

Andreas Bruvik Westberg

The Lootable Resource on Africa's Horn:

Why are there no pirates in
Northwest Somalia?
And why are they everywhere else?

Master's thesis in Political Science

Trondheim, Spring 2011



The *lootable resource* on Africa's Horn

Why are there no pirates in Northwest Somalia?
And why are they everywhere else?

**Andreas Bruvik Westberg
Spring 2011**

Master's thesis in Political Science
Department of Sociology and Political Science (ISS)
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Abstract: *In this thesis I wish to examine the underlying mechanisms that caused the onset of piracy in Somalia. Since the 1990s piracy has spread like wildfire from the Northeast of Somalia and Southwards. Yet it has failed to take root in the Northwest. Why are there no pirates there? And why are they everywhere else? To explain the onset of piracy I introduce conflict study literature on lootable resources and actors in conflict. I propose that the concepts of lootability and obstructability enable us to understand why, when and how individuals and groups decide to violently appropriate international shipping. The presence of weak institutional authority, economic marginalization and a heavy reliance on artisanal fishing appear to be important contributors to the presence of piracy. My main conclusion is, furthermore, that while the precise activity of hunting down and hijacking is a new phenomenon, the activity of looting international shipping and demanding ransom is no stranger to the shores of the Northeast.*

Acknowledgements

I wish to extend a profound gratitude to my supervisor Nils Petter Gleditsch for his patience and timely, mind-reading abilities. A special appreciation goes to “The Row” at Room 9453: Dženana Besic for her ability to inject me with oxygen when needed and the ability to listen to my ceaseless ramblings, Ådne Naper for countless stimulating discussions on the study of conflict, the conflict of studies and the conflicts of studying, Gina Olafsson for her excellent coffee taste and infectious humour, and Jonas Ramberg for the audacity of always being a week in front of the rest of us! I thank all of you for two very rewarding years in my MA studies. I am grateful to my three sisters and parents for their encouragement and support. Lastly I would like to send my eternal admiration to my four grandparents, Haakon, Ingeborg, Johannes and Viktoria, for their sense of righteousness and fortitude.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	iii
1.0 Introduction.....	1
2.0 The literature on piracy in Somalia	3
3.0 Theory: <i>The political economy of piracy</i>	5
3.1 Need, greed and grievance: <i>The onset of rebellion</i>	5
3.2 The primacy of resources: <i>Scarcity versus abundance</i>	8
3.3 The social contract	11
3.4 Lootability and obstructability	14
3.4.1 H1: <i>Lootability favors poverty</i>	16
3.4.2 H2: <i>Obstructability favors intensity and duration</i>	17
3.4.3 H3: <i>Illegality favors rebels</i>	18
4.0 Method.....	19
4.1 The comparative case study	19
4.2 Proxying governance.....	21
5.0 Data.....	23
5.1 International shipping: <i>An obstructable resource</i>	23
5.1.1 Resource choke sectors.....	23
5.1.2 Distance from resource choke sector.....	24
5.1.3 Mean wind speed level	25
5.1.4 Proximity of legal structures.....	26
5.1.5 Density of ships	27
5.2 Data on piracy attacks	28
6.0 Analysis: Understanding piracy through lootability.....	29
6.1 Fragmentation: Somaliland’s unity, Puntland’s marginalization.....	32
6.1.1 Somaliland’s unity.....	32
6.1.2 Puntland’s marginalization	36
6.2 The political economy of Northern Somalia.....	40
6.2.1 The Northwest: <i>Insulated, but not marginalized</i>	40
6.2.2 The Northeast: <i>Self-destruction</i>	42
6.3 Puntland’s marine Mecca.....	46
6.3.1 The coast is closed	46

6.3.2	Artisanal fishing in the Democratic Republic of Somalia.....	48
6.4	The merits of <i>lootability</i> and <i>obstructability</i>	50
7.0	Conclusion.....	54
8.0	Bibliography.....	56
9.0	Appendix I: <i>Somalia's social contract</i>	64
10.0	Appendix II: <i>Clans and institutions of Northeast Somalia</i>	67
11.0	Appendix III: <i>Clans and institutions of Northwest Somalia</i>	70
12.0	Appendix IV: <i>Figures and tables</i>	72
13.0	Appendix V: <i>Six towns on the Northern coast</i>	86

1.0 Introduction

Somalia's civil war, now having lasted a full 20 years since the fall of General Muhammad Siyaad Barre's regime on January 26th 1991, has torn the country apart through insurgency, warlordism, inter-clan fighting, Islamic jihadists and foreign intervention (Hesse 2010b: 247). As Barre's regime fell so did the Somali central government, and with it the country's institutions. The territory of Somalia has been left ravaged by the whims of near-anarchy and statelessness. What has followed has been widespread displacement of large sections of the population, a substantial exodus and a humanitarian crisis unparalleled in its longevity on the African continent. After two decades there have been fourteen failed attempts at producing a unified, national government for the former republic.

In the mid-1990s *piracy* first appeared on the horizon, a few years after the dissolution of the central state. As the state institutions of the Democratic Republic of Somalia fell apart, so did the country's Westphalian sovereignty and with it the coast guard and its control over Somalia's territorial waters. This period saw the increased presence of foreign, industrial-scale fishing trawlers in Somali waters¹, leading local fishermen to engage in deterrence and retribution to protect their fish stocks and economic livelihood (Pham 2010: 331). Yet equally it seems that the presence of foreign trawlers off Somalia's coast spurred on an 'economy of looting'. In the course of a decade some Somali fishermen had joined forces with their local populations, and increasingly begun to shift their activity from merely deterring the trawlers; to boarding, attacking and hijacking them. In this way a full-scale piracy has blossomed in Somalia.

In this thesis I wish to examine the underlying mechanisms that caused the onset of piracy in the middle of the last decade. Why are some parts of Somalia full of pirates, while others are not? What explains the absence of piracy in the Northwest, but its presence in the Northeast? To fundamentally understand piracy we need to use concise language and frame its mechanisms so that its nature is not detached from the wider civil war in Somalia, the illegal fishing off the Somali coast or the socioeconomic disaster that permeates Somalia's population: for they are heavily intertwined. To concisely address the nature of Somalia's piracy this paper wishes to introduce a portion of political science and economic literature that deals with *lootable resources* and their relation to actors in an 'anarchic' natural economy of conflict. Need, greed and grievance details the motivation and opportunity of *rebellion*. I posit that recruitment to *piracy* follows similar mechanisms. When individuals decide to engage in piracy their decision to do so

¹ Operating inside Somalia's Exclusive Economic Zone (200 nautical miles from the coastline)

can be explained through the concepts of *lootability* and *obstructability* of a resource. I propose that these two concepts capture not only the economy of opportunistic greed, but also the grievance of deprivation and the need of desperation. With this literature I aim to shed light on why some population centers have piracy and some don't.

The thesis is structured as follows. In **Chapter 2.0** I provide a brief overview of sections of the growing literature on piracy in Somalia. **Chapter 3.0** details the political science and political economy literature on rebels and resources. **Chapter 4.0** introduces the qualitative case study methodology, while **Chapter 5.0** defines obstructability and international shipping as a lootable resource. In **Chapter 6.0** I analyze three propositions on the absence and presence of piracy in Northwest and Northeast Somalia. The analysis discusses the role of tribal institutions, economic marginalization of the coast and the underdevelopment of Somalia's artisanal fisheries. **Chapter 7.0** concludes the thesis, and points out potential areas of future research. Additionally further overview and analysis, and a range of figures and tables can be found in **Appendix I, II, III, IV and V**.

I find that the concept of lootability enables us to understand when circumstances are prone to lead to violent appropriation of a resource, and obstructability provides a measure of where we should expect piratical attacks to happen. At the crux of high lootability and high obstructability we find a potent mix underlining why some population centers encounter a lowered cost of transforming into a piratical enterprise compared to others. I put forward three propositions on the presence or absence of piracy: *institutional authority*, *economic marginalization* and *artisanal fisheries*. I find that the absence of piracy in Northwest Somalia is largely explained by the presence of (tribal) institutional authority built on a social contract intimately tied to coastal population centers. My proposition was that this cost is particularly low in population centers heavily reliant on artisanal fishing due to the unique properties of most coastal fisheries as immobile sectors that are inherently specialized in maritime activities. However I came across a finding which I did not expect and which, to my knowledge, has not been given much attention in the current literature on piracy. What is unique about the Northeast is that the lowered social cost of engaging in piracy cannot be solely attributed to the presence of civil war and social disintegration. My claim is that this is historical baggage. While the precise activity of hunting down and hijacking international shipping is a recent phenomenon in Somalia, the activity of *looting* international shipping is historical and no stranger to the shores of the Northeast. I find that the introduction of lootability and obstructability captures this relationship. While the currently unfolding activities offshore are acts of piracy, they are only an extension of the historical practice of violently appropriating a societally defined lootable resource.

2.0 The literature on piracy in Somalia

So far, focus on a centralized solution has limited the international fleets' access to information from onshore sources. It has also limited the international fleets' ability to cooperate with entities that de-facto hold power close to the pirate bases. This approach is reminiscent of an attempt to control crime in London by patrolling the streets of Warzawa. In short, relevance is lacking.

- Stig Jarle Hansen (2009)

The literature on piracy in Somalia is rich in its variation, but sometimes impoverished by its historical inaccuracy and lack of conceptual coherence. The following chapter presents a very short summary of a growing field of research.

Pham (2010) points out that Somali pirates are unique in that they do not seize international shipping to obtain its cargo for its intrinsic value, but rather for the ransoms. Pham (2010: 333) explains that the former activity would require “[...] functioning ports to offload stolen goods and the development of networks to fence them”, i.e. an infrastructure and transportation network. Pham (2010: 336) argues that the success of piracy in Somalia is due to its widespread roots in society, “[...] predicated on the co-optation of the country’s clan structure and elders”, and that a subsequent antidote is to “[...] engage the same local authorities” and give Somalis a stake “[...] in building up security along the Somali littoral²”. Weir (2009: 19-20) maintains that ‘fish, family and profit’ provide the rationale for Somalia’s piracy, and that “[...] when clashes began between local fishermen and the commercial fishing ventures, no clan interests or presumptive authority intervened to prevent uncontrolled escalation”. He argues that “[...] regardless of its present nature, large-scale and increasingly deep-ocean piracy in Somalia originated from the desire of poor communities to save their livelihoods” (Weir 2009: 24). And that accordingly the longevity of piracy is maintained by a “[...] pool of unemployed and desperate candidates ripe for recruitment” (Weir 2009: 24). In agreement, Arky (2010) explains piracy as ‘trading nets for guns’. Arky emphasizes the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. He shows how the collapse of the artisanal fishing sector produced ‘an unprecedented upsurge in piracy’. Arky’s argument is that the destruction of infrastructure and gear has a direct bearing on the presence of piracy, sufficiently lowering the opportunity cost of recruitment.

Termansen (2011: 8) argues that while lack of governance, fish poaching by Asian and European trawlers and dumping of toxic waste *may* be legitimate explanations for piracy, he emphasizes that “[...] law, order and state wide governance do not seem to be a realistic End State within the foreseeable future”. Termansen (2011: 8) points to the financial reward of hijacking ships as the reason behind piracy, and largely dismisses grievance as a claimed ‘perception’ that “[...] international fishing fleets have been stealing Somalia

marine resources”, and a post-legitimizing rather than initial reason for piracy. Ryan (2010) suggests that ‘the solution is ashore and not at sea’ and then reaches the conclusion that “[...] it is the lack of any real functioning central government on the land which allows for piracy to flourish” (Ryan 2010: 29). Pham (2009) and Murphy (2011) criticize the academic and policy-making community for assuming that state failure only may be solved by restoring collapsed state institutions.

Murphy (2011: 178) contends that Somali piracy is a “[...] rational response that satisfies an economic need by exploiting a security weakness”, arguing contrary to Termansen (2011) that “Somali piracy is not a criminal fraternity hiding in the midst of an otherwise largely law-abiding society” but that it “[...] constitutes a significant part of that society”. Pham (2009) holds that the presence of law and order varies by geography and political associations. He argues that “[...] ‘failed state’ is an accurate description for only part of the country” (Pham 2009: 86), and that there is a link between a taxable income base, accountable institutions and the absence of piracy. Hesse (2010b) seeks to demonstrate the ‘myth of Somalia’ and emphasizes the clan-based social contract which stands at odds with the modern conception of the nation-state. Hesse (2010b: 248) points to the fact that most Somalis “[...] have nearly always lived with a dizzying array of flags, but rarely united under one of their own”. Percy and Shortland (2010: i) argue that “[...] contrary to conventional wisdom, Somali piracy is likely to increase if Somalia’s domestic stability is improved” on the basis of their statistical study. They base this conclusion on an empirically suspect proxy for ‘governance’ which rests on data collected by weather stations and an ‘innovative’ concept of ‘contracting’ (Percy and Shortland 2010: 20).

Some observers describe a relationship between the pirates and international shipping that is empirically inaccurate. Ploch et al. (2009) describe a manifestly wrong timeline wherein pirates in Somalia initially attacked ships along the Eastern coast, but then shifted their focus to the Northern coast and the Gulf of Aden. In fact the first pirate attacks in Somalia were relatively balanced between the two coasts. Marchal (2011: 31) points to the contradiction in fighting piracy under the auspices of international law, when “[...] the international community would then have to consider the violations of international law perpetrated by some of its major members”. Marchal (2011: 31) points out that piracy is presented amongst policy-makers as a symptom of anarchy and ‘state collapse’, disqualifying its ‘moral economy’. He is however wrong in claiming that piracy as ‘armed robbery’ is a “[...] new phenomenon in that part of the African continent” (Marchal 2011: 34). In fact the looting of international shipping off the Horn of Africa acquired a relatively sophisticated political economy in the 19th century, as this thesis will detail.

² Littoral = the *coast* of Somalia

3.0 Theory: *The political economy of piracy*

Most economic models of civil conflict ignore politics, whereas most political scientists studying civil war ignore economic motivations

- Scott Gates (2002)

The theoretical foundations of the analysis rest on a rich literature on civil war that during the course of the last decade have spurred on a torrent of scientific discourse, and with it new terminology. It is at the cross-section of political science and economic theories that some of the most productive and revealing tools for understanding the behavior of civil war participants have appeared. A substantial section of this literature has dealt with the causes and onset of civil war. Yet the interest of this thesis lies not in the causes of Somalia's civil war, nor in the wider context of its continuation (although it is certainly a related question). Rather it is the economic behavior of the various population centers, and by extension those that began engaging in piracy, examined in the *context* of a civil war. The primary task of the paper is to understand the discrepancy between piracy on the Somali Northeast coast, and the *lack* of it on the Northwest coast. However, in answering the question the equally compelling and complementary aim is to examine the fertility of using theories on *rebel behavior* (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Addison and Murshed, 2001; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009) and *resources* (LeBillon, 2001; Ross, 2003, 2004; Lujala, 2009; Lind, Moene and Willumsen 2009) in civil war to enlighten our understanding of Somalia's piracy.

3.1 Need, greed and grievance: *The onset of rebellion*

In the seminal book on political violence, *Why Men Rebel* (1970) Ted Gurr takes issue with explanations of rebellion that focus on 'aggressive instincts' and 'conspiracy'. According to Gurr (1970: ix) "[...] men have a capacity, but not a *need* for aggression". Rather, when individuals behave aggressively they do so because this capacity has been *activated*. According to Gurr rebellion is the result of relative deprivation. So what are human beings relatively deprived of? The feeling of relative deprivation is subjective (although this does not deny the possibility of objectively measuring it) as it occurs when a human being suffers from a value *deficit* as opposed to his value *expectation* (Gurr 1970: 13). Here aspirations are pitted against achievements. The deficit vs. expectation dynamic is built around 'three needs': *welfare*, *power* and *interpersonal* values. When the fulfillment of one or more of these needs is reduced to below what the individual considers acceptable, the perception of relative deprivation is not far away (Gurr 1970: 26). Relative deprivation may also occur on a collective basis. Muller explains how the individual may seek attractive goods through group membership. When the group that the individual belongs to cannot somehow obtain this good a shared feeling of relative deprivation may develop (Muller 1980: 71-

72). An important inhibiting condition against collective and violent mobilization is ‘institutionalization’; which is the existence of moderating and stable political associations that represent more than one group. Institutionalization lowers frictions between individuals and groups by providing a nonviolent means of ‘voicing discontent’ and ameliorating relative deprivation (Oberschall 1978: 300). When value expectations are fulfilled there is an absence of political violence.

Greed’s *Homo economicus* made its mark on conflict analysis when opportunity-driven perspectives were introduced in the influential publications of Grossman (1991; 1999) and Hirshleifer (1994). The idea of economic incentives as the underlying *rationale* for engagement in conflict draws heavily on neoclassical theory of economics. The actor in neoclassical theory, when his deceptive social cloak has been revealed, is an opportunity-maximizing individual³. *Homo economicus* is he who, according to Hirshleifer (1994: 4), “[...] will lean in the direction of conflict or lean in the direction of cooperative production and exchange, whichever is more profitable on the margins”. The neoclassical perspective examines conflict through the prism of trade-off; the opportunity cost of *producing* versus that of *appropriating* (Cramer 2002: 1847). When appropriating becomes more profitable on the margin than producing, the actor has reached a point where the opportunity cost of rebelling is sufficiently low. The decision to rebel is thus an *investment*. Insurrections (and the suppression of them) are according to (Grossman 1999: 269), “[...] economic activities that compete with production and consumption for scarce resources”. What enables this shift in opportunity cost from *producing*, and to *appropriating*? Why does *Homo economicus* rebel?

In attempting to answer this question Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2004) examine the merits of *greed* versus the relative deprivation perspective of *grievance*. While *grievance* is driven by socio-psychological factors such as “[...] ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 570), *greed* is opportunity-driven, fueled by a rebel’s perceived benefits of engaging in the “[...] extortion of natural resources, [receiving] donations from diasporas, and subventions from hostile governments” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 565). Focusing on the rent-seeking behavior implicit in

³ According to Hobbes human beings will always endeavour to plot against one another. The individual is driven by an insatiable lust for personal reward, security and power (Hobbes 2008 [1651]: 83). So when one individual has more than another “[...] others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty” (Hobbes 2008 [1651]: 83). Human beings, by virtue of their self-interest, are inherently aggressive. The result is brutality and violence. However, as Lichbach (1998: ix) asks, “Why does this terrible social consequence, a war ‘of very man, against every man’, follow from the assumption of self-interest?”. The biological drives of human beings naturally result in self-interested behavior, but this does not automatically mean that self-interest invariably leads to bottomless conflict. The Hobbesian view of the relationship between individuals is problematic, argues Lichbach (1998: ix), because individual’s varying and unequal capacities and resources often leads to mutually beneficial relationships. Self-interest and group identity need not be irrational, but can be highly complementary.

greed the authors argue that natural resources such as oil, alluvial gemstones⁴ and drugs, and other agricultural commodities, provide a major economic rationale behind the outbreak of rebellion. Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 565) employ an expanded version (1960-1999) of Small and Singers' dataset on civil war (1982; 1994) to execute a large-N statistical analysis on the proxies for opportunity-driven rebellion. The authors introduce mean income *per capita*, male secondary schooling and economic growth as proxies for foregone income. An especially strong effect is found in primary commodity exports on the opportunity cost of rebelling. The extortion of primary commodities provides rent that makes "[...] rebellion feasible and perhaps even attractive" (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 588).

Yet we would distort our understanding of the decision to rebel if we presented motive and opportunity as mutually exclusive. Cramer (2002) criticizes classical economic arguments that focus on the primacy of the rational, socially aloof individual. He asks: "What is the basis for deciding that people cannot be mobilized by ideology or promises of change [...] when history and contemporary democratic politics are virtually defined by political enthusiasm for all manner of pledges despite their frequently being unfulfilled?" (Cramer 2002: 1850). According to Cramer the weakness of the opportunity-argument is that it reduces complex political and social relationships such as ethnic and religious affiliation to fixed measures such as 'ethno-linguistic fragmentation'. In examining this tendency of over-simplifying social identities Cramer (2002: 1850) asks the potent question: "Do the proxies actually measure what they purport to measure?" Proxies such as ethno-linguistic fragmentation, share of primary commodity export, and male secondary education may mask other realities than those they are meant to represent. Cramer points out that while the attractiveness of higher marginal profit may induce impoverished individuals to violently appropriate resources, this does not rule out other complementary explanations. The presence of a larger share of primary commodity export may mask stagnant economic development, poor market opportunities and last but not least grievances and need arising from the poverty caused by these realities.

Korpi (1974) emphasizes that motivation in itself is not sufficient to explain rebellion. A profound desire for change will count for little if the possibility of forcing the change is remote (Korpi 1974: 1569). Eckstein (1980: 154) observes that a question equally as important as *why* men rebel is *when* they do so. Oberschall (1978: 301) finds that the 'hardship' narrative of grievance only goes half-way in that it lacks the specificity of the actual mechanism that sparks conflict. Discontent and grievances may not be sufficient if there is no enabling environment that provides the *feasibility* of rebellion (Oberschall⁵ 1978:

⁴ Alluvial gemstones: loose, unconsolidated and non-cemented gemstones found in the higher layers of the soil, as opposed to deep-shaft gemstones of mined in the underground, usually industrial-scale.

⁵ However Oberschall (1978: 307) also notes that "[...] psychological gratification from participating in a collective action [...]" should not be underestimated.

301). Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) move beyond the motivational aspect of *greed*, and instead elaborate further on *feasibility*. While they acknowledge that grievances may form through the latter mechanism, the authors insist that motivation, either as grievance or greed, remains *indeterminate* and that it is “[...] supplied by whatever agenda happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche” (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009: 24). Their ‘feasibility hypothesis’, a variant of Jack Hirshleifer’s Machiavelli Theorem⁶, claims that “[...] where a rebellion is feasible it will occur” (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009: 2). A recurring point in their papers (1998; 2004; 2009) is that the sources of rent that consistently make rebellion a profitable investment are primary commodity exports. These natural resources, argue the authors, are the perfect mold for the rent-seeking actor. And as such *loot-seeking* is a powerful mobilizing agent in the maximizing behavior of the rebel. They make this claim as they find that natural resources, along with a high proportion of young, unemployed men, have a significant effect on the decision to rebel (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009: 10-12). The decision to rebel is then, according to the authors, dependent on a sufficiently lowered opportunity cost of violent engagement.

3.2 The primacy of resources: *Scarcity versus abundance*

Resources are highly dynamic functional concepts; they are not, they become, they evolve out of the triune interaction of nature, man, and culture

- Erich W. Zimmerman (1951)

Le Billon (2001: 565) asserts that “[...] the creation of resources from the earth’s natural endowment is a historical process of social construction”, and as such the decision to transform nature into a resource depends on “[...] the conditions, means and forces of production” of our political economy. The assertion is a response to a wider debate on the merits of *scarcity of resources* (Homer-Dixon, 1994) versus *abundance of resources* (Collier, 2000; de Soysa, 2000; 2002a) as determinants of conflict. The ‘scarcity hypothesis’ posits that scarcity of resources produces a scramble for survival amongst population groups, leading to violent conflict. Foremost amongst the proponents of the scarcity of resources has been Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994) whom, in focusing on *environmental scarcity*, claimed that resource scarcity (particularly through environmental degradation) causes violent conflict, and that this would likely “[...] in the next decades [...] rapidly worsen in many parts of the world [through the scarcity of] cropland, water, forests, and fish [...]” (Homer-Dixon 1994: 39). The arrow of causality according to Homer-Dixon (1994: 10) is that the qualitative and quantitative reduction of resources reduces the ‘resource pie’, and along with population

⁶ The Machiavelli Theorem states that “[...] No one will ever pass up an opportunity to gain a one-sided advantage by exploiting another party” (Hirshleifer 2001: 10-11).

growth this leads to an unequal access to resources. The result is violent conflict spurred by inequality across scarcity.

