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A Study of Ethnic Relations and Policy Responses

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Trondheim, September 2019

Joachim Vogt Isaksen

Abstract

The overarching topic of this thesis is ethnic attitudes in view of social and economic changes, and how this is dealt with through policy measures.

The reason for writing this thesis is twofold; 1) to study ethnic attitudes widely by using quantitative data, varying between multilevel analysis and time series data. The aim here is to explore factors that influence ethnic attitudes and to what extent attitudes depend on circumstances such as social and economic conditions, as well as the ethnic composition of a society and 2) identifying suggested policy measures on immigration and integration, by using Sweden and Norway as illustrative examples. The second part provides an in-depth analysis of how immigration and integration is framed and discussed at the "elite level", and what kind of policy practices and solutions are suggested.

The main findings provide insight into how countries respond to immigration, and thereby understand how to alleviate tension between immigrants and members of the majority populations. Several conclusions have been drawn from the four research articles. First, there is a link between social and economic conditions, and attitudes toward immigration. However, ethnic attitudes vary extensively both nationally and regionally, as well as over time. The main pattern found is that people living in Western countries, which are characterized by having the most stable economies, are the most tolerant toward immigration; while less economically developed countries generally are more skeptical. The data also indicates that for the countries which were relatively wealthy before the crisis, the impact of the economic crisis on immigrant attitudes was quite modest.

The regional variations follow the same pattern as those observed at the national level. Comparisons of regions in Europe show that poorer regions are more negative towards immigration compared to wealthier regions. Another pattern shows that increased diversity and thus contact between the majority and the minority population leads to increasingly tolerant attitudes, but only up to a certain point. A further increase in diversity seems to lead to more skepticism towards immigration. However, this "critical" point varies between countries, and factors such as national and regional social and economic circumstances seem to have moderating effects. Attitudes are also sensitive to economic fluctuations, especially in countries that are the least economically developed. Overall, an increase in negative attitudes can be observed relatively soon after an economic downturn.

The case study of Sweden and Norway gives an overview of how immigration is perceived among important actors which contribute to the shaping of national immigration policy. The empirical findings in this paper illustrate how actors at the macro level might function as actors on how attitudes are formed. The last study provides an insight into how policy responses may develop and vary over time at the "elite level" of society. It also provides an insight into how the measures of immigration and integration policy develops and varies over time.

List of papers

Paper I: Jakobsen, T. G., J.V. Isaksen, G. K.O. Skavhaug, and H. A. Bakkan. 2016. “The Turning Point of Tolerance: Ethnic Attitudes in a Global Perspective.” *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 23, no. 1: 80-104.

Paper II**:** Isaksen, J. V., T. G. Jakobsen, A. Filindra, and Z. Strabac. 2016. “The Return of Prejudice in Europe’s Regions: The Moderated Relationship Between Group Threat and Economic Vulnerability.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 22, no. 3: 249-277.

Paper III: Isaksen, J. V. 2019. “The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Attitudes toward Immigration.” *Comparative Migration Studies* 24, no. 7: 1-20. doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0127-5

Paper IV: Isaksen, J. V. “The Framing of Immigration and Integration in Sweden and Norway: A Comparative Study of Official Government Reports.” Accepted for publication in *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*

Content

Paper 1: The Turning Point of Tolerance: Ethnic Attitudes in a Global Perspective

Paper 2: The Return of Prejudice in Europe's Regions: The Moderated Relationship between Group Threat and Economic Vulnerability

Paper 3: The impact of the financial crisis on European attitudes toward immigration

Paper 4: The Framing of Immigration and Integration in Sweden and Norway: A Comparative Study of Official Government Reports

Introduction

An ongoing increase in global immigration in recent decades has led to a rising political conflict concerning the issue of ethnic relations. This makes it crucial to gain an understanding on the basis of how majority attitudes towards the newcomers are shaped. One important aspect is to understand how people`s opinion towards immigrants are shaped as a result of increased immigration and demographic changes. The overall objective of this thesis is to examine the consequences of immigration on the majority population`s attitudes, both regionally, nationally and globally. More specifically, I explore the extent to which attitudes are dependent on circumstances such as economic conditions and relative size of out-groups. I use different sets of survey data in combination with national-level data. The quantitative part of the thesis covers data from longer time periods and provides an overview of trends in the field. Another part of the thesis goes more in depth into the immigration topic with a study that consists of a comparative analysis of policy measures on immigration and integration with an in-depth analysis of the framing of immigration at the "elite level" in two Scandinavian countries. The example of Sweden and Norway provides further insight into how immigration is discussed, an evaluation of certain policy practices as well as suggestions for policy solutions. The findings from this study provide insight into how countries can respond to immigration, and thereby alleviate tension between immigrants and members of the majority populations.

The thesis increases knowledge concerning the underlying determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration, and how this is responded to by people who shape policy. Migration can be viewed as the natural consequence of wars, globalization, and political decisions, and people at different levels in society must face the challenges related to the integration of newcomers. In order for politicians to succeed with the integration process, it is necessary to acquire an insight into influences on attitude formation, and possible policy responses. The question of how public opinion towards immigration is shaped has relevance and implications *both* for immigrants as well as for actors developing policies to meet challenges associated with increased immigration. As such, the qualitative study of this thesis consists of an analysis of discourses on immigration and integration in Norway and Sweden.

The thesis consists of four papers. The first three papers use quantitative measures of ethnic attitudes towards immigration, while the last study identifies discussions involving immigration issues by looking at policy documents. More specifically, Paper 1 investigates global patterns in individual ethnic attitudes, with a comparison of non-Western and Western countries using

five waves of the World Values Survey, with a measure denoted as *ethnic aversion*. Paper 2 studies anti-immigrant attitudes among Europeans in 16 different countries, with a test of how regional variations in ethnic tolerance depend on relations between a country's proportion of immigrants, the country's economic conditions, and people's attitudes towards immigration. In Paper 3, I observe the long-term effects of economic downturn on attitudes toward immigration where data from 24 European countries gathered from the European Social Survey (2002–2014) are analyzed. Finally, in Paper 4, I study reactions towards immigration at the macro-level. The paper considers differences and similarities in Swedish and Norwegian policies with an in-depth analysis of policy documents collected during the period 2010–2018. When exploring the topic of immigration, I have looked at different factors, and used inspiration from different disciplines and theoretical traditions.

Several conclusions have been drawn from the four research articles. First, and not so surprisingly, there is link between social and economic conditions, and attitudes toward immigration. However, ethnic attitudes vary extensively both nationally and regionally as well as over time. The main pattern in the quantitative articles is that people living in Western countries, which also have the most stable economies, are the most tolerant toward immigration; while countries that are less economically developed are generally more skeptical. The regional variations follow the same pattern as the national variations. In poorer regions there are more negative immigrant attitudes compared to wealthier regions. There is also a pattern which shows that increased diversity and thus contact between the majority and the minority population leads to increasingly tolerant attitudes, but only up to a certain point. A further increase in diversity seems to lead to more skepticism towards immigration. However, this "critical" point varies between countries, and factors such as national and regional social and economic circumstances seem to have moderating effects. Attitudes are also sensitive to economic fluctuations, especially in countries that are the least economically developed. Overall, an increase in negative attitudes can be observed relatively soon after an economic downturn. The response at the more "elite level" of society also seems to vary substantially; the last paper shows that there are considerable differences in how issues concerning immigration are discussed and understood, even in neighboring and relatively similar countries such as Sweden and Norway.

Contribution

I argue that the main contribution of the dissertation is to increase knowledge about the underlying determinants of people`s immigrant attitudes, and to gain insight into government responses to challenges resulting from immigration. This research represents a valuable contribution to the emerging scientific field of the consequences of, and responses to migration. First, there is a need for comparative studies testing ethnic attitudes simultaneously at a national and a regional level since most of the research has been conducted at state level. European countries display substantial regional differences in terms of economic development, which suggests that there are limitations to solely using country-level analysis that primarily rely on country average indicators for social and economic variables. To fill this gap in the literature, the thesis uses collapsed data from country, regional, and individual levels, employing three-level logistic models to test the hypotheses. This includes sundry level-2 and level-3 control variables. The thesis contributes to the existing literature by exploring the influence that both country-level characteristics and regional-level characteristics have on individual-level opinions. A common denominator for the quantitative papers is that macro factors, both at regional and national levels, influence individual attitudes on different dimensions of the immigration subject. This contributes with an insight into how individual attitudes are influenced by changes in macro-economic factors, both geographically and over time. To gain insight into different policy responses and solutions, I have mapped out different frames as seen from a more official governmental position in two Scandinavian countries. Attitudes towards immigration is important since the success of the integration process is influenced by people`s attitudes.

Summarized briefly, the four research articles shed light on the relation between macro factors and the formation of ethnic attitudes, and contribute to the development of the research field by: 1) identifying the link between diversity and ethnic attitudes in various contexts; 2) making use of improvements in data (using data at an individual, regional, and national level); 3) identifying those contextual factors which are the most important when it comes to explaining ethnic attitudes and 4) identifying important frameworks in which immigration and integration are discussed and understood. This thesis might have relevance for the scholarly field and can also have policy-implications. Research on policy and practice, and on encounters between immigrant populations and host communities, may be of public interest; It can be relevant when it comes to evaluating different practices as well as pointing out future political directions.

Table 1. Overview of the three quantitative articles

	Paper I	**Paper II**	**Paper III**
Main data set	World Values Survey	European Social Survey	European Social Survey
Dependent variables	Ethnic aversion	Ethnic tolerance	Immigration good or bad for economy
Individual-level factors	Gender Age Income Political left-right Education Personal trust Institutional trust	Age Gender Income Education Political left/right Personal trust Institutional Trust	Immigration attitudes
Macro-level factors	Per capita GDP, Democracy, Ethnic fractionalization	Per capita GDP, Unemployment rate Immigration rate	Per capita GDP GDP growth Unemployment rate

Note: Paper 4 is not listed as it is a qualitative contribution.

Previous research on ethnic attitudes

In the following section I provide an overview of the research upon which this thesis is based. First, I present and discuss the concepts "ethnicity" and "attitude," both of which have been the subject of considerable debate. There is seldom any consensus on the precise meaning of the terms, and how they are used and defined have also changed over time- I therefore clarify my use of these concepts, after which I present the theoretical perspectives that the thesis builds upon.

