Johanne Eriksen Rimstad

Globalization and Internal Conflicts

A Statistical Analysis of the Effects of Economic, Social, and Political Globalization on Different Forms of Internal Conflict

Master's thesis in Political Science

Trondheim, July 2012

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Abstract

Globalization is one of the most significant developments in the world today. At the same time that globalization is integrating the world, violent conflicts are to an increasing degree internal affairs, rather than international. Most of the previous research on the subject is concerned with economic globalization and civil war, but there is more to both globalization and internal conflict. I attempt to shed light on the relationship between the two using a broad, three-part definition of globalization and data on different forms of violent internal conflict. Through a statistical analysis I find that a high level of social globalization is related to higher levels of internal peace, and that certain features of economic globalization is related to lower risk of riots, but dangerous when implemented in sudden shocks. Political globalization, on the other hand, does not appear to matter much to the risk of internal conflict. Regardless of the effect of a higher level, I expected the process of globalization to be dangerous. Slow change is not particularly influential, but there is some indication that rapid increases in level of economic globalization are connected with a greater risk of both riots and guerrilla war.

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1   Introduction

Globalization is a popular topic for debate in the world today, and has been for the last few decades. No wonder, as it is a phenomenon that potentially affects the whole world: it is, of course, geographically widespread, and it is widespread in the sense that it takes place in practically all areas of society – in the economy, in our social and cultural lives (including science), and in politics and government. Despite being a popular topic for academic debate, there is little consensus about exactly how important globalization is to societal developments; it may be a wide phenomenon, but how deep is it? Some believe the world to be fully globalized; the other extreme denies that any globalization whatsoever has occurred (Scholte, 2005: 15). Some of the variation in views can be traced to the fact that there is no consensus on what globalization *is*. The bulk of the research on globalization treats it as a mainly economic development, as internationalization, liberalization, and integration of national economies. However, I argue that there is much more to it than that. Globalization is going on in the political world, as governments and political organizations cooperate more and more; in the cultural world, as entertainment media, norms, and belief systems span out across the globe; and in society in general, as people and information increasingly cross national borders.

Warfare is going through changes, too. The 'new wars' (McGrew, 2007) or 'asymmetric wars' of the contemporary world are not conflicts between two (roughly) equally powerful states, but often between a state and rebel groups who cannot match the state in organization and equipment and therefore use tactics like guerrilla warfare or terrorism (Levy, 2007: 19). Scholars have examined the relationship between globalization and international conflict, but its relationship with internal conflict is less intuitive, an less studied. However, as the changing nature of warfare is happening in an increasingly globalized world, there is reason to ask whether there is a connection. It raises the question of whether globalization is contributing to internal conflict in general, and if it has anything to do with the changing face of conflict. Does it promote certain forms of violence, and reduce the likelihood of others? In other words, are different types of conflict affected differently by globalization? And if globalization does affect internal conflicts, is there a difference between the effects of globalization in one area of society, and globalization in another? The following study attempts to shed light on these questions.

Because the term globalization covers developments in highly diverse fields, I divide it into three categories: economic, social, and political. This makes the results more

meaningful, gives a better understanding of what exactly is dangerous and what is pacifying, and allows the results to be more comparable to other studies that may only have been carried out on one of the categories. Studying the different parts of globalization separately is especially interesting when studying several forms of internal conflict. For example, political globalization might have no effect on the occurrence of riots, but still influence the risk of civil war. My general research question is, thus, as follows:

Does globalization affect internal conflict, and does its effect vary by form of globalization and form of internal conflict?

Chapter 2 is a presentation of the theoretical background for the study. I start the chapter by defining the key concepts of the thesis, globalization and internal conflict. Globalization is understood as consistent of three subcategories: economic, social, and political globalization. Internal conflict is divided into two: spontaneous and organized conflict forms. These are explained by different theories, and I argue that the mechanisms leading to the one conflict type is different from the mechanisms leading to the other. With the theoretical basis covered, I discuss how the two concepts are likely to relate to each other. Existing theories and previous research present a multitude of arguments both in favor of and against globalization, and I attempt to sum up the most important and most plausible of these. For each of the subcategory of globalization I derive a set of pro and con hypotheses from these discussions, because both sides have convincing arguments. I also discuss whether the process of change can be expected to have a different influence on conflict than a static level of globalization, and whether different conflicts can be expected to be affected by globalization in different ways.

In chapter 3 I describe how the empirical analysis is designed and conducted. The study is carried out as a statistical analysis covering 142 countries over the period of 38 years from 1970 to 2007, using logit regression. The data on globalization is taken from the KOF Globalization Index (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008), while the internal conflict data is taken from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks, 2011) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al., 2002).

In chapter 4 I present the results of the analyses and discuss what they mean. I find that globalization does affect the risk of internal conflict, although not in all forms and in all operationalizations. The effect varies by type of globalization: social globalization is the most

influential form of globalization. According to the results, a high level of social globalization is related to a lower risk of violent internal conflict. I question and discuss whether this is because of the way it is measured or because of a real pacifying effect of global social integration. Economic globalization is only found to be statistically significant in the form of policies, not as measured by FDI, trade, and portfolio investments; operationalized as level it is connected with a lower risk; as shock, it is associated with higher. Globalization also seems to affect different conflicts differently, although these findings are not as robust. The results indicate that shocks of globalization only influence the risk of spontaneous conflict, not organized, although an analysis of guerrilla warfare shows a relationship between shocks of economic globalization and a heightened risk, in the same way that shocks of economically globalizing policies appears to increase the risk of riots. Political globalization, on the other hand, does not seem to be a particularly good explanatory factor for either riots or civil war.

Chapter 5 is the conclusion, where I sum up the findings. I assess what implications the results of my analysis might have for later research and for policy making. I also discuss some weaknesses of this particular study, some of which might be improved in later studies.

2 Theory

Does globalization influence the likelihood of internal conflict? In what ways could it lead to more conflict, in what ways could it lead to less, and does it promote certain types of conflict over others? Before taking on these questions there are two more basic things that need to be clarified, namely (1) what is globalization, and (2) what is internal conflict. I start this chapter by discussing different understandings of the word globalization, from the ones revolving around economic internationalization to more comprehensive concepts of development, which include social, cultural, and political factors as well. In this thesis I use a broad definition. It allows me to get a picture both of how global interaction as a whole affects internal conflict, as well as a more detailed view of how globalization of different areas of society may have different effects. One type of global interaction may be making countries more prone to civil conflict, while another is promoting peace. Following the definition of globalization I discuss how it can affect the world in terms of equality, democracy, and security.

My focus is on globalization's consequences for internal security, and the second section of the theory chapter is a definition of the term 'internal conflict' and theories explaining why they occur. I describe different forms of violent conflict and different theories on what causes them, and what allows them to persist and potentially grow from 'spontaneous' violent clashes to 'organized' armed conflicts.

Finally, I discuss the relationship between globalization and internal conflict. There is no consensus on whether it is a negative or positive influence, and I assess a number of theoretical arguments from each side of the debate and derive a set of pro and con hypotheses for the empirical analyses. I further argue that different forms of conflict are likely to be differently affected by globalization.

2.1 What is Globalization?

2.1.1 Overall Phenomenon

Globalization is a word that is used by many different people in many different ways, and what I mean by it in this particular study must therefore be thoroughly described. It is a word that tends to be over-used and under-explained, resulting in confusing and less than fruitful debates. Divergent understandings of the term leads to divergent understandings of how prevalent the phenomenon is – according to Scholte (2005: 15), the field ranges from those that believe the world to be fully globalized, to those that 'deny that any globalization

whatsoever has occurred'. In any case, the term is not particularly helpful in itself, as it could very well cover anything and everything, and using the word 'global' invites over-generalizations (Tomlinson, 2007: 148). It is useful then, to devote a generous amount of space to describing what exactly I include and do not include in the term 'globalization'.

A simple way of categorizing the different understandings of the word is saying that it may be used in a broad or in a narrow sense. The narrower and most often used definition refers to the increasingly global nature of economy and markets; less trade barriers, lower tariff rates, increased capital flow across borders and so on. In the broad sense, it means more generally that the world is 'shrinking' – not only economically, but also culturally, socially, and politically. In a broad definition globalization can be seen as 'the fact that different cultures and economic systems around the world are becoming connected and similar to each other because of the influence of large multinational companies and of improved communication' (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2005: 659).

So what do scholars mean by globalization? The term may be diffuse in public debate, but surely researchers must have a more fixed idea of what it means. Scholte (2005: 16-17) identifies five different definitions of globalization that are prevalent in the academic literature. The first two are of an economic nature. *Internationalization*, in short, understands it as the actual flows of capital, goods, labor, people, and ideas between nations. *Liberalization*, on the other hand, is more about policies; globalization is the process of removing trade barriers and other state-imposed restrictions on the economy, and on the movement of people (i.e. visas). Third is the *universialization* perspective, which perceives globalization as the emergence of an increasingly global culture – exemplified by spread of automobile use, Chinese restaurants, IKEAs, ways of food production etcetera. Yet others see globalization as *westernization/modernization/Americanization*. From this perspective it is a form of imperialism, whether economical, social, cultural, or political, as the many '-isms' of the western countries spread across the world – capitalism, individualism, rationalism, and bureaucratism. In this perspective, democratization (meaning implementation of the institutions of electoral democracy developed in western countries) can be seen as part of political globalization. Galtung (1971) describes in detail how such imperialism manifests itself in communication, economic, cultural, military, and political ways, and defines one of its mechanisms as 'vertical interaction' (ibid.: 91). Vertical interaction is characterized by exchanges (of e.g. goods) whereby 'the dominating nation enriches itself more as a result of the interaction process than the dominated nation' (ibid.: 116). If this is what globalization is,

there is reason to believe it may create a conflict-prone climate – especially in poor countries, and especially if at the same time new technology enables people in dominated peripheries to be more conscious of their situation. Lastly, Scholte describes *respatialization* (under which he categorizes himself). In this view, globalization is the deterritorialization of social relations and transactions, i.e., distance in the social world cannot be equated to territorial distance; another way of saying that the world is shrinking. Globalization is, then, the process by which 'people become more able – physically, legally, linguistically, culturally, and psychologically – to engage with each other wherever on planet Earth they may be' (Scholte, 2005: 59).

Because the term globalization embodies such a wide range of societal developments, it is useful to divide it into three categories: economic, social, and political globalization. These categories are distinguishable both theoretically and empirically, and it is theoretically meaningful to assess these three areas of society separately as they can be expected to have different effects on people's life; a change in the number of foreign embassies in your country affects you in other ways than seeing the latest Hollywood blockbuster at your local movie theater. Moreover, different areas of society can globalize at different rates and at different times; an increase in international trade does not automatically mean an equally high increase in international political involvement.

2.1.2 Economic Globalization

Economic globalization is the process of integration of economies across the world, through liberalization and internationalization (Scholte, 2005). Features of this process are the opening up of markets, and freer flow of capital, goods, and labor across national borders (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008). It's consequences is among other things that companies may buy raw material for their products from one country, have them processed in another, and sell them in yet another, enabled by technological advances in communication and efficient global infrastructure. The investors that put money into the companies may be based in different continents, but computer technology and the globalization of financial systems makes it possible for capital to be moved efficiently around the world. This provides flexibility and freedom, but it also means that a global economy is very vulnerable, as changes happen fast, and downturns in one part of the globalized world have impact way beyond national borders.

Economic globalization can be described as the 'contemporary surge in economic interdependence' (Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch, 2003: 3). This increasing

interdependence is a two-dimensional phenomenon consisting of (1) increasing flows of capital and goods across borders (internationalization), and (2) the removal of policy restrictions on such flows, e.g. lowering of tariff rates and less taxes on international trade (liberalization) (Dreher, 2006: 43; Scholte, 2005). Rodrik (1997b) notes that even the most globalized economies still retain a high level of independence – higher than we might be led to believe by the public debate. For instance, Toronto trades ten times as much with Vancouver as with Seattle, even though the geographical distance is more or less the same (Nye, 2009: 203). But even so, the desire to be 'internationally competitive' is in fact narrowing the bounds within which national policy makers can operate (Rodrik, 1997b: 23). Goods and finances flow far from freely across national borders, but the international competition brought on by economic globalization has a biasing effect on policymaking; it encourages governments to adopt liberalist economic policies that promote efficient production and thereby make the country's products more attractive in the global market. The relation between the two dimensions mentioned above is thus that (2) is carried out to achieve (1).

While some policies are created on the national level, another driving force of economic globalization on is external, in form of international agreements and policies that come from membership in supranational organizations or unions. These supranational actors may have different focus areas, and they may be regional, like the European Economic Area (EEA) and Mercosur[1], or worldwide, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). One example of a globalizing policy initiated by an international actor is the Euro. The introduction of a common currency in large parts of the European Union (EU) was an effort to make trade and international investment easier between the countries of the Eurozone. It was a 'liberalizing' policy choice made to increase 'internationalization', a reduction of the practical restrictions that different currencies have on trade.

Other important forces of economic globalization are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). They have a great deal of influence when it comes to liberalizing national economies and in that way the promote the second dimension of economic globalization, and they operate with a neoliberal economic philosophy. In order to

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[1] It must be noted that the interaction between members of the EEA and Mercosur might more appropriately be identified as regionalization than globalization, but in my definition here I see all international engagements as 'global', regardless of the geographical distance between the actors.

be granted loans from the IMF and the WB, countries are expected to undergo economic reform. The standard set of reform policies are, in a term coined by John Williamson in 1989, known as the Washington consensus (Peet, 2009: 15). These include tax reform, securing property rights, reducing public expenditure, trade liberalization, deregulating and privatizing the economy in order to enable competition, encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) and competitive exchange rates – all of which are in accordance with economic globalization. The decision to adopt such policies is therefore not necessarily based entirely on free choice – especially for developing nations; it may be influenced by the diffusion of neoliberal ideas, but also by the need for IMF or WB funding or explicit pressure from the US government (mainly in Latin American countries) (Mosley, 2007: 106).

When inter- or supranational economic agreements and organizations are getting more numerous, it affects the power of national governments. Add non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) to the mix, and national sovereignty is considerably diminished (Moses and Brigham, 2007). Some talk about 'marketization'; liberal theory contends that the invisible hand of the market is all the regulation one needs, and thus that state regulations should be minimized. The global market is gaining power, through international agreements or the race to be international competitive, at the expense of national sovereignty (Barber, 1992). However, the suppliers of the markets are not the only ones gaining power; consumers are empowered, too (Moses and Brigham, 2007: 148-149). Less government regulation, lower tariff rates, and online retailers give consumers a great deal of independence.

2.1.3 Social Globalization

The economy is not the only area of society that is globalizing. Social globalization is the increasing global flow of information, ideas, cultures, and people, enabled by improved geographical mobility and more or less revolutionizing innovations in communication technology. Dreher, Gaston, and Martens (2008:44) group elements of social globalization into three categories: cultural proximity, personal contacts, and information flows.[2]

Increasing cultural proximity is evident in how different people all over the world are eating in the same restaurant chains, watching the same television shows, and wearing the

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[2] The term 'cultural globalization' is sometimes used instead of 'social globalization'. I prefer to use the word 'social' as I think it better represents all three elements mentioned above, while 'cultural' draws the focus more toward the cultural proximity element in particular.

same clothes. McDonalds' and Chinese restaurants are spread out across the globe, and American pop music and Bollywood films are entertaining people well beyond the borders of the USA and India. 'Proximity' indicates that cultures are 'moving' from separate places closer together. Social globalization can thus be described as the distance between the traditional perception of national identity – e.g. what is fundamentally and typically 'Norwegian', and the actual everyday reality – where kebabs, Coca Cola, and American television shows are more common elements than lutefisk and lefse (Moses and Brigham, 2007: 17). As the global spread of culture is inserting common elements into vastly different parts of the world, it is providing people with a common cultural reference base. It is becoming easier to relate to people regardless of nationality, and as especially English is getting more and more widespread, linguistic barriers are eroding, too. This diffusion of cultures is happening not only through the mobility of cultural expressions, but also because people are moving. Increasing human mobility is an important element of social globalization, and it results in personal contacts between different linguistic, ethnic, and religious groups. Whether this contact is likely to result in more unity, tolerance or conflict will be discussed below.

On the individual level, social globalization influences identity formation. As the nation-state loses its practical and theoretical relevance, national identities are also challenged. As individuals are getting more independent, e.g. through advances in communication technology, group affiliation is less dependent on geography, and faith, class, gender, race, age, sexual orientation etc. are just as relevant for the individual as nationality. (Scholte, 2005: 225). Information flows, and the Internet in particular, allows for creation of communities completely independent of geography and nationality, and anyone with Internet access can form and develop their identity in a virtual network of likeminded.

On a societal level, social globalization challenges traditional structures and hierarchies. As cultures or civilizations interact, their values and ideas of right and wrong are challenging each other as well as influencing each other. Social globalization may affect society from the bottom-up or top-down. A bottom-up effect comes from technological advances in computing and transport. These give people more individual freedom, and providing that the new technologies are increasingly available to lower social strata, they can be expected to reduce the importance of traditional social hierarchies. Regular people are more able to get information about the world, making them less dependant on society elites. A top-down effect is that socially, too, policy makers may be pressured to change policies in

order to be internationally competitive. For instance, Moses (2005) expects the mobility of workers to result in better social conditions as national governments try to attract valuable labor; much in the same way they are adopting liberal economic policies to attract investors. That is, in an increasingly globalized economy investors can easily move their money to where they are offered the best conditions, and the same logic could be applied to an increasingly globalized labor market. If people are free to move where they like, policy makers are given an incentive to improve social conditions to attract the most qualified workers. However, worker mobility has more natural restrictions than investment mobility (it is easier to move your money to a foreign country than to leave your home), which limits the effectiveness of this argument.

2.1.4 Political Globalization

Political globalization denotes the shift of power from the national to the supranational and international level through countries' membership in supranational and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and through the presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). This means more international interdependence and less national sovereignty, which can be a source of vulnerability, but it can also improve the nation's ability to handle global problems (Moses and Brigham, 2007: 60). In the form of embassies and diplomats, or organized citizen activism on global issues, political globalization entails the growth of a global political and civil society (Scholte, 2005: 222). Thus, while decreasing sovereignty, globalization also increases the possibility of influencing others; international organizations exert power over nations and individuals, but both nations and individuals have more power to influence global actors and other nations' governments.

Political globalization is important to be aware of because of its implications for how we understand the world. The conventional way of ordering and systemizing the world, in daily life and in research, is in states. The world is thus perceived as a whole made up of many separate components. But because of its decreasing sovereignty, the national perspective is getting less relevant (Moses and Brigham, 2007), both in theory and in practice. When states lose power they lose causal relevance, meaning that studies of causal relationships need to take into account the actors that have taken over some of this power. For example, if we want to know why Norway is represented with military forces in Afghanistan,

we need to look beyond the state level and consider the causal effect of NATO[3] membership. Scholte (2005: 185) claims that 'globalization has rendered the statist mode of governance non-viable', but Rodrik (1997b) reminds us that so far, the world is far from completely globalized, and states still retain a high level of independence. While we ought to keep global relationships and entities in mind, understanding the world in terms of states is not misunderstanding, at least not yet.

Another expression of political globalization is the spread of political ideologies and government practices. Democratization[4] can therefore be seen as a part of political globalization. Held (2006: 94) describes the contemporary form of representative liberal democracy as 'a cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broadest participation of the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make political decisions (that is, decisions affecting the whole community)'. This form of democracy was developed in the West, but toward the end of the 20th century and into the 21st it has come to be 'widely adopted in principle as a suitable model of government' all over the world (ibid.: 95). Whether following international pressure, pressure from citizens, or changes in ideological convictions within the government, the last decades have seen more and more states introducing popular elections. Especially after the end of the cold war, representative democracy has had hegemony over other models of government, thus contributing to globalization of the political world. However, political globalization in the form of spread of elections as the legitimate way of appointing political authorities does not necessarily entail a corresponding spread of democratic civil society. Critics argue that simply holding elections does not automatically make a country a democracy (Collier, 2010). A deeper form of democratization would also involve strengthening of institutions and the rule of law, reducing corruption etcetera, as well as strengthening of civil society and democratic ideals such as tolerance and freedom of speech.

2.2 Globalization: Blessing or Curse?

Globalization is a wide-ranging phenomenon, and it could have an equally wide range of consequences. Globalization might bring development and peace, or inequality and exploitation. It may strengthen institutions and contribute to a stable community, or it may

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[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[4] The word 'democratization' is used here in the meaning 'regime change toward representative liberal democracy'.

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cause instability simply by being a process of change: 'globalization has invariably contributed to a backdrop of uncertainty that tends to accompany any significant social change' (Scholte, 2005: 315). Scholte (2005) sums up a lot of the debate around globalization and whether it is positive or negative for the world. He discusses its influence on various issues using the categories equality, democracy, and security. I will be focusing on globalization's relationship with internal security, but before circling in on that issue it is useful to give a brief summary of how it can affect other areas of society. These areas may in turn be related to internal conflict: if globalization has consequences for equality and democracy, this is likely to have implications for internal security, too.

2.2.1 Equality

Globalization is hardly the original cause of social inequalities (ibid.: 346). However, some aspects of globalization can expand already existing gaps in society, other aspects can contribute to their reduction. Economic globalization has been blamed for increasing inequalities between the global North and South, as well as more local class inequalities, urban/rural divides, etcetera (ibid.: 316). On the other hand, a stronger global civil society can more effectively put such inequalities on the agenda, and advocate equality in other areas of society as well, e.g. gender, race, and sexual orientation. Many sides to globalization has the potential to promote equal opportunities for people across traditional social stratifications, e.g. the spread of new technologies and access to knowledge, but regrettably, many of the benefits of globalizing have been concentrated in the North, with younger generations, propertied classes, men, and in urban areas (ibid.: 345).

2.2.2 Democracy

Globalization can also be criticized for being undemocratic (ibid.: 348). How so? According to Scholte, 'democracy prevails when the members of a public determine – collectively, equally, freely, openly, and responsibly – the policies that shape their joint destinies' (2005: 349). By reinforcing existing inequalities in society, globalization makes less attainable the ideal of equal democratic participation. Uneven distribution of economic, academic, and social capital means the 'public' cannot participate in democratic rule on equal terms. The imbalance between potential democratic participants is reinforced by the shift of power away from the traditional governmental structures. This development can be argued to be

undemocratic in itself, not only because of its consequences for equal and collective participation. Even if nation-based democracy spreads around the world, a shift toward a more supranational power structure implies that this type of democracy is not adequate; '[g]lobal democracy needs more than a democratic state' (ibid.: 354). The diminishing importance of national borders entails opportunities and freedoms, but also decreases the public's power to control and regulate themselves, even in the most democratic of nations (ibid.: 354). However, globalization opens up for other forms of democratic participation through growth of a civil society, and global diffusion of knowledge and information facilitates more informed and responsible democratic action. What is more, such diffusion of knowledge should surely be regarded as valuable in itself, regardless of its impact on democracy.

