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Trust in Modern and Traditional Political Institutions in Africa

Determinants, Winners and Losers



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Africa**

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my father Mr. Abdul Karim without whose support I would not have come this far.

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Abstract

Political trust in modern and traditional political institutions has been established to move in the same direction that is it rises and falls together. Countries that have high trust in its modern political institutions also demonstrate high trust in its traditional political institutions. This study has through a systematic and comparative analysis established that there are set of factors that affect trust in the two sets of political institutions. Among these factors are perception of state legitimacy, satisfaction with democracy and interpersonal trust. This study has further established that individual perception and assumption rather than external objective factors are the most critical predictors of trust in both modern and traditional political institutions.

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“If Africa wants peace, truth and justice; if Africa wants to restore its traditional values of being each other's keeper; if Africa genuinely recognizes deep weaknesses in its developmental agenda, then I can only say that it is not too late to critically look for convergences between the modern state and the traditional state.”

(His Majesty, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, King of Asante, at The Fourth African Development Forum , Addis Ababa, October, 12, 2004).

The most secure political system is the one that can secure the trust and confidence of citizens and sometimes political system can secure such trust and confidence by genuinely looking at its genesis.

Chapter 1

1.0 Introduction

Before the advent of colonialism, African societies had some form of political organization that governs their day- to- day activities. These societies were however different in their make-up. Whereas some states like Asante, Buganda, Sokoto, Kano and Zulu kingdoms were highly centralized societies with an elaborate bureaucracy with a king at the apex supported by sub-chiefs in the administration of the affairs of the societies, others especially in the Igbo land and pastoral communities were mainly stateless societies where there was no authority beyond the family or the village head or in the case of East African pastoralist, the age-set of adult men. In both societies, the position of the king or the village head is hereditary and source of his authority or legitimacy is rooted in tradition, customs, norms and values of the community and as the embodiment of the people.

With the advent of colonialism, colonial administrators to achieve control and enhance governance expediency reorganized mostly but not exclusively, the non state communities and “tribes were created on the basis of territorial contiguity as villages were brought together under a single administrative chief” (Mandani, 1996: 41). Consequently, chiefs were imposed on those societies in which hitherto such institution never existed. For example, Warrant chiefs, as they were known because they were created by the warrant of the colonial governor (Mandani, 1996) were imposed on Igbo communities (Ekeh, 1990), and the pastoral communities of Karamoja in Uganda (Ocan, 1992) and many other such communities across the continent. This process was however not smooth as observed by Mandani (1996) since it

led to Maji Maji rebellion in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and the great revolt against warrant chiefs in Igbo land.

These chieftaincy institutions were later on used by the British and other colonial administrators in running the affairs of their respective colonies in West Africa through a policy known as indirect rule which has been defined by Murray (1935) as

“a situation in which black and white are associated, in which the white is on top, but where the institutions of the black are not abolished but incorporated as far as may be into the alien system of government” (Murray, 1935:227)

According to Mandani (1996), although some scholars argued that the policy of indirect rule was a practical necessity that was turned into theoretical virtue by Lord Lugard (the architect of the policy) because of the lack of personnel faced by colonial power and the difficulty in communicating over long distances. He however thinks that it is the policy imperatives of indirect rule was underpinned by what he calls “the native question” which refused to go away as the British realized when an attempt at introducing a direct rule in the colony of Natal in 1846 and later the whole of South Africa was met with stiff resistance by the natives. This forced the British to search for a less costly and less hostile but also an efficient mode of control over the natives. To make colonial administration less complex, under indirect rule, there will be a semi- autonomous Native Administration which is headed by an administrative chief with powers to make by-laws or rules and a Native Treasury to pay its personnel and finance its activities (Mandani, 1996).

In response to proto-nationalist movement which spread in the continent before World War I, the colonial authorities created Executive Councils in the colonies with an ex-officio representation for traditional rulers instead of the educated African elites. This was a tactical decision to deprive those most eager of independence from influence. After World War II however, nationalist movements transformed into mass movement and then begun to oppose indirect rule and “seek the removal of chiefs from political leadership and ex-officio influence in political affairs” (Walshe, 1972:398). This cooperation of traditional authority with colonial authorities will be used against them once independence was achieved in many parts of the continent. After independence, many independent African leaders made vigorous attempt to proscribe the chieftaincy institution, laws were passed either circumscribe the powers of, or ban traditional authorities since they were seen as competing with the post-

colonial state for legitimacy and resource control (Englebert, 2002). For examples, Milton Obote abolished the Kingdom of Buganda (Englebert, 2002), Frelimo in Mozambique banned the chieftainship system in 1975 (Buur and Kyed, 2006), the Convention People's Party under Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana saw chiefs as the last vestige of colonial legacy (Rathbone, 2000) and even the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa did not hide its disdain for the chieftaincy institution because of the precarious and oppressive role it is alleged to have played during the apartheid era (Williams, 2004). In sum, only in few places like Lesotho was the traditional institution formally incorporated in post-colonial institutions of governance.

Despite everything that has happened in the past, the chieftaincy institution has managed to survive and continues to play significant role political and social of life of people and in the view of Englebert (2002b) there is a solid base to conclude that the institution has experienced resurgence from the late 1990s and the process is continuing unabated. This resurgence is however viewed with consternation especially at a time when many countries in Africa is embracing democracy and the traditional institutions are seen as an antithesis to democratic consolidation since its principles and ethos runs contrary to democracy; competitive elections (Logan, 2009). Whereas Englebert (2002b) has focused mainly on explaining the patterns and theories underlying the resurgence of traditional institutions, earlier literature that examined the nature and implication of such resurgence for Africa's democracy has been very polarized. The first polarization is between Ayittey (1991) who glamorizes and romanticizes everything about traditional institutions and Mandani (1996) who does not favorable view of the institution of chieftaincy in Africa. At each of the spectrum in the debate about traditional political institutions and their relevance for Africa are the formalist and the traditionalist respectively. It is the view of the formalist that it is the desire of Africans like any other people in any parts of the world to live under modern democratic institutions because democracy is a universal value and no group of people will reject it as a system of government. The traditionalist on the other hand are of the view that upholding tradition and all the institutions that go with such tradition is the remedy for the maladies of modern democratic institutions (Keulder, 1998).

Empirical analysis from the Afrobarometer Survey data Round 1(1999-2001), Round 2 (2002-2003) and Round 4 (2008) revealed that positive attitude towards traditional authorities is not incompatible with democracy or vice versa, that there is popular support and high level of trust for traditional authority and that Africans do not make a distinction between hereditary

chiefs and elected government officials (Logan, 2008, 2009, and 2011). Again, previous research has also indicated that there is high level of support (80%) for democracy as the preferred form of government among the country surveyed in Africa (Bratton, 2007). But what does an overwhelming support for democracy mean for trust in modern political institutions and traditional political structures?

Moreover, recent studies (Logan, 2009, 2011) have concluded that trust in modern and traditional political institutions move in the same direction with countries who recorded high trust in modern political institutions equally doing well on trust in traditional political institutions.

The main research question driving this thesis therefore is: Why does trust in modern political institutions and traditional political institutions move in the same direction? To this end, this research shall address the following specific questions.

1. What are the variables that affect trust in modern and traditional political institutions?
2. Do these variables affect trust in these institutions in the same way or are there any differences in the way these factors affect trust in both institutions?
3. Among modern political institutions under review, which of these institutions is the most trusted and which ones are the less trusted by citizens of African countries?
4. Finally, how do the modern political institutions compare with traditional political institutions in terms of trust?

By modern political institutions, I am referring to the institutions of state in Africa that has constitutionally been mandated to discharge specific responsibilities as far as the functioning of the modern state is concerned. These institutions include: The President, The Courts of Law, Parliament/National Assembly, The National Electoral Commission, The Elected Local Government Officials, The Police, The Ruling Party, and The Opposition Parties. Traditional political institutions refer to the various traditional authorities in Africa such as traditional kings, Chiefs and Queen mothers, traditional courts and other indigenous institutions within the jurisdiction of traditional rulers.

Although there has been some research on both institutions and a more general explanation on the relationship between the two has been made, no research has studied both institutions simultaneously with the same set of explanatory variables and in the same analysis with an effort to highlight their similarities and differences. Again, previous research focused

exclusively on the effect of individual level variables on trust in these institutions. In this thesis, both institutions will be analyzed together with the same set of variables and with individual and state level variables. This is the significance of this research.

This whole thesis is made up of five chapters: this chapter is on the introduction, the theory and related research chapter, data and methods chapter, an empirical analysis chapter and the final chapter is the discussion and the implication of the findings for public policy, the state in Africa and especially for decentralization in the continent.

In chapter two (2), I do a literature review on modern and traditional political trust. Since much has been done in connection with modern political trust, I first present comprehensive review of modern political trust, explain many of the central concepts in modern political trust, why modern political trust is important, discuss the theories that provide the framework for this research and present the hypotheses that will be tested in order to find answers to the research question posed above. I then follow this up with a literature review on traditional political trust, why traditional trust is also important. I then extrapolated the hypotheses formulated in connection with modern political trust to traditional political trust with a view to testing the same set of variables on both institutions.

In chapter three (3), I present my data and methodology, the research design; how I operationalized the variables of interest, constructed scales to capture some concepts and some of the potential weaknesses of that approach. I also present the macro-level variables from internationally recognized institutions and other academics and discuss some of the criticisms that have been leveled against the use of those variables and how it will affect the analysis.

Chapter four (4), I test my hypotheses and present the empirical analysis of my findings. Chapter five (5), I present the discussion of my findings in the light of theories that provide the framework for the thesis, I also present the summary of the findings and the implication of this on public policy.

This analysis finds that state legitimacy, satisfaction with democracy and interpersonal trust positively influence trust in both modern and traditional political institutions. The most important of these variables is state legitimacy. Perception of corruption negatively affects trust in both institutions. Support for democracy, experienced of corruption and membership of voluntary association do not affect both trust in modern and traditional political

institutions. Rejection of authoritarian alternatives to democracy, satisfaction with the economic condition of a country and the perception of quality national elections country do affect modern political trust but do not have any effect on traditional political institutions.

At the State level, the level of democracy, measured by Vanhanen's Polyarchy and state capacity measured by a country's ranking on the Human Development Index (HDI) are both unrelated to trust in both modern and traditional political institutions. This is an indication that trust is very much predicated not by external objective factors but on individual level behavioral perceptions and assumptions.

Finally, this analysis finds that indeed the modern state is not in competition with traditional authority for legitimacy and therefore calls for genuine and substantive cooperation the two. Both national and international development agencies should consider making the traditional political structures the focal point of development from the formulation to implementation. Again, governments should engage with citizens and make information available so that people can make informed decision because people make decision based on their perception and information should help shape those perceptions. Education is indispensable for the emergence of critical citizens.

Chapter 2

2.0 Theoretical Framework and Previous Research

In order to explore the factors that account for cross national and individual differences in level of trust in modern and traditional political institutions in Africa and also to account for the differences in levels of trust in modern political institutions- the president (or in some cases the prime minister), parliament, the courts of law, the police, the electoral commission and political parties, it is only logical that I begin with a literature review on previous research. Although research on determinants, of and level of political trust about established democracies of the Western Countries (US and Western Europe) and then transitional democracies of the former Soviet Countries abound, much less has been done especially in comparative terms to look at the level of trust that the various modern political institutions enjoy in Africa's new democracy.

2. 1 Political and Institutional Trust

Before I proceed with the discussion on political and institutional trust, I would like to explain some conceptual issues relating to trust, confidence and support. Although these terms are used interchangeably in many studies, there has been conscious effort to draw some distinction about them (Easton, 1975: Tonkiss and Passey, 1999). According to Easton (1975) in everyday language, support is more associated with behavior than to attitude but within the field of social science, it has been useful for its reference to attitudes as to action. For instance, Webster defines support as "upholding something by aid, countenance or adherence; the active promotion of the interest or cause of an object; defending something as valid, right, just or authoritative; or giving it assistance" (Webster, 1968: cited in Easton, 1975). In the view of Easton, although there is an emphasis on overt behavior, there are certain underlying attitudes implicit in such overt behavior because unless one is favorably disposed to an institution, it is unlikely that one will support such institution and so the most important attitude associated with support is in the form of an evaluation which can either be positive or negative. It is this attitude by which a person orients himself to an institution and it may be expressed in a parallel action. For example: through a decision to pay taxes or a willingness to accept a judgment of a court of law.

Trust on the other hand according to Easton (1975) is an expression of a diffuse support. It is a feeling by the citizenry that even if their systems or institutions were to be exposed to a little supervision or scrutiny, their interest will not be compromised. It is “the probability that the political system (or some part of it) will produce preferred outcomes even if left unattended to. In other words, it is the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about. They or others may do things to influence this probability” (Gamson, 1968: cited in Easton, 1975: 447). Trust is not so much predicated on authoritative outcomes but on the process leading to such outcomes.

However, according to Newton (2007), the convention these days has been to distinguish between *trust* in people and *confidence* in institutions. His argument is that, we may trust people like our friends, neighbors, countrymen because we have personal knowledge of them but we have confidence in institutions like parliament, the state bureaucracy and the courts because it is based on our sense of how these institutions work. He concludes that “institutions are based on systems, rules, and formal procedures that operate independently of the face-to-face relations of personal trust. In order to conform to this distinction, most survey questions ask about trust in people but confidence in institutions” (Newton, 2007:344). But this is a distinction which is far from settled because the World Value Survey Wave 5 uses this distinction but both the European Social Survey 5 (2010/11) and Afrobarometer Survey 4 (2008) do not. This might be an indication of lack of unanimity of the conceptual definitions.

Based on the discussion, it is safe to conclude that citizens express their *support* for a political system by for example, paying their taxes, obeying the decisions of a court and going to the polls to vote for their preferred political parties and candidates during elections thereby reposing their *trust* or *confidence* in such political parties and candidates with a view that their taxes will be used judiciously, the courts’ decisions will be based in law and that in the period between elections, their elected representatives will protect and safeguard their interest by churning out preferred outcomes.

I shall now turn to the discussion on trust in political institution but some referenced sources still use those concepts interchangeable as indicated earlier because of the difficulty of maintaining the necessary conceptual distinction between support and trust (Easton, 1975).

It is generally agreed that trust or confidence in political institutions is part of a broader concept of modern political trust which is an analytical framework that was propounded by David Easton (1965) when he classified and made a distinction between support for the community (core), the regime (political institutions) and the authorities (political parties and politicians). According to him, although, the level of support for each part of the system is intertwined, the level of support nevertheless stratified because the lack of support for political parties and politicians is transient and it is not as fatal as the lack of support for political community whose implication might results in the shutting down of the system entirely. This is because, at least periodic elections provide an opportunity for electorate to vote out incompetent politicians. But the lack of support for politicians may have a negative implication for support in modern political institutions which will in turn affect the support enjoyed by the political system as a whole.

