

Risk-based Fatigue Design Considering Inspections and Maintenance

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ABSTRACT

The different phases of a structure's life-cycle are managed by different teams with little interaction. Correspondingly, the optimization of the individual phases is isolated and does not necessarily result in optimal life-cycle decisions. This motivates the treatment of structural optimization from a broader life-cycle perspective. A framework to enhance the design of structural systems by considering the operation and maintenance phase in the decision process is proposed in this article. The framework focuses on fatigue prone details, but it can be extended to consider other deterioration mechanisms. A hierarchical influence diagram is proposed as an efficient way to represent the probabilistic decision problem while considering system effects, such as the correlation of the deterioration among hot-spots. A simple example is presented to illustrate the implementation of the framework. Challenges and potential applications are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

A significant share of the available societal resources is spent annually to develop new public infrastructure and to manage the existing one. For instance, European countries employed on average 3.3%-4.2% of their GDP in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) during 2009-2015 (Athenosy et al. 2017), the USA spent 2.4% of GDP in 2014 (Shirley, Chad 2017), and Canada spent 7.4% of GDP during 1956-1993 (Kalaitzidakisa and Kalyvitish 2005). The investment in operation and maintenance (O&M) constitutes a large part of this expenditure. By way of example, Canada employed on average 21% of the GFCF in O&M during 1956-1993 (Kalaitzidakisa and Kalyvitish 2005), while the USA spent on average 49% during 1956-2004 (Rioja 2013). The built environment is reaching a state of maturity in developed countries and the cost associated with the integrity management of existing infrastructure is increasing its share of the total expenditure in public infrastructure. As a reference, it is estimated by using the database from the US Department of Transportation (FHWA 2020) that the ratio between the number of highway bridges subject to major repair or reconstruction to newly constructed ones increased from 7% during the 1950s, to 13% during the 1970s and to 24% during the 2000s.

For a particular structure, the main phases of its life-cycle are (see Figure 1) (i) planning and design, (ii) construction/installation, (iii) commissioning, (iv) O&M, and (v) decommissioning. Integrity management, including the planning of inspections and maintenance (I&M), is a crucial part of the life-cycle optimization of structures. Optimal I&M planning for a structural system depends on many aspects specified during the design phase: number and configuration of structural components, accessibility of hot-spots, correlation of the material resistance among components, importance of components relative to system reliability, redundancy and robustness. Correspondingly, the consideration of possible integrity management measures in structural design decisions likely results in a more optimal use of resources (ISO 2015; McAuliffe et al. 2017).

Life-cycle risk management for fatigue deteriorating structures

Decisions made for the integrity management of structures depend on the estimation of their structural reliability. The reliability of a structural system changes with time. Deterioration

49 processes, such as corrosion or fatigue, may reduce the structural resistance during the operational
50 life of the structure. Moreover, the stochastic environmental loading may not be a stationary process.
51 The estimation of structural reliability is conditional on the available knowledge. Consequently,
52 information acquisition techniques that reduce uncertainty, such as inspections and structural health
53 monitoring, have a strong influence on the estimation of structural reliability and correspondingly
54 on integrity management decisions.

55 This study focuses on fatigue deterioration. The current practice for fatigue assessment is
56 established in several standards and recommended design guidelines, e.g. Norsok 2004; HSE
57 1995; CEN 2005; ISO 2007; API 2002; Hobbacher 2016; DNV-GL 2016; BSI 2015. An overview
58 of the fatigue assessment approaches and safety factors employed in some of these standards can
59 be found in HSE (2001). In general, these codes provide prescriptive rules for fatigue design based
60 on a semi-probabilistic safety format. Often, different safety factors are given depending on the
61 consequences of failure. For instance, three different consequence classes are distinguished by the
62 International Institute of Welding (Hobbacher 2016): (1) loss of secondary structural parts, (2) loss
63 of entire structure and (3) loss of human life.

64 Risk of failure can be managed throughout the different phases of a structure's life-cycle. The
65 definition of risk and the information that is required for its computation may differ depending on
66 the type of decision that is assessed. For instance, the assessment of the risk of fatigue failure at
67 the design phase is in general assessed using semi-empirical SN-curves (DNV-GL 2016), whereas
68 the fracture mechanics approach is preferred during O&M (Almar-Næss 1985; DNV-GL 2015).
69 The latter is due to the need of relating fatigue deterioration to physical parameters, such as crack
70 depth, that are directly observable and can consequently be updated based upon structural health
71 information. To represent the sequential decision problem that includes design as well as I&M
72 decisions, coherent probabilistic models of the relevant phenomena should be chosen.

73 Fatigue design of steel structures is addressed in part 1-9 of the Eurocode 3 (CEN 2005).
74 The code accepts two different design approaches: (1) safe-life and (2) damage tolerant. Partial
75 safety factors are provided for two levels of inspectability or accessibility to the structural detail:

76 accessible joint detail and poor accessibility.

- 77 (1) The safe-life method dispenses with regular inspections by requiring a sufficiently large
78 reliability level. This is achieved by reducing the probability of a crack growing to a critical
79 crack dimension below a codified threshold during the service life of the structure (Gurney
80 1979).
- 81 (2) For the damage tolerant method, also called the fail-safe approach, structures are designed
82 such that cracks are expected to develop at certain hot-spots. It was developed by the
83 aircraft industry for the purpose of reducing the amount of employed structural material
84 and therefore, reducing the weight of the aircrafts (Lincoln 1985). Consequently, regular
85 inspections are required in order to maintain the structure within a reasonable safety-level
86 during its service life.

87 The damage tolerant approach opens the possibility of finding a cost-optimum balance between
88 the investments in maintenance and design. Nevertheless, the required level of safety at design in
89 Eurocode 3 is prescribed independently from an inspection and maintenance program.

90 **Integrated structural design and life-cycle integrity management**

91 Extensive literature exists on the development and application of risk-based methodologies for
92 the different phases of a structure's life-cycle. A comprehensive overview is presented in Moan
93 (2018) for offshore structures. However, there are not many studies conducted on quantitative
94 design methodologies that address the combined impact and efficiency of mitigation measures
95 performed at different points in time of the life-cycle of a structure. These methods are referred to
96 as integrated structural design methods in this paper. A review of literature in this field is presented
97 in the following.

98 The usefulness of integrating I&M information at the design phase is emphasized in the literature
99 (Straub et al. 2006; Moan 2018). A model to quantify the effect of fatigue design on inspection
100 planning at the component level is proposed in Madsen and Sorensen (1990). The framework is
101 applied to the optimization of the thickness, inspection times and inspection quality of a jacket

102 joint. Cramer and Friis-Hansen (1994) use this model to address optimal design, fabrication and
103 inspection length for welded components with several hot-spots. Moan et al. (1993) proposes a
104 relaxation of the design Palmgren-Miner's sum as a function of the inspection program. Generic
105 reliability- and risk-based inspection planning methods have been developed in terms of commonly
106 used deterministic design parameters, such as the fatigue design factor *FDF* defined in this paper
107 in Eq. (7) (Faber et al. 2000; Straub 2004; Faber et al. 2005). Some system effects were neglected
108 in these studies, such as the updating of a component due to the inspection outcome of nearby
109 components; although other system considerations were included, such as the importance of a
110 component with regard to the integrity of the system. Straub et al. (2006) shows the benefits of risk-
111 based inspection (RBI) planning for offshore structures and discusses the possibility of optimising
112 inspection planning and the *FDF* by including the associated construction costs. In Sørensen (2011)
113 and Márquez-Domínguez and Sørensen (2012), a framework for reliability-based *FDF* calibration
114 for offshore wind turbines is developed. Another application of this framework exists for RBI
115 planning of a 20 MW offshore wind turbine jacket (Gintautas et al. 2018). A component based
116 optimization of the *FDF* and maintenance strategy is proposed in Zou et al. (2018). A risk-based
117 framework for conceptual design of ships is developed in Garbatov et al. (2018), where an ultimate
118 limit state is considered in combination with deterioration due to corrosion.