The concept of ethnicity

The concepts "ethnicity" and "ethnic" are derived from Greek. Aristoteles (384–322 BC) used the term "ethnos" to denote alien or "barbarous" groups as distinct from Hellenic civilization. The adjective "ethnikos" accordingly meant "pagan," "heathen," or "barbarian." "Barbarians comprised those who spoke unintelligible languages and lacked civilization, order and decency"

(du Toit 1978, 1; Chapman et al. 1989, 12–14). “Ethnos” was originally a term exclusively applied to foreigners, and often in an unfavorable manner.

While race can be considered as a biological construct, ethnicity also includes ideas of people and nationality. “Ethnicity” is therefore a wider notion than “race” even if both terms are used interchangeably in the literature (e.g., Foster et al. 1996). Race is used by social scientists to refer to distinctions drawn from physical appearance (e.g., skin color, hair texture, facial features), while ethnicity includes cultural aspects that go beyond physical appearance. As such, ethnicity is something that needs to be defined and negotiated compared to the notion of race which is a more stable category.

The 20th century definitions of ethnicity have usually focused on two important features: common descent and shared culture. In social anthropology, the focus has mainly been on culture. Summarizing the state of anthropological research on ethnicity in the 1970s, Cohen (1978) states: “Quite suddenly, with little comment or ceremony, ethnicity is a ubiquitous presence. Even a brief glance through titles of books and monographs over the past few years indicates a steadily accelerating acceptance and application of the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic’ to refer to what was before often subsumed under ‘culture,’ ‘cultural,’ or ‘tribal’” (p. 379). Weber`s classic definition of an ethnic group is also commonly used. He notes that “ethnic groups” entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration … it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” (Weber 1978, 389). Today, this view on ethnicity is often used in the social sciences, frequently focusing on ethnicity that is not solely reduced to common biological descent. Phinney (1996) has emphasized that although most people have a “common sense” notion of ethnicity, the concept itself lacks a clear theoretical framework with a limited empirical base. This difficulty partly lies in the differences *between* and *within* ethnic groups and their members in terms of their migration history, social class, country of origin, acculturation or enculturation, variation in cultural norms and practices, and regional differences among others. Additionally, there is an increasing number of children from mixed race (or “inter-ethnic”) backgrounds that extend the range of groups even further or “blur” the boundaries between them (Choudhry 2010). In this dissertation my use of the concept of ethnicity lies close to that of Weber. One advantage with his definition is that it captures both *real* as well as *assumed* common descent, while the concept of race is less dynamic as blood ties are the foundation of ethnic ties. According to Weber (1978), it does not matter whether an objective blood relationship actually exists. For the purpose of this

dissertation the question asked can be interpreted by the respondents as capturing both dimensions–biological *and* assumed common descent. Questions that ask whether immigration is considered "good" or "bad" do not indicate an exclusionary definition, and do not indicate whether immigrants share the same blood line or whether this captures common ethnic descent.

Research on ethnic attitudes–a cross disciplinary field

Ethnic attitudes have been the subject of considerable research, especially within sociology and social psychology. Negative attitudes toward other ethnic groups have usually been named "ethnic prejudice" (e.g., Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002b). However, many other terms have been used, such as "ethnic intolerance" (e.g., Kunovich, and Hodson 1999; Sekulic, and 2006) or "ethnic exclusionism" (e.g., Coenders, and Scheepers 2003), and "ethnic aversion" which builds upon Allport`s (1954) concept of avoidance. In quantitative surveys, different denotations of negative ethnic attitudes have been used to measure ethnic prejudice. The term "tolerant" has also been used in a general way in the literature on inter-ethnic attitudes to describe someone who is "not prejudiced" (see, Bettelheim, and Janowitz 1965, 686). Tolerance towards ethnic minority groups is often considered a democratic virtue and is sometimes also used as a litmus test on how democratic a society really is. Much of the research within the field of migration has also been devoted to studies of negative attitudes directed towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. One focus in empirical studies is on the determinants of prejudice or negative attitudes toward immigrants. Regarding the extent of anti-immigrant attitudes, it must be pointed out that there is a lack of general agreement on how to measure anti-immigrant attitudes accurately. One main reason for this is that the literature in psychology and social psychology presents a rich variety of definitions of the term "attitude," and many different theoretical concepts have been used in previous studies. One of the most frequently used is "prejudice" (e.g., Quillian 1995), but other terms, such as "anti-foreigner sentiment" (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006) and "ethnic exclusionism" (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002), are also common. Fishbein and Ajzen`s (1975) general definition of attitude can be usefully applied to immigrant attitudes. They define attitude as "a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to a given object" (p. 6). In other words, attitudes can be seen as more or less consistent tendencies to evaluate particular objects positively or negatively. Regardless of whether immigrant attitudes are learned or innate, The European Social Survey (ESS) data measures how

Europeans evaluate the object "immigration." Although I use different measures of anti-immigrant attitudes in this dissertation, partly due to the availability of dependent variables in the data. Even if the dependent variables in Papers 1–3 separately measure both attitudes towards race, ethnicity and attitudes towards immigration for the economy, research has shown that attitudes to immigration are closely related to attitudes towards ethnic minorities or to out-groups in general. Empirical studies have for example shown that attitudes to diverse groups such as Jews, Muslims, homosexuals, the disabled and homeless persons are indeed very similar in their origins and consequences (Zick et al. 2008). Based on the consistency in earlier research I therefore assume that even if the variables pose different questions they still measure the same dimensions.

Another assumption behind this thesis is that attitudes are dynamic and thus susceptible to contextual factors. This assumption builds on previous research which has revealed that people's attitudes are often inconsistent, and strongly dependent on the concrete situation in which they are expressed (Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988). Attitudes are thus more than a consistent, purely rational calculation based on concrete, well-founded information. Therefore, I assume that the contextual factors such as economic development, the number of migrants in a country or a region, social and economic changes over time etc. are all likely to explain variations in attitudes. It is still important to point out that the although individual attitudes will vary by situation, there are also personality differences in how situations influence individual attitudes. Mondak et al. (2010a) suggest that "expression of personality traits vary by situation" (p. 90). A similar view is expressed in the literature on authoritarianism and ethnocentrism with regard to the role of these dispositions in shaping prejudice and intolerance (Feldman 2003; Kinder, and Kam 2010). However, in this thesis I do not measure personality differences in attitudes as the empirical data can only describe whether environmental factors have a general influence on the population, and not on whether different personalities respond differently to the same environmental stimulus.

Theories on prejudice

This section presents some of the main theories of prejudice upon which the thesis is constructed. There are both individual-level and group-level theories of prejudice, as well as micro- and macro theories. While individual-level and group-level theories at the micro level have a psychological and sociological approach, the macro-level theories are to a larger degree

based on economic and political science. While group-level theories argue that individual and sociotropic economic vulnerability can trigger out-group prejudice, macro theories from sociology and political economy have emphasized country-level differences in wealth and economic insecurity as the main causes. For example, some studies suggest that citizens of more affluent countries tend to be more inclusive in comparison to those from poorer countries (Gorodzeisky 2011), while other studies have linked unemployment and economic decline with prejudice (Strabac, and Listhaug 2008).

The social context: intergroup contact- and group threat theory

Theories on ethnic prejudice do not provide a consensus on the roots of prejudice. I argue that although prejudice is rooted in individual characteristics and personality traits, it is also a social phenomenon and cannot only be ascribed to stable and permanent characteristics of human nature. Consequently, prejudice is likely to change depending on social circumstances. Although I recognize that prejudice is an expression of biological (and genetic) forces, it is still majorly influenced by environmental factors. This does not exclude genetic factors as having an impact on stereotypes through innate information processing. As far as stereotypes lead to affects and discrimination, genetic factors also have an indirect influence on these dimensions of prejudiced behavior (see for example Flohr 1987).

Flohr (1986) suggests that the known sociological and psychological approaches should not be replaced by biological explanations, but that they should be complemented by a comprehensive biocultural understanding. In summary, my starting point is that prejudice has a significant biological origin, but social forces can still encourage and/or reverse the process within the context of society. Many studies within social psychology and sociology have demonstrated how social situations influence the shaping of human attitudes and behavior. Even if there is strong agreement among social scientists that context *does* influence prejudice, different studies reach different conclusions on precisely *how* social factors influence attitudes. Some studies have, for example, indicated that an increase in contact between the majority population and immigrants is likely to reduce ethnic tension, while other studies have concluded that increased contact and diversity leads to more conflict. Allport (1954) argued through his *intergroup contact theory* that a society can achieve more ethnic tolerance through openness and inter-ethnic interaction. He argued that direct positive interaction with out-group members is expected to increase positive affect, empathy, and general goodwill towards out-groups, thereby

leading to a decline in prejudicial attitudes. He drew on William Graham Sumner`s work in *Folkways* (1907) to outline a theory of prejudice that is based upon in-group and out-group conflict. According to Allport, the need for defined in-groups and out-groups grew out of our evolutionary development as an obligatorily interdependent species. Because humans rely on one another for the information and resources they need in order to survive, we must be willing to trust and cooperate with one another. Although, indiscriminate trust is not a good survival strategy, since it is necessary to have some degree of certainty that the obligation is mutual. Therefore, in-groups are formed in which members are obligated to reciprocate any aid given to them in a system of "contingent altruism" (Brewer 1999, 433). At the most basic level, members expect the in-group to treat them with kindness and fairness so long as they cooperate with other group members. As groups become larger, signs and symbols are created to differentiate in-group members from out-group members so that out-group members will not inadvertently receive the benefits given to in-group members. At the same time, the group's institutions and rules gain a degree of moral authority within the group. As that authority becomes more absolute, the in-group members` tolerance for the institutions and rules of the out-group declines, leading to disapproval of, or outright hostility towards the out-group (Brewer 1999).

It is important to point out that Allport (1954) emphasizes that the beneficial effects of contact only appear under certain conditions, and that "prejudice may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional support (i.e., by law, custom, or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and common humanity between members of the two groups" (Allport 1954: 281). The general implication of the contact hypothesis is that under certain conditions, contact between "different" groups reduces the initial level of prejudice. The consequence of this hypothesis is that in a closed homogenous society with limited contact between the majority and the "outsiders", prejudice will be high. Conversely, in an open and heterogeneous society, prejudice will be low.