2.2.3 Security

Human security is also affected by globalization. When Scholte (2005) talks about security he does not solely mean freedom from war or violence, but a much broader notion of security covering virtually all areas of society. Environmental changes, for instance, have consequences for security both locally and globally. As economic globalization increases production efficiency through industrialization, there are bound to be consequences for the natural environment. Pollution, deforestation, global warming, and so on are byproducts of increasingly global industrialization and transportation of people and products across the world. Additionally, the globalization of businesses is likely to affect how companies deal with environmental challenges. While local businesses have a rational incentive to preserve the environment they operate in, large multinational corporations are more disconnected from the feeling of local responsibility. On the other hand, small local businesses may have to 'do what they have to do' to survive without having the luxury of being environmentally conscious. Larger companies are more likely to be under pressure from environmental organizations, and to actually have the means to take such considerations into account. The same logic can be applied to the strengthening of worker's rights, and human rights in general. Political globalization can thus be a positive influence on the environment, both natural and social, through supra- or international agreements and the watchdog function of a global civil society. Whether this function is successfully exercised is, however, questionable. Still, global industries have contributed to security by creating jobs (ibid.: 297). By enhancing

economic growth and creating job opportunities, globalization increases financial security. By globalizing economic crises, though, it can cause great insecurity and instability (ibid.: 294).

Migration, increased travelling, and transportation of products from distant places has consequences in terms of health security, too (ibid.: 288). Diseases travel further and faster. Then again, treatments do, too, as knowledge of and access to medical treatments is diffused across borders. So is knowledge and information more generally, through global networks of communication. But, according to Scholte, this globalizing of networks comes at a price: '[p]eople who are glued to television and computer screens may have virtual bonds across the planet but little or no acquaintance with persons living next door' (2005: 309). By challenging traditional identities and communities, by changing the way we look at ourselves, and others, globalization has implications for the social and cultural aspects of human security, too. On the one hand, global networks facilitate the expression of identity in a different way than in a more geographically bound world (ibid. 305). Anyone with access to the Internet can find a community of likeminded, and more geographical mobility makes it easier even to relocate to a place where ones identity and/or culture can be expressed. On the other hand, this 'expansion' of the world may compromise social cohesion and the security of a local community. Lack of social cohesion and social capital may in turn affect security by increase crime rates (ibid.: 308). Criminals are also benefiting from global networks and markets, facilitating better organization, drug trafficking etcetera.

As for warfare, globalization has negative and positive implications. It entails the spread of weapons technology and global arms markets, and the effectiveness of diasporas (Scholte, 2005: 312). Globalization of the media makes terrorism a more effective strategy (ibid.: 284). Globalization also reinforces interests beyond national borders, which can in some ways strengthen governments' incentives for military operations across the globe. Ranging from UN peacekeeping missions to USA led invasions, some of these are arguably more constructive than others. International economic interdependence can also be a strong incentive for keeping the peace between nations. Don't fight a country if a downturn in his economy is going to cause a downturn in yours, or leave you without the goods he supplies you. Political and social interconnectedness should contribute to the same effect. Theories of the 'liberal peace', the 'capitalist peace', the 'democratic peace', and so on contend that globalization decreases the likelihood that countries engage in international conflicts through modernization, development, economic growth, and democratization (Doyle, 2012). Liberal democracies do not fight other liberal democracies (ibid.), and by contributing to development

toward liberal democracy and economic prosperity, globalization can promote international peace. However, it is difficult to know the causal direction, or if it is simply a spurious correlation (Nye, 2009: 49). Moreover, even if liberal democracy does cause peace in the long run, the risk of war is increased in early stages of democratic transition (ibid.: 50).

2.2.4 Globalization: A Bit of Both

None of the problems presented here are solely globalization's fault, though, and many of the problems blamed on globalization have been exaggerated; SARS did not turn into the global plague it was hyped up to be, and the computer systems of the world survived the Y2K millennium bug (Scholte, 2005: 311). Moreover, even where globalization has in fact caused troubles they may very well be possible to avoid by choosing alternative approaches to globalization, rather than by eliminating it completely. Scholte criticizes neoliberalist policy choices rather than global relations as such, arguing that '(…) the harms have resulted not from increased globality as such, but from the policies that have been adopted towards it' (Scholte, 2005: 278). Although not being the sole cause of all the problems of the world, Scholte argues that 'globalization has invariably contributed to a backdrop of uncertainty that tends to accompany any significant social change' (2005: 315).

Since globalization is such a multifaceted phenomenon, deciding whether globalization is good or bad for the world as a whole is of course impossible. It works differently on different areas of human life, and it has both positive and negative implications for each of these areas (Scholte, 2005: 311). To quote Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 181):

> '(…) [G]lobalization and internationalization have mixed results. The same processes that allowed the United States to plant secret detention centers in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan also exposed those abuses to global public opinion. Similarly, the same processes that contribute to the creation of 'good' NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch facilitated the formation and mobility of the murderers of September 11, 2001.'

It seems the answer to the headline is that globalization can be both a blessing and a curse, and finding out which element of it is which requires asking more detailed questions. I have chosen to concentrate on globalization's relationship with security; more specifically, how it affects different forms of violent internal conflict.

2.3 What is Internal Conflict?

2.3.1 Spontaneous vs. Organized Conflict

Internal conflict, like globalization, is a term that can encompass many things. Internal conflicts may range from peaceful demonstrations to deadly and destructive civil wars, from conflicts between groups to conflicts between less coherent collections of people. I limit my definition of internal conflict to include only violent forms of conflict. While non-violent conflict can be a legitimate way of working out issues, once the conflict turns violent it becomes harmful to people, economic activities, and/or society in general in a much greater degree. Peaceful protest, for instance, is a legitimate form of political participation, a way for people to communicate their views to the government and can thus be viewed as a democratic action. Still, there are many forms of violence, from unorganized clashes between groups of citizens or citizens and the government, to highly organized military conflicts. Collier et al. (2003: 56) illustrate the differences between different internal conflicts with political protest movements and military organizations. Political protest movements may riot and partake in violent events, but they can be unstructured groups, while private military organizations need structure, typically a highly hierarchical organization with a charismatic leader on top. Moreover, protest movements do not by far require the same amount of financing that a military group does; participation is usually part-time and voluntary, while an army has great material needs both in terms of equipment and keeping its (full-time) soldiers fed (ibid.).

Most studies on internal conflict focus on civil war, but the great variation between the different conflict types makes it plausible that the mechanisms that lie behind them vary as well, making other conflicts equally interesting to study. Different conflicts can be loosely divided into 'spontaneous' and 'organized' conflicts. For a systematic understanding of the differences between conflict types, I apply a two-dimensional framework: first, internal conflicts may vary in the size and structure of their organization, and second, in level of popular involvement. They differ also in the instruments applied by their actors. The violent conflicts with low requirements for organization and popular participation are the most 'spontaneous', while conflicts that generally need more structure and involve society to a

larger degree are termed the most 'organized' conflicts.[5] Looking again at the example from Collier et al. (2003: 56) above, the riots of the political protest movement is the most spontaneous type of conflict, while civil war of the private military organization is the most organized. Riots do not require a high level of organization, nor do they necessarily entail extensive public involvement – they can be local events. The parts in a civil war, on the other hand, have much greater need for organization, and the conflict generally involves and/or affects a large part of the population. Many internal conflicts are of course somewhere in between the poles 'spontaneous' or 'organized'. Some riots escalate from local events to large-scale popular uprisings, to armed rebellions, without automatically gaining the organizational structure of a private military organization. Revolutions may have these characteristics. Some military groups may be professional and organized, yet not large enough to take on a government army in a civil war, and instead operate through sabotage, bombing of government targets or other sporadic violent attacks. This type of warfare characterizes guerrilla war. Table 2.1 is a classification of different conflicts, highly simplified, but useful as an illustration of the differences and commonalities of different types of violent internal conflict, ordered (top to bottom) from the most spontaneous to the most organized.[6]

Table 2.1 *Violent Internal Conflict Characteristics*

Conflict type	Organization	Participation	Instruments
Riot	Low	Low	Violent demonstration
Revolution	Low	High	Armed rebellion
Guerrilla war	High	Low	Sporadic armed activity, sabotage, terrorism
Civil war	High	High	Armed rebellion

2.3.2 Causes of Conflict

The variation within types of internal conflict is reflected in the variations in theoretical explanations for why and how it occurs. Traditionally the theories explain what is necessary for conflicts to arise, whereas more recently the focus has also been on what is necessary for

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[5] 'Spontaneous' conflicts may indeed turn into 'organized' ones, but in other cases a country may experience a number of sporadic violent episodes without the situation ever escalating into armed conflicts between organized groups.
[6] It is debatable whether riots and revolutions are always violent, but my focus here is on the violent kind.

the conflicts to persist. The first type of theories is useful for explaining spontaneous violence, while the second is useful for explaining organized conflict.

The mobilization of spontaneous conflicts can be explained by collective action theory (Tilly, 1978; Olson, 1965) and relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970). In *From Mobilization to Revolution* Tilly (1978) presents a mobilization model that explains how and why collective action occurs. It is useful for understanding popular movements like demonstrations, riots, and in the more extreme cases, revolutions. The main elements in the model are interest, organization, mobilization, and opportunity, and the balance between them influences the intensity, range, and nature of the outcome: the collective action. People have to have an interest in common in order to organize as a group and/or be mobilized for collective action. Opportunity to act collectively is also necessary, and opportunity depends on e.g. the level of repression in a country, the group's power relative to other groups or to what extend they feel threatened. A paradox in collective action theory is that if a group is taking collective action to obtain a public good, this good will be available to anyone in the public whether they themselves acted or not, making it more attractive to be a 'free-rider' than investing in the collective action (Olson, 1965). If the personal cost of engaging in collective action is bigger than the prospective outcome, it will be in everyone's personal interest not to act, eliminating a vital element of Tilly's model. However, this is assuming that people are rational, calculating actors, which is far from always the case. There may also be incentives to be an active member of the group on top of the public good that the collective action seeks to obtain, e.g. pressure, friendship or additional goods reserved for active members.

Relative deprivation is a term in social psychology that describes 'the perception that one is less well off than others with whom one compares oneself' (Myers, 2008: 351). Gurr (1970: 37) calls it a 'perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities'. The discrepancy can result from (1) capabilities falling while expectations stay the same, (2) capabilities staying the same while expectations rise, or (3) expectations and capabilities both rising, but the former at a quicker rate (Gurr, 1970). Either way, relative deprivation is thought to breed frustration, which can in turn lead to aggression and motivation for spontaneous collective violence (ibid.).

The theories above set out to explain how conflicts occur spontaneously, i.e. the mechanisms behind grass root movements and individual frustrations, the move from no conflict to violence. But arguably, there is a gap between explaining the occurrence of collective violence and explaining the sustainability of full-scale civil wars. The dominating

theoretical perspective in civil war studies today is developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003). They argue that economy is the best predictor of civil war because it says something about the feasibility of staging an uprising, but they interpret the results somewhat differently. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that economy is so important because it provides motivation for rebellion (people rebel because of greed and/or grievances).[7] Fearon and Laitin (2003) contend that economic factors are not the 'root cause' as such, but they act as a proxy for state weakness. In Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) view, either greedy leaders are seeking to exploit wherever they can and mobilize people for rebellion, or grievances are driving people to rebel. In both these situations the theory considers armed conflict likely if the anticipated gains outweigh the anticipated costs of conflict. States with high per capita income should thus have a lower risk of civil war, as people generally will be better off financially and will have less to gain and more to lose by engaging in warfare. In a later study they stress that motivation is not the only thing that is important; feasibility is a significant factor in explaining civil war (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, 2009). After all, many countries facing grievances in the form of repression, poverty, ethnic abuse, and so on do not experience civil war (Collier et al., 2003). Fearon and Laitin (2003: 76) argue that 'economic variables such as per capita income matter primarily because they proxy for state administrative, military, and police capabilities'. When the state's capabilities are weak, it both motivates and makes feasible a rebellion. 'Where states are relatively weak and capricious, both fears and opportunities encourage the rise of would-be rulers who supply a rough local justice while arrogating the power to "tax" for themselves and, often, for a larger cause' (ibid.).

The theories explaining organized conflict echo Tilly's (1978) mobilization model, but add the element of sustainability. For a large-scale, organized conflict to be realized there must not only be motivation and opportunity for a quick rebellion, an organized conflict needs more structure and financing, and to not be stuck down by the state before acquiring these. On the other hand, organized conflicts steer more clear of the free-rider problem than spontaneous ones. If an organization is already in place it is easier to recruit people and organize the rebellion. A spontaneous conflict could thus be thought to need more in terms of motivation, as it entails the move from passive unorganized individuals to collective action, while with organized conflict the organized groups are already there and the group authorities

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[7] According to Collier et al. (2003: 53), the 'key root cause of [internal] conflict is the failure of economic development'.

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just have to initiate the violence. Still, as such groups have to have become organized at some point, we do not escape the free-rider problem entirely when trying to explain them, either.

2.4 How Does Globalization Affect Internal Conflict?

With the key terms explained, I can start tackling the question of how they relate to each other. In this section I assess what influence globalization may have on internal conflict.

2.4.1 Overall Globalization and Internal Conflict

Globalization in the broad sense could represent significant positive development through increasing economic growth, political cooperation, and knowledge and information flows. If this is the case it should be expected to diminish both the motivations and opportunity for internal conflict. Scholte (2005: 346) argues that globalization per se is not what creates conflicts and that rather it is all about how globalization is handled. Higher levels of globalization may provide countries with institutional strengths that let countries avoid some of the problems of increasing globalization, as well as other challenges (Tsai, 2007: 122). Through improved social mechanisms and economic growth globalization can give the state more resources, making them more able to improve the population's living standard, and thereby enhancing the state's legitimacy and increasing the opportunity cost of rebellion (Nieman, 2011: 282).

H1a: The higher the level of globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict.

On the other hand, McGrew (2007: 27) argues that modern intrastate and transstate conflicts are sustained by 'the capacity of combatants to exploit global networks to provide finance, arms, émigré support, or aid as well as to facilitate profiteering, racketeering, and shadow economies, such as the diamond trade, which pays for arms and influence'. Global networks in the economic, social, and political sense influence the face of warfare. By facilitating the access to means, globalization helps make internal conflicts possible.

H1b: The higher the level of globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict.

Different types of conflict do have things in common, but as previously discussed, they also have important differences. Because of this, some features of globalization could be expected to matter more to spontaneous forms of conflict than to organized conflicts, and vice versa. As previously discussed, high-scale, high-organization internal conflicts require different conditions than lower-scale, spontaneous forms of conflict to be feasible. They are more feasible if rebel groups have sufficient economic funding, good organizational methods, if the state is weak enough to not crush them before they evolve from protest into war, and if the geography of the country enables asymmetric wars. Spontaneous violent conflicts do not require these things to the same degree. One does not need a rebel army to riot, nor mountainous terrain to stage a political protest, but to get mobilized they may require more in external motivation to make up for what they lack in organization, and societal changes that influence collective interest could be of particular relevance for them. Because different conflicts require different things, the explanatory factors for riots may be different from those of civil war. Conditions that make a country prone for spontaneous conflicts may not make them prone for civil war. In that way, the economic, social, and political conditions in a country will influence which conflict type is more likely. Globalization influences these conditions in different ways, and consequently globalization will affect the risk of one conflict type in a different way than another.

H2: Overall globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict differently than the risk of organized internal conflict.

2.4.2 Economic Globalization and Internal Conflict

The economic side of globalization is the most widely studied and debated part of the phenomenon, but there is no consensus on whether it is nurturing peace or war. Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) sort the debaters into two main camps: liberalists and structuralists. The main liberal argument is that high levels of trade and free markets lead to economic growth, development, and in turn to peace, and this is backed by a number of empirical analyses (Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 2003; Gissinger and Gleditsch, 1999). Liberalism is well established both with academics and policy makers. The values and fundamental philosophy behind economic globalization as a positive force dates back to liberalists in the 18th and 19th century, and the idea that economic interdependence promotes

peace is evident in the developments particularly in the western world after World War I and World War II. The European Union is based in large part on the conviction that nations that are trading partners and economically dependent on one another will have too much to lose going to war with each other. Children of the same era are the WTO (as a descendent of GATT), the IMF, and the World Bank – huge promoters of economic globalization. But even if it might promote international peace, does economic globalization necessarily have the same effect on internal conflict? Yes, liberalists will argue, through generating economic growth. The countries that experience the most change in level of globalization are, more or less by definition, developing nations. Mishkin (2006: ix) argues that '[i]nstead of a danger, globalization is an opportunity', and goes on to lay out concrete advice to 'disadvantaged nations' on how to 'harness their financial systems to get rich'. Economic globalization's positive effect for low-development nations is supported empirically; De Soysa (2003) comes to the conclusion that trade and FDI benefits low-development countries through economic growth. Since poverty seems to be a source of conflict, economic globalization should then reduce the risk of internal conflicts.[8] Besley and Persson (2011) show that higher wages reduce the likelihood of political violence. With higher wages, the opportunity cost is higher, and the net gain from engaging in conflict is lower for both non-government and government actors. Said in a different way, more welfare and higher wages increase the recruitment cost for rebels, making it harder for rebellion to be financially viable (Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 2003). As for the government, higher wages means higher tax revenues, and consequentially more to lose should a serious conflict occur, as such conflicts can be economically destructive. De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) contend that war is an economic venture. They argue that 'closed economies provide a high payoff to organizing 'illegal' economic activities that in weak state environments develop into organized armed activity (…)', and thus that economic openness is pacifying (ibid.: 295-296). Globalization could therefore be expected to decrease the risk of internal conflict, especially the more organized types of conflict where soldiers need to be paid or fed and where greed is a motivation.

H3a: The higher the level of economic globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict.

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[8] Even if there is high correlation between poverty and conflict it is worth asking which way the causality goes. The answer is probably both – economic grievance motivates conflict, but is also a consequence of it, particularly for major conflicts like civil war.

However, the pacifying effect of globalization through national economic growth is based on the presupposition that this growth benefits citizens relatively equally. The structuralist argument is that economic globalization is increasing inequalities both on a national and global level, and that this in turn is increasing instability, making conflict more likely (Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 2003; Rodrik, 1997; Peet, 2009; Buckman, 2004; Doyle, 2007: 197). Thus, for economic globalization to decrease the risk of conflict, the pacifying effect of economic growth needs to outweigh the aggravating effect of economic inequality. Chua (2004) argues that free market economy in several cases is shown to enable ethnic minorities to gain economic dominance over the majority. This hardens the divide between the ethnic groups and breeds hatred, toward the minority in particular, and increases the risk of internal conflict[9].

The empirical studies are divided on the structuralist theory. Bussmann, De Soysa, and Oneal (2005) find that economic globalization has no significant effect on income inequalities, strengthening the liberal argument, while Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) report that trade does indeed increase income inequality, but at the same time, that it has no statistically significant relationship with civil war. The liberal standpoint appears, then, to be the most convincing when studying trade and FDI, as they would decrease grievances, and according to Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch (2003: 8), '[f]ew scholars today question the belief that economic integration generally brings economic benefits and peace (…)'. Even so, Tsai (2007) reports a small, but negative effect of economic globalization on human well-being. This, he says, may not be because of the economic integration as such (trade, FDI etc.), but because it is often accompanied by neo-liberal policies that reduce the government's social spending. Scholte (2005: 279) echoes that explanation. The first dimension of economic globalization (as described above) in the form of increased trade and FDI may be pacifying, but other features of economic globalization might influence conflict differently. The globalization of markets does not only entail the flow of goods and finances, but the flow of labor, too. Because of this, workers may experience more instability (Kaplinsky, 2001). Rodrik (1997a: 27, 1997b) explains that '(…) workers now find themselves in an

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[9] If the majority gains political power (through democratization, in Chua's theory), this leads to one of three things: either a backlash against markets (deglobalization), a backlash against democracy, or backlash against the market-dominant minority (internal conflict, genocide). Chua's theory involves a lot of conditions (e.g. conditions of ethnic composition and level of democratization), though, and is therefore not very generalizable.

environment in which they can be more easily 'exchanged' for workers in other countries. For those who lack the skills to make themselves hard to replace, the result is greater insecurity and a more precarious existence'. Additionally, the second dimension of economic interdependence – liberalizing policy changes – may influence the domestic social arrangements in a negative way (Rodrik, 1997a). For instance, cheaper production can be achieved by allowing child labor and bad conditions for workers. No doubt, a precarious existence and bad working conditions can breed frustration, thereby increasing the risk of internal conflict.

Economic globalization may also fire up internal conflicts over ownership of natural resources that are valuable on the global market, as privatization decreases national cohesion and local groups strive to control what is 'rightfully' theirs. This can play out and lead to conflict through increasing the motivational power both of greed and grievance. One possibility is that local actors may fight the government for control of sellable natural resources. If there is suddenly a global market that is interested in your local resources, it is tempting to claim them for yourself and cash in the profit, rather than let it go to the government. The prospective output of engaging in collective action is increased, as is the financial viability of an organized violent movement. Another possibility is that the state may neglect local considerations in favor of foreign investments. If the state sells the rights to resources that are traditionally used by local actors, e.g. farmland, to foreign actors, this can create severe problems for the local population and cause both spontaneous and organized internal conflict because the local group may feel threatened, experience grievances, and so on.

Another unpleasant side effect of a globalized economy is the vulnerability that comes with being so dependent on others. The financial recession that started in 2007 is an example of how a crisis in one state's economy can quickly spread to the whole world. A consequence of such crises is that value capabilities drop, but value expectations are likely to stay the same. In other words, it causes a drop in living standards, while the expectations of what living standard should be like may not change. This can destabilize societies and create both relative and absolute deprivation that increases the risk of internal conflict.

H3b: The higher the level of economic globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict.