119 In summary, models to quantify the effect of design on life-cycle risk and on optimal I&M
120 planning exist in the literature. Furthermore, reliability requirements for I&M given design spec-
121 ifications are provided in studies and design standards. Models to simultaneously assess optimal
122 integrated design and I&M strategies began to be developed in the 90s for the component level.
123 Little follow-up of these studies is documented in the literature afterwards, although new studies
124 from the offshore wind sector have been published in recent years. The authors are not aware of
125 studies on optimal integrated fatigue design and I&M planning methods at the system level.

126 **Aim of the paper**

127 The objective of this paper is to present a risk-based integrated structural design framework in
128 which I&M planning of deteriorating details is explicitly considered. The framework considers

129 system effects such as the effect of correlation among hot-spot deterioration, the level of redundancy
130 and the impact of information gathered at the component level on system reliability. The proposed
131 framework is elaborated in the following section. Afterwards, the methodology is implemented
132 to study the optimal life-cycle fatigue design of the joints of a lattice structure. Advantages and
133 limitations of the proposed methodology are explored, together with some potential applications of
134 the framework and further research. The paper concludes with a summary of the main findings.

135 **INTEGRATED STRUCTURAL DESIGN FRAMEWORK**

136 The proposed framework aims to optimise the allocation of mitigation measures during the
137 life-cycle of deteriorating structural systems prior to their construction. Two mitigation measures
138 are considered. Namely, to increase the safety level at the design phase and to conduct I&M
139 actions. The framework explicitly addresses system effects. This is computationally demanding
140 (Luque and Straub 2016). Consequently, an efficient system representation needs to be used. The
141 proposed framework is kept general in this section, but a hierarchical influence diagram (ID) based
142 on Luque and Straub (2019) and Bismut and Straub (2018) is employed for the numerical example
143 in the following section. The computational demand of the numerical example is reported in the
144 discussion section.

145 **Generic representation**

146 The proposed framework is illustrated in Figure 2. An integrated design is here defined as the
147 combination of a design specification $\mathcal{D}_j \in \mathcal{D}$ together with an I&M strategy $\mathcal{S}_i \in \mathcal{S}$. A design
148 consists of a set of specifications that are sufficient to assess the safety level of the structural system
149 for given failure mechanisms. An I&M strategy specifies when and where to inspect as well as the
150 repair and maintenance criteria. The optimal integrated design $\{\mathcal{D}_{opt}, \mathcal{S}_{opt}\}$ is defined as the one
151 that minimizes the expected total life-cycle cost.

152 In their most complete definition, \mathcal{D} and \mathcal{S} would contain all possible design descriptions and
153 I&M strategies. Nevertheless, this is unpractical and therefore, smart choices should be made
154 upfront to explore a reduced, yet still representative, space of alternatives. For instance, \mathcal{D} could
155 contain a discrete set of fatigue safety factor values. \mathcal{S} could contain decision rules, such as

156 repair any detected damage, and a reduced set of alternatives, such as a set of time intervals
 157 between preventive inspections (Bismut and Straub 2020). Optimal I&M planning given a design
 158 specification depends on available information and therefore, it can and should be reassessed for
 159 the as-built structure and every time new information becomes available (Madsen and Sorensen
 160 1990; Moan 2018). This is to be considered in the selection of the appropriate level of detail used
 161 to represent potential I&M strategies.

162 The system representation includes:

- 163 • A deterioration model that allows for the representation of the influence on the deterioration
 164 process of design decisions and maintenance actions.
- 165 • A model for the statistical dependence of the deterioration among components, since this
 166 affects the estimation of the reliability of the system and the efficiency of the inspection
 167 campaigns.
- 168 • A likelihood model connecting the observations from the inspection techniques with the
 169 state of deterioration.
- 170 • A model that relates component condition to system reliability.
- 171 • A model for the costs of the different decision alternatives and consequences of the consid-
 172 ered outcomes.

173 **Objective function**

174 A set of N_d designs $\mathcal{D} = \{\mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{D}_2, \dots, \mathcal{D}_{N_d}\}$ and a set of N_s I&M strategies $\mathcal{S} = \{\mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2, \dots, \mathcal{S}_{N_s}\}$
 175 are considered. The optimal integrated design $\{\mathcal{D}_{opt}, \mathcal{S}_{opt}\}$ is found by minimizing the expected
 176 life-cycle cost $E[C_T(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)]$:

$$177 \quad \{\mathcal{D}_{opt}, \mathcal{S}_{opt}\} = \arg \min_{\substack{i=1, \dots, N_s; \\ j=1, \dots, N_d}} \{E[C_T(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)]\} \quad (1)$$

178 where $E[\cdot]$ is the expectation operator.

179 The expected life-cycle cost $E[C_T(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)]$ is defined as the sum of the design cost $C_D(\mathcal{D}_j)$,

180 which includes costs associated with the design and construction of the structural components, and
 181 the expected inspection, maintenance and failure (IMF) cost $E[C_{IMF}(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)]$:

$$182 \quad E[C_T(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)] = C_D(\mathcal{D}_j) + E[C_{IMF}(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)] \quad (2)$$

183 The expected IMF cost $E[C_{IMF}(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)]$ is computed as the sum of the expected costs associated
 184 with starting an inspection campaign C_C , conducting inspections C_I , repairs C_R and failure C_F :

$$185 \quad E[C_{IMF}(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)] = E[C_C(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)] + E[C_I(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)] + E[C_R(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)] + E[C_F(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i)] \quad (3)$$

186 These costs are discounted to their present value by a function $\gamma(t)$ as described in (Bismut and
 187 Straub 2020). In particular, the expected failure cost, also called risk of failure R_F , is given by:

$$188 \quad R_F(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i) = E_Z [E_{\Theta}[C_F(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i|\mathbf{Z})]] = E_Z \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T_{SL}} C_F \cdot \gamma(t) \cdot \Pr(F_{sys,yr,t}|\mathbf{Z}_{0:t-1}) \right] \quad (4)$$

189 where C_F is the cost of failure and $\Pr(F_{sys,yr,t}|\mathbf{Z}_{0:t-1})$ is the annual probability of failure during year
 190 $t - 1$ to t , conditional on available information up to time $t - 1$, denoted $\mathbf{Z}_{0:t-1}$. The expectation
 191 over the cost of failure is computed over possible states of the system $\Theta \in \Omega_{\Theta}$ and inspection
 192 outcomes $\mathbf{Z} \in \Omega_Z$. This double expectation is computationally expensive. Luque and Straub
 193 (2019) propose to first compute the expected cost of failure conditional on the inspection outcomes
 194 and afterwards integrate over the sampled observation histories by crude Monte Carlo simulations
 195 (MCS). A relatively low number of samples is needed since the conditional probability of failure is
 196 computed for each sampled observation history. They estimate that around $n_{sim} = 200$ simulations
 197 suffice for most practical applications, although this depends on the variance of the expected cost
 198 of failure conditional on the observation histories, i.e. $\text{Var}_Z[E_{\Theta}[C_F(\mathcal{D}_j, \mathcal{S}_i|\mathbf{Z})]]$. The accuracy of
 199 the estimation is explored below for the numerical application.