While Allport (1954) emphasized that contact between ethnic groups can reduce prejudice, Blalock (1967) suggested through his *group threat theory* that the larger the relative size of the minority, the more these people could be in direct or potential competition with a given individual in the dominant (majority) group. Following this logic, an increase in the proportion of the minority group would lead to increasingly intolerant attitudes in the society. He explained

that while the out-groups increase in number, the total level of intergroup competition was expected to increase. Blalock (1967) emphasized two key factors that became prominent during an increase in the minority proportion: *competition* and *power threat*. Another basic notion derived from the group threat theory is that the ethnic composition of both neighborhoods and states, influence people`s attitudes toward immigrants. In this perspective the ethnic composition of a country and the economic conditions and competition, can explain difficulties and problems in areas of mixed ethnic groups. The group-threat theory could for example suggest that African-Americans encounter worse prejudice than Asian-Americans because they are larger in numbers (Quillan 1995).

Group threat theory focuses on the relationship between groups and assumes that the threat from other ethnic groups is greater during a recession, which aggravates anti-immigrant attitudes. Several studies have also demonstrated an association between the percentage of ethnic minorities and majority-group members' ethnic prejudice and discrimination (Colapinto 2000). Aside from supplying a direct justification for violent conflict, the ideology of intergroup struggle ignites a feature of human social psychology: the tendency to divide people into in-groups and out-groups and to treat the out-groups as less than human. It does not matter whether the groups are thought to be defined by their biology or by their history. Psychologists have found that humans can create instant intergroup hostility by sorting people on just about any pretext, including the flip of a coin (Colapinto 2000). Empirical studies also demonstrate various forms of group threat affect negative attitudes towards minority groups (Esposito, and Murphy 1999). One classic example is Bobo's (1983) study of the conveying white children by bus to black neighborhoods in the USA. His research showed that white parents strongly opposed this when it concerned their own children, despite their advocacy of general principles of equality between ethnic groups. They experience threat towards their group position and react negatively. Other studies show that factors at the macro level interact with the proportion of immigrants when it comes to an increase in negative attitudes. A study by Semyonov, Rajdman, and Gorodzeisky (2006) showed that anti-foreigner sentiment was shown to be more pronounced in places with a large proportion of foreign communities and where economic conditions are less prosperous. According to the authors, the effect of these two factors on anti-foreigner sentiments has not changed much over time. Quillian (1995) shows that prejudice in Europe is influenced by the interaction of GDP and the proportion of immigrants. Similarly, Fetzer (2000) suggests that the more people think that immigrants are likely to compete for jobs, the more likely they are to support reduced levels of immigration. From a group threat

perspective, the explanation is that the struggle over scarce resources makes people want to favor their own group over other groups. Hjerm (2007) points out that there is a theoretical difference between Bobo (1983) and Fetzer (2000) in that the former comes from the "realistic-group-threat-theory" school, where anti-immigrant attitudes are a result of real experiences and interests. The other school of group threat theory claims that what matters is not whether threats are real or not, but that they are perceived as such. To summarize, the research on whether community diversity has a positive or negative effect on ethnic attitudes remains inconclusive. It is important to point out that Allport did not argue that "mere contact" by itself would automatically reduce prejudice. He warned that without moving beyond casual contact into a deeper engagement characterized by the conditions he laid out, that more contact could lead to more trouble (Allport 1954, 263). Later studies also found evidence that living at greater levels of diversity can have both positive effects (indicative of the contact hypothesis) *and* negative effects (indicative of the threat hypothesis) on attitudes towards ethnic out-groups. This has led several scholars to conclude that the vast empirical literature has not provided a definite answer as to which of these two effects that is strongest (Dustmann and Preston 2001, 354; Wagner et al. 2006). Laurence (2014) suggests that both processes of threat and contact may occur with increasing diversity. He concludes that increasing community diversity *does* have a negative effect on inter-ethnic attitudes, but only among individuals without inter-ethnic ties. Furthermore, he demonstrates that increased diversity has no effect on people who have already developed ties with other ethnic groups. Whether Allport's ideal conditions are important for a reduction in the level of prejudice is not just a matter of theoretical importance—it is also an urgent policy question. Scholars reviewing the contact literature often express skepticism about the possibility of orchestrating the kinds of "high-quality" contact that Allport had prescribed. Dixon et al. (2005), for example, lament that contact in "rarefied conditions" may not generalize to "everyday life in divided societies" (p. 697). Finally, even if there are differences between the intergroup contact and group threat theory, similar outcomes affecting prejudice can be explained by both theories, while social circumstances seem to be an important moderating factor. It also provided empirical support for this in Papers 1 and 2.

The scapegoat theory

The scapegoat theory can be understood as a group threat mechanism, but more at the individual psychological level than the group level. According to Macionios and Plummer (2008),

scapegoat theory refers to the tendency to blame someone else for one's own problems–a process that often results in feelings of prejudice towards the person or group that one is blaming. Scapegoating serves as an opportunity to explain one's own failures or misdeeds while maintaining a positive self-image. For example, a person who is unemployed can blame what is perceived as an unfair system, or the people who did get the job. The person may be using others as a scapegoat and may end up hating them as a result. However, if the system really *is* unfair and keeps the person from succeeding financially, or other people got the job because of nepotism or illegitimate preferential treatment, then blaming those factors would not be scapegoating. Essentially, scapegoating generally employs a stand-in for one's own failures so that one does not have to face one's own weaknesses. Scapegoating can also occur when an in-group perceives itself to be interdependent with an out-group. When the two groups are forced to work together to achieve a common goal or face a common threat, the lack of mutual trust between the groups becomes particularly noticeable. Since neither group can trust the other not to exploit the relationship, the relationship becomes one of distrust. This distrust can lead to scapegoating as one group blames the other for the difficulties or failures it encounters while working to achieve the groups` mutual goal or ward off a mutual threat (Brewer 1999). The scapegoat theory notes that prejudices serve as an ego-defensive function, and that attitudes help to protect our fragile egos from uncomfortable self-criticisms.

The scapegoat theory bears resemblance with ethnic competition theory, although the focus here is more on increased competition between ethnic groups for jobs. Olzak`s (1992) model of ethnic competition, emphasizes the influence of a shrinking job market on native workers, and builds on the insights from relative deprivation theory (Gurr 2011; Runciman 1966), which stresses the influence of group comparisons on discontent. Olzak (1992) posits the general prediction that at the individual level, economic threat, whether real or imagined, engenders opposition to immigration. The competition for resources, and the attempts to remove this competition, are important determinants of intergroup attitudes and behavior. Although some studies provide little or no support to the theory that competition for scarce resources lead to increased ethnic intolerance (see for example Strabac et al. 2011), many studies both in Europe and in the United States have found strong positive correlations between macro-economic decline and anti-immigrant attitudes or policy preferences. Increased unemployment rates have for example been associated with preferences for immigration restrictions (Strabac, and Listhaug 2008). Scapegoat theory was an important theoretical starting point of paper 3, where

scapegoating mechanisms were used to explain increased opposition towards immigration after the financial crisis.

The integration process

Both Papers 1 and 3 show that the attitudes in the Scandinavian countries are generally positive towards immigration. Individual attitudes towards immigration can to some extent be shaped by the many public debates and media coverage originating from policy documents. But what kind of foundation do policy practices toward the newly arrived immigrants build upon? In the following section I describe issues related to integration of immigrants. I use the two neighboring countries Norway and Sweden as an illustrative example of how immigration is dealt with.

The integration of immigrants

Policy-makers have often sought advice from researchers on how to reduce prejudice, and social scientists have contributed in developing programs and policies. As such, theories and empirical data on how ethnic relations are formed provides us with an important understanding of how governments and communities can develop measures to improve the integration of immigrants. Amir (1969), for example, argues that if future research concludes that Allport's conditions are in fact necessary for reducing ethnic tension, then policy-makers have a challenging but clear recipe for improving intergroup relations. Insights into attitude formation can also help the government in designing integration policies with more precision.

Although it is reasonable to assume that there is a link between patterns and determinants of people`s opinions on immigration and policy outcomes, it is relevant to observe variations on how policy is developed through official government documents. In Paper 4, I have used Norway and Sweden as empirical illustrations of similarities and differences in understanding how policy is shaped. They represent interesting cases since both countries have been quite ambitious concerning the state's role in the integration process. Paper 4 gives an insight into how appointed officials, something in this regard we might define as the academic and political elite, present issues concerning immigration and integration in Sweden and Norway. How the issue of immigration is framed at the official level, and the solutions that are offered, is of

crucial importance for the integration process. That which has particularly has been in focus within this research field is the rhetorical level, defined as how the political elite in the Scandinavian countries "talk" about immigration and integration issues (Hagelund 2003; Jørgensen 2006; Holm 2007). In Scandinavia, as in the rest of Europe, the aim of the immigration policy is to enhance the integration of immigrants into the society. This is exemplified by the political climate, the party competition (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008), the policy objectives and underlying principles of immigrant policy, and how these objectives and principles are substantiated and discursively constructed (Borevi 2002; Hagelund 2003). From this literature it appears that there are many variations in how the issues of immigration and integration policy have been politically debated. Paper 4 provides an overview of immigration and integration policies in two relatively similar Scandinavian welfare states. It gives a presentation of the landscape on immigration policies and politics in these countries by exploring policy documents from the 2010-2018 period, where immigration and integration was high up on the political agenda. The policy documents provide an insight into dominant frames that present the discussion around immigration.