Relative deprivation theory is, as previously discussed, one of the major theoretical approaches to explaining spontaneous conflicts. Economic globalization could increase this feeling of deprivation through economic crises, but also through economic growth. It may create economic growth for only a portion of the population, producing internal inequalities and motivation for violent conflict. More specifically relevant to organized conflict is the possibility of economic globalization increasing the opportunity cost of rebellion, as well as increasing state capability (i.e. institutional strength and capability of offering welfare services to their citizens), thereby making organized rebellions less feasible.

H4: Economic globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict differently than the risk of organized internal conflict.

If economic grievances and deprivation were the only potential conflict-bringing consequences of globalization, the negative effect might be preventable by providing economic compensation. However, Bussmann and Schneider (2007) show that neither social spending or foreign aid reduce the increase in risk of conflict following economic globalization. This suggests that it could be something related to the economic changes, but not the economy in itself, creating discontent; it might be related to more general societal changes.

2.4.3 Social Globalization and Internal Conflict

Social globalization can be thought to have a negative effect on internal stability in that it entails actual movement of people and thus higher potential for cultures to clash, dissolving of communities, and loss of social capital and safety nets. A recurring theme in assessments of the consequences of social globalization is how it affects identity. In 'The Clash of Civilizations?' (1993) Samuel P. Huntington describes the type of conflict he thinks the world will see more of as it moves into the future. As the world shrinks and different civilizations interact more, conflicts will occur not on the basis of political differences, but along cultural divides. Globalization, he says, is 'separating people from longstanding local identities', weakening national identity and often leaving religion to fill the gap (ibid.: 26). Through changes in identity formation, social globalization can be expected to increase the likelihood of internal conflict. As the nation-state loses relevance economically and politically, so does

national identity. In the process of globalization, '(…) other aspects of self and solidarity have acquired increased prominence (…)' (Scholte, 2005: 225). With social globalization, the individuals' solidarity increasingly shifts from national to other groups. This could result in a clash of civilizations as well as mean less intrastate unity and solidarity, and contribute to the change in the nature of conflicts from international conflict to 'new wars' – intrastate or transstate conflicts (McGrew, 2007: 27).

Huntington claims that there has been an increase in ethnically and culturally based conflicts after the end of the cold war, but critics claim that this supposed increase is a misreading of the data, and that 'most ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity is not politically destabilizing' (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 248). But many scholars find that ethnic and religious heterogeneity is related to conflict (Gurr, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Chua, 2004; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch, 2009; Cederman, Weidemann, and Gleditsch, 2011). The trouble with ethnicity and religion is that they potentially create strong in-group solidarity and the opposite toward out-groups. Especially if there are horizontal inequalities (whether economic or political) between ethnic groups, the risk of internal conflict will be increased (Chua, 2004; Cederman and Girardin, 2007; Cederman, Weidemann, and Gleditsch, 2011). Reynal-Querol (2002) emphasizes the special standing of religion. To a vast amount of people it is an important source of identity and motivation for action, and you cannot have more than one religious affiliation. You can belong to more than one ethnic or national group (you can be half Sámi, half Chinese), but you cannot be half Christian, half Muslim. This makes religion an especially powerful factor in division of societies, and therefore a potential cause of internal conflict in religiously heterogeneous countries. If social globalization influences identity in a way that increases the importance of ethnicity and religion and decreases the importance of nationality it increases the risk of such conflicts. Granted, in many countries, especially non-Western, national identity has never been particularly strong and in many cases it is trumped by tribal, ethnic or territorial identity. Claiming that people in Afghanistan have strong tribal identities because social globalization has eroded national identity would be misguided at best. Even so, if social globalization reduces the importance of nationality where nationality has traditionally been strong, it will increase the risk of internal conflict.

Erosion of nationality is not the only element of social globalization that can affect internal conflict. Global interactions challenge traditional values and identities more generally, too. Lieber and Weisberg (2002: 273) assess Huntington's argument and contend

that the cultural aspect of globalization leads to 'not so much a clash of civilizations as a clash within civilizations'. They argue that strong reactions to globalization are more likely in countries with strong traditional values, which generally puts developing countries more at risk. Nieman (2011: 267) talks about 'globalization shocks', arguing that globalization may lead to internal conflict if the state is not equipped to handle the 'grievances of domestic actors that lose in the face of increased competition or face challenges to traditional ways of life'. Parts of social globalization can be interpreted as modernization, westernization, or just Americanization (Barber, 1992; Conversi, 2010). To the degree that social globalization is indeed a unidirectional process it is likely to cause trouble internally as well as causing anti-western or anti-American attitudes. In the western, highly globalized societies, there is traditionally a stronger notion of individualism and personal identity, in contrast to societies (often in developing countries) that put more emphasis on group identities. These societies in particular can experience higher levels of frustration because of this identity crisis that is a clash between its established norms and a more individualistic way of thinking. Seen through the lens of collective action theory, this threat to traditional power can result in reactive collective action (Tilly, 1978).

Social globalization entails an increased flow of information and potential knowledge, as well as exchange of cultural elements. Such developments could very well be thought to lead to more solidarity, mutual understanding, and tolerance, rather than clashes and war. Increased knowledge, tolerance, and increasingly similar values and cultures ought to lead to less tension and conflict (Scholte, 2000). On the other hand, this cultural development is not necessarily something that occurs in all social strata (Tsai, 2007: 115), and it may benefit only the more privileged who have the resources to engage in global cultural exchange. This could mean social exclusion (Munck, 2005), increasing (domestic) social inequality, frustration, and conflict. More communication, both digitally and in terms of people travelling and moving, means more transparency, and while this may breed understanding and tolerance, it also lets people become aware of their rights and get better means to do something about it. Being tolerant towards e.g. other ethnic or religious groups does not necessarily mean being tolerant toward an oppressive government. Moreover, both actual and perceived inequalities can create tensions, and according to relative deprivation theory, comparing one's lot to the lives of the better off creates a feeling of deprivation and discontent (Gurr, 1970). Increased flows of information may lead to increased discrepancy between actual and expected standard of living, in both economic and social terms. Being informed about other value systems and

civilizations invites critical assessment of ones own social situation, knowing the options that are 'out there'. The conclusion may be that 'the others have it better', which creates motivation for demanding change, and increased knowledge can thus increase frustrations and create motivation for both spontaneous riots and organized rebellion. A different conclusion, however, could be that 'we have it better', which could result in a protective or defensive state of mind and more domestic solidarity. But in the modern, high-mobility world where people from different civilizations live inside the same national boundaries (e.g. in the United States), such intracultural solidarity could be polarizing and increase the risk of internal conflict, ranging from riots to civil war.

One of the main concerns critics have with social globalization is its socially destabilizing effect, both through increased mobility and the consequences of cultural changes. If the social structure of a society is broken down or radically altered there will be a reduction of social capital. This, in turn, reduces the opportunity cost of conflict, making rebellion more likely (Nieman, 2011). If you have trouble finding your place in a changing community with weakened social safety nets, there is less to lose by going to war.

H5a: The higher the level of social globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict.

Still, with all these possible dangers of social globalization, the potentially pacifying effects of increased tolerance, knowledge, and merging cultures should not be underestimated. Such positive developments could very well make up for many of the negative factors. Moreover, the increasing mobility of workers may actually lead to improvement of social conditions as states try to attract skilled labor. Moses (2005: 70) argues that 'in the same way that states today compete by offering attractive investment havens for mobile capital, we might expect states in a free migration context to compete with one another for mobile citizens/labor'. According to this logic, social globalization should be associated with a decrease in frustration among the population and consequently less tensions and grievances.

H5b: The higher the level of social globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict.

Some features of social globalization are of particular relevance to spontaneous forms of conflict. The changes it causes in identity formation weaken national identity and strengthen alternative group solidarity. This may result in intranational fractionalization and/or polarization, and stronger notions of collective interest within these non-national groups, facilitating collective action. Immigration is very likely to contribute to this development. As for organized conflicts, they may also increase with social globalization, but for other reasons. Improved communications within and across borders, e.g. the Internet and airfare, facilitates new ways of organizing and even reduces the requirements for good organization. The combination of migration and improved communications increases the likelihood of diasporas providing organizational and economic support to a group involved in internal conflict.

H6: Social globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict differently than the risk of organized internal conflict.

2.4.4 Political Globalization and Internal Conflict

Political globalization in the form of IGO membership might reduce internal conflict in that when the world is watching, governments will be more interested in meeting the demands of dissatisfied groups, reducing their grievances instead of using violent means to solve the problem (Naghshpour and St. Marie, 2008). Besley and Persson (2011) find empirical support for this line of reasoning when examining the relationship between UN Security Council membership and internal political violence. They argue that such membership may 'change a country's international accountability, reducing the likelihood that its government engages in violence' (ibid.: 1432). This effect may also be expected for other international memberships, as governments are more likely to adhere to international laws and norms if they seek political allies, economic aid, and other benefits that motivate international engagement. Let us say that a state wants to be part of an organization, and the organization in question demands a certain adherence to e.g. human rights. The expected result would be less internal conflict because the government would have incentive to try and solve internal issues in a non-violent manner, and internal grievances would decrease. The same sort of effect can be expected for the presence of foreign embassies; they function as watchdogs. However, correlation is no proof of causality: serious internal conflicts may cause foreign embassies to leave the country.

Political globalization may also decrease the risk of internal conflict by strengthening political institutions. Fearon and Laitin (2003) agree, as mentioned, with Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) that economic variables are good predictors of civil war, but argue that this is not because of the economic factors as such but because they are proxies for state capability. By this reasoning, the strength of the state is a better determinant of civil war onset. Besley and Persson (2011) find that variables that increase the risk of political violence have a stronger effect if political institutions in a country are weak. Having weak political institutions makes internal conflict more feasible. This is reflected in the fact that stable regimes are less likely to experience conflict than unstable ones (Hegre et al., 2001; Ellingsen, 2000).

H7a: The higher the level of political globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict.

On the other hand, if political globalization encourages democratization because of diffusion of political ideology or a state's need to appear attractive in the global market, it can be a destabilizing force rather than a strengthening one. Both stable autocracies and stable democracies are less conflict prone than intermediate regimes, suggesting that democratization is a dangerous process (Hegre et al., 2005). Political globalization in the form of international pressure to democratize governmental institutions may have the effect that a democratic façade is put up (i.e. popular elections are held, but more fundamental societal structures enabling fair, equal, and informed democratic participation are missing), destabilizing the state structure and moving countries into the range of intermediate regimes that are more at risk of civil war (Collier, 2010). Presumably, in stable democracies, there are other ways to voice discontent than through armed conflict and the opportunity cost is higher, and in strong autocracies, the state is good at keeping potential protesters at bay (Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 2003). But when the autocracy loosens (or loses) its grip, repression is diminished. There will thus be more opportunity for collective action, and an organized rebellion will be more feasible as well.

Another potential issue with political globalization is the democratic problem that faces democracies as the elected national government loses power to international actors, who in most instances the public has no control over. For instance, the Norwegian public has to adhere to EU regulations because of Norway's membership of the EEA. But, especially

because Norway is not a member of the EU, the democratic control that the citizens have over the regulations is minimal. This shift in power away from the people could theoretically breed frustration with the government and result in revolution. The turbulence and distrust in several European countries following the economic recession starting in 2007 is related to political as well as economic globalization, as the EU is both an economic and political union.

H7b: The higher the level of political globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict.

Political globalization also has consequences that could be thought to result in different effects on different conflicts. It might create pressure on governments to adopt policies that reduce inequalities and deprivation, and pressure to respect human rights, decreasing individual motivation and thereby render spontaneous conflicts less likely. However, organized conflicts could be enabled by some elements of political globalization. To the extent that it weakens autocracies, moving them toward intermediate regimes, political globalization is a destabilizing development – decreasing state capacity, and increasing conflict feasibility. State capacity and legitimacy may also be decreased regardless of regime type as the nation state loses power and relevance.

H8: Political globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict differently than the risk of organized internal conflict.

2.4.5 Globalization Level vs. Globalization Process

In the discussions above I have presented arguments both in favor of and against globalization. Complicating the matter further, when analyzing globalization's effect on conflict the results are likely to depend on whether we examine the level of globalization or the process. The two may have very different implications for conflict proneness. Looking only at the level leaves out the fact that it is a process of change, and the time in history and the rate at which this process happens is of crucial importance for its effect on society. Bussmann and Schneider (2007) combine the liberalist and structuralist predictions for economic globalization in what they call the distributional theory of civil conflict. They argue that a high level of economic openness reduces the risk of internal conflict, but that 'the steps

toward global economic integration render armed conflict more likely' (ibid.: 94). In countries that are in a transitional period toward a globalized economy, any pacifying effects could be outweighed by the dangers of destabilization. This destabilization argument also applies to changes in globalization level in other areas of society. The steps toward globalization should therefore be expected to have a different relationship with internal conflict than the level of globalization in a country.

H9a: Change in level of globalization increases the risk of internal conflict.

Additionally, the size of the 'steps' may matter. If the country is globalizing (or deglobalizing) slowly, any potential destabilizing effects they could be mitigated, or simply unimportant, but if the changes are rapid they are more likely to cause disturbance. Big changes over a short period of time can upset a community. Nieman (2011) argues that whereas a high level of globalization is beneficial both for states and individuals, globalizing in sudden 'shocks' can 'overwhelm the state's capacity to offset the negative impacts of globalization' (ibid.: 263). Globalization shocks are therefore expected to be more dangerous than both globalization level and the process in general.

H9b: Shocks of globalization increase the risk of internal conflict.

2.5 Summing up the Theory

2.5.1 A Theoretical Model

The relationship between globalization and internal conflict is an intricate one, particularly because both terms include so much, but I have tried to illustrate the main points of their relationship in Figure 2.1. I have summed up the explanations for why conflict occurs in the words 'motivation' and 'opportunity'. Each type of globalization has consequences that affect both of these, and both motivation and opportunity influences risk of internal conflict in general. But as argued above, motivation is of particular importance to be able to mobilize for a spontaneous conflict, and organized conflicts require more in terms of opportunity (because of higher feasibility requirements) than do spontaneous ones.

Figure 2.1 *Different Features of Globalization and How they Influence Risk of Internal Conflicts in General, and Different Types of Conflict in Particular*

2.5.2 Hypotheses

To recap, I list the hypotheses derived in the theory section. There, they are ordered by type of globalization, but it can also be useful to arrange them in three categories by other commonalities. The first group of hypotheses concerns the effect of globalization level on internal conflict in general. These are dual, with one negative and one positive hypothesis for each type of globalization. The second group addresses the expected difference in effect by conflict type, but do not include a suggested direction. The third group points out an expectation of different effects with different operationalizations of globalization.

Different Globalizations

H1a: The higher the level of globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict.
H1b: The higher the level of globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict.
H3a: The higher the level of economic globalization in a country, the lower the risk of
internal conflict.

H3b: The higher the level of economic globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict.

H5a: The higher the level of social globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict.

H5b: The higher the level of social globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict.

H7a: The higher the level of political globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict.

H7b: The higher the level of political globalization in a country, the higher the risk of internal conflict.

Different Conflicts

H2: Overall globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict differently than the risk of organized internal conflict.

H4: Economic globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict differently than the risk of organized internal conflict.

H6: Social globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict differently than the risk of organized internal conflict.

H8: Political globalization in a country affects the risk of spontaneous internal conflict differently than the risk of organized internal conflict.

Different Operationalizations

H9a: Change in level of globalization increases the risk of internal conflict.

H9b: Shocks of globalization increase the risk of internal conflict.

3   Research Design and Data

3.1 Methodology

Methodologies in social sciences are often divided into the somewhat vague categories quantitative and qualitative methods. Moses and Knutsen (2007) present a more detailed and arguably more useful categorization, describing four scientific methods: the experimental method, the statistical method, the comparative method, and the case study. For a naturalist, these are listed in order from best to worst. A constructivist might claim quite the opposite (ibid.: 196). When choosing a methodological approach for this study, I asked myself what type of knowledge I was interested in getting. While the experimental method is the most appropriate for generalizable knowledge, the case study provides the most in-depth understanding of the subject. I opted to go for the most generalizable knowledge, hoping to identify some pattern or relationship that applies to more than one or two cases, but because experiments are hard to conduct in social science (especially, I might add, in civil war studies), I went for the second best: the statistical method.

Whereas the experimental method is based on manipulating the data itself and studying the events that occur as a consequence, with the statistical method we manipulate the data on events that have already happened (ibid. 2007: 93). In order to do this in a satisfactory manner, we need enough data. A large N is therefore desirable. When studying war this may pose a problem. World wars, for instance, are too few that we can draw any generalizable conclusions from them. Luckily (for scholars), internal conflict is a relatively common occurrence, in one form or another. Making the period of study as long as possible is also a way of getting the N count up, but there are limitations to this because data material is usually scarcer the further back in time we go, and moreover, it is debatable whether generalizations in social sciences can be drawn beyond a certain period of time. Constructivism has a point; what was generally true before may not be applicable now.

Globalization, too, is something that (more or less by definition) happens in all parts of the world, and has done so for quite a long time, albeit in different forms and at varying pace. I conclude, then, that it possible and meaningful to analyze the relationship between internal conflict and globalization by conducting a large-N statistical study.

3.2 Sample

The unit of analysis in the study is country-year. My full dataset covers 165 countries over the period from 1970 to 2007. However, because I want to study the effect of the globalization process as well as the level (*H1a* and *H1b*), the countries that are most relevant are the ones where the globalization process – or lack of – has happened within the period of study. If countries are included where the substantial part of the globalization process to date happened in large part before 1970, the process is not captured by the limited time frame of this study. Such countries are therefore less interesting, and more worryingly, if included, they cause the study to be biased toward the effect of globalization level, which may affect the results. To avoid this bias I exclude 23 high-income OECD[10] countries from the main analyses, leaving me with a sample of 142 countries.[11] As an additional test, however, I run the analyses on the full dataset as well to see whether the results are different (see appendix C). If they are, it may have implications for other studies of globalization.

3.3 Dependent Variables: Internal Conflict

3.3.1 More Than Civil War

Most studies of internal conflict, as well as most theoretical discussions, concentrate on civil war or armed conflict. A prevalent definition of *war* is 'sustained combat with 1000 battle-related deaths between/among the combatants per year' (Sarkees, 2010), and *civil* war means that at least one of the actors is a non-state actor. Some definitions require that one of the actors be a state, others include non-state wars in the term. *Armed conflict* is another term much used in civil war studies, and it includes conflicts resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths, as opposed to 1000 (UCDP, 2008). But internal conflict is, as I have argued, not a uniform concept, and the mechanisms behind other forms of conflict are worth looking into as well. Some lower level spontaneous conflicts may escalate and evolve into organized armed conflicts, but others may not, and even if a conflict does not lead to 25 battle-related deaths per year it can still be destructive and highly problematic to a community or nation, economically, socially, and politically.

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[10] Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
[11] A list of the excluded countries can be found in appendix A.

3.3.2 Spontaneous vs. Organized: Riots and Civil War Onset

The main dependent variables in my analyses represent the most spontaneous and the most organized types of violent internal conflict. Internal conflicts may take on other, intermediate forms as well, but as I aim to investigate the difference between spontaneous and organized conflict, it makes sense to focus on the outermost points of the scale; it is most relevant to study the two forms of conflict that are farthest apart, and there is a theoretical expectation that these are affected differently by globalization. However, I have also run the analyses on two intermediate conflict forms[12] to make the study as comprehensive as its scope allows. A table summing up the findings can be found in the last part of the analysis chapter. Variable descriptions and the full results from the analyses are presented in appendix D.

Riots

For the most spontaneous form of internal conflict in this study I use the variable *Riots* from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks, 2011). It is defined as '[a]ny violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force'. Banks' definition is in large part borrowed from Rummel and Tanter (1974). They describe Riots to be generally marked by 'the destruction of property, people being wounded or killed, or by the use of the police of riot control equipment such as clubs, guns or water cannons' (ibid.: 13). Riots are spontaneous conflicts then, in the sense that they require little organization and they may be of very short duration – i.e. they require relatively little opportunity, but more in terms of mobilization in order to occur. The original data is coded in number of events per year, but to make it comparable to the Civil War variable I have coded it into a dichotomous variable where 0 indicates no clashes and 1 indicates one or more clashes.

Civil War

For the most organized type of conflict in my analysis I employ UCDP/PRIO's[13] Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4-2010 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010). Internal Armed Conflict is defined as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths' (UCDP, 2008). Relative to the civil war definition requiring 1000 deaths, this definition has quite a drastically lower

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[12] Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare, both from Banks (2011).
[13] Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute of Oslo.

threshold. For my study, the most interesting divide is between the nature of the conflict types, as opposed to the deadliness. The low-scale operationalization of civil war differs from the high-scale operationalization in level of deadliness rather than in the nature of, or the form of, conflict, and I therefore use the low-scale to capture as many relevant cases as possible. I use a variable that is coded 1 if there has been a new intrastate conflict onset or there is more than two years since the last observation of the same conflict.

3.4 Independent Variables: Globalization

3.4.1 More Than Economy

The bulk of the research that exists on globalization is focused on the economic aspects of the phenomenon, often operationalized as trade and FDI as share of GDP. However, using only economic openness as an indicator of globalization when studying internal conflict is problematic because of endogeneity, as conflict will reduce trade and foreign investment (Elbadawi and Hegre, 2008). The Index of Economic Freedom (Miller, Holmes, and Feulner, 2012) and the Economic Freedom of the World survey (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall, 2011) include more factors than just trade and FDI, but some of these factors are arguably more expressions of neoliberal policies than of a globalized economy. The Index of Economic Freedom is made up of data from four categories, one of which is open markets, but the three others are rule of law, limited government, and (economic) regulatory efficiency. This makes it biased toward neoliberal economic policies, diminishing the importance of open markets and increasing the weight of good governance policies. Consequently, it would be difficult to tell whether any relation to internal conflict using this index would be because of globalization, or rather a result of neoliberalization in particular. The same criticism applies to the Economic Freedom of the World.

A big problem with using the measurements above to study globalization is that they are biased toward the economic sides of globalization. In both public debate and academic writing, social and political globalization is often overlooked. Some studies include factors like Internet use in addition to the traditional economic indicators, but generally, 'globalization' seems to be measured in accordance with what Scholte calls internationalization and liberalization. However, a few studies do include measures of political and social globalization, and confirm that these factors, too, are statistically significant and ought to be taken into account (Tsai, 2007; Nieman, 2011). To analyze the

hypotheses derived in the theory section I need to use a measure that captures these sides of globalization as well as the economic side, and that provides independent measures for each of the three.