The distinction between trust in political institutions, political authorities and the entire political system was also brought to the fore by the often cited debate between Miller (1974a and 1974b) and Citrin (1974). Miller had earlier argued and maintained his position that sustained discontent as a result of deep-seated social conflict has been translated into a negative orientation towards the entire political system. A negative orientation which he fears might be very ominous for the continued existence of the current American political system. But Citrin rejected the assertions and fears of Miller as unfounded because he was of the view that, the fact that Americans are dissatisfied with current office holders does not mean a total rejection of political system. As far as Citrin is concerned, there is the need “to distinguish, operationally between the following attitudes: dissatisfaction with current government policy positions, dissatisfaction with the *outcomes* of ongoing events and policies, mistrust of incumbent officeholders and rejection of the entire political system” (Citrin, 1974: 987).

Furthermore, the idea of distinguishing between different levels of support in different parts of the political system has also been made by Norris (1999). This has resulted in further classification of the system support into fivefolds. These include; support for the *political community*, which mean an unquestionable and enduring attachment to the nation. Support for *regime principles*, which denotes the values embedded into the system. Support for *regime performance*, which is support for how the political system functions in practice. Support for *regime institutions*, concerned with evaluating attitudes and trust towards parliament, the executive, the legal system, the police, the army and other institutions of state. Finally,

support for *political actors*, this is concerned with evaluating the performance of politicians as a whole and of particular office holders.

Indeed, if regime institutions as indicated above are a part of larger political system and “people seem to make clear judgment concerning different institutions within the regime, expressing confidence in the courts, for example, while disapproving of parliament” (Norris, 1999:9) and if “much can be learnt by examining the dynamics of support for individual institutions, such as congress and the courts, because evidence suggests that the public distinguishes between them (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995: cited in Norris, 1999:13) then it is imperative that such situation should equally be applicable to Africa when studying issues of trust in the political system. In this vein, I am moving away from the previous preoccupation with demand for and supply of democracy, rejection of or nostalgia for authoritarian or military rule which are mainly issues of *regime principles* and *performance* to factors influencing trust in various modern political institutions in Africa and which of these institutions enjoy high levels of trust in cross-national analysis and why. I now turn to the issues of why modern political trust is important especially for modern political institutions in Africa.

2.2 Why does Political trust matter?

According to Listhaug (2005), there are three reasons why trust is important. First, trust is important for democracy and especially representative democracy because apart from the election day when the citizens take direct control of the political process, between elections, voters only depend on quality of the representative process. Therefore, continued political trust means that citizens are content with the way the representative process works. Second, is the fact that once the role of governments has increased over time especially in the allocation of economic resources created by the society. Economic efficiency is indispensable as government can easily achieve compliance from citizens and firms through political trust. Finally, because of comparative and international dimension of governance, government needs to engender trust to create a bond between government and citizens. This will send a signal that the country is safe for foreign investment and that the authority of the government is healthy.

The importance of political trust is also emphasized by Miller (1974b) who defined political trust as “the belief that the government is operating according to one’s normative expectations of how government should function” (Miller, 1974b:989). In his view, political trust is closely

related to the concept of legitimacy, the idea that government institutions and authorities are morally and legally valid and widely accepted. The decisions of trusted authorities are more likely to be accepted as legitimate and worthy of support than are those of distrusted leaders (Miller, 1974b). This argument is very germane especially for transitional democracies in Africa as most are struggling to win the recognition and legitimacy of their citizens (Englebert, 2000).

Although, Coleman ((1990), cited in Listhaug, 2005) has intimated that when citizens withdraw their trust from democratic forms of government, it is likely that they place it elsewhere and Linz (1988 also cited in Listhaug, 2005) has ominously indicated that such a trust in extreme cases is transferred to non-democratic institutions and thereby threatening the legitimacy of the system. Mishler and Rose (1997) are of the view that no government enjoys absolute trust of its citizens and none should. Their contention is that the power of every government dwarfs that of any individual citizen's and no matter how benevolent a government is, it represent a threat to individual freedom and welfare (Mishler and Rose, 1997). This is in line with the argument of Listhaug (2005) that strong support is not necessarily good because a sound level of skepticism is appropriate for democracy but the danger is that there is a thin line between sound skepticism and pure cynicism.

2.3 Sources of Modern Political Trust

Another long standing debate in the literature is the source of modern political trust. Is trust generated by the institutions themselves through the churning out of political goods that meet the expectations of the citizens? Or do citizens trust political institutions because they have been socialized to trust others (Almond and Verba, 1963). From the point of view of proponents of social capital theorists like Putnam (1993) and Inglehart (1997), institutional trust is a sub-set of inter-personal trust, it is acquired at an early stage in life, reinforced much later in life and then transferred onto the political institutions and this is what conditions institutional performance capabilities. However, this point has been rejected by Hetherington (1998) who posits that institutional trust is dependent on institutional performance and therefore when institutions performs well, they will engender trust , otherwise they will be met with cynicism and distrust from the citizenry. A study by Mishler and Rose (2001) to test the two competing theories in the post-communist societies have concluded that the source of political trust depends on whether one is looking at either macro cultural and macro institutional theories or micro level explanation of both. Both macro cultural and macro

institutional theories see trust as a group property broadly shared by all members of the group. Micro theories on the other hand contend that trust levels are different among individuals within society and it is contingent upon differences in socialization and social background, political and economic experiences or on the perception and evaluation of the individual. Mishler and Rose (2001) conclude that their “results strongly support the superiority of institutional explanations of the origin of political trust, especially micro-level explanations, while providing little support for either macro or micro-cultural explanation” (Mishler and Rose, 2001:30). The implication of this finding for new democracies is that there is very little hope that political trust can be nurtured since political institutions will have to justify their existence by providing favorable outcomes in the course of time.

2.4 Theories on trust in Africa’s Modern Political Institutions

2.4.1 Micro or Individual Level Variables

In studying factors that influence trust in political institutions at the individual level especially in advanced democracies, much emphasis is invariably placed on issues of well-being of the individual in terms of financial satisfaction and satisfaction with life as a whole (Catterberg and Moreno, 2004). As a result, economic performance looms large in this analysis with political institutions enjoying massive trust during the period of economic boom and then experience decline in trust during economic crisis (Listhaug and Miller, 1999). This is because issues of political freedom and other human rights issues are matters that are taken for granted in the West. In relation to Africa however, Bratton and Mattes (2001) have observed that although “approval of democracy remains performance-driven; but approval hinges less on the government’s capacity at delivering economic goods than its ability to guarantee basic political rights” (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:447). Basic political rights can only be guaranteed if the political system is constituted in such a way that allows political institutions to function independently and effectively. The independence of political institutions are protected and guaranteed under democratic political systems where the power of the executive to interfere with their functions of other political institutions is circumscribed, unlike totalitarian or authoritarian political system, where the executive branch controls and interfere in the functions of other political institutions. It is therefore not surprising that individual’s attitudes towards democracy have been linked with trust in political institutions (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005). Individuals who are predisposed towards democratic attitudes should be more trusting of political institutions than those who are averse

towards democratic governance since entrenching democracy can only be predicated on trust in effective and efficient political institutions. As a result of this I would expect that:

H₁: Individuals with higher democratic attitudes would have high trust in modern political institutions

According to Diamond (1999), political performance is very critical for the survival and consolidation of democracy especially in transitional and emerging democracies. The enjoyment of political freedom, openness, greater transparency, accountability and responsiveness, and guaranteed constitutionalism, rule of law and the absence of arbitrariness can work in a nuanced way to increase the level of trust in political institutions. The connection between political performance and trust in political institutions have also been established by Mishler and Rose (2001) in Eastern European countries and by Seligson (2002) in some selected Latin American Countries whilst Chang and Cho (2006) have arrived at a similar conclusion in their studies in Asia. From the afore mentioned, it is imperative that individuals need not only have favorable disposition towards democracy but they ought to be satisfied with the way democracy functions in order to increase their trust in the political institutions that have been given the mandate to ensure that democracy works. Based on these findings, I will expect that:

H₂: individual who are satisfied with democracy will have higher trust in modern political institutions

However, there is a potential problem with the above hypotheses because of the possibility of a reverse causality although what we seek to establish here is correlation and not causation. For instance, is it trust in political institutions that will provide a fertile ground for individual to nurture support for democracy and also be satisfied with it or it is the other way round as these hypotheses seem to suggest. According to Bratton and Mates (2000), within the African context, support for and/or satisfaction with democracy appears to be basic than political trust as many Africans continues to prefer democracy even if it does not work very well to any other forms of government that work very well. In consonance with Bratton and Mates (2000) that support for democracy is intrinsic rather than instrumental, I will maintain the above hypotheses.

As it has been noted already, popular evaluation of Africa's new democracies has been in concord with evaluation of new and transitional democracies elsewhere in the world as the

new regimes continue to enjoy popular support and widespread approval resulting from the rejection of an old regime (Mishler and Rose, 1999). As a result, evaluation has largely been based on political goods which are been provided by the regime even if the basket of economic goods is deteriorating (Linz and Stepan, 1996: Bratton and Mates, 2000). In the long term however, support cannot be sustained in new democracies unless political institutions justify their existence with the provision of tangible economic goods as new democracies draw their experiences from old and established democracies (Mishler and Rose, 1999). As few years have passed since some African countries made their transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes, it is imperative that we start examining the trajectories of trust in modern political institutions and see whether the economic performance has yet to matter in evaluating modern political institutions in Africa. Since the economy looms large in old democracies, we should expect that after some time, same would apply to democracies in Africa. As a result of this, I would expect that:

H₃: Satisfaction with the economic condition of a country is positively associated with high trust in modern political institutions

The concept of social capital has enjoyed a certain level of conceptual stardom in the literature of modern political trust despite criticisms of its ubiquitous nature and alleged lack of clarity in terms of its precise meaning and proper measurement (Newton, 1999). Nevertheless, social capital since it was popularized by Putnam (1999, 2000) and others, has been linked with modern political trust. The argument that underlies social capital is that as more people get involved in voluntary associations and become members of large organizations, there would be higher sense of community and enhanced social network and this will generate interpersonal and social trust which will ultimately lead to greater political trust. The connection between social trust and political trust is thus assumed to be automatic. However, other studies (Newton, 1999: Kim, 2005) have questioned this automatic linkage. Newton (1999) is of the view that in most cases such relationship either does not exist or where it does, it is very insignificant. Kim (2005) has argues that the relationship between social capital and political trust where it exist is mediated or contingent upon other factors.

However, in a case study of Nigeria and Ghana, Kuenzi (2008) has found that “trust in modern political institutions (“political trust”) is tightly linked with interpersonal trust in Ghana and Nigeria” (Kuenzi, 2008:17). Since Kuenzi’s studies was situated in some African

in contrast to that of Newton and Kim, I would therefore expect that Kuenzi's findings would be applicable to wider context in Africa. Based on this I would posit that:

H₄: Individuals with higher interpersonal trust are likely to have high trust in modern political institutions

Another theory which will provide the frame work for analysis of trust between modern and traditional political institutions is state legitimacy. I examine state legitimacy from the point of view of Englebert (2000, 2000b). Englebert has argued that African states have weak capacity because the legitimacy of the state itself is very weak. According to him, a state is legitimate when its institutions have evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of historical continuity to its institutions (Englebert, 2000: 4). Following from Holsti (1996), he drew a distinction between *vertical legitimacy*, that is the quality of the relation between society and political institutions, which he considers to be a very crucial dimension of state legitimacy and *horizontal legitimacy*, that is the extent to which there is an agreement of what constitutes the polity that comprise the state. After using these two variables and other variables associated with growth, policy choice and institutional quality, he concluded that “state legitimacy favors developmental capacity and growth, and that policy choices and the quality of governance and institutions are the main variables mediating these effects” (Englebert, 2000: 9). This according to him also accounts for variation in the level of development between Africa and particularly East Asia and within Africa.

If Engbert's theory is to be true and that vertical legitimacy or the relation between society and its political institutions is very weak in many African countries accounting for developmental quagmire of states in the continent, then we should expect that citizens in such states should be less trusting of modern political institutions. Consequently, I posit that:

H₅: high perception of state legitimacy is positively associated with high trust in modern political institutions

As a result of the weakness of the political institutions in Africa which is often bedeviled by inertia and inaction, there were earlier theories which seem to suggest that corruption helps facilitate economic and political development (Leff, 1964). For instance, Bayley (1967) has made the point that corruption increases the loyalty of citizen to and trust in political institutions. This led to the “grease the wheels” theory, which postulated that corruption is the

grease which is used to put the rusty wheel of bureaucracy into action which does not function effectively without grease in Africa (Nye, 1967).

However, in recent times, a body of literature has also emerged which seem to contradict this earlier theory. For instance, an empirical study by Anderson and Tverdova (2003) finds that in some Western and Eastern European countries where corruption is endemic; citizens have less trust in the modern political system. Seligson (2002) made similar findings in relation to Latin America and Cho and Kirwin (2007) have also arrived at the same conclusion on Africa. The “grease the wheel” theoretical argument has also been rejected by Lavalée, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud(2008) when they concluded in relation to Africa that “both experienced corruption and the perception that corruption is widespread have a negative impact on citizens’ trust in political institutions” (Lavalée, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2008:16). In view of the latest empirical research findings, I expect that:

H₆: increased perception of corruption is negatively associated with trust in modern political institutions

Since some Africa countries embarked on a democratic path in the late 1990s, the quality of elections has come under spotlight especially from scholars like Lindberg (2006) and Bratton (2004) to mention just a few. According to Alemika (2007), election is a means of entrenching some of the core tenets of representative democracy, the engagement of citizens in governance and to ensure the accountability of leaders. Although initial elections in Africa have been flawed, Lindberg (2006) is of the view that the quality of elections increases after two or three rounds of elections. Bratton (2004) has opined that the alternation of power from one party to another enhances the legitimacy of government and political institutions. The connection between the quality of elections and increased legitimacy of institutions and consequently the increased trust in modern political institutions have been empirically studied by Alemika (2007) using the *Afrobarometer round 3 data*. In that study, his findings were that there was a significant relationship between citizens’ evaluation of the quality of their national elections and trust in political institutions. In line with this finding, I also expect that:

H₇: a perception of high quality of elections is positively associated with trust in political institutions

2.4.2 Contextual or State Level Variable

One of the implicit assumptions underlying this study so far is that all the countries in this sample are democratic. This is of course, due to obvious reasons. For instance, it is relatively easy to undertake survey and elicit some level of sincere answers in democratic countries. However, not all African countries have been able to sustain the euphoria and optimism that greeted the transition to democracy. Whereas some countries have consolidated their democratic process, others are barely authoritarian disguised as democracies (Bratton and Mates, 2000). Since arrangement and functions of political institutions differ depending on regime type, I would expect that level of trust in modern political institutions would also differ depending on regime. Democratic theory predicts that citizens trust political institutions that more democratic than less democratic institutions. This is because democratic political institutions are more accountable, transparent and responsive to needs of citizens (Newton, 2007). Based on democratic theory, I expect that:

H₈: there is a relationship between the level of democracy and trust in modern political institutions

In discussing the developmental quagmire in Africa especially following the failure of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the relative economic success of East Asian countries where governments intervene in economy, the focus has been on weak state capacity and institutional quality (Englebert, 2000b). State capacity defined as the capacity of the state to design and implement policies that will inure to the benefit of the people, ensure the supremacy of the rule of law by promoting good governance for the effective and efficient running of societies and markets on the continent. Good governance is seen as imperative because it will engender and promote accountability and thereby enhance the quality of the institutions (Englebert, 2000b). There are however different explanation of what accounts for state weakness in Africa and I shall consider two of such explanations here.