Immigration in the Scandinavian welfare states

Empirical data from this thesis demonstrate that more contact between the majority populations and immigrants seems to influence the integration process. In the Scandinavian context it has been of crucial importance to analyze potential problems immigration might have in light of its effect on the welfare state. Based on Esping-Andersen`s (1990) typologies of welfare states, both Norway and Sweden are social democratic welfare regimes characterized by being highly egalitarian. This means that these regimes strive towards social equality within several areas such as employment, redistribution of income, and access to public benefits. In Scandinavia, the welfare states have also been given a huge responsibility in the integration of immigrants. One reason for this can be traced back to the strong commitment to the ideal of egalitarianism. According to Allport (1954), increased contact between the majority and the minority populations, under certain ideal social circumstances, can increase the possibilities of positive contact. In this sense, one could assume that some of the conditions in the Scandinavian countries may facilitate a reduction in prejudice among the majority. Jakobsen et al. (2013, 351) also emphasize that the Scandinavian countries are characterized by social equality and a political system that is built on social democratic and consensus-oriented principles, that could

make it easier for the immigrants to become integrated into society. Despite the fact that the Scandinavian countries have created beneficial circumstances for integration, Grødem (2016) discusses three potential problems for the welfare Nordic model caused by increased migration. First, that the Nordic model depends on high employment rates, but has features that make it particularly difficult to achieve high employment among immigrants. Second, public support for comprehensive welfare states can only be sustained in culturally and ethnically homogeneous societies. and Thirdly, that the emphasis on gender equality and female employment may create extra tension when facing families from more conservative and traditional cultures. Within the migration discourse, it has been pointed out that the relatively easy access to social benefits has made Scandinavia particularly attractive for immigrants. Among other aspects, this has raised concern for low work participation on the labor market, especially among immigrants with low skills and few formal qualifications. One important issue has been whether immigration, especially concerning the unskilled, is compatible with an inclusive welfare state. If the newcomers have immediate and full access to public benefits in their host countries, these can act as welfare magnets, attracting many more migrants than would be economically sustainable since, in addition to their wages, immigrants receive a migration grant in the form of public transfers (Razin 2015). One important aspect of immigration in the Scandinavian context attaches particular weight to the impact it has on the welfare state. For example, it has been asked whether the welfare state is able to combine immigration with economic sustainability. Generous welfare distribution depends on a restrictive selection of its new members to avoid being overburdened, and according to Michael Walzer (1983: 31), "The idea of distributive justice presupposes a bounded world within which distributions take place: a group of people committed to dividing, exchanging and sharing social goods."

Scandinavian case studies clearly demonstrate that integration is not just an analytical term measuring levels of social incorporation according to pre-defined parameters of achievement within, for example, employment, housing and education: it has become a term denoting the ability to conform to social norms and cultural values defined in dominant discourse as basic to proper citizenship. "Integration" has therefore become a powerful notion, designating who belong–and by implication who does not belong–in society. In a Danish study, Nannestad, Svendsen, and Svendsen (2008) found that there is a general tendency to distrust strong ethnic communities–called "parallel societies"–because they are seen to be in conflict with the principle of generalized social loyalty and economic exchange associated with welfare societies

based on the universalist model. Consequently, there will be a strong desire to "integrate" these "parallel societies" into the wider society.

The Scandinavian welfare states have instituted many integrative measures during the recent decades. Sweden instituted an immigration policy in 1975 based on a multicultural ideology of "equality, freedom of choice and partnership. Sweden also emphasized the right to maintain cultural differences while enjoying the benefits of the welfare society on a par with the majority population. This policy was supported by the intellectual elite, a highly influential force in the social democratic welfare society, and regarded as the mark of a progressive, humanitarian Swedish society. While Sweden took the lead in the introduction of a multicultural policy towards immigrants and refugees, Norway adopted a more cautious multicultural policy, a stance that has been characterized as "ambivalent multiculturalism" (Engebrigtsen 2011). Engebregtsen (2011, 306-307) notes that the official rhetoric employs concepts such as "colorful community" (*fargerikt felleskap*), "cultural diversity" (*kulturelt mangfold*) and "multiculturalism", which emphasize the positive values inherent in societies with different population groups. Engebretsen argues, however, that integration policies are dominated by ambivalence. On the one hand, integration is seen as a political program whereby the welfare state incorporates foreigners through its educational institutions, social benefits and employment system. On the other hand, politicians, welfare agencies and the media complain about foreigners not adapting quickly enough or sufficiently to these conditions. Finally, in a more simplified manner, Brochmann and Hagelund (2011) point out that the main difference between Norway and Sweden is that overall, Sweden has blamed racism as an obstacle to integration, while Norway has tended to blame the social welfare system. Paper 4 identifies some of the same themes, but also expands the knowledge drawn from previous studies on how immigration and integration is framed in Norway and Sweden.

Methods

This section discusses the methodological issues that are of relevance for the empirical analyses. Each of the four articles has its own method section, although these are short due to space limitations determined by the author guidelines of the journals. The thesis is largely based on statistical methods, although the fourth article has a qualitative approach. I cover some issues related to quantitative measurement of ethnic attitudes, operationalization of variables, the social desirability bias within sensitive fields (such as immigration), and lastly, some

considerations around values and ethics relevant for the study. Additionally, I have included a closer review of framing as a method. Paper 1 and 2 are based on quantitative methods by applying multilevel modelling, while Paper 3 uses time series data. The fourth paper consists of a qualitative approach to document analysis, where framing analysis was used in a comparative study of Swedish and Norwegian policy documents within the topic of immigration and integration politics.

The use of quantitative methods in measuring ethnic attitudes

In the three quantitative papers I have used a combination of statistical methods, varying between multilevel analysis and time series data. According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 8), the goal of scientific research is to make conclusions that go beyond the collected data. With a large sample of respondents it is possible to make generalizations about causal effects on the basis that the researcher actually has established the direction of causality. However, this presupposes the availability of data where the data usually consists of a sample population. This may be used for predictions and hypothesis testing, and is often used in studies of attitudes.

Inductive inferences are based on systematized observations, or generalizations, while deductive inferences lead to a conclusion with a logical necessity, provided that the premises which serves as the departure of the inference are true (Sohlberg, and Sohlberg 2008). The inferences in the quantitative papers in the thesis is of deductive character. In order to construct a hypothesis, I use previous literature and findings of what is known about ethnic attitudes. The theoretical assumption is that some specific characteristics of a society lead to certain outcomes in attitude formation. Since statistical data on ethnic attitudes are widely available in large sample surveys, a large amount of this research has focused on the relations between demographic, social, and psychological characteristics and prejudicial attitudes. These studies usually view racial prejudice as resulting from individual differences or experiences, or as an outcome of the relation between individuals in the majority and minority groups. Although these studies have increased our understanding of individual-level predictors of prejudice, one might argue that they are limited in their ability to explore group-level sources of prejudice.

Multilevel analysis

Multilevel analysis has been a core analytical technique in this thesis. Harvey Goldstein is considered to be one of the founders of multilevel modelling. The assumption of multilevel modelling is that a unit at the lowest level (level 1) was nested within a higher-level unit, such as region, country or school (level 2). Multilevel modelling soon became popular within educational research, which students were nested within school classes, which again were nested within school (Mehmetoglu, and Jakobsen 2016). There are both theoretical and statistical reasons for using a multilevel approach. Theoretically it is interesting to explore hierarchical data in order to identify the effect of variables located at the individual level, as well as characteristics with the respondent`s environment. For example, one could observe whether the individual is influenced by characteristics in his country, region or school. Observations that are close in space are likely to be more similar than respondents from different countries due to shared history, experiences, environment etc. (ibid,). This is also a statistical reason for using multilevel modelling, since shared context can be a cause of dependency among observations. Since I argue that variables at the nation-level influence variables at the individual level, the application of multilevel analysis, or hierarchical models, is useful. Such models involve data that are ordered hierarchically; that is, some units of analysis are considered as a subset of other units. In this dissertation, individual respondents are treated as a subset of countries. In short, the object of a multilevel analysis is to account for variance in a dependent variable measured at the lowest level by investigating information from all levels of analysis (Steenbergen, and Jones 2002, 219). There are both theoretical and statistical reasons for using this approach. From a theoretical point of view I am concerned with the relationship between the individual and society. I argue that a person is influenced by the features of his or her society. Observations that are close in space are likely to be more similar than observations more distant. Thus, one may assume that respondents from the same country share more similarities with each other than they do with respondents from other countries due, among other things, to shared history, experiences, and environment.

In the three quantitative papers, variables observed at the country and region levels seem to influence individual-level attitudes. Taking this into account, I have used multilevel modelling to test my hypotheses. From a statistical point of view one needs to address both the intra-country and intra-regional correlation between units when investigating attitudes in different countries in the same model. Units (individuals) are not independent, as they share more similarities with people from their own country (or region) than they do with respondents from

other countries or (regions). This will change the error variance of ordinary least squares regression models, which assumes that the error terms are unrelated (Kreft and de Leeuw 1998, 9). An additional benefit resulting from using this multilevel analysis is that when including country-level factors in the regression equation one allows for the context surrounding the individuals to be accounted for. This is an answer to some of the criticism proponents of the qualitative method often raise against statistical research, and by including nation-level factors one allows for the context surrounding the individuals to be accounted for.

Repeated survey data

Time series data means that the data is in a series of particular time periods or intervals. One example might be economic data for a group of countries over a longer time period, where one is able to increase the number of observations. The purpose of using this method is to explain trends in the past by analyzing series in terms of simple patterns, and to better be able to make expectations around future trends (Mehmetoglu, and Jakobsen 2016). The third paper in the dissertation applies longitudinal survey data from the ESS, which is a statistical technique that deals with time series data, or trend analysis and where I have looked at mean scores over time. It is useful to observe trends as they are consistently increasing or decreasing. In a natural experiment the variation appears without any intervention from the researcher (DiNardo 2013). I use the sudden change in the economy following the financial crisis as an exogen shock, which fulfills the conditions for being a natural experiment. Natural experiments include large population groups, eventually the whole population, and makes it possible to observe causation. The 25 European countries in the sample were nested into five groups based on their economic performance over time. According to Remler and Ryzin (2011, 429) researchers do not create natural experiments–they find them. In this way, natural experiments resemble observational studies–studies in which the world is observed as it is, without any attempt to manipulate or change it. All exogen shocks can be treated as a natural experiment where one compares the state before and after the exogen shock (Sekhon and Titiunik 2012). I argue that the financial crisis can be viewed as a natural experiment where changes in attitudes after the outbreak of the crisis in 2007 can be attributed to the crisis.