3.4.2 Globalization Level

I employ the 2007 KOF Globalization Index, which has data on a wide range of globalization factors such as global flows of goods and finances, state restrictions on trade, cultural universialization, Internet use, and tourism (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008). It includes a general index as well as a separate variable for economic globalization, one for social globalization, and one for political globalization. All four globalization measures in the KOF are scales that go from 0–100. The three subcategories consist of several components each, which are weighted and added up, and the overall index is in turn composed of the three subcategories in the same way.

Overall Globalization

The index measuring overall globalization level is made up of the measures for economic, social, and political globalization. They constitute respectively 36%, 38%, and 26% of the index. Weighting of the data is a potential issue because it is necessarily based on a subjective assessment of which components are more and which are less important. However, in the case of the overall index this is not a big problem, since I also analyze all three components separately.

Economic Globalization

The data on economic globalization is composed of a number of separate measures, grouped into the categories 'actual flows' and 'restrictions'. The first includes data on trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and portfolio investment, all in percent of GDP (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008: 43). To account for globalization of the labor market in addition to finance and goods, it also includes a measure of income payments to foreign nationals. The second category measures restrictions on international trade and investments. These include taxes on

international trade, mean tariff rate, hidden import barriers, and capital account restrictions.[14] The two categories are each weighted to be 50% of the index of economic globalization.

Social Globalization

The index of social globalization contains three sets of measures: (1) measures for international flow of information, (2) personal contact across borders, and (3) cultural proximity. They are weighted as, respectively, 35%, 29%, and 38% of the index. Flow of information is proxied by Internet users, Internet hosts, trade in newspapers (again in percent of GDP), radios, and cable television (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008: 49). Data on personal contact consists of outgoing international telephone traffic and letters, government and worker's transfers, international tourism, as well as foreign population in percent of the total population. Level of cultural proximity is indicated by international trade in books, and the number of IKEAs and McDonalds' in a country.

Political Globalization

This variable is a measure of membership in international organizations, participation in UN Security Council missions, and number of embassies in the country. It does not include data on regime type. I choose not to include regime type or regime transition as a measure of political globalization. It is such a large and distinctive subject that it is more useful to study on its own. It would be very difficult to distinguish between any effect of internationalization of politics and any separate effect of democratic institutions if democracy was included in the measure. Regime type is therefore treated as a control variable in the empirical analysis. Again, it must be mentioned that political internationalization is often regional rather than global in nature. The KOF measures political globalization in terms states' inter- or supranational engagement, which does not allow for distinction between regional and global interaction.

3.4.3 Globalization Process and Shock

The KOF data indicate the *level* of globalization for a country in a given year, but I am also interested in the effect of the globalization *process*, i.e. the change in level. I have therefore computed variables measuring change as the difference in level of globalization between a

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[14] Some of these measures are borrowed from the above mentioned Economic Freedom of the World survey (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008: 43).

given year and two years earlier, in percent of the earlier of the two. Additionally, to be able to distinguish between change in level and globalization shocks I have computed a dummy variable that is coded '1' when the globalization process variable is higher or equal to 15% and '0' for any smaller, or negative, change.[15] The limit value is set to 15% based on an examination of the distribution of the data for all four globalization process variables. The mean value of the change variables for overall, economic, and social globalization is about 3%,[16] and I assess a change in level over two years that is five times the mean to be a fairly dramatic change.

3.5 Control Variables

In addition to the globalization variables I include a number of control variables in the statistical models. These are more or less standard explanatory variables for civil war, and they are included in the analyses of riots as well to make the results comparable.

Democracy and Autocracy

Regime type is found by many to be statistically related to risk of internal armed conflict, with intermediate regimes most at risk (Hegre et al., 2001, Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Regime type is therefore included in the analyses, in the form of a set of dummy variables. However, the validity of such findings is questionable, because of endogeneity issues (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006: 527, Gates et al., 2006, Vreeland, 2008). Like many other studies on the subject they employ regime data from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2010), but the political participation dimension of the Polity score is defined in part by civil war (Vreeland 2008: 402). As a consequence, intermediate regimes are more correlated with conflict by definition rather than by causality (Vreeland 2008, Gates et al., 2006: 897-898). To try and avoid these problems I use the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP) as an indicator of regime type (Gates et al., 2006). The SIP is calculated using the same three dimensions as

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[15] The shock variable includes only positive shocks, i.e. rapid increase in level of globalization, not negative, i.e. rapid drops in level of globalization. Negative shocks represent *de*globalization, not globalization. They are therefore not relevant to this the question of whether globalization increases conflict. Additionally, there are substantial endogeneity issues with the relationship between internal conflict and drops in international interaction. Even when lagging the variables, there is a danger that the circumstances in a country leading up to a measurable violent conflict can also cause loss of foreign investors, loss of tourism, and so on.

[16] Note that the mean for change in political globalization is around 6.5%, suggesting that shocks of political globalization are either more common or less shocking, than for other forms of globalization. See the discussion of validity below.

Polity (executive recruitment, executive constraints, and political participation), but without the problematic elements from Polity IV (ibid.: 897-898).

I have computed two dummies for regime type: one for democracy and one for autocracy. Both dummies are included in the regression models, leaving intermediate regimes as the reference category. The Polity IV scale ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy), and the definition of autocracy and democracy is often limited to the outer points of the scale, e.g. -10 to -6 for autocracy, and 6 to 10 for democracy. The SIP values range from 0–1, and modeling my operationalizations on the standards for Polity IV, I have coded observations from 0 to .238 as autocracy and .762 to 1 as democracy.

Ethnic Fractionalization

The relationship between ethnicity and internal conflict is debated, and there are several different measures available: polarization, fractionalization, political domination, etcetera. I employ a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) updated by Fearon and Laitin (2003) giving the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethnolinguistic groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 78). The ELF is calculated from data compiled by a team of Soviet ethnographers in the early 1960s,[17] using the Herfindahl concentration index,

$$ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2 \qquad (1)$$

where s_i is the share of group i ($i=1,\ldots,$ n) (Posner 2004: 849, fn.3).

Hegre and Sambanis (2006) find this variable to have a statistically significant relationship with the UCDP/PRIO's Internal Armed Conflict data, i.e. lower scale civil war, making it relevant for my analysis. The variable is updated to 2007.

Population Size

I control for population size because large populations are statistically more likely to experience more internal conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). The threshold of 25 battle deaths or 100 citizens in a clash is fixed, but the ratio of the threshold to total number of citizens changes, of course, with population size. Moreover, large populations are more likely to be heterogenous, and thereby have internal divides based on geographical, ethnic, or

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[17] Published in the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964).

religious identity.[18] The data material is collected from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* (WDI) (World Bank, 2011). The effect is theoretically likely to be logarithmic rather than linear due to the diminishing return of the marginals: the effect of an increase of 10 000 matters more in a population of a million than one of a billion. A symmetry plot of the observations confirms that this is the case, and the variable is therefore log transformed using the natural logarithm (ln).

GDP Per Capita

Even though GDP per capita may be suspected to be somewhat correlated to globalization, controlling for poverty/wealth lets me examine what effect global interaction as such may have and what is due to economic standings. By the same logic that applies to population size, GDP per capita is also log (ln) transformed. These data are also collected from the WDI (World Bank, 2011).

GDP Growth

I control for annual GDP growth in % using WDI data (World Bank, 2011). As with GDP per capita, there is some concern that correlation with globalization could pose an issue, a possibility it is important to be aware of in robustness checks and the interpretation of the results.

Oil

The data on oil is a dichotomous variable collected from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and updated to 2008. Oil wealth is found to be positively related to organized internal conflicts (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). It could be because it says something about state capacity and institutional strength. The 'resource curse'[19] thesis describes how having high-income natural resources often holds countries back in terms of institutional strength and development. A country that has high profits from natural resources (e.g. oil) is less dependent on human resources. Less dependency on high tax income gives the government less incentive to work for economic development, high primary commodity export means less incentive to develop industry.

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[18] Take the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, for example. Before South Sudan became independent in 2011, the conflict was internal, but after the divide, it became international.
[19] See e.g. Lujala (2010)

Mountainous Terrain

Like oil, this data is borrowed from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and extrapolated from 1999 to 2008. It indicates percent of the terrain in a country that is 'mountainous'. To be able to take on more numerous and better equipped government armies, rebels are likely to be helped along by favorable geographical conditions like mountains or woodland, where they can fight without facing the enemy head-on, and hide when necessary.

Peace Years, Splines, and Year Dummies

In addition to the ones listed above I include variables for peace years, cubic splines, and year dummies in the analyses. For discussions of their function, see the paragraph on regression assumptions and other challenges (below). The peace year variables indicate the number of years since the last conflict. For civil war, this is done by calculating the years from the last year with more than 25 battle related deaths, using the variable for *incidence*, as opposed to *onset*.

3.6 Reliability and Validity

Is the data reliable? The Banks data is compiled using newspapers as sources, which may be problematic. It relies on there being free press in the countries in question, but in authoritarian regimes, conflicts and demonstrations critical of the regime may be underreported. Economic data is also often underreported (and not only in authoritarian regimes), which can be seen in the many missing observations for economic globalization and data on GDP. I have attempted to account for this by examining whether the missing observations are randomly or systematically missing (see discussion of regression assumptions and other challenges below). The KOF also poses somewhat of a reliability challenge in that it does not always stick to reporting data for independent countries. The data for the Soviet Union are reported in the form of data for each state, not for the union as a whole. Because of this, the analysis does not include any of these countries (including Russia) pre 1990; this region is only included when the different states became independent. Missing the Soviet Union in a study of internal conflict in the period around 1990 is far from ideal, but on the other hand, it is only one country out of 142, and thus not too dramatic.

What about validity? Do the operationalizations of my variables really measure what I want to measure? The variable for civil war onset is dichotomous, and to be able to compare

the results I have coded dichotomous variables for the other dependent variables as well. Banks' data originally indicate number of events in a year, while in this study they only indicate whether there have been any events or not. This makes the variables less sensitive to conflict quantity, but the main focus of my analyses is not primarily the frequency of conflict, but rather the type of conflict. I prioritize examining possible differences in the mechanisms behind different types of conflict, sacrificing the information of whether something leads to multiple conflicts or just one. Additionally, the variable for civil war onset is not sensitive to ongoing conflict. It indicates conflict onset, not duration, and not whether any other conflicts are already active in the year of onset. This makes me unable to distinguish between what leads to long wars and what leads only to short eruptions of violence, but by adding peace years to the regression models I compensate partly for this lack of sensitivity. Moreover, the globalization process can be expected to not move forward in the event that there is an ongoing conflict in a country, it might drop when the conflict starts, and it might jump when the conflict is over. This means that there is an issue with endogeneity, but I attempt to minimize this problem by lagging the variables, thereby studying globalization's relationship with the risk conflict the following year.

A possible criticism of the data on social globalization is that it employs number of IKEAs and McDonalds' as indicators of cultural proximity. These are arguably more indicators of westernization than of globalization, which needs to be kept in mind in the interpretation of the results. Another part of the data on social globalization is number of Internet users and hosts, and distribution of cable television. These may be indicators of development, rather than of global interaction, which could bias the results. Another potential issue of validity is the fact that the globalization scales are relative. Absolute gains in a country may not move it up the ranking if other countries have globalized even more (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens, 2008). By measuring globalization in this way the KOF Index keeps moving the goal posts, which may not be ideal when studying the effect of globalization on domestic conditions. Absolute changes in globalization means changes to society, regardless of whether the country has globalized more or less than other countries. A further criticism is that the KOF index does not distinguish between regional and global interaction; all international interaction is seen as globalization. Finally, the way that shock in political globalization is coded could be argued to make it less valid than the other shock variables. The mean change in political globalization is the double that of the other globalizations, but the shock variables are all coded as a 15% or higher increase in level. Bigger changes in

globalization level are apparently more common in political than in other areas of society. This may either mean that shocks are simply more frequent (which is the assumption behind my shock variable) in political globalization, or it may mean that they are not actually shocks – that big changes in level of political globalization are not as dramatic as in other areas of society, and consequently that I ought to set the limit for shock higher than for the other globalizations. I conclude that a 15% change is indeed a 15% change for the country in question, regardless of how common it is for other countries, and keep my 15% shock limit.

3.7 Statistical Method

3.7.1 Logit Regression

Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, the appropriate statistical method for the analyses is logistic or logit regression. I use the latter. With logistic regression the coefficients in the results signify the increase in odds, while logit regression is concerned with the logit. The logit is the natural logarithm of the odds, making it less intuitively interpretable, but giving a linear effect as opposed to a logarithmic one. Although not quite as intuitive as ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients, the logit is not impossible to interpret: the coefficients indicate the variable's effect on the logit that a conflict occurs (Hamilton, 2006: 269). The analyses are carried out in STATA (v. 11.2).

The logit L is expressed as the natural logarithm (ln) of the odds of $Y = 1$ (Ringdal 2001: 409),

$$L = \ln(P/(1-P)) \qquad\qquad (2)$$

where P is the probability of $Y = 1$. The logit model for country i in a year t is then

$$\ln(P_{it}/(1-P_{it})) = \alpha + \beta X_{it} \qquad\qquad (3)$$

where α is the constant, and βX a set of explanatory variables.

3.7.2 Regression Assumptions and Other Challenges

Regression analysis relies on a number of assumptions being met. First, it assumes that the model is specified correctly. This is to say that no important variables omitted, and no irrelevant variables are included in the regression model. As for the last point, I have described relevance of all the variables in the variable descriptions above. As for omitting important variables, there is always the chance that there will be some causal relationship that

has not been thought of. But, having included standard variables for civil war studies, I do not expect it to be a problem for the regressions on civil war. One might question whether the same model is correctly specified for riots, but I think the case against it being so is weaker than the importance of having comparable models and comparable results for the different dependent variables.

Second, regression analyses require that the observations are independent of each other (Galton's problem (Moses and Knutsen, 2007: 81)). My data fails this requirement: it is neither independent spatially nor temporally. However, I control for this as best I can in the analyses. To make up for spatial dependence I cluster the observations by country, meaning that the analyses account for the fact that e.g. the population size in a country in one year is not independent of the population size the previous year. To make up for temporal dependence I add peace years and cubic splines to the regression models, as suggested in Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). The logic is that whether there is a conflict in a given year is likely to be related to how much time there has been since the last conflict; countries that have experienced conflict are statistically more likely to experience it again than countries that have not.

A third assumption is the absence of perfect multicollinearity. After finding some correlation[20] between a few of the variables that might be troublesome, I ran checks for the variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF value is an indication of the severity of multicollinearity in the models. They were worryingly high, as exemplified by testing a regression model where the control variables and overall globaliaztion level is regressed on civil war onset.[21] Suggested limit for acceptable VIF value is 10, but for GDP per capita (ln), population (ln), and globalization they are 94.19, 48.97, and 42.94, respectively. There is clearly an issue with multicollinearity. To try and account for the problem I ran likelihood-ratio tests, checking whether the variables with multicollinearity were still significant additions to the regression models. The likelihood-ratio tests showed that GDP per capita is significant for the riot models, but not the civil war models. However, removing it from the analyses did not produce dramatic changes in the results, and it is therefore included in both because of the value of comparability between the results. Population is a significant addition to either models. To conclude, while I have struggled with some multicollinearity in the

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[20] Correlation matrices are presented in appendix E, tables A.14 and A.15.
[21] Model 4 in table 4.1, peace years and splines omitted. See appendix F for table with all VIF values from the model.

analyses, there is not perfect multicollinearity, and I have taken the measures described above to ensure that it is not too problematic.

Influential outliers are also a potential problem in regression analysis. Extreme values can pull the results in one direction. There are a few outliers in my data material, but due to the large N, they are not influential to the degree that they are problematic. There are not too many or too extreme outliers relative to the amount of observations in total. I have tried to solve a potential problem of influential outliers by excluding high-income OECD countries, as they are likely to be systematically similar to each other, thus being influential outliers. Another possible issue is the randomness of the missing data. Are the missing observations systematically missing, or missing completely at random? As noted in the reliability discussion, economic data is sometimes lacking, and economic globalization is the biggest potential problem in my analyses. There are quite a lot of missing observations in the economic globalization variable (781 missing, 4178 observations). This could be a problem, if the countries that have missing data on economic globalization have e.g. systematically more cases of riots than other countries. To check for this I examined the mean value for riots, civil war onset, revolution, and guerrilla warfare. In the cases where economic globalization data is missing, the mean for riots is lower, and the mean for the other three types of conflict is higher.[22] This is a problem and could influence the results, which is important to be aware of in the discussion; it could have the consequence that riots seem more likely to be affected by economic globalization than is really is, and the opposite for the other forms of conflict. It is, however, not an issue with the other three types of globalization, as they have few missing observations. Another thing to consider in a study covering nearly four decades is whether there are certain years that are especially influential. To control for time trends, i.e. historical trends, I add year-dummies to the models. If there are 'worldwide' fluctuations for certain years, they should be captured by these dummies. Additionally, civil war studies generally have a challenge in that the dependent variable is relatively rare, but with over 4000 observations I assess this to be, although not ideal, a manageable problem.

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[22]Mean for economic globalization missing vs. mean for non-missing: riots: .08 vs. .15, civil war: .07 vs. .03, revolutions: .29 vs. .15, guerrilla warfare: .23 vs. .13.

3.8 Descriptive Statistics

Table 3.1 *Descriptive Statistics*

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Riots	4734	.144	.351	0	1
Civil war onset	4737	.039	.193	0	1
Revolutions	4734	.192	.394	0	1
Guerrilla warfare	4735	.154	.361	0	1
Overall globalization, level	4875	40.785	14.422	9.558	88.619
Economic globalization, level	4178	44.357	17.492	6.969	97.388
Actual flows	4105	47.082	21.058	2.887	99.005
Restrictions	3991	42.179	19.563	5.024	95.772
Social globalization, level	4951	33.146	17.356	2.368	93.744
Personal contacts	4769	41.120	21.170	3.783	94.391
Information flows	4913	42.375	21.335	2.505	98.568
Cultural proximity	4951	16.158	19.480	1	97.242
Political globalization, level	4951	49.021	19.846	4.274	94.895
Overall globalization, change[a]	4617	3.587	6.314	-25.049	42.440
Economic globalization, change[a]	3954	3.565	10.509	-52.297	258.231
Social globalization, change[a]	4689	3.201	9.726	-37.496	116.850
Political globalization, change[a]	4689	6.511	17.760	-44.471	317.600
Overall globalization, shock[b]	4617	.062	.240	0	1
Economic globalization, shock[b]	3954	.099	.298	0	1
Social globalization, shock[b]	4689	.086	.280	0	1
Political globalization, shock[b]	4689	.139	.346	0	1
Democracy	4309	.288	.453	0	1
Autocracy	4309	.472	.499	0	1
Ethnic fractionalization	4485	.453	.281	.004	.925
Population, total[c]	4936	15.666	1.672	11.594	20.999
GDP per capita[c]	4290	7.035	1.311	4.057	11.025
GDP growth, annual (%)	4337	3.907	7.031	-51.031	106.280
Oil	4959	.170	.375	0	1
Mountainous terrain	4555	17.721	22.279	0	94.3
Riots peace years	4734	7.607	8.088	0	37
Riots cubic spline 1	4734	-277.998	483.808	-2664.027	0
Riots cubic spline 2	4734	-1023.762	1977.743	-11220.13	0
Riots cubic spline 3	4734	-1415.346	3143.628	-19032.32	0
Civil war peace years	4737	10.239	10.293	0	37
Civil war cubic spline 1	4737	-459.258	661.429	-2628	0
Civil war cubic spline 2	4737	-2307.170	3741.410	-15312	0
Civil war cubic spline 3	4737	-2320.263	4284.125	-18810	0
Revolutions peace years	4734	7,401	8,367	0	37
Revolutions cubic spline 1	4734	-279,542	504,235	-2664,027	0
Revolutions cubic spline 2	4734	-1156,551	2350,041	-12864,16	0
Revolutions cubic spline 3	4734	-1447,974	3376,146	-19824,37	0
Guerrilla warfare peace years	4735	10,682	10,467	0	37
Guerrilla warfare cubic spline 1	4735	-920,260	1320,380	-5112,051	0
Guerrilla warfare cubic spline 2	4735	-2615,714	4187,318	-16704,24	0
Guerrilla warfare cubic spline 3	4735	-2569,873	4586,861	-19494,5	0

[a] % difference from 2 years prior
[b] >15% difference from 2 years prior
[c] Log transformed

4 Analyses and Discussion

In the first part of this chapter I present the results from the main empirical analyses. It is divided into subsections by the four types of globalization. The first subsection contains the analyses of how globalization as a whole affects internal conflicts, using the globalization index made up of the three subcategories economic, social, and political globalization. Then I analyze all three subcategories separately. Each of the four sections includes a set of logit regression models that are run on both spontaneous and organized conflict. In the second part of the chapter I present briefly the most noteworthy findings from the same regressions run on two additional forms of conflict: revolutions and guerrilla warfare. After the results are presented, I spend the last part of the chapter discussing what implications the results may have, how they relate to each other, and how they relate to the theoretical discussions above.

4.1 Riots and Civil War

4.1.1 Overall Globalization Level, Change, and Shock

Table 4.1 displays the results from the regression analyses of overall globalization's effect on spontaneous and organized internal conflict. It is built up as a twin analysis, in which the same set of regression models is run on both forms of conflict, thereby testing *H2*. Models 1, 3, 5, and 7 have riots as the dependent variable, whereas models 2, 4, 6, and 8 are run on the variable for civil war onset. They each have a base model (models 1 and 2), as well as three models where I add different operationalizations of globalization to this base. First I test *H1a* and *H1b* by including globalization level as the independent variable (models 3 and 4). Second, I test the validity of *H9a* in relation to overall globalization by instead including the variable for change in percent from two years earlier (models 5 and 6). Finally, to test *H9b*, models 7 and 8 add to the base model a dummy variable that indicates whether there has been a shock of globalization, i.e. an increase of 15% or more.