200 The minimisation of the expected life-cycle cost in Eq. (1) can be divided into two steps,
 201 as illustrated in Figure 2. First, an optimal strategy $\mathcal{S}_{opt,j}$ can be found given a certain design

202 specification \mathcal{D}_j through the minimization of the expected IMF cost:

$$203 \quad \mathcal{S}_{opt,j} = \mathcal{S}_{opt} | \mathcal{D}_j = \arg \min_{i=1,\dots,N_s} \{E[C_{IMF}(\mathcal{S}_i, \mathcal{D}_j)]\} \quad (5)$$

204 For N_d considered designs, the set of optimal strategies is collected into the vector $\hat{\mathcal{S}}_{opt} =$
 205 $\{\hat{\mathcal{S}}_{opt,1}, \hat{\mathcal{S}}_{opt,2}, \dots, \hat{\mathcal{S}}_{opt,N_d}\}$. The optimal integrated design $\mathcal{D}_{opt} \in \mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{S}_{opt} \in \hat{\mathcal{S}}_{opt}$ is then
 206 computed as:

$$207 \quad \{\mathcal{D}_{opt}, \mathcal{S}_{opt}\} = \arg \min_{j=1,\dots,N_d} \{E[C_T(\mathcal{D}_j, \hat{\mathcal{S}}_{opt,j})]\} \quad (6)$$

208 DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY

209 The application of the proposed framework is illustrated with a case study. The fatigue design
 210 of the joints of the offshore lattice structure in Figure 3 is considered. The structure is a redundant
 211 frame constituted of six tubular members (B1-B6) and a semi-rigid top horizontal I-beam. All
 212 joints among members are welded. The frame structure has ten locations or hot-spots (HS1-HS10)
 213 where fatigue cracks may occur under cyclic loading. Hot-spots above the highest astronomical tide
 214 (HAT), i.e. HS1-HS4, are denoted dry hot-spots and can be inspected. Hot-spots HS5-HS10 are
 215 denoted submerged hot-spots and are assumed to be non-accessible, i.e. they cannot be inspected.
 216 The frame is subject to an extreme environmental load with annual maximum Q and cyclic wave
 217 loading $L(t)$. The system is a simple structure that allows investigating the effect of:

- 218 (1) the correlation among component deterioration;
- 219 (2) the structural importance of the components;
- 220 (3) the inspectability of structural details.

221 The objective of the decision problem is to compute the optimal integrated fatigue design of the
 222 structure $\{\mathcal{D}_{opt}, \mathcal{S}_{opt}\}$. An inspection strategy \mathcal{S}_j is characterized by the time between inspection
 223 campaigns Δt_I . A fatigue design \mathcal{D}_j is characterised by the specification of the fatigue design factor
 224 FDF of the hot-spots. The FDF of a hot-spot i is defined as the ratio between its deterministic

225 fatigue life $T_{FL,i}$ and the design service life of the structure $T_{SL} = 20$ years:

$$226 \quad FDF_i = \frac{T_{FL,i}}{T_{SL}} \quad (7)$$

227 **Hierarchical influence diagram**

228 A hierarchical ID is used to assess the influence of the decision parameters, i.e. the FDF of
229 the hot-spots and the inspection interval Δt_I , on the probabilistic fatigue deterioration process and
230 consequently, on the structural reliability of the system. The employed ID is an extension of the
231 one proposed in Luque and Straub (2019). First, the deterioration model is presented. Second, the
232 relationship between the deterioration model and the system condition is elaborated. Lastly, the
233 likelihood models used for inference of inspection outcomes are described.

234 *Fatigue deterioration model*

235 The structure is subject to a wave-induced cyclic load $\Delta L(t)$ that leads to fatigue stresses in its
236 hot-spots $i = 1, 2, \dots, 10$, with long-term distribution ΔS_i represented by a Weibull distribution with
237 scale parameter $k_{\Delta S,i}$ and shape parameter λ_i . As shown in Madsen (1997), the effect of the fatigue
238 stresses on fatigue crack growth can then be captured by the equivalent stress range $\Delta S_{e,i}$, which is
239 defined as:

$$240 \quad \Delta S_{e,i}(FDF_i) = E_{\Delta S}[\Delta S_i^{m_i}]^{(1/m_i)} = k_{\Delta S,i}(FDF_i) \cdot \Gamma \left(1 + \frac{m_i}{\lambda_i} \right)^{(1/m_i)} \quad (8)$$

241 where $\Gamma(\cdot)$ is the gamma function and m_i is a material parameter of the deterioration model, which is
242 modelled according to (Ditlevsen and Madsen 1996). The distributions and values used to represent
243 these parameters are shown in Table 1. Note that $k_{\Delta S,i}$ depends on the fatigue design factor of the
244 hot-spot FDF_i . This relationship is explored further below and shown in Figure 7.

245 Hot-spots are assumed to contain initial defects, which are represented by an exponential
246 distribution with mean crack length equal to 1 mm. Given this initial crack length, crack growth
247 can then be modelled by a linear elastic fracture mechanics model (LEFM), see Lassen (1997).
248 The stochastic LEFM-based model proposed in Madsen et al. (1987) is used to represent the crack

249 growth model. The crack length at a hot-spot i at time step t is denoted $a_{i,t}$ and given by:

$$250 \quad a_{i,t} = \left[(1 - m_i/2) C_{i,t} \Delta S_{e,i}^{m_i} \pi^{m_i/2} \nu + a_{i,t-1}^{(1-m_i/2)} \right]^{(1-m_i/2)^{-1}} \quad (9)$$

251 where ν is the number of stress cycles per time step, $a_{i,t-1}$ is the crack length at the previous time
 252 step and C_i is a material parameter. It is assumed that C_i is fully correlated with m_i by the linear
 253 model $\ln C_i = -1.567m_i - 27.517$ proposed in Bismut and Straub (2020). The employed values
 254 of the basic variables of the fatigue deterioration model are summarized in Table 1. Note that ν is
 255 taken as 10^5 cycles/year according to Straub (2009).

256 The structural reliability of the components is assessed according to the fatigue limit state g_{FM} :

$$257 \quad g_{FM} = a_{cr} - a_{i,t} \quad (10)$$

258 where $g_{FM} \leq 0$ represents the event of failure, which happens when the crack length is larger than
 259 the critical crack length $a_{cr} = 10$ mm. It is noted that the LEFM-based estimate of fatigue life is
 260 rather insensitive to the value of a_{cr} , due to the exponential nature of the model.