Weaknesses to this line of thought have been pointed out however. Examining the merits of scarcity-induced conflict, Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998) challenges the distinction between *resource scarcity* on the one hand, and *environmental degradation*. Taking issue with *environmental scarcity* as an ambiguous term, Gleditsch (1998: 388) points out that “Most, if not all, territorial conflict can be seen as the result of past population policies (or lack thereof)”, providing the example of the city of Madrid whom, today lacking forests, may trace this back to the ship-building frenzy of the 16th century. The result, contends Gleditsch, is a hedging of the bets. Alluding to scarcity-induced insecurity implies in a political and policy-making context a ‘danger of armed conflict’ (Gleditsch 1998: 388). Yet empirical support for this open-ended term is tenuous. And by consequence its theoretical fertility may be weak. Leach and Mearns (1996) also underline the problematic nature of the scarcity-narrative. Like Gleditsch, Leach and Mearns point out that particular suffocating weakness, of the *narrative*, which seems much less a robust empirical reality than a politically convenient red herring. ‘Blind spots’ in the scarcity-narrative pronounce themselves in the face of more thorough scrutiny, like the example of the “[...] researchers and others working in Kenya’s Machakos district [who] failed to ‘see’ farmers’ investment in soil conservation and farm landscape improvement, because of a conviction that they were ‘resource-poor’ and therefore must lack the necessary capital to make such investments” (Leach and Mearns 1996: 13). Gleditsch, Leach and Mearns, like Le Billon, stress that the scarcity of a resource is more often the function of the political and economic context, than its absolute diminishment. Rather than acting as the gateway to conflict, scarcity may lead to socioeconomic innovations, and by consequence diversify economic activity (Le Billon 2001: 564). If then the scarcity hypothesis has yielded little predictive power on the relationship between resources and conflict, how has the ‘abundance hypothesis’ fared?

The ‘abundance hypothesis’ posits that the presence of abundant natural resources, which are easily and heavily taxable (Le Billon 2001: 564), provides a strong incentive for appropriation by violent means. De Soysa (2000: 113-114) finds that “[...] countries with an abundance of mineral wealth are likely to suffer greed-motivated rebellion [while] there is little to suggest that scarcity of renewable resources is a significant predictor of armed conflict”. Collier (2000: 9) finds that the export of primary commodities, the presence of low average income and slow growth, all contribute to an increased risk of armed conflict. According to de Soysa (2002a: 115) the abundance of natural resources produces a ‘honey pot’ effect, significantly lowering the opportunity cost of engaging by violent means because the potential profit is so staggeringly high. Natural resources such as coca, opium poppy, diamonds and timber emit the lure of profit for the

individual. In countries suffering low growth rates and poorly diversified economies, individuals are usually confronted with little education and meager prospects for employment. Engaging in coercive methods of income becomes particularly attractive when abundant resources lie readily to be appropriated (Ivey 2008: 82). It is this aspect of some *particular* natural resources that Le Billon (2001) wishes to draw attention. While the ‘abundance hypothesis’ provides both theoretical clarity and empirical basis, the focus on ‘abundance’ somewhat deflects the focus on why certain resources are more conflict-prone than others⁷. As underlined by Gleditsch (1998) and Le Billon (2001) earlier, it is the political and economic context that determines the link resources-conflict.

According to Le Billon (2001) ‘spoil politics’ provide an influential shift in how individuals and groups earn their income. ‘Spoil politics’ finds fertile soil in socioeconomically eroded societies, where institutions are weakened and social capital is low. Illicit and violent means of economic gain fill the vacuum of failed licit economic opportunities. And when natural resources abound, such as drugs and diamonds, they become increasingly *lootable*. For Le Billon (2001: 56) the *lootability* of a resource is high when both “[...] governments and rebels alike [require] minimal bureaucratic infrastructure [to extract them]”. Two political economic realities are crucial for the facilitation of higher lootability; *fragmentation* and *peripheralization*⁸. The fragmentation of a country’s political economy entails the *geographic splintering* of different regions and sub-regions, leading to a contraction of cross-national economic activity (Le Billon 2001: 571). The informal economy begins dominating as population centers (and subsequent trade) are splintered. Adding to fragmentation is the marginalization of sections of the country. Le Billon (2001: 571) argues that population centers far removed from borders may be transformed into ‘satellite populations’ as they are cut off from more active economic hubs usually proximate to trans-border trade. In this scenario, wherein fragmentation and marginalization occur, locations close to lootable resources may prove particularly susceptible to violent conflict over its rents. According to Le Billon the proximity of resources will determine the type of conflict that accompanies it. Constructing a two-by-two table, Le Billon differentiates between *proximate* and *distant*, versus *point*⁹ or *diffuse*¹⁰ resources (See **Table 12.3**)

⁷ Renner (2002: 9) finds that resource scarcity versus resource abundance presents a ‘false dichotomy’; “[...] hewing more to the purity of academic theory than allowing for the complexities and contradictions of our world, in which some regions enjoy a generous resource endowment, even as others have to contend with meager resources or have already depleted a large portion of their resource base”.

⁸ I use ‘marginalization’ instead of ‘peripheralization’ throughout.

⁹ Point: resources concentrated in a limited geographical area.

¹⁰ Diffuse: resources spread out across a wider geographical area.

Le Billon holds that this political ecology of war (point resources that are proximate favor state control, while diffuse resources that are distant favor warlords) and the spatial distribution of resources, means that resource dependence is a historical product. It is therefore a more complex question than the open-endedly defined environmental scarcity, or how abundant the resource is. An example is when marginalization produces satellite populations, whom are severely limited to a short range of economic activities. The effect is that what a satellite population views as legitimate economic activity is stretched towards what arguably are *criminal activities*. As populations are excluded from the larger veins of commerce lootable resources may provide an increasingly important income base. If the appropriation of rent is violent, and dependent on criminal networks, the effect is that the population itself is criminalized¹¹.

3.3 The social contract

The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest. The workings of this principle may be viewed under two aspects, according as the agents acts without, or with, the consent of others affected by his actions. In wide senses, the first species of action may be called war; the second, contract.

- Francis Edgeworth (1881)

The marginalization of population centers is not only a function of political economic fragmentation. The political science literature can provide a rich input on the role of the state and its breakdown. The institutional context serves to clarify the changing nature of economic activity. When populations contract and become isolated (and become satellites), they may be comparable to pockets of air. Over time the quality of the oxygen worsens, the economic opportunities of the population begin choking, and the social fabric twists in desperation. So what defines the breakdown of the state? To conceive of its breakdown we must first concisely understand what the social contract of the state is. There is a difference between the social contract that forms the basis of a state and its institutions, and the social contract in general. This understanding of what a state is and what it isn't is often ambiguously approached by the academic community, policy-makers and international organizations. Concepts of 'weak', 'failed' and 'collapsed' states are frequently used as evidence of a breakdown of all social contract, thereby concluding in an anarchic reality of lawlessness. But the collapse of states does not automatically imply the collapse of all social contracts and all institutions (they may be weakened or strengthened). This fallacy has become so widespread that it is taken for granted¹². In the following chapter we will examine what a failed/collapsed state is, along with political theory on the social contract and institutional authority.

¹¹ Arguably this is a reversible process that may de-criminalize the population when licit, alternative economic opportunities lessen the resource dependence.

¹² And in discussing piracy in Somalia a continuation of this fallacy would be poison for our ability to analyze it.

According to Rotberg (2002: 87) the failed state is one that ceases to deliver goods such as security, economic goods, services and opportunities, as well as education, health services and a judicial system that provides law and order. The *collapsed* state is “[...] a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. Dark energy exists, but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other vital political goods [...]” (Rotberg 2002: 90). Hastings (2009) does not distinguish between the ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ state as two different categories, but defines the collapsed state as an extreme version of the failed state. According to Hastings (2009: 2), “[...] failed states and weak states [are distinguished] by the political and economic goods they provide over their sovereign territory”. In common to all types of state failure is the removal of their ‘stateness’. Weber (1919: 1) points out that a state is defined by “[...] a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory”. Furthermore, argues Weber (1919: 1), “[...] if the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be”. A state is an entity that inhabits the ability to exert power through force across its territory, but also one that enjoys the authority to have the monopoly on that force. In reference to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States¹³ Malanczuk (2006: 77) points out that “Effective control by a government over territory and population is [a] core element [...] for the purposes of international law”. Furthermore the mere existence of a government (*claiming* to represent a state) is not a sufficient legal reason to be defined as a state. The International Committee of Jurists found in 1920 that Finland had not achieved sovereign statehood as an equal in the international system of states. Their report which finds that Finland is not legally a state “Until a stable political organization had been created, and until the public authorities had become strong enough to assert themselves throughout the territories of the State without the assistance of foreign troops” (Malanczuk 2006: 77). A state that does not possess effective control over territory and population is no longer a *de facto* state, and as such merits the term failed or collapsed state, where only degree of breakdown separate these terms. However, international law being largely driven by a normative structure, the failure of a state may imply a *de facto* cessation of statehood, but a *de jure* continued existence of its international legal personality. Whether *de jure* statehood is upheld is then often dependent on the continued recognition by other states (Malanczuk 2006: 77).

While the state is a political association which enjoys a *monopoly of the legitimate use of force*, this only means that if it fails or collapses (whether *de facto*, *de jure* or both) that it is *that* type of political association which has ceased to exist. It does not mean that political associations in general have ceased to exist. A political association, a *social contract*, may be institutionalized without being bound to the

¹³ Article 1: “The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States” (Malanczuk 2006:75).

definition of the state. According to Rousseau (2004 [1762]: 14) a political association in its most basic form comes together when “[...] men reach a point where the obstacles to their preservation in a state of nature prove greater than the strength that each man has to preserve himself in that state [because] the only way in which they can preserve themselves is by uniting their separate powers in a combination strong enough to overcome any resistance [...]”. A political association is then a constitution of the combined powers of individuals, for purposes of self-preservation. According to Rousseau (2004 [1762]: 103) state failure leads to *anarchy*. But as established earlier state failure is not the end of political association in general. This begs the question whether anarchy is possible where political associations exist. If we are to follow the international relations literature the answer would be affirmative. If states exist in an anarchic international system, the logical conclusion is that political associations inhabiting the geographical vacuum of a former state exist in a likewise anarchic system. In both sets of systems there is a lack of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Hirshleifer (1995: 27) argues that the external relations (as opposed to internal relations built on contract) of all (political) associations, from tribes to the nation-state, exist in an anarchic system. The implication is that their relations are set in the context of anarchic competition.

According to Hirshleifer anarchy is a *natural economy*, similar to the state of nature described by Hobbes (2008 [1651]: 86-87). In the state of nature laid out by Hobbes (2008 [1651]: 83) “[...] if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another”. This Hobbesian anarchy of ‘total war’ where all economic activity is by *violent appropriation*, stands in contrast to the natural economy laid out by Hirshleifer. Hirshleifer’s (1995: 27) natural economy has the nuance of being divided into two opposing economic activities: *production* and *appropriation*. These two opposing economic activities are similar to those of Usher (1989), who differentiates between *bandits* and *farmers*. According to Usher (1989: 1032) an equilibrium will develop between those that violently appropriate and those that produce, and the economic activity that is pursued depends on their relative opportunity costs for said individuals and groups. The natural economy, essentially the anarchy of the failed state, serves as a useful political economic context to discuss lootable resources. Why and when do individuals, groups and political associations engage in the extraction of lootable resources? How do they overcome the barrier of collective action?

De Soysa (2002b: 400) points out that “One major drawback in the Collier-Hoeffler model is that it lacks an institutional component. Institutional factors fashion the opportunity cost of people and help to solve collective action problems at the level of the group [...]”. The criticism weighs in on the general concept of the neo-

classical *Homo economicus* whom ceaselessly seeks opportunity-maximization, without reference to social setting. Individuals, argues de Soysa (2002b: 401), have an incentive to overcome collective action and a disincentive against destructive behavior. De Soysa finds that in countries with higher amount of trade there is also a corresponding higher social capital. In comparison, ‘shadow economies’ that are fragmented and closed (satellite population centers) have alternative institutional arrangements other than that of the state. These groups are “[...] often based on kinship ties, so that the perpetration of violence by one group or the other leads to the [further] weakening of social capital [...]” (de Soysa 2002b: 401). Notwithstanding their kinship, these (informal) institutions (or political associations) will be confronted with similar problems to that of the state. This point deserves elaboration.

Earlier I detailed the mechanisms highlighted by greed and grievance. The grievance perspective would argue that the collective action problem is overcome by shared (cultural, social, ethnic) relative deprivation. The greed perspective highlights the importance of rent-seeking as lowering the opportunity cost of (violent) collective action to appropriate resources. If we merge group membership and lowered opportunity costs we may approach a satisfactory explanation for collective violent action. But when a population already has suffered state failure and subsequent conflict, and been subject to the forces of fragmentation and marginalization, the question is then whether the problem of collective action is rendered easier or harder? Will the weak institutional quality of the pre-failed state (which we expect to be progressively poorer as the state dissolves) produce a stronger or weaker playing field for the emergence of alternative institutional authority? As noted earlier the absence of the state produces an (anarchic) natural economy. Therefore the institutional authority of each political association will depend on its ability to produce and appropriate, to control territory and to provide security. These are traits that are not too different from that of the state (Stewart et al. 2001: 207). Political associations in the anarchic vacuum of a failed state and the state in the anarchic vacuum of the international arena encounter a similar problem; which is preserving allegiance to the *internal* social contract. As underlined earlier, the social contract in its most basic form rests on shared security and economic opportunity. A social contract that lacks or has a limited amount of either of these will have subsequent weakened institutional authority.

3.4 Lootability and obstructability

Ross (2003) develops more measurable concepts¹⁴ behind the extraction of lootable resources: the *lootability* and *obstructability* of natural resources. According to Ross (2003: 54) lootability is the “[...] ease with which [a resource] can be extracted and transported by individuals or small teams of unskilled

¹⁴ Ross builds on Le Billon’s paper on lootable resources, “The Political Ecology of War” (2001)

workers”, while obstructability is the extent to which a resource “[...] can easily be blocked by a small number of individuals with few weapons; [and] it is relatively unobstructable if it can only be blocked with many soldiers and heavy equipment”. We find in lootability and obstructability two measures that enable us to determine to what extent a resource may be considered lootable.

To appreciate the fertility of these two measures we must however first understand the background for Ross’ paper. In a general critique of scientific papers on the relationship between natural resources and civil war, he examines whether there are certain types of resources that contribute to the *onset* or *increased duration* of civil war. In the period of 1994-2001 he summarizes the frequency of various natural resources in civil war (from greatest to least frequency): 1. diamonds and gemstones, 2. oil and natural gas, 3. illicit drugs, 4. copper or gold, and 5. timber (Ross 2003: 48). Interestingly he finds that *legal* agricultural crops never played the dominant role in a civil war during this period (1994-2001). Ross argues that this information does not provide us with any enhanced understanding of the role of natural resources. He points out that the frequency of a natural resource playing a part in a civil war could on a general basis be entirely up to how common it is. Building on the data and analysis of Collier and Hoeffler (2000) Ross (2003: 51-53) stresses that he finds no significant correlation between the rate of civil war amongst countries that are dependent (major export) on natural resources and those that aren’t. Rather he finds “[...] a strong association between civil war and both the production of diamonds – especially alluvial diamonds – and the production of drugs, especially coca and opium” (Ross (2003: 53). Ross draws on Le Billon’s differentiation between ‘point’ resources and ‘diffuse’ resources (see **Table 12.3**). According to Ross the role played by a natural resource is dependent on its lootability, as well as its obstructability and legality. On this basis Ross articulates seven hypotheses on the lootability of resources in conflict (see **Table 12.1**): Since we in this thesis are not concerned with the separatist/nonseparatist aspect of civil war, but the economic behavior of the pirates, we narrow down to Ross’ analysis of **Hypotheses 1, 6 and 7** (see **Figure 2.0**)

Figure 2.0 – Three hypotheses on resources and civil war

- 1.** The more lootable a resource is, the more likely it is to benefit local peoples and the poor
 - 2.** If a resource is obstructable, it is more likely to increase the duration and intensity of conflicts
 - 3.** If the resource is illegal, it is more likely to benefit the rebels - unless the government is willing to endure international sanctions
-

The following sub-chapters provide an elaboration on the logic, theoretical and empirical basis of the three hypotheses¹⁵.

¹⁵ Readers should be aware that these are not the hypotheses of the thesis, but serve as a theoretical discussion.

3.4.1 H1: *Lootability favors poverty*

1. *The more lootable a resource is, the more likely it is to benefit local peoples and the poor*

According to Ross (2003) the extraction of highly lootable resources is *labor intensive* as it is more reliant on *unskilled* labor. This reliance on unskilled labor has the effect of benefiting poor populations whom lack technological skills and equipment, as well as lacking industrial infrastructure and capital. Traditionally these populations are present in developing countries with a primary engagement in the agricultural sector. This reveals another pressing mechanism that makes resources particularly lootable for poor populations: substantial levels of underemployment. As Doving (1967: 163) points out, “The size of an agricultural labor force, in traditional agriculture, is not *prima facie* an economic fact but a demographic fact. How many people there are on farms in an underdeveloped country bears no particular relation to the demand for labor, either in the technical or the economic sense”. The presence of large-scale underemployment is a result of agricultural economies characterized by mostly subsistence activity, with surplus amount of labor that leads to zero marginal productivity (Doving 1976: 164; Reynolds 1965: 19). The presence of a lootable resource that offers high marginal profits would then intuitively seem attractive for a population whom engages in subsistence activities with negligible marginal productivity. On the opposite side of the scale are *unlootable* resources, whom require capital and skilled labor, which are scarce factors in developing countries (Ross 2003: 56).

Lind, Moene and Willumsen (2009) challenge the traditional explanation of why farmers decide to produce illicit substances such as opium. According to the authors *that* “[...] explanation rests on centralized power within rebel organizations or governments, where strongmen organize the growing of illegal substances to finance military campaigns” (Lind, Moene and Willumsen 2009: 2). The implication is that rebels engage through a centralized and coherent strategy to produce illicit substances for a broader conflict. The authors present a reversed mechanism, wherein the production of illicit substances is a *reaction* to the presence of conflict. This provides an additional context to the earlier chapter on the marginalization of population centers. The available set of economic opportunities is narrowed due to the presence of conflict, the dilapidation of infrastructure and a general lack of long-term planning. Additionally we find that institutional authority is likely to be weak due to the lack of security and economic opportunities.

Because of these impediments any resource that offers *higher lootability* will become attractive. Lind, Moene and Willumsen highlight the competitive advantage of opium compared to other agricultural

commodities¹⁶. Opium's higher lootability is the high marginal profit it offers as well as its lessened reliance on roads and irrigation systems (Lind, Moene and Willumsen 2009: 27). Opium here plays the role of the lootable resource that overcomes economic impediments associated with conflict and instability. The authors argue that in Afghanistan the presence of conflict has a tendency to reduce social stigma associated with illicit activities because of the reduced probability or absence of credible punishment (Lind, Moene and Willumsen 2009: 2). As a population center transforms into an 'insecure oasis' the incentives of the population change. (Licit) Resource A will replace (illicit) resource B if the relative risks and social costs are deemed acceptable and the marginal profit greater.

3.4.2 H2: *Obstructability favors intensity and duration*

2. *If a resource is obstructable, it is more likely to increase the duration and intensity of conflicts*

Hypothesis 2 is built on the assumption that "[...] obstructable resources are subject to holdups, a tactic that benefits a weaker party in its campaign against a stronger opponent, and hence will tend to lengthen a conflict" (Ross 2003: 62). Ross argues that Colombia's various rebel groups have earned windfall profits from holding up the oil pipelines that serve as crucial economic veins for the central government. In the example of Colombia rebels obstruct the oil pipelines by blowing them up (ninety-eight times in 2000), earning an estimated U.S. \$140 million in extortion on an annual basis (Ross 2003: 62). Obstructability in this case is high because onshore oil pipelines provide stationary and accessible targets for rebels (Lujala 2009: 69). The level of obstructability is perhaps best understood when compared with the lootability of resources, as seen in **Table 12.4**. The effect of high obstructability will be that rebels may continuously engage in a 'guerilla-type' manner, picking targets as they please and without being constrained by time¹⁷. The other factor in the hypothesis is the intensity of the conflict. According to Ross (2003: 62) obstructability may also lead to "[...] a larger number of resource-related deaths" because the government would engage preemptively to dissuade rebels from attempting to obstruct a given resource.

¹⁶ "Opium is more drought resistant than wheat, the main alternative crop, and opium does not require road transportation" (Lind, Moene and Willumsen 2009: 2).

¹⁷ As will be argued later in the thesis, the *obstructability* of the maritime commerce off Somalia's coast is extraordinarily high as it is both abundant, exposed and diffuse (spread across a vast geographical area, and not confined to infrastructure such as pipelines or railways).

3.4.3 H3: *Illegality favors rebels*

3. *If the resource is illegal, it is more likely to benefit the rebels – unless the government is willing to endure international sanctions*

Illegally produced and extracted resources such as coca, opium and cannabis (as well as commercial shipping vessels in international waters¹⁸) are restricted by strong international sanctions¹⁹ (Ross 2003: 63). The reasoning then is that a sovereign state and its central government will be loath to base their income on the sales of illicit resources. According to Ross (2003: 63) the expectation is then that rebels, whom are not internationally recognized sovereign bodies and whom are not bound by treaties or relations with other states, will be far less responsive to objections and sanctions from the international community. Ross underlines that responsiveness would be expected to fall as well among states that already suffer large-scale sanctions²⁰.

¹⁸ Article 15 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958) states that piracy is “1. Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship [...] (a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against person or property on board such a ship or aircraft [...] (b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State” (Malanczuk 2006: 189).

¹⁹ Article 3 ‘Offences and Sanctions’ of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) states that “Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally: “(a) (i) That production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance [is an offence and subject to sanctions]” (INCB 1988: 18).

²⁰ See *Table 12.2* in the Appendix on the four drug-producing states that exist.

4.0 Method

In this thesis my analysis of Somalia's piracy is largely qualitative. Arguably the greatest obstacle to such a study is over-determination of causal patterns. The case itself may also be open to scrutiny. The examination of the onset of piracy in Somalia is narrowed to the Northwest versus the Northeast, thereby cutting away the South and most of the interior. A case can be made that due to the absence of international shipping on the open savannah, the analysis will remain relatively on track by focusing primarily on the coast. In general the qualitative method I employ poses both advantages and challenges if we are to ensure sufficient scientific rigidity in the analysis. In this chapter I examine choice of method, and problems pertaining to the analysis. I also examine the problems of employing a statistical study on piracy and the pitfalls of proxying the (*lack of*) governance in Somalia, as has been carried out in a recent publication by Percy and Shortland (2010).

4.1 The comparative case study

The comparative case study enables us to examine the similarities and variances across a set (or sets) of cases. The strength of the case study is that it focuses on few units, but many variables. It may capture important historical complexities that usually dissolve in large-N studies. The case study is executed by interweaving the analysis with its historical complexities and particularities (Andersen 1997: 19). This provides us with the opportunity of both inductively drawing out the essentials of the case, as well as testing broader and more deductive theories that cover a greater variation of cases. In Somalia I am introducing a rebel-resource literature not previously used to explain piracy. While testing the fruitfulness of this literature is one important aspect of the thesis, I also attempt to generate some new hypotheses on where we can expect piracy to occur.

Because of the qualitative nature of the comparative case study in this thesis we want to allow for the maximum amount of complexity, without rendering the analysis too general. Andersen (1997: 20) observes that the 'narrative' of traditional case studies in political science often leads toward the pitfall of 'no predictable structure'. Andersen (1997: 20) points out that this can be avoided if the qualitative data rests on a concise conceptual framework. In this thesis the 'framework' that I wish to pursue is the testing of a specific case against well-developed theories on rebels-resources. By consequence the strength of the analysis rests on detailed empirical data. But the data in such a qualitative is not 'gathered' per se, but "[...] arise in the interplay between a focus on certain variables and the relations they partake in" (Andersen 1997: 24). Because of the absence of 'clear scientific procedures' in case studies the analysis ultimately

rests on the ability of the researcher to observe relevant relationships and appreciate the “[...] connections between individual observations and their systemic conditions” (Andersen 1997: 24).