In the base model for riots, the only variables that produce statistically significant coefficients are population size and peace years. A larger population size is related to a greater risk of riots, while peace years has a negative relationship with riots. Running the same model on civil war onset, ethnic fractionalization and population size are significant at the .01 level, and GDP per capita (natural logarithm) and oil are significant at the .10 and .05 level, respectively. Civil war peace years are also statistically significant at the .10 level. Population has a smaller effect on civil war than on riots, though just as statistically

Table 4.1 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Overall Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007*

	(1) Riots	(2) Civil war	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Riots	(6) Civil war	(7) Riots	(8) Civil war
Overall glob, level[a]			-0.018* (0.010)	-0.046*** (0.015)				
Overall glob, change[a]					-0.006 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.017)		
Overall glob, shock[a]							-0.244 (0.229)	0.385 (0.293)
Democracy[a]	0.217 (0.158)	0.250 (0.285)	0.230 (0.153)	0.337 (0.299)	0.220 (0.155)	0.337 (0.289)	0.219 (0.155)	0.357 (0.294)
Autocracy[a]	-0.130 (0.135)	-0.206 (0.289)	-0.140 (0.135)	-0.242 (0.294)	-0.097 (0.138)	-0.108 (0.287)	-0.094 (0.138)	-0.096 (0.289)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.086 (0.279)	1.230*** (0.380)	0.130 (0.261)	1.287*** (0.369)	0.137 (0.277)	1.354*** (0.388)	0.147 (0.279)	1.354*** (0.393)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.354*** (0.046)	0.282*** (0.070)	0.356*** (0.044)	0.306*** (0.068)	0.348*** (0.045)	0.288*** (0.070)	0.347*** (0.044)	0.283*** (0.072)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	0.115 (0.074)	-0.228* (0.119)	0.249** (0.114)	0.083 (0.153)	0.113 (0.074)	-0.236* (0.124)	0.114 (0.075)	-0.231* (0.125)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.005 (0.007)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.007)	0.002 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.006 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.006 (0.014)
Oil	-0.183 (0.178)	0.684** (0.294)	-0.222 (0.196)	0.618** (0.291)	-0.183 (0.171)	0.759** (0.301)	-0.181 (0.171)	0.756** (0.301)
Mountainous	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)
Riot peace yrs	-0.632*** (0.100)		-0.618*** (0.100)		-0.637*** (0.099)		-0.637*** (0.099)	
Civil war peace yrs		0.324* (0.167)		0.327* (0.171)		0.317* (0.174)		0.311* (0.171)
Constant	-7.430*** (0.945)	-7.924*** (1.682)	-7.652*** (0.883)	-9.003*** (1.661)	-6.996*** (0.901)	-6.702*** (1.604)	-7.007*** (0.907)	-6.651*** (1.610)
N	3610	3339	3605	3334	3447	3173	3447	3173
ll	-1308.222	-509.800	-1302.260	-504.940	-1241.040	-485.917	-1240.669	-485.207

Standard errors in parentheses
* *p* < 0.10, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01
Time dummies and splines not shown
High-income OECD countries excluded
[a]Lagged one year

significant and in the same direction. Ethnic fractionalization has a quite considerable, positive effect on civil war onset. Oil also has a positive effect, though not as big, while an increase in GDP per capita is related to a lower risk of civil war.

In model 3 and 4 I add the variable for overall globalization level to the base model. It has a statistically significant negative effect on risk of riots at the .10 level, as well as a negative effect on civil war, which is larger, and significant at the .01 level. *H1a* is supported and *H1b*, consequently, is not. A high level of globalization is associated with a lower level of both spontaneous and organized internal conflict, but it is more strongly linked to organized conflict. This confirms the expectation stated in *H2* that there is a significant difference between the two, but it is not a dramatic difference, as both conflict types are still affected in the same direction.

In models 5 and 6, globalization level is not included; globalization is instead treated as a process of change in that level. The change variable is not statistically significant for either riots or civil war onset, and both coefficients are close to 0, albeit with different signs. Change in overall globalization level does not seem to be related to the likelihood of internal conflict (whereas the level appears to be), and *H9a* is not supported for overall globalization.

What about *H9b*? Slow change may be harmless, but are shocks destabilizing? Models 7 and 8 include the variable for globalization shock. It is not a statistically significant factor for either riots or civil war, suggesting that globalization shocks neither increase nor decrease the likelihood of internal conflict; *H9b* is not supported.

As for the control variables, their coefficients are roughly the same as in the base models throughout the analyses. The notable exception is GDP per capita, which changes when globalization level is included. In the riot models, it turns from an insignificant variable to a statistically significant and positive influence. In the civil war models, it goes from being a significant negative influence to being insignificant. In total, then, it moves toward being related to higher risk of internal conflict. Why might this be? Overall globalization and GDP per capita are quite highly correlated, suggesting that an increase in GDP per capita in itself is related to higher risk of conflict. Perhaps this effect is obscured in the base models as well as the process models because GDP per capita proxies for level of globalization. Then, when globalization level is included as an independent variable, the statistically positive effect of GDP per capita is no longer moderated by the pacifying effect of globalization level, which seems to reveal two separate effects – one negative, and one positive. It is also interesting to note that neither regime type, GDP growth, nor percentage of mountainous terrain are statistically significant variables in any of the regression models.

Globalization is such a wide collection of developments, which calls for a more detailed look at its subcategories. Does it matter which part of society is globalized? Can the

pacifying effect of globalization level be traced to specific areas of society, and does globalizing in different areas of society influence risk of conflict in the same direction? Change and shock are not statistically significant using the overall index, but is this the case for all subcategories as well? If one has a negative influence and one is positive, they may counteract each other's effect.

4.1.2 Economic Globalization Level, Change, and Shock

H3a, *H3b*, and *H4* concern globalization of the economy. These hypotheses are tested in the logit regression analyses shown in table 4.2, together with the hypotheses that whether it is measured as level, change, or shock will affect what relationship globalization has with conflict. The results indicate, somewhat surprisingly, that economic globalization is not statistically related to internal conflict – neither spontaneous, nor organized, and for none of the three alternative ways of operationalizing the phenomenon.

The control variables stay reasonably stable throughout the models here, too, except for GDP per capita. Like in the analysis of overall globalization, adding economic globalization level affects the coefficients for GDP per capita. It becomes visible as a positive effect on the risk of riots, its influence apparently being strengthened when separated from the moderating effect of globalization level, which it correlates somewhat with. However, for civil war, the moderation is not as strong. This can be seen as an indication that spontaneous and organized conflicts do not work in quite the same way. GDP per capita loses statistical significance when either of the alternative economic globalization measures is added, but it does not change as dramatically from negative to positive as it did when overall globalization level was added in table 4.1[23]. This is likely to be because economic globalization does not have a statistically significant effect, and that adding it to the models therefore does not act as a control for the effect of GDP per capita, like in the case of overall globalization. Hence, a different aspect of globalization must be the suspected 'moderator'.

My findings lend no support to the claim that economic globalization as a whole is related to risk of internal conflict. Several studies find, however, that factors connected with economic globalization are significant predictors of civil war, in the form of trade and FDI (Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005; Bussmann and Schneider, 2007; Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 2003), but also measured as economic freedom (De Soysa and Fjelde, 2010). Why

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[23] In model 5 (table 4.2), GDP per capita is significant at the .10 level, but its coefficient and standard error is nearly the same as in model 1 and 7; it only just tipped over the edge to significance.

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Table 4.2 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Economic Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007*

	(1) Riots	(2) Civil war	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Riots	(6) Civil war	(7) Riots	(8) Civil war
Economic glob, level[a]			-0.010 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.012)				
Economic glob, change[a]					0.004 (0.005)	0.010 (0.013)		
Economic glob, shock[a]							0.017 (0.179)	0.245 (0.320)
Democracy[a]	0.217 (0.158)	0.250 (0.285)	0.219 (0.155)	0.279 (0.301)	0.216 (0.155)	0.330 (0.302)	0.219 (0.155)	0.336 (0.303)
Autocracy[a]	-0.130 (0.135)	-0.206 (0.289)	-0.050 (0.138)	-0.267 (0.327)	-0.023 (0.145)	-0.215 (0.321)	-0.023 (0.145)	-0.216 (0.321)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.086 (0.279)	1.230*** (0.380)	0.122 (0.264)	1.188*** (0.369)	0.128 (0.276)	1.288*** (0.390)	0.121 (0.276)	1.281*** (0.393)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.354*** (0.046)	0.282*** (0.070)	0.322*** (0.049)	0.270*** (0.080)	0.335*** (0.046)	0.295*** (0.081)	0.336*** (0.046)	0.299*** (0.082)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	0.115 (0.074)	-0.228* (0.119)	0.203** (0.086)	-0.140 (0.159)	0.124* (0.073)	-0.234* (0.139)	0.121 (0.074)	-0.233* (0.137)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.005 (0.007)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.003 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.003 (0.019)
Oil	-0.183 (0.178)	0.684** (0.294)	-0.188 (0.183)	0.770** (0.309)	-0.165 (0.169)	0.853*** (0.319)	-0.162 (0.169)	0.862*** (0.314)
Mountainous	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.007 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.007 (0.005)
Riot peace yrs	-0.632*** (0.100)		-0.650*** (0.103)		-0.650*** (0.102)		-0.654*** (0.101)	
Civil war peace yrs		0.324* (0.167)		0.271 (0.181)		0.252 (0.183)		0.255 (0.183)
Constant	-7.430*** (0.945)	-7.924*** (1.682)	-7.281*** (0.954)	-7.708*** (1.858)	-6.780*** (0.898)	-6.849*** (1.856)	-6.757*** (0.899)	-6.882*** (1.843)
N	3610	3339	3298	3047	3150	2896	3150	2896
ll	-1308.222	-509.800	-1221.354	-450.261	-1161.954	-427.028	-1162.195	-427.501

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Time dummies and splines not shown
High-income OECD countries excluded
[a]Lagged one year

does the same connection not appear in this study? It could be a result of the different ways economic globalization is measured. FDI and trade represent only 50% of the KOF measure of economic globalization, together with portfolio investment. The other half is represented

by restrictions on the economy, e.g. tariffs and taxes.[24] There might be a discrepancy between the effect of actual flows of goods and finances, and restrictions, causing the results of economic globalization to appear insignificant. To test whether this is the case I ran the same regression models with the variables for the two sub-measures of globalization as the independent variable.[25] When measured as change the variables were still insignificant, but both as level and shock there were statistically significant coefficients.[26] The results demonstrate that a higher level of globalization friendly economic policies, i.e. less restrictions on international flows, is related to a lower risk of riots, but that when such restrictions are loosened in 'shocks' there is a considerably higher risk of riots. Having an open economy may be pacifying, but opening it up rapidly can spawn spontaneous internal conflict. Recall, however, how the mean for riots was lower for missing values of economic globalization, meaning that these results are not completely reliable. The cases I have the data to test are overall more prone to riots than the ones with missing data. This was the opposite for the other conflict forms tested, including civil war. The cases I have tested are less prone to civil war than the ones that are missing from the analysis, and this could influence the results, e.g. contributing to them being insignificant.

4.1.3 Social Globalization Level, Change, and Shock

Table 4.3 shows the results from the analyses of social globalization. According to the results in model 3 and 4, a high level of social globalization is pacifying, both for spontaneous and organized conflict forms. *H5b* – social globalization decreases the risk of internal conflict – is supported, but only if we measure social globalization in level. The process of social globalization – both change and shock – is statistically insignificant, and appears to be of no relevance to the risk of either form of internal conflict. *H9a* and *b* are not supported. The only substantial difference in the effect of social globalization is between the different ways of operationalizing it, not between the different conflict forms, and *H6* is not supported.

It seems, though, that the results reveal which part of globalization causes the change in the coefficients for GDP per capita that we see in table 4.1. When adding the variable for

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[24] De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) use the Economic Freedom of the World index, which focuses on policies and restrictions, but it can be criticized for including measures of 'good governance' and being biased toward neo-liberalism, rather than global integration (as discussed in the variable description above).

[25] Tables with the results can be found in appendix B.

[26] Significant at the .05 level.

Table 4.3 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Social Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007*

	(1) Riots	(2) Civil war	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Riots	(6) Civil war	(7) Riots	(8) Civil war
Social glob, level[a]			-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.038** (0.018)				
Social glob, change[a]					-0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)		
Social glob, shock[a]							0.043 (0.180)	-0.128 (0.308)
Democracy[a]	0.217 (0.158)	0.250 (0.285)	0.227 (0.150)	0.298 (0.298)	0.224 (0.156)	0.338 (0.288)	0.230 (0.155)	0.331 (0.289)
Autocracy[a]	-0.130 (0.135)	-0.206 (0.289)	-0.157 (0.132)	-0.229 (0.289)	-0.095 (0.137)	-0.116 (0.286)	-0.090 (0.137)	-0.118 (0.288)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.086 (0.279)	1.230*** (0.380)	0.036 (0.250)	1.127*** (0.374)	0.137 (0.277)	1.372*** (0.394)	0.141 (0.278)	1.371*** (0.393)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.354*** (0.046)	0.282*** (0.070)	0.307*** (0.045)	0.232*** (0.082)	0.352*** (0.045)	0.279*** (0.071)	0.345*** (0.045)	0.288*** (0.072)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	0.115 (0.074)	-0.228* (0.119)	0.340*** (0.101)	0.073 (0.176)	0.116 (0.075)	-0.235* (0.125)	0.114 (0.075)	-0.233* (0.125)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.005 (0.007)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.005 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.014)
Oil	-0.183 (0.178)	0.684** (0.294)	-0.264 (0.194)	0.552* (0.312)	-0.182 (0.171)	0.757** (0.300)	-0.176 (0.171)	0.747** (0.301)
Mountainous	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)
Riot peace yrs	-0.632*** (0.100)		-0.610*** (0.100)		-0.639*** (0.099)		-0.643*** (0.099)	
Civil war peace yrs		0.324* (0.167)		0.338** (0.169)		0.307* (0.171)		0.309* (0.172)
Constant	-7.430*** (0.945)	-7.924*** (1.682)	-7.477*** (0.918)	-8.162*** (1.697)	-7.247*** (0.914)	-8.009*** (1.705)	-7.133*** (0.901)	-8.174*** (1.720)
N	3610	3339	3610	3339	3452	3178	3452	3178
ll	-1308.222	-509.800	-1300.058	-505.525	-1244.367	-486.171	-1244.675	-486.224

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Time dummies and splines not shown
High-income OECD countries excluded
[a]Lagged one year

level of social globalization to the riots base model, GDP per capita changes from a statistically insignificant effect to a decidedly significant, and positive effect. For civil war, GDP per capita changes from being significant and pacifying, to statistically insignificant. As described earlier, this is likely to be a result of the high correlation between globalization and

GDP per capita, a correlation that is highest for the social element of globalization (see correlation matrix in appendix E, table A.14). An interpretation of these results could be that the conflict reducing effect that seems to come from GDP per capita is better captured by level of social globalization, and that when these are controlled for by including globalization level, other elements of GDP per capita, that are associated with a higher risk of conflict, are shown. However, because of the high correlation, which is an issue in regression analysis, I must be cautious about drawing conclusions. The other control variables are stable on approximately the same figures as in the base model.

A high level of social globalization as measured by the KOF index is related to lower risk of internal conflicts, but as previously discussed there are some validity issues with this part of the index. There are three sub-measures that compose the measure for social globalization, and two of these are arguably measures of development and/or westernization, rather than globalization. 'Information flows' is measured by e.g. Internet, cable TV, and radio use, which might be expressions of technological development more than globalization. Level of 'cultural proximity' is indicated by number of IKEAs and McDonalds restaurants (although book trade is also a factor), making biased toward westernized countries. The data on personal contacts is less problematic, measured as e.g. number of immigrants and international tourism, which are decidedly indicators of international interaction. Although I have excluded high-income OECD countries from the analyses, there is a risk that what my results are showing is simply that development more generally is associated with less conflict proneness. What is more, there is a significant theoretical difference between e.g. the number of cable TV users and the number of immigrants in a country, and including them all in the same index has limitations in terms of theoretically meaningfulness. I have therefore run the same regression models on the sub-measures of social globalization, as I did with economic globalization. The models with the shock variables have not produced results that are notably different from the results in table 4.3, but both the analyses of level and change have interesting results.[27] The pacifying effect on riots comes entirely from information flows and level of cultural proximity.[28] There is no statistically significant effect from personal contacts. This supports the suspicion that the lower risk of internal conflict that seems to come from social globalization may rather be a result of how it is measured – i.e. in part as development. As for civil war, the risk of onset is lower with a higher level of information flows, but neither

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[27] For tables with the results, see appendix B.
[28] Significant at the .05 and .01 level, respectively.

level of personal contacts, nor cultural proximity is statistically significant. However, an increase in level of cultural proximity (i.e. change) is related to lower risk of civil war.

Table 4.4 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Political Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007*

	(1) Riots	(2) Civil war	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Riots	(6) Civil war	(7) Riots	(8) Civil war
Political glob, level[a]			0.004 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)				
Political glob, change[a]					-0.007* (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)		
Political glob, shock[a]							-0.315 (0.194)	-0.093 (0.245)
Democracy[a]	0.217 (0.158)	0.250 (0.285)	0.211 (0.160)	0.256 (0.282)	0.217 (0.156)	0.324 (0.288)	0.219 (0.156)	0.331 (0.288)
Autocracy[a]	-0.130 (0.135)	-0.206 (0.289)	-0.127 (0.134)	-0.235 (0.290)	-0.094 (0.137)	-0.116 (0.287)	-0.100 (0.137)	-0.118 (0.286)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.086 (0.279)	1.230*** (0.380)	0.078 (0.284)	1.252*** (0.381)	0.142 (0.280)	1.374*** (0.393)	0.146 (0.281)	1.375*** (0.396)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.354*** (0.046)	0.282*** (0.070)	0.332*** (0.057)	0.320*** (0.086)	0.341*** (0.044)	0.282*** (0.072)	0.344*** (0.044)	0.285*** (0.072)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	0.115 (0.074)	-0.228* (0.119)	0.096 (0.088)	-0.206 (0.127)	0.107 (0.075)	-0.237* (0.124)	0.109 (0.075)	-0.234* (0.125)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.005 (0.007)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.014)
Oil	-0.183 (0.178)	0.684** (0.294)	-0.184 (0.174)	0.688** (0.290)	-0.174 (0.169)	0.754** (0.302)	-0.169 (0.169)	0.752** (0.302)
Mountainous	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)
Riot peace yrs	-0.632*** (0.100)		-0.635*** (0.099)		-0.629*** (0.099)		-0.635*** (0.100)	
Civil war peace yrs		0.324* (0.167)		0.317* (0.167)		0.321* (0.174)		0.313* (0.173)
Constant	-7.430*** (0.945)	-7.924*** (1.682)	-6.808*** (1.035)	-8.437*** (1.849)	-6.949*** (0.911)	-8.012*** (1.734)	-7.037*** (0.906)	-8.117*** (1.728)
N	3610	3339	3610	3339	3452	3178	3452	3178
ll	-1308.222	-509.800	-1307.717	-509.457	-1242.656	-485.650	-1243.058	-486.242

Standard errors in parentheses
* *p* < 0.10, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01
Time dummies and splines not shown
High-income OECD countries excluded
[a]Lagged one year

4.1.4 Political Globalization Level, Change, and Shock

Lastly, I analyze the political side of globalization (table 4.4). Models 3 and 4 in table are regressions with level of political globalization as the main independent variable, 5 and 6 include instead change in level of globalization, and 7 and 8 test for the effect of political globalization shocks. Level does not matter for either forms of conflict, and neither does shock. The change variable has a tiny, negative relationship with the risk of riots, but that is all that political globalization seems to have to do with risk of internal conflict. This relationship is only significant at the .10 level, and the coefficient is just -0.007. It is weak, but some, support for *H7a* and *H9a*. The difference between the effect of change in political globalization on riots and civil war onset is so small that I would be reluctant to take it as confirmation of *H8*, although the former is statistically significant and the latter is not. Here, too, the control variables stay stable throughout the analyses; the GDP per capita coefficient that has been an issue in the analyses of the other forms of globalization level is only slightly affected by the inclusion of political globalization level in models 3 and 4.

4.2 Alternative Analyses

4.2.1 Including High-Income OECD Countries

The analyses above are carried out on the sample described in the research design chapter; high-income OECD countries are excluded. High-income OECD countries are more relevant to the study of globalization level than of the globalization process, making them potentially biasing for this study. They are likely to have systematic similarities and thereby be a group of influential outliers. But does excluding them make a difference in the results? Is it necessary for future research to take this divide into account? To check the general validity of the hypotheses regardless of income level I have conducted the same analyses as the ones described above on the full data set.[29] Tables with the results from these regressions can be found in appendix C. The results are not dramatically different. The effects appear somewhat stronger, both in terms of size of the coefficients and statistical significance, but the general picture of the relationship between globalization and conflict is the same.

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[29] That is, the analysis of overall, economic, social, and political globalization, not the detailed analyses of economic and social globalization.

4.2.2 Other Forms of Internal Conflict

The outer points of the spontaneous–organized scale are not the only types of internal conflict. Many are somewhere in between. To achieve a broader perspective on the relationship between internal conflict and globalization I have run the same models as the ones described in the paragraphs above on two additional forms of internal conflict: revolutions and guerrilla warfare. The results from the analyses of all four forms of conflict are summed up in table 4.5 below, showing only the statistically significant coefficients.[30] The direction of the other coefficients are indicated by + or −.

Revolutions are affected similarly to riots by overall globalization. However, when the index is separated into the three smaller variables, globalization does not appear as a significant effect. Guerrilla warfare is characterized by having a relatively high level of organization, and might be expected to behave in a similar way to civil war. This is not particularly evident in the results, although a few similarities can be seen. Guerrilla warfare, too, is affected negatively by level of social globalization, but only with half the strength relative to civil war. Guerrilla warfare has a quite strong, statistically significant relationship

Table 4.5 *Statistically Significant Coefficients: Globalization and Four Types of Internal Conflict 1970-2007*

	Riots	Civil War	Revolutions	Guerrilla War
Overall Globalization				
Level	-0.018*	-0.046***	-0.016*	−
Change	−	−	−	+
Shock	−	+	−	−
Economic Globalization				
Level	−	−	−	−
Change	+	+	−	+
Shock	+	+	−	0.524**
Social Globalization				
Level	-0.028**	-0.038**	−	-0.018*
Change	−	+	−	−
Shock	+	−	−	+
Political Globalization				
Level	+	−	−	+
Change	-0.007*	−	−	−
Shock	−	−	−	−

$* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01$
High-income OECD countries excluded
+ and − indicates direction of the coefficients that are not statistically significant

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[30] See appendix D for variable descriptions and full tables.

with shocks of economic globalization, and is thus the only form of conflict to be significantly affected by the full index of economic globalization. The relationship is positive, meaning that a rapid increase in a country's level of economic globalization increases the risk of guerrilla warfare.