261 The fatigue deterioration process is modelled as a Markov process using the dynamic Bayesian
 262 Network (BN) proposed in Straub (2009). This is illustrated in Figure 5, where circular nodes
 263 represent random variables, rectangle nodes are decision parameters and the arches represent
 264 dependencies, directed from cause to effect. At a given time step t ($0 \leq t \leq T_{SL}$), the crack length
 265 of a given hot-spot $a_{i,t}$ is specified conditional on the crack depth at the previous time step $a_{i,t-1}$,
 266 and the stochastic crack growth parameters, i.e. the material parameters m_i and C_i , and the scale
 267 parameter $k_{\Delta S_i}$ of the Weibull distributed fatigue stress range. Furthermore, if an inspection is
 268 conducted ($I_{i,t} = yes$), the inspection outcome $z_{i,t}$ is available. If a repair action is triggered, i.e.
 269 $R_{i,t} = yes$, the condition of the hot-spot is set to ‘‘as new’’.

270 The correlation and interdependence among components’ deterioration is represented by the
 271 hierarchical structure of the BN, as illustrated in Figure 5. The stochastic parameters of the presented
 272 deterioration model are explicitly represented by chance nodes, with the exception of C_i , since it

273 is deterministic conditional on m_i . The initial crack length $a_{i,0}$, the material parameter m_i and the
 274 stress parameter $k_{\Delta S,i}$ are specified conditional on the hyperparameters α_A , α_M and α_K , respectively.
 275 The three hyperparameters are standard normal distributed. The conditional distribution of a
 276 deterioration parameter given the hyperparameter is specified so that the joint distribution of the
 277 parameter for all hot-spots follows a Gaussian copula with specified correlation coefficients. This
 278 hierarchical representation is described in Luque and Straub (2016). The correlation coefficients
 279 are set to $\rho_A = 0.5$, $\rho_M = 0.6$ and $\rho_K = 0.8$ for $a_{i,0}$, m_i and $k_{\Delta S,i}$, respectively. Note that
 280 the deterioration parameters are conditionally independent for given hyperparameters, which is
 281 computationally advantageous to perform Bayesian inference (Luque and Straub 2016). The
 282 design decision node \mathcal{D} includes a set of discrete choices of the *FDF* of the hot-spots. Increasing
 283 the *FDF* mitigates fatigue by reducing the cyclic stress range. This is represented by the node \mathcal{D}
 284 affecting the initial expected scale parameter nodes $k_{\Delta S,i}$ with $i = 1, 2, \dots, 10$.

285 *System condition*

286 The system is loaded by a time-variant stochastic load with annual maximum Q , which is
 287 represented by a Gumbel distributed random variable with mean value $\mu_Q = 1.05 \cdot 10^6$ N and
 288 coefficient of variation 0.35. The value of μ_Q is chosen so that the probability of failure of the
 289 undamaged structure is approximately 10^{-6} . The resistance of the system to ultimate load, denoted
 290 r , depends on the condition of its members B1-B6 and is assumed to be deterministic.

291 The dependence between the system condition and the components' deterioration state is
 292 modelled with the BN in Figure 6. At a given time step t , the system condition is represented
 293 by the node $E_{S,t}$, which has binary outcome space $\{fail, safe\}$. $E_{S,t}$ is specified conditional on
 294 the members' condition, denoted $E_{B_j,t}$, $j = 1, 2, \dots, 6$. This is represented by the converging arcs
 295 from $E_{B_j,t}$ to $E_{S,t}$. $E_{B_j,t}$ takes the state *safe* if none of the hot-spots of member i is failed and *fail*
 296 otherwise. A failed member does not contribute to resistance to ultimate load. Any number of
 297 members may fail between two time steps, thus increasing the probability of failure of the system.
 298 The deterioration state of the system is characterized by the process $\Psi_t = \{E_{B_{1,t}} \cap E_{B_{2,t}} \cap \dots \cap E_{B_{6,t}}\}$,
 299 which collects the condition of the members of the system. Note that Ψ_t consists of 2^6 disjoint

300 states that range from all members being safe $\psi_1 = \cap_{j=1}^6 \{E_{Bj,t} = safe\}$, to all members being failed
 301 $\psi_{64} = \cap_{j=1}^6 \{E_{Bj,t} = fail\}$. The capacity of the system is pre-computed by performing a push-over
 302 analysis for all states of Ψ_t , as described in the next subsection. The probability of system failure
 303 is computed conditional on Ψ_t as:

$$304 \quad \Pr(E_{S,t} = fail | \Psi_t = \psi) = \Pr[r(\psi) - Q \leq 0] = 1 - F_Q(r(\psi)) \quad (11)$$

305 where F_Q is the cumulative distribution function of Q .

306 The probability of system failure $\Pr(E_{S,t} = fail)$ can then be related to the deterioration state by:

$$307 \quad \Pr(E_{S,t} = fail) = \int_{\mathbf{a}_t} \sum_{\Psi_t} \Pr(E_{S,t} = fail | \Psi_t) \Pr(\Psi_t | \mathbf{a}_t) \Pr(\mathbf{a}_t) d\mathbf{a}_t \quad (12)$$

308 where \mathbf{a}_t is a vector collecting the crack length for all components.

309 The event of failure of the system up to time t is given by $F_{sys,t} = \{E_{S,1} = fail \cup \dots \cup E_{S,t} = fail\}$.

310 The cumulative probability of system failure at time t is defined as $\Pr(F_{sys,t})$. This is approximated
 311 assuming independence between failure events at different years:

$$312 \quad \Pr(F_{sys,t}) \approx 1 - \prod_{\tau=1}^t (1 - \Pr(E_{S,\tau} = fail)) \quad (13)$$

313 It is noted that the error associated with this simplification is reasonably low in this context (Bismut
 314 and Straub 2018).

315 The annual probability of system failure $\Pr(F_{sys,yr,t})$ is simply computed from the cumulative
 316 probability of system failure as:

$$317 \quad \Pr(F_{sys,yr,t}) = \Pr(F_{sys,t}) - \Pr(F_{sys,t-1}) \quad (14)$$

318 *Push-over analysis*

319 A push-over analysis of the structure is performed to determine the ultimate resistance of the
320 system as a function of the configuration of the system $r(\Psi_t)$. This is done using the software
321 USFOS (Søreide et al. 1993). The analysis consists in applying a lateral load as shown in Figure 3,
322 increasing its amplitude until its ultimate resistance is reached. This push-over analysis is performed
323 for all $2^6 = 64$ possible configurations of the system Ψ_t . The employed FE model considers non-
324 linear material behavior, global buckling of the members, large displacements and deformations,
325 formation of plastic hinges and load redistribution within the structural system. Additionally, a
326 limit state of maximum displacement is defined. The maximum allowed displacement at the node
327 where the load is applied is set to 1.5 m.

328 The nominal dimensions of the tubular members are shown in Table 2. These dimensions
329 are specified at an intermediate cross-section located outside of the area influenced by the welded
330 connection, where stress concentration exists. The single element importance SEI is provided in
331 addition as a measure of a member's importance. The SEI_i of a component is equal to that of the
332 member that it belongs to. The SEI_i is defined as the difference between the probability of system
333 failure with only component i failed and the probability of failure of the intact system (Straub and
334 Der Kiureghian 2011). It can be observed that all structural components of the considered structure
335 are of approximately equal importance.

336 *Inspection model*

337 The likelihood of detecting a crack is based on the following probability of detection (PoD)
338 curve:

339
$$\Pr(Z_t = z | a_{i,t} = a) = PoD(a) = \exp(-a/\xi) \quad \text{if } z = 0 \quad (15)$$

340 where ξ is the expected minimum detectable crack length. Inspections are visually conducted, with
341 $\xi = 10$ mm.