The nature of the case study entails that the researcher seeks to ‘identify commonalities’ across a set of cases (Ragin 2008: 17). The identification of ‘commonalities’ has important limits however. There is an inherent danger in making simplifying assumptions too early (Ragin 1987: 105), and most importantly confusing connections with *correlations*. Ragin (2008: 15) here points out that connections based on “[s]et-theoretic arguments are often erroneously reformulated as correlational hypothesis”. If the fallacy of connection-as-correlation is avoided an important strength emerges in the case study since cases “[...] are treated as interpretable combinations of characteristics [and] not as arrays of sample values” (Ragin 1987: 106). The difference between connection and correlation is perhaps best exemplified in a Boolean truth-table, as featured below in *Table 4.1*:

Table 4.1 – Boolean truth-table

Input						Output
<i>Case</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>P</i>
I	1	0	1	0	0	1
II	1	1	1	0	0	1
III	0	0	1	0	1	1
IV	0	0	0	1	0	0
V	0	1	0	1	0	1
VI	0	1	0	1	0	0

In *Table 4.1* six cases are listed. Five different conditions, or ‘inputs’ are listed, separated by their absence or presence (0 or 1), and an absence (0) or presence (1) of ‘output’. In this Boolean truth-table we could plot in output as *P*; representing the absence or presence of *Insurgency*. The five inputs, *A*, *B*, *C*, *D* and *E*; could represent the absence or presence of (*A*) *Coastline*, (*B*) *Mountainous terrain*, (*C*) *Former colony*, (*D*) *Democracy* and (*E*) *War in neighbouring country*. In this truth table the absence or presence of output serves not as “[...] an outcome or some type of historically emergent phenomenon” (Ragin 1987: 106), but shows the variations in combinations amongst a selection of cases. For example *Case I* has a coastline, and insurgency is present. In *Case III* insurgency is also present, but it has no coastline. *Case IV* is a democracy and has no coastline, and insurgency is absent. *Case V* has no coastline and it a democracy, but insurgency is present. Neither of these input combinations can be analyzed as conditions that lead to the presence of the output. Rather the combinations reflect the diversity of inputs and absence or presence of output across select cases. The absence or presence dichotomy is no more than an indication of the combinations that exist. They are *connections*, not *correlations*, and should be treated as such in a qualitative case study.

4.2 Proxying governance

The rationale behind the qualitative nature of this thesis lies in the difficulty of capturing *governance* in a hypothetical statistical study. Capturing governance in Somalia is especially problematic because of the centrality of *kinship* in all types of political interaction. I argue that any variable(s) that fail to capture kinship are distorting institutional authority, competition and representation in Somalia. As such, studies that decide on statistical analysis by proxying *governance* run the risk of gravely misrepresenting empirical relationships if it is not based on solid data. I examine Percy and Shortland's (2010) paper "The Business of Piracy in Somalia"²¹ to point out the fallacies that arise when proxies are played around with scant reference to the complexity of Somalia's conflict cosmos. (Percy and Shortland 2010: i) argue that "[...] contrary to conventional wisdom, Somali piracy is likely to increase if Somalia's domestic stability is improved". Their finding is that "[...] land-based approaches focusing on rebuilding state capabilities may also backfire as economic development and greater stability aid pirates" (Percy and Shortland 2010: i). This extraordinary claim is based on their proxying of *governance*.

Percy and Shortland's study at first bears the hallmark of one that accepts the importance of local governance in Somalia's clan-based society. Yet when they introduced their variable for governance these considerations are cast aside to the benefit of the theoretically pleasing, but empirically suspect. The authors might be credited for their 'innovative approach' (Percy and Shortland 2010: 20), using proxies to avoid problems of endogeneity. To erect a variable for governance the authors have put together three proxies for what they claim is *institutional quality*; 'contractual environment', 'civil conflict' and 'UIC dummy'²². The two first variables are entirely based on the presence or absence of reporting from weather stations across Somalia, while the third variable is based on the 'governance' by UIC for the period June-December 2006²³..

²¹ Percy and Shortland's (2010) paper spawned the study by de Groot, Shortland and Rablen (2011), titled "Gov-aargh-nance – 'Even Criminals Need Law and Order'". This paper drew substantially from Percy and Shortland's case study on Somalia, and was presented at Britain's Royal Economic Society. The claim was (as reviewed by The Economist) that "There is a 'sweet spot' for piracy: countries like Cambodia or Cameroon provide far more conducive environments for it than Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone, which are too dysfunctional. Helping such anarchic places to improve their governance a bit has many benefits. Cutting down on pirates attacks may not be among them" (Economist April 20th 2011).

²² 'Contractual environment' is "percentage of pre-war [weather] stations contracted as a proxy for the feasibility of entering into a long-term contract/supply relationship and building (very) basic infrastructure", 'civil conflict' is "[...] the number of contracted stations which are not reporting rainfall data as a (rough) proxy for the intensity of civil conflict" and 'UIC dummy' is "[...] the period of the UIC control in Mogadishu from June to December 2006" (Percy and Shortland 2010: 21).

²³ Percy and Shortland (2006: 35) find the greatest explanatory power in the 'UIC indicator', and draw the conclusion that "[u]nsurprisingly during this period of turmoil, unrest and uncertainty pirates had no guarantee that they would see any gain from successful hijack and piracy stopped for a number of months". The implication is that the fall in piracy is a function of heightened uncertainty, and not increased governance; and odd conclusion considering the premise of the paper. Moreover the analysis of the 'UIC indicator' is devoid of any political context. Menkhaus (2007: 374) holds that "Clan dynamics within the CIC [aka UIC aka ICU] were a critical dimension [...] The CIC could point to a number of leaders in its executive committee

Defending their two variables on reporting weather stations the authors make the odd claim that “In the Somali context the well resourced SWALIM must be an exceptionally attractive employer” (Percy and Shortland 2010: 20). The logic of this proxying is that when a weather station is reporting the assumption is that security has improved, while the absence of reporting entails a worsening of the security situation. By consequence, argue Percy and Shortland, a deterioration of security leads to greater hardships in contracting. On the basis of pre-war weather stations (some of which are currently being revived by SWALIM) Percy and Shortland end up equating the frequency of reports with institutional quality. This equation is empirically suspect, and turns out to be particularly so when I check for their respective locations. Of the 44 weather stations I could count in SWALIM’s database for 2010 only *five*²⁴ are located along the coastline stretching from Northwest Somalia (the border with Djibouti) and down to Galmudug (the border between Puntland and Southern Somalia) (SWALIM 2010: 57-58). All of the other weather stations in Puntland are located in the interior, and not at the coast. The subsequent ‘controversial’ findings in Percy and Shortland’s analysis of Somalia’s piracy is not surprising when they proxy governance with two variables for reporting weather stations and a 6-month period in 2006. I argue this to be a grossly oversimplified proxy for governance. It is also an instructive example of the *potential* potholes inherent in studies with superficial analysis of (complex) economic, political and social realities.

and its military from the Rahanweyn, Isaaq and Darood clan families, and its Islamist network clearly extended into Puntland, Somaliland, eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya, as well as throughout the Somali diaspora”.

²⁴ The last date of reporting in each of these five locations; Hobyo, Caluula, Bossaso, Berbera and Galkacyo; was respectively 1982, 1967, 1976, 1978 and 1990.

5.0 Data

The data in this thesis is primarily qualitative and for that reason the main challenge has been to balance between too little and too much information. At the same time I want to be able to project a balanced and empirically sound collection of data. While I have primarily relied on document analysis I have also generated some minor quantitative data. In this chapter I present various figures based on this research.

5.1 International shipping: *An obstructable resource*

Measuring obstructability has been challenging as it is a theoretical concept that has a negligible history beyond Ross (2003). The aim is to show that developing such a measure is ultimately rewarding for our understanding of Somalia's piracy. *Obstructability* is a theoretical concept with an easy, but powerful logic. Reiterating Ross' definition (2003: 54); obstructability is a measure of the extent to which a resource "[...] can easily be blocked by a small number of individuals with few weapons; [and] it is relatively unobstructable if it can only be blocked with many soldiers and heavy equipment". It is unlikely that Ross had pirates in mind when he coined the term, so therefore any usage of the term necessarily means selecting a few (and new!) appropriate variables. To create a coherent measure that is both empirically and theoretically defensible I have selected four unique variables. The aim is that these four variables in sum give a lesser or greater degree of obstructability. However, before introducing this measure we need to understand properly what the geographical realities are of international shipping as a lootable resource.

5.1.1 Resource choke sectors

If Somalia's piracy is to be properly analyzed in terms of the lootable resource literature we need to develop a credible definition of international shipping as a resource. We must know where the commercial shipping lanes are, and where they are not. Using data on international shipping activity in 2004-2005²⁵ created by (Halpern et al. 2008: 7-8), The Global Environment Monitoring Unit of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, (JRC 2010) constructed a map of international shipping lanes. I have used this map along with ship density figures provided by The Luxembourg System

²⁵ (Halpern et al. 2008: 7-8) use "[...] 1,189,127 mobile ship data points from a total of 3,374 commercial and research vessels, representing roughly 11% of the 30,851 merchant ships >1000 gross tonnage at sea [...]" and "[...] connected all mobile ship data to create ship tracks, under the assumption that ships travel in straight lines (a reasonable assumption since ships minimize travel distance in an effort to minimize fuel costs)." The explosion in the number of acts of piracy since 2004-2005 has led some companies to divert their fleet around the Cape of Good Hope, such as AP Moller-Maersk and Odfjell shipping group (Bowden et al. 2010: 12). However (Bowden et al. 2010: 13) estimate that no more than ca. 10% of international shipping has chosen to divert the route due to relatively prohibitive costs for small- and medium-sized companies. (Unterreiner 2009: 9) calculates that the cost of rerouting is "[...] about 70 times larger than the cost of doing nothing."

Integrator for Aerospace & Defense Systems, (LUXSPACE 2010) to create various *resource choke sectors* (RCSs) off the Somali coast. Resource choke sectors are the various geographical areas out at sea where lanes of international shipping pass. Resource choke sectors are to a greater or lesser degree attractive for pirates depending on the density of ships (creating something of a ‘bottleneck’ effect). These resource choke sectors are meant to identify the various shipping lanes crisscrossing the Western Indian Ocean. I have divided them into eight sectors; and since the Gulf of Aden already has been given the name of ‘Pirate Alley’ by analysts the sectors are named thus too: RCS 1 = *Red Sea Alley*, RCS2 = *Aden Alley*, RCS3 = *Oman Alley*, RCS4 = *Mogadishu Alley*, RCS5 = *Seychelles Alley*, RCS6 = *Maldives Alley*, RCS7 = *India Alley* and RCS8 = *Gulf Alley* (see **Figure 11.7**). In this thesis I define obstructability by the following four variables (see **Figure 5.1**):

Figure 5.1 – Four variables for measuring obstructability

1. *Distance* = Distance from the resource choke sector to the nearest point on the Somali coastline (see **Chapter 5.1.2**)
2. *Mean wind speed level* = This variable is a measurement of the mean wind speed level of each month across the year (see **Chapter 5.1.3**)
3. *Law enforcement* = Proximity of legal structures. This variable is a measurement of the reaction time of anti-piracy military vessels going at maximum speed, relative to the nautical mile circumference of the resource choke sector they find themselves in (see **Chapter 5.1.4**)
4. *Density of ships* = This variable is a measurement of the density of ships in each respective resource choke sector (see **Chapter 5.1.5**)

Each variable is given values from 1 to 4. These values do not in themselves possess any meaning, but symbolize a given amount of (respectively) distance, time, speed and density. For all four variables the value of 1 = *low obstructability*, 2 = *medium obstructability*, 3 = *high obstructability* and 4 = *very high obstructability*. It must be noted that these values are the result of my research and are as such limited by the empirical information that I have available. Nonetheless my claim is that they contribute rather than confuse our understanding of piratical activity. In the following sub-chapters we examine each of the variables to understand their relevance towards obtaining a measure of obstructability.

5.1.2 Distance from resource choke sector

Distance from resource choke sector (RCS) is divided into four separate categories of distances (see **Table 5.2**):

Table 5.2 – Distance from resource choke sector

<i>Nautical miles (nm)</i>	<i>Obstructability value</i>	<i>Obstructability</i>
0-300	4	Very high
300-600	3	High
600-900	2	Medium
900-1200	1	Low

Examining *Figure 12.11* we get an idea of the distances at sea when we employ these four measures. Very high obstructability is expected when the resource choke sector is entirely or partly in the vicinity of no more than 300 nautical miles from the coast of Somalia. Sectors within 0-300 nautical miles are Aden alley, the *Bab-el-Mandeb Strait* and parts of Mogadishu alley and Oman alley. High obstructability is found beyond between 300 and 600 nautical miles (orange line), while medium obstructability is found between 600 and 900 nautical miles (green line). When pirates operate at distances between 900 and 1200 nautical miles (purple line) they are very far away from their base, and although pirates are increasingly making use of *motherships* (to enable longer and more distant voyages) they will still be faced with significant logistical challenges when travelling this far.

5.1.3 Mean wind speed level

The second variable for obstructability is *mean wind speed level* across the various resource choke sectors. The mean wind speed will vary greatly from the relatively calm Red Sea to the foaming waters off Cape Guardafui. These variations are considerable depending on the month of the year, and are the result of the monsoons ('mawsim', or *season* in Arabic). From October to April the Northeast monsoon drives the winds in a Southwest direction, then they abruptly turn around, and the Southwest monsoon carries on from April to October. Hall (1998: xxi) notes that the "[...] lives of ordinary people [...] were always ruled by nature than by great events, by the perpetual monsoons rather than by ephemeral monarchies". This holds no less true for the pirates of Somalia, whom at their own peril venture into headwinds approaching 10.0 meters per second²⁶.

Constructing a variable on wind speed was initially a daunting task. The main challenge was finding information on the resource choke sectors that I could myself crystallize into relevant categories, for each month and for each RCS (resource choke sector). While there are plenty of figures and maps for the Western Indian Ocean as a whole available online, they usually contain one weakness or another. Publications sometimes only cover a few months, and when they cover the entire year they are usually too general to be used to distinguish between the mean wind speed levels of various RCS. I want to be able to distinguish between the mean wind speed levels of for example Oman Alley and Gulf Alley in the month of November, and be able to do that for each RCS for every month of the year. More importantly, I want to be able to check the variations across *years*.

²⁶ 10 meters per second (m/s) = 19.4 knots (nautical miles per hour) = 36 km/h.

I solved this problem when I came across a dataset on oceanic data published by the Earth System Research Laboratory of the United States National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NOAA provides a dataset on oceanic surface information such as mean wind speed levels across all bodies of water across the globe. The subset pertaining to mean wind speed levels allows for specifications of latitude and longitude, as well as month and year starting from January 1948(!) (and up to the spring of 2011 in my case). To capture the mean wind speed levels across the various RCS I plotted latitude dimensions of -25.00S and 30.00N, and longitude dimensions of 35.00E and 80.00E (see *Figure 12.12*). The result is that I can now measure various resource choke sectors depending on the month of the year. On the basis of these monthly plots I gave values to four categories of obstructability, from low to very high (see *Table 5.3* below):

Table 5.3 – Overview of mean wind speed categories of obstructability

<i>Mean wind speed (m/s)</i> ²⁷	<i>Obstructability value</i>	<i>Obstructability</i>
0-3,0	4	Very high
3,0-6,0	3	High
6,0-9,0	2	Medium
9,0-12,0	1	Low

When pirates are active in areas with wind speeds of no more than 3,0 m/s they are able to conduct their predation with reasonably little impediments from wind and waves. However as they approach 9,0-12,0 m/s activity is significantly hampered. I try to capture this variation in the ease/difficulty of their activity by constructing the above measure.

5.1.4 Proximity of legal structures

A significant variable of interest to the pirates is the likelihood of being impeded by anti-piracy military vessels. These ‘seaborne legal structures’ patrol the shipping lanes to protect convoys and to hunt pirates. The European Union Naval Force Somalia²⁸ (EU NAVFOR 2011)’s *Operation Atalanta* is mandated until December 2012 to “[1] Protect vessels of the World Food Programme, humanitarian aid and African Union Mission in Somalia shipping, [2] help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery, [3] protect vulnerable shipping [and 4] monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia”. According to EU NAVFOR (2011) the number of vessels patrolling the combined resource choke sectors vary between “[...] 5 to 10 Surface Combatants, 1 to 2 Auxiliary ship and 2 to 4 Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft”. The

²⁷ Conversion: 3,0 m/s = 5,83 nautical miles per hour (knots), 6,0 m/s = 11,66 knots, 9,0 m/s = 17,49 knots, 12,0 m/s = 23,33 knots (Unitarium 2010)

²⁸ Participating countries of *Operation Atalanta* are/have been Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and non-EU members Croatia, Norway and Ukraine.

maximum number of EU NAVFOR ships engaged from the Red Sea to the Maldives, from the Seychelles to the Gulf of Oman (an area of approximately 2,000,000 square miles or 30 Englands) is 16 anti-piracy military vessels. I use the Portuguese frigate, the *NPR Vasco da Gama*, as a reference for the speed and range of legal structures across the resource choke sectors. With two diesel engines and two gas turbines and a displacement of 3,200 tons (fully loaded) the *NPR Vasco da Gama* has a range of approximately 4,000 nautical miles at 18 knots. When using both diesel engines and gas turbines the maximum speed of the frigate is 32 knots (Wikipedia 2011²⁹). On the basis of this information we construct a measure of obstructability:

Table 5.4 – Approx. transportation time of anti-piracy military vessel at maximum speed

<i>Distance</i> ³⁰ (nm)	<i>Approx. transportation time</i> ³¹ (32 knots)	<i>Obstructability value</i>	<i>Obstructability</i>
200	6 hours and 15 minutes	4	Very high
100	3 hours	3	High
50	1 hour and 30 minutes	2	Medium
25	50 minutes	1	Low

5.1.5 Density of ships

The fourth variable we used to obtain a measure of obstructability is the *density of ships* for each resource choke sector. LUXSPACE provides mean values of density per grid cell across the globe (LUXSPACE 2010). Based on these numbers I categorize from low to very high obstructability (see *Table 5.5* below):

Table 5.5 – Density of ships per grid cell for resource choke sectors

<i>Density of ships per grid cell</i>	<i>Obstructability value</i>	<i>Obstructability</i>
20+	4	Very high
5.0-20.0	3	High
0.6-5.0	2	Medium
0.0-0.6	1	Low

Ship density varies considerably between the various RCS. This is partly a function of the varying square miles that separate the alleys in *size*, and more importantly a function of where the busiest shipping lanes are located. While *Red Sea Alley*, *Aden Alley* and *Oman Alley* are dense with 20+ ships per grid cell, *Seychelles Alley* and *Maldives Alley* have 0.0-0.6 ships per grid cell. *Mogadishu alley* and *India alley* are in the range of 5.0-20.0 ships per grid cell.

²⁹ The source for the specifications of the *NPR Vasco da Gama* is a website belonging to the State of Portugal, however the site is inaccessible, and therefore I have decided to use Wikipedia as the source.

³⁰ Although a distressed ship may decide to realign its course towards the coordinates of an anti-piracy vessel, the amount of distance covered will be intuitively negligible when the pirates are right next to them.

³¹ See *Figure 12.13*

5.2 Data on piracy attacks

Collecting data on pirate attacks outside Somalia may intuitively seem like a straightforward exercise. The pirates travel out to sea, attack a ship and, whether they succeed or not, the incident is reported by the ship's crew or more ominously by the pirates themselves. However, I have found that the reported number and locations of incidents varies. The data is on the whole varying, and sometimes inconsistent, amongst governments, militaries, think-thanks, piracy reporting websites and other data collecting organizations. While many of the analyses I have read claim to employ the same source, the International Maritime Organization, they somehow manage to get different figures.

For this reason I have decided to count every attack reported by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) since 1999³². Prior to April 2000 the reports issued by the IMO were on a quarterly basis and do not specify the location and date of each reported incident (IMO April 2000). In most of the cases the details of the attacked ship are documented. In the vast majority of the cases the coordinates of the incident are given as well³³. For every attack I have counted I have plotted the coordinates given in Google Earth (2011), which immediately provides the point of reference³⁴ (See *Table 12.8*, *Figure 12.9* and *Figure 12.10*). The coordinates given for most of the piracy attacks, when coupled with Google Earth provides a very helpful overview of the piracy activity of Somalia's pirates. Counting the piracy attacks and ticking off their locations for the 10+ years has provided important advantages. With this information I am able to measure *distances* and pinpoint the changes in density across *time* without being reliant on secondary analysis of the primary data (each reported incident by IMO). It has also aided tremendously in creating a measure for obstructability.

³² See *Figure 12.6* for every month between May 1999 and April 2011. The IMO documents every reported incident in its monthly reports. In the *Bibliography* I have listed all the monthly reports and their numbers, because although I have included every monthly report between May 1999 and April 2011, the IMO numbers are *not* in sequence. In several instances other reports have been given numbers in between the monthly reports. To avoid any confusion I have therefore referenced each report.

³³ The few times when the coordinates are unavailable I have chosen to reference the location given by the IMO, although it does leave room for the possibility of the incident being categorized in the wrong *resource choke sector*.

³⁴ In some instances the coordinates given have no relationship to the location given in the monthly report. In numerous instances the coordinates have been off the coast of West Africa when the location of the attack was reported to have happened off East Africa. I have tried to overcome such errors by trying to find information on the attacked vessel so to verify its actual location at that point in time. Sometimes that information has not been available. I have tried changing the geographical notation on the coordinates (from W to E) to see whether the new point of reference ends up in the likely area where it was *said* to have happened. However in most of the cases I have not been confident enough in this potential human error so a very few number of incidents have been intentionally left out (This may partly explain the variation amongst analysts).

6.0 Analysis: Understanding piracy through lootability

Every age has its follies; perhaps the folly of our age could be identified as an unmatched ambition to change the world, without even bothering to study it in detail and understand it first. [...] What is surprising in the attitude of contemporary policy makers is the readiness to enter countries and set out to transform every remote corner of the world. This fever to turn everything upside down was already seen during the colonial age, but at least at that time it was accomplished by a determined effort to improve knowledge and understanding of the objects of conquest.

- Antonio Giustozzi (2009)

In this thesis the aim is to examine the causes behind the onset of piracy in Somalia with the aid of political science and political economy rebel-resource literature. The research question is: *Why are there no pirates in Northwest Somalia? And why are they everywhere else?* Why has there been a near total absence of piracy on the Northern coastline stretching from Djibouti to Bosaso? Moreover, why has piracy been especially clustered in the towns and district on the Northeastern coast? Why are there such stark geographic differences? Earlier I examined need, greed and grievance, the social contract, institutional authority and the (anarchic) natural economy of war. The sum of these theories I condensed into a discussion of the *lootability* and *obstructability* of resources. These two concepts I wish to introduce to the literature on piracy in Somalia. Becoming engaged in piracy depends on the *lootability* of the resource, and to some extent on its *obstructability*. Lootability is not merely the ease with which a small number of individuals can appropriate a resource, but also the socioeconomic and legal environment they inhabit. What conditions are conducive to engaging in piracy? And which are not? When is the opportunity cost sufficiently low? I put forward three propositions on the absence and presence of piracy in Somalia:

Proposition 1:

*Absence of piracy is linked to the presence of (tribal) **institutional authority***

Weak institutional authority = High lootability

Strong institutional authority = Low lootability

I propose that when there is an increase in institutional authority there will be a corresponding absence of piracy. I emphasize institutions based on *kinship* because this is the political coinage that separates authoritative and legitimate from un-authoritative and illegitimate *governance* in Somalia. The lootability of a resource such as international shipping will be low when there is a high social stigma attached to its predation. When there is a weak social contract this social stigma is reduced. I posit that where we find authoritative and legitimate, tribal institutions we find corresponding strong social contracts and high social stigma attached to piracy. I propose that this one of the main conditions behind the absence of piracy.

Proposition 2:

*Presence of piracy is linked to higher lootability caused by increased economic **marginalization** of population centers*

High marginalization = High lootability

Low marginalization = Low lootability

I propose that when population centers have been marginalized their socioeconomic condition deteriorates, infrastructure dilapidates and lootable resources become more attractive as an alternative income. Transportation routes are hampered and the access to capital is reduced. The opportunity cost of engaging in violent forms of extraction and predation subsequently falls. **Proposition 2** is intimately linked to **Proposition 1** in that the marginalization of population centers may be exacerbated by a weakened social contract.

Proposition 3:

*Presence of piracy is linked to population centers with a greater reliance on **artisanal fishing***

Heavy reliance on artisanal fishing sector = High lootability

Low reliance on artisanal fishing sector = Low lootability

I propose that when a population center in Somalia is heavily reliant on its artisanal fishing sector it is increasingly perceptible to engage in illegal and violent predation on international shipping. Artisanal fishing is a particularly inflexible economic livelihood. Artisanal fishing consists of small-scale fisheries, where marginal profits are razor-thin and the risk of failure exceedingly high³⁵. This is because the traditional artisanal fisherman usually invests all of his scarce funds in necessary capital such as maritime transportation vehicles and gears³⁶ (Geheb and Binns 1997: 76-77). When maritime resources are scarce³⁷ and the marginal costs begin exceeding the marginal revenue, the alternative income-generating opportunities for the fisherman may be scarce. The fisherman moves from being the ‘price-maker’ to being the ‘price-taker’. I propose then that the shift from extracting fish and lobsters from the sea, and instead hijacking ships, involves a particularly low economic cost compared to other employment sectors. Lootability is high because fishermen usually have the knowledge and the means to engage in piracy. So *when* does a fisherman overcome the legal barrier and social stigma of engaging in illegal, violent predation on international shipping?