Framing analysis

In Paper 4, I use framing analysis to identify main tendencies in the Swedish and Norwegian reports. Almost any type of document may be disputed in an investigation. The aim of framing analysis is to study the messages in the content; one key methodological tool used in the study of documents is policy frame analysis. This may be defined as the study of how "public policies rest on frames that supply them with underlying structures of beliefs, perceptions and appreciation" (Fischer 2003, 144). Erving Goffman is often considered as the person who first introduced the concept of framing, and used it to describe how people develop cognitive structures in social interaction. The frame concept refers to systems of classification that allow us to localize, perceive, identify and label occurrences or information (Goffman 1974:,21). Framing can be viewed as placing information in a unique context so that certain elements of the issue acquire a greater proportion of an individual's cognitive resources. An important consequence of this is that the selected elements become important in influencing individual's judgments or inference-making (Kahneman, and Tversky 1984:341-350). Although the concept of framing may be traced back to Goffman (1974), its introduction to the field of policy analysis can be attributed to Schön and Rein (1994). Elaborating on their definition, Verloo (2005, 20) defines a policy frame as an "organizing principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included." The concept of framing has also been applied to study voters` sense of causality and responsibility concerning public policy issues (e.g., Lyengar 1991), and to assess the effects of question framing on public opinion responses (e.g., Kinder, and Sanders 1990; Pan, and Kosicki 1991). The overlapping conceptions from different disciplines suggest that frames function as both "internal structures of the mind" and "devices embedded in political discourse" (Kinder, and Sanders 1990, 74). Framing analysis is often used as a method where the researcher attempts to deconstruct the processes within which the frames are presented (Kitzinger 2007, 132). More specifically, we may conceive different kinds of documents as cognitive devices used in information encoding, interpreting, and retrieving; it is communicable. Framing, therefore, may be studied as a strategy of constructing and processing information in public discourses. When one frame is used instead of another, a certain type of problem definition will guide the interpretation of causalities, a certain evaluation or a suggested solution. In Paper 4, I have categorized the Scandinavian government reports by identifying different frames where I have looked for interpretations and suggested solutions of immigration and integration issue.Identifying such frames demands sensitive and detailed reading of the text that is examined. Different frames can be identified from different

perspectives, and openness is important in order to test one`s own suppositions. Kitzinger (ibid.) notes that it might be valuable to comment on possible alternative frames that are excluded in the texts, and emphasize that it is important that the researcher uses his "sociological imagination." How themes are framed is arguably important in the recent immigration debate, and might influence and shape politics, defining what counts as "problems" and constraining the debate to certain set of issues.

Methodological and scientific issues

This thesis uses a combination of a holistic and an individualistic approach. The anthropologist, Ernest Gellner (2007), made a distinction between an individualistic/ atomistic approach, and a holistic/organic approach to science. The individualistic approach holds that knowledge will be obtained as the individual studies nature. The knowledge must be gained from the fractions or "atoms" of nature that one may observe. Putting the pieces next to each other will give a picture of nature as a whole. The organic approach, on the other hand, relates to the world as an existing unity. It is common to see the system and the totality as essential parts of reality, and the fractions are to be understood according to this totality (Sohlberg, and Sohlberg 2008). There is considerable debate between these two main perspectives, and according to Benton, and Craib (2010) an individualistic approach fails to explain social uniformities that are found to exist while the main weakness in the holistic approach is that it often comes too short when explaining mechanisms of social change and development. They therefore suggest that it might be more fruitful to appreciate that the social world comprises different types of being; social structure, processes and individuals, and that these all should be studied simultaneously. Within the individualistic approach the main objects of the study are individuals (individual attitudes). The focus in the three quantitative articles in this thesis is individual differences in ethnic attitudes which are studied by using different predictors from different sets of variables. The explanatory variables are macro factors in the environment that are expected to influence the formation of individual attitudes. The part of the thesis that is more holistically oriented attempts to understand individual shifts in attitudes by looking at macro factors, historical trends, differences between regions and countries, and the social factors that influence the individual. In addition, the study of government reports constitutes a holistic approach to how the overarching issues concerning immigration can be understood in a policy context. As such, the thesis is concerned with how the different parts of society (history, certain events such as

economical shifts, unemployment, education level, etc.) constitute the wholeness where the individual`s attitudes are being formed.

The quantitative papers rest on the positivist assumption that patterns exist in nature that can be observed. Since attitudes change over time; these issues are never settled, and they need further follow up in empirical studies within the field. Some patterns are found, but the same regularities will probably not be repeated over time and place, since attitudes may be influenced by different sets of social development. As such, statistical work does not need to have any ambitions of finding any "social laws," but rather to give descriptions of phenomena that are relevant at a specific time or in space. The study of immigration attitudes has also undergone substantial change when it comes to explaining mechanisms. The theoretical understanding of ethnic attitude has gone through extensive studies, something that influences the methodological design of surveys. In the early studies, ethnic attitudes were often explained in view of personality traits and social psychologic factors. The historic literature demonstrates that over the last decades, researchers have begun explaining individual differences in attitudes by looking more to factors at a macro level instead of just looking at personality traits. Towards the end of the 1950s this line of research was criticized for not taking into account the relevance of sociological factors. Pettigrew (1959, 1960) published two ground-breaking studies which demonstrated regional and cross-national differences in prejudice. These results suggested that regional differences in prejudice could not be accounted for by individual differences in psychological characteristics alone. "Ethnic attitudes" are now more explained through a broader set of variables and not only reduced to individual characteristics.

Operationalization and the measurement of ethnic attitudes

The process of turning a theoretical concept into a measurable variable is referred to as operationalization. There is a challenge in the operationalization of ethnic attitudes since what constitutes an attitude may have different definitions and interpretations. The same applies to ethnicity since this concept may be defined differently by the individual and by the external society. These concepts have been subject of considerable scientific debate. Jenkins (1994) defines an *ethnic group* as collectively defined by *internal definition*s by its members, while *ethnic category* is defined as the result of *external definitions* by others. The ethnic identity of an individual is the result of both internal and external definitions; the distinction between these two is purely analytical. In short, I consider this analytical distinction to be useful since it makes

it possible to apply the concept of ethnic attitudes to large groups of individuals which clearly do not possess a common ethnic identity such as "immigrants," or "people of different race." Another important phenomenon of relevance which has different definitions in the literature, is the term "prejudice."

Since the different definitions vary widely, the measurement instruments are not necessarily consistent operalizations of the concepts. There are some relevant measurement issues that might need to be discussed, and survey-based questions are vulnerable to many types of measurement errors. The questions I used to measure attitudes in the quantitative articles varied to some extent. Some can be interpreted as a straightforward operationalization of the theoretical definition of ethnic attitudes such as "positive or negative evaluations of another ethnic group." For example, in Paper 1, I use a dichotomous dependent variable *ethnic aversion and* denotes that *respondent either wish or do not wish to have neighbor belonging to a different race.* This question can be considered as a rather direct evaluation of other ethnic groups. However, some of the questions used to measure attitudes can be considered evaluative in a more indirect way. Examples of this are from paper 2 where the dependent variable was labeled *ethnic tolerance* and consisted of the following three items:

(1) *Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?;* (2) *Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?;* (3) *Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live herefrom other countries?*

It might be that the first item of this dependent variable measures ethnic attitudes in a more indirect way. In principle, it is possible to simultaneously think that *it is generally bad for a country's economy that people come to live here from other countries* without being negative toward immigration per se. The answers from the respondents might reflect their belief about the issue and not their attitude. However, in practice one often finds that belief questions strongly correlate with questions measuring attitudes more directly. Schuman et al. (1997, 2) consider the use of questions that have "obvious evaluative implications" to be unproblematic when it comes to measure attitudes. They summarize the issue as follows: "We use the term `attitude` in a broad sense to include not only direct evaluations but also beliefs that are evaluative in implications."

The social desirability bias

The social desirability bias refers to the respondent's tendency to consistently over-report attitude and behavior that are in accordance with prevailing social norms, and to under-report the attitudes and behavior that conflict with the norms. This bias is considered to be an important methodological problem in survey research in general (see de Vaus 2002; Nederhof 1985). The social desirability bias occurs when people in self-reports frequently report sensitive topics inaccurately in order to present themselves in the best possible light (Fisher 1993). In order to preserve a positive self-image people may not always answer in a manner which reflects their true attitudes, but rather in a way they feel is socially acceptable. Consequently, the subjects sometimes give socially desirable responses instead of choosing responses that are reflective of their true feelings. This can be due to both self-deception and other-deception. (Sackeim and Gur 1978; Paulhus, 1984). Self-deception occurs when the respondent actually believes a statement to be true of him or herself, even though it is inaccurate (Millham and Kellogg 1980). On the other hand, a person might deliberately misrepresent the truth as a form of impression management motivated by a desire to avoid evaluation (Millham and Kellogg 1980, 447; Goffman 1974). The bias in responses due to this tendency becomes a major issue when the scope of the study involves socially sensitive issues such as politics, religion, and environment, or personal issues. One also assumes that there are powerful social norms prohibiting open expressions of ethnic antipathies related to ethnic prejudice (Nelson 2002). Empirically, this can lead to possible measuring errors in surveys, due to the respondent`s tendency to possibly over-report or under-report on certain answers that are consistent with social norms and values, and systematic measurement errors can possibly be the result of social desirability bias.

Even if the methods for coping with the social desirability bias are not waterproof, there are still some techniques that may be applied when designing the survey questions (for more, see for example Brownback, and Novotny 2016). The "bogus pipeline" is one of the most well-known techniques which assesses levels of social desirability bias, used by Sigall and Page (1971) for the answers to 22 items measuring racial stereotypes. Roese and Jamieson (1993) conducted a meta-analysis of a large number of studies that used the bogus pipeline technique and concluded that the effects of social desirability bias reported in the studies were "moderate in magnitude" (p. 369). I have not performed any analysis on potential effects of social desirability in the data. However, I argue that the social desirability bias does not need to be a major problem. The measures of ethnic attitudes were mainly used to compare several countries and changes over time. Even if the social desirability bias is present, it does not have to be a

huge problem as long as the distribution of bias is roughly equal for the units analyzed. The social desirability bias might also be less problematic if the researcher can estimate the differences in bias between units. For example, Scheepers et al. (2002a) constructed a five-point scale measuring "ethnic exclusionism," They found that the mean value on the scale was 1.66 in Sweden, and 2.58 in Belgium. It is reasonable to assume that certain levels of social desirability bias are the result of systematic measurement error in both Sweden and Belgium. However, it is also reasonable to assume that those bias levels were relatively similar in both countries, and that the level of ethnic exclusionism at least was higher in Belgium than in Sweden. To illustrate with an example from the thesis, Paper 3 measured response to the question *Immigration good or bad for economy*. The results showed that the differences between the 25 countries during the 12-year period were quite systematic even if social desirability bias may have existed. Thus, large changes in values of indicators of ethnic attitudes can hardly be ascribed solely to the differences in levels of social desirability bias.