342 If a crack is detected, it is assumed that the inspection can provide a measurement of the
343 crack size with an associated Gaussian error. The likelihood function $f_{Z_t|a_t=a}(Z_t|a_t = a)$ used for

344 Bayesian updating is then defined as:

$$345 \quad f_{Z_t|a_{i,t}=a}(Z_t|a_{i,t} = a) = (1 - PoD(a)) \cdot \frac{\varphi\left(\frac{z-a}{\sigma_\varepsilon}\right)}{1 - \Phi\left(\frac{-a}{\sigma_\varepsilon}\right)} \quad \text{for } z > 0 \quad (16)$$

346 where σ_ε is the measurement error, which is set to 0.1 mm, and $\varphi(\cdot)$ and $\Phi(\cdot)$ are the proba-
 347 bility density function and cumulative distribution function of the standard Normal distribution,
 348 respectively.

349 **Calibration of the LEFM model to the SN approach**

350 The *FDF* in Eq. (7) is a design parameter that is defined according to the SN approach. The
 351 employed deterioration model is based on the LEFM approach. Therefore, in order to use the *FDF*
 352 as a design parameter, the employed LEFM model needs to be calibrated to the SN-curve that is
 353 used to define the *FDF*. The calibration could be applied through several parameters. In this study,
 354 the parameter $k_{\Delta S}$ is chosen. The calibration is performed so that both models estimate the same
 355 probability of failure at the end of service life (Bismut and Straub 2020). The procedure for the
 356 computation of the probability of failure for the LEFM and the SN approach is elaborated hereafter.
 357 The results of the calibration are shown in Figure 7.

358 *LEFM*

359 The crack growth model used in the hierarchical ID is rewritten in terms of the number of cycles
 360 n and the initial crack length a_0 :

$$361 \quad a(n) = \left[(1 - m/2) C \Delta S_e^m \pi^{m/2} n + a_0^{(1-m/2)} \right]^{(1-m/2)^{-1}} \quad (17)$$

362 At the end of service life, the structure is subject to $n = \nu \cdot T_{SL}$ cycles. Using Eq. (10), the
 363 associated probability of failure results in:

$$364 \quad \Pr[g_{FM} \leq 0] = \Pr[a_{cr} - a(n = \nu \cdot T_{SL})] \quad (18)$$

365 This is computed by crude MCS for different values of $E[k_{\Delta S}]$, see Figure 7.

366 *SN approach*

367 The fatigue design factor FDF is a parameter associated with the deterministic SN failure
 368 criterion. The cumulative probability of failure associated with a given FDF is calculated so that
 369 the expected cumulative damage $E[\Delta D_i]$ reaches the deterministic failure criterion D at the end of
 370 fatigue life $T_{FL} = T_{SL} \cdot FDF$:

$$371 \quad D(T_{FL}) = 1 = \sum_{i=1}^{\nu \cdot FDF \cdot T_{SL}} \Delta D_i \approx \nu \cdot FDF \cdot T_{SL} \cdot E[\Delta D_i] \quad (19)$$

372 The deterministic fatigue lifetime $1/N_F^D$ is estimated according to the following bi-linear dia-
 373 gram:

$$374 \quad \frac{1}{N_F^D} = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{C_1^D} \Delta S^{m_1} \cdot \left(\frac{t_w}{t_{ref}} \right)^{q_t m_1} & \text{for } \Delta S \leq \Delta S_q \\ \frac{1}{C_1^D} \Delta S^{m_2} S^{m_1 - m_2} \cdot \left(\frac{t_w}{t_{ref}} \right)^{q_t m_2} & \text{for } 0 \leq \Delta S < \Delta S_q \end{cases} \quad (20)$$

375 with parameters taken according to the D-curve prescribed by the Department of Energy (DoE) of
 376 UK (SSC 1996): $m_1 = 3$, $m_2 = 5$, $C_1^D = 1.52 \cdot 10^{12}$, $N_q = 10^7$ cycles, $S_q = 2.48$ MPa, $t_{ref} = 16$ mm
 377 and $q_t = 0.30$.

378 The expected number of cycles to failure is computed according to the mean SN-curve associated
 379 with the diagram in Eq. (20) (SSC 1996):

$$380 \quad \begin{cases} \frac{1}{N_F} = \frac{1}{C_1} B_s^{m_1} \Delta S^{m_1} \cdot \left(\frac{t_w}{t_{ref}} \right)^{q_t m_1} & \text{for } B_s \Delta S \leq \Delta S_q \\ \frac{1}{N_F} = \frac{1}{C_1} B_s^{m_2} \Delta S^{m_2} \Delta S^{m_1 - m_2} \cdot \left(\frac{t_w}{t_{ref}} \right)^{q_t m_2} & \text{for } 0 \leq B_s \Delta S < \Delta S_q \end{cases} \quad (21)$$

381 where $C_1 = 3.99 \cdot 10^{12}$ and B_s is Log-normal distributed with mean 1 and standard deviation 0.25.

382 Noting that ΔS is Weibull distributed, the expected damage per cycle $E[\Delta D_i]$ can be expressed
 383 as:

$$E[\Delta D_i] = E\left[\frac{1}{N_F}\right] = k^{m_1} \cdot \left(\frac{t_w}{t_{ref}}\right)^{q_i m_1} \cdot \frac{1}{C_1} \cdot \Gamma\left(1 + \frac{m_1}{\lambda}, \left(\frac{\Delta S_q}{k}\right)^\lambda\right) + k^{m_2} \cdot \left(\frac{t_w}{t_{ref}}\right)^{q_i m_2} \cdot \frac{1}{C_1} \cdot \Delta S_q^{m_1 - m_2} \left[1 - \Gamma\left(1 + \frac{m_2}{\lambda}, \left(\frac{\Delta S_q}{k}\right)^\lambda\right)\right] \quad (22)$$

where $\Gamma(\cdot, \cdot)$ is the incomplete gamma function and λ and k are the shape and scale parameters of the Weibull distribution.

The shape parameter k is calibrated so that Eq. (19) is satisfied. The cumulative probability of failure for a duration of T_{SL} years is computed as $\Pr[g_{SN} \leq 0]$, with g_{SN} being the SN-approach limit state function:

$$g_{SN} = \Delta - \nu \cdot T_{SL} \cdot E[\Delta D_i] \quad (23)$$

Note that Δ is a Log-normal random variable with mean 1 and standard deviation 0.3 that represents the uncertainty associated with the Palmgren-Miner failure criterion (JCSS 2001).

The probability of failure $\Pr[g_{SN} \leq 0]$ is computed for different values of the *FDF* using first order reliability method (FORM), see Figure 7.

Calibration

The mean value of $k_{\Delta S}$ used in the LEFM deterioration model is calibrated to the SN approach as a function of the *FDF* by ensuring that both models estimate the same probability of failure at the end of service life. The relationship between $E[k_{\Delta S}]$ and the *FDF* is shown in Figure 7.

Cost model

The IMF cost $C_{IMF}(S_i, \mathcal{D}_j)$ is defined in Eq. (3) as the sum of the discounted costs of campaign, inspection, repair and failure. These costs are calculated based on the cost input in Table 3. These costs are rough estimates based on the cost of inspection given in Salmon, J. (2015) and the cost ratios in Luque and Straub (2019). An annual discount rate $i_r = 0.02$ is used.