³⁵ If the produce of the sea does not have sufficient volume, is not sufficiently accessible, or for some reason is difficult to sell (even for a short period of time), the fisherman has a serious problem.

³⁶ The fisherman is reliant on netting a certain volume of maritime resources (lobsters, demersal fish, pelagic fish, etc.) on a regular basis to be able to make a living. Artisanal fishing is labor intensive and involves net-menders, fish-processing workers, salesmen, administrators and other fishing-related employment.

³⁷ Over-fishing, over-crowding, insufficient or destroyed vehicles and equipment.

Table 6.0 – Socioeconomic and climatic variables for Northern and Central towns and districts³⁸

Input												Output	
<i>Coastal towns and districts</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>P</i>
Sailac (Zeila)	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
Berbera	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
Xiis	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
Maydh	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
Laasqoray (Las Khorey)	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
Bosaso	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Qandala	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Caluula	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Bargaal	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Hordio	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Xaafuun (Hafun)	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Bandarbeyla	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Eyl	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Garacad	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Hobyo	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1

Input: (1 = present, 0 = absent)

A: Deep-water port³⁹

C: Traditional, cyclical grazing between inland-coast⁴¹

E: 150+ km by road to nearest major town/city⁴³

G: Somaliland⁴⁵

I: Major ground for industrial-scale trawling⁴⁷

K: Former British colony⁴⁹

B: Extreme food insecurity⁴⁰

D: Pop. center w/dominant artisanal fishing sector⁴²

F: Violent conflict since 1991⁴⁴

H: Puntland⁴⁶

J: Precipitation less than 50 mm/month⁴⁸

L: Former Italian colony⁵⁰

Output: (1 = present, 0 = absent)

P: Population center with piracy

These three propositions are meant to capture the variations in *governance*, *geography* and *economic feasibility* in Somalia. I propose that high lootability, and to some extent high obstructability, depend on the absence of institutional authority, the presence of peripheralized population centers and the presence

³⁸ For easier reading of the table I have highlighted *green* for absence of piracy and *red* for presence of piracy.

³⁹ Deep-water port, source: (Qayad 1997: 2)

⁴⁰ Extreme food insecurity, source: (FSNAU 2011)

⁴¹ Traditional, cyclical grazing between Inland-Coast, source: (PDRC 2004: 48; Sommerlatte and Umar 2000: ii)

⁴² Population center w/dominant artisanal fishing sector, source: (Gulaid 2004: 9; FAO 2005)

⁴³ 150+ km by road to nearest major town/city, source: (GoogleEarth 2011)

⁴⁴ Violent conflict since 1991, source: (Prunier 1995)

⁴⁵ Somaliland, source: (SWALIM 2009)

⁴⁶ Puntland, source: (SAC 2007; SWALIM 2009)

⁴⁷ Major ground for industrial-scale trawling, source: (Van Zalinge 1988)

⁴⁸ Precipitation less than 50 mm/month, source: (GPCC 2011)

⁴⁹ Former British colony, source: (Goodenough et al. 1931; Andrew 1934; UTEXAS 2011)

⁵⁰ Former Italian colony, source: (Goodenough et al. 1931; Tripodi 1999; UTEXAS 2011)

of a large artisanal fishing sector. To examine the explanatory power of these propositions we need to establish a set of variables that may account for variations across governance, geography and economic feasibility. In **Table 6.0** above I present a truth-table on various socioeconomic data on coastal towns and districts in Somalia. The presence of a variable is given the value 1, while the absence of a variable is given the value 0. Piracy in a population center is given 1 = present, 0 = absent. The qualitative nature of this thesis entails that I do give variables a name that signifies anything but their precise meaning, as well as their absence/presence. There is not an explicit variable detailing *governance*; however I argue Somaliland and Puntland to mask two distinctly different political systems.

6.1 Fragmentation: Somaliland's unity, Puntland's marginalization

Proposition 1:

Absence of piracy is linked to the presence of (tribal) institutional authority

In this thesis I argue that the political fragmentation of various regions in itself is not the cause of the onset of piracy, nor its continuation. What determines the variable of *governance* in Somalia is to what extent politically fragmented regions have become *marginalized*. I argue that while Somaliland was fragmented from the rest of Somalia its subsequent clan-driven, political developments prevented its marginalization and is an important explanation for the absence of piracy. It was particularly the early fighting over the port of Berbera, and the subsequent compromise reflecting the high social and economic value of this port, which effectively proved a buffer for any later predation on international shipping. Puntland, too, has been extensively fragmented from the rest of Somalia. The primary difference between Somaliland and Puntland is the respective absence and presence of a marginalized coastline. In Somaliland we find coastal towns and districts that have remained relatively 'tapped-in' to the rest of the region. The contrast is stark compared to the marginalized population centers in the Northeast.

6.1.1 Somaliland's unity

How did Somaliland avoid the political marginalization of its population centers and has this had led to an absence of piracy? The focus of the inquiry is on four population centers along the Coast; Zeila, Berbera, Xiis and Maydh. We want to understand why these population centers did not develop a predatory relationship to international shipping. I propose that an important factor contributing to the absence of piracy in Northwest Somalia is the political economy of pastoralism. When civil war broke out in 1991 Northwest Somalia already possessed an abundant natural resource in the form of livestock. It provided a stable income base for the vast majority of Northwest Somalia's population, whom engaged in the livestock economy on some level or another.

According to Le Billon there are four different types of resource-geography-conflict (RGC) relationships (see *Table 6.1* below):

Table 6.1 – Relation between nature/geography of a resource and type of conflict

	Point	Diffuse
Proximate	<i>State control/coup d’etat</i>	<i>Rebellion/rioting</i>
Distant	<i>Secession</i>	<i>Warlordism</i>

(Le Billon 2001: 573)

Although *Table 6.1* represents the types of conflict that we should expect depending on the spatial characteristics of the resource, I propose that there are similar mechanisms at work in relation to the looting of international shipping off Somalia’s coast.

In Northwest Somalia the difference between international shipping and livestock in terms of RGC is that the former is a ‘diffuse’ and ‘distant’ resource, while the latter is a ‘proximate’ and ‘point’ resource⁵¹. The political economy of looting international shipping thrives because said resource provides a highly profitable source of income compared to any other alternative. Because of the diffuse and distant spatial distribution of international shipping it also entails, however, that a ‘point’ control over the resource is hard to achieve. Le Billon (2001: 576) emphasizes that resource “[d]ependence is not only determined by geographical circumstances – the ‘gift’ of nature – [...] but also by the creation of markets and associated commodity chains, predicated upon the social construction of desirable resources”. While the income obtained by looting international shipping is lucrative it necessitates that political associations that vie for or hold power are willing to pay the price of predated a resource that is both diffuse and distant. Does it make sense for all types of political association to engage in the looting of international shipping? Although the profits obtained from the ransoms paid to the pirates are high, the evidence suggests that in Somaliland the comparative advantage is substantially higher than that of looting international shipping, both in terms of economic turnover and social cost.

With an estimated value (2000) of US\$ 200,000,000 per annum (Sommerlatte and Umar 2000: 43) the livestock economy in Northwest Somalia is not just profitable. It might as well be coined Northwest Somalia’s ‘white gold’. Berbera exported 2,372,656 sheep and goat, along with 64,606 cattle and 42,828 camels in 1996 (Sommerlatte and Umar 2000: 43), which was estimated to a value of US\$ 155,000,000.

This is a telling figure of just how profitable the livestock economy was a mere five years after the fall of Barre's regime. As a consequence any political association in the Northwest that wishes to obtain the easiest and most profitable access to a stable source of income will concern themselves with the livestock economy.

In Northwest Somalia the range is common property belonging to all pastoralists. As such, even though a sub-clan may inhabit a certain territory their grazing areas usually overlaps with those of other sub-clans. In the region scarcity of water has usually followed natural seasonal cycles, and because of the erratic nature of rainfall (Sommerlatte and Umar 2000: 4) the pastoralists follow cyclical movements with their livestock. There are three distinct geographical zones, the *Guban*⁵², the *Ogo*⁵³ and the *Haud*⁵⁴, and pastoralists move their livestock according to the month of the year and the presence or absence of drought. Pastoralists travel down to the coast (*Guban*) during the dry season to use the groundwater wells available there because of the relative scarcity of permanent sources of water in the interior (*Ogo* and *Haud*). However these latter zones flourish during the rainy season (Sommerlatte and Umar 2000: 4) and therefore provide lush grazing areas for the livestock. What we can draw from this cyclical pattern is that while Zeila and Berbera are important outlets for export, the coastal towns of Xiis and Maydh provide traditional sources of water for pastoralists during the dry season. Historically, as will be discussed in the next chapter, *all* of the towns along the Northwest coast would hardly merit the designation 'town'. Their populations fluctuated wildly between the negligible to the tens of thousands, depending on the season (Cruttenden 1849: 54-55). Due to the seasonal status of the coast the political economy of pastoralism in Northwest Somalia has developed a relatively weak relationship to maritime activity.

Moreover the cyclical pattern of pastoralism has engrained itself in the social fabric. Due to the communal nature of grazing the political structures of the clans and sub-clans have attained a likewise egalitarian streak. The clan system is both "[...] highly individualistic and democratic in nature. Clans and sub-clans are led by 'elders', generally senior, adult males, but the idea of 'elder' is not synonymous with 'chief'. 'Clan-heads' have little instated authority. At every level of political division policy is made by the elders concerned meeting in *ad hoc* councils (*shir*) in which every adult male traditionally has the right to speak" (Murphy 2011: 39). Due to the flexible nature of the primary economic activity (livestock) we find a likewise flexibility in the tribal institutions of reaching compromise. I examine the case of Berbera.

⁵¹ While it is undeniably true that livestock moves over large areas of land (and thus one would logically assume it being 'diffuse'), yet it is also true that the main profit obtained from livestock is exporting it from a handful of ports by the Gulf of Aden. As such, the control of ports such as Zeila and Berbera also entail access to the main livestock earnings.

⁵² The *Guban* or 'Burnt' due to the high temperature: The belt of coastal plains that stretches from Zeila in the extreme Northwest and towards Laasqoray in the Northeast (Sommerlatte and Umar 2000: 4).

⁵³ The *Ogo*: The highlands above the coastal plains (Sommerlatte and Umar 2000: 4).

Due to the sheer size of the livestock economy the highest profits were obtained from controlling the ports of Zeila and Berbera. These two ports functioned as ‘proximate’ and ‘point’ locations of this abundant resource, and is reflected in the coalescing of political associations around Berbera in particular with the collapse of Barre’s regime. In the immediate aftermath of the civil war the infrastructure in the inland towns of Hargeisa and Burco was respectively 10% and 30% intact, while the Zeila was leveled to the ground (Eubank 2011: 6). The widespread destruction meant that “[...] hospitals, schools, clinics and wells had all been destroyed, government offices ransacked, bridges blown up, and roads mined and made impassable” (Eubank 2011: 6). The lack of infrastructure and capital in the Northwest provided obvious obstacles in the region’s attempt in distancing itself from the wider civil war.

Internal divisions between the sub-clans of the *Ishaaq* began to surface early on. Although these sub-clans had been formally united under the banner of one political association, the Somali National Movement (SNM), a serious divide occurred between the *Ishaaq-Habar Yonis* on the one hand and the *Ishaaq-Habar Jelo* and *Ishaaq-‘Ilse Muse*. The central point of contention was the status of the port of Berbera and its undisputable status as the most profitable economic center in the Northwest. In 1992 the Somaliland government⁵⁵, headed by interim President Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’ (Pham 2010: 334) of the *Ishaaq-Habar Yonis* clan, attacked the port of Berbera on the grounds that the new state needed the income generated by the port. Up to that point the *Ishaaq-‘Ilse Muse*, whom were native to Berbera, had controlled the port but were unsatisfied that they had become temporarily politically marginalized in the new interim government. The *Ishaaq-‘Ilse Muse*, supported by the *Ishaaq-Habar Jelo* of Burco, resisted the attack and in the ensuing battle lasting over five months approximately 600 people were killed (Eubank 2011: 10). The interim government, unable to take control of Berbera, was forced to negotiate a revised power-sharing arrangement with the *Ishaaq-‘Ilse Muse* clan, *Ishaaq-Habar Jelo* clan and other politically marginalized clans across Somaliland.

Through the prism of Le Billon’s (2001) terminology the argument may be that the nature of the livestock export as a ‘proximate’ and ‘point’ resource favors state control. The compromise over the control of the port of Berbera seems a good example of this. Because the pastoral political economy in Northwest Somalia is engrained in its tribal institutions, their consequent political and social responsibilities will lie

⁵⁴ The *Haud*: The plateau stretching beyond the interior and into Ethiopia (Sommerlatte and Umar 2000: 4).

⁵⁵ The unity of sub-clans during the years of rebellion against Barre’s regime, under the banner of the SNM, led to the ‘Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples’ on May 18th 1991 (Yusuf 2003: 456). The 1960 Act of Union was rescinded and Somaliland was proclaimed a state on the grounds that it had always been a sovereign territory (albeit in Union with the South); it had been a separate state as a British Protectorate and had enjoyed a few weeks as an independent nation-state in the summer of 1960.

in ensuring the continued existence of active outlets for export. Moreover, the communal pastoralism entails a traditional ‘no borders, no harm’ approach to overlapping grazing, meaning that livestock as a resource allows for competition that *isn't* zero-sum. While neither Xiis nor Maydh are towns that export livestock, they are nonetheless part of the greater cyclical political economy that stretches all the way to the Ethiopian border. Population centers along the coast are therefore ‘tapped in’ to the political economy of the interior, and the social contract therefore possesses an inherently sustainable reciprocity.

Arguably, if we are to borrow an analogy from molecular physics, the three geographical zones of the Northwest can be viewed as three different systems, S_1 (Coast), S_2 (Highland) and S_3 (Plateau), with varying entropy according to their energy potential (i.e. *resource* potential such as availability of grasslands and water), p_1 , p_2 and p_3 . Because the resource potential rarely reaches a uniform temperature across the three systems, there will always be a flux of livestock from one system to another. During the rainy season p_2 and p_3 is high in S_2 and S_3 , but when the dry season sets in the net flux tends towards S_1 , because it offers higher energy potential, p_1 . The natural preference of pastoralists is low energy usage and maximum entropy, so they cycle between S_1 , S_2 and S_3 . What lies beyond the coast (out in the Gulf of Aden), C_x , is only relevant to the clan institutions when it acquires an energy potential that exceeds that of the combined systems of S_1 , S_2 and S_3 . As long as these three systems experience a relative equilibrium over time (i.e. sustainable pastoralism) the most important energy potential that C_x will have to offer is buying the pastoralist’s livestock. Perhaps only if the equilibrium across S_1 ⁵⁶, S_2 and S_3 is shattered a situation arises wherein international shipping becomes one of many other attractive energy potentials in C_x . I propose therefore that the tribal institutions of Northwest Somalia operate in a landscape where the economic incentive of engaging in the looting of international shipping is too low and the social cost is too high⁵⁷.

6.1.2 Puntland’s marginalization

I propose that the political marginalization of coastal population centers in the Northeast has been reinforced by and is largely due to the persistence of ‘valleyism’. In Northeast Somalia the general lack of progress in developing institutional authority and legitimacy beyond the initial 1998 inter-clan agreement has meant that there exists a ‘general’ social contract rooted in *kinship*, but that the security and socioeconomic development inherent in the social contract’s premise has failed to materialize. I posit that an important reason why there is an absence of piracy in Bosaso, and why there is a presence of piracy in

⁵⁶ In such a scenario the energy potential of S_1 remains constantly low because it is detached from the economy in the Interior.

⁵⁷ See *Appendix III* for further a discussion of institutions in the Northwest.

other coastal population centers, is because the State of Puntland has vested interests in the former, but not in the latter. Importantly, the towns from Qandala to Eyl (see *Figure 12.0* and *Figure 12.14*) do not have the dynamic relationship with the interior as witnessed in the Northwest. These marginalized ‘fishing-towns’ are unable to provide short-term economic profits to the state.

Bosaso is the only existing *port* in the Northeast and it has moved against the tide by experiencing an economic boom since 1991. As is the case for the *Ishaaq*-clan’s relationship to Berbera, the port of Bosaso offers a likewise lucrative outlet for the export of livestock for the *Darod*. And in the Northeast too, the livestock sector offers by far the largest income base to the State of Puntland⁵⁸. Prunier (1996: 9-10) reported that “[...] Boosaaso is a modern city, with a good electrical supply, a police force, shops replete with goods, (expensive) satellite telephone and fax connections, working banks, air conditioned hotels with CNN [...] and a crude but effective network of public transport”. Moreover, wrote Prunier (1996: 10), “Cattle traders are in constant touch with their Middle Eastern customers and the authorities dream of being able to modernize and enlarge the harbor which is crammed to full capacity”. Considering the point in time this report was written, it serves as an astonishing contrast to the onset of international shipping as a legitimate target: In 1996 “[...] the Kenyan merchant vessel *Clove*, captured by the ‘Somali Coast Guard’ in February [...] was the first merchant vessel to be held for ransom” (Arky 2010: 13).

Because Bosaso is the ‘Berbera of the Northwest’ it provides an abundant and lucrative income for the state. The absence of piracy seems largely to be the result of the fact that Bosaso early on presented a flourishing number of alternative activities that inhabitants of this population center can engage in (USAID 2009: 20-25). Because of its status as the only port in the Northeast, and the only population center with active trading ties to the regional economy (Prunier 1995: 23-24), the resulting social contract has rested on an economically reciprocal relationship between the State of Puntland and the inhabitants of Bosaso⁵⁹. Eubank (2011: 1) notes that “[...] studies of state formation in early and medieval Europe have argued that the modern, representative state emerged as the result of negotiations between autocratic governments **in need of tax revenues**⁶⁰ and citizens who were only willing to consent to taxation in exchange for greater government accountability”. The taxation of the livestock sector also provides incentives for the State of Puntland and the inhabitants of Bosaso to respectively supply and demand security, infrastructure

⁵⁸ There is also an influential demographic factor which highlights the predominance of Bosaso in the Northeast. Since 1986 the population has grown from 10,000 (Prunier 1996: 9) to 300,000 in 1996, and approximately 500,000 in 2009 (USAID 2009: 11). Indeed, in 1996 the percentage of the total population of the Northeast living in Bosaso was 40%, i.e. 300,000 out of a total of 700,000 (Prunier 1996: 9). Bosaso is also the only population center to be linked with an all-weather, tarmac road (built in the late 1980s) to the wider transportation network in Somalia (Prunier 1996: 9), as evident in *Figure 12.14*.

⁵⁹ The close proximity of piratical activities to the town of Bosaso has (ironically) had a profoundly negative impact on the 2000s and 2010s on fishermen in the area (PiracyReport March 18th 2011).

and accountability. Institutional authority is strengthened, and social capital increases. And by consequence the lootability of an illicit resource such as international shipping is reduced.

The main difference between the Northwest and the Northeast is that in the latter the ‘boom’ of the livestock sector in Bosaso has had little impact across the rest of the coast. I present the case that institutional authority was not strengthened here because none of these towns could provide relatively easy and quick income for a nascent state. We must not forget that while Bosaso developed into the commercial capital of the State of Puntland, it was only one of many coastal population centers up to the formation of Puntland in 1998. Consequently, what provided security and stability in Bosaso between 1991 and 1998, and which discouraged the onset of the looting of international shipping, was the presence of a viable social contract across the sub-clans. In Somalia institutional authority is defined by *tol iyo xeer*, ‘kinship and contract’ (Mohamed 2007: 226). Importantly, while kinship is the coinage of political competition, “[p]ractical kinship rather than ‘official’ kinship is the basis of group feeling [...]” (Mohamed 2007: 240), based as much on the (shifting) advantages of individual, business and corporate relations. Although it may be said that the Somali social contract entails leadership, but not kingship (Mohamed 2007: 228), its essential relational authority rests on a “[...] bargain between ruler and ruled” (Lake 2007: 25)⁶¹. The Somali social contract, when broken down into its most basic components, is thus similar to other social contracts; dependent on the provision of economic security between the ruler and ruled. This holds true for the population centers of Laasqoray, Qandala, Caluula, Bargaal, Hordio, Xaafuun, Bandarbeyla and Eyl as well.

According to Hoh (PBS October 29th 2009) both the *reason* and the *consequence* in the difficulty of extending the authority of the central government in Kabul to Afghanistan’s (southern) Pashtun tribal areas is the presence of ‘valleyism’⁶². While a comparison between Afghanistan and Somalia generally should be approached warily, I argue nonetheless that the concept of ‘valleyism’ provides a fruitful concept to elaborate on. The basic idea of ‘valleyism’ is that the institutional authority of central government has been historically weak in geographically and politically marginalized areas. Intuitively

⁶⁰ Added **bold**

⁶¹ In detailing the importance of institutional authority Lake (2007: 36) argues that “Maoist rebels in Nepal are earning legitimacy by restoring order in the absence of the state, providing justice through ‘people’s courts, collecting taxes, awarding contracts, providing basic health care, and aiding victims of flooding. In these and other cases, the first step towards legitimacy is the provision of a stable social order of value to the group’s members”.

⁶² In a PBS NewsHour interview former political adviser of the U.S. State Department, Matthew Hoh defined ‘valleyism’ as the idea of nationalism, but shrunk to a ‘much smaller level’; “These are folks who live within communities of 100 to 500 people. And that’s – I don’t want to say where their world ends, but that’s what they’re concerned with. And they have never had a central government there that has done any good, that has never – that has delivered services to them. And they have never had a central government that has brought them anything” (PBS October 29th 2009).

one would expect that the social contract of sub-clans in Northeast Somalia to remain relatively unaffected by the collapse of the central government in 1991. Yet, as underlined earlier, the inherent premise of the social contract is the provision of economic and social security. If international shipping can be understood as a lootable resource on par with resources such as opium then the decision to engage in its appropriation may follow a similar logic. In Afghanistan Mankin (2009: 203) points out that “[t]he opiate economy not only provides the economic opportunities at the local level, it also provides the incentives and revenues for stability. Local and tribal elites provide political goods to build their power [...]”. Indeed there is evidence of a similar political economy in the marginalized population centers of the Northeast. According to Marchal (2011: 41) piracy in Puntland “[...] consists of building support among clan elders, officials, and intellectuals, as well as a very entrepreneurial approach to the use of ransoms”.

The institutional authority of the elders across sub-clans and sub-sub-clans is here accountable to the provision of economic and social security. When Barre’s regime collapsed and Somalia moved into an ‘anarchic’ natural economy, the expectation is a rising pressure on clan elders to deliver goods and services in an increasingly unstable environment. While there is no less *Darod-Majerteen* dominance in Qandala or Xaafuun than in Bosaso, the two former experienced an onset in piracy, while the latter didn’t. ‘Valleyism’ provides a context; Bosaso is S_{1A} , Qandala is S_{1B} , Xaafuun is S_{1C} and the interior is S_2 . Unlike in the Northwest, only S_{1A} interacts actively with S_2 . The other coastal systems, S_{1B} and S_{1C} , scarcely interact with one another, and have a relatively non-existent relationship to both S_{1A} and S_2 . This in itself does not create the siege mentality of ‘valleyism’. What captures the weak institutional authority of S_{1B} and S_{1C} is their continuing diminishing energy potential over time. These population centers are marginalized from their fellow *Darod-Majerteen* institutions in Bosaso and the population centers of the interior. Consequently, the only real relationship S_{1B} and S_{1C} experience with another system is C_x , off the coast. Because there are no deep-water ports between the population centers of Qandala to Eyl the list of attractive trade-offs that C_x has to offer is very limited. Indeed, there might be only *two*: 1) marine resources and 2) maritime transportation⁶³.

⁶³ Maritime transportation denotes both fishing trawlers and international shipping.

6.2 The political economy of Northern Somalia

Proposition 2:

*Presence of piracy is linked to higher lootability caused by increased economic **marginalization** of population centers*

‘Spoil politics’ (Le Billon 2001) develop where institutions are weak and social capital is low. The road an illicit resource takes to arrive at high lootability is defined by the lowering of the social stigma. The resource won’t be truly lootable however, until it becomes economically rational to extract it. Usher (1989) separated economic activities in the natural economy between those that produce, and those that violently appropriate. The former is less attractive than the latter when there are higher costs involved. Lind, Moene and Willumsen (2009) emphasize the conflict-induced nature of illicit resource extraction, as opposed to it being the result of a planned strategy by rebels. Here the population is ‘reactive’ to the absence of law and order. This conflict-induced nature rests on the relative lowered costs of extracting a resource such as opium, with a ‘lessened reliance on roads and irrigations systems’, compared to other agricultural products. Ross (2003) points out the competitive advantage poor population centers have in the extraction of lootable resources because such resources are labor intensive rather than capital intensive. Moreover the extraction is not dependent on skilled labor. ‘Producers’ that engage in an economic activity with negligible or zero marginal productivity become ‘predators’ when an illicit resource offers higher marginal profits. Are towns with large artisanal fishing sectors more likely to engage in piratical activity?