The first explanation is provided by Knack and Keefer (1995) and others who have developed an economic theory of social capital¹. According the social capital theory, Africa's weak state capacity emanates from the continent's low level of social capital and civic culture and as a result of this there is pervasive patron-client relationship which hinders political participation

¹ Knack and Keefer (1995) has argued that social capital leads to the emergence of efficient political institutions which functions effectively to protect property rights, investment and this promote economic growth.

and equality. Instead, sentimental attachment to tradition stunts the flourishing of associational life and ethnic identities continue to muzzle the spread of trust in the society. Lack of trust prevents the creation of modern political institutions that can deliver services to the citizenry.

Another explanation of weak state capacity and lack of institutional quality was postulated by Easterly and Levine (1999). They posited that African countries have weak institutions and largely favor poor policies because of their ethnic diversity. Their argument is that ethnic diversity has created social polarization and entrenched interest groups in the continent. This has increased the “likelihood of selecting socially sub-optimal policies” as ethnic representatives in government fail to appreciate the negative effect of neo-patrimonial policies they adopt (Englebert, 2000b). In the view of Easterly and Levine (1999), the more ethnic diverse a society is, the poor policies it adopts and this consequently weakened its institutions and thereby hampering economic growth. After an extensive study of the relation between poor policies, weak institutions and low economic growth among sub-Saharan African countries in a cross-national regression analysis, their conclusion was that ethnicity significantly account for growth difference between sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia (Englebert, 2000). This same point has been made by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Posner (2004). However, there is another school of thought which sees ethnic diversity as a resource because it helps act as fetters on an overbearing majority that may lead to political polarization (Collier, 2001). The argument is that “cross-cutting cleavages may also reduce the propensity for large scale ethnic polarization because of offsetting interest, which may stimulate better institutions for managing pluralist interest in society, such as proportional representation and other consociational arrangement” (de Soysa, 2011:22).

The above point on ethnic diversity stimulating better institutions had earlier been buttressed by Cho (2007) in his studies in Malawi and Namibia and concluded that the effect of ethnic diversity and fractionalization on trust in political institutions is mediated by the nature of electoral system adopted by such a society. He finds that majoritarian electoral system is likely to exacerbate the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on popular trust in political institution while proportional representation mitigates this negative effect. Indeed according to de Soysa (2011) ethnic diversity reduces social friction, predicts higher level of economic freedoms of a country and predicts better conditions of entrepreneurial capitalism.

Although there are many explanations of what accounts for state weakness in Africa, what is common throughout the argument is that weak states have weak institutions and their inability to deliver to social services to the people. Therefore increasing the capacity of states in Africa will strengthen its institutions and this will consequently increase the trust and confidence citizens have in those institutions. As a result of this I would expect that

H₉: high state capacity would lead to increase trust in modern political institution

The discussion thus far, has concentrated on trust in modern political institutions but since I am seeking to do a comparative analysis of the dynamics of trust between modern and traditional political institutions in Africa, I will turn my attention on the latter.

2.5 Traditional Political Institutions in Africa

Various theories have been propounded to explain what accounts for the continued existence, resilience and resurgence of traditional African political institutions despite its checkered history from the pre-colonial period through to the era of return to democratic rule on the continent (Logan, 2011). For instance, Mandani (1996) thinks that such institutions continue to exist at the pleasure of the state both during the colonial and the post-colonial period. Englebort (2000) is of the view that their continued existence is as a result of the fact that the African states have not been able to establish their own base of legitimacy and therefore could not draw support away from the traditional political authority. Yet, another view offered by Williams (2010) is that, it is its claim to both historical and moral legitimacy that has kept the traditional political authority afloat but then moral legitimacy has been reinforced by performance legitimacy. As far as Bratton et al. (2005) are concerned, it is the absence of a well functioning alternative especially at the local government level that the traditional authorities continue to be important to the rural communities. Ntsebeza (2004) has posited that it is the continued allocation of land by chiefs that compelled the people to cooperate with them even though they may not be popular with them. Further explanation for the continued existence was provided by Williams (2010) who argues that the idea that traditional authorities are the embodiment of the community, are seen as custodians of the culture and identity of the people, as symbol of an enduring community and the norms and values that shape the community from pre-colonial period is a very powerful idea which continue to guarantee their existence. Another argument put forward in this direction is the contrast between traditional authorities, and politicians and civil servants in terms of the way they

interact with the people. The point is that traditional authorities are very close to the people, understand the needs of their people very well and the processes and the procedures they adopt in handling issues brought before them are understood by their people. As opposed to the politicians and civil servants who are far away from the people that they are supposed to serve (Logan, 2009) and very often are not accountable to the people.

However, many of these theoretical speculations have not been empirically supported. Through an empirical study, Logan (2011) has concluded that support for traditional authorities appears to be intrinsic rather than instrumental, that traditional authority is not in competition with modern state for legitimacy. Again, in terms of distribution of responsibility for managing important public services, the people are very clear in their mind as to who should be in charge of what. For instance, whereas the people think that traditional authorities should take primary responsibility for solving local disputes and allocating lands, in terms of maintaining law and order, collecting income taxes, managing schools and health clinics, they want the state or the central government to assume a primary responsibility. In this vein, it will be interesting to see how the allocation of responsibilities affects the level of trust enjoyed by traditional authority and the respective modern political institutions that are variously mandated with handling these responsibilities.

But an earlier study has already given an indication as to attitudes of African citizens towards traditional authority (Logan, 2008). Summary findings from Afrobarometer 2 are quite revealing. For instance, when respondents were asked as to which alternative they will reject as an alternative to democracy², although 54% reject traditional rule but the disdain for traditional authority was mild when compared with other alternatives to democracy. Indeed as many as 77% rejected both presidential dictatorship and military rule respectively whilst 66% reject one party state. Again, when respondents were asked as to the persons they will contact for help to solve a problem, the target of contact for traditional authority was 35%, trailing behind only religious leaders whom 47% say they will target. Traditional authority did better than members of parliament, government officials, political party officials and local councilors who will be contacted by only 12%, 15%, 18%, and 27% of the respondents

² There are so many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: all decisions are made by a council of elders or elders: only one political party is allowed to stand for elections and hold office: the army comes in to govern the country: elections and the parliament/national assembly are abolished so that the president can decide everything. disapprove/strongly disapprove (Afrobarometer round 2)

respectively. Even in the resolution of violent conflict, traditional authority was favored than other institutions of state and even surprisingly more than the armed forces and the police. Whereas 25% of respondents prefer traditional authority to solve violent conflict and this compares favorably with 19% of the respondents who prefer the armed forces or the police. All these go to confirm that traditional authority is an integral part of the whole gamut of governance structure within the African political system.

2.6 Trust in Traditional Political Institutions

In order to explore the factors that explain support for greater influence for traditional political authorities in Africa, Logan (2008, 2011) set out to empirically test the full range of hypotheses that has been propounded in the literature using the Afrobarometer Round 4. Those hypotheses have sought to link support for greater influence for traditional political institutions to socio-demographic characteristics, state legitimacy, government performance, the nature of the functions of traditional authorities, ethnicity either as prime identity over national identity or a means of expressing grievance, the quality of leadership offered by traditional rulers compared with local government officials and attitudes towards and assessment of the quality of democracy in Africa.

Since my aim in this thesis is to find out why trust in both modern and traditional political institutions move in the same direction, my expectation is that trust in both institutions could be explained by the same underlying variables. In order to explore this possibility, I am extrapolating and extending the scope of the hypotheses I have formulated in relation to modern political institutions in Section 2.5 above to include traditional political institutions. All my expectations relative to modern political institutions should equally hold for traditional political institutions and to this end the same set of micro and macro variables would therefore be employed to test these hypotheses on traditional political institutions.

Chapter 3

3.0 Data and Methodology

This section deals with the explanation of how the data that were used for this study, the methods employed to test various hypotheses, explanation of variables and the measurement that was used to construct or build up scales and how those scales have been operationalized in order to reflect the hypotheses that will be tested. Again, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression technique, the assumptions underlying its use, the weaknesses of such technique for this kind of analysis and how those weaknesses were managed would be explained. The question of validity and reliability of the scales I have constructed and how they reflect the phenomena of interest in this thesis would be explained in this section.

3.1 Data Sources

The data used in this analysis is made up of variables from the Afrobarometer Survey Round four (4)³ which was conducted in twenty (20) countries between March, 2008 and June, 2009.⁴ The random sampling technique that was employed in this survey is the multi-stage cluster sampling which is the ideal method when a random sample is to be drawn from a widely dispersed population, such as a national population, or a large region, or even a large city (Bryman, 2000). The probability sample ranges from 1,200 to 2,400 respondents per country and representing a cross section of citizens in each country aged 18 years and older, with each adult person having a known and equal chance of being selected. Besides, the final dataset has been weighted at both within and across country. Within country weight adjusts the distribution of each of the country sample to take account of over or under samples with respect to region, gender, urban-rural distribution and education. As far as across country weight is concerned, this has been done to adjust all country samples to the same size, N=1200. Furthermore, both weights were then combined to produce a single weighing factor (Afrobarometer, 2010). The combined weighing factor would be applied in conducting analysis for this study. In statistical analysis and prediction, weighting is indispensable

³ The Afrobarometer survey is a project coordinated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development and the Michigan State University.

⁴ The countries included in this round are: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

because given some parts of the sample more or less weight than they are entitled to may in that situation entail errors of estimation (Maletta, 2007).⁵

The Afrobarometer survey is credited for making data available for studies in Africa which involve both individual and country level explanation and especially so because the countries sampled offer a wide variety of context across key state-level variables. It has nevertheless been criticized for its sampling bias which tend to favor countries that are more populous, more democratic, and less prone to conflict compared to other African countries not included in the sample (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011) This same point has been made by Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) when they argued that the sample selection favors countries that are stable or countries that have higher political capacity on the average. A cursory look at the countries in this sample reveals that relative to other countries, although not absolute, they tend to do very well both in terms of political and economic indicators. This problem of sample bias is however not limited to the Afrobarometer alone, many large scale country survey like the World Value Survey, have all tended to be bias in favor countries that are more prosperous and democratic. However, some analysis with precaution is better than no analysis at all.

3.2 Ordinary Least Square Regressions (OLS)

The idea behind Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model is to find the combination of coefficients (the *bs*) that minimize the errors, that is the distance between the predicted values and observed values. Then based on OLS model, we can predict each case value but the desire is for the predicted values to be as close as to the observed values as possible. Regression is a technique to understand a relationship between an outcome variable (dependent variable) and predictor variables (independent variables). In other words, given the values of independent variables (e.g. level of education), I would be able to predict the value(s) of a dependent variable (e.g. income/happiness).

However, for inference drawn from OLS regression analysis to be valid, there are some assumptions that must be fulfilled and some problems must be avoided. Some regression assumption in this regards include:

⁵ <http://www.spsstools.net/Tutorials/WEIGHTING.pdf> (Last accessed on 14.04. 2012).

3.2.1 No omitted independent variable

This happens when a variable that has been suggested by a previous research or a theory is not included in the model and this can be detected when the effect of a dependent variable changes when another variable is included in the model. In other words, some important aspect of the variation of the dependent variable is due to a variable that is not included. In essence any important variable that should be have been included. When this happens, there is what is called an “omitted variable bias”. For example, if I use ethnicity to explain the variation in income and the relationship between race and income vanishes when I introduce level of education, then the relationship between ethnicity and income is said to be spurious. Any inference based on this spurious relationship is obviously not valid.

3.2.2 No Non-Linear Relationship

This regression assumption means that the relationship between an independent and the dependent variable is linear and that an increase in a dependent variable must be the same for every unit increase in an independent variable. For example, in order to be able to apply a regression technique on the relationship between income and age, then it is assumed that an increase in income (dependent variable) must be the same for every unit increase in age (independent variable). In other words, the mean values of dependent variable for each increment of the independent variable(s) lie along a straight line (Field, 2009).

3.2.3 Homoscedasticity

In a regression model, the variance of the residual term should always be constant at each level of the independent variable or variables and when this is observed, the model is said to be homoscedastic. If however it is observed that the variances are very unequal and therefore not constant, then the model is said to be experiencing heteroscedasticity (Field, 2009). Heteroscedasticity might reflect that the model misses some important variables or that the dependent variable is not a uniform phenomenon. The main point is that heteroscedasticity is one problem caused by omitted variable(s).

3.2.4 Autocorrelation

It is a regression assumption which mostly occurs when one observation’s values are affected by neighboring observation’s values and is most typical in time series or in cross sectional designs. For example, because of inertia within the physical system or atmosphere and as a result of carry over process, the weather forecast for today and tomorrow is likely to be correlated with each other. For instance, if it is very cold today, the likelihood of the weather

being cold the following day is higher than the weather being warm. The reason for this kind of autocorrelation is as a result of omitted variable because if I have all the variables I desire, I could use them to explain the carry over process. However, since it is often very difficult to get those kinds of data, such forms of “automatic correlations” are referred to as autocorrelations. For instance, neighboring countries to countries experiencing civil war have a higher risk of experiencing civil war themselves. However, if I account for economic recession, regime stability and trans-border ethnic kin-ties, much of this effect vaporizes. Autocorrelation is also true with attitudes that tend to be reasonably stable and with social, political and economic variables that change gradually and incrementally (Berry, 1993). We cannot expect that, for instance, a society characterized by high level of distrust, will overnight change into a society with higher level of trust.

Moreover, a potential source of autocorrelation in relation to this study is the problem of spatial dependence. That means respondents in each country in my sample are affected by their national context and therefore, their responses to questions cannot be assumed to be independent of each other. In other words, the responses of one Ghanaian are likely to be autocorrelated with the responses of another Ghanaian and so would it be the same for other respondents in another country because of their national context. To avoid this, respondents would be clustered by country in the regression analysis.