The cost associated with a certain design choice C_D needs to be coherent with the aforementioned cost function. A design choice comprises the specification of the *FDF* for the different hot-spots. The relation between the *FDF* and the fatigue stress is established through $E[k_{\Delta S}]$, see Figure 7.

407 The fatigue stress range ΔS can be linked to a certain cross-section area, given that the cycling
 408 loading is known. Given that the fatigue stress is of a predominantly axial nature, i.e. the stress
 409 associated with bending and shear forces can be neglected, the relationship between $\Delta S_i(t)$ and the
 410 required cross-section area of the tubular member at the connection $A_{HS,i}$ is given by:

$$411 \quad \Delta S_i(t) = \frac{\Delta N_i(t)}{A_{HS,i}} \quad (24)$$

412 where subscript i refers to the hot-spot i , $\Delta N_i(t)$ is the nominal cyclic axial force range. Note that
 413 the cross-section area $A_{HS,i}$ is specified within the region affected by the stress concentration due
 414 to the tubular joint of interest and it is typically different than the nominal area specified at an
 415 intermediate cross-section by the dimensions in Table 2.

416 A linear relation between the fatigue load $\Delta L(t)$ and the internal forces at a member $\Delta N_i(t)$ can be
 417 established given that linear elasticity theory is applicable. In that case, it suffices to calculate $\Delta N_i(t)$
 418 for one value of $\Delta L(t)$. The axial forces associated with a unitary load, i.e. $\Delta L = 1$, here called
 419 α_{Bi} , are plotted in Figure 8. The internal forces can be computed simply as $\Delta N_i(t) = \alpha_{Bi} \cdot \Delta L(t)$,
 420 for any value of the fatigue loading.

421 The area $A_{HS,i}$ of hot-spot i can then be expressed as a function of the mean equivalent fatigue
 422 stress range at year zero $E[\Delta S_{e,i}]$ and the equivalent fatigue load range ΔL_e :

$$423 \quad A_{HS,i}(FDF_i) = \frac{|\alpha_{Bj}| \cdot \Delta L_e}{E[\Delta S_{e,i}]} =$$

$$424 \quad = \frac{|\alpha_{Bj}| \cdot \Delta L_e}{E[k_{\Delta S,i}](FDF_i) \cdot E \left[\Gamma \left(1 + \frac{m_i}{\lambda} \right)^{(1/m_i)} \right]} \quad (25)$$

424 where j refers to the member associated with hot-spot i and $\Delta L_e = E[\Delta L^m]^{(1/m)}$ is assumed to be
 425 600 kN. Note that Eq. (8) is used to express $\Delta S_{e,i}$ as a function of $k_{\Delta S,i}$ and that the relationship
 426 between $E[k_{\Delta S}]$ and FDF is shown in Figure 7.

427 By using Eq. (25), the cross-section area of the tubular member at the connection $A_{HS,i}$ can be
 428 expressed as a function of FDF_i . $A_{HS,i}$ is plotted as a function of the FDF for the different members

429 in Figure 9.

430 The cost of fatigue design of a single hot-spot $C_{HS,i}$ is defined as:

$$431 \quad C_{HS,i}(FDF_i) = \rho_s \cdot c_s \cdot A_{HS,i}(FDF_i) \cdot 1.5d_{o,i} \quad (26)$$

432 where ρ_s is the steel density, here assumed to be 7850 kg/m³. c_s is the cost of steel per unit weight,
433 which is around 2-3€/kg (De Vries et al. 2011). In this case study, c_s is assumed to include
434 the cost of welding and it is set to 6€/kg. The last term of the expression, i.e. $1.5d_{o,i}$, refers to
435 the extension of the tubular joint, with $d_{o,i}$ being the outer diameter of the tubular member at the
436 joint. Thus, $A_{HS,i} \cdot 1.5d_{o,i}$ is an estimation of the volume of steel employed in the fabrication of
437 the tubular connection. A large number of combinations of diameter d_o and thickness t_w could
438 be used in practice to achieve the same area $A_{HS,i}$. The ratio $k_{dt} = d_o/t_w$ is introduced. The
439 cross-section area $A_{HS,i}$ can be expressed as a function of $d_{o,i}$ and $t_{w,i}$ by use of the simplified
440 formula $A_{HS,i} = \pi(d_{o,i} - t_{w,i}) \cdot t_{w,i}$. It is straightforward then to express the diameter as a function
441 of the cross-section area and k_{dt} :

$$442 \quad d_{o,i} = \sqrt{\frac{A_{HS,i} \cdot k_{dt}}{\pi(1 - 1/k_{dt})}} \quad (27)$$

443 A typical range of k_{dt} for tubular members of offshore lattice structures is 10 to 50. The cost of
444 fatigue design $C_{HS,i}$ is calculated for this range of k_{dt} and plotted in Figure 10. Only the cost of B1
445 and B3 is plotted for clarity of the figure. The mean value, which is highlighted by a dashed line
446 in the plot, is used for the cost model of the case study. The cost of fatigue design C_D is computed
447 as the sum of $C_{HS,i}$ for all hot-spots $i = 1, 2, \dots, 10$.

448 **Discretization for the BN model**

449 The discretization of the random variables in the BN is performed according to recommendations
450 in Straub (2009). According to Luque and Straub (2016), one state is sufficient to represent the
451 failure domain of the deterioration variable, i.e. any realization $a_t \geq a_c$ is represented by one
452 single state that ranges between a_c to infinity. However, this introduces an error in the smoothing
453 operation performed in the employed algorithm for Bayesian inference (Zhu and Collette 2015).

454 The discretization selected in this study takes these considerations into account and provides a good
455 enough trade off between computation time and accuracy.

456 **RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDY**

457 Three designs \mathcal{D} are tested as shown in Table 4. Since the importance of the hot-spots is
458 similar, as shown in Table 2, all the dry hot-spots (HS1-HS4) are assigned the same FDF , denoted
459 FDF_d and all submerged hot-spots (H5-H10) are assigned the same the same FDF , denoted FDF_s .
460 The effect of varying FDF_d is studied. FDF_s is kept constant and equal to 6 for all designs for
461 simplicity.

462 As mentioned above, the aim of this framework is not to assess optimal I&M strategies but to
463 enhance the design decisions. With this in mind, the optimization of I&M strategies is limited to
464 the optimization within a discrete set of inspection intervals Δt_I . Inspections of all dry hot-spots
465 every two, five and ten years are considered, plus the case in which no inspections are performed.
466 Furthermore, a decision rule is applied: any detected damage is assumed to be repaired and thereby
467 restored to the initial condition.

468 **Effect of correlation**

469 An important benefit of considering system effects is that the dependency among hot-spots'
470 deterioration is explicitly taken into account. Consequently, information obtained by inspecting a
471 certain hot-spot is used to update the belief on the deterioration state at other correlated hot-spots.
472 The effect of correlation among the deterioration processes at different hot-spots can be observed in
473 Figure 11. The time evolution of the cumulative probability of failure of hot-spots HS1 and HS5 is
474 plotted. In this example, HS1 is inspected every five years without detecting any crack. HS5, which
475 belongs to B4 and is located underwater, cannot be inspected. These results are given for Design
476 3, with $FDF_d = FDF_s = 6$. Therefore, the prior probability of failure is equal for both hot-spots.
477 It can be seen that inspecting HS1 and not finding a crack decreases the estimated probability of
478 system failure of HS5 through the statistical dependence among the fatigue processes.