There seems to be a complex relationship between *resource scarcity* on land, *resource abundance* at sea, the *pastoral identity* of the Somali clans and the veins of *international shipping* just off the coast. To concisely apply the lootability-obstructability theory we must first understand this dynamic. The following evidence allows for the suggestion that the social cost of engaging in the looting of international shipping has been *historically low* in *Northeast Somalia*. I argue that the cost of moving from ‘production’ to ‘predation’ in relation to piracy is uniquely low in Northeast Somalia’s coastal communities, for a number of reasons which we will examine in the following chapter.

6.2.1 The Northwest: *Insulated, but not marginalized*

The political economy of *looting* on Somalia’s Northeastern coast was primarily a reaction to the increasing activity of international shipping in the Gulf of Aden, spurred by the establishment of the Port of Aden as a British Protectorate in 1839. Although the Indian Ocean had been under varying degrees of

control across different regions and periods, by the Portuguese, Ottomans, French, Omani, Dutch and British, the trade between East Africa and its Arabian and Indian neighbors had persisted. Prior to British control of Aden the ports of Zeyla (Sailac) and Berbera had been the two only significant points of commerce along Somalia's Northern coast (see *Figure 12.15*). The chief exports were livestock and slaves from the interior⁶⁴. One of the *Ishaaq* sub-clans controlled the port of Zeila and levied a tax of one Maria Theresa thaler for every slave that was exported (Cruttenden 1849: 54). Yet the most important export for the pastoral clans of Northwest Somalia was livestock. The majority of the *Ishaaq*-clans lived in the interior, and migrated on the seasonal cycle between S₁, S₂, and S₃, except when everyone converged on Berbera for the biannual fair in March and October⁶⁵ (Cruttenden 1849: 54-55). At the height of the fair the population was estimated to reach ca. 20,000, but consequently dropping to a negligible figure (in the Northwest fishermen were usually seasonal, being pastoral for the rest of the year) until the next fair (Cruttenden 1849: 54).

Due to the natural resource scarcity across the entirety of Northwest Somalia the fair had become a vitally important biannual event for the entire population, irrespective of kinship. When pastoralists met Arabian and Indian merchants they would trade their livestock, slaves, gum arabica, myrrh, ivory, ostrich feathers and ghee. In return merchants from Bombay, Muscat, Ras el Khyma, Bahrein, Bussorah and Mocha⁶⁷ would trade rice, dates, tobacco, dungaree cloth, bars of iron, cash and other imported goods not available inland (Durrill 1986: 297). The biannual fair was such that the few foreign merchants that came to trade effectively established a monopoly on the export of goods from the interior. Pastoral Northwestern Somalis whom had made the long journey out to the coast sold their goods, and when they could afford to sell no more of their livestock (and having run out of its milk) were given an extended credit until the next fair (Durrill 1986: 297). The extension of credit to the local population secured Indian and Arab merchants a monopolistic grip on all export and import. Merchants were creditors and pastoralists were debtors, providing an uneven, but continuing (and perhaps stable) relationship. The dynamics of this relationship was somewhat pre-capitalistic; Somali pastoralists engaged in economic activity barely above

⁶⁴ The slave trade mostly funneled through the city of Hurrur (modern-day Harar, Ethiopia).

⁶⁵ As was true for the rest of region, the monsoon winds dictated the periods of time when merchants from India and Arabia would be able to trade their goods.

⁶⁶ Twice a year, with the reversal of the wind caused by the monsoons, merchants from Arabia and India would have the opportunity to dock at Berbera and trade with Northwest Somalia's pastoral population. Having witnessed the fair in 1848, British Lieutenant C. J. Cruttenden reported to the *Royal Geographical Society of London* in 1849 that: "The annual fair is one of the most interesting sights on the coast, if only from the fact of so many different and distant tribes being drawn together for a short time, to be again scattered in all directions. [...] During the height of the fair, Berbera is a perfect Babel in confusion, as in languages; no chief is acknowledged, and the customs of bygone years are the laws of the place" (Cruttenden 1849: 54-55). The description reflects the egalitarian nature of the Somali clan society, but also the *seasonal* nature of Berbera's status as a port.

⁶⁷ Respectively in modern-day India, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Iraq and Yemen

that of subsistence, made the seasonal trek to the coast to buy and sell the affordable quantity of goods, only to return to their nomadic lifestyle in the interior.

The establishment of a British Protectorate over the Port of Aden in 1839 had a profound impact on the political economy across Northern Somalia. But distinct differences emerged between the Northwest and the Northeast. In the Northwest (territory of the *Ishaaq-clan*) Zeila and Berbera⁶⁸ were both ancient (but seasonal) ports, exporting substantial quantities of livestock and slaves. The coast was largely uninhabited, with most of the clans residing with their herds in the interior. Yet although the export of livestock was a biannual event, the Northwest nonetheless had important economic veins stretching towards Hurrur in the interior and to the Arabian and Indian markets. In the Northeast there were three notable ports, Bander Khor, Caluula and Xaafuun, but none could match the seasonal veins in the Northwest. Thus, while the Northwest was insulated from the coast for most of the year, it was not marginalized from the wider regional economy (Cruttenden 1846: 113). In comparison, the Northeast had a more permanent attachment to its coast, but was in a much greater degree marginalized. This geographic irony I argue to have had a profound bearing on the development of an ‘economy of looting’ in the Northeast. When, after 1840, the Northeast managed to plug into the wider regional trade (almost to the same degree as in Zeila and Berbera) it did so by *shattering* the traditional basis of its economy, thereby creating a structural weakness both along the coast and in the interior that has persisted until this year of writing.

6.2.2 The Northeast: *Self-destruction*

Historically pastoralists from the interior (*Darod-Ogaden* and *Darod-Dulbahante*) as well as those residing in the immediate Northeast (*Darod-Warsangeli* and *Darod-Majerteen*) would travel to Bander Khor to sell their livestock in exchange for goods from Arabia and India. Besides livestock from the interior, the Northeast exported large quantities of gum arabica, an *abundant resource* along the coast (Durrill 1986: 292). The gum, sapped from acacia trees in the nearby mountains, was primarily a main source of income for population centers residing on the coast between Bander Khor and Xaafuun. While the population centers in the Northeast were smaller than the seasonal ones in the Northwest, they were nonetheless of a more permanent nature. From Bander Khor to Xaafuun various sparsely populated villages would sell, amongst other things, gum arabica, myrrh⁶⁹ and ivory to foreign merchants.

⁶⁸ In Berbera Cruttenden could report of the ruins of ancient aqueducts (Cruttenden 1849: 55).

⁶⁹ A highly valuable type of gum resin used for perfume, incense and medicine.

Besides these export articles the *Darod-Majerteen* were prone to *loot* the shipwrecks that foundered along the rocky coast. International shipping could not yet be described as a constant and abundant resource off the coast, but the inclination to loot the occasional shipwreck bore a strong resemblance to likewise inclination amongst Somali clans in looting livestock from each other (Durrill 1986: 304). The historical evidence of the roots of a peculiar relationship between the Northeastern clans and international shipping can be seen as early as 1801. On June 7th of that year a frigate of the East Indian Company, the *Weisshelm*, sailed just south of Cape Guardafui on its journey from India to Egypt (Durrill 1986: 287). In the turbulent southwest monsoon wind the frigate sailed off course, foundered and wrecked in the vicinity of Xaafuun. The following day the local inhabitants, of the *Darod-Majerteen* sub-clan, killed the survivors that did not escape and looted the ship's cargo. This incident would develop to be a recurring reality along this stretch of coastline. Durrill (1986) makes the interesting observation that "The Majeerteen alone among Africans systematically scavenged among the shipwrecks that regularly littered their shores" and that they "[...] confidently expected two or three European ships to be wrecked on their shores each season. When that happened, nearby residents converged on the site, chased away the survivors, and looted the vessel" (Durrill 1986: 287-289)⁷⁰. But in the course of the 19th century the 'economy of looting' had developed from that of the occasional shipwreck to being *engrained* in the political economy of the various sub-clans and sub-sub-clans of the *Darod-Majerteen*. How and *why* did this happen?

In 1839 the British East India Company established a garrison at the port of Aden, reacting to the increased need for security for the shipping lanes snaking upwards to Egypt (Durrill 1986: 295). British, French and American merchants were also gaining a foothold in markets traditionally controlled by Arabs and Indians. The result was an influx of European shipping in the Gulf of Aden and a likewise heightened frequency of shipwrecks (Durrill 1986: 295). Various coastal *Darod-Majerteen* sub-clans would pillage shipwrecks and *sell the loot* to merchants in Bander Khor. In the course of the 1840s one group of *Darod-Majerteen* merchants, the *Kaptallah*, recognized the potential profits of inserting themselves as middlemen in the import-export market, and particularly the emerging market at the Port of Aden⁷¹ (Durrill 1986: 298). To achieve this they subsequently founded the port of Bander Gassim, which later would be re-named *Bosaso*. To gain a foothold in Aden the *Kaptallah* and the various sub-clans of the *Darod-Majerteen* in the vicinity of Bosaso, Qandala and Caluula decided to strike a deal with the British. The British agreed that they would pay an annual tax of three hundred and sixty Maria Theresa thalers if

⁷⁰ In 1878 an American traveler reported that "A priest is stationed in the mountains near Cape Guardafui who prays day and night that God will drive Christian vessels ashore that they may plunder them!" (Durrill 1986: 289).

⁷¹ To secure a grip on Northeastern exports, the *Kaptallah* decided to no longer wait for the Inland pastoralists to arrive at the Coast. Rather they would buy the goods of Arab and Indian traders and set the exchange with pastoralists further Inland, instead of at the Coast. The result was a forfeit of bargaining power amongst the pastoralists; beneficial prices would be set

the *Darod-Majerteen* would refrain from looting the shipwrecks, and rather return both cargo and passengers to the security of Aden. Additionally the *Kaptallah* and the various *Darod-Majerteen* sub-clans would be allowed to ship livestock directly from Bosaso to Aden. The export of livestock to Aden in this way went from zero in 1839 to fifteen thousand animals per year by 1844 (Durrill 1986: 296).

Throughout the 19th century international shipping as a lootable resource was fairly unobstructable as the local population lacked the transportation and the technology to physically stop an ocean-going European vessel. Obstructability is defined by four variables: **1. Distance from the resource choke sector**, **2. Mean wind speed level**, **3. Law enforcement** and **4. Density of ships**. **Variables 1 and 4** are arguably converging here: The choke sector would here represent the international shipping route off the Cape and in the 19th century this would cluster in fairly predictable routes of sailing. Wind speeds (**Variable 2**) off the Cape are on average high throughout the year, and law enforcement (**Variable 3**) in the un-colonized Northeast would be non-existent. The British raised the possibility of erecting a lighthouse at Cape Guardafui, but this was protested by the local *Darod-Majerteen*. Visiting the area in 1909 Giulio Baldacchi noted that “A little beyond Olok rises the majestic promontory of Guardafui, where these many years past a lighthouse has been projected [but the] inhabitants are violently opposed to the idea, seeing themselves about to be deprived of a very profitable source of income” (Baldacchi 1909: 71). From the mid-19th century and onwards European vessels passing by the treacherous Cape would continue to lack any form of guidance from the shore. Although obstructability offshore was low, the geographic and climatic nature of the Cape provided a fairly high obstructability *onshore*.

With an emerging market at Aden the political economy in the *Darod-Majerteen* territories was being irreversibly altered. The Northeast was intent on moving from its traditionally marginalized status to establishing regional economic ties. Seeking to dominate this trade the *Kaptallah*'s demand for increasing margins of profit led to an increased demand for the livestock of the pastoralists that lived Inland. The pastoralists responded to this demand by increasing the size of their herds, which could only be achieved by abandoning traditional selective grazing, and instead pursuing an intensive use of *all* pastures simultaneously (Durrill 1986: 301). The effect was a disastrous overgrazing across pastoral lands in the Northeast region, which the Northwest largely avoided. Although droughts had regularly occurred in Northern Somalia, the Northeastern pastoralists stopped responding to the drought by reducing their herd; instead they grew uncontrollably larger (Durrill 1986: 301). By the mid-1850s the port of Bosaso was exporting one thousand and fifteen tons of gum arabica, as well as unprecedented volumes of

by the *Kaptallah*, instead of the pastoralists having the possibility of trying to achieve higher prices with the foreign merchants.

frankincense and myrrh, to Aden, Muscat, Bombay, Zanzibar and Kenyan ports (Durrill 1986: 299). The income from sales, and taxes on export and import, led to a political economy in the Northeast where wealth was accumulating amongst the *Kaptallah* and various sub-clan leaders in Bosaso. Importantly this wealth was not distributed to sub-clans living in other ports such as Qandala, Caluula and Xaafuun.

The income earned by the export of livestock in the Northwest was distributed amongst the *Ishaaq*-clans when they travelled *back* inland. In the Northeast this traditional political economy was shattered when wealth was accumulating in Bosaso, a permanent and growing settlement, while the subsistence economy of inland pastoralists and other coastal populations remained unaltered. This horizontal inequality between sub-clans controlling Bosaso and all other sub-clans led to greed and grievances amongst the latter. One sub-clan residing in Caluula, the *Darod-Majerteen*-*'Ali Suleymaan*, intensified their *looting* of shipwrecks to challenge the economic monopoly of the *Kaptallah* (Durrill 1986: 303). Although looting increased temporarily it could not compete with long-term trends. Although the Suez Canal⁷² had opened in 1869 the advent of ocean-going ships driven by *steam*, and not wind, meant that shipwrecks were becoming more infrequent. More importantly, the backbone of Northeast economy had been rapidly disintegrating with the onset of a pastorally-induced ecological disaster. In 1868 Northeast Somalia experienced its first prolonged famine, which lasted until 1872 (Durrill 1986: 302). By 1900, when the Italians had begun raking up large swathes of Southern Somalia (Baldacchi 1909: 59), most of the livestock export in the Northeast had evaporated against the increasing sophistication of the port of Berbera. Berbera had become the primary exporter of meat to the British garrison in Aden. In Berbera the British had established a permanent port, enlarged the harbor and begun providing security for the (still) seasonal caravans from the inland (Durrill 1986: 305). **Figure 12.16** shows evidence of a Northeast which has the (dubious?) honour of being the only un-colonized stretch of coastline in all of East Africa.

I hold that the 'delicately balanced environment' of the Northeast was been destroyed by a contradictory relationship wherein a fragile, pastoral economy met the full force of a mercantilist and expansionist regional economy. Durrill (1986) points out that "Decisions once made locally [...] fell into the hands of livestock buyers in Aden who had little stake in the condition of Somali pastures" (Durrill 1986: 305). Yet the political economy of the Northeast was equally a creation of local *Darod-Majerteen* merchants whom expanded production where none was viable. In a region where resource scarcity and droughts were *natural*, the expansion of the pastoral economy with little consideration for the ecological capacity of the land led to its long-term destruction. Resources scarcity was not in itself an issue in Northeast Somalia, and neither was the resource abundance of gum arabica, myrrh and frankincense. Rather it was a man-

⁷² The 'Highway to India' catapulted the Gulf of Aden into the top international shipping routes.

made shift from relatively low-gear subsistence to high-gear production. Several thriving coastal ports began disappearing and the historical, cyclical droughts were leading to an unprecedented recurrence of famine well into the 20th century.

6.3 Puntland's marine Mecca

Proposition 3:

*Presence of piracy is linked to population centers with a greater reliance on **artisanal fishing***

The devastating impact of the famine in the Northeast, described in 1882 by the French explorer George Revoil as 'atrocious misery' (Durrill 1986: 304), escaped the isolated population centers on the *coast* in the sense that they had little livestock to lose. The coastal villages sprinkled around the Cape; Qandala, Caluula, Hunda, Bargaal, Hordio, Xaafuun and Bandarbeyla, had traditionally endured an interdependent relationship with the inland pastoralists, but were not directly impacted by the loss of livestock. These population centers had exported gum arabica, tragacanth⁷³, myrrh, shark's fins, fish, fish-teeth, ivory and ambergris⁷⁴ to foreign markets as far away as China, and to closer ports in Arabia, India and the Swahili coast, from where they would import such goods as corn, cloth and dates (Miles 1872: 70). While these population centers were mostly fishing communities there were persisting structural barriers to the export of fish.

6.3.1 The coast is closed

In Somalia there is a clear disdain for and lack of disposition to eat *fish* (Yassin 1981: 3). Upon his visit in Northern Somalia in 1854 English explorer Richard Burton noted this aversion: "They despise the excellent fish with which Nature has so plentifully stocked their seas" and recalled a widely-used insult amongst the pastoralists: "Speak not to me with that mouth which eateth fish!" (Burton 1856: 154-155). This hostile relationship to fish has entailed that the numerous population centers hugging the Coast have endured a non-existent *domestic* market. I argue that this would develop from an accepted reality (but of limited consequence) to become a severe limitation for the coastal population centers in their relationship with the interior.

While the first serious famine to hit Northeastern Somalia (1868-1872) was primarily caused in the interior, it had long-term consequences for the population centers on the Northeast coast. The domestic market had been non-existent, but it seems that its absence became more apparent when traditional

⁷³ A type of water-soluble gum used as a binding for leatherworking and textiles.

⁷⁴ A highly valuable substance excreted by sperm whales; its fragrance used for a fixative for perfumes.

alternative sources of income were beginning to dry up. The tip of the Horn had served an abundance of natural resources for time immemorial and was well-documented in *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (Greek periplus⁷⁵ from ca. 1st century A.D.). “Frankincense in great quantity and of the best grade” had been exported from Qandala, Caluula and Xaafuun (Schoff 1912: 26) to Arabian and Indian markets, reports the writer of the periplus. Furthermore the tip of the Horn was known as *Regio Aromatifera* by the Romans due to its abundance of myrrh and other variations of gum (Schoff 1912: 87), and the largest river in the region was the ‘Elephant River’; the region abounding in supply of highly coveted ivory (Schoff 1912: 26). On his visit to Xaafuun in 1848 the English Lieutenant C. J. Cruttenden took note of this trade: “Elephant hunting is followed by those who have guns; and last year upwards of 35 were killed by a party of gun-men brought by a speculating Somali from Brava on the coast” (Cruttenden 1849: 75). In 1872, when the Northeast had been engulfed for four years in the aforementioned famine, Captain S. B. Miles reported that “The supply of ivory has almost ceased, and there is only one elephant-hunter left in town” (Miles 1872: 70). His further testimony provides an indication of the structural collapse of the economy, and the gross depletion of once abundant natural resources: “The river is said to have been the resort of wild elephants until three years ago; since then they have only reappeared once. [...] The universal drought in the country had visited this place: they had hardly any rain for a year, and the river was dry in consequence. All human habitants had no ceased, and I was told that none were to be met with for a long distance in front. [...] The hills were all entirely destitute of verdure, and I saw no frankincense or gum-arabic trees anywhere on the journey” (Miles 1872: 75). The 1868-1872 collapse of the economy in the Northeast seems to hardly have abated nearly *four decades* later, when Baldacci on his visit to the coast reported that “Kandala has no water whatever, and that which the inhabitants have to fetch from Bander Kor is brackish. [...] In Damu and Olok⁷⁶ [the] people are very poor, and eke out a living by fishing **and trading in goods plundered from wrecks**⁷⁷ on the east coast” (Baldacci 1909: 65-70).

The isolated population centers of the coast had remained relatively well off until they’re traditional interdependence with the interior had ceased. The pastorally-induced famine in the Northeast had violated the delicate ecological balance in the region, and destroyed much of the alternative sources of income that both coastal fisherman and inland pastoralist had depended upon. The evidence suggests a traditional cycle of water scarcity versus relative water abundance. Following intensive overgrazing this developed into a chronic state of water scarcity. While the Northeast coast had been isolated, it had not become truly marginalized from the rest of Somalia until the outward trade with regional markets *also* dried up. The historical supplies of gum arabica, frankincense, ivory and ambergris were under heavy stress due to the

⁷⁵ Periplus: a manuscript that details important ports, coastal landmarks and trade routes

⁷⁶ Olok was coined the ‘Market of Spices’ in *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (Schoff 1912: 86).

chronic water scarcity and overexploitation, and the merchants who had come to buy them no longer arrived. Instead Berbera emerged as the primary export market for what was traditionally a niche in the Northeast. This debilitating structural weakness to the economy of Northeast population centers *already* living on the fringe persisted well into the 20th century⁷⁸, and is apparent in the next sub-chapter.

6.3.2 Artisanal fishing in the Democratic Republic of Somalia

Not until 1971 did Somalia establish an institution that dealt specifically with its marine resources. Shortly after its *coup d'état* Barre's revolutionary council had decided to establish the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Transport (Yassin 1981: 26). The Barre regime and its doctrine of *scientific socialism*, inspired by the industrial scale growth of fellow socialist regimes, was decidedly intent on casting away the traditional Somali distaste for fish. Of the 3.5-4 million Somalis residing in the country in 1981, approximately 60 percent were inland pastoralists (Yassin 1981: 26). As we learned earlier, these pastoralists saw the Indian Ocean as a "[...] barrier to their 'free movement' and not as a food source" (Yassin 1981: 26). The Barre regime had in the course of the 1970s recognized the enormous potential of the marine resources waiting patiently off the coast. A pelagic⁷⁹ fish assessment survey by the Norwegian research vessel *Dr. Fridtjof Nansen* in 1975-1976 had provided solid confirmation of the presence of major fish stocks. The average width of continental shelves are 15 km, but off the Northeast coast the width is nearly 60 km (Yassin 1981: 3). The vast aquatic habitat is fed an upwelling of cold, nutrient-rich currents, enabling a fertile environment for phytoplankton and zooplankton, and producing favorable conditions for a variety of pelagic fish (Yassin 1981: 3).

Because of these rich fishing grounds the Barre regime, in the contemporary socialist fashion, organized artisanal fishing communities across the coast⁸⁰ into cooperatives. The organization of artisanal fishing cooperatives was meant to boost the sector, with the government providing technical and financial support (Yassin 1981: 26). Additionally the cooperatives were meant to partner with larger fishing companies so to gain a foothold in the regional market. To boost the domestic consumption of fish the Barre regime mandated that markets in Mogadishu were not permitted to sell meat two days a week; only

⁷⁷ Added **bold**.

⁷⁸ Xaafuun is an exception; during Italian control a salt works was established. The high-quality salt would be "[...] piled on carriers and elevators and later conveyed by rail to the terminus of an overhead cable connecting the mainland with Hafun [...] There it is stored in suitably constructed warehouses, endless belt-carriers taking it to the required level on the floors. Between October and March [...] an average a 9000-ton steamer [is] loaded every three days. The steamers lie ¾ km. off-shore, and carriers run out on cables [...] About 300 Europeans and 2000 natives find employment" (Andrew 1934: 91).

⁷⁹ Pelagic fish reside in the habitat of Coastal waters, with Inshore fish occupying the slender and sunlit waters above the continental shelf (as opposed to Offshore fish that inhabit the deeper waters off the continental shelf).

⁸⁰ In Coastal population centers such as Zeila, Berbera, Xiis&Maydh, Laasqoray, Bosaso, Qandala, Caluula, Bandarbeyla, Hobyao and Eyl.

fish (Yassin 1981: 40). Yet the initial pro-fish campaign would have limited effect in an economy where the artisanal fishing sector itself was marred by structural weaknesses. Somalia's recurring droughts were increasingly becoming synonymous with famine. In 1975 a nationwide famine led to ca. 250,000 inland pastoralists losing their livestock, causing widespread displacement of population groups. Of these the Barre regime decided the unprecedented move of resettling ca. 15,000 pastoralists to the coast. By 1981 the number of Somalis engaged in the artisanal fishing sector was ca. 20,000 (Yassin 1981: 27). Of these ca. 4,000 were fishermen, 10,000 part-time fishermen and the remainder 'administrators, net-menders, processing workers, storekeepers, and watchmen' (Yassin 1981: 27). A report, "Somali Fisheries Development and Management" (1981), noted that "The fishing cooperatives are not yet self-supporting so the government assists [them] with food, clothing, medical facilities, and schools" (Yassin 1981: 27). Although the artisanal fishing sector had received an influx of surplus labor due to the resettlement its flawed structure seems to have only worsened this.