3.2.5 Influential Cases

Influential cases do have a huge implication on the inferences one makes from a regression analysis and it can lead to misleading results. This happens when some cases with extreme values on one or more independent variables exert an undue influence over the parameters of a model, and when those cases were to be deleted a different regression coefficient is obtained from the model (Field, 2009). To be practical on this issue, assuming that my hypothesis predicts that there is a relationship between a wealth and level of trust in political institutions in Africa. If there is a country within my sample whose GDP (proxy for wealth) is way higher than average GDP in Africa, then inclusion of such a country in regression analysis is most likely to affect the parameters of the model and as a result the regression coefficient.

Besides, influential cases are also problem caused by omitted variables. Analyses of influential cases often lead to the detection of important patterns that at first sight might be considered deviation. For instance, a correlation between hours worked per week and wealth may have some persons that are extremely rich but are unemployed or simply too lazy to

work. These could highly influence the relationship between working hours and wealth. A closer analysis could reveal that these persons had all inherited a colossal amount of money. A variable capturing “inheritance” would reduce the influence of these cases, as the predictions of the model would be much better.

3.2.6 Multicollinearity

This arises when there is a strong relationship between two or more independent variables in a regression model (Field, 2009). What this substantively means is that although those independent variables appear to be different, in reality they measure the same underlying phenomena and that they explain the same variation in a dependent variable. For example, if I use an individual’s poverty (X1) and standard of living (X2) to explain political trust in Africa. In this instance, both poverty and standard living are indicators of the same underlying phenomenon and therefore the two variables are likely to explain the same variation in political trust in Africa.

These assumptions are by no means all the assumptions that must be satisfied in order to have a valid inference from a regression analysis but these are nevertheless important

3.3 Dependent Variables

The dependent variable for the first model is modern political trust. This is however an ambivalent concept in the trust literature because of the lack of differentiation between trust in modern political institutions and evaluations of government performance. This ambivalent has had implication on operationalization and on the level of modern political trust in the world today (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005). Much of the literature from the United States follow the National Election Studies (NES) trust in government question and these are four battery questions about whether government can be trusted to do the right thing, how much tax the government wastes, whether the government is run in the interest of all, and how many in government are crooked to measure modern political trust (Levi and Stoker, 2000,). Even for those who used these questions, there is a controversy about what they actually measure (recall the classical debate between Miller and Citrin). Another measure of modern political trust is constructed with indicators of modern political institution. Even those who use modern political institutions, which modern political institution is included is dependent on the context of the discussion (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005).

Since my focus is on modern political institutions rather than government performance, the use of political institution indicators will obviously be the natural way to go. One of the most extensive scale of modern political trust with the indicators of trust in political institutions in my opinion is constructed by Listhaug (1984) and Listhaug and Ringdal (2007) because these scales go beyond the executive and parliament to include politicians, political parties, the legal system and the police. Since my focus is on political institutions and I am seeking to compare the trust in modern political institutions and traditional political institutions, I will adopt the Listhaug and Listhaug and Ringdal's scale of political trust and then add other relevant institutions within the context of this study to the original scale. Accordingly, I constructed a scale of modern political trust based on the following indicators of trust in political institutions: trust in parliament, courts of law, the president, the ruling party, the opposition parties, the national electoral commission, the local government and the police. Although this might seem over inclusive at first glance, all these powers used to be vested in traditional political institutions in Africa. Again, all the institutions are major stakeholder in the political process in Africa. For instance, in Africa, the role of the electoral commission is very key in the political process and the police is an integral part of the executive arm of government. The scale of modern political trust created from the individual items has a higher level of internal reliability with the Cronbach Alpha of ($r .846$).

The other dependent variable for the second model is trust in traditional political institutions which until the evolution of the modern state system in Africa was the embodiment of the executive, the legislative, the adjudicative and the policing functions in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed most of the functions performed by decentralized local government structures were handled by traditional authorities who were in touch with the communities even during colonial times. It therefore comes as no surprised that one of the areas in which traditional authority is given much say today is at the local level (West and Kloeck-Jenson, 1999).

These indicators of modern political trust and traditional political trust originally have four (4) response options, from 0 to 3 and the questions were introduced in this way:

How much do you trust each of the following or haven't you heard enough about them to say: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=somewhat, 3=A lot, 9= don't know/haven't heard enough , 998= Refused to answer, -1= missing

.....Q49A: The President

.....Q49B: Parliament

.....Q49C: The Electoral Commission

.....Q49D: Your Metropolitan, Municipal, or District Assembly

.....Q49E: The Ruling Party

.....Q49F: The Opposition Parties

.....Q49G: The Police

.....Q49H: The Court of Law

.....Q49I: Traditional Authority

Apart from the variable of Trust in Traditional Authority, I have recoded the response options *don't know/haven't heard enough, refused to answer and missing* into missing values, thereby maintaining the original valid responses from 0 to 3. The scale of Modern Political Trust is a continuous variable, it ranges from 0=Not at all to 3 = A lot. On the other hand, I have recoded the response options of the other dependent variable, Trust in Traditional Authority, into a 5-point scale, with 0 is recoded into 1 and “don't know/haven't heard enough” placed at the midpoint and so the range is from 1=Not at all to 5=A lot. Table 3.1 below contains the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of Institutional and Political Trust and trust in Traditional Authority

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Trust President (0=Not at all, 3= A lot)	26142	1.857	1.109	0	3
Trust Parliament (0=Not at all, 3= A lot)	25606	1.683	1.059	0	3
Electoral Commission (0=Not at all, 3= A lot)	25160	1.577	1.117	0	3
Trust Local Government (0=Not at all, 3= A lot)	25810	1.585	1.078	0	3
Trust Ruling Party (0=Not at all, 3= A lot)	26173	1.599	1.128	0	3
Trust Opposition Party (0=Not at all, 3= A lot)	25586	1.255	1.132	0	3
Trust Police (0=Not at all, 3= A lot)	26778	1.566	1.117	0	3
Trust Law Courts (0=Not at all, 3= A lot)	26105	1.773	1.053	0	3
Political Trust (0= Not at all, 3= A lot)	22097	1.600	.772	0	3
Trust traditional Authority (1=Not at all, 5= A lot)	26433	3.537	1.454	1	5

As it is clear from the Table 3.1 above, among the indicators of scale of political trust, trust in the president has the highest mean value of 1.857 with a standard deviation of 1.109 this is immediately followed by trust in the courts of law with 1.773 and a corresponding standard deviation of 1.053. Trust in Opposition Parties has the lowest mean value of 1.255 and a standard deviation of 1.132. The scale of Modern Political Trust has a mean value of 1.600 and a standard deviation of 0.772.

The other dependent variable, trust in traditional political institution has a mean value of 3.537 and a standard deviation of 1.454.

Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix of the indicators of Political Trust

1. President	1.00							
2. Parliament	0.60	1.00						
3. Electoral Commission	0.57	0.62	1.00					
4. Local Government	0.47	0.55	0.56	1.00				
5. Ruling Party	0.62	0.56	0.59	0.54	1.00			
6. Opposition Party	0.07	0.21	0.13	0.22	0.12	1.00		
7. Police	0.38	0.43	0.47	0.43	0.44	0.20	1.00	
8. Courts of Law	0.40	0.45	0.48	0.42	0.45	0.19	0.62	1.00
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Table 3.2 above is the correlation matrix of the indicators of modern political trust and as it can be seen, every variable is obviously perfectly correlated with itself with a coefficient of 1.00. All other variables are positively correlated with each other and this is an indication that as trust in one modern political institution increases, there is a corresponding increase in another modern political institution. However, the correlation between some institutions is higher than in others. For example, trust in the President and trust the Ruling Party, trust in the President and trust in the Electoral Commission and trust in the Police and trust in the Courts of law each have a correlation coefficient of $r=0.62$. The high correlation between these institutions are however understandable because, the President is more often than not a member of the Ruling Party, the Electoral Commission can either conduct free and fair elections and enhance its credibility and that of the eventual winner, that is the President or it can rig the elections and along with the President suffer from credibility crises. The function of the Courts of law and that of the Police as officers of the law also explains why trust in those two institutions is highly correlated. The correlation between trust in the Electoral Commission and trust in the Opposition Parties is very low ($r=.13$), an indication that members of the Opposition in many parts of Africa still doubt the impartiality and the independence of the Electoral commission. Trust in the President and trust in Opposition Parties has the lowest coefficient of $r=.07$.

3.4 Independent Variables

In undertaking the analyses, the independent variables have been presented in the same order as they have been in the theory chapter. The table below shows each of the variables included in the analysis: variable name, number of respondents, the minimum and maximum values, the mean and standard deviation of each variable. Some variables will however be explained in greater details to show how they were operationalized and whether they indeed measure the concept that I am interested in testing. Where it is applicable, I have adopted scales that have been developed already and in which factors analyses have carried out.

Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of independent variables

Variable Name	N	Min	Max	Mean	St. deviation
Age (Actual age of Respondents)	27380	18	110	36.331	14.502
Gender(0= Female, 1= Male)	27713	0	1	1.501	.500
Residency (0=Urban, 1=Rural)	27713	0	1	1.620	.485
Level of Education(Respondents' highest level of education)	27669	0	9	3.154	2.019
Support for democracy(non-democratic preferable, 1=democracy preferable)	25555	0	1	.245	.430
Reject Autocracy (1=Strongly disapprove, 5=Strongly approved)	25506	1	5	1.905	.912
Satisfaction with democracy (0=My country is not a democracy, 4=Very satisfied)	25367	0	4	2.514	1.076
Perception of economic condition (1=very bad,5=very good)	23200	1	5	2.959	.885
Interpersonal trust(0=Not at all,4= a lot)	27196	0	4	1.819	.784
Membership of Voluntary Association (0=not a member,3=official member)	27445	0	3	.681	.953

Perception of state legitimacy (1=Strongly disagree, 4=Strongly agree)	25469	1	5	3.731	.952
Perception of corruption (0=None, 3= All of them)	18499	0	3	1.386	.6834
Experienced with corruption(0=Never,3=Often)	19828	0	3	.232	.528
Quality of Elections (1=Not free and fair, 4=Completely free and fair)	25377	1	4	2.966	1.117
Polyarchy (Vanhanen's Index of democracy, High values indicates highly democratic)	27713	4.1	28.1	11.618	5.352
Human Development Index (high values indicate high human development)	27713	.1295	.708	.482	.131

3.4.1 Support for democracy

In chapter two, Hypothesis one claimed that people with *democratic attitudes* are much more inclined to trust political institutions because these political institutions are also seen as democratic institutions and most of them only find expression within the context of a democratic society. Instead of asking people how much they like democracy in an abstract form, Mattes and Bratton (2003) are of the view that the best way to measure support for democracy is to give respondents realistic choices between democracy and its alternatives. The net effect is that one cannot claim to support democracy and then in another breath tolerate alternatives to democracy. In this vein, I have adopted the scale of a person's democratic attitude developed by Mattes and Bratton by summing up three variables from the Afrobarometer survey.⁶ The scale of a respondent's rejection of alternative to democracy and

⁶ In the Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or disapprove of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for elections and hold office? The army comes in to govern the country? Elections and Parliament/National Assembly are abolished so that the President/Prime Minister decides everything?

an open preference for democracy⁷, although far from perfect, is considered a much reliable and valid construct measure of a person's democratic attitude.

3.4.2 Satisfaction with democracy

The measure for satisfaction with democracy is taken from the Afrobarometer survey in which respondents were asked about their satisfaction with the way democracy works in their respective countries. In order to ensure that it is democracy that is measured and nothing else, interviewers were instructed to read the question in the language of the respondent but always read "democracy" in English. Translation is permissible only if the respondent does not understand the English term. Given that a substantial number of Africans have appreciation of what the terms means (Bratton and Mattes, 2001), I can say with some level of certainty that this variable elicit respondent's satisfaction with democracy and nothing else and so I am in a position to test hypothesis two.

3.4.3 Economic Performance

Hypothesis 3 claimed that a positive evaluation of the economic performance of government is positively associated with trust in modern political institutions and in order to test this, I took inspiration from Mishler and Rose (2001) when they suggested that in terms of evaluation of the economy, micro economic performance matters most to the individual. This means that what is the deciding factor is not aggregate government performance but individual circumstances as a whole. I therefore used variables relating to how the individual feels about the economy to construct a scale of economic performance. These variables relate to a respondent assessment of the current economic condition in a country and whether there has been an improvement or there is the expectation that things might improve in a year.⁸ A caveat on this measure is the possibility of a gap between objective government economic performance and citizen's expectation because although economic and living conditions

⁷ Here again, respondents were asked: Which of the following statement is closest to your opinion? Statement 1= democracy is preferable to any form of government, 2= in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable, 3= for someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have.

⁸ In the Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked a battery of questions about the economy and condition of life: In general, how would you describe the present economic condition of this country? 1= Very bad, 2= Fairly bad, 3= Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good and 5= Very good. Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Economic conditions in this country? 1=Much Worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better and 5= Much better. Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months? 1=Much Worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better and 5= Much better.

might have improved, it may have been below citizens' expectation (Listhaug and Miller, 1999).

3.4.4 Social Capital

Social capital at the individual level is measured using an individual's membership of a voluntary association and interpersonal trust (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Kuenzi, 2008). Interpersonal trust also consists of both generalized and particularized trust, that is trust in strangers and trust in other people we know (Newton, 2007). In line with Kuenzi (2008), I have constructed a scale of interpersonal trust based on a respondent's trust in relatives, other people they know and fellow citizens.⁹ The entire questions on interpersonal trust are correlated. It is very interesting that, saying that one trust one's relative is highly correlated with one's trust in other people that one knows ($r=.47$) and one's trusts in other people that one knows is significantly and highly correlated with one's trust in his fellow countrymen ($r=.61$). Although one's trust in one's relatives is correlated with one's trust in one's fellow countrymen, the correlation is not that very high ($r=.31$).

As far as membership of a voluntary association goes, the question is a straight forward one. Respondents were asked: *Let us now turn to your role in the community. I am now going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, or inactive member or not a member? 0= Not a member, 1= Inactive Member 2= Active member and 3=Official leader.* This measure is reliable because when administered at different point in time, it will measure a person's true status as far as voluntary association is concerned. Above all, as a construct, its validity is not in doubt as the question is very clear.

3.4.5 Perception State Legitimacy

I have posited in Hypothesis five that perception of high state legitimacy is positively associated with high trust in political institutions. To test this hypothesis, I have adopted the scale of perception of state legitimacy constructed by Logan (2011). This is based on three variables that relate to the willingness of a respondent to recognize and submit to the authority

⁹ How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Your relatives? Other people you know? And Trust in other fellow citizens. 0= Not at all, 1= Just a little, 2= I trust them somewhat,3= I trust them a lot

of three state institutions such as the courts of law, the police and the tax department¹⁰. When citizens feel that they are bonafide members of the state, compliance with these agencies can be achieved without coercion. However, the type of legitimacy these variables are supposed to measure is not clear. Is it the legitimacy of the state as a unit or the legitimacy of those controlling the state? Besides, the bases of legitimacy of state go beyond compliance with only three agencies of the state.