4.3 Discussion

I have described the results from the empirical analysis above, but in this section I assess and discuss further what implications they have for the expectations in the initial theoretical discussion. Are the hypotheses valid or not, and if not, why is this? Can any of them be safely confirmed or rejected? I address these questions in three subsections below, each with its own focus. The first is centered around the difference between globalization of the three separate areas of society. In the second section I discuss what the results say about the difference between spontaneous and organized conflict, and the third is concentrated on the variation in results owing to the different ways of operationalizing globalization.

4.3.1 Different globalizations

I have found some support in the empirical analysis for *H1a*. Having a high level of overall globalization has a pacifying influence on internal conflict in general, i.e., it decreases the risk of violent riots and civil war. But, 'globalization' covers a broad spectrum of developments, and some of these may affect risk of internal conflicts; others may not. Some may increase the risk, some may decrease it, and opposing effects may balance each other out.

The empirical analyses confirm that there is indeed a difference between economic globalization, social globalization, and political globalization in terms of their relationship with several types of internal conflict. At first glance, only the social/cultural branch of globalization seems to have a strong statistical relationship with internal conflict, while economic and political forms of globalization are both close to inconsequential. However, when studying individually the components that make up the index of economic globalization I find that the component that concerns policies matter, while the actual international flows of goods and finances is not a statistically significant predictor of internal conflicts.

A lower level of restrictions on the economy is linked with a lower risk of spontaneous conflict. Riots seem to occur less in countries with more globalization friendly economic policies than in more economically protectionist countries. This result supports *H3b*.

However, although the long-term effect may be pacifying, shock treatments of economically globalizing policies – rapid removal of restrictions – is not a good way of avoiding riots. Decreasing restrictions in shocks seems to increase the risk of riots quite considerably. This is in line with the expectation of globalization's critics that economic globalization affects people negatively, by increasing inequality both globally and nationally, causing insecurity for workers, etcetera. If economic globalization has such consequences, it should be expected to increase individual motivation for conflict, and therefore be particularly important to the risk of riots, and this is just what the results of the empirical analyses are indicating. And so, I find support for both *H3a* and *H3b*, but on different conditions.

Although it works the other way than economic globalization, social globalization is perhaps a significant influence on risk of internal conflict because it, too, affects large parts of the population directly. But although it appears as a pacifying factor, there are some issues to consider before taking this as confirmation of *H5b*. When divided into its three components, there is a distinct difference between their individual effects. Increase in cultural proximity is related to lower risk of civil war, and a high level is associated with less riots. However, the cultural proximity variable is somewhat questionable as it relies on counting the number of IKEAs and McDonalds' in a country (although book trade is also a factor), and could be a proxy for capitalism or westernization rather than global integration. Still, the theory is that they represent a certain common cultural base. We eat the same food and sit on the same chairs. We have a common culture of eating fast food and buying cheap furniture, representing not only American and Swedish culture, but commercial culture more generally. Whether this commercialism is an expression of westernization or globalization is debatable. As for information flows, it is connected with lower risk of spontaneous and internal conflict. A high level of information flows means high use of international newspapers, Internet, and other media and information technology. Integration across borders is perhaps in that way felt inside the borders through promotion of knowledge and tolerance of other cultures and identities, and generally a broader perspective. But note that it could partly be a spurious relationship. There may be factors that are not part of social globalization as such, but that are related, causing the pacifying effect we see in the results. Both cultural proximity and information flow might represent development rather than globalization. For instance, cable TV use and consumption of international media suggests that there is a certain level of wealth and resources available to people, which is likely to be associated with a peaceful society. As we have seen, level of social globalization is correlated with GDP per capita and appears to

capture some of its pacifying effects. The part of the index of social globalization that measures personal contacts across borders is not a statistically significant effect. This element includes e.g. international tourism to the country and number of immigrants in a country, and it is not as likely to be a proxy for development, capitalism, etcetera as cultural proximity and information flows. Its statistical insignificance suggests that it might not be the increase of global interaction in itself that leads to a lower risk of internal conflict, but that there is something to the suspicion that the relationship is in fact a spurious one.

Political globalization has a minor relationship with lower risk of riots, but the results are just barely statistically significant and the coefficient is small. Why? Perhaps international political integration is a factor that does not affect people's daily lives directly or dramatically. Whatever goes on in the political elite circles is not necessarily felt acutely in the general population and, apparently, does not create either sparks or harmony. Still, it is surprising that neither the level nor the process of political globalization act as a proxy for other developments in a country that could be related to the likelihood of internal conflict. As mentioned in the theory, one might expect politically globalized countries to be more stable, more adhering to human rights, etcetera, thereby reducing conflict risk, but no such effect turns up in my results, and I cannot confirm nor discard either *H7a* or *H7b*.

There are, however, some quite interesting findings in how the control variables are affected by the addition of different globalization forms to the regression models. Oil does not matter to risk of civil war when level of social globalization is added to the analysis. As described above, in theories of civil war, oil is expected to be a contributing factor because of either its consequences for a country's economic development – having high-value natural resources reduces the incentive to develop other industry and an economy based on human resources – or because it is a proxy for the strength of the government. In my analyses, oil is a significant explanatory factor for civil war even when economic and political globalization are added to the models, but when level of social globalization is included in the explanatory model, the effect of oil is obscured. What is it about social globalization that suddenly explains what oil used to explain? Perhaps level of social globalization says something about the social capital in a society, not just economic capital, and the stability of the social institutions, not just state institutions. Perhaps, when such factors, or the lack of them, are captured by another variable, the importance of oil as an explanatory factor is diminished.

4.3.2 Different conflicts

Does globalization affect spontaneous and organized internal conflicts in different ways? The most notable finding showing a difference between the two is the difference in the way they are affected by economic restrictions. Less economic restrictions is pacifying in terms of riots, but has no statistically significant effect on civil war, and reducing restrictions in shocks increases the likelihood of riots, but has no detectable effect on civil war. As mentioned, this can be interpreted as support for the argument that economic globalization increases the motivation for internal conflict, by increasing grievances of various kinds. Organized conflict is more binding to be a part of; it requires different conditions in order to grow, like state weakness. Spontaneous conflict requires individual motivation, and according to the results in this study, shocks of economically globalizing policies increases such motivation, but has no statistically significant effect on the feasibility of organized conflicts.

Apart from in the analysis of social globalization level, oil consistently appears as a statistically significant positive factor in explaining civil war, and is consistently insignificant to riots. This shows that there is a difference between spontaneous and organized internal conflicts. Organized conflicts appear to be more feasible in countries that have oil, whether because of lower state capacity or economic explanations, but riots do not require the same conditions to be feasible.

4.3.3 Different operationalizations of globalization

According to the discussions leading up to *H9a* and *H9b*, we ought to expect a high level of globalization in a country to be a different influence on a society than the process of globalizing. The theory was that highly globalized societies generally possess a certain institutional strength that less globalized countries do not, but that any process of change in a society is destabilizing and contributes to a higher risk of war. The balance between these two – the strength gained by a higher level and the weakness of being in transformation – should help determine the likelihood of conflict in a society. To complicate the matter, there are many potential threats associated with a high level of globalization that may outweigh the expected pacifying effect of institutional strength.

The results from the analyses generally support the expectation that the higher the level of globalization in a country, the lower the risk of internal conflict. However, this effect

seems to come solely from the elements categorized as social globalization; neither a high level of economic, nor political globalization, seems to matter to the risk of internal conflict.

Change in level of globalization in a country does not influence the risk of internal conflict except for in the detailed analysis of social globalization, where increase in cultural proximity appeared to be pacifying. Still, in general the coefficients are invariably low, although it just about tips over to the lowest level of significance in the case of political globalization. I cannot find any support for *H9a*, the results instead suggest that the opposite is more accurate: that the globalization process is pacifying, if anything. An explanation for this could be that the change that the variable captures in most cases happens at a slow pace, not upsetting society.

Shocks of globalization, on the other hand, should be expected to be more dangerous events. According to the results, this is the case with economic globalization measured as policy restrictions, lending some support to *H9b*. Globalization shock is not a significant predictor of internal conflict in any other form. This might be due to the way the variable is calculated. It is arguable whether the limit for what is a shock is set high enough. It may be that a 20% change instead of a 15% is destabilizing

5 Conclusion

I have conducted a broad empirical analysis of the relationship between globalization and internal conflict, dividing globalization into economic, social, and political globalization, and distinguishing between spontaneous and organized forms of violent internal conflict. The results indicate that the factors that go under social globalization are the strongest influences on the likelihood of internal conflict. It is, however, questionable whether its apparently pacifying effect is a result of global social interactions as such, or a result of a spurious relationship with development and social or economic resources as an underlying variable. Some elements of the data on social globalization employed in this study can be criticized for being indicators of development instead of globalization, and the element that is less likely to be subject to such criticism did not produce statistically significant results. Economic and political globalization appears to have very little effect on the risk of either spontaneous internal conflict (represented by riots) or organized conflict (represented by civil war onset), but when separating the measure of economic globalization into its two subcomponents actual flows and economic restrictions, the latter turns out to be a significant predictor of riots. In the long term, a high level (i.e. little restrictions) is related to a slightly lower risk of riots, but rapid drops in economic restrictions can apparently increase frustrations and cause riots. This indicates that there is a significant difference in the way globalization affects spontaneous and organized conflicts, and thus that it is meaningful to study in the future not only globalization and civil war, but globalization and riots, too.

Further, the study demonstrates that whether globalization is treated as a static condition or a process of change matters significantly to which result one will get when studying it. This distinction is very useful to be aware of in future research and when comparing the results from different studies of globalization. The level of globalization is the most influential factor, and while the change in that level was expected to be destabilizing and increase conflict risk, it seems to be of little importance. While many aspects of the process of globalization appear not to affect internal conflict, there are notable exceptions. Increasing cultural proximity is pacifying and that shocks of economically globalizing policies spawn riots.

One cannot control for everything, and there are a few weaknesses to this study that should be commented on. First, the framework of this analysis does not allow for the distinction between globalization and regionalization (Moses and Brigham, 2007: 61). A country may have very high levels of interaction with their neighboring countries, but very

little with other parts of the world. Is that really 'globalization'? It is an important difference in its own right, but I have not controlled for it in this study, as it would add to the complexity level and obscure the results more than it would be useful. Any interaction with foreign actors is counted as globalization, regardless of geographical proximity.

Second, the negative effect that economic globalization may have through globalizing economic crises is not represented well by this type of quantitative study, even less so because of my adding year dummies to the analyses.

Third, the scope of the thesis does not allow for both broad and in-depth studies. Studying several forms of globalization and several forms of internal conflict is no doubt a broad subject, and consequently an in-depth analysis of the different effects of each of the many factors that make up the overall picture is not realistic, although I have attempted to look into details of both social and economic globalization when possible and desirable. Still, studying the overall picture hopefully contributes to the fields of conflict studies and globalization studies by giving an idea of which parts of the picture are most interesting for further research, and which distinctions should be paid particular attention to, e.g. the difference between economic policies and economic flows. Additionally, being aware of which forms of globalization affect which forms of internal conflicts is useful for policy makers in the process of developing preventive measures and developing policies steering society toward the developments that are associated with less conflict. My findings suggest that quick loosening of economic restrictions is not desirable, which has implications for how wise the adoption of an economic policy reform package in line with the Washington Consensus should be expected to be. On a different note, my findings suggest that promoting social and cultural globalization could help prevent both spontaneous and organized internal conflict, but that one should be aware that aiming for general development might be the more effective way to go.

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Appendices

Appendix A. List of High-Income OECD Countries Excluded From Main Analyses

United States
Canada
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
Belgium
Luxembourg
France
Switzerland
Spain
Portugal
Germany/West Germany (post/pre 1990)
Austria
Italy
Greece
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Denmark
Iceland
Japan
Australia
New Zealand

(23 countries in total)

Appendix B. Sub-Measures of Economic and Social Globalization

Table A.1 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Sub-Measures of Economic Globalization Level 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded*

	(1) Riots	(2) Riots	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Civil war	(6) Civil war
Economic glob, level[a]	-0.010 (0.006)			-0.012 (0.012)		
Actual flows, level[a]		-0.001 (0.004)			-0.005 (0.007)	
Restrictions, level[a]			-0.013** (0.006)			-0.010 (0.011)
Democracy[a]	0.219 (0.155)	0.199 (0.162)	0.228 (0.160)	0.279 (0.301)	0.150 (0.303)	0.224 (0.298)
Autocracy[a]	-0.050 (0.138)	-0.098 (0.144)	-0.048 (0.136)	-0.267 (0.327)	-0.221 (0.316)	-0.266 (0.324)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.122 (0.264)	0.081 (0.274)	0.113 (0.274)	1.188*** (0.369)	1.293*** (0.396)	1.098*** (0.369)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.322*** (0.049)	0.338*** (0.053)	0.329*** (0.044)	0.270*** (0.080)	0.268*** (0.084)	0.285*** (0.079)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	0.203** (0.086)	0.126 (0.085)	0.247*** (0.078)	-0.140 (0.159)	-0.158 (0.139)	-0.141 (0.163)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.018)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.018)
Oil	-0.188 (0.183)	-0.197 (0.185)	-0.233 (0.169)	0.770** (0.309)	0.646** (0.300)	0.718** (0.308)
Mountainous	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)
Riot peace yrs	-0.650*** (0.103)	-0.655*** (0.101)	-0.637*** (0.103)			
Civil war peace yrs				0.271 (0.181)	0.259 (0.180)	0.260 (0.180)
Constant	-7.281*** (0.954)	-6.887*** (0.947)	-7.132*** (0.895)	-7.708*** (1.858)	-7.801*** (1.872)	-6.699*** (1.834)
N	3298	3237	3159	3047	2993	2928
ll	-1221.354	-1221.744	-1193.782	-450.261	-447.294	-445.604

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Time dummies and splines not shown
High-income OECD countries excluded
[a]Lagged one year

Table A.2 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Sub-Measures of Economic Globalization Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded*

	(1) Riots	(2) Riots	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Civil war	(6) Civil war
Economic glob, shock[a]	0.017 (0.179)			0.245 (0.320)		
Actual flows, shock[a]		0.246 (0.322)			0.791 (0.485)	
Restrictions, shock[a]			1.024** (0.460)			-0.059 (1.068)
Democracy[a]	0.219 (0.155)	0.207 (0.160)	0.232 (0.157)	0.336 (0.303)	0.364 (0.301)	0.451 (0.302)
Autocracy[a]	-0.023 (0.145)	-0.036 (0.145)	-0.008 (0.147)	-0.216 (0.321)	0.022 (0.307)	-0.071 (0.319)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.121 (0.276)	0.139 (0.277)	0.133 (0.279)	1.281*** (0.393)	1.457*** (0.430)	1.291*** (0.406)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.336*** (0.046)	0.335*** (0.046)	0.326*** (0.045)	0.299*** (0.082)	0.306*** (0.083)	0.303*** (0.083)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	0.121 (0.074)	0.118 (0.077)	0.122 (0.076)	-0.233* (0.137)	-0.184 (0.139)	-0.244* (0.144)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.003 (0.019)	0.022* (0.013)	0.017 (0.020)
Oil	-0.162 (0.169)	-0.206 (0.175)	-0.148 (0.172)	0.862*** (0.314)	0.669** (0.319)	0.858*** (0.317)
Mountainous	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.005)
Riot peace yrs	-0.654*** (0.101)	-0.657*** (0.100)	-0.642*** (0.103)			
Civil war peace yrs				0.255 (0.183)	0.278 (0.182)	0.268 (0.180)
Constant	-6.757*** (0.899)	-6.883*** (0.912)	-6.821*** (0.882)	-6.882*** (1.843)	-8.908*** (1.938)	-7.094*** (1.892)
N	3150	3076	3000	2896	2829	2766
ll	-1162.195	-1157.366	-1127.711	-427.501	-412.536	-412.673

Standard errors in parentheses
* *p* < 0.10, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01
Time dummies and splines not shown
High-income OECD countries excluded
[a]Lagged one year

Table A.3 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Sub-Measures of Social Globalization Level 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded*

	(1) Riots	(2) Riots	(3) Riots	(4) Riots	(5) Civil war	(6) Civil war	(7) Civil war	(8) Civil war
Social glob, level[a]	-0.028*** (0.008)				-0.038** (0.018)			
Personal contact, level[a]		-0.004 (0.007)				-0.011 (0.011)		
Information flows, level[a]			-0.013** (0.005)				-0.028** (0.011)	
Cultural proximity, level[a]				-0.014*** (0.004)				-0.010 (0.008)
Democracy[a]	0.227 (0.150)	0.210 (0.162)	0.245 (0.158)	0.232 (0.154)	0.298 (0.298)	0.176 (0.288)	0.326 (0.292)	0.277 (0.294)
Autocracy[a]	-0.157 (0.132)	-0.144 (0.141)	-0.118 (0.138)	-0.134 (0.132)	-0.229 (0.289)	-0.293 (0.305)	-0.147 (0.294)	-0.201 (0.291)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.036 (0.250)	0.169 (0.280)	0.017 (0.265)	0.054 (0.257)	1.127*** (0.374)	1.213*** (0.379)	1.083*** (0.387)	1.194*** (0.375)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.307*** (0.045)	0.341*** (0.061)	0.332*** (0.046)	0.376*** (0.043)	0.232*** (0.082)	0.265*** (0.094)	0.245*** (0.077)	0.294*** (0.069)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	0.340*** (0.101)	0.168* (0.087)	0.231** (0.097)	0.212*** (0.077)	0.073 (0.176)	-0.123 (0.128)	0.033 (0.157)	-0.163 (0.126)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.014)
Oil	-0.264 (0.194)	-0.197 (0.183)	-0.194 (0.186)	-0.283 (0.188)	0.552* (0.312)	0.611** (0.294)	0.677** (0.293)	0.608** (0.309)
Mountainous	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Riot peace yrs	-0.610*** (0.100)	-0.648*** (0.100)	-0.634*** (0.100)	-0.610*** (0.102)				
Civil war peace yrs					0.338** (0.169)	0.350** (0.169)	0.378** (0.172)	0.319* (0.167)
Constant	-7.477*** (0.918)	-7.257*** (1.105)	-7.144*** (0.885)	-8.339*** (0.973)	-8.162*** (1.697)	-6.328*** (1.889)	-8.317*** (1.694)	-8.440*** (1.729)
N	3610	3535	3587	3610	3339	3270	3319	3339
ll	-1300.058	-1273.808	-1294.791	-1301.191	-505.525	-482.997	-498.015	-509.020

Standard errors in parentheses
* *p* < 0.10, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01
Time dummies and splines not shown
High-income OECD countries excluded
[a]Lagged one year

Table A.4 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Sub-Measures of Social Globalization Change 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded*

	(1) Riots	(2) Riots	(3) Riots	(4) Riots	(5) Civil war	(6) Civil war	(7) Civil war	(8) Civil war
Social glob, change[a]	-0.004 (0.005)				0.004 (0.006)			
Personal contact, change[a]		-0.035 (0.026)				-0.003 (0.032)		
Information flows, change[a]			0.003 (0.015)				0.010 (0.028)	
Cultural proximity,change[a]				-0.009 (0.009)				-0.022** (0.010)
Democracy[a]	0.224 (0.156)	0.231 (0.160)	0.235 (0.156)	0.223 (0.156)	0.338 (0.288)	0.394 (0.283)	0.492* (0.285)	0.463 (0.284)
Autocracy[a]	-0.095 (0.137)	-0.091 (0.141)	-0.069 (0.136)	-0.090 (0.138)	-0.116 (0.286)	-0.069 (0.298)	0.039 (0.285)	-0.004 (0.284)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.137 (0.277)	0.202 (0.284)	0.162 (0.278)	0.139 (0.275)	1.372*** (0.394)	1.393*** (0.406)	1.445*** (0.412)	1.413*** (0.404)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.352*** (0.045)	0.355*** (0.046)	0.345*** (0.045)	0.349*** (0.044)	0.279*** (0.071)	0.326*** (0.075)	0.299*** (0.072)	0.309*** (0.070)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	0.116 (0.075)	0.137* (0.075)	0.117 (0.074)	0.122 (0.076)	-0.235* (0.125)	-0.215 (0.133)	-0.222* (0.129)	-0.219* (0.128)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.005 (0.014)	0.021 (0.018)	0.019 (0.012)	0.017 (0.012)
Oil	-0.182 (0.171)	-0.182 (0.176)	-0.180 (0.171)	-0.180 (0.173)	0.757** (0.300)	0.700** (0.318)	0.732** (0.310)	0.718** (0.310)
Mountainous	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
Riot peace yrs	-0.639*** (0.099)	-0.653*** (0.099)	-0.647*** (0.099)	-0.637*** (0.099)				
Civil war peace yrs					0.307* (0.171)	0.355** (0.171)	0.374** (0.177)	0.357** (0.174)
Constant	-7.247*** (0.914)	-7.464*** (0.912)	-7.013*** (0.907)	-7.090*** (0.930)	-8.009*** (1.705)	-9.105*** (1.807)	-8.763*** (1.725)	-7.364*** (1.604)
N	3452	3361	3411	3432	3178	3093	3140	3158
ll	-1244.367	-1202.077	-1228.492	-1235.857	-486.171	-446.323	-464.954	-471.324

Standard errors in parentheses
* *p* < 0.10, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01
Time dummies and splines not shown
High-income OECD countries excluded
[a]Lagged one year

Appendix C. Riots and Civil War, All Countries

Table A.5 *Descriptive Statistics, All Countries*

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Riots	5608	.141	.348	0	1
Civil war onset	5611	.034	.180	0	1
Overall globalization, level	5749	45.580	18.118	9.558	92.893
Economic globalization, level	5052	48.710	19.611	6.969	98.688
Social globalization, level	5825	38.41	21.249	2.368	94.575
Political globalization, level	5825	54.015	22.465	4.274	98.781
Overall globalization, change[a]	5445	3.376	5.981	-25.049	42.440
Economic globalization, change[a]	4782	3.367	9.679	-52.297	258.231
Social globalization, change[a]	5517	3.193	9.363	-37.497	116.850
Political globalization, change[a]	5517	5.739	16.703	-44.471	317.600
Overall globalization, shock[b]	5445	0.051	0.219	0	1
Economic globalization, shock[b]	4782	0.073	0.259	0	1
Social globalization, shock[b]	5517	0.077	0.267	0	1
Political globalization, shock[b]	5517	0.099	0.299	0	1
Democracy	5177	.405	.491	0	1
Autocracy	5177	.396	.489	0	1
Ethnic fractionalization	5245	.421	.283	.004	.925
Population, total[c]	5810	15.761	1.680	11.594	20.999
GDP per capita[c]	5147	7.498	1.592	4.057	11.025
GDP growth, annual (%)	5190	3.761	6.507	-51.031	106.280
Oil	5833	.151	.358	0	1
Mountainous terrain	5353	17.367	21.737	0	94.3
Riot peace years	5608	7.915	8.433	0	37
Riot cubic spline 1	5608	-299.803	515.838	-2664.027	0
Riot cubic spline 2	5608	-1114.808	2116.477	-11220.13	0
Riot cubic spline 3	5608	-1564.383	3386.688	-19032.32	0
Civil war peace years	5611	11.276	10.751	0	37
Civil war cubic spline 1	5611	-525.433	707.811	-2628	0
Civil war cubic spline 2	5611	-2676.687	4028.777	-15312	0
Civil war cubic spline 3	5611	-2733.068	4653.880	-18810	0