Along the coast only the ports of Berbera, Mogadishu and Kismayo had sufficient facilities for large-scale export, and they were also the only locations with ice⁸¹ plants and other freezing and processing facilities (Yassin 1981: 35-37). In Qandala and Laasqoray tuna canneries had been built (in respectively 1935 and 1966), but they were operating at minimum to capacity because there was insufficient *delivery* of fish. This is a telling evidence of the still isolated condition of the artisanal fishing communities and the continued persistence of 'valleyism'. Delivery from the coast to the processing plants and export sites was bottlenecked by the absence of 'all-weather roads', with most of the communities only connected to the road network by hazardous dirt roads⁸² (Yassin 1981: 37). Moreover fishing cooperatives along the coast were complaining about the fixed price of their produce, which the Barre regime had set to 3.50 Somali Shilling per kilo, *irrespective of the quality* (Yassin 1981: 43). The fixed price meant that fishermen had little incentive to catch 'high value species' or improve the sales and processing technology. The 1978 FAO report advised that "Since the development of a network of roads is a long and expensive process, a quicker alternative would be a system of carrier boats suitably equipped with refrigerated holds which could all at all these villages" (Yassin 1981: 41). Yet by 1991 this had still failed to materialize, and with the onset of the civil war Somalia's fishing communities were about to embark on 20 years (and counting) of scarce to non-existent funding.

⁸¹ The modern-day regional fishing economy mandated the export of *fresh fish* to a greater extent than the traditional dried variants in the Northeast. In the hot climate (averaging over 30°C) of Somalia's Northern and Eastern coasts fish spoil quickly.

⁸² A contemporary report by United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) noted that "Road communications are extremely difficult and some do not exist. Villages such as Eil⁸² are extremely isolated and marketing of produce is a serious problem" (Yassin 1981: 41).

6.4 The merits of *lootability* and *obstructability*

Access to many fishing settlements that dot the coastline is hampered by impassable roads and non-existent telephone and postal services. So if, say, pirate ships are spotted fishing illegally offshore on one of these settlements, it can take several days before the relevant authorities in the bigger towns are notified.

- EAM (2001)

The onset of civil war in Somalia involved the collapse of state institutions and an abrupt end to artisanal fishing cooperatives along the coast. I argue that the lack of institutional authority and the increased marginalization of coastal communities that rely heavily on artisanal fishing largely explains the *onset* of piracy. In **chapter 6.1** I examined the basis of ***Proposition 1; Absence of piracy is linked to the presence of (tribal) institutional authority***. In **chapter 6.2** I detailed the unity of the Northwest and the marginalization of the Northeast on the basis of ***Proposition 2; Presence of piracy is linked to higher lootability caused by increased marginalization of population centers***. Finally in **chapter 6.3** I discussed the continued structural weaknesses of the artisanal fishing sector, as a context for ***Proposition 3; Presence of piracy is linked to population centers with a greater reliance on artisanal fishing***.

The lootability of international shipping in the Northeast became significantly enhanced with the disappearance of the central state and the marginalization of the coast. But does this explain the onset of piracy? I argue that the decision to engage in piratical activity was a coastal reaction to the presence of industrial-scale foreign fishing trawlers, but was also reliant on advances in technology. Lootability and obstructability were mutually enhanced in the course of the 1990s. But it was particularly the increased *obstructability* of international shipping that took place in the early years of the 2000s that accelerated piratical activity. As quoted earlier, Zimmerman (1951: 814) stated that “Resources are highly dynamic functional concepts; they are not, they become, they evolve out of the triune interaction of nature, man, and culture”. And indeed in Somalia this had once before been true of the Northeast coasts’ relationship to international shipping. In the 1990s the necessary ‘condition, means and forces of production’ would once again crystallize into an environment in which international shipping became a highly valuable and increasingly legitimate target in the eyes of the inhabitants of the coast.

After the onset of civil war Somalia experienced a steady influx of small arms. This inflation of weaponry meant that violent appropriation became a widespread pursuit of trade. Whatever historical equilibrium existed between ‘predation’ and ‘production’ was temporarily shattered, providing social and economic legitimacy to a ‘culture of looting’ (Webersik 2004: 520). The exception to this norm was found in the border-areas, where less predatory trade with the regional economy was still ongoing. As in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, Cambodia and Afghanistan (Nest, Grignon and Kisangani 2006: 42), the safest locations in Somalia to engage in trade was in the border-areas. As a

consequence regions bordering Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, and the larger ports of Berbera and Bosaso, would remain the few areas where commerce was relatively unimpeded. Consequently Bosaso is the only coastal town in Northeast Somalia to experience an absence of prolonged, violent conflict. Bosaso, along with Zeila and Berbera, and inland border towns will naturally be of primary interest to actors such as the Somaliland and Puntland governments for purposes of income. The beneficial reciprocal relationship provides an obvious mandate for security and development of infrastructure. Across Somalia's inland the livestock trade was lucrative even during the early years of the civil war, with it being a commodity that is easily transported and more importantly, not dependent on infrastructure (Little 2003: 91).

This stands in sharp contrast to the infrastructure-dependent artisanal fishing sector. In the numerous artisanal fishing communities dotted along the Northern and Eastern coastlines of Somalia the collapse of the state institutions has meant an absence of maritime control⁸³. A six-week UN inter-agency coastal assessment mission found that the now open waters off the Somali coast were principally exploited by foreign fishing trawlers whom had found an ungoverned source of 'high-value tuna, shark and ray fins, lobster, deepwater shrimp and demersal whitefish' (Coffen-Smout 1998: 1). Likened to an intensive 'mining operation', it was noted that the ungoverned extraction of large quantity of biomass from these waters could lead to a sudden collapse of stocks, as well as the 'long-term socio-economic welfare of coastal communities' (Coffen-Smout 1998: 1). The result of intensive overfishing in Somali coastal waters has been the transformation of areas previously rich in biomass into 'marine deserts' (EAM 2001: 1). The presence of foreign fishing trawlers in Somali waters outside a Coast already underdeveloped, marginalized and completely dependent on its marine resources, have tipped the scale towards piracy. During a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Dubai in 1998 Somali businessmen reported the presence of no less than 300 foreign-owned vessels (unreported, unregulated and untaxed) off the Northeast coast. Coined 'invading ships' by the local artisanal fishing communities, the conference participants reported that they were so numerous that "[...] the glow that emanates from their combined lights at night can be mistaken for a well-lit metropolitan city" (EAM 2001: 1).

⁸³ The already documented underdevelopment of Somalia's coastal artisanal fishing communities found immediate competition in one particular species; *lobster*. In the relatively calmer winds between monsoons, in October-November and February-April, artisanal fishermen from Xaafuun and southwards to Eyl employed rudimentary traps (made of woven sticks) to catch lobsters (Fielding and Mann 1998: iv). These techniques served as scarce competition against the industrial-size trawlers sweeping the continental shelf off Somalia. These industrial-scale trawlers also functioned as offshore processing-plants, able to haul several tonnes of biomass onboard in the course of a six-hour shift (EAM 2001: 1). Although the trawlers would specifically attempt to catch marine products such as high-value lobsters the use of fine-mesh nets (three-layered) meant an indiscriminate catch. This low-value 'bycatch' (representing the majority of catches) would only end up being dumped overboard (EAM 2001: 1), leading to a gross waste of marine resources.

Lootability is the “[...] ease with which [a resource] can be extracted and transported by individual or small team of unskilled workers”. And obstructability is the extent to which a resource “[...] can easily be blocked by a small number of individuals with few weapons” (Ross 2003: 54). But both of these mechanisms need a spark; an exogenous trigger that catapults the resource toward its irresistible lootability and subsequent extraction. I argue that *need* captures socioeconomic desperation, *greed* captures the entrepreneurial opportunist and *grievance* the relatively deprived who wishes to level the playing field. These three concepts also explain why the spark was absent in the Northwest, but present in the Northeast. I defined obstructability through four variables; **1. Distance to resource choke sector**, **2. Mean wind speed level**, **3. Law enforcement** and **4. Density of ships**. This measure gives us the following obstructability across the eight resource choke sectors off Somalia’s Coast (see **Figure 12.21**).

Three RCS; *Aden Alley*, *Red Sea Alley*, and *Mogadishu Alley* stand out with a high and stable degree of obstructability across the months of the year. All of these three resource choke sectors are geographically proximate to the Somali coast. *Aden Alley* and *Red Sea Alley* also have amongst the highest density of ships. Consequently we expect the first pirate attacks to happen at these locations since the other resource choke sectors, *Oman alley*, *MIS alleys* and *Gulf alley* are more distant and therefore harder and riskier to extract from. **Figure 6.2** below shows the number of reported acts of piracy between July 1999 and July 2002. Bar a single attack in *India Alley* (under *Maldives*, *India*, and *Seychelles Alleys*), all reported incidents in this period happened in *Aden Alley*, *Red Sea Alley*, and *Mogadishu Alley* (collectively I coin them the *RAM Alleys*). This squares well with which resource choke sectors we would expect to dominate when gauging degree of obstructability. Moreover it is indicative of the small-scale nature of piracy up to the early years of the 2000s⁸⁴.

While obstructability is high through *Aden Alley* (indeed *Red Sea Alley* is geographically closer to the Northwest than the Northeast) we find only find acts of piracy in the Northeast. Walter (2004: 371) notes that rebellion “[...] will have little chance to get off the ground unless individual farmers, shopkeepers, and potential workers choose to enlist in the rebel armies that are necessary to pursue a war”. She lays down two important enabling conditions for this ‘take off’; “The first is a situation of individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction with one’s current situation. The second is the absence of any nonviolent means for change” (Walter 1995: 371). I argue that these two enabling conditions are directly transferable to the mechanisms behind the onset of piracy. Walter’s argument is that hardship and poverty only spawn rebellion when the violent means for change becomes an attractive (or the only) option. Arnson and Zartman (2005: 260)

⁸⁴ The complete dominance of the *RAM Alleys* is also true for the period 1991-1998, but is not reflected in this figure. While the civil war began in 1991 I find that acts that can positively be identified as acts of piracy don’t occur until 1995 and onwards.

concur, pointing to (*effective*) *governance* as the prime suspect separating the presence and absence of rebellion. Legitimate institutions also mask a society's relationship with legal/illegal resources. The legality of a lootable resource is, according to Ross (2003: 55), more likely to benefit the rebels, "[...] unless the government is willing to endure international sanctions". As posited in ***Proposition 1*** the expectation is that confrontations (between respective coast guards and foreign fishing trawlers) that occurred in the Northwest and Northeast are different in that there is a peaceful outcome in the former, but not in the latter. I find, on the whole, that all three propositions⁸⁵ have merit in explaining the absence and presence of piracy. Yet while the combination of weak institutional authority, economic marginalization and heavy reliance on artisanal fishing seem to combine to form 'spoil politics' and predation on international shipping, it does seem that the historical baggage of the Northeastern clans is especially pronounced, if not unique.

⁸⁵ See ***Appendix V*** for a micro-comparison of six Northern Somali towns

7.0 Conclusion

The aim in this thesis has been to understand why there has been an absence of piracy in Northwest Somalia while it has flourished in the Northeast. Having previously examined the relationship between resources and rebels in Afghanistan I was struck by the striking similarities between the appropriation of opium there and the predation on international shipping in Somalia; both activities are illegal; both are cheap to carry out and involve relatively little infrastructure; both are lucrative; both thrive in the absence of strong institutions, both are difficult to ban, both are self-financing and both are, curiously, seasonal. Another striking similarity are the extremely adaptive criminal networks that develop in their wake, and the torrent of literature that attempts to analyze it. What seems to be a commonality between Afghanistan and Somalia is that the inherent illegality of lootable resources becomes the prime focus, overshadowing our understanding of *why* there is opium production and piracy. Yet to understand why opium poppy production and piracy persist in recruiting new labor we need to know why an opium poppy farmer in Marjab⁸⁶ and a fisherman in Xaafuun decide that they are better off engaging in an illegal economic activity.

To concisely address the nature of Somalia's piracy I have therefore introduced a portion of political science and economic literature that deals with lootable resources and their relation to actors in an anarchic natural economy of conflict. Need, greed and grievance details the motivation and opportunity of *rebellling*. I posit that recruitment to *piracy* follows similar mechanisms. When individuals decide to engage in piracy they're decision to do so can be explained through the concepts of *lootability* and *obstructability* of a resource. I posit that at the crux of high lootability and high obstructability we find a potent mix underlining why some population centers encounter a lowered cost of transforming into a piratical enterprise compared to others. I put forward three propositions on the presence or absence of *institutional authority*, *economic marginalization* and *artisanal fisheries*. I find that the absence of piracy in Northwest Somalia is largely explained by the presence of (tribal) institutions built on a social contract intimately tied to Coastal population centers. However I came across a finding which I did not expect and which, to my knowledge, has not been given much attention in the current literature on piracy. What is unique about the Northeast is that the lowered social cost of engaging in piracy cannot be solely attributed to the presence of civil war and social disintegration. It is also an historical baggage. While the precise activity of hunting down and hijacking international shipping is a recent phenomenon in Somalia, the activity of *looting* international shipping is historical and no stranger to the shores of the Northeast. The introduction of lootability and obstructability captures this relationship. While the currently activities

offshore are acts of piracy, they are only an extension of the historical practice of violently appropriating a societally defined lootable resource.

Furthermore, while it seems that population centers that are heavily reliant on artisanal fisheries are more likely to have a presence of piracy, the causal mechanism remains ambiguous and warrants further research. The thesis has found clear evidence that international shipping off Somalia's Coast should largely acknowledge its international cousins, the *fishing fleets*, in attaining an *eau de resource*. However, a large-N statistical study could provide an improved buffer towards endogeneity on the arrow of causation on the triangular relationship of artisanal fisheries, foreign fishing trawlers and piracy. Why are population centers that are heavily reliant on artisanal fisheries more likely to have a presence of piracy? Is it because of limited alternatives for economic diversification and 'illegal competition', leading to a lowered opportunity cost of violent appropriation of foreign fishing trawlers? Or are population centers that are heavily reliant on artisanal fisheries (who by consequence have marine equipment and transportation) more likely to have a presence of piracy because pirates *target* such population centers? I suggest further development of these three propositions; particularly concerning the availability and distribution of small arms⁸⁷, which I have regrettably have not had the opportunity to discuss in detail. The availability and distribution of arms would serve two functions; as an availability variable: The low-tech premise of obstructability; and as a distributional variable: A measure for the level of social capital in a population center. Intuitively I would expect higher distribution of arms to be a measure of lessened social capital, increasing the likelihood that violent appropriation is viewed as a more 'accepted' economic activity; but this warrants further research.

⁸⁶ A fertile agricultural district in Helmand province, Afghanistan

⁸⁷ Small arms: AK-47, G3A4, AKM and other assault rifles, light machine guns and pistols (as well as rocket-propelled grenades such as RPG-7).

8.0 Bibliography

- Addison, Tony and S. Mansoob Murshed (August 2001): "From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract", *United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research*, Discussion Paper No. 48.
- Andersen, Svein S. (1997): *Case-studier og generalisering – Forskningsstrategi og design*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Andrew, R. B. W. G. (1934): "The Somali Coasts: An Account of the T. A. Glover Senegal-Somali Expedition in the Somalilands and Eritrea", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 81-97.
- Arky, Aaron S. (2010): "Trading Nets for Guns: The Impact of Illegal Fishing on Piracy in Somalia", *Master thesis at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California*.
Web-link: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Sep/10Sep_Arky.pdf
- Arnson, Cynthia J. and I. William Zartman (2005): *Rethinking the Economics of War – The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press..
- Baldacci, Giulio (1909): "The Promontory of Cape Guardafui", *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 9, No. 33, pp. 59-72.
- Buh, Abdikarim Haji Abdi (2010): "Warlords and TFG talks in Addis Ababa – Another Deadly Contract from the Tigreya", *Mareeg Online*.
Web-link: <http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=15220&tirsan=3>
- Burton, Richard F. (1856): *First Footsteps in East Africa; or An Exploration of Harar*, London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans.
- Chenery H. and T. N. Srinivasan (eds.) (1988): *Handbook of Development Economics – Volume 1*, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
- Coffen-Smout, Scott (1998): "Pirates, Warlords and Rogue Fishing Vessels in Somalia's Unruly Seas",
Web-link: <http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/~ar120/somalia.html>
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (1998): "On economic causes of civil war", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 50, pp. 563-573.
- Collier, Paul (2000): "Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy", *Development Research Group, World Bank*.
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2000): "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", *Policy Research Working Paper*.
Web-link: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/06/17/000094946_00060205420011/Rendere d/PDF/multi_page.pdf
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004): "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, pp. 563-595.
- Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner (2009): "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 61, pp. 1-27.
- Cramer, C. (2002): "*Homo Economicus* Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War", *World Development*, Vol. 30, No. 11, pp. 1845-1864.
- Cruttenden, C. J. (1849): "Memoir on the Western or Edoor Tribes, Inhabiting the Somali Coast of N.-E. Africa, with the Southern Branches of the Family of Darrood, Resident on the Banks of the Webbe Shebeyli, Commonly Called the River Webbe", *Journal of the Royal Geographic Society of London*, Vol. 19, pp. 49-76.
- de Soysa, Indra (2000): "The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?" in Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds.) (2000): *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- de Soysa, Indra (2002a): "Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie, or Honey Pot?", *Global Environmental Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 1-34.
- de Soysa, Indra (2002b): "Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 395-416.
- Dovring, Folke (1967): "Unemployment in Traditional Agriculture", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Part 1, pp. 163-173.
- Durrill, Wayne K. (1986): "Atrocious Misery: The African Origins of Famine in Northern Somalia, 1839-1884", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 91, No. 2, pp. 287-306.
- EAM (2001): "Militia vs Trawlers: Who is the Villain?",

- Web-link: <http://www.ecop.info/e-news/e-news-01-07-9.htm>
- Eckstein, Harry (1980): "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence", in Ted Gurr (ed.) (1980): *Handbook of Political Conflict – Theory and Research*, The Free Press, United States.
- Edgeworth, F. Y. (1881): *Mathematical Physics – An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences*, London: C. Kegan Paul & Co.
- Web-link: <http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/edgeworth/mathpsychics.pdf>
- Eubank, Nicholas (2011): "Taxation, Political Accountability, and Foreign Assistance: Lessons from Somaliland", *Forthcoming in *Journal of Development Studies*.
- Web-link: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1621374
- EUNAVFOR (2011): "Mission", Web-link: <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/>
- FAO (2005): "Fishery Country Profile – The Somali Republic", *Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations*. Web-link: <http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/SOM/profile.htm>
- Fielding, P. J. and B. Q. Mann (1999): "The Somalia Inshore Lobster Resource – A Survey of the Lobster Fishery of the North Eastern (Puntland) Between Foa and Eyl During November 1998", *The Somali Natural Resources Management Programme, IUCN-EARO*.
- Web-link: http://epub.sub.uni-hamburg.de/epub/volltexte/2009/1355/pdf/1999_088.pdf
- FSNAU (2011): "Somali Integrated Food Security Phase Classification – Rural, Urban and Selected IDP Populations – January-June 2011", *ReliefWeb*.
- Web-link: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9A67912186AC438D8525783A005923C3-map.pdf>
- Gates, Scott (February 2002): "Recruitment and Allegiance – The Microfoundations of Rebellion", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 111-130.
- Geheb, Kim and Tony Binns (1997): "'Fishing Farmers' or 'Farming Fishermen'? The Quest for Household Income and Nutritional Security on the Kenyan Shores of Lake Victoria", *African Affairs*, Vol. 93, pp. 73-93.
- Giustozzi, Antonio (ed.) (2009): *Decoding the New Taliban – Insights from the Afghan Field*, Hurst & Company.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter (May 1998): "Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 'Special Issue on Environmental Conflict', pp. 381-400.
- Goodenough, William et al. (1931): "The Anglo-Italian Somaliland Boundary: Discussion", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 121-125.
- GoogleEarth (2011): "Google Earth 6.0". Web-link: <http://www.google.com/intl/no/earth/download/ge/agree.html>
- GPCC (2011): "GPCC Landsurface Monitoring Product 1.0", *Deutscher Wetterdienst*.
- Web-link: <http://kunden.dwd.de/GPCC/Visualizer>
- de Groot, Olaf J., Matthew D. Rablen and Anja Shortland (2011): "Gov-aargh-nance – 'Even Criminals Need Law and Order'", *Working Paper No. 01, CEDI Discussion Paper Series*.
- Grossman, Herschel I. (September 1991): "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections", *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 912-921.
- Grossman, Herschel I. (1999): "Kleptocracy and revolutions", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 51, pp. 267-283.
- Gulaid, Ahmed H. O. (2004): "Feasibility Report on the Fisheries Sector in Somaliland", *Discussion Paper, United Nations Development Programme, Somalia*.
- Web-link: http://www.somalilandlaw.com/sl_fisheries_feasibility_report.pdf
- Gurr, Ted R. (1970): *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- HAB (1994): "On the Brink of Massive Famine", *The Horn of Africa Bulletin*, Vol. 6, No. 4.
- Web-link: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/HAF_Sum_94.html
- Hall, Richard (1998): *Empires of the Monsoon – A History of the Indian Ocean and its Invaders*, London: HarperCollins.
- Halpern et al. (2009): "Supporting Online Material for 'A Global Map of Human Impact on Marine Ecosystems'", *Science*, Vol. 319, No. 5865, pp. 948-952.
- Hansen, Stig Jarle (2009): "Piracy in the greater Gulf of Aden – Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies", NIBR Report No. 29.
- Web-link: <http://www.nibr.no/uploads/publications/26b0226ad4177819779c2805e91c670d.pdf>
- Hastings, J. V. (2009): "Geographies of state failure and sophistication in maritime piracy hijackings", *Political Geography*, Web-link: http://www.cistp.gatech.edu/publications/files/Hastings_Piracy.pdf
- Hesse, Brian J. (2010a): "Lessons in successful Somali governance", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 71-83.
- Hesse, Brian J. (2010b): "Introduction: The myth of 'Somalia'", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 247-259.

Hirshleifer, Jack (1994): "The Dark Side of the Force", Western Economic Association International 1993 Presidential Address. Web-link: <http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Hirshleifer/Hirshleifer172.pdf>

Hirshleifer, Jack (1995): "Anarchy and its Breakdown", *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 26-52.

Hirshleifer, Jack (2001): *The Dark Side of the Force – Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom.

Hobbes, Thomas (2008 [1651]): *Leviathan*, Oxford University Press.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1994): "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 5-40.

ICG (2009): "Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland", *Africa Briefing*, No. 64.
Web-link: <http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivejun09/090815601.pdf>

IMO (September 1999): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – Third quarterly report – July to September 1999", *MSC/Circ.935*.

IMO (January 2000): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – Fourth quarterly report – October to December 1999", *MSC/Circ.939*.

IMO (April 2000a): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – First quarterly report – January to March 2000", *MSC/Circ.944*.

IMO (April 2000b): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC./Circ.945*.

IMO (May 2000): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.968*.

IMO (June 2000): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.969*.

IMO (July 2000): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.972*

IMO (August 2000): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.973*.