3.4.6 Corruption

In order to have a fuller understanding of the effect of corruption on trust in political institutions as I stated in Hypothesis six, I have adopted the measure used by Lavalée, Razanfindrakoto and Rouband (2008) by using both indicators of experiences of petty corruption and perception of corruption. The scale of experienced corruption is constructed by summing up three variables relating to a respondent's experience with petty corruption, which is whether one has had to pay a bribe to get a permit or a document, get water or sanitation services or to avoid problem with the police.¹¹ With regards to perception of corruption, the scale is made up of seven indicators in which respondents were asked as to how many of a certain number of public officials they perceived to be involved in corruption.¹² This scale of perception of corruption has been found to be highly correlated with the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) developed by Transparency International (Bratton, 2007).

¹⁰ In the Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked: For each of the following statement, please tell me whether you agree or disagree: The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by. The police always have the right to make people obey the law. The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes. 1= strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree and 5= Strongly agree

¹¹ Respondents were asked: In the past year, how often (if ever, have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in order to: Get a document or a permit? Get sanitation services? To avoid problem with the police (like passing a check point or avoiding a fine or arrest? 0=Never, 1=Once or twice, 2=A few times and 3= Often.

¹² The question goes as follows: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption or haven't heard enough to say: Office of the President? Members of Parliament? Elected Assembly men/women? Government Officials? Police? Judges and Magistrates? 0= None, 1= Some of them, 2= Most of them, and 3=All of them

3.4.7 Quality of Elections

In order to test Hypothesis seven (7), I relied on the survey question which sought respondent's opinion about the free and fairness of last general elections held in a country: *On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last general election, held in (year). Was it: 1=Not free and fair, 2=Free and fair with major problems, 3= Free and fair, but with minor problems and 4=completely free and fair.*

3.5 Macro Variables

The fewer number of countries put severe limits on the number of country level variables that is reasonable to include. But because attitudes are not formed in a vacuum and contexts do matter, I have introduced two country variables that measure democracy and state capacity.

3.5.1 Democracy

To measure the level of democracy in a country during the year of the survey, I used the latest version of Vanhanen's Index of Democracy (ID). This Index was compiled by Vanhanen in collaboration with International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo,¹³ which measures the level of democracy in a country based on the level of *competition* and *participation* at every election. The competition is calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes won by the largest party from 100 and the value of participation is calculated from the total population and not from adult or franchised population (Vanhanen, 2000). The countries are subsequently ranked based on their score on these two variables with higher score corresponding to very democratic but there is no cut off point or threshold below which a country is not considered democratic. However, to measure democracy with only procedural matters such as competition and participation may not be very good indicator as far as Africa is concerned. Issues of political rights and civil liberties cannot be taken for granted. Although Vanhanen (2000) in response to some of these concerns have argued that "it is not necessary to measure them separately because the indicators of electoral competition and participation, indirectly at least, reflect the existence of freedom and political right" (Vanhanen, 2000: 263). this is not a matter of course in every situation. Despite this, ID is correlated with other measures such as the Freedom House Ratings, Scalar Index of Polities (SIP). I could not use SIP because of the limited coverage relative to the countries in my sample. Despite correlation between these measures of democracy, I am mindful of the fact that "high degree of

¹³ <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/> (last accessed on 01.03.2012)

correlation among existing democracy indices does not put to rest concerns about their validity” (Munk and Verkuilen, 2002:290).

3.5.2 Human Development Index (HDI)

I have chosen to use the Human Development Index (HDI) as a proxy for administrative/bureaucratic capacity of a state. Although HDI has been criticized for not being multidimensional enough (see Najam and Saga, 1998; Ranis et al, 2006; Escosura 2010), a country’s performance on education, health and economic growth might be a reflection of its administrative/bureaucratic quality. The poor performance of rentier states like Saudi Arabia and other countries in the gulf on HDI is an indication that a country needs quality bureaucracy to be able to deliver such social services as health and education. Economic growth can also be enhanced or hindered by the nature and quality of bureaucracy and state institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Bureaucratic quality is a good measure of bureaucratic capacity from the perspective of constructs validity (Hendrix, 2010). I could not use the International Country Risk Guide Bureaucratic Quality Index (ICRG_BQ), because data available did not cover all the countries in my sample.

3.6 Control Variables

I will introduce the standard socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, residency and education as control variables for both models on political trust and trust in traditional political institutions.

In relation to age, gender and education, Seligson (2002) has suggested that unlike older people, the experience of the political life of younger people are recent and therefore might be expected to have high trust in modern political institutions. They are yet to accumulate years of disappointment with their political institutions and their vision of democracy is ideal. Educated people are well informed about their political system and so they are more critical of it. Most studies of political trust indicate that gender is important with women expressing less political trust (Seligson, 2002).

In terms of traditional political trust, modernization theory predicts that urbanized, younger and highly educated people will have lower traditional political trust as they are liberated from the shackles of traditional authorities whose influence is greater on the rural, less educated and older people (Logan, 2011).

Chapter 4

4.0 Results and Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the analysis and discuss the findings. I began my analysis by examining which of the modern political institutions enjoyed high trust among the respondents in the survey and the reasons behind those levels of trust. Thereafter, I look at the levels trust that Africans have in their traditional political institutions. In order not to obscure the differences that exist among the countries in this sample, I present some country wise descriptive statistics relating to both the dependent and independent variables. I present the OLS general models with the same set of micro and macro variables which was tested on both modern and traditional political institutions. I further comment on some of the observations made when other variables are included or excluded in the models.

4.1 Trust level in Modern and Traditional Political Institutions

Table 4.1 below contains information about percentages of respondents who have expressed some levels of trust in eight modern political institutions and the traditional political institution. It also contains descriptive statistics with regards to both modern and traditional political trust and mean score of each of them is 1.60 and 3.53 respectively. As already shown in table 3.1 in Chapter 3 that trust in the President had the largest mean value of 1.857, trust in the Courts of Law followed with a mean of 1.773. Trust in the Opposition Parties had the least mean value of 1.255. Although the values of the mean provide information about which modern political institutions enjoy high trust from the respondents, let us look at the percentages too.

First of all, among the eight modern political institutions, the President enjoys greater trust than all the other institutions. About 63% of the respondents said they have a lot of and somewhat trust in the President as compared to 47% who expressed just a little or no trust at all in the President. The Courts of Law is in the second position with about 60% of the respondents expressing a lot of and somewhat trust in them and 40% expressing just a little or no trust at all. Trust in Parliament is in the third position with 57% of respondents indicating that they have a lot of or somewhat trust in Parliament compared to 43% who said they have just a little or no trust at all in Parliament. The Ruling Party, The National Electoral Commission and the Elected Local Government Officials share the fourth position with 53% of respondents expressing a lot of or somewhat trust and 47% expressing just a little or no trust at all in these institutions. The Police enjoys about 52% of a lot of or somewhat trust and

48% of just a little or no trust from the people. Opposition Parties enjoy the least trust from our respondents with only 49% expressing a lot of or somewhat trust in them whilst 61% expressing just a little or no trust at all in them.

However, when compared with all the modern political institutions, traditional political institutions earned the highest form of trust. As many as 66% of the respondents indicated that they have a lot of or somewhat trust as opposed to 34% who expressed just a little or no trust at all in traditional political institutions. The comparison between modern political institutions and traditional political institutions is possible because all the institutions have the same width which ranges from 0= Not at all to 3= A lot. Finally, the two main dependent variables, modern and traditional political trust have mean values of 1.60 and 3.53 respectively.

Table 4.1: Percentages and Mean levels of trust

Institutions	Trust Levels in Percentages and The Mean Values					
	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Total	Mean
President	15.89	21.51	23.56	39.04	100	1.86
Courts of Law	14.34	25.17	28.19	31.90	100	1.77
Parliament	16.87	26.31	28.48	28.33	100	1.68
Ruling Party	22.44	24.35	24.07	29.14	100	1.60
Electoral Commission	22.82	24.04	25.77	27.37	100	1.58
Local Gov't	20.33	26.46	27.61	25.60	100	1.58
The Police	22.78	25.14	24.79	27.29	100	1.57
Opposition Parties	31.40	29.65	23.11	15.84	100	1.25
Traditional Authority	14.34	19.53	23.51	42.61	100	1.94
Modern Political Trust						1.60*
Traditional Political Trust						3.53

- *How much do you trust each of the following or haven't you heard enough to say?
0=Not at all, 1= Just a little, 2= Somewhat and 3= A lot*
- *Modern Political trust is the average of all 8 political institutions and a continuous variable and ranges from 0=Not at all to 3=A lot.*
- *Traditional Political Trust is a recording of traditional authority to a five point scale ranging from 1=Not at all to 5=A lot*
- *Apart from the last column which contains the mean, all other figures are in percentages.*

In order not obscure some very important information regarding the countries in the sample, I present country wise descriptive statistics on the dependent variables and some of the independent variables.

Figure 1 below contains the mean of modern political trust by country ranging from 1.09 to 2.05. The total sample mean is 1.60. The following countries had a mean score higher than the total country score. Mozambique has the highest score on modern political trust with 2.05 followed by Tanzania with 2.03 and then Burkina Faso with 1.99: Botswana, 1.95: Malawi, 1.94: Namibia, 1.89: Ghana, 1.82: Mali, 1.67 and Lesotho, 1.6. The rest of the countries had a mean score lower than the total sample score with Nigeria recording the lowest with a score of 1.09.





Figure 2 below contains the mean of traditional political trust by country with the exception of Cape Verde since that question was not asked because Cape Verde did not have a system of traditional political system. The total sample means score is 3.54. Mali has the highest score of 4.27 followed by Senegal with 4.25: Burkina Faso, 4.11: Botswana, 4.05: Malawi, 3.98: Zambia, 3.85: Lesotho, 3.72: Namibia, 3.71: Ghana, 3.63 and both Mozambique and Uganda had 3.59. Here again the rest of the countries scored below the total sample mean with South Africa having the least mean score of 2.85.




Apart from a few countries like Tanzania which did very well on modern political trust but performed poorly on traditional political trust and then Senegal, Uganda and Zambia which had lower scores on modern political trust but higher scores on traditional political trust, the rest of the countries either scored higher or lower on both modern and traditional political trust. For instance, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Liberia, and Benin all did very poorly on both forms of trust but Burkina Faso, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Ghana and Lesotho performed creditably very well on both form political trust. This reinforces the fact both modern and traditional political trust rise and fall together and this is what this thesis has set out find answers.

Before I begin the regression analysis, I would like to have an overview of the relationship between modern and traditional political trust and level of democracy and state capacity.


In order to see if there is some sort of relationship between modern political trust and a level of democracy in a country, let us look at Figure 3 below. Although, Cape Verde, Kenya, Liberia, Benin, Senegal and Uganda are relatively much more democratic, yet as we have already seen in Figure 1 above, their mean score on modern political trust fell below the total sample mean. Conversely, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Mali and Mozambique scored high on modern political trust but they are among the least democratic countries in Africa in this

sample. Very few countries like Botswana, Ghana and Malawi have a high score on both. This is an indication that the level of democracy does not impact the level of modern political institutions.



On the relationship between traditional political trust and level of democracy in a country, Figure 4 below tells the same story as that of Figure 3 above. There appeared not to be any relationship between traditional political trust and a level of democracy and this is not surprising given that I have already noted above that both modern and traditional political trust move in the same direction. Therefore, if there is no relationship between modern political trust and level of democracy, it would be natural not to expect any relationship between traditional political trust and level of democracy. As it is illustrated in Figure 4 below, it is very evident that apart from few countries whose score on both traditional political trust and level of democracy correlates, for most of the countries, there is no clear pattern of correlation or relationship.

Figure 4: Mean of Traditional Political Trust and Level of Democracy by Country



Finally, I examined the relationship between modern and traditional political trust and state capacity by looking the illustrations in Figure 5 and 6 below. Figure 5 contains information about state capacity using HDI as a proxy and modern political trust. The countries are ranked from the highest to the lowest in terms of HDI and it can be seen that there is no clear pattern between state capacity and modern political trust.





Figure 6 below is an illustration of mean of traditional political trust and state capacity of each country in the sample. It is clear that some of the countries with low state capacity have a high or low traditional political trust and vice versa, making it difficult to identify any clear pattern on the nature of relationship between traditional political trust and state capacity.



Having looked at how well each of the countries performs in terms of modern and traditional political trust and their positions relative to level of democracy and state capacity, I turn to the regression analysis to see what kind of relationship exist between the dependent variables and the independent variables.

4.2 OLS- Simple Regression Analysis of both Modern and Traditional Political Trust

I began the analysis with simple bivariate regression analysis before I proceed with the multivariate analysis. Table 4.2 below contains model 1 and 2 of bivariate regression analysis of both modern and traditional political trust and the corresponding observations of each independent variable. I consider the micro and macro variables and then the control variables.

4.2.1 Micro Variables

Here I examined the effect of each of the independent variable on modern and traditional political trust without taking into consideration or controlling for other independent variables.

In Hypothesis 1, I argued that democratic attitudes are positively associated with trust in modern political institutions and by extension to trust in traditional political trust. As it can be seen from the models 1 and 2 below, there is no difference between those who support democracy and those who do not as far as modern and traditional political trust are concerned. The other indicator of democratic attitudes, that is the rejection of authoritarian alternatives to

democracy, is positively and significantly related with modern political trust but it is also not far from significance when it comes to traditional political trust.

Hypothesis 2 is supported as the coefficients for satisfaction with democracy is significantly and positively correlated with modern and traditional political trusts. The coefficients are both positive but it is a bit weaker on traditional political trust compared to that on modern political trust.

Satisfaction with economic condition of a country as I posited in Hypothesis 3 finds support as it is positively associated with modern and traditional political trust. Satisfaction with economic condition is significantly correlated with modern political trust at a .01 level of significance whereas it is significant on traditional political trust at a .05 level of significance.

In Hypothesis 4, I proposed that social capital, measured by indicators of interpersonal trust and membership of voluntary association is positively correlated with modern political trust and also traditional political trust. Only interpersonal trust is positively and significantly correlated with both modern and traditional political trusts with the coefficient on traditional political trust been higher than that on modern political trust. Membership of voluntary association is not in any way related to both modern and traditional political trust.

Perception of state legitimacy is both positively and significantly correlated with modern and traditional political trusts as I have expected based on Hypothesis 5. In the bivariate analysis in model 1 and 2, it can be seen that a unit change in state legitimacy leads to an increase of 0.150 and 0.148 in both modern and traditional political trusts respectively.