Values and ethical considerations

Immigration is a sensitive issue that needs to be treated with caution and respect. Furthermore, the field of immigration has many normative implications, and can also be influenced by specific values and ethical considerations of the researcher. Weber is famous for his concept of value freedom; what scientists understands as meaningful and important at one point in history or in one culture might not be that relevant at a different time or place (Benton, and Craib 2010: 82, 83). A review of the historical literature on ethnic attitudes shows that the values in the field have changed over time. The concept of ethnicity has had a variety of meanings in its long history, and the definitions vary both over time but also across different disciplines. Weber (1949) was concerned with how values influence the researcher`s subjectivity and may color the choice of research questions. The researcher may be influenced by the dominant ideas in his own social environment and age group, and this may influence the conceptual framework the researcher uses. One may, for example, problematize the use of the word "xenophobic" to describe people having prejudice toward immigrants. Phobia is a concept normally used within the psychological and psychiatric field to label delusions and irrationally conditioned fear. One interpretation could be that the word *xenophobia* might be used to pathologize negative or skeptical attitudes towards other ethnic groups. The word may therefore be seen as value-laden,

where being prejudiced towards other ethnic groups is associated with a medical diagnosis. This word may therefore have values attached to it, and as such is open to discussion.

Some common ethical challenges also occur in statistical research. The researcher must consider ethical aspects of selecting and applying behavioral measurement instruments (Carrig, and Hoyle 2011), and consider ethical implications of alternative approaches to sample size planning that are, for example, specific to detecting the existence versus magnitude of effects (Maxwell, and Kelly 2011). One important consideration is the social desirability bias which is discussed further down in this section. Regardless of how the researcher defines himself within the positivist tradition, he or she should also be aware of the ontological and epistemological position, and how this may influence objectivity in the research process. The positivist should also be aware of other influences on the research. This can include factors such as subjective interpretations, opinions, subjective motivations, how the research is focused, personal values, and lastly the culture and social structures of the society of which the social researcher is a part.

Main conclusions

This dissertation provides a systematic and extensive comparative investigation of immigration attitudes in a variety of social contexts in European countries and regions, and where I have observed some of the underlying causes of people's ethnic attitudes. My argument is that both characteristics of the society and the individual explain individual responses to these questions. The main aim of the thesis is to explain the link between macro factors and attitudes, using theories from different research areas and disciplines. The thesis also uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to provide both an overview as well as a more in-depth understanding of immigration. The qualitative study provides further insight into how immigration is discussed; it also includes an evaluation of certain policy practices as well as suggested solutions. The thesis has found that there is a combination of different factors that influence attitudes. The combination of individual-level survey data with region and country-level statistics was useful in order to observe differences not only at the national level, but also at the regional level. I argue that macro-level factors, such as a country`s BNP per capita and unemployment influence micro-level attitudes. One main finding is that economic decline leads to more negative ethnic attitudes, especially in countries and regions that over time have been less economically developed. Additionally, this effect depends on other factors such as ethnic

composition of a region or a country where more ethnic diversity leads to more tolerance, but only up to a certain point. Papers 1, 2 and 3 cast light on the micro–macro link when it comes to opinion studies. My main argument is that it is important to consider both characteristics of the individual, the region, and the country, and that there is a gap in the literature concerning systematic studies of the macro–micro linkage. The link between attitude formation at the macro and the micro levels is explained by using theories from several research areas and disciplines.

Theoretically, the intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954) and group threat theory (Blalock 1967) were tested. I argue that these theories do not take into account the influence a third factor may have on the individual's level of ethnic tolerance–a country or region's economic situation. Another central theoretical point is that all the three quantitative papers provide support to Inglehart`s (1997) concept of post-materialism, and this applies not only at the country-level but also the regional-level. The findings further suggest that people in the most prosperous regions are generally more tolerant than those from poorer regions. Lastly, the effects of an economic downturn on ethnic attitudes do not have a substantial impact on countries that were relatively prosperous before the economic change. Paper 4, which consists of a case study of Sweden and Norway, gives an overview of how immigration is perceived among important actors which contribute to the shaping of national immigration policy. The empirical findings in this paper illustrate how actors at the macro level might function as actors on how attitudes are formed. The last study provides an insight into how policy responses may develop and vary over time at the "elite level" of society. One main conclusion is that there are some striking differences between Sweden and Norway in how immigration and integration is discussed and understood.

There are some limitations to the data. For example, it would be desirable to perform tests for the percentage of immigrants at the regional level. There is also a lack of data at other levels, such as the municipality or the neighbourhood. Future research would be well advised to employ more elaborate measures that involve the size of immigrants at these levels.

The fourth article uses official government documents as an indicator of actual policy. In the article I have pointed out that policy documents do not automatically manifest itself into actual policy. Still, I would argue that the reports stemming from these sources provide a fairly representative picture of discourses at what I refer to as the "elite" level of society. These policy

documents also provide a valuable insight into how immigration issues develop, and what kind of policy that is suggested.

Overall, research on policy and practice, and on encounters between immigrant populations and host communities, is of public interest. Increased knowledge on this topic is of importance both when it comes to evaluating the effect of practices, as well as pointing out future political directions. Future research would be well advised to employ more elaborate measures that involve the size of immigrants at the regional level. Although there is a lack of data at other levels, such as the municipality or the neighborhood, it would be ideal to study attitude formation at these levels. I conclude this introduction by summarizing the main conclusions from the four papers. Overall, the findings from the studies provide an insight into how attitudes towards immigration are shaped, and which policy measures that can alleviate tension between immigrants and members of the majority populations.

Summary of the papers

This dissertation is based on four articles. In the following section a brief description of the studies is presented.

Paper I: The Turning Point of Tolerance: Ethnic Attitudes in a Global Perspective

This paper was co-authored with Tor Georg Jakobsen, Gunn Kari Skavhaug, and Hilde Andersen Bakkan. The main author is Tor Georg Jakobsen. It is published in *The International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*. The main part of the statistical analysis was done by Jakobsen. Jakobsen also contributed to the theory, discussion and conclusion. Skavhaug contributed to the data analysis and the discussion, while Bakkan contributed to the data analysis. I contributed to the theory, discussion and conclusion of the paper.

Studies have reached different conclusions when investigating the link between ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic intolerance, and the aim of this paper is to explain differences in global patterns in individual ethnic attitudes. In this paper we find that in a global perspective ethnically polarized countries display the most tolerant attitudes. Both homogeneity and fractionalization in non-Western societies is associated with ethnic aversion, while the opposite pattern was found in Western societies. We argue that higher economic development in Western countries lead to increased tolerance and trust. We investigated 81 countries, 201 country-

survey years, and more than 200,000 individuals, which enabled us to go deeper into the mechanisms that lie behind the divergent results on ethnic relations shown in the literature. We applied data from five waves of the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2014), combined with the updated ethno-linguistic fractionalization index and relevant controls. The dependent variable from the World Value Survey asks whether "the respondent does not wish to have neighbor belonging to a different race." This question provided us with a measure we denoted as *ethnic aversion*. While negative attitudes towards other races may not be necessarily be interpreted by the respondents as ethnic aversion. This was the only measure that was close to ethnic aversion answered in all five waves of the World Values Survey. We nested the data into two levels: (1) individuals; and (2) country-survey-years. Also, we tested the effect of a country-survey-year-level variable on individual level attitudes, thus relying on hierarchical modelling.

The main assumption was that some mechanisms prove stronger when there is one type of ethnic composition, while other mechanisms exert greater explanatory power when the ethnic structure is of another kind. In short, we argue that up to a certain point increased intergroup contact leads to increased tolerance. However, when this threshold is reached, any further diversity will lead to less tolerance. This assumption is built on the combination of mechanisms described by Allport (1954) and Blalock (1967). The main finding in this paper is that the most ethnically polarized countries display the most tolerant attitudes. The models employed show a threshold effect in non-Western societies where the level of tolerance drops when the societies become more diverse. Both homogeneity and fractionalization are associated with ethnic aversion in non-Western countries. We explain the lack of a turning point effect in Western societies by using Inglehart's (1997) concept of post-materialism, where we argue that increased development is linked with predictable public changes away from absolute social norms, toward increased levels of tolerance and trust. Economic development implies a gradual shift from survival values to self-expression values, which can help explain why richer societies are more likely to be democracies. Fundamental in explaining the findings is the survival/self-expression dimension, which involves the themes that characterize postindustrial societies.

Paper II: The Return of Prejudice in Europe's Regions: The Moderated Relationship Between Group Threat and Economic Vulnerability

The co-authors of this paper are Tor Georg Jakobsen, Alexandra Filindra, and Zan Strabac. The paper is published in *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*. I am the main author of the paper. Jakobsen

provided the analysis of the data and contributed to the theory and conclusion. Filindra and Strabac contributed to the theory, discussion and conclusion of the paper. I contributed to the theory, discussion and conclusion, and the main part of the writing was done by me.

This paper investigates the effect of migration and challenges to integration in European countries. We tested regional variations in ethnic tolerance in European countries by looking at relations between a country's proportion of immigrants, the country's economic conditions, and people's attitudes towards immigration. We used data from 16 countries and employed multilevel analysis which included the national, regional, and individual levels. Employing a comparative approach we investigated the link between a country's proportion of immigrants, the regional economic conditions, and people's attitudes towards immigration. The survey data were combined with population statistics gathered by the ESS, as well as data on development (Human Development Index and per capita GDP) and the percentage of immigrants (gathered from national statistics bureaus and other sources). Theoretically we suggest that the intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954) and the group threat theory (Blalock 1967) do not take into account the influence a third factor may have on the individual's level of ethnic tolerance, that is a country or region's economic condition. We build on Ronald Inglehart's (1997) concept of post-materialism which states that rich countries in general have the most tolerant values.