IMO (September 2000): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.974*

IMO (October 2000): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.976*

IMO (November 2000): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.977*

IMO (December 2000): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.985*

IMO (January 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.989*

IMO (February 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.990*

IMO (March 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC/Circ.992*

IMO (April 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.1*

IMO (May 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.2*

IMO (June 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.3*

IMO (July 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.5*

IMO (August 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.6*

IMO (September 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.7*

IMO (October 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.9*

IMO (November 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.10*

IMO (December 2001): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.11*

IMO (January 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.13*

IMO (February 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.14*

IMO (April 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.15*

IMO (May 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.17*

IMO (June 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.18*

IMO (July 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.20*

IMO (August 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.21*

IMO (September 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.23*

IMO (October 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.24*

IMO (November 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.25*

IMO (December 2002): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.27*

IMO (January 2003): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.28*

IMO (February 2003): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.30*

IMO (March 2003): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.31*

IMO (April 2003): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.33*

IMO (May 2003): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.35*

IMO (June 2003): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.36*

IMO (July 2003): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.37*

IMO (August 2003): "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships", *MSC.4/Circ.38*

- IMO (June 2008b): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.119*
- IMO (June 2008c): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.120*
- IMO (July 2008): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.122*
- IMO (August 2008): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.124*
- IMO (October 2008a): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.125*
- IMO (October 2008b): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.126*
- IMO (November 2008): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.127*
- IMO (March 2009a): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.128*
- IMO (March 2009b): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.129*
- IMO (March 2009c): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.130*
- IMO (April 2009): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.134*
- IMO (May 2009): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.136*
- IMO (June 2009): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.137*
- IMO (July 2009): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.138*
- IMO (August 2009): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.141*
- IMO (September 2009): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.142*
- IMO (October 2009): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.143*
- IMO (November 2009): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.145*
- IMO (December 2009): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.146*
- IMO (January 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.147*
- IMO (February 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.148*
- IMO (March 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.149*
- IMO (April 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.150*
- IMO (May 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.154*
- IMO (June 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.155*
- IMO (July 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.156*
- IMO (August 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.157*
- IMO (September 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.159*
- IMO (October 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.160*
- IMO (November 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.161*
- IMO (December 2010): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.164*
- IMO (January 2011): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.165*
- IMO (February 2011): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.167*
- IMO (March 2011): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.168*
- IMO (April 2011): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.170*
- IMO (May 2011): “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”, *MSC.4/Circ.171*
- INCB (1988): “United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances”, United Nations. Web-link: http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/conv/1988_convention_en.pdf
- Ivey, William Noël (2008): “Robin Hood or Al Capone? Natural resources and conflict in India’s Naxalite insurgency” in Magnus Öberg and Kaare Strøm (eds.) (2008): *Resources, Governance and Civil Conflict*, London: Routledge.
- JRC (2010): “Travel time to major cities: A global map of Accessibility”, Routledge, New York.
Web-link: <http://bioval.jrc.ec.europa.eu/products/gam/sources.htm>
- Kelti, J. Scott (1890): “The Partition of Africa”, *Proceeding of the Royal Geographic Society and Monthly Record of Geography*, Vol. 12, No. 11, pp. 655-666.
- Korpi, Walter (1974): “Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 1569-1578.
- Leach, M. and R. Mearns (eds.) (1996): *The Lie of the Land – Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment*, London: Villiers Publications.
- Le Billon, Philippe (2001): “The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts”, *Political Geography*, Vol. 20, pp. 561-584.
- Lewis, I. M. (1959): “Clanship and Contract in Northern Somaliland”, *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 29, No. 3.
- Lewis, I. M. (1965): *The Modern History of Somaliland – From Nation to State*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson..
- Lewis, I. M. (1994): *Blood and Bone – The Call of Kinship in Somali Society*, The Red Sea Press.

- Lewis, I. M. et. al. (1995): “A Study of Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options”, *London School of Economics and Political Science*.
Web-link: http://tobiashagmann.freeflux.net/files/media/horn/docs/lewis_mayall_1995_decentralised-structures-somalia.pdf
- Lewis, I. M. (2002): *A Modern History of the Somali – Revised, Updated and Expanded*, Ohio University Press.
- Lichbach, Mark Irving (1998): *The Rebel’s Dilemma*, University of Michigan Press.
- Lind, Jo Thori, Karl Ove Moene and Fredrik Willumsen (2009): “Opium for the masses? Conflict-induced narcotics production in Afghanistan”.
Web-link: <http://www.nupi.no/Arrangementer/Kommende-arrangement/Opium-for-the-Masses-Conflict-induced-narcotics-production-in-Afghanistan>
- Little, Peter D. (2003): *Somalia – Economy Without State*, Indiana University Press.
- Lloyd, Marshall Davies (1998): *Polybius and the Founding Fathers: The Separation of Powers*.
Web-link: <http://mlloyd.org/mdl-indx/polybius/intro.htm>
- Lujala, Päivi (2009): “Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 50-71.
- LUXSPACE (2010): “Global Ship Density (mean value)”, LuxSpace Sarl.
Web-link: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/maritimeforum/system/files/AIS_Issue3_AllShip_densityMap_0.pdf
- Madison, James (2004 [February 27, 1788]): “Federalist Paper No. 62 – Nature and Stability of the Senate”, in William H. Gross (2004): “The Federalist Papers”.
Web-link: http://www.onthewing.org/user/Pol_Federalist%20Papers.pdf
- Malanczuk, Peter (2006): *Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law – Seventh Revised Edition*, Routledge.
- Mankin, Justin (2009): “Gaming the System: How Afghan Opium Underpins Local Power”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 195-209.
- Marchal, Roland (2011): “Somali Piracy: The Local Contexts of an International Obsession”, *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 31-50.
- Menkhaus, Ken (2007): “The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts”, *African Affairs*, No. 106, Vol. 204, pp. 357-390.
- Meredith, Martin (2006): *The State of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, London: The Free Press.
- Miles, S. B. (1872): “On the Neighbourhood of Bunder Marayah”, *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, Vol. 42, pp. 61-76.
- Minahan, James (2002): *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations*, Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Mohamed, Jama (2007): “Kinship and contract in Somali politics”, *Africa*, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 226-249.
- Muller, Edward N. (1980): “The Psychology of Political Protest and Violence”, in Ted Gurr (ed.) (1980): *Handbook of Political Conflict – Theory and Research*, The Free Press, United States.
- Murphy, Martin N. (2011): *Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa*, London: Hurst & Company.
- Nest, Michael, Francois Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani (2006): *The Democratic Republic of Congo – Economic Dimensions of War and Peace*, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- NOAA (2011): “Visualize CDC Derived NCEP Reanalysis Products Surface Level Data”, *Earth System Research Laboratory – Physical Sciences Division*. Web-link: http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/cgi-bin/DataAccess.pl?DB_dataset=CDC+Derived+NCEP+Reanalysis+Products+Surface+Level&DB_variable=Wind+Speed&DB_statistic=Mean&DB_tid=30223&DB_did=39&DB_vid=1070
- Oberschall, Anthony (1978): “Theories of Social Conflict”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 4, pp. 291-315.
- PBS (October 29th 2009): “Ex-State Department Official Explains Exit Over Afghan War Strategy”, *PBS NewsHour*, Web-link: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/july-dec09/hoh_10-29.html
- Percy, Sarah and Anja Shortland (2010): “The Business of Piracy in Somalia”, *Discussion Paper 1033, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin*.
- Pham, Peter J. (2009): “Peripheral Vision”, *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 5, pp. 84-90.
- Pham, Peter J. (2010): “Putting Somali piracy in context”, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 325-341.
- PiracyReport (March 18th 2011): “Pirates Stealing Local Fishing Boats, Motors – Local Economy Devastated by Piracy in Bosaso”, *SomaliaReport*.
Web-link: http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/330/Pirates_Stealing_Local_Fishing_Boats_Motors
- Ploch, Lauren et al. (2009): “Piracy off the Horn of Africa”, *Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress*.
Web-link: <http://www.nps.edu/research/mdsr/Docs/R40528.pdf>

- Prunier, Gérard (1995): “Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990-1995”, *Writenet*.
Web-link: http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/somalia/country_conditions/Prunier.pdf
- Prunier, Gérard (1996): “Somalia: Update to End of August 1996”, *Writenet*.
Web-link: http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/somalia/writenet96_somalia_prunier.pdf
- Qayad, Mahdi Gedi (1997): “Assessment Mission to Somalia in Connection with Alleged Dumping of Hazardous Substances”, *Mission Report, Joint UNEP/DHA Environmental Unit and the UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) for Somalia*, Web-link: <http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1109388>
- Ragin, Charles C. (1987): *The Comparative Method – Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, University of California Press.
- Ragin, Charles C. (2008): *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*, University of Chicago Press.
- ReliefWeb (December 8th 2010): “Somalia: Thousands at risk as severe drought hits Mudug”.
Web-link: <http://reliefweb.int/node/377345>
- Reynolds, Lloyd G. (1965): “Wages and Employment in a Labor-Surplus Economy”, *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 55, No. 1-2, pp. 19-39.
- Ross, Michael L. (2003): “Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Role of Natural Resources in Civil War”, in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.) (2003): *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict – Beyond Greed and Grievance*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Ross, Michael L. (2004): “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases”, *International Organization*, No. 58, pp. 35-67.
- Rotberg, Robert I. (2002): “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 85-96.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (2004 [1762]): *The Social Contract*, Penguin Books Ltd.
- Ryan, Michael J. (2010): “The Origins and Challenges of Somali Piracy”, *Master thesis, Peace Operations Training Institute*. Web-link: <http://www.peaceopstraining.org/theses/ryan.pdf>
- SAC (2007): “Bari, Nugaal, Northern Mudug, Sanaag, Sool Regions and Buhoodle District in Togdheer Region – Landmine Impact Survey 2005/2007”, *Survey Action Center*.
Web-link: http://www.sac-na.org/pdf_text/somalia_ph3/SOM2&3_PosterMap.pdf
- Schoff, Wilfred H. (ed.) (1912): *The Periplus of the Erythræan Sea – Travel and Trade in the Indian Ocean by a Merchant of the First Century*, New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.
- Sii’arag, Duale A. (2005): “The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the Somali Inhabited Regions in the Horn of Africa”, *WardeerNews*.
Web-link: http://wardheernews.com/articles/November/13_Alittihad_Sii%27arag.html
- Sommerlatte, Malte and Abdi Umar (2000): “An Ecological Assessment of the Coastal Plains of North Western Somalia (Somaliland)”, *Somali Natural Resources Management Programme*.
Web-link: http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Coastal_Plains.pdf
- Stewart, Frances et. al. (2001): *War and Development – Volume 1: The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict*, Oxford University Press.
- SWALIM (2009): “Chapter 1 – Administrative”, *Atlas of Somali Water and Land Resources*.
Web-link: <http://www.faoswalim.org/downloads/Chapter%201.pdf>
- SWALIM (2010): “Swalim Product Catalogue 2010”, *Somalia Water and Land Information Management System*.
Web-link: <http://www.faoswalim.org/userfiles/SWALIM%20Catalogue%202010.pdf>
- Termansen, Dan B. (2011): “Counter Piracy off Somalia; A Case for Applying the Comprehensive Approach Strategy?”, *Naval War College*.
Web-link: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA536267>
- The Economist (April 20th 2011): “Brigands Seeking Harbours – Why Pirates Like a Little Law and Order”.
Web-link: <http://www.economist.com/node/18586874>
- Tripodi, Paolo (1999): “Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled Independence”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2-3, pp. 359-380.
- Unitarium (2010): “Speed Units Converter”, Web-link: <http://www.unitarium.com/speed>
- UNHCR (1996): “Somalia: Information on the clans in control of Galcayo, Gelinsoor and Hobyoo and on current conditions in these areas”, *Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada*, Document SOM23634.E.
Web-link: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c22541,4565c25f515,3ae6acff4c,0.html>
- Unterreiner, B. (2009): “The Cost of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden”, *Montana State University, Department of Economics*. Web-link: <http://www.docshare.com/doc/202143/The-Cost-of-Piracy-in-the-Gulf-of-Aden>
- USAID (2009): “Bosasso Urban Household Economy Study”, *FEWSN*. Web-link: <http://www.feg-consulting.com/resource/reports/Bosasso%20Livelihood%20Baseline%20%20Study%20Report.pdf>

- Usher, Dan (1989): "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State", *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 79, No. 5, pp. 1031-1044.
- UTEXAS (2011): "Alula – Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland", *PCL Map Collection*, NC 39.
Web-link: <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/imw/txu-oclc-6654394-nc-39-3rd-ed.jpg>
- Van Zalinge, N. P. (1988): "Summary of Fisheries and Resource Information for Somalia" in Sanders, M. J., P. Sparre and S. C. Venema (eds.) (1988): "Proceedings of the Workshop on the Assessment of the Fishery Resources in the Southwest Indian Ocean", FAO/UNDP.
Web-link: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/field/303859/3038590b.htm>
- Walter, Barbara F. (2004): "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 371-388.
- Weber, Max (1919): "Politics as a Vocation", Web-link: <http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/weber.pdf>
- Webersik, Christian (2004): "Differences That Matter: The Struggle of the Marginalised in Somalia", *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 516-533.
- Weir, Gary E. (2009): "Fish, Family, and Profit – Piracy and the Horn of Africa", *Naval War College*.
Web-link: <http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/fb5704fd-61c8-4c93-bbc7-5db7894a9808/Fish,-Family,-and-Profit--Piracy-in-the-Horn-of-Af>
- West, Jessica (2006): "The Political Economy of Organized Crime and State Failure: The Nexus of Greed, Need and Grievance", *Innovations: A Journal of Politics*, Vol. 6.
- WHO (2005): "Somalia: Extent of Affected Areas due to Tsunami", *Somalia maps, Health Action in Crises*.
Web-link: http://www.who.int/hac/crises/som/maps/en/Somalia_18Jan2005.pdf
- Wikipedia (2011): "Classe Vasco da Gama", Web-link: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classe_Vasco_da_Gama
- Yassin, Mohamed (1981): "Somali Fisheries Development and Management", *Master thesis at Oregon State University*. Web-link: http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/dspace/bitstream/1957/6400/1/Mohamed_Yassin_ocr.pdf
- Zimmermann, Erich (1951): *World resources and industries; 2nd revised edition*, New York: Harper & Brothers.

9.0 Appendix I: *Somalia's social contract*

While the Somali may be coined a homogenous people (if only to separate them from any other East African family of genes) this should not mask the complexity of their social relations. Common to all Somalis is the social structure built on patrilineal descent and which breaks off into innumerable branches and sub-branches of kinship. As a consequence all relationships, whether social, political or economic, are built around kinship. But, stresses Lewis (1994), the clan (kinship) politics of Somalia are not necessarily rigid and entrenched. The individual engaging in Somalia's genealogical cosmos may throw his support behind a clan, sub-clan, sub-sub-clan, etc. depending on the issue, the opposition and the context (Lewis 1994: 96-97). Therefore we find in various genealogical levels a flexible set of responses to political and socioeconomic realities. The result, contends Lewis, is that Somalia's clan politics on a macro level is quite stable, but on an individual level it may be rather volatile (Lewis 1994: 97).

The clan politics of Somalia are structured somewhat differently dependent on geographic location. There is primarily a difference between the nomadic peoples that inhabit the dry, arid North and Northeast (modern-day Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug), and those that inhabit the fertile valleys of Southern Somalia. In the North and Northeast we find Somalia's arid belt that stretches from the border with Djibouti in the Northwest and which runs along the entire coastline eastwards to Cape Guardafui (the tip of the Horn). After that the arid, semi-desert landscape snakes downwards the Eastern coast until around the vicinity of Mogadishu, where the interior erupts into wider variations of moist soils and fertile landscapes. An important difference between the North(*west*) and the Northeast however is what the interior has to offer for the respective coastal population centers. In the North the mountainous interior supplies a constant source of groundwater, available just beneath the 'sandy soil' (Lewis 1965: 2). In the Northeast the population centers hugging the desert coastline have scarcely the same availability or refuge in their corresponding interior. From Caluula by the Gulf of Aden and downwards to Ceeldheer (just south of the pirate hub of Harardheere) the interior is bush-lands and a mostly hostile landscape. Across these regions of Somalia we find rough divisions of clans. The *Dir* and *Isaaq* clans in the North, the *Darod* in the Northeast and the *Digil* and *Rahanweyn* in the South. We find the *Hawiye* in both the East and South. Lewis points out that the social structure in Southern Somalia is largely influenced by those of the nomadic peoples in the north, transmitted through waves of southwards immigration across centuries (Lewis 1994: 133). However, since the South represents a much larger mosaic of different peoples and socioeconomic backgrounds the clan politics have subsequently become 'expanded', but also looser and less centralized.

The roots of the fluid and ‘shifting-sands’ politics of the Somali we find in the socioeconomic nature of their past. As they have historically been a nomadic people (and large numbers still are primarily in the North) the Somali have for a very long time been subject to uncertainties of the next rainy season and a general scarcity of resources (Lewis 1965: 2). The (anarchic) natural economy of their nomadic lifestyle has infused a ‘rugged individualism’ into their clan politics (Hesse 2010: 250). Historically this limited access to pastoral land and sources of water has produced politics of alliances and counter-alliances that are temporary and contextual⁸⁸ (Hesse 2010: 250). The instrument of this interaction is achieved through contracting (*heer*). The (social) contract entered upon through various agnatic relationships is crucial to Somali engagement with one another. The contract conveys not only kinship but political affiliation (Lewis 1994: 97). Political affiliation of course *varies*, depending on how far back one chooses to pinpoint the ancestral lineage: *the immediate family? The sub-clan? The clan?* Somali politics is contextual, and *context means kinship* as relates to the kinship of others. Arguably we may understand the political capital that a Somali draws upon in his day-to-day business as his kinship capital: *What genes do you have in your bank? And which account do you intend to use today?*

Because the social contract in Somalia revolves around kinship we also expect legitimate institutional authority to draw on clan relations. Institutions that rest on power structures and authority other than the clan will, logically, be doing so on a highly volatile and perhaps illegitimate basis. The Democratic Republic Somalia, in existence from the 1st of July 1960 until the end of January 1991, is a prime suspect of how unstable the system becomes when the kinship capital of some clans hits inflation relative to others. It took about six months between independence and the first attempted *coup d’état* in December 1960 (Lewis 2002: 173). From the first hoisting of the united Somali flag there was extensive dissatisfaction amongst clans in Northern Somalia (former British Somaliland, and modern-day Somaliland) about their representation and political opportunities in the South. Furthermore the National Assembly in Mogadishu was seen less and less by Somalis as the incarnation of their traditionally egalitarian clan politics, but instead as “[...] a sordid market-place where, with little concern for the interests of those who had voted for them, deputies traded their votes for personal gain” (Lewis 2002: 206). The widespread discontent with the (civilian) government led to a military *coup d’état* on October 21st, 1969. A few days later on November 1st General Muhammad Siyad Barre along with twenty-four officers declared the institution of a new government under the leadership of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) (Lewis 2002: 207). Under the leadership of Barre and the SRC Somalia entered into an ill-

⁸⁸ Hobbes asserted that: “For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as he shall think best; in the same manner as a very small company of soldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their arms, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword” (Hobbes 2008 [1651]: 136).

conceived experiment of *scientific socialism*. (Lewis 2002: 209) Its primary aim: The total dissolution of clan politics.

Inspired in varying degrees by the socialist ideologies of Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung and Gamal Abdel Nasser, the new government began in 1971 with a national campaign of anti-clanism. The regime mandated that from now on every Somali would greet one another as *jaalle* (comrade) rather than *ina'adeer* (cousin) (Lewis 2002: 210). The latter was considered 'tribalistic' and filled with negative connotations of clan and kinship. Nationalist and undifferentiated 'Somali' identities would replace the lineage relationships that traditional Somali identities had been intrinsically built upon (Lewis 2002: 210). At the helm of Somalia's new state hierarchy stood General Muhammad Siyad Barre, of the *Darod* clan, as the 'Victorious Leader'. In the ensuing years Barre's regime began resembling a state-organized version of his sub-clan faction, the *Marehan*. There was scant time before Somalia's scientific socialist state was the incarnation of traditional clan politics, *albeit disguised*. After Barre had won 99.9 percent of the vote in the December 1986 national election (Lewis 2002: 255) even the most pessimistic observer could not predict that Somalia was close to collapsing into anarchic civil war. The most important positions and ministries of government were concentrated in the hands of the closest kin, with *Marehan* representing nearly a half of the senior corps in the military and most top positions inside the Ministry of Defence (Lewis 2002: 256). Yet the resilient 'rugged individualism' of Somali clan politics meant that this concentration of *Marehan* power only increased jockeying across its various genealogical branches. This renewal of internal and inter-clan divisions along with the disastrous economic impact of the failed Ogaden War (Meredith 2006: 466) with Ethiopia and the subsequent end of financial backing from the Soviet Union to Somalia (Lewis 2002: 260-261) meant that the pan-Somali unity of scientific socialism began ringing hollow. Somalia's economy had been in a ruinous decline as the external (socialist) life-support system had withered away (Meredith 2006: 469). Dilapidation of state structures and the uneven establishment of goods and services in large swathes of the country meant that by 1990 Barre had received the unflattering title of 'Mayor of Mogadishu' (Meredith 2006: 469). On the 25th of January 1991 he was chased out of the capital by General Muhammad Farah 'Aideed and his *Hawiye* clan factions (Lewis 2002: 264). The date marked the end of the Democratic Republic of Somalia. State institutions and socialist credentials collapsed under the weight of clan warfare.

10.0 Appendix II: *Clans and institutions of Northeast Somalia*

Puntland is mostly made up of the *Darod* clan, which may be divided into three dominant sub-clans, the *Majerteen*, the *Dulbahante* and the *Warsangeli* (Pham 2009: 87). These three sub-clans make up what is collectively known as the *Harti*⁸⁹ sub-clan (Lewis et. al. 1995: xiii). In Puntland the Coast has historically been occupied by the *Darod-Majerteen*, from the port of Bosaso in the North down to the port of Garacad⁹⁰, while the *Darod-Dulbahante* and the *Darod-Warsangeli* have controlled respectively the Inland, and the Northern coast east of Bosaso⁹¹ (UNHCR 1996: 1). Prior to the outbreak of civil war Puntland-based Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) had begun engaging in guerilla warfare against the Somali central government, which intensified following a failed *coup d'état* against Siyad Barre's regime in 1978 (Pruner 1995: 4). The SSDF was essentially an organization composed of the *Darod-Majerteen*. Following the collapse of the Somali state the SSDF fought for the control over Puntland against the Wahhabi Islamist group *al-Itihaad al-Islamiya*⁹², whom primarily consisted of the *Darod-Ogaden* sub-clan. Having initially taken control of the port of Bosaso in March 1991, the *al-Itihaad al-Islamiya* was pushed back by the SSDF in June 1992 (Sii'arag 2005: 1). In this same time period the SSDF fought the United Somali Congress⁹³ (USC) for control of the Inland town of Galcayo. As Puntland's population between Bosaso and Garacad is primarily the *Darod-Majerteen*, both the *al-Itihaad al-Islamiya* and the USC, as non-*Majerteen* clans, found scarce popular support in the various towns and districts and were consequently defeated by the SSDF (Sii'arag 2005: 1). Following a period of internal power struggle in the SSDF (Prunier 1995: 24) and a prolonged period of inter-clan warfare, the three *Harti* sub-clans the *Darod-Majerteen*, *Darod-Dulbahante* and *Darod-Warsangeli* followed the example of Somaliland, and established the State of Puntland in May-August 1998 (Marchal 2011: 37).

⁸⁹ The correct genealogical term would then be *Darod-Harti-Majerteen*, *Darod-Harti-Dulbahante* and *Darod-Harti-Warsangeli*, however for the sake of simplicity they will be referred to as the *Darod-Majerteen*, *Darod-Dulbahante* and *Darod-Warsangeli*. Suffice to say that traditional enmity has existed between the tripartite *Darod-Harti* sub-clan and the two other main sub-clans of the *Darod*, the *Darod-Marehan* and the *Darod-Ogaden*. The *Darod-Marehan* was Siyad Barre's clan, and therefore the rebellion against his regime was essentially an inter-clan struggle between the *Darod-Marehan* and the *Darod-Majerteen* (Prunier 1995: 5).

⁹⁰ The region south of Garacad, both Inland and in Hobyo on the Coast, is controlled by the *Habr Gedir* sub-clan of the *Hawiye* clan. In this region the *Hawiye-Habr Gedir-Sa'ad* sub-sub-clan have erected the State of Galmudug (Buh 2010: 1), overlapping territorial claims of the State of Puntland and districts of Southern Somalia. Galmudug, dead-center on Somalia's North-South axis, represents the melting pot of various clans and sub-clans, and is contested by four main political associations: the *Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a* (Sufist group opposed to anti-Sufist and Wahhabi Islamist *al-Shabaab*), the *Hawiye-Suleiman* sub-clan (currently dominating piracy in Harardheere), the *Hawiye-Habr Gedir-Sa'ad* sub-sub-clan (State of Galmudug) and *al-Shabaab* (Boh 2010: 1).

⁹¹ The Northern coastal town of Laasqoray has been a *Darod-Warsangeli* stronghold, unlike the other coastal towns that are dominated by the *Darod-Majerteen*.

⁹² *Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya*, or 'The Islamic Union' (not to be confused with the Islamic Courts Union, or ICU).

⁹³ The USC, led by General Mohamed Farah 'Aideed (*Hawiye-Habr Gedir* sub-clan), was responsible for the overthrow of Sayid Barre's regime from Mogadishu on 25th January, 1991.

The political developments in modern-day Puntland⁹⁴ since 1991 reflect, like in Somaliland, an initial inter-clan conflict followed by a peaceful settlement and the establishment of state-like institutions. These two regions differ, however, in the complete absence of piracy in Somaliland, while Puntland is the birthplace of piracy. Are there particular differences in the political developments of the two that may have contributed to the onset of piracy in the latter? The new State of Puntland consists primarily of the *Darod-Majerteen* as they make up ca. 86% of the population, with 8% belong to the *Darod-Warsangeli* and 6% belonging to the *Darod-Dulbahante* (Minahan 2002: 1145).

