** (0.091)	0.241*** (0.091)	0.241*** (0.091)	0.241*** (0.091)
Housewife	0.044 (0.112)	0.045 (0.112)	0.045 (0.112)	0.044 (0.112)	0.045 (0.112)	0.045 (0.112)	0.044 (0.112)
Student	-0.467*** (0.140)	-0.467*** (0.140)	-0.467*** (0.140)	-0.467*** (0.140)	-0.467*** (0.140)	-0.467*** (0.140)	-0.467*** (0.140)
Unemployed	0.201** (0.102)	0.202** (0.102)	0.201** (0.102)	0.202** (0.102)	0.201** (0.102)	0.201** (0.102)	0.201** (0.102)
Not religious	0.185*** (0.055)	0.184*** (0.055)	0.185*** (0.055)	0.184*** (0.055)	0.185*** (0.055)	0.185*** (0.055)	0.185*** (0.055)
Unemployment rate		-0.146 (0.108)					
Asylum seekers			0.629** (0.297)				
Immigration				0.142* (0.083)			
Low unempl. benefits					-0.023 (0.026)		
Proportionality						0.081 (0.078)	
Decentralization							0.077 (0.263)
Level 2 variance	3.542 (1.142)	3.207 (1.055)	3.067 (0.989)	3.213 (1.037)	3.478 (1.120)	3.418 (1.104)	3.539 (1.141)
ICC	0.518	0.493	0.482	0.494	0.516	0.509	0.518
-2LL	-11.872	-11.872	-11.868	-11.870	-11.872	-11.872	-11.872
N level 1	30.131	30.131	30.131	30.131	30.131	30.131	30.131
N level 2	34	34	34	34	34	34	34

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: EVS 1981-2008.

*The radical right parties included in this definition are identical to that of the second definition in the main analyses, with the only exception that the Finnish True Finns is defined as a 'populist' party as well, in contrast to Golder's (2003) original definition. Arter (2010) on the other hand, argues that the True Finns is a radical right party.

Table 5A. Intention to Vote for the Radical Right, Robustness Check II - Excluding the Dutch *Centre Democrats* and *Centre Party* as Neo-Fascist*

	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1	Model 1
	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)	L (S.E.)
Constant	-3.920***	-2.406***	-4.705***	-4.847***	-3.468***	-4.790***	-4.074***
Male	0.480*** (0.057)	0.480*** (0.057)	0.480*** (0.057)	0.480*** (0.057)	0.480*** (0.057)	0.480*** (0.057)	0.480*** (0.057)
Age	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)
Low education	0.641*** (0.080)	0.642*** (0.080)	0.642*** (0.080)	0.641*** (0.080)	0.642*** (0.080)	0.641*** (0.080)	0.641*** (0.080)
Medium education	0.638*** (0.066)	0.638*** (0.066)	0.638*** (0.066)	0.637*** (0.066)	0.638*** (0.066)	0.638*** (0.066)	0.638*** (0.066)
Part-time	-0.088 (0.109)	-0.088 (0.109)	-0.087 (0.109)	-0.088 (0.109)	-0.088 (0.109)	-0.088 (0.109)	-0.088 (0.109)
Self-employed	0.233** (0.100)	0.234** (0.100)	0.234** (0.100)	0.234** (0.100)	0.234** (0.100)	0.233** (0.100)	0.233** (0.100)
Retired	0.258*** (0.093)	0.258*** (0.093)	0.258*** (0.093)	0.258*** (0.093)	0.258*** (0.093)	0.258*** (0.093)	0.258*** (0.093)
Housewife	0.051 (0.114)	0.051 (0.114)	0.051 (0.114)	0.051 (0.114)	0.051 (0.114)	0.051 (0.114)	0.051 (0.114)
Student	-0.484*** (0.144)	-0.484*** (0.144)	-0.483*** (0.144)	-0.484*** (0.144)	-0.484*** (0.144)	-0.484*** (0.144)	-0.484*** (0.144)
Unemployed	0.160 (0.107)	0.161 (0.107)	0.160 (0.107)	0.160 (0.107)	0.160 (0.107)	0.160 (0.107)	0.160 (0.107)
Not religious	0.214*** (0.057)	0.213*** (0.057)	0.214*** (0.057)	0.214*** (0.057)	0.214*** (0.057)	0.215*** (0.057)	0.214*** (0.057)
Unemployment rate		-0.207* (0.117)					
Asylum seekers			0.599* (0.324)				
Immigration				0.147 (0.095)			
Low unempl. benefits					-0.017 (0.028)		
Proportionality						0.064 (0.084)	
Decentralization							0.054 (0.286)
Level 2 variance	4.054 (1.403)	3.457 (1.223)	3.570 (1.238)	3.704 (1.283)	4.000 (1.384)	3.946 (1.369)	4.054 (1.402)
ICC	0.552	0.512	0.520	0.531	0.550	0.545	0.552
-2LL	-11.224	-11.222	-11.222	-11.222	-11.224	-11.224	-11.224
N level 1	28,498	28,498	28,498	28,498	28,498	28,498	28,498
N level 2	31	31	31	31	31	31	31

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: EVS 1981-2008

* This approach follows an identical definition of 'populist' parties in line with Golders (2003). Thus, compared to the approach in Chapter 5.2.2, this approach leaves out the Dutch parties CD and CP, as Golder (ibid.) defines these as neo-fascist.