In Hypothesis 6, I opined that corruption is negatively associated with modern and traditional political trusts. My expectation has been met as both the indicators of measurement of corruption, that is perception and experienced corruption are both significantly and negatively associated with modern and traditional political trust. The coefficients of experienced corruption on both modern and traditional political trusts is however weaker compared to the coefficients of perception of corruption on modern and traditional political trusts.

Perception of the quality of elections as stated in Hypothesis 7 was expected to be positively associated with both modern and traditional political trust. Hypothesis 7 finds support as the quality of elections affect both modern and traditional political trusts and the coefficients are both positive and significant.

4.2.2 Macro Variables

The simple regression analysis on the macro variables can also be seen in Table 4.2 in models 1 and 2 below and the analysis is as follows:

In hypothesis 8, I posited that level of democracy is positively related to modern and traditional political trusts. My expectation has not been met and the coefficients are not statistically significant.

In order to assess the impact of state capacity on modern and traditional political trust, I used a country's ranking on the human development index as a proxy. As it can be seen from model 1 and 2, state capacity is not related in any way to both modern and traditional political trust as the coefficients are not significant.

4.2.3 Control variables

As far as the control variables are concerned, bivariate regression and preliminary analysis indicates that age is a significant predictor of trust in modern and traditional political institutions and that older people should have a higher trust in modern and traditional political institutions younger people.

Gender male is insignificant as there is no difference between men and women as far as modern political trust is concerned but it is not far from significance in relation to traditional political trust.

Residential unit has a positive and significant relation with modern and traditional political trust as those residing in the rural areas have higher trust in modern and traditional political institutions. It means moving from urban area to a rural area increases a person's trust in modern and traditional political institutions.

Education has a significant relation with modern and traditional political trusts but in a negative way. People who are highly educated have less trust in both modern and traditional political institutions.

The analyses above as I have already indicated, do not take into consideration the effect of other variables. However, since in a real world situation, it is very difficult for a phenomenon to be an outcome of only a single variable, there is the need to introduce other variables to determine which of the relationships above are real and which ones are spurious? Multivariate analyses in the next section below help unravel this concern.

Table 4.2: Bivariate Analysis of both Modern and Traditional Political Trust

	Model1 Modern Political Trust	Number of observations	Mode 2 Tradtional Poltical Trust	Number of observations
Age	0.005*** (4.96)	21,894	0.008*** (5.01)	26,101
Gender male ^a	0.008 (0.56)	22,097	-0.041* (-2.02)	26,433
Rural ^b	0.218*** (5.11)	22,097	0.477*** (4.96)	26,433
Education	-0.064*** (-4.36)	22,066	-0.158*** (-8.32)	26,392
Supportdem ^c	-0.007 (-0.18)	20,947	-0.030 (0.55)	24,395
Reject authocracy	0.101*** (3.65)	21,076	0.072* (2.00)	24,450
Satisdem	0.276*** (14.81)	20,971	0.226*** (6.13)	24,174
Economy	0.187*** (6.09)	19,168	0.124** (2.75)	22,034
Interp trust	0.298*** (10.75)	21,875	0.400*** (7.79)	25,936
MemberVolu	0.000 (0.03)	22,097	0.016 (0.75)	26,433
State legitimacy	0.150*** (8.70)	20,986	0.148*** (5.50)	24,350
Percorup	-0.502*** (-16.48)	15,128	-0.527*** (-7.28)	16,627
Excorup	-0.170 (-4.07)	16,460	-0.302*** (-4.36)	18,657
Election quality	0.248*** (11.64)	20,787	0.174*** (4.25)	24,323
Polyarchy	0.001 (0.05)	22,097	0.013 (0.85)	26,433
HDI	0.300 (0.76)	22,097	-0.455 (-0.59)	26,433

Note: *** significance at 0.01; **significance at 0.05; * significance at 0.1
Education becomes significance at 0.01 when HDI is introduced (model 2)

a. Dummy. Reference category: female

b. Dummy. Reference category: Urban

c. Dummy. Reference category: non democratic can be preferable/ it does not matter

4.3 OLS – Multivariate Regression Analysis of Modern Political Trust

What are the effects of each of the independent variables on the political trust when other variables are controlled for? The answer to this question is found in Table 4.3 below.

4.3.1 Micro Variables

This analysis on the micro variables can be found in table 4.3, model 3-6 below.

I posited in Hypothesis 1 that high democratic attitudes or values are positively associated with modern political trust. The Hypothesis is supported but with only one of the indicators of the measurement of democratic attitudes or values. The first indicator which is an expressed support for democracy is far from statistical significant and the coefficient is negative and close to zero, that is to say there is no difference between those who say democracy is always preferable and those who say it did not matter or sometimes non-democratic systems can be preferable. However, the other indicator of democratic attitude, which is an expressed rejection of authoritarian alternatives to democracy, is statistically significant with a positive coefficient of 0.046 (model 6). The results are the same as the bivariate analysis in Table 4.2 in model 1 above, an indication that the relationship still holds when I control for other variables.

Satisfaction with democracy was assumed to be positively associated with modern political trust and this has proven to be the case with a strong statistical significance and a positive coefficient. This means that satisfaction with the way democracy works increases one's trust in modern political institutions. Hypothesis 2 therefore finds support and this result is also true in the bivariate analysis in mode 1 above.

In Hypothesis 3, I proposed that satisfaction with the economic condition of a country is positively associated with modern political trust and this is supported with a strong and significant coefficient. For every one unit increase in economic satisfaction, we would expect about 0.086 (model 6) increases in trust in modern political institutions. This result lends much credence to the fact that the relationship found in model 1 above in not spurious since the relationship is maintained with the introduction of other variables.

Social capital is measured by interpersonal trust and membership of a voluntary association. It was my expectation that social capital would be positively associated with modern political trust. Although Hypothesis 4 finds support, only one of the indicators of social capital, which

is interpersonal trust, is statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.215 (model 6). In the case of membership of a voluntary association, whether in a bivariate regression analysis as in model 1 above or in the multivariate regression analysis as in model 6 below, it remains statistically insignificant.

In Hypothesis 5, it was my proposition that high perception of state legitimacy is positively correlated with trust in modern political institutions. In other words, when people view the state and its institutions as legitimate, they are more likely to repose their confidence and trust in such institutions. This proposition has been supported with a very strong and significant coefficient. Therefore, the bivariate relationship in model 1 above is not spurious as the relationship between perception of state legitimacy and trust in modern political institutions holds even when I controlled for other variables

I have earlier indicated that when citizens view the national elections through which office holders are elected as credible, free and fair, their trust in those political institutions will *ceteris paribus* be high. Hypothesis 7 gain credence with a robust and significant coefficient and this result is also applicable in the bivariate analysis in model 1 above.

Perception of corruption was expected to negatively affect political trust as earlier indicated in Hypothesis 6. This expectation has been met (see appendix 1) and therefore Hypothesis 6 is supported. Although I was interested in perception of corruption, previous research requires that I should also include a variable on respondents' direct experience of corruption. This is however statistically insignificant whether it is included in the model alone (result not shown) or with the indicator of perception of corruption.

4.3.2 Macro Variables

I have already made the point that attitudes are not formed or developed in a vacuum. There are always contextual factors that implicitly impact individual attitudes. To this end, I have included some contextual variables with a view to seeing how they affect political trust of respondents in this sample.

I have posited in Hypothesis 8 that level of democracy is positively correlated with modern political trust. This is because the more democratic a country is, the higher the levels of accountability as a result of increased scrutiny from the citizens. Democracy comes with it the provision of political goods like rule of law, respect for human right and other political rights and personal freedoms. This I have already noted is very important in the African context as a

result of past experience with tyranny and autocracy. However, my expectation with regards to Hypothesis 8 has not been fulfilled as level of democracy is statistically insignificant and does not account for any variance in modern political trust (model 4 and 6).

In order to measure bureaucratic capacity of a state, I used HDI as a proxy. A country's performance on education, health and the economy would give an indication of the quality of its bureaucracy and thus its bureaucratic capacity. It was my expectation that countries with high state capacity in terms of its ability to deliver social and economic services to its people would have high political trust. My expectation in this regard has not been met but it must be noted that, HDI increased the significant of education to a level of 0.05 percent. This is understandable since education is one of the components of HDI.

4.3.3 Control variables

As far as the socio-demographic variables are concerned, age is statistically insignificant but this is in sharp contrast with the bivariate result in model 1 above. However, when I run a model similar to model 3 without education variable (results not shown), age became significant but that relationship disappeared when I reintroduce education. Therefore, the apparent relationship between age and modern political trust is spurious. This same scenario applies to gender male. The conclusion therefore is that what matters most as far as modern political trust goes is education and not age or gender. This is partly because the younger generation in Africa today is much more educated than the older generation and also on the average men tend to have higher education than women.

There is however a significance difference in modern political trust between those in rural areas and those in the urban area and this relationship is independent of education. Education becomes statistically significant when I introduced the HDI variable (model 5 and 6) but even without the HDI variable, it is only significant at 0.1 (model 3 and 4). It must however be noted that the effect of education on modern political trust is negative, an indication that highly educated people are more critical of the political institutions than those who are not.

With the individual level variables alone, F-test for Model 3 is statistically significant and it can explain about 30 percent of the variance in modern political trust. When only HDI is included (model 5), the explanatory power of the model increased marginally by 0.02 percent but level of democracy alone does not add anything to the model (model 4). Overall, the

country level variables included in this analysis have been poor predictors of modern political trust.

Table4.3: A Multivariate Analysis of Modern Political Trust¹⁴

Independent Variables	(model 3) Modern Political Trust	(Model 4) Modern Political Trust	(Model 5) Modern Political Trust	(Model 6) Modern Political Trust
Age	0.000 (0.92)	0.000 (1.14)	0.000 (0.58)	0.000 (0.73)
Gender male ^a	-0.006 (-0.44)	-0.006 (-0.50)	-0.002 (-0.20)	-0.003 (-0.29)
Rural Resident ^b	0.111*** (5.04)	0.111*** (5.82)	0.116*** (5.44)	0.113*** (5.46)
Level of educ	-0.015* (-1.99)	-0.015* (-1.96)	-0.018** (-2.36)	-0.018** (-2.43)
Supportdem ^c	0.014 (0.61)	0.014 (0.57)	0.013 (0.57)	0.010 (0.43)
Reject Authocracy	0.050*** (3.46)	0.050*** (3.51)	0.049*** (3.19)	0.046*** (3.21)
Satsidemo	0.176*** (10.76)	0.176*** (11.71)	0.171*** (11.80)	0.173*** (12.42)
Economy	0.082*** (4.52)	0.082*** (4.55)	0.085*** (4.81)	0.086*** (5.11)
Interpersonaltrust	0.214*** (14.22)	0.213*** (15.27)	0.216*** (16.07)	0.215*** (16.13)
MemberVolu	-0.001 (-0.06)	-0.001 (-0.07)	0.001 (0.17)	0.001 (0.15)
State legitimacy	0.085*** (6.45)	0.085*** (6.44)	0.086*** (6.49)	0.087*** (6.56)
Election Quality	0.144*** (12.29)	0.144*** (11.93)	0.139*** (10.55)	0.139*** (10.50)
Polyarchy		-0.000 (-0.05)		-0.003 (-0.47)
HDI			0.237 (1.07)	0.300 (1.35)
Constant	-0.352*** (-4.27)	-0.349*** (-3.24)	-0.440*** (-4.29)	-0.430*** (-3.86)
Observations	16,018	16,018	16,018	16,018
R-squared	0.300	0.300	0.302	0.302

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

Note: ***significance at 0.01; ** significance at 0.05; *significance at 0.1

a. Dummy. Reference category: Gender female

b. Dummy. Reference category: Urban resident

c. Dummy. Reference category; non democratic government can be preferable/it does not matter

¹⁴The corruption variables are excluded from this table because of high number of missing cases which reduces the number of observation by almost 50% making it difficult to rely on that low number of cases for analysis. Since the results don't change very much with the inclusion of corruption, I have included it in table so and so in Appendix 1. The analysis on corruption is therefore based on table 1.

4.4 OLS- Regression Analysis of Traditional Political Trust

In trying to find out the effects of the independent variables on traditional political trust, I must remind you that this is based on the fact that modern political and trust in traditional political trust are correlated, that is either of them has a relationship with each other or they are both an outcome of a third variable(s). Again, the finding of previous research (Logan, 2011) is that both trusts move in the same direction: they rise and fall together. Based on these reasons, I speculated that both are outcome of a third variable(s) and I therefore proceed to test the same set of variables on traditional political trust as I did with modern political trust above.

4.4.1. Micro Variables

Both indicators of democratic attitude that is support for democracy and the rejection of authoritarian alternatives to democracy are unrelated to traditional political trust. What this means for the first indicator is that in terms of traditional political trust there is no difference between those expressing support democracy for as the preferred system of government and those who said that the system of government does not matter or that sometimes non-democratic system can be preferable. As for the second indicator of democratic attitude, even when one openly rejects any form of an authoritarian alternative to democracy, it still does not affect his trust in traditional political institutions.

Satisfaction with the way democracy works is statistically significant and positively associated with traditional political trust and it is also the same for modern political trust. This therefore means that those satisfied with the way democracy works have higher trust in both modern and political traditional institutions. This means that the relationship in model 2 above is not spurious because it still stands even when I control for other variables.

Satisfaction with economic condition of a country is unrelated to trust in traditional political institutions. This is in contrast with the case of trust in modern political institutions. This is perhaps in recognition of the fact that the management of an economy and the control of national resource is to a large extent not within the jurisdiction of traditional authority.

Social capital which is measured with interpersonal trust and membership of a voluntary association has the same effect on both trusts in modern and traditional political Institutions. It is remarkable that just as it is only interpersonal trust that is statistically significant with a rather strong coefficient in relation to modern political trust, the same can be observed for traditional political trust. Again, membership of voluntary association has no relationship with traditional political trust as it did not with modern political trust but the only difference is that the coefficient is positive here but it was negative in the case of modern political trust.

Perception of state legitimacy is very significant and it has strong positive effect on trust in traditional political institutions. The more legitimate a state is perceived to be, the higher the trust in its traditional political institutions and this finding was observed with modern political institutions as well.

Whether elections in a country are perceived by the citizens to be free and fair or not, it has no bearing on their level of traditional political trust. In other words, the quality of elections has no effect on trust in traditional political as compared to the case of modern political trust where the quality of election has significant effect. After all, traditional authorities do not come into office through elections and therefore this result is quite understandable.

Perception of corruption and experienced with corruption are negatively correlated with traditional political trust but only perception of corruption is statistically significant with strong coefficients (See appendix II). Experienced with corruption becomes significant only when the indicator of perception of corruption is dropped (results not shown) but even in that instance, it is only significant at 0.1.