The main findings show that people in the most prosperous regions are generally more tolerant compared to those from poorer regions. One additional finding is that the effect of non-EU immigration differs depending on economic development in the host regions: increased level of immigration is associated with more tolerant attitudes in prosperous regions, and conversely, with intolerance in poorer regions. Empirically, one contribution of this paper was to investigate the region level rather than the country-level. The data are drawn from the ESS, a biennial multi-country survey designed to chart and explain the attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral patterns of people in Europe.

Paper III: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Attitudes toward immigration

(The paper is published in *Comparative Migration Studies*.)

In the third paper, I study the long-term effects of economic downturn on attitudes towards immigration, with an emphasis on economic changes occurring after the financial crisis. I apply data from 24 European countries gathered from the European Social Survey (2002–2014). I

investigate how economic performance measured by economic indicators at the country-level influences attitudes towards immigration over time. In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis parts of Europe experienced the growth of far-right political parties One aim was to observe whether the rise of these political parties also can be recognized in individual attitudes. My theoretical starting point is scapegoat theory which states that there is a tendency to blame someone else for problems the individual experiences in life (Macionis, and Plummer 2008). This tendency can be stronger during certain circumstances, such as recessions. I build upon *ethnic competition theory*, which is useful in understanding how attitudes are shaped during recessions. Feelings of ethnic competition may increase in such situations, and on an individual level various studies suggest that lower-skilled natives are particularly more likely to have anti-immigrant attitudes since to a larger extent they compete with low-skilled immigrants (Scheve, and Slaughter 2001). Consequently, I have assumed that negative ethnic attitudes are more likely to increase during periods of economic hardship.

The main findings indicate that in certain circumstances an economic downturn can lead to increased resistance towards immigrants. Countries that were most affected by the 2007–-2008 financial crisis show a pattern of increased negative attitudes. This was evident when respondents were asked to evaluate immigrants` contribution to the economy. This finding is especially prevalent in those countries where the crisis had the most severe economic impact. However, the data indicates that for the countries which were relatively wealthy before the crisis, the impact of the economic crisis were quite modest. Thus, immigrant attitudes in countries with the most vulnerable economies are more responsive to economic downturns.

Paper IV: The Framing of Immigration and Integration in Sweden and Norway: A Comparative Study of Government Reports

(Accepted for publication in *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*)

The fourth paper provides an insight into how immigration and integration is framed among researchers appointed by politicians. By analyzing government reports I identified frameworks for understanding problems and suggestions for policy solutions. This qualitative study consists of policy documents in Sweden and Norway, spanning 2010 to 2018, and gives an insight into how immigration issues develop. The document analysis sheds light over similarities and differences in policy practices toward immigration between Norway and Sweden, and the

"immigrant dimension" is examined more deeply. The documents used in the analysis were available in the homepage archives of the Scandinavian governments (i.e., *regjeringen.no, Riksdagen.se*). A variety of topics concerned with immigration and integration policies are analyzed such as immigration policies, how immigration influences the welfare state, integration issues, policy plans, and different integration measures. The main finding is that many common issues are evaluated in both countries, but the emphasis is quite different. Somewhat simplified, one can conclude that Norway evaluates issues related to immigration and integration as something that society is able to deal with, depending on resources within the social services as well as the numbers of immigrants received by that country. Sweden also considers the success of immigration and integration as dependent on the reception system and social services, but places more weight on the responsibility of Swedish society as a whole. There is a stronger concern for how immigration may lead to increased conflict between the host population and the immigrants, especially in the Norwegian reports. Furthermore, it is pointed out that immigration may challenge the foundation and legitimacy of the welfare state. One might conclude that the opposite pattern is prevalent in the Swedish reports. There is an overall positive outlook in Sweden on cultural diversity, and immigrants are considered as a resource rather than a burden on the welfare state. The reports represent one of the main sources of legitimation of government-led policy and provide a broad picture of important discourses on immigration and integration. Even if Sweden and Norway are similar in many aspects, this study reveals that at the official level there are some striking differences in the framing of issues related to immigration and integration.

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Paper I

The Turning Point of Tolerance: Ethnic Attitudes in a Global Perspective

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Paper II

The Return of Prejudice in Europe's Regions: The Moderated Relationship Between Group Threat and Economic Vulnerability.

Isaksen, J. V., T. G. Jakobsen, A. Filindra, and Z. Strabac

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Paper III

The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Attitudes toward Immigration.

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Comparative Migration Studies

ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access

The impact of the financial crisis on European attitudes toward immigration

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Abstract

This paper studies changes in attitudes toward immigration over a 10-year period, with an examination of the long-term effects of economic downturn.The focus is on changes before and after the financial crisis. I use data from the European Social Survey (2002–2014), combined with economic indicators at the country level. This intends to observe links between economic performance and attitudes with a comparative analysis of data from 25 European countries. Overall, European public appear to become less positive toward immigration during economic crisis, although there are notable variations among the countries. The results show more pessimistic attitudes toward the immigrations' contribution to the economy, especially in countries where the crisis had the most severe economic impact. Overall, the findings suggest that a downward economic spiral correlates with more negative attitudes towards immigration.

Keywords: Immigration, Financial crisis, Attitudes

Introduction

An increase in migration in most EU countries has taken place in recent decades. Simultaneously many European countries have experienced periods of economic instability. An increase in immigration together with the financial crisis of 2007–2008 makes it relevant to investigate changing attitudes among majority populations. Fluctuations in the economy frequently return to normal after a relatively short period. Occasionally, however, a downturn in the economy can result in economic performance remaining at a low level for many years and unemployment can remain stubbornly high. Simply put, the economy sometimes appears to be stuck, unable to return to normal (Blanchard, 2006). This is what happened during the financial crisis during 2007–2008. Most economists agree that early signs of the economic crisis were evident already in 2007 (Roth, 2009). The US housing boom began to deflate in the fall of 2005 but it took a while for most people to react to this. As prices rose to the point where purchasing a home became out of reach for many Americans, sales began to slacken off (Krugman, 2009). Quillian (1995) has argued that prejudice may increase in times of economic recession because the majority group tends to blame minority groups for the economic problems. Opposition towards minority groups can be triggered if the size of the minority group increases, especially if the majority feels that it has to compete for scarce resources or cultural hegemony. Against this background it is relevant to explore whether there has been increased resistance towards immigration in

European countries subsequent to 2007–2008, as a response to the economic downturn. This paper explores changes in immigration attitudes from 2002 to 2014 in the light of developments reflected in macroeconomic measures over time. The data used is from the European Social Survey for the period 2002–2014 combined with economic indicators at the national level, from the World Bank (2017a, b, c), and The International Monetary Fund. The main purpose is to ascertain whether there has been a change in attitudes toward immigration before, during, and after the financial crisis. While many studies have focused on variations in immigration attitudes *within* and *between* countries, relatively few have focused on changing attitudes over time. There are nevertheless some exceptions, as for example Coenders and Scheepers's (1998) study of Dutch support for ethnic discrimination in the Netherlands 1979–1993, as well as their study of changes in resistance to the social integration of foreigners in Germany 1980–2000. In addition Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky's (2006) studied the rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European societies, 1988–2000. However, these studies have not initially looked at immigration attitudes in relation to economic data. The contribution of the present article is to show the long-term relationship between economic performance and attitudes toward immigration in 25 European countries. The large sample of countries makes it possible to undertake a comparative approach. I analyze the changes in attitudes in the light of macroeconomic factors such as growth in GDP, GDP per capita, and unemployment rate, in order to identify to what extent economic factors might be associated with negative attitudes toward immigration.

Research on attitudes toward immigration

Different terms have been used to refer to attitudes toward immigration. The literature presents a rich variety of definitions, and a large number of different theoretical concepts have been used in the previous studies. Perhaps the most commonly used, particularly in American research, is "prejudice" (e.g., Quillian, 1995), but other terms, such as 'anti-foreigner sentiment' (Semyonov et al., 2006) and "ethnic exclusionism" (Scheepers, Gijberts, & Coenders, 2002), are also widespread. Negative attitudes toward other ethnic groups is often named "ethnic prejudice" (Quillian, 1995), while other common terms are ethnic intolerance and anti-immigration attitudes. One of the most used definitions of the concept is Allport's (1954) that defines ethnic prejudice as an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group. For the purpose of this study, I use negative attitudes towards immigration, but the use of the concept does not necessarily imply ethnic prejudice, since the question is seen in relation to how immigration influences the economy. One could argue that a person might be positive toward immigrants as a group, but simultaneously have negative perceptions of immigration as seen from an economic perspective.

Contextual factors may influence negative attitudes toward immigration as well as different ethnic groups. Several studies show that individuals who are socially and economically vulnerable feel more threatened by the presence of minorities, and are more likely to express discriminatory and exclusionary attitudes (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Raijman, Semyonov, & Schmidt, 2003; Semyonov, Raijman, Yom-Tov, & Schmidt, 2004). These findings are in line with the *group threat* argument first proposed by Blalock (1967), and that for the purpose of the present study, implies that economic

recessions will lead to more people being in direct or potential competition over resources across group boundaries. This competition can lead to more hostile attitudes towards members of other groups. Various studies have also shown this effect to be present regarding the positive association between out-group size and in-group prejudice (Fosset & Kiecolt, 1989; Semyonov et al., 2006). Quillian (1995) is well known for a groundbreaking study of prejudice toward foreigners in 12 European countries. The results show that most of the variation in average prejudice scores across these countries could be attributed to group threat. Scheepers et al. (2002) have performed large studies on exclusionary attitudes toward foreigners in 15 countries, while Evans and Need's (2002) analyzed attitudes toward minorities' political rights in 13 East European countries. Gijsberts, Scheepers, and Coenders (2004) focused on nationalism and exclusion of migrants in 22 European countries. Turner and Cross's (2015) observed changing ethnic attitudes in Ireland during recession. This study compares Ireland with 12 European countries, and investigates variations between countries in view of economic fluctuations. Czaika and Di Lillo (2018) have performed a study of regional variations in anti-immigrant attitudes across Europe in the period 2002–2014. One of the main findings was that the identification of a spatially dependent process in the diffusion and clustering of anti-immigrant attitudes may explain the rise and fall of populist movements across Europe and changing electoral support for anti-immigration parties across European regions over time. They argue that a clustering of populations with anti-immigrant attitudes takes place when people with more liberal attitudes move to regions with a greater presence of like-minded others, while those with more nativist attitudes also do the same. This may lead, at least to some extent and only in the long term, to a "population resorting" along attitudinal categories creating spatially more homogeneous clusters of anti-immigrant populations. Even if Czaika and Di Lillo (2018) emphasize influences from the surroundings, they also mention economic hardship as an important factor.