[a] % difference from 2 years prior
[b] >15% increase from 2 years prior
[c] Log transformed

Logit regression

Table A.6 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Overall Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007, All Countries*

	(1) Riots	(2) Civil war	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Riots	(6) Civil war	(7) Riots	(8) Civil war
Overall glob, level[a]			-0.025** (0.010)	-0.046*** (0.014)				
Overall glob, change[a]					-0.009 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.017)		
Overall glob, shock[a]							-0.285 (0.220)	0.374 (0.291)
Democracy[a]	0.090 (0.165)	0.234 (0.295)	0.148 (0.159)	0.343 (0.302)	0.104 (0.164)	0.329 (0.301)	0.104 (0.164)	0.348 (0.306)
Autocracy[a]	-0.154 (0.131)	-0.210 (0.288)	-0.150 (0.131)	-0.229 (0.292)	-0.126 (0.134)	-0.101 (0.287)	-0.121 (0.134)	-0.089 (0.289)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	-0.062 (0.277)	1.230*** (0.375)	0.070 (0.256)	1.347*** (0.363)	-0.019 (0.273)	1.353*** (0.383)	-0.005 (0.274)	1.356*** (0.388)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.324*** (0.050)	0.287*** (0.068)	0.327*** (0.049)	0.311*** (0.065)	0.316*** (0.048)	0.288*** (0.069)	0.314*** (0.048)	0.285*** (0.071)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	-0.052 (0.058)	-0.305*** (0.095)	0.173 (0.125)	0.053 (0.142)	-0.059 (0.058)	-0.318*** (0.097)	-0.056 (0.059)	-0.313*** (0.098)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.007 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.007 (0.013)
Oil	-0.064 (0.171)	0.760*** (0.282)	-0.140 (0.192)	0.649** (0.275)	-0.054 (0.165)	0.847*** (0.288)	-0.052 (0.165)	0.843*** (0.287)
Mountainous	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)
Riot peace yrs	-0.679*** (0.102)		-0.654*** (0.099)		-0.662*** (0.101)		-0.662*** (0.101)	
Civil war peace yrs		0.389** (0.174)		0.403** (0.179)		0.382** (0.181)		0.378** (0.179)
Constant	-5.662*** (0.941)	-7.734*** (1.584)	-6.500*** (1.066)	-9.171*** (1.578)	-5.573*** (0.894)	-7.887*** (1.615)	-5.599*** (0.893)	-7.877*** (1.616)
N	4324	4107	4319	4102	4126	3906	4126	3906
ll	-1547.277	-538.702	-1536.239	-532.901	-1464.136	-510.473	-1463.922	-509.782

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Time dummies and splines not shown
[a]Lagged one year

Table A.7 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Economic Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007, All Countries*

	(1) Riots	(2) Civil war	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Riots	(6) Civil war	(7) Riots	(8) Civil war
Economic glob, level[a]			-0.010 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.011)				
Economic glob, change[a]					0.003 (0.005)	0.010 (0.013)		
Economic glob, shock[a]							0.008 (0.175)	0.237 (0.319)
Democracy[a]	0.090 (0.165)	0.234 (0.295)	0.110 (0.163)	0.273 (0.311)	0.109 (0.165)	0.322 (0.314)	0.111 (0.165)	0.329 (0.313)
Autocracy[a]	-0.154 (0.131)	-0.210 (0.288)	-0.074 (0.135)	-0.271 (0.325)	-0.056 (0.141)	-0.219 (0.318)	-0.057 (0.141)	-0.221 (0.318)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	-0.062 (0.277)	1.230*** (0.375)	0.011 (0.268)	1.207*** (0.363)	0.003 (0.276)	1.291*** (0.385)	-0.004 (0.276)	1.282*** (0.388)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.324*** (0.050)	0.287*** (0.068)	0.291*** (0.053)	0.272*** (0.077)	0.302*** (0.049)	0.295*** (0.079)	0.303*** (0.050)	0.299*** (0.079)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	-0.052 (0.058)	-0.305*** (0.095)	0.038 (0.084)	-0.207 (0.135)	-0.049 (0.058)	-0.324*** (0.104)	-0.052 (0.059)	-0.324*** (0.103)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.018)	0.000 (0.008)	0.006 (0.019)	0.000 (0.008)	0.006 (0.019)
Oil	-0.064 (0.171)	0.760*** (0.282)	-0.084 (0.176)	0.836*** (0.291)	-0.051 (0.169)	0.940*** (0.302)	-0.048 (0.169)	0.949*** (0.298)
Mountainous	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)	0.008 (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)	0.007 (0.005)
Riot peace yrs	-0.679*** (0.102)		-0.695*** (0.104)		-0.676*** (0.104)		-0.680*** (0.103)	
Civil war peace yrs		0.389** (0.174)		0.356* (0.193)		0.337* (0.195)		0.338* (0.195)
Constant	-5.662*** (0.941)	-7.734*** (1.584)	-5.183*** (0.960)	-6.121*** (1.560)	-5.425*** (0.892)	-7.748*** (1.799)	-5.413*** (0.889)	-7.805*** (1.790)
N	4324	4107	4012	3808	3829	3622	3829	3622
ll	-1547.277	-538.702	-1459.136	-478.661	-1384.418	-451.333	-1384.642	-451.835

Standard errors in parentheses
* *p* < 0.10, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01
Time dummies and splines not shown
[a]Lagged one year

Table A.8 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Social Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007, All Countries*

	(1) Riots	(2) Civil war	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Riots	(6) Civil war	(7) Riots	(8) Civil war
Social glob, level[a]			-0.029*** (0.008)	-0.033** (0.014)				
Social glob, change[a]					-0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)		
Social glob, shock[a]							-0.046 (0.161)	-0.205 (0.305)
Democracy[a]	0.090 (0.165)	0.234 (0.295)	0.146 (0.157)	0.295 (0.302)	0.108 (0.165)	0.328 (0.300)	0.112 (0.164)	0.319 (0.300)
Autocracy[a]	-0.154 (0.131)	-0.210 (0.288)	-0.146 (0.129)	-0.210 (0.289)	-0.126 (0.133)	-0.110 (0.286)	-0.119 (0.133)	-0.115 (0.288)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	-0.062 (0.277)	1.230*** (0.375)	0.033 (0.246)	1.211*** (0.371)	-0.015 (0.272)	1.372*** (0.389)	-0.007 (0.273)	1.372*** (0.388)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.324*** (0.050)	0.287*** (0.068)	0.282*** (0.050)	0.246*** (0.076)	0.319*** (0.049)	0.283*** (0.069)	0.314*** (0.049)	0.291*** (0.070)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	-0.052 (0.058)	-0.305*** (0.095)	0.248** (0.111)	0.011 (0.162)	-0.055 (0.059)	-0.317*** (0.098)	-0.054 (0.059)	-0.317*** (0.098)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.001 (0.008)	0.006 (0.013)	0.001 (0.008)	0.007 (0.013)
Oil	-0.064 (0.171)	0.760*** (0.282)	-0.202 (0.188)	0.596** (0.301)	-0.055 (0.165)	0.841*** (0.287)	-0.051 (0.165)	0.834*** (0.288)
Mountainous	0.003 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)
Riot peace yrs	-0.679*** (0.102)		-0.644*** (0.097)		-0.663*** (0.101)		-0.664*** (0.101)	
Civil war peace yrs		0.389** (0.174)		0.411** (0.177)		0.372** (0.179)		0.372** (0.179)
Constant	-5.662*** (0.941)	-7.734*** (1.584)	-6.358*** (1.027)	-8.370*** (1.622)	-5.356*** (0.980)	-7.792*** (1.600)	-5.282*** (0.966)	-7.917*** (1.616)
N	4324	4107	4324	4107	4131	3911	4131	3911
ll	-1547.277	-538.702	-1532.004	-534.395	-1467.702	-510.838	-1468.191	-510.692

Standard errors in parentheses
* *p* < 0.10, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01
Time dummies and splines not shown
[a]Lagged one year

Table A.9 *Risk of Riots and Civil War Onset by Political Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007, All Countries*

	(1) Riots	(2) Civil war	(3) Riots	(4) Civil war	(5) Riots	(6) Civil war	(7) Riots	(8) Civil war
Political glob, level[a]			-0.002	-0.009				
			(0.006)	(0.007)				
Political glob, change[a]					-0.009**	-0.006		
					(0.004)	(0.005)		
Political glob, shock[a]							-0.359*	-0.022
							(0.190)	(0.244)
Democracy[a]	0.090	0.234	0.098	0.250	0.099	0.317	0.101	0.325
	(0.165)	(0.295)	(0.166)	(0.289)	(0.165)	(0.299)	(0.165)	(0.300)
Autocracy[a]	-0.154	-0.210	-0.158	-0.256	-0.123	-0.111	-0.128	-0.112
	(0.131)	(0.288)	(0.133)	(0.289)	(0.134)	(0.287)	(0.134)	(0.286)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	-0.062	1.230***	-0.052	1.277***	-0.007	1.372***	-0.003	1.371***
	(0.277)	(0.375)	(0.276)	(0.375)	(0.275)	(0.388)	(0.276)	(0.391)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.324***	0.287***	0.338***	0.346***	0.308***	0.284***	0.311***	0.287***
	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.082)	(0.048)	(0.071)	(0.048)	(0.071)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	-0.052	-0.305***	-0.035	-0.257**	-0.064	-0.320***	-0.062	-0.317***
	(0.058)	(0.095)	(0.077)	(0.106)	(0.059)	(0.097)	(0.059)	(0.098)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.002	0.001	-0.002	0.002	-0.001	0.005	-0.001	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.013)
Oil	-0.064	0.760***	-0.064	0.755***	-0.046	0.842***	-0.040	0.837***
	(0.171)	(0.282)	(0.173)	(0.273)	(0.163)	(0.289)	(0.163)	(0.290)
Mountainous	0.003	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Riot peace yrs	-0.679***		-0.676***		-0.652***		-0.657***	
	(0.102)		(0.100)		(0.101)		(0.101)	
Civil war peace yrs		0.389**		0.380**		0.384**		0.374**
		(0.174)		(0.175)		(0.182)		(0.180)
Constant	-5.662***	-7.734***	-5.653***	-8.623***	-5.050***	-7.752***	-5.142***	-7.855***
	(0.941)	(1.584)	(1.089)	(1.721)	(0.964)	(1.633)	(0.964)	(1.623)
N	4324	4107	4324	4107	4131	3911	4131	3911
ll	-1547.277	-538.702	-1547.006	-537.760	-1465.374	-510.410	-1466.031	-510.892

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Time dummies and splines not shown
[a]Lagged one year

Appendix D. Alternative Types of Internal Conflict: Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare

Variable Descriptions

Revolutions

Like the riot event data, the data on revolutions is collected from Banks (2011). It measures '[a]ny illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government'. As with Riots, Banks' definition is based on Rummel and Tanter (1974). Revolutions in their definition may be coup d'etats, or 'attempted takeovers on a grand scale involving pitched battles between opposing forces' (ibid.: 17). Note that the variable includes attempts at revolution, not only successful ones. It is originally coded according to number of revolutions or attempts, but like Riots I have coded it into a dichotomous variable.

Guerrilla Warfare

Banks (2011) also provides data on guerrilla warfare, measured in number of violent episodes associated with guerrilla groups. Again, I have coded a dichotomous version of the variable, 0 representing no events in a year and 1 representing one or more. Guerrilla warfare is defined in the Banks User's Manual as '[a]ny armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.' Both Revolutions and Guerrilla warfare are described as armed activity aimed at the overthrow of the government, but Revolutions are direct attempts at government change (like coup d'etats), while Guerrilla warfare denotes more indirect attacks. Rummel and Tanter (1974: 6-7) describe it in this way: '[guerrilla warfare] may take the form of sporadic attacks on police posts, small villages, government patrols, or military barracks. A country is also considered to have guerrilla war when sporadic bombing, sabotage, or terrorism occurs.'

Logit Regression

Table A.10 *Risk of Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare by Overall Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded*

	(1) Revolu-tions	(2) Guerrilla warfare	(3) Revolu-tions	(4) Guerrilla warfare	(5) Revolu-tions	(6) Guerrilla warfare	(7) Revolu-tions	(8) Guerrilla warfare
Overall glob, level[a]			-0.016* (0.010)	-0.012 (0.011)				
Overall glob, change[a]					-0.003 (0.009)	0.000 (0.011)		
Overall glob, shock[a]							-0.215 (0.207)	-0.091 (0.250)
Democracy[a]	-0.083 (0.198)	0.248 (0.211)	-0.053 (0.201)	0.256 (0.212)	-0.044 (0.203)	0.278 (0.220)	-0.047 (0.204)	0.276 (0.220)
Autocracy[a]	-0.281* (0.166)	-0.242 (0.207)	-0.299* (0.163)	-0.270 (0.205)	-0.249 (0.170)	-0.229 (0.215)	-0.247 (0.170)	-0.229 (0.214)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.489* (0.284)	0.379 (0.364)	0.547* (0.289)	0.411 (0.368)	0.531* (0.289)	0.418 (0.394)	0.532* (0.287)	0.420 (0.389)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.156*** (0.048)	0.191*** (0.052)	0.158*** (0.047)	0.191*** (0.052)	0.165*** (0.048)	0.166*** (0.056)	0.165*** (0.048)	0.167*** (0.056)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	-0.118* (0.071)	0.049 (0.074)	0.002 (0.088)	0.137 (0.108)	-0.107 (0.074)	0.030 (0.077)	-0.108 (0.073)	0.029 (0.077)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.017** (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.016** (0.008)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.016** (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.016** (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)
Oil	-0.147 (0.180)	-0.248 (0.193)	-0.178 (0.185)	-0.295 (0.200)	-0.185 (0.186)	-0.280 (0.207)	-0.186 (0.186)	-0.279 (0.207)
Mountainous	0.007*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.007* (0.004)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.007* (0.004)
Revolution peace yrs	-1.239*** (0.125)		-1.234*** (0.126)		-1.255*** (0.132)		-1.255*** (0.131)	
Guerrilla war peace yrs		-1.125*** (0.093)		-1.127*** (0.093)		-1.081*** (0.092)		-1.081*** (0.092)
Constant	-2.962*** (1.098)	-3.945*** (1.112)	-2.968*** (1.150)	-4.202*** (1.138)	-2.111* (1.201)	-3.164** (1.238)	-2.101* (1.199)	-3.165** (1.235)
N	3610	3611	3605	3606	3447	3448	3447	3448
ll	-1209.465	-813.129	-1204.328	-807.624	-1148.647	-744.310	-1148.196	-744.264

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Time dummies and splines not shown
[a]Lagged one year

Table A.11 *Risk of Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare by Economic Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded*

	(1) Revolutions	(2) Guerrilla warfare	(3) Revolutions	(4) Guerrilla warfare	(5) Revolutions	(6) Guerrilla warfare	(7) Revolutions	(8) Guerrilla warfare
Economic glob, level[a]			-0.007 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.008)				
Economic glob, change[a]					-0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)		
Economic glob, shock[a]							-0.037 (0.225)	0.542** (0.256)
Democracy[a]	-0.083 (0.198)	0.248 (0.211)	-0.074 (0.202)	0.285 (0.209)	-0.052 (0.207)	0.307 (0.219)	-0.053 (0.207)	0.313 (0.221)
Autocracy[a]	-0.281* (0.166)	-0.242 (0.207)	-0.329** (0.166)	-0.432** (0.194)	-0.300* (0.177)	-0.434** (0.208)	-0.301* (0.177)	-0.432** (0.209)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.489* (0.284)	0.379 (0.364)	0.470* (0.286)	0.275 (0.383)	0.434 (0.297)	0.239 (0.410)	0.436 (0.296)	0.279 (0.410)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.156*** (0.048)	0.191*** (0.052)	0.126** (0.052)	0.194*** (0.060)	0.156*** (0.050)	0.181*** (0.058)	0.156*** (0.050)	0.181*** (0.058)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	-0.118* (0.071)	0.049 (0.074)	-0.052 (0.082)	0.060 (0.102)	-0.104 (0.077)	0.002 (0.083)	-0.104 (0.078)	0.017 (0.085)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.017** (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.009)	0.006 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.009)	0.005 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)
Oil	-0.147 (0.180)	-0.248 (0.193)	-0.079 (0.184)	-0.169 (0.216)	-0.092 (0.190)	-0.146 (0.227)	-0.092 (0.190)	-0.145 (0.230)
Mountainous	0.007*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)
Revolution peace yrs	-1.239*** (0.125)		-1.232*** (0.133)		-1.258*** (0.138)		-1.258*** (0.138)	
Guerrilla war peace yrs		-1.125*** (0.093)		-1.104*** (0.096)		-1.062*** (0.094)		-1.060*** (0.095)
Constant	-2.962*** (1.098)	-3.945*** (1.112)	-2.645** (1.177)	-3.779*** (1.179)	-1.906 (1.256)	-3.493*** (1.278)	-1.900 (1.252)	-3.624*** (1.289)
N	3610	3611	3298	3299	3150	3151	3150	3151
ll	-1209.465	-813.129	-1106.175	-724.753	-1051.985	-663.902	-1052.080	-662.139

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Time dummies and splines not shown
[a]Lagged one year

Table A.12 *Risk of Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare by Social Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded*

	(1) Revolu- tions	(2) Guerrilla warfare	(3) Revolu- tions	(4) Guerrilla warfare	(5) Revolu- tions	(6) Guerrilla warfare	(7) Revolu- tions	(8) Guerrilla warfare
Social glob, level[a]			-0.014 (0.009)	-0.018* (0.011)				
Social glob, change[a]					-0.009 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.009)		
Social glob, shock[a]							-0.029 (0.221)	0.142 (0.260)
Democracy[a]	-0.083 (0.198)	0.248 (0.211)	-0.059 (0.201)	0.253 (0.216)	-0.061 (0.204)	0.261 (0.218)	-0.044 (0.203)	0.278 (0.218)
Autocracy[a]	-0.281* (0.166)	-0.242 (0.207)	-0.288* (0.165)	-0.285 (0.205)	-0.245 (0.169)	-0.222 (0.213)	-0.237 (0.170)	-0.210 (0.213)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.489* (0.284)	0.379 (0.364)	0.457 (0.285)	0.305 (0.370)	0.509* (0.285)	0.405 (0.388)	0.522* (0.287)	0.400 (0.390)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.156*** (0.048)	0.191*** (0.052)	0.133*** (0.051)	0.153** (0.061)	0.177*** (0.048)	0.177*** (0.056)	0.166*** (0.048)	0.166*** (0.056)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	-0.118* (0.071)	0.049 (0.074)	-0.007 (0.089)	0.186* (0.107)	-0.103 (0.074)	0.034 (0.077)	-0.106 (0.074)	0.028 (0.077)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.017** (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.018** (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.016** (0.008)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.017** (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)
Oil	-0.147 (0.180)	-0.248 (0.193)	-0.185 (0.181)	-0.296 (0.205)	-0.176 (0.186)	-0.248 (0.206)	-0.166 (0.184)	-0.251 (0.204)
Mountainous	0.007*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.007** (0.003)	0.006* (0.004)	0.007** (0.003)	0.006* (0.004)
Revolution peace yrs	-1.239*** (0.125)		-1.238*** (0.124)		-1.250*** (0.131)		-1.256*** (0.130)	
Guerrilla war peace yrs		-1.125*** (0.093)		-1.118*** (0.092)		-1.076*** (0.091)		-1.082*** (0.091)
Constant	-2.962*** (1.098)	-3.945*** (1.112)	-2.960*** (1.098)	-3.725*** (1.156)	-2.321* (1.208)	-3.363*** (1.258)	-2.136* (1.201)	-3.634*** (1.244)
N	3610	3611	3610	3611	3452	3453	3452	3453
ll	-1209.465	-813.129	-1207.604	-811.116	-1150.895	-748.583	-1152.090	-749.060

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Time dummies and splines not shown
[a]Lagged one year

Table A.13 *Risk of Revolutions and Guerrilla Warfare by Political Globalization Level, Process, and Shock 1970-2007, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded*

	(1) Revolu- tions	(2) Guerrilla warfare	(3) Revolu- tions	(4) Guerrilla warfare	(5) Revolu- tions	(6) Guerrilla warfare	(7) Revolu- tions	(8) Guerrilla warfare
Political glob, level[a]			-0.001 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)				
Political glob, change[a]					-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.005)		
Political glob, shock[a]							-0.002 (0.172)	-0.258 (0.211)
Democracy[a]	-0.083 (0.198)	0.248 (0.211)	-0.082 (0.198)	0.245 (0.212)	-0.044 (0.203)	0.262 (0.219)	-0.043 (0.203)	0.259 (0.220)
Autocracy[a]	-0.281* (0.166)	-0.242 (0.207)	-0.284* (0.165)	-0.240 (0.208)	-0.237 (0.169)	-0.223 (0.213)	-0.237 (0.170)	-0.227 (0.211)
Ethnic fractionaliz.[a]	0.489* (0.284)	0.379 (0.364)	0.496* (0.289)	0.392 (0.354)	0.523* (0.287)	0.406 (0.383)	0.523* (0.288)	0.410 (0.386)
Population, total (ln)[a]	0.156*** (0.048)	0.191*** (0.052)	0.164*** (0.057)	0.151** (0.073)	0.164*** (0.049)	0.161*** (0.056)	0.165*** (0.049)	0.165*** (0.056)
GDP p.c. (ln)[a]	-0.118* (0.071)	0.049 (0.074)	-0.111 (0.076)	0.012 (0.081)	-0.107 (0.074)	0.022 (0.077)	-0.106 (0.074)	0.026 (0.076)
GDP growth (%)[a]	-0.017** (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.017** (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.017** (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)
Oil	-0.147 (0.180)	-0.248 (0.193)	-0.147 (0.181)	-0.245 (0.194)	-0.166 (0.184)	-0.228 (0.204)	-0.166 (0.185)	-0.234 (0.203)
Mountainous	0.007*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.004)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.004)	0.007** (0.003)	0.006* (0.004)
Revolution peace yrs	-1.239*** (0.125)		-1.238*** (0.126)		-1.254*** (0.131)		-1.256*** (0.131)	
Guerrilla war peace yrs		-1.125*** (0.093)		-1.120*** (0.093)		-1.075*** (0.091)		-1.075*** (0.091)
Constant	-2.962*** (1.098)	-3.945*** (1.112)	-3.089** (1.217)	-3.052** (1.450)	-2.103* (1.213)	-3.467*** (1.261)	-2.128* (1.214)	-3.074** (1.239)
N	3610	3611	3610	3611	3452	3453	3452	3453
ll	-1209.465	-813.129	-1209.417	-812.526	-1152.056	-748.385	-1152.101	-748.580