Like in Somaliland, the state of Puntland originally rested on an inter-clan peace agreement which formed the basis for system of government. Besides the unity achieved through the SSDF's regional military victories, Puntland also had a 'Council of Elders', the *Isimo*, which was instrumental in approving the May-August 1998 government formation (Hesse 2010a: 77). In May 1998 the *Isimo* issued the 'Garowe Declaration, proclaiming the State of Puntland as an autonomous territory with Garowe as the state capital (Hesse 2010a: 77). The foundation of this new political association was based on a regional social contract of the *Darod-Harti* sub-clans. On the basis of this social contract and the 'Garowe Declaration' the *Isimo* established a 66-member unicameral parliamentary system (Hesse 2010a: 77). While Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was instituted as the President, this was primarily meant to be a *caretaker* role, and he was instructed to negotiate and implement a written constitution for the State of Puntland within three years (Hesse 2010a: 77). According to Hesse (2010a) President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was, as one of the main officers of the former SSDF, determined to follow the internal 'Puntland Charter' of the latter organization (Hesse 2010a: 77), which provided more general recommendations as to the development of the state.

Rather than establish a bicameral parliament where the power of clan elders was secured in the Upper House, and general political factions represented in the Lower House, the presence of a single chamber meant that the President and his supporters in the SSDF were rather less constrained (Hesse 2010a: 77). The Somaliland institutional arrangement contains checks and balances through not only a tripartite *Montesquieuian* separation of the branches of government, but an added division of the legislative branch. This Anglo-American bicameral tradition is perhaps best summed up in James Madison's Federalist Paper No. 62, where he stated that "It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents,

⁹⁴ See **Appendix II** for an overview of clan organization in Northern Somalia

and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a [S]enate, as a *second branch*⁹⁶ of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient” (Madison 2004 [February 27, 1788]: 216). This institutional weakness is perhaps best revealed by the power the President of Puntland has in dismissing the parliament arbitrarily (Hesse 2010a: 78). Due to a mixture of rubber-stamp unicameral parliament and extensive, though vaguely-defined presidential powers, Puntland’s institutional strength has been relatively weak compared to that of Somaliland. In this climate the International Crisis Group (ICG) delivered the verdict that “By 2005, corruption in Puntland had permeated every tier of government and become almost a way of life. Its impact on business was particularly devastating. [...] Poverty and malnutrition increased, and ill-advised state interventions made matters worse, including the printing of new banknotes that flooded the money market and created hyper-inflation” (ICG 2009: 6). Additionally, in Puntland the central government has a policy of a ‘non-party’ political system citing the need for the consolidation and ‘institutionalization’ of democracy (ICG 2009: 8).

⁹⁵ Prior to 1998 and its establishment, Puntland had naturally not been given its current name. Throughout I will use ‘Puntland’, although the historical name is a variation of Majertania, i.e. land of the *Darod-Majerteen* sub-clan.

⁹⁶ Italics added.

11.0 Appendix III: *Clans and institutions of Northwest Somalia*

More than 1,000 km by road separates Berbera in Somaliland from the former capital Mogadishu. In between there are large swathes of grasslands, arid wasteland and open deserts providing social, economic and ecological divides that criss-cross the country⁹⁷. With the collapse of state institutions this meant that Somaliland was one of many geographical territories that were fragmenting from what previously was the Democratic Republic of Somalia. Already prior to collapse the largest clan in northern Somalia, the *Ishaaq*, had formed a rebel movement (Somali National Movement, formed in 1981) to fight a regime with rapidly deteriorating institutional authority. While the SNM had initially set an aim to secure the continued unity of Somalia (albeit devolved), it changed that aim as the civil war began raging. On 18th May 1991 (four months after Barre's fall) the SNM met in the inland town of Burco and proclaimed the state of Somaliland. While the majority of the clan elders were of the *Ishaaq* clan, they also gathered support from the *Darod-Dulbahante* clan, *Darod-Warsangeli* clan and *Dir-Gadabuursi* clan⁹⁸. The proclamation was a tectonic shift in the political developments of northern Somalia. Importantly it signified that while Somaliland as a region had fragmented from the collapsed Somali state, it had not experienced a complete dissolution of authority or stability.

The new National Charter of 1993 produced a power-sharing agreement where parliament would consist of 150 elders, as well as a President and Vice President. The new President, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, had paternal lineage from the *Ishaaq-Ilse Muse* and maternal lineage from *Ishaaq-Habar Yonis*, the two most important adversaries in the battle for Berbera. In Somaliland the agreement of a social contract binding various clans together was reflected in one united body, the *Guurti* (parliament). This new institution was rooted in the legitimate authority of the various clan elders. By 2001 Somaliland had been a self-proclaimed state for ten years. In the same year President Egal presented a draft of a new, permanent constitution. In the subsequent May 2001 referendum 97% of voters approved of the constitution (Pham 2010: 335), solidly rooting Somaliland's institutional basis in popular support⁹⁹. The

⁹⁷ Somalia is a country roughly the size of *France*. When civil war broke out it was due to, and further entrenched by, deep socioeconomic, political and geographical divides that had been forming during the course of the 20th century (and pronounced themselves under Barre's regime).

⁹⁸ For all such clan names in this thesis, such as *Darod-Dulbahante*, *Darod* means the larger clan, while *Dulbahante* is a sub-clan within this larger clan. Another example is *Darod-Warsangeli*, where *Darod* is the larger clan, while *Warsangeli* is a sub-clan within this larger clan.

⁹⁹ In 2002, a year after the approval of the May 2001 constitution, President Egal died in office, leading to Somaliland's first presidential election in April 2003. This election provides evidence of a shift from a violent means of power struggle **amongst the clans** to a peaceful settlement through electoral competition. In the 2003 presidential election the incumbent, Vice-President Dahir Riyale Kahin (whom succeeded the deceased President Egal) and the main challenger Ahmed Silanyo, received respectively 205,595 and 205,515 votes: 80 votes separating them. Improbably the challenger accepted defeat, and although there were minor outbreaks of violent protest, the outcome was settled with VP Dahir Riyale Kahin proclaimed

new constitution implemented an executive branch, a bicameral legislative branch and an independent judicial branch of government.

So how may we understand the emerging Somaliland social contract? The tripartite division of government draws from Charles-Louis Montesquieu's checks and balances in *L'esprit de lois*, or *Spirit of the Laws* (1748). The social contract laid out by Montesquieu can be traced even further back to Polybius, the Greek political theorist, whom declared that: "For when one part having grown out of proportion to the others aim at supremacy and tends to become too predominant, it is evident that, as for the reasons above given none of the three is absolute, but the purpose of the one can be counterworked and thwarted by the others [and that] any aggressive impulse is sure to be checked [...]" (Lloyd 1998). The separation of the executive from the legislative and judicial bodies is then a uniquely Western political concept. Yet in Somaliland's new form of government we find also strong elements of *kinship*. The bicameral legislative branch is in Somaliland divided into the Upper House of the Elders and the Lower House of Representatives. The Upper House (equivalent to the modern-day United States Senate or British House of Lords) is in Somaliland drawn entirely from clan elders. This presents a unique mixture of an essentially Western form of government with a distinctly Somali social contract. According to (Lewis 1959: 282) the Somali social contract (*heer*) denotes 'explicitly formulated obligations, rights, and duties' which "[...] binds people of the same treaty together in relation to internal delicts and defines their collective responsibility in external relations with other similar groups" (see **Appendix I**). Somali *contracting* is an essential political activity, and especially pronounced as regards *Diya*-groups. *Diya*, or 'blood money', is the most fundamental political association for a Somali. Defined almost entirely by kinship, the individual in the *Diya*-group surrenders certain freedoms to the 'sovereign will' (Lewis 1959: 292). Each individual partakes in the collective responsibility of every other individual's actions, with institutional authority placed in the hands of clan elders. The elders are given the power to enforce the 'internal' codes and laws of the *Diya*-group. In this respect Somalis in Somaliland are not foreign to the concept of surrendering their individual will to the general 'sovereign will'¹⁰⁰.

Somaliland's 3rd President. Arguably Somaliland's unity has been largely achieved because political competition has moved from violent conflict to the electoral arena. Institutional authority has rested on kinship, which constitutes the political and socioeconomic fabric of Somalia. And it seems that most importantly, the new institutional arrangements of Somaliland reflect the specter of its various clans and sub-clans, providing both breadth and depth in authority and legitimacy.

¹⁰⁰ Somaliland has a history, asserts Lewis, wherein clans too small or weak to form *Diya*-groups (contingent on the financial strength of paying 'blood money') may form contractual agreements with larger and stronger associations (i.e. hosts). In Somalia's clan cosmos we may arguably divide *power* (and by consequence security) into that of *prestige* and *strength* (financial, number of members). In the above example we find a weaker group losing the *prestige* of joining a 'foreign' *Diya*-group, but gaining the *strength* of joining a larger and stronger association (Lewis 1959: 290).

12.0 Appendix IV: Figures and tables

Figure 12.0 – Map of Northern Somalia with modern-day and historical borders¹⁰¹




Table 12.1 – Hypotheses on Resources and Civil War

1. The more lootable a resource is, the more likely it is to benefit local peoples and the poor
2. The more unlootable a resource is, the more likely it will lend to separatist conflicts
3. The more lootable a resource is, the more likely it is to benefit a rebel group; the more unlootable it is, the more likely it is to benefit the government
4. The more lootable the resource, the more likely it is to create discipline problems inside the army that controls it
5. The more lootable the resource, the more likely it is to prolong nonseparatist conflict
6. If a resource is obstructable, it is more likely to increase the duration and intensity of conflicts
7. If the resource is illegal, it is more likely to benefit the rebels - unless the government is willing to endure international sanctions

(Ross 2003: 55)

¹⁰¹ Yellow indicates the current area controlled by Somaliland, while grey is Puntland. The black dotted line is the historical border between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. Because of the mercurial nature of Somalia's borders and the dispute between Somaliland and Puntland, the figure above should only serve as an *indication*, and not a definite political map.

Table 12.2 – Which Side Profits from Illegal Drugs?

	Substance	Beneficiary
Afghanistan	Opium	Both
Burma	Opium	Both
Colombia	Coca, opium	Both
Peru	Coca	Rebels

(Ross 2003: 64)

Table 12.3 – Relation between the nature/geography of a resource and type of conflict¹⁰²

	Point	Diffuse
Proximate	<i>State control/coup d'etat</i> Algeria (gas) Angola (oil) Chad (oil)	<i>Rebellion/rioting</i> El Salvador (coffee) Guatemala (cropland) Israel-Palestine (freshwater)
Distant	<i>Secession</i> Angola/Cabinda (oil) Caucasus (oil) D.R. Congo (copper, cobalt, gold)	<i>Warlordism</i> Afghanistan (opium) Angola (diamonds) Burma (opium, timber)

(Le Billon 2001: 573)

Table 12.4 – Natural resources by lootability, obstructability and legality¹⁰³

	Lootable	Unlootable
Highly Obstructable	<i>International shipping??</i> ¹⁰⁴	Onshore, remote oil and gas
Moderately Obstructable	Agricultural products Timber	Deep-shaft minerals
Unobstructable	Coca Opium Alluvial gems	Deep-shaft gems Offshore oil and gas

(Ross 2003: 55)

¹⁰² Shortened list

¹⁰³ Bold denotes illegality

¹⁰⁴ I introduce *international shipping* to **Figure 11.4** (in a cell that originally has been left blank by Ross) to indicate the proposed theoretical *lootability, obstructability* and *legality* status of the resource appropriated by the Somali pirates.

Table 12.5 – Cross-tabulation of presence/absence of outcome vs. presence/absence of causal condition

	Causal condition absent	Causal condition present
Outcome present	<i>Cell 1:</i> Cases here undermine the research argument	<i>Cell 2:</i> Cases here support the research argument
Outcome absent	<i>Cell 3:</i> Cases here support the research argument	<i>Cell 4:</i> Cases here undermine the research argument

(Ragin 2008: 21)

Figure 12.6 – Number of reported acts of piracy (May 1999 – April 2011)




Figure 12.7 – Overview of eight resource choke sectors off Somalia's coast¹⁰⁵




Table 12.8 – Details and coordinates of two reported incidents of piracy¹⁰⁶


N°	Ship Name Type of Ship Flag Gross Tonnage IMO Number	Date Time	Position of the incident*	Details of the incident	Consequences for crew, ship, cargo
1	2	3	4	5	6
4	ARDMORE SEAFARER Product tanker Marshall Islands 27969 9310161	12/10/2010 15:00 UTC	INDIAN OCEAN Off Somalia, 08° 11.00' N 067° 56.00' E	Pirates hijacked the ship underway taking 21 crew members hostage. Crew locked themselves in the citadel. When pirates could not sail the tanker, they abandoned the ship on 13.10.2010. Crew took command of the ship and resumed voyage	Ship hijacked, 21 crew members taken hostage. Crew took command of the ship again
6	YORK Tanker Singapore 4807 9220421	23/10/2010 12:35 UTC	EAST AFRICA Southeast of Malindi Kenya 04° 14.19' S 041° 18.19' E	Armed pirates hijacked the ship underway taking 17 crew members hostage	Ship hijacked and 17 crew taken hostage

(IMO October 2010: 3)

¹⁰⁵ In Figure 11.7 each line represents the route of a single ship. Higher density is represented by brighter coloration of lines (white indicating the highest density), which indicates the summation of single tracks (Halpern et al. 2008: 8).

¹⁰⁶ In Table 11.8 I have sampled two reported incidents of piracy in IMO's monthly report for October.

Figure 12.9 – Plotted coordinates in Google Earth for ARDMORE SEAFARER¹⁰⁷



¹⁰⁷ The first sample (see **Table 11.8**) is an attack on the ARDMORE SEAFARER on the 12th of October 2010. The coordinates for the attack are reported as 08° 11.00' N, 067° 56.00' E. In Google Earth that gives us the following point of reference (see **Figure 11.9**). From reading the details of the attack in the report it is not self-evident that the attack happened nearly 1100 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia. As can be observed the attack happened northwest of the Maldives and just east off the coast of India. Although the piracy attack is in all likelihood carried out by Somalis the *location of the incident* (which we need to be ascertained of) has ramifications for our wider understanding of piracy.

Figure 12.10 – Plotted coordinates in Google Earth for YORK¹⁰⁸



¹⁰⁸ The second sample is an attack on YORK on the 23rd of October, 2010 (coordinates: 04° 14.19' S, 041° 18.19' E). The attack is reported to have happened southeast off the town of Malindi on Kenya's coast (see **Figure 11.10**). The point of reference provided by Google Earth shows the coordinates to be as expected; which is off the coast of Kenya about equidistance between Malindi and Mombasa, and about 150 nautical miles from the southernmost point of Somalia.

Figure 12.11 – Overview of distances in nautical miles





Figure 12.12 – Overview of mean wind speed levels for the month of July, 2010




(NOAA 2011)¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ **Figure 12.12** shows a map of the Northwest Indian Ocean, which I have plotted using aforementioned dataset provided by NOAA. Latitude: -25.00S to 30.00N. Longitude: 35.00E to 80.00E. I have highlighted Somalia's 1991 territorial borders in bold. We find the maximum wind speed just off the Northeast Coast by Socotra Island; at 14 m/s = 27.21 knots = 31.31 miles per hour = 50.4 km/h.

Figure 12.13 – Transportation time at hypothetical position of the NPR Vasco da Gama¹¹⁰



Figure 12.14 – Main road network in Puntland and neighbouring regions¹¹¹



¹¹⁰ **Figure 12.13:** Shows the transportation time of the NPR Vasco da Gama at a given hypothetical position in the mouth of the Gulf of Aden.

¹¹¹ **Figure 12.14:** The main road runs from Galcayo in southern Puntland, through the state capital Garowe, through Qardho and then up to the port of Bosaso. All other coastal population centers in Puntland; Laasqoray, Qandala, Caluula, Bargaal, Hordio, Xaafuun, Bandarbeyla, Eyl, Garacad and Hobyo are not connected to the main road network, moreover all of them are connected to the grid via dirt roads. This geographic reality is one of the current reflections of the marginalization of the abovementioned population centers from the rest of the state.

Figure 12.15 – Map of Northern Somalia with clans, ports and territories¹¹²




Figure 12.16 – The un-colonized territory of the Darod-Majerteen (1890)



(Keltie 1890: 669)

¹¹² Figure 12.15: An approximate overview of the locations of the various clans and sub-clans, as well as the ports, territories and modern-day states of the Horn. The Northwest is inhabited by the *Ishaq* (and *Dir*) clans. The Northeast is inhabited by the *Darod-Majerteen* and *Darod-Warsangeli*.

Figure 12.17 - Six Somali towns in the Gulf of Aden






Figure 12.18 – Number of reported acts of piracy (April 2004 – April 2008)¹¹³



¹¹³ Arky (2010: 20) details the catastrophic impact upon coastal population centers along the Eastern coast of Somalia in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami: “The tsunami damaged both of the remaining coastal cold storage facilities in the smaller towns on the coast. [...] As a result, over 50% of fish (excluding lobster) caught in 2005 was wasted due to spoilage. In addition, the tsunami destroyed nearly 25,000 nets and 3,700 traps – approximately three-quarters of all the fishing gear. Fishermen also lost 480 boats, with a further 466 severely damaged: accounting for two-thirds of all fishing boats”. Examining **Figure 12.18** above the sharp upturn in attacks in the course of 2005 seems to coincide with the aftermath of the destruction of the infrastructure and equipment in the fisheries on the Eastern coast.

Figure 12.19 – Total acts of piracy vs. obstructability of 4 select RCS (1999-2010)



The minimum obstructability value a RCS can obtain is **4** (*Distance = 1, Mean wind speed = 1, Legal structures = 1 and Density of ships = 1*), while its maximum value is **16**. We may say then that a resource sector is relatively unobstructable when it equals 4, while it is highly obstructable if it has a value of 16. None of the RCS fall below the value of 4 so we can say that maritime shipping is a fairly obstructable resource across the board. In **Figure 12.19** above I show the total number of attacks that have occurred in four select months since 1999 (the months of January and July are in the monsoon season, while April and October occur approximately in between the monsoons). When obstructability is high there is a likewise upward number of attacks in all the resource choke sectors, while this number falls coinciding with lower obstructability. The one inconsistent trend in **Figure 12.19** is that *Oman alley* reaches its highest obstructability in December and January, yet between 1999 and 2010 there had been no record of attacks in this resource choke sector. This is in stark contrast to January 2011, wherein 18 attacks occurred in *Oman alley*. The increase in *Oman alley* must be viewed in relation to a changing trend across resource choke sectors over the past couple of years (see **Figure 12.20** below):

Figure 12.20 – Number of reported acts of piracy (April 2007 – April 2011)




Figure 12.20 shows the initial explosion in pirate attacks in 2008. In December 2008 the EU NAVFOR’s *Operation Atalanta* deployed to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, while NATO’s Standing Maritime Group force, *Operation Allied Protector*, deployed in March 2009 (Baniela 2010: 200). Was there a fall in obstructability in *Aden alley* due to these two deployments? The evidence provides some indication of this, although the fall in attacks may mask a variable other than the presence of legal structures. The initiation of *Operation Atalanta* seems not to have had any significant effect, while the timing of *Operation Allied Protector* seems to coincide well with the fall in attacks (see April 2009 to October 2009). The drastic fall in attacks between April 2009 and July 2009 may seem to correlate with the increased presence of legal structures. However, if we consider the obstructability in *Aden alley* in April and July over a ten-year period we know that obstructability is at its highest in the former, and at its lowest in the latter due to the strong monsoon winds. This is also apparent for April 2008 to July 2008, wherein the explosion in attacks probably would have risen sooner had it not been for the onset of the Southwest monsoon. It is therefore less certain as to the actual impact of the increased presence of legal structures. The number of attacks in *Aden alley* stabilizes at a much lower average after the middle of 2009. The shift we see in attacks occurs in 2010, when the seasonal attacks in the *MIS alleys* begin steadily growing along with *Oman alley*, and in 2011, *Gulf alley*. Arguably the noticeable rise in attacks January 2011 reflects the fact that Somalia’s pirates have acquired the sophistication to take advantage of the high obstructability that *Oman alley* and *Gulf alley* offer during this month.

Figure 12.21 – Obstructability of resource choke sectors off Somalia





Figure 12.22 – Number of reported acts of piracy (July 1999 – July 2002)



13.0 Appendix V: Six towns on the Northern coast

In the following table (*Table 13.0*) I have removed the larger ports of Berbera and Bosaso, as well as all the towns on the Eastern coast. In this narrowed version I conduct a ‘micro-comparison’ between the smaller towns on the Northern Coast; Zeila, Xiis, Maydh, Laasqoray, Qandala and Caluula¹¹⁴.

All six towns have relatively small populations and all have experienced violent conflict since 1991. However, in Zeila, Xiis and Maydh piracy was absent following the outbreak of civil war, while Laasqoray, Qandala and Caluula all have experienced an onset of piracy in the course of the 1990s. I compare these six towns in light of *Proposition 1, 2, and 3* to determine if *all, a few or none* of these propositions provide explanatory power for the absence/presence of piracy.

Table 13.0 – Socioeconomic and climatic variables for Northern towns and districts

Input												Output	
<i>Coastal towns and districts</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>P</i>
Zeila (Sailac)	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
Xiis	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
Maydh	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
Laasqoray (Las Khorey)	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
Qandala	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Caluula	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1

Input: (1 = present, 0 = absent)

A: Deep-water port

C: Traditional, cyclical grazing between Inland-Coast

E: 150+ km by road to nearest major town

G: Somaliland

I: Major ground for industrial-scale trawling

K: Former British colony

B: Extreme food insecurity

D: Pop. center w/dominant artisanal fishing sector

F: Violent conflict since 1991

H: Puntland

J: Precipitation less than 50 mm/month

L: Former Italian colony

Output: (1 = present, 0 = absent)

P: Population center with piracy

Examining *Table 13.0* it is evident that the presence of 150+ km of road between a coastal population center and a major town seems to be a poor predictor of the presence of piracy. Xiis and Maydh both score 1 on this input, yet they have no piracy. The geographical isolation of these two population centers seems not to lead to an onset of piracy. What they do have in common with Zeila is that they have relatively small artisanal fishing sectors (Gulaid 2004: 9), compared to the dominant roles the fishing

¹¹⁴ For map see *Figure 12.17*.

sector has in Laasqoray, Qandala and Caluula. Moreover, Zeila, Xiis, Maydh and Laasqoray all belonged to British Somaliland. **Chapter 6.2** mentioned British efforts in the development of Berbera. Rather than violate the traditional, pastoral economy, they encouraged it. It seems they did not press for an industrial-scale surge in production, which had the effect of *not* leading to the ecological disaster seen in the Northeast. While Laasqoray was part of British Somaliland, it has nonetheless historically been controlled by the *Darod-Warsangeli*, and is therefore *politically* a Northeastern town. Moreover the Darod-Warsangeli are rare among the Somali in their seafaring traditions (Prunier 1996: 10). This may be a telling difference explaining the respective presence and absence of piracy between Laasqoray and its fellow former British Somaliland neighbours further west. Xiis and Maydh have historically been seasonal locations used by the pastoral population residing in the interior (Sommerlatte and Umar 2000: ii). **Input C**, ‘traditional, cyclical grazing between inland-coast’ masks the difference between a relatively ecologically sustainable grazing pattern in the Northwest and its absence in the Northeast. This is precisely the same ecologically unsustainable practice as was first initiated by the inhabitants of Puntland in the 1840s, and in which the recurring famine thrives (HAB 1994; ReliefWeb December 8th 2010).

As established in **Chapter 6.2**, the mountainous region of Laasqoray, Qandala and Caluula (Qayad 1997: 3) have been both geographically and economically marginalized. These population centers hug the thin coastline and have acquired a close relationship with maritime activity. Bosaso too has a relatively mountainous region, but has avoided the underdevelopment that is present in Qandala and Caluula (and their Eastern neighbours¹¹⁵) due to its importance as a major point of livestock export. The coast off of Qandala and Caluula are major grounds for industrial-scale trawling, but it seems this is not the case for Laasqoray. This has led to a higher lootability of international shipping by Cape Guardafui, and indeed a higher obstructability since it represents one of the most proximate parts of the Somali coastline to the offshore traffic.

¹¹⁵ Due to the extreme scarcity of economic opportunities along the Coast *women* too are now deciding to engage in the piratical enterprise in Hobyo (PiracyReport May 21st 2011).