4.4.2 Macro Variables

In order to put individual attitudes into context and since we already know that context do matter in shaping attitudes, I introduce two contextual factors to assess their effects on attitudes towards traditional political trust.

Both level of democracy and state capacity are unrelated to traditional political trust because their coefficients are not statistically significant. This result conforms to the one that I had reported earlier in the bivariate analysis in model 1 and 2 above.

Indeed the macro variables have not in any way been able to predict trust in traditional political institutions because F-test for model 7 is statistically significant, which means the model is statistically significant. Approximately, 10.9% of the variance in traditional political trust is accounted for by model 7, without the inclusion of the macro variables.

4.4.3 Control Variables

As it can be seen from the Table 4.4 below, age and gender male are not statistically significant do not affect trust in traditional political institutions. As with the case of modern political institutions, the bivariate relationship between age and trust in traditional political institutions is spurious. Rural dwellers have higher traditional political institutions than their urban counterparts. Level of education is significantly but negatively associated with trust in traditional political institutions. Just as witnessed for modern political trust, educated people are equally very critical in their assessment of traditional political institutions.

Table 4.4: Multivariate Analysis of Traditional Political Trust

Independent Variables	(Model7) Traditional Political Trust	(Model 8) Traditional Political Trust	(Model 9) Traditional Political Trust	(model 10) Traditional Political Trust
Age	-0.000 (-0.21)	-0.001 (-0.56)	-0.000 (-0.29)	-0.001 (-0.50)
Gender male ^a	-0.021 (-0.76)	-0.012 (-0.46)	-0.020 (-0.78)	-0.014 (-0.56)
Rural Resident ^b	0.251*** (2.93)	0.266*** (3.39)	0.252*** (2.95)	0.266*** (3.42)
Level of educ	-0.105*** (-5.11)	-0.106*** (-4.69)	-0.106*** (-6.33)	-0.104*** (-5.39)
Support for demo ^c	-0.031 (-0.76)	-0.021 (-0.51)	-0.032 (-0.78)	-0.017 (-0.42)
Reject Authocracy	-0.008 (-0.26)	0.007 (0.22)	-0.008 (-0.27)	0.009 (0.30)
Satisdemo	0.143*** (5.02)	0.126*** (4.83)	0.142*** (5.90)	0.129*** (5.44)
Economy	0.062 (1.44)	0.061 (1.54)	0.063 (1.56)	0.056 (1.60)
Interpersonaltrust	0.305*** (6.37)	0.319*** (8.40)	0.306*** (6.22)	0.317*** (7.86)
MemberVolu	0.001 (0.05)	0.004 (0.20)	0.002 (0.08)	0.003 (0.15)
State legitimacy	0.115*** (4.81)	0.111*** (4.97)	0.115*** (4.80)	0.111*** (4.94)
Election Quality	0.053 (1.43)	0.047 (1.43)	0.051 (1.53)	0.052 (1.74)
Polyarchy		0.018 (1.26)		0.020 (1.22)
HDI			0.082 (0.16)	-0.237 (-0.40)
Constant	2.083*** (7.15)	1.905*** (5.41)	2.052*** (4.97)	1.973*** (4.64)
Observations	17,503	17,503	17,503	17,503
R-squared	0.109	0.113	0.109	0.113

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

Note: ***significant at 0.01: ** significant at 0.05: * significant at 0.1

a. Dummy. Reference category: Gender female

b. Dummy. Reference category: Urban Resident

c. Dummy. Reference category: non democratic government can be preferable/it does not matter

Table 4.5: Summary of Results

Hypothesis	Modern Political Trust	Traditional Political Trust
Hypothesis 1 Support for Democracy Rejection of Authoritarian Alternatives	Not Significant Significant/Supported	Not Significant Not significant
Hypothesis 2 Satisfaction with Democracy	Significant/supported	Significant/Supported
Hypothesis 3 Satisfaction with Economic Condition	Significant/supported	Not Significant
Hypothesis 4 Interpersonal Trust Membership of a voluntary Association	Significant/supported Not Significant	Significant Not Significant
Hypothesis 5 Perception State Legitimacy	Significant/supported	Significant/supported
Hypothesis 6 Perception of Corruption Experienced of Corruption	Significant/Supported Not Significant	Significant/Supported Not Significant
Hypothesis 7 Perception of Quality of Election	Significant/supported	Not Significant
Hypothesis 8 Level of Democracy	Not Significant	Not Significant
Hypothesis 9 State Capacity	Not Significant	Not Significant

Chapter 5

5.1 Discussion and Conclusion

In the previous chapter, we saw the results from the analysis. The discussion in this chapter is concerned with the interpretation of the findings in the light of the theories that provide the framework for this study. It is also concerned with the way the results answer the main research question. I have been very much interested in the following: first, which factors affect modern and traditional political institutions? Second, do these set of factors affect modern and traditional political trust in the same way or are there differences in the way these factors affect both institutions? Third, which of the modern political institutions are winner in terms of trust and which ones are losers? Finally, how do the modern political institutions compared with traditional political institutions in terms of trust? I will end the discussion with conclusion and reflections.

5.2 Main Findings

5.2.1 Micro Variables

Some of the main findings from the analysis in the previous chapter are that, there are micro variables that affect both modern and traditional political trust and these variables are as follows:

As far as social capital is concerned, interpersonal trust is positively related to modern political trust. This finding is consistent with the one by Kuenzi (2008) in his studies on Ghana and Nigeria. What is however surprising is the positive relationship between interpersonal trust and traditional political trust. The theoretical framework for including these variables is the concept of social capital. What does this finding mean for the concept of social capital? The argument has been that social capital enhances cooperation by facilitating coordinated actions because as people meet and interact with one another; they learn to trust each other (Putnam, 1993). Within the context of Africa, high interpersonal trust should lead to trust in a wide-range of group of people including trust in institution of state but low interpersonal trust limits one's trust in a tight-knit community and therefore to only one's traditional authority. Interpersonal trust is therefore supposed to lead to higher modern political trust and lower traditional political trust. This is because if one has a low social capital, one limits one's trust to only one's ethnic group and the traditional political institution

that represents that ethnic group. But a person with high interpersonal trust will trust other people and institutions that go beyond his ethnic group and those institutions will obviously be the institutions at the state level. But this has not been the case and therefore the result of this study does not support the assertion by Knack and Keefer (1995) that high social capital should lead to associational life, increased trust and civic culture which should reduce sentimental attachment to tradition. On the other hand, this study revealed that at even those with high interpersonal trust, have higher trust in traditional political institutions. The implication of this is that those with higher interpersonal trust have positive evaluation of leadership in general. This is because they have favorable disposition towards other people and society in general.

Membership of voluntary organization is unrelated to both modern and traditional political trust. This strengthens the argument of Newton (2007) that membership of voluntary association has no effect on political trust. The finding is however paradoxical because the ethos underlying membership of voluntary association is nearly the same as what is needed for political organization. It is therefore quiet surprising that membership of voluntary association is not in any way related to especially modern political trust and also traditional political trust.

My finding regarding perception of state legitimacy is that there is a strong relationship between state legitimacy and trust in both modern and traditional political institutions. Many analysts of traditional political institutions have largely attributed the continued existence of traditional political institution to the inability of African state to build their own base of legitimacy. The African states are assumed to be in constant competition and in conflict with traditional political institutions. According to Englebert (2000b), the low levels of state legitimacy of many countries in Africa stems from the incongruity between its pre-colonial structures and the post-colonial state and institutions of such states and it is this incongruity that is hampering development and economic growth on the continent. On the contrary, my findings here rather support the point that legitimacy is not a zero-sum game and that legitimacy of modern states and their institutions and that of traditional political institutions are mutually reinforcing. The point has been made by Logan (2011) that “if the state is perceived as legitimate, then all of the leaders in it - even traditional leaders who may have a purely informal role - are also perceived as more legitimate, and states likewise benefit from the legitimacy of traditional leaders” (Logan, 2002: 17). The states benefitting from

traditional leaders might be as a result of the fact that the modern state having realized that it could not exercise control over scarcely populated areas within their post-colonial boundaries and the lack of capacity to displace traditional authorities, chose to empower and cooperate with them (Herbst, 2000). As a result of this, both modern and traditional political institutions are seen as different sides of the same coin. But Herbst's might be one of the reasons but it may not be the case for all African countries given the animosity that existed between many independent African leaders and some powerful kingdom within their boundaries. For instance, Milton Obote of Uganda and the Buganda Kingdom (Englebert, 2002), Convention People's Party of Kwame Nkrumah and traditional leaders in Ghana (Rathbone, 2000), and Frelimo and traditional leaders in Mozambique (Buur and Kyed, 2006).

I am therefore of the view that the critical factor that underlies the rise of and fall of both modern and traditional political trust is perception of state legitimacy. A well constituted state in Africa with a very sound and robust legitimacy creates the necessary ambiance for both elected political leaders and hereditary traditional political institutions to function effectively and efficiently to the benefit of the citizenry and therefore their respective legitimacy reinforce each other.

My finding relative to the effect of democratic attitudes on modern and traditional political trust is mixed. We have already seen that support for democracy has no effect on both modern and traditional political trust. The implication of this is that in terms of political trust, there is no difference between those who sees democracy as the only preferred system of government and those who are willing to tolerate non-democratic system of government at some point in time. However, the other indicator of democratic attitude, which is rejection of all forms authoritarian alternatives to democracy, has a strong and positive relationship with modern political trust but it is unrelated to traditional political trust. What this means is that those who reject any form of authoritarian alternative to democracy have a higher trust in modern political institutions but are neither more nor less likely to have positive evaluation of traditional political institutions. Apparently, their disdain for other form of authoritarian alternatives such as presidential dictatorship, military rule and one party state does not extend to traditional political institutions and therefore it is unrelated to their trust in traditional political institutions. This confirms the point that has been made by Ayittey (1991) that Africans see the traditional political institution to be democratic in its peculiar way. Ayittey had challenged the view by Mandani (1996) that traditional leaders are local despots. But the

fact that people reject authoritarian alternatives but not traditional leadership is a confirmation of Ayittey's assertion.

Satisfaction with democracy is positively associated with both modern and traditional political trust and this conforms to the findings by Hutchison and Johnson (2011). The issue of satisfaction with democracy and its positive association with both modern and traditional political trust could be linked with the concept of legitimacy discussed above. It relates to the issue of governance and therefore if democracy works well, it opens up the political space for other forms of leadership to equally flourish.

Satisfaction with economic condition of a country is positively associated with modern political trust and this fact is well established in the trust literature. It is however unrelated to traditional political trust and this is understandable because policies and programs that lead to improved standard of living and improvement in the economic condition of a country are not in the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. Much as I agree with Linz and Stepan (1996) about the critical role of political goods in shaping modern political trust, this finding suggests that ultimately, economic goods will also matter for Africans when they are evaluating the performance of the modern political institutions. Although satisfaction with the economic condition does not affect traditional political trust, in certain parts of African however, there is evidence to suggest that government has ceded control of lands, an important resource, to traditional authority (Baldwin, 2011). As people in the rural areas depend on land for farming and other economic activities, it would be interesting to see how a question of economic condition which is related to access to land would affect traditional political trust.

Perception of corruption has a negative effect on both modern and traditional political trust and its negative effect is equally strong on both institutions. Corruption is therefore some sort of capsized ship that will sink all leadership in a country, whether they are traditional or modern. Logan (2011) has made the point that the integration of traditional leaders into the political system will enhance the legitimacy of the system but it will undermine the position of traditional leadership because they will suffer from the potential exposure to corruption and rent-seeking opportunities. However, the fact that perception of corruption negatively affects both modern and traditional political trust but experienced with corruption is unrelated to both modern and traditional political trust, there is the need to also revisit the grease the wheel theory and its implication on this findings. This findings support both the view of the proponent of grease the wheel theory (see Leff, 1964: Barley, 1967 and Nye, 1967) and

opponents of the theory (see Seligson, 2002: Anderson and Tverdova, 2003: Cho and Kirwin 2007). This is because, experienced with corruption such as paying money to avoid problem with the police, to get water and sanitation services or to secure a document or permit is seen as a normal routine once it gets things done. But the perception that there is corruption among high profile public officials rather negatively affects trust in both modern and traditional political institutions. What this implies is that there is the need to differentiate between different levels of corruption and how they affect political trust general.

We have seen that the quality of national election of a country have a strong effect on modern political trust but not so with traditional political trust. In a democratic dispensation, election is one of the means through which public officials are recruited into public office. Citizens' perception of the quality of elections is therefore very crucial because it also bothers on the legitimacy of elected public officials. Consistent with the findings by Alemika (2007), I found that there was a significant relationship between citizens' evaluation of the quality of their national elections and their trust in modern political institutions. However, there is no relationship between citizens' evaluation of national election and trust in traditional political institutions. This finding is very important because election is one of the most defining differences between modern and traditional political institutions. Whilst political institutions are occupied through elections or appointment by elected representatives and can be occupied by any citizen within the confines of the law, the traditional political institutions are hereditary and can only be occupied by people from a particular family. This finding on the effect of the perception of the quality of election on modern and traditional political institutions lend credence to the fact that the findings in this study is a reflection of a real variance in the answers of the respondents because they did not just "say yes" to all questions but were mindful and critical of the answers they provided to the questions.

5.2.2 Macro Variables

Level of democracy as captured by Vanhanen's Polyarchy index has been a poor predictor of both modern and traditional political trust. This finding however runs counter to the democratic theory which states that individuals have more trust in government and invariably in modern political institutions that are more democratic because they operate under the confines of rule of law, are responsive to the needs of the people and generally are more accountable to the people (Newton, 2007). The implication of this finding is that individuals do not care about the nature of the political system but what it does. I have however, already

pointed out that the validity of polyarchy as a measure of level of democracy as far as Africa is concerned may not be comprehensive because it does not capture the essential ingredient of democracy which is very germane to Africa. Political goods such as human rights, rule of law, protection of political and civil liberties are not included in the Polyarchy. The findings in this study might therefore be as results of the problem of validity of Polyarchy as a measure of the level of democracy in Africa. To improve the utility of Polyarchy in studies concerning Africa, I would suggest that the index should take into consideration indicators of human rights, civil and political liberties. It is not enough to say that the current indicators of Polyarchy, that is competition and participation measures civil and political liberties indirectly.

Strong states are supposed to be efficient and capable of delivering service to its people and should therefore engender higher modern political trust (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011). The finding on the relationship between state capacity and modern political trust is quite surprising but it might be with the problem of measurement. Although a country's performance on the human development index is an indication of how effective the state is in delivering social and economic services to its people, it might nevertheless not be a measure of state capacity. May be another measure of state capacity could have produced a different result.