Standard errors in parentheses
* *p* < 0.10, ** *p* < 0.05, *** *p* < 0.01
Time dummies and splines not shown
[a]Lagged one year

Appendix E. Correlation Matrices

Table A.14 *Correlation Matrix, High-Income OECD Countries Excluded, 1970-2007 (obs=2884)*

	Riots	Revolutions	Guerrilla warfare	Civil war onset	Overall glob. level	Economic glob. level	Social glob. level	Political glob. level	Overall glob. change	Economic glob. change	Social glob. change	Political glob. change	Overall glob. shock	Economic glob. shock	Social glob. shock	Political glob. shock	Actual flows	Restrictions	Personal contacts	Information flows	Cultural proximity	Democracy	Autocracy	Ethn. fractionalization	Population (log)	GDP per capita (log)	GDP growth (%)	Oil	Mountainous	Riot peace years	Riot cubic spline 1	Riot cubic spline 2	Riot cubic spline 3	Revolution peace yrs	Revolution spline 1	Revolution spline 2	Revolution spline 3	Guerrilla peace yrs	Guerrilla spline 1	Guerrilla spline 2	Guerrilla spline 3	Civil war peace yrs	Civil war spline 1	Civil war spline 2	Civil war spline 3
Riots	1																																												
Revolutions	0,09	1																																											
Guerrilla warfare	0,11	0,42	1																																										
Civil war onset	0,07	0,13	0,13	1																																									
Overall glob. level	-0,06	-0,12	-0,11	-0,07	1																																								
Economic glob. level	-0,10	-0,11	-0,12	-0,08	0,88	1																																							
Social glob. level	-0,12	-0,13	-0,12	-0,09	0,91	0,79	1																																						
Political glob. level	0,10	-0,03	-0,01	0,04	0,55	0,19	0,28	1																																					
Overall glob. change	0,01	-0,02	-0,03	0,02	0,06	0,02	0,03	0,12	1																																				
Economic glob. change	0,04	0,04	-0,01	0,00	0,03	0,02	-0,01	0,07	0,51	1																																			
Social glob. change	0,00	0,01	-0,01	0,03	0,11	0,03	0,08	0,15	0,46	0,04	1																																		
Political glob. change	-0,04	-0,02	-0,05	0,03	-0,01	0,03	0,01	-0,08	0,62	0,00	0,04	1																																	
Overall glob. shock	0,01	0,00	-0,02	0,02	-0,01	-0,03	-0,03	0,06	0,66	0,26	0,33	0,47	1																																
Economic glob. shock	0,04	0,04	-0,04	0,02	-0,03	-0,06	-0,06	0,06	0,37	0,63	0,02	0,01	0,17	1																															
Social glob. shock	-0,01	0,02	-0,01	0,05	0,05	0,00	0,04	0,08	0,35	0,03	0,79	0,02	0,25	0,01	1																														
Political glob. shock	-0,01	-0,02	-0,02	0,02	-0,02	0,01	-0,01	-0,07	0,53	0,01	0,04	0,77	0,47	0,02	0,02	1																													
Actual flows	-0,09	-0,11	-0,14	-0,08	0,74	0,89	0,64	0,14	-0,04	0,02	-0,03	-0,03	-0,06	-0,06	-0,04	-0,02	1																												
Restrictions	-0,08	-0,09	-0,07	-0,06	0,81	0,87	0,77	0,20	0,07	0,02	0,10	0,08	0,00	-0,04	0,05	0,04	0,55	1																											
Personal contacts	-0,13	-0,20	-0,15	-0,10	0,65	0,69	0,79	-0,05	-0,06	-0,07	-0,06	0,06	-0,06	-0,11	-0,04	0,03	0,61	0,60	1																										
Information flows	-0,12	-0,12	-0,12	-0,09	0,87	0,73	0,91	0,36	0,03	0,02	0,07	-0,01	-0,03	-0,02	0,02	-0,04	0,57	0,72	0,62	1																									
Cultural proximity	-0,07	-0,03	-0,05	-0,04	0,77	0,60	0,82	0,36	0,08	0,01	0,18	0,00	0,01	-0,04	0,11	-0,01	0,45	0,62	0,43	0,65	1																								
Democracy	0,07	-0,02	0,07	0,00	0,38	0,29	0,36	0,24	0,04	0,05	0,04	-0,02	0,01	0,02	0,00	-0,02	0,20	0,32	0,19	0,38	0,32	1																							
Autocracy	-0,03	0,03	-0,06	0,00	-0,44	-0,34	-0,40	-0,29	-0,11	-0,06	-0,14	-0,03	-0,06	-0,05	-0,09	-0,05	-0,25	-0,36	-0,23	-0,39	-0,38	-0,59	1																						
Ethn. fractionalization	0,00	0,09	0,06	0,09	-0,25	-0,14	-0,33	-0,10	0,02	0,00	0,06	0,06	0,02	0,07	-0,05	-0,22	-0,24	-0,34	-0,22	-0,18	0,05		1																						
Population (log)	0,26	0,14	0,19	0,14	-0,11	-0,31	-0,29	0,50	0,09	0,07	0,17	-0,08	0,05	0,06	0,10	-0,04	-0,38	-0,16	-0,58	-0,21	-0,01	0,00	0,01	0,08	1																				
GDP per capita (log)	0,01	-0,13	-0,01	-0,06	0,73	0,63	0,76	0,30	-0,08	-0,06	0,00	-0,07	-0,08	-0,13	-0,02	-0,07	0,50	0,62	0,69	0,69	0,52	0,36	-0,31	-0,41	-0,17	1																			
GDP growth (%)	-0,09	-0,10	0,01	-0,02	0,10	0,11	0,07	0,06	-0,01	-0,03	0,03	0,03	-0,04	0,02	-0,09	-0,03	0,08	0,03	-0,04	0,00	-0,03	0,06	0,08		1																				
Oil	0,01	-0,01	-0,01	0,06	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,04	-0,04	-0,01	-0,01	-0,03	-0,01	-0,01	0,00	-0,02	0,04	-0,02	0,02	0,07	-0,09	-0,13	0,17	0,00	0,09	0,18	0,04	1																	
Mountainous	0,06	0,12	0,13	0,03	-0,13	-0,17	-0,13	0,01	0,00	0,01	0,02	-0,01	-0,01	0,00	0,00	-0,01	-0,22	-0,06	-0,25	-0,07	-0,04	0,00	0,04	-0,17	0,19	-0,12	0,00	-0,04	1																
Riot peace years	-0,23	-0,07	-0,12	-0,05	0,18	0,23	0,23	-0,08	-0,05	-0,01	-0,02	-0,06	-0,02	-0,01	-0,01	-0,05	0,18	0,22	0,24	0,19	0,17	-0,07	0,02	0,06	-0,29	0,09	0,06	0,03	-0,17	1															
Riot cubic spline 1	0,16	0,06	0,11	0,03	-0,18	-0,22	-0,22	0,05	0,03	0,01	0,00	0,04	0,00	0,00	-0,01	0,04	-0,16	-0,22	-0,21	-0,17	-0,18	0,06	0,01	-0,07	0,22	-0,11	-0,06	-0,05	0,17	-0,95	1														
Riot cubic spline 2	0,14	0,06	0,10	0,02	-0,18	-0,21	-0,21	0,04	0,02	0,00	0,00	0,04	0,00	0,00	-0,01	0,04	-0,15	-0,22	-0,21	-0,17	-0,18	0,06	0,02	-0,07	0,22	-0,11	-0,06	-0,06	0,17	-0,93	1,00	1													
Riot cubic spline 3	0,12	0,05	0,10	0,02	-0,18	-0,21	-0,21	0,03	0,02	0,00	-0,01	0,03	-0,01	0,00	-0,02	0,02	-0,14	-0,22	-0,20	-0,17	-0,18	0,06	0,03	-0,07	0,18	-0,11	-0,06	-0,07	0,17	-0,89	0,99	0,99	1												
Revolutiion peace yrs	-0,06	-0,30	-0,25	-0,06	0,39	0,32	0,39	0,02	-0,06	-0,02	-0,04	-0,07	-0,05	-0,01	-0,03	-0,05	0,27	0,30	0,37	0,35	0,28	0,11	-0,18	-0,17	-0,18	0,34	0,03	-0,03	-0,22	0,29	-0,29	-0,28	-0,27	1											
Revolution spline 1	0,07	0,21	0,19	0,06	-0,39	-0,31	-0,39	-0,20	0,05	0,00	0,04	0,05	0,04	0,00	0,03	0,04	-0,25	-0,31	-0,34	-0,35	-0,30	-0,12	0,20	0,16	0,15	-0,32	-0,02	0,04	0,20	-0,28	0,30	0,30	0,29	-0,95	1										
Revolution spline 2	0,07	0,19	0,17	0,05	-0,38	-0,31	-0,38	-0,20	0,05	0,00	0,03	0,05	0,04	0,00	0,02	0,04	-0,24	-0,31	-0,33	-0,34	-0,30	-0,12	0,20	0,16	0,14	-0,31	-0,02	0,04	0,20	-0,27	0,29	0,30	0,29	-0,93	1,00	1									
Revolution spline 3	0,07	0,17	0,16	0,05	-0,37	-0,30	-0,37	-0,19	0,04	0,00	0,04	0,04	0,04	-0,01	0,02	0,03	-0,22	-0,31	-0,31	-0,34	-0,31	-0,12	0,20	0,15	0,13	-0,30	-0,02	0,04	0,18	-0,26	0,29	0,29	0,29	-0,89	0,98	0,99	1								
Guerrilla peace yrs	-0,08	-0,26	-0,37	-0,07	0,30	0,23	0,24	0,24	-0,01	0,02	0,02	-0,07	0,01	0,06	0,01	-0,05	0,24	0,16	0,14	0,27	0,20	0,02	-0,13	-0,01	-0,16	0,19	-0,01	0,00	-0,05	-0,27	0,28	-0,29	-0,29	0,53	-0,51	-0,50	-0,48	1							
Guerrilla spline 1	0,07	0,19	0,27	0,05	-0,30	-0,22	-0,24	-0,26	0,00	-0,02	-0,03	0,06	0,00	-0,05	-0,01	0,04	-0,21	-0,18	-0,12	-0,27	-0,22	-0,05	0,17	-0,01	0,11	-0,08	-0,01	0,06	0,25	-0,25	0,28	0,29	0,29	-0,49	0,50	0,49	0,49	-0,97	1						
Guerrilla spline 2	0,07	0,18	0,24	0,05	-0,29	-0,22	-0,24	-0,26	0,00	-0,02	-0,03	0,06	0,00	-0,05	-0,01	0,04	-0,20	-0,18	-0,11	-0,27	-0,22	-0,05	0,18	-0,01	0,10	-0,08	-0,01	0,06	0,24	-0,24	0,27	0,28	0,29	-0,47	0,49	0,49	0,48	-0,94	1,00	1					
Guerrilla spline 3	0,07	0,16	0,22	0,05	-0,29	-0,21	-0,24	-0,26	-0,01	-0,02	-0,03	0,05	0,01	-0,05	-0,01	0,04	-0,19	-0,19	-0,10	-0,27	-0,22	-0,06	0,18	-0,02	0,09	-0,08	-0,02	0,06	0,23	-0,22	0,26	0,27	0,28	-0,44	0,47	0,47	0,47	-0,91	0,98	0,99	1				
Civil war peace yrs	-0,07	-0,29	-0,34	-0,09	0,40	0,35	0,36	0,22	-0,04	0,01	-0,01	-0,09	-0,04	0,00	-0,03	-0,09	0,35	0,26	0,26	0,37	0,29	0,10	-0,15	-0,18	-0,19	0,21	0,02	-0,02	-0,13	0,22	-0,22	-0,21	-0,20	0,64	-0,62	-0,61	-0,59	0,69	-0,65	-0,63	-0,60	1			
Civil war spline 1	0,05	0,21	0,26	0,08	-0,41	-0,35	-0,37	-0,25	0,02	-0,02	0,00	0,08	0,03	-0,01	0,01	0,07	-0,32	-0,29	-0,24	-0,37	-0,32	-0,13	0,20	0,16	0,13	-0,22	-0,02	0,06	0,11	-0,21	0,22	0,22	0,22	-0,62	0,65	0,64	0,64	-0,67	0,66	0,66	0,64	-0,96	1		
Civil war spline 2	0,05	0,19	0,23	0,07	-0,41	-0,34	-0,37	-0,26	0,02	-0,02	-0,01	0,07	0,03	-0,01	0,01	0,07	-0,31	-0,29	-0,23	-0,37	-0,32	-0,14	0,20	0,16	0,12	-0,22	-0,02	0,06	0,10	-0,20	0,21	0,22	0,22	-0,61	0,65	0,65	0,64	-0,65	0,66	0,66	0,65	-0,94	1,00	1	
Civil war spline 3	0,05	0,17	0,21	0,07	-0,41	-0,34	-0,37	-0,26	0,01	-0,03	-0,01	0,06	0,03	-0,02	0,00	0,06	-0,30	-0,30	-0,22	-0,37	-0,33	-0,14	0,21	0,15	0,10	-0,21	-0,03	0,06	0,10	-0,18	0,20	0,21	0,21	-0,58	0,64	0,64	0,65	-0,62	0,65	0,65	0,65	-0,90	0,98	0,99	1

Table A.15 *Correlation Matrix, All Countries, 1970-2007 (obs=3931)*

	Riots	Civil war onset	Overall glob. level	Economic glob. level	Social glob. level	Political glob. level	Overall glob. change	Economic glob. change	Social glob. change	Political glob. change	Overall glob. shock	Economic glob. shock	Social glob. shock	Political glob. shock	Democracy	Autocracy	Ethn. fractionalization	Population (log)	GDP per capita (log)	GDP growth (%)	Oil	Mountainous	Riot peace years	Riot cubic spline 1	Riot cubic spline 2	Riot cubic spline 3	Civil war peace yrs	Civil war spline 1	Civil war spline 2	Civil war spline 3
Riots	1																													
Civil war onset	0,07	1																												
Overall glob. level	-0,09	-0,09	1																											
Economic glob. level	-0,12	-0,09	0,90	1																										
Social glob. level	-0,13	-0,10	0,95	0,83	1																									
Political glob. level	0,04	-0,01	0,71	0,40	0,54	1																								
Overall glob. change	0,02	0,01	-0,05	-0,07	-0,07	0,04	1																							
Economic glob. change	0,05	0,00	-0,02	-0,02	-0,05	0,02	0,50	1																						
Social glob. change	0,00	0,02	0,04	0,00	0,03	0,10	0,46	0,05	1																					
Political glob. change	-0,03	0,02	-0,10	-0,06	-0,09	-0,13	0,62	0,00	0,04	1																				
Overall glob. shock	0,01	0,02	-0,08	-0,08	-0,09	-0,01	0,66	0,25	0,32	0,49	1																			
Economic glob. shock	0,04	0,03	-0,11	-0,12	-0,13	-0,03	0,36	0,64	0,04	0,01	0,17	1																		
Social glob. shock	-0,01	0,03	0,01	-0,02	0,00	0,05	0,34	0,03	0,79	0,01	0,22	0,02	1																	
Political glob. shock	-0,01	0,02	-0,11	-0,07	-0,10	-0,12	0,54	0,01	0,05	0,74	0,49	0,02	0,02	1																
Democracy	0,04	-0,04	0,55	0,45	0,52	0,46	-0,02	0,02	0,03	-0,08	-0,04	-0,05	0,00	-0,08	1															
Autocracy	-0,03	0,01	-0,49	-0,40	-0,46	-0,41	-0,05	-0,04	-0,13	0,04	-0,01	-0,01	-0,08	0,01	-0,62	1														
Ethn. fractionalization	0,01	0,11	-0,34	-0,26	-0,38	-0,22	0,04	0,01	-0,01	0,09	0,08	0,06	0,01	0,10	-0,30	0,16	1													
Population (log)	0,25	0,12	0,01	-0,20	-0,11	0,46	0,08	0,07	0,16	-0,10	0,03	0,04	0,08	-0,06	0,10	-0,08	0,02	1												
GDP per capita (log)	-0,04	-0,09	0,83	0,72	0,84	0,54	-0,15	-0,09	-0,03	-0,14	-0,13	-0,18	-0,03	-0,13	0,54	-0,41	-0,48	-0,02	1											
GDP growth (%)	-0,08	-0,03	0,01	0,05	-0,01	-0,01	-0,01	-0,02	0,03	-0,08	-0,03	-0,05	0,02	-0,07	-0,08	0,03	0,00	0,03	0,00	1										
Oil	-0,01	0,05	-0,04	-0,01	-0,05	-0,06	-0,04	-0,02	-0,02	-0,02	-0,01	-0,01	0,00	0,02	-0,18	0,18	0,03	-0,03	0,10	0,05	1									
Mountainous	0,06	0,03	-0,13	-0,18	-0,12	-0,01	0,01	0,01	0,03	0,00	0,01	0,00	0,00	-0,01	-0,01	0,03	-0,08	0,19	-0,13	0,00	-0,06	1								
Riot peace years	-0,24	-0,06	0,24	0,29	0,27	0,02	-0,07	-0,03	-0,03	-0,06	-0,03	-0,03	-0,02	-0,06	0,00	-0,01	-0,01	-0,31	0,15	0,05	0,05	-0,14	1							
Riot cubic spline 1	0,17	0,04	-0,24	-0,29	-0,26	-0,04	0,06	0,03	0,02	0,05	0,02	0,03	0,01	0,05	-0,01	0,05	0,02	0,25	-0,16	-0,05	-0,07	0,14	-0,96	1						
Riot cubic spline 2	0,15	0,04	-0,24	-0,28	-0,26	-0,05	0,05	0,03	0,01	0,05	0,02	0,03	0,00	0,04	-0,01	0,05	0,02	0,23	-0,16	-0,05	-0,07	0,13	-0,94	1,00	1					
Riot cubic spline 3	0,14	0,03	-0,24	-0,28	-0,25	-0,05	0,05	0,03	0,01	0,04	0,01	0,03	0,00	0,04	-0,02	0,06	0,02	0,21	-0,16	-0,05	-0,07	0,13	-0,90	0,99	1,00	1				
Civil war peace yrs	-0,11	-0,09	0,46	0,43	0,44	0,30	-0,07	-0,02	-0,03	-0,10	-0,07	-0,04	-0,04	-0,10	0,19	-0,20	-0,22	-0,16	0,32	-0,01	-0,05	-0,10	0,36	-0,36	-0,35	-0,35	1			
Civil war spline 1	0,10	0,08	-0,47	-0,43	-0,44	-0,32	0,06	0,02	0,02	0,09	0,06	0,03	0,03	0,09	-0,21	0,23	0,20	0,11	-0,32	0,01	0,05	0,08	-0,35	0,37	0,37	0,37	-0,97	1		
Civil war spline 2	0,09	0,07	-0,47	-0,43	-0,44	-0,32	0,06	0,01	0,02	0,08	0,05	0,03	0,02	0,08	-0,21	0,23	0,19	0,10	-0,31	0,00	0,05	0,07	-0,35	0,37	0,37	0,37	-0,95	1,00	1	
Civil war spline 3	0,08	0,07	-0,46	-0,42	-0,43	-0,32	0,05	0,01	0,02	0,07	0,05	0,02	0,02	0,08	-0,21	0,23	0,19	0,08	-0,30	0,00	0,05	0,07	-0,33	0,37	0,37	0,37	-0,91	0,98	0,99	1

Appendix F. VIF values

Logit regression run on dependent variable civil war onset (onset2). STATA commands:

logit onset2 l.oglob l.demo l.auto l.iethfrac l.lpop l.lgdppc l.gdpg oil mtnesti yeardum1-yeardum38 if oecd ==0, cl(cow)

vif, uncentered

Table A.16 *VIF values*

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
GDP p.c. (ln) (lagged)	94.19	0.010616
Population (ln) (lagged)	48.97	0.020422
Overall glob. level (lagged)	42.94	0.023290
Ethn. fractionaliz. (lagged)	4.19	0.238799
Autocracy (lagged)	2.93	0.340973
Democracy (lagged)	2.40	0.417076
yeardum24	1.93	0.518308
yeardum23	1.92	0.519691
yeardum25	1.92	0.521596
yeardum26	1.91	0.524888
yeardum27	1.89	0.530318
yeardum28	1.88	0.530907
yeardum29	1.88	0.531953
yeardum37	1.86	0.538092
yeardum30	1.86	0.538214
yeardum34	1.86	0.538395
yeardum35	1.85	0.539442
yeardum33	1.85	0.539785
yeardum36	1.85	0.540977
yeardum32	1.84	0.543326
yeardum31	1.84	0.544796
yeardum20	1.83	0.546149
yeardum22	1.82	0.549729
yeardum21	1.81	0.551452
yeardum14	1.81	0.552560
yeardum15	1.81	0.552917
yeardum18	1.81	0.553944
yeardum17	1.78	0.560863
Mountainous terrain	1.78	0.562909
yeardum8	1.76	0.566952
yeardum13	1.76	0.568664
yeardum7	1.74	0.576340
yeardum6	1.72	0.580184
yeardum10	1.72	0.580908
yeardum4	1.71	0.584466
yeardum5	1.71	0.584664
yeardum12	1.70	0.587063
yeardum3	1.70	0.588076
yeardum11	1.69	0.590507
yeardum2	1.67	0.597834
GDP growth (lagged)	1.50	0.664893
Oil	1.47	0.681757
Mean VIF	6.19	