Effect of FDF on the probability of system failure

The time evolution of the posterior annual probability of failure of the system is compared for the three considered designs in Figure 12. Δt_I is set to five years, which means that three inspections are carried out at years 5, 10 and 15. Note that at year t , the annual probability of system failure $\Pr(F_{sys,yr})$ is estimated by Monte Carlo simulation over the observation outcomes up to that time.

It can be observed that the FDF has a significant impact on the time-variant system reliability, which is strongly affected by the speed of the hot-spot deterioration, i.e. the growth rate $da(t)/dn(t)$, which is proportional to the fatigue stress range to the m -th power and consequently inversely proportional to the FDF . Thus, doubling the FDF decreases the crack growth rate by about 50%. Unfortunately, due to the complexity of the system, it is not possible to establish a simple relationship between $\Delta S(t)^m$ and the probability of system failure. In general, the effect of increasing the FDF will be larger when the probability of system failure is larger. Therefore, the reduction achieved by increasing the FDF from 2 to 4 will be larger than that from 4 to 6. For $\Delta t_I = 2$ yr, increasing FDF_d from 2 to 4 and from 4 to 6, reduces the probability of system failure at the end of service life by 51% and 46%, respectively. For the same reason, the reduction will be larger when no inspections are conducted. In that case, 83% reduction of the probability of failure is achieved by increasing FDF_d from 2 to 4 and 67% by increasing FDF_d from 4 to 6.

Effect of I&M on the probability of system failure

The time evolution of the annual probability of failure of the system $\Pr(F_{sys,yr})$, including sampled observation histories, is plotted for different inspection strategies \mathcal{S} in Figure 13 for Design 1. It can be seen that the frequency of I&M campaigns has a clear effect on the annual reliability, helping to mitigate the annual risk in between inspections.

Expected life-cycle cost and optimal design

Figure 14 shows the expected life-cycle cost for the different considered designs \mathcal{D} and I&M strategies \mathcal{S} . The optimal I&M strategies for designs 1, 2 and 3 are two, five and ten years, respectively. The optimal integrated design, which is defined according to Eq. (1), is found to be $\{\mathcal{D}_{opt}, \mathcal{S}_{opt}\} = \{\text{Design 3}, \Delta t_I = 10 \text{ years}\}$. It can be observed that, for the given cost model, it is

506 cost-efficient to invest in a more conservative design. This initial investment in the construction of
507 the structural details is compensated by a reduced expected investment in inspections and repairs.
508 It can also be seen that allowing for a slightly larger risk and inspecting every ten years instead of
509 five is cost-effective.

510 The *FDF* has a clear effect on the expected consequences of failure. In particular, the effect is
511 easily appreciated for the cases with no inspections, where the expected cost is dominated by the risk
512 of failure, particularly for smaller values of the *FDF*. For $FDF_d = 2$, the expected life-cycle cost
513 associated with no inspections is disproportionate compared to the cases with inspections, being
514 approximately 11 times larger than for $\Delta t_I = 2$ years. The importance of the *FDF* is less evident
515 when an intensive inspection control is performed, such as for $\Delta t_I = 2$ years, where the expected
516 life-cycle cost is approximately the same for all the tested designs. In general, it is observed that
517 increasing the *FDF* shifts the optimal I&M policies towards longer inspection intervals.

518 **Influence of the annual discount rate**

519 The estimation of the expected life-cycle cost $E[C_T]$ is sensitive to the annual discount rate
520 i_r . Typical values of the annual discount rate range between 0.02 and 0.05. In order to study the
521 influence of the annual discount rate on optimal life-cycle decisions, the expected life-cycle cost is
522 plotted for these two values as a function of the inspection interval Δt_I and for the three designs in
523 Figure 15. It can be observed that increasing i_r from 0.02 to 0.05 leads to a significant reduction of
524 $E[C_T]$. This reduction mainly concerns the risk of failure term. For the case of no inspections and
525 $FDF_d = 2$, the risk of failure decreases by approximately 40%. Fortunately, the optimal choice of
526 an inspection interval is more robust with regard to changes of this parameter. For this particular
527 case study, the optimal I&M planning given each of the three design specifications remains the
528 same for both values of the annual discount rate.

529 **Accuracy of the Monte Carlo estimate**

530 In the present study, $n_{sim} = 350$ sampled histories are used to estimate the expected life-cycle
531 cost for each tested design and strategy. The coefficient of variation $\hat{v}_{E_Z[C_T]}$ is introduced to assess

532 the accuracy of the estimation of the expected life-cycle cost:

$$533 \hat{\nu}_{E[C_T]} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n_{sim}}} \cdot \frac{\sqrt{\text{Var}_Z[C_T(S_i, \mathcal{D}_j | \mathbf{Z})]}}{E_Z[C_T(S_i, \mathcal{D}_j | \mathbf{Z})]} \quad (28)$$

534 where $\text{Var}_Z[\cdot]$ is the variance operator upon the set of observations Z .

535 For designs 1, 2 and 3, respectively, it results in $\hat{\nu}_{E[C_T]} = \{0.087, 0.080, 0.013\}$ for $\Delta t_I = 2$ yr,
536 and $\hat{\nu}_{E[C_T]} = \{0.080, 0.076, 0.035\}$ for $\Delta t_I = 5$ yr. It is seen that the estimation of $E[C_T]$ is
537 associated with relatively large uncertainties. Nonetheless, this accuracy is sufficient to compare
538 the effect of the different I&M strategies and to assess the optimal integrated design for the explored
539 decision alternatives.

540 DISCUSSION

541 The presented framework can be used to assess a cost-effective balance between the design
542 investments and expected I&M costs and inform about the efficiency of the safety measures. The
543 paper focuses on fatigue deterioration, but the framework can be applied to other phenomena, such
544 as corrosion. Moreover, information about the importance of the components regarding system
545 structural integrity, the components dependency and the inspectability of a structural detail can be
546 efficiently utilized for the identification of optimal design decisions.

547 The framework only considers decisions related to structural deterioration in order to keep the
548 model as simple as possible. Therefore, not all aspects that a structural design should consider are
549 contemplated in the model. Nevertheless, it is expected that I&M planning decisions will mainly
550 influence the design decisions related to deterioration. Additional limit states could be added ad-hoc
551 into the model. For instance, serviceability limit states such as maximum allowed deflection, could
552 be added as a design constraint. Alternatively, additional limit states could be taken into account
553 in a prior assessment of the design.

554 Another limitation of the model is its computational demand. Although it increases linearly with
555 the number of hot-spots, the increase is exponential with the amount of random variables (Luque
556 and Straub 2016). The computational demand also increases dramatically with the number of

557 inspection campaigns. Using an Intel Xeon Gold 6132 processor, the computational time per
558 sampled history grows from ca. 22 s when no inspections are conducted to ca. 230 s for $\Delta t_I = 2$
559 years. Additionally, 2^N push-over analysis (with N being the number of structural elements that
560 contain fatigue prone details) are to be performed prior to the generation of the BN in order
561 to estimate the reliability of the damaged system. This becomes intractable for relatively small
562 systems. For 12 structural elements, 4096 analysis are to be performed. Assuming that a push-over
563 analysis takes in average 20 s, this requires ca. 22 h. For 14 elements, which is still a small number
564 of components for e.g. an offshore jacket structure, the push-over analysis requires approximately
565 4 days. Therefore, for structures with more than say 12 components, a smart selection of the cases
566 is to be performed beforehand. This could be done by identifying for which cases the structure
567 is structurally under-determinate or by ranking the elements based on their contribution to the
568 probability of system failure (Luque and Straub 2016; Kim et al. 2013).