On the other hand, state failure and weakness was assumed to lead to the rise of traditional political institutions to feel the vacuum created by the absence of an effective state and its institutions. When the state is weak and dysfunctional, the traditional political institutions must enjoy higher trust because they face no competition from the weak state. This has however not been the case as state capacity is unrelated to traditional political trust. The relationship between state capacity and traditional political trust is also very interesting. The initial suggestion has been that in a weak state, traditional political institutions will enjoy higher trust because they will be the only institutions that will be providing for the needs of the people in the absence or in the face of a dysfunctional state. However, where the state is very strong, trust in traditional institutions should be low. According to Englebert (2002b), this has not been the case but what has rather occurred in Africa is what he referred to as "the paradox of state strength". Englebert observed that in places where the states have completely collapsed during the period of civil wars, traditional political structures appear to have vanished completely. The notable exception has been in Somalia and in Sierra Leone. In Somalia, the clan has become the mainstay of political organization in the absence of the

state. During the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone and following the invasion of the country by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels led by Foday Sanko, a traditional leader known as Chief Sam Hinga Norman formed a group known as Traditional Civil Defense Forces. The formation of this group which was popularly called Kamajors was according to that traditional leader to protect his people and then help the government to fight against the rebel invasion (Englebert, 2002b). Apart from these notable exceptions, in many places in Africa, the collapse of the state has been the collapse of other forms of traditional political formations. Traditional political institutions have been revived in relatively stronger states in Africa. For instance, the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda, the Ashanti and other kingdoms in Ghana and the formation of Association of Traditional Leaders in South Africa play critical role in the governance of the country (Englebert, 2002b). These days in Ghana, almost every traditional leader is trying to compliment the effort of central government by establishing educational funds to sponsor brilliant but needy students. Traditional leaders also organized fundraising ceremonies during Easter holidays to raise funds to embark upon development projects. To add to this, traditional leaders travel to Europe and America to meet investors in order to encourage them to come and invest in their communities.

5.2.3 Control Variables

My findings on the socio-demographic variables indicate that both age and gender do not have any effect on trust in modern and traditional political institutions. Rural dwellers have higher trust in modern and traditional political institutions than urban dwellers. Education is very significant but negatively affects trust in both modern and traditional political institutions. Although women are supposed to be critical of traditional political institutions because of its patriarchal nature, unfortunately, they are not.

What does this finding mean for modernization theory in relation to traditional political trust? Modernization theory states that younger, more educated and urbanized individuals are more likely to view traditional institutions as anachronistic, vestiges of colonialism and not relevant in modern democratic era. Although modernization theory somehow finds support but support would only stand if there is a revision of that theory to exclude age because age does not matter as far as trust in traditional political institutions is concerned. Again, if modernization theory had hoped that withdrawal of trust from traditional political institutions will inure to the benefit of modern political institutions, then it will be disappointed. This is because, the

most important component of the theory, education, affect modern political trust in a negative way as it does to traditional political institutions.

In relation to modern political institutions, the idea by Seligson (2002) that younger people would be more trusting because their experience with those political institutions are recent and that they have not yet accumulated years of disappointment with the political system is also not accurate as age did not matter for trust in modern political institutions.

But why are educated people critical of all political institutions and rural dwellers favorably disposed to all political institutions? The solution might lie with the relative deprivation theory, defined as an individual frustration produced by negative comparison within a reference group (Coleman, 2000 cited in Stewart, 2006). Educated people generally have high expectation which is normally very difficult to be fulfilled and any slight deterioration in their privileged status is normally met stiff resistance. Rural dwellers on the other hand have low expectation, are very close to traditional political institutions but far removed from modern political institutions.

Finally, which of the modern political institutions are winners in terms of trust and which ones are losers? The answer to this question can be found in table 4.1 in Chapter 4. Overall, we see the executive arm of government or the President (sometimes the Prime Minister) appears to be riding high in terms of trust. Almost 63% of respondents in Africa have expressed high level of trust in the president with a mean score of 1.86. The Courts of law is in the second position and this is an indication that the courts are exerting their independent and citizens are very confident that justice will be done without fear or favor. Parliament/National Assembly, an institution which is the heartbeat of democracy is in third position. The National Electoral Commission, Elected Local Government officials and the Ruling Party are the fourth trusted modern political institutions Africa. The losers are the Police and Opposition Parties. The traditional political institutions are however the most trusted of all these institutions, an indication of the reverence and respect Africans have in their own indigenous institution.

From the above discussions of the findings so far, it is clear that much as there are some variables that effect both modern and traditional political institutions, they do not however affect them in the same way. Moreover, the magnitudes of the effect are equally not the same. For instance, whereas the independent variables can explain about 30% of the variation in

modern political trust (models 3 to 6), it only account for about 11% of the variation in traditional political trust (models 7 to 10). This is an indication that the independent variables have much more effect on modern political institutions than on traditional political institutions.

5.3 Conclusions and Reflections

My main aim in this thesis has been first, to find out which factors affect modern and traditional political institutions? Second, do these set of factors affect modern and traditional political trust in the same way or are there any differences in the way these factors affect both institutions? Third, which of the modern political institutions are winners in terms of trust and which ones are losers? Finally, how do the modern political institutions compared with traditional political institutions in terms of trust? Using Ordinary Least Square regression analysis, and with a set of micro and macro variables, I found out that some of the variables tested seem to have influence on trust in modern and traditional political institutions but some of the variables do not.

Among the individual level factors which seem to positively influence both institutions in the same way include perception of state legitimacy, satisfaction with democracy and interpersonal trust. Perception of corruption affects trust in both modern and traditional political institutions but in a negative way. As far as I am concerned, perception of state legitimacy is the central theory that explains why trust in modern and traditional political institutions move in the same direction.

Other factors unrelated to both modern and traditional political trust include support for democracy, membership of voluntary organization and experienced with corruption.

Perception of the economic condition of a country and the perception of the quality of election and rejection of all forms of authoritarian alternatives to democracy affect trust in modern political institutions but are not related to trust in traditional political institutions.

At the macro level, state capacity and level of democracy in a country are both unrelated to and do not have any influence on modern and traditional political trust. Therefore, I did not find support for democratic theory.

Among the socio-demographic variables, education is the most critical factor negatively influencing both modern and traditional political trust. Age and gender are unrelated to trust

in modern and traditional political institutions. Rural dwellers are however, more trusting of both modern and traditional political institutions. The relative deprivation theory is strengthened but modernization theory needs some form of revision.

However, the same sets of variables do not have the same effect on both modern and traditional political trust. Whereas these same set of variables account for about 30% of the variation in modern political trust, they only account for 11% variance in traditional political trust. This is however understandable given the fact that most of these variables are variables that have sound theories in relation to modern political trust but have only been tested on traditional political trust because of the correlation that exists between the two institutions. The modest contribution of these models means that there are so many explanations for the rise and fall of both modern and traditional political institutions that this study has not been able account for. In other words we know less about the factors that affect traditional political trust than modern political trust. Williams (2010) has pointed to the role of traditional leaders as the embodiment of the community, the custodian of culture and identity and the symbol of enduring community as some of the reasons why people want the institution to continue to exist. But exactly how this can be tested empirically is a challenge that future research should try to explore.

But let me point out that the outcome of this study might have been influenced by several factors.

First, empirical research on traditional political trust and trust in traditional political institutions are few and therefore there is paucity of literature available on which this study can rely on. However, literature on the post-colonial state in Africa, the role of the modern political institutions and development in Africa can be a good starting point. Qualitative studies focusing on specific traditional leaders in Africa are also indispensable for deriving of theories. Second, although the variables I have included in this study are very important in determining political trust, it is possible that I might not have identified the most important factors. Again, the fewer number of countries in this sample limit the number of macro-variables that can be included in the analysis. Given that I already pointed out that the countries in this sample are the most influential, prosperous, democratic and stable countries on the continent, the sample bias might have affected the outcome in relation to the macro variables.

Through this thesis, my aim has been to contribute to the research field of comparative trust in modern and traditional political institutions in Africa in some important ways. First, I have studied both traditional and political institutions using the same set of variables and this has enabled me to do a comparative analysis between the two. Second, I have studied both individual and state level variables making it possible to be able to see cross national differences.

However much needs to be done. First, in comparing modern and traditional political trust, future research should explore the role of recruitment into both institutions. In the past, traditional authorities were mainly composed of people who do not have any formal education and therefore competition for political power was essentially a competition between the uneducated traditional rulers and the educated elite. However, these days both modern and traditional political institutions recruit from highly educated people in the society. Again, nowadays, it is very common to have politicians and senior public officials, academics, and people with all sorts of professional backgrounds enskinned or enstooled as traditional rulers. Moreover, many traditional rulers work for international organizations, multinational corporations and government department and agencies and only visit their rural communities occasionally. How this dual role of traditional leaders and their engagement with modern political institutions affect trust in both institutions will be interesting.

Again, we must also recognize the heterogeneous nature of African societies. This means that in terms of trust in modern and traditional political institutions there can be great variation even within countries. For instance, within the same countries, some are pastoralist and others are agricultural communities, some have strong traditional political institutions which are very effective and efficient in protecting their communities whilst others do not. Therefore, a study at the sub-national level might reveal interesting findings. In this direction, future research should examine differences in level of trust in modern and traditional political institutions between politically relevant ethnic groups (Wucherpfening et al, 2011) and those who are not.

Finally, a look at the various modern political institutions revealed that the President is the most trusted of all of them and the opposition parties are least trusted institutions in Africa. Exactly why the president is the most trusted institution and the opposition parties the least trusted is not clear but my speculation is that this might be as a results of the fact the president is the focus of government and get the media spotlight more than any other institutions. The activities of the opposition parties are hardly covered especially where the state media is

controlled virtually by the executive arm of government. But media coverage too is not necessarily good especially if it is dominated by political scandals. To solve this puzzle, future research should consider the role of media exposure (at the individual level) and press freedom (at the macro level). Including the media in the analysis should help test indoctrination theory (Miller, Goldenberg and Erbring, 1979: Robinson 1976).

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Appendix 1

Multivariate analysis on Modern Political Trust including the corruption Variables

	(Model1) Modern Political Trust	(Mode 2) Modern Political Trust	(Mode 3) Modern Political Trust	(Mode 4) Modern Political Trust
Age	-0.000 (-0.65)	-0.001 (-1.00)	-0.000 (-0.67)	-0.000 (-0.89)
Gender male ^a	0.002 (0.13)	0.004 (0.27)	0.002 (0.13)	0.004 (0.24)
Rural ^b	0.099*** (5.04)	0.100*** (5.20)	0.099*** (5.02)	0.097*** (4.61)
Education	-0.014** (-2.15)	-0.017*** (-3.08)	-0.014** (-2.12)	-0.018*** (-3.16)
Supportdem ^c	0.004 (0.19)	0.000 (0.01)	0.004 (0.18)	-0.002 (-0.11)
Reject authocracy	0.070*** (5.29)	0.070*** (4.96)	0.070*** (5.83)	0.067*** (5.50)
Satisdem	0.146*** (10.98)	0.141*** (11.22)	0.146*** (11.33)	0.143*** (11.68)
Economy	0.079*** (5.60)	0.083*** (6.35)	0.079*** (5.57)	0.084*** (6.29)
Interp trust	0.191*** (16.53)	0.194*** (17.77)	0.191*** (16.19)	0.193*** (16.53)
MemberVolu	-0.003 (-0.30)	-0.002 (-0.20)	-0.003 (-0.30)	-0.002 (-0.21)
State legitimacy	0.050*** (3.86)	0.051*** (4.08)	0.050*** (3.88)	0.051*** (4.20)
Percorup	-0.306*** (-14.68)	-0.298*** (-16.65)	-0.306*** (-14.19)	-0.300*** (-15.71)
Excorup	-0.001 (-0.05)	0.005 (0.21)	-0.001 (-0.05)	0.004 (0.17)
Election quality	0.117*** (8.56)	0.113*** (7.42)	0.117*** (8.44)	0.113*** (7.41)
HDI		0.280* (1.79)		0.332* (1.78)
Polyarchy			-0.000 (-0.04)	-0.003 (-0.67)
Constant	0.399*** (4.34)	0.276** (2.75)	0.401*** (4.13)	0.289*** (3.04)
Observations	9,371	9,371	9,371	9,371
R-squared	0.373	0.375	0.373	0.375

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

Note: *** significance at 0.01; **significance at 0.05; * significance at 0.1

- Dummy. Reference category: female
- Dummy. Reference category: Urban
- Dummy. Reference category: non democratic can be preferable/ it does not matter

Appendix 2

Trust in Traditional Political Institutions Including the Corruption Variables

	(Model 5) tradtrust	(Model 6) tradtrust	(Model 7) tradtrust	(Model 8) tradtrust
Age	-0.001 (-0.50)	-0.001 (-0.68)	-0.001 (-0.80)	-0.001 (-0.87)
Gender (male) ^a	0.010 (0.35)	0.013 (0.45)	0.013 (0.47)	0.014 (0.51)
Rural ^b	0.281*** (3.69)	0.283*** (3.72)	0.290*** (4.02)	0.289*** (4.07)
Education	-0.089*** (-3.53)	-0.093*** (-4.23)	-0.090*** (-3.48)	-0.093*** (-4.01)
Supportdem ^c	-0.118** (-2.59)	-0.122** (-2.84)	-0.112** (-2.29)	-0.117** (-2.46)
Reject authocracy	0.013 (0.37)	0.013 (0.36)	0.022 (0.55)	0.019 (0.48)
Satisdem	0.129*** (4.32)	0.123*** (4.41)	0.120*** (4.23)	0.118*** (4.30)
Economy	0.049 (1.28)	0.055 (1.50)	0.049 (1.29)	0.053 (1.51)
Interp trust	0.294*** (6.83)	0.300*** (6.74)	0.300*** (8.33)	0.303*** (7.81)
MemverVolu	0.003 (0.10)	0.004 (0.17)	0.004 (0.15)	0.005 (0.19)
State legitimacy	0.101*** (4.03)	0.103*** (4.11)	0.101*** (4.03)	0.102*** (4.22)
Percorup	-0.378*** (-6.52)	-0.368*** (-7.31)	-0.370*** (-6.30)	-0.365*** (-6.94)
Excorup	-0.065 (-1.13)	-0.056 (-1.03)	-0.058 (-1.01)	-0.053 (-0.98)
Election quality	0.014 (0.46)	0.009 (0.30)	0.012 (0.39)	0.009 (0.30)
HDI		0.386 (0.92)		0.266 (0.48)
Polyarchy			0.009 (0.67)	0.007 (0.41)
Constant	2.765*** (10.01)	2.592*** (7.31)	2.655*** (7.19)	2.564*** (6.76)
Observations	9,961	9,961	9,961	9,961
R-squared	0.142	0.143	0.143	0.143

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

Note: *** significance at 0.01; ** significance at 0.05; * significance at 0.1

a. Dummy. Reference category: female

b. Dummy. Reference category: Urban

c. Dummy. Reference category: non democratic can be preferable/ it does not matter