569 **Further research**

570 The proposed framework can be used to assess the optimal trade-off between investments in
571 design and I&M for a particular structure or portfolio of structures. Unfortunately, identified
572 optimal decisions may not ensure a sufficient safety level from a societal point of view. The
573 marginal life-saving cost principle together with the life-quality index can be used to assess if risk
574 can be further mitigated in a cost-effective way according to societal preferences (Nathwani et al.
575 1997). This assessment should be conducted considering all reasonable mitigation measures.

576 There are challenges associated with the implementation and dissemination of the proposed
577 model. Currently, applying the framework to systems with a large number of deteriorating compo-
578 nents or using deterioration models with more stochastic parameters than the one used in this paper
579 is computationally unfeasible. Moreover, due to the complexity of the model, building the model
580 and interpreting the results require of expert knowledge. Nevertheless, the insight that can be gained
581 from it could be summarized as prescription rules and requirements for reliability-based design.
582 Standards such as ISO (2015) prescribe acceptable safety levels according to the consequence class
583 and the relative costs of the safety measures. The proposed framework can be used to extend the

584 differentiation of prescribed safety level to consider the level of inspectability of a structural detail.
585 In addition, the proposed framework can be used to find the optimal safety level at the design stage
586 given the characteristics of the system, the relative cost of safety measures and a consequence class.

587 **CONCLUSIONS**

588 A risk-based decision framework for the design of large infrastructure systems was presented
589 in this paper. The proposed framework presents an enhanced formulation of the design decision
590 problem in which design decisions can be made taking aspects of inspection planning into account.
591 The framework focuses on fatigue design and the optimal allocation of resources to mitigate risk of
592 fatigue failure. The framework considers system effects. This has an impact on the quantification
593 of the reliability of the structure and the optimization of the mitigation measures.

594 The methodology was implemented to a simple example, an offshore lattice structure subject
595 to fatigue deterioration. Considered mitigation measures are the specification of the fatigue design
596 factors of the hot-spots as well as the time interval between inspections and possible repair.
597 Inspections were assumed imperfect and therefore their outcome was associated with uncertainty.
598 Furthermore, not all hot-spots were considered to be accessible. The example showed the feasibility
599 of the methodology and documented the challenges in its implementation. Results show a significant
600 influence of the periodicity of inspections and the fatigue design of components on the life-cycle
601 risk. It is seen that optimal fatigue design is enhanced by the consideration of life-cycle risk
602 mitigation measures.

603 **DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

604 Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are available from the
605 corresponding author upon reasonable request. This includes the push-over analysis data and the
606 code used for conducting the integrated design optimization.

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TABLE 1. Mean value μ and standard deviation σ of the variables of the deterioration model used in the case study.

Variable	Type	μ	σ
$a_{i,0}$	Exponential	1 mm	1 mm
m_i	Normal	3.5	0.3
$k_{\Delta S,i}$	Log-normal	$f(FDF_i)$	0.22 N/mm ²
λ_i	Deterministic	0.8	-
a_{cr}	Deterministic	10 mm	-
ν	Deterministic	10 ⁵ cycles/year	-
T_{SL}	Deterministic	20 years	-

TABLE 2. Characteristics of the six tubular members. Nominal cross-section dimensions are given by the outer diameter d_o and the wall thickness t_w . SEI_i refers to the single element importance of the member i .

Member i	d_o [m]	t_w [m]	SEI_i
B1, B2	0.480	0.009	2.90 E-03
B3, B4	0.520	0.010	5.26 E-03
B5, B6	0.520	0.010	2.60 E-03

TABLE 3. Cost input.

Cost	Symbol	Value
Inspection campaign	c_C	1 k€
Component inspection	c_I	0.3 k€
Component repair	c_R	0.6 k€
System failure	c_F	3,000 k€
Cost of steel	c_S	6 €/kg

TABLE 4. Fatigue design factor FDF for the three tested designs. FDF_d and FDF_s refer to the FDF of the inspectable and non-inspectable hot-spots, respectively.

\mathcal{D}	Design 1	Design 2	Design 3
FDF_d	2	4	6
FDF_s	6	6	6

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



Fig. 1. Main phases of the life-cycle of large structural systems.



Notes: N_d = number of considered designs; \mathcal{S} = considered I&M strategies; $\hat{S}_{opt,j}$ = optimal I&M strategy given design D_j , RBI planning = risk-based inspection planning

Fig. 2. Schematic representation of the integrated structural design framework.




Fig. 3. Case study structure: offshore lattice structure subject to fatigue deterioration at ten hot-spots (HS1-HS10) that are located at the welded tubular joints of the braces B1-B6.




Fig. 4. Schematic influence diagram of the fatigue deterioration model. The crack length of a hot-spot i at year t , denoted $a_{i,t}$, is specified conditional on the stochastic deterioration parameters and evolves in time according to Eq. (9).




Fig. 5. Dependence structure of the fatigue deterioration process modelled through the correlation of the stochastic deterioration parameters $a_{i,0}$, $k_{\Delta S,i}$ and m_i among different hot-spots $i = 1, 2, \dots, 10$ with a hierarchical Bayesian Network.




Fig. 6. Bayesian Network model of the relationship between the crack length of the hot-spots, the condition of the structural members and the system condition at time step t .




Fig. 7. Calibration of the mean value of the stochastic scale parameter $k_{\Delta S}$ of the Weibull distributed fatigue stress range process as a function of the fatigue design factor FDF , so that the fracture mechanics and the SN approaches result in the same probability of failure at the end of service life.




Fig. 8. Axial forces in the members for a unit load.




Fig. 9. Cross-section area of a joint $A_{HS,i}$ as a function of the fatigue design factor FDF plotted for the members B1-B4 and for different values of α .




Fig. 10. Design cost of a hot-spot $C_{HS,i}$ as a function of the fatigue design factor FDF for the members B1 and B3. The colored areas referred to values of the diameter to thickness ratio in the range from 10 to 50 and the dashed lines are the mean values within that range.




Fig. 11. Posterior cumulative probability of failure $\Pr(g_{FM} \leq 0)$ of inspected hot-spot HS1 and non-inspected hot-spot HS5. In this example, inspected hot-spots are associated with $FDF_d = 6$ and inspected every five years with no crack detection at any instance.




Fig. 12. Comparison of the annual probability of system failure of $\Pr(F_{sys,yr})$ between the three tested designs, with $\Delta t_I = 5$ yr.




Fig. 13. Time evolution of the annual probability of system failure $\Pr(F_{sys,yr})$ for different inspection intervals Δt_I , with $FDF_d = 2$.




Fig. 14. Expected life-cycle cost $E[C_T]$ for the considered fatigue design factors FDF_d and inspection intervals Δt_I .




Fig. 15. Influence of the annual discount rate i_r on the expected life-cycle cost $E[C_T]$ and optimal fatigue design factor FDF_d and inspection interval Δt_I .