Immigrants as scapegoats in times of economic pressure

The scapegoat theory refers to the tendency to blame someone else for one's own problems (Macionis & Plummer, 2008). According to Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma, and Hagendoorn (2011) such emotions may increase during times of crisis, leading to an increase in negative attitudes directed toward immigrants. First of all, frustration against weak minority groups may take place, where these groups are labeled as scapegoats. Second, increased competition may reinforce group mentality and the need to identity with one's own in-group which is trying to distance itself from out-groups. For the purpose of this study, scapegoating can serve as an opportunity to explain personal failures or misdeeds while maintaining one's positive self-image during the financial crisis. A person who is poor, or does not get a job that he or she applies for, can choose to blame the people who did get the job that he or she wanted. The person may be using others as a scapegoat and end up with resentment as a result. The scapegoat theory states that prejudice towards other ethnicities is often strongest among individuals in the majority population who have fewer resources, and direct frustration toward groups that are relatively safe to refer to in a negative manner (Macionis & Plummer, 2008). The scapegoat theory states that individuals who fear job competition from immigrants tend to be those employed in low-skill, low-wage occupations. However, there is also a

broader segment of the population which is concerned with possible negative implications of large-scale immigration on macroeconomic performance (Moehring, 1988). Half of those responding in a 1986 national poll identified economic issues as "the biggest problem" immigrants have caused. Typical of the kinds of problems mentioned, are strains on jobs, resources, and housing; immigrants on welfare; and cheap labor (Day, 1990). The most common adjectives used to describe migrants were "poor" and "welfare-dependent" (Pear, 1986). Following this logic one assumption is that an increase in level of frustration toward immigration can be one result of the financial crisis. This could lead to more negative attitudes toward immigrants, especially in countries with the weakest economies.

Ethnic competition

The scapegoat theory resembles *ethnic competition theory*, which has often been used to account for negative attitudes toward minority groups. Ethnic competition is another commonly used explanation for negative attitudes toward immigration. During recessions, feelings of ethnic competition may increase. On an individual level various studies suggest that lower-skilled natives are particularly more likely to have anti-immigrant attitudes since they compete with low-skilled immigrants (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). However, Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet (2009) have found that it is not the degree of competition by itself that may affect out-group attitudes, but rather the extent to which competition fluctuate. Consequently, attitudes toward immigration are more likely to change when sudden changes occur in economic conditions. One main reason is that rapid economic change can affect labor demand more dramatically than slow-paced evolution.

Early studies have also shown a link between economic fluctuation and ethnic hostility. According to Blumer (1958) and Blalock (1967) prejudice and hostility toward a minority population increases with a rise in competitive threat associated with an increase in the size of an out-group population. That is, hostility and prejudice against outsiders are expected to rise, especially among economically vulnerable populations when the minority group is expanding and when economic conditions in the country are deteriorating. The realistic group conflict theory explains how intergroup hostility arises as a result of conflicting goals and competition over limited resources (Jackson, 1993). Realistic group conflict theory has support from several empirical studies. For example, optimistic evaluations of personal economic well-being are related to positive attitudes toward immigration (Kehrberg, 2007). Some theories on ethnic relations state that economic threat engenders opposition to immigration. Olzak's (1992) model of ethnic competition emphasizes the influence of a shrinking job market on native workers, while relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 2011; Runciman, 1966) stress the influence of group comparisons on discontent. The structural factors stimulating a heightened sense of economic vulnerability may vary depending on the context. One may be or feel insecure in relation to the labor market, housing market, or the continued supply of government benefits (Hernes & Knudsen, 1992). In a global economy, the exchange of cross-border goods, capital, and labor make the working force vulnerable to sudden economic changes. Dancygier and Donnelly (2014) suggest that economic conditions may influence native ethnic attitudes. They point out that during a recession, native workers may view the inflow of immigrants into their sectors as economically

threatening to themselves and their co-workers. In short, they point out that immigrants fill the need of low-wage labor to a larger degree than the native population. On the other hand, if immigrants seek employment in economies that are growing, they may provide the necessary contribution to meet rising demand. In such cases, the native workers may not risk losing their jobs and any potential negative effect on their wages may be disguised by an increase in wages since potentially higher wages that would have arrived in the absence of migration are never observed (Dancygier & Donnelly, 2014). However, during times of recession the low-wage labor workforce may simultaneously experience a further decline in their wages and a decreased demand for workers. The combination of these two factors may increase feelings of competition from out-groups. Ethnic competition can be understood as a function of the in-group–out-group relationship, and can take place within the economy as well as within welfare services and jobs (Coenders & Scheepers, 2008; Kunovich, 2004; Mayda, 2006). A sum up of research suggests that the impact on the labor market resulting from immigration is worse for natives during economic downturns than during expansions. For example, Peri (2010) finds that when the economy is growing, immigration creates jobs in sufficient numbers to leave native employment unaffected. During downturns, however, the economy does not appear to respond as quickly. Therefore, he argues that the national economy benefits most from immigration that adjusts to economic conditions. In this respect, the low-wage native work force experiences increased threat from migration during periods of worsened economic conditions. Research also indicates that prosperous countries are less susceptible to recessions when it comes to changing attitudes toward immigration.

Based on the ethnic competition theory and scapegoat theory one might expect to find that immigrants are more likely to be blamed during times of economic pressure. The data material will show whether changes in national performance on economic indicators influence immigrant attitudes. I expect that countries that are the most affected by the economic crisis display the largest increase in negative immigrant attitudes. Although, it might not be only the economic per se, but also the shape of the economy before an economic crisis.

While ethnic competition theory and scapegoat theory emphasize economic factors such as employment level, competition on the labor market from immigrants, and GDP growth, social theories focus more on social influence. The social impact theory states that when other people are the source of impact and the individual is the target, impact should be a multiplicative function of the strength, immediacy, and number of other people. It is a broad theory, which seeks to encompass a variety of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. When other people are sources of social influence on a target person, impact is predicted to be a multiplicative function of the strength, immediacy, and number of sources (Latané, 1981). The implications are that people first and foremost are influenced by their immediate surroundings, such as people living in the same neighborhood. Accordingly, people who are geographically distant do not have a substantial social impact on the individual. This argument implies that variations in immigration attitudes are more dependent on social factors at the micro level, rather than macroeconomic factors. As such, it would be relevant to explore regional variations in attitudes, since social factors may influence the individual independently of national macroeconomic fluctuations. Following this logic, it is reasonable that some of the

variations on attitudes is due to micro factors. Although, financial crisis was a large scale event where the impact was not restricted just to certain regions, but rather had an impact on nations as a whole. Accordingly, I firmly believe that macroeconomic factors represent a solid indicator for attitudinal variations.

The importance of long term economic development

According to Inglehart (1990) the post-materialistic development in Europe implies that people in countries with the highest economic standards have the most tolerant values. Post-materialism is a value orientation that emphasizes self-expression and quality of life over economic and physical security. Further, Inglehart (1990) suggests that until the 1970s, it was almost universal for individuals to prioritize so-called materialist values such as economic growth and maintaining order. After the rise in prosperity, post-materialists started to prioritize such goals as environmental protection, freedom of speech, and gender equality. The shift, particularly among citizens living in Western countries, reflected a change from an environment in which one was aware that survival was precarious, to a post-World War II world where most felt that survival could be taken for granted. Further, conditions of prosperity and security are conducive to tolerance of diversity in general and democracy in particular. This helps explain a long-established finding: rich societies are much more likely to be more democratic than poor ones. One contributing factor is that the authoritarian reaction is strongest under conditions of insecurity.

Building on Inglehart's post-materialistic diagnosis, I assume that higher standards of living reduce the influence of the group threat mechanisms proposed by Blalock (1967). Similar to Inglehart (1990), I also focus on the national context. Nevertheless, there might be economic variations *between* nations as well as variations over time. I therefore assume that variations in attitudes are dependent on the GDP per capita and unemployment rate.

Data and method

To investigate whether there is an association between economic fluctuations and attitudes I use data spanning from 2002 to 2014, covering 25 European countries, based on six rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). The data is from the European Social Survey for 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2014 rounds. Rounds 2002, 2004, and 2006 are included to reduce the possibility that the numbers found are a continuation or exacerbation of an earlier trend. The years following the outbreak of the crisis are also included in order to evaluate the long-term trends. The method employed is time series data with two levels; individual and country-year. The time series is used in order to identify changes in attitudes over time, and the data consists of countries with different experiences from the 2008 financial crisis. First, there are those countries which have been most affected (Greece, Spain, Italy etc.). Second, we have those who have been relatively moderately affected (Norway, Sweden, Germany etc.). The financial crisis can be seen as an exogenous event and may be viewed as a natural experiment, where I argue that economic fluctuations is one of the main factors that can influence a change in attitudes. Immigration attitudes are analyzed in light of changes in economies based on indicators gathered from the World Bank (2017a, b, c) and the International Monetary Fund.

Dependent variable

In the ESS data set there are several questions that measure how respondents evaluate migrants. One question measures attitudes to the allowance of professionals from a poor country outside Europe. Another measures attitudes to the allowance of people from the poorer countries in Europe, while one asks the respondents whether they think one should allow people from the poorer countries outside of Europe. While these questions measure attitudes in different context, I found it useful to focus on a variable that is more specifically related to the economic dimension. According to the economic decline, I expect an increase in negative attitudes toward immigration from 2008 to 2014, and as dependent variable, I use the measure *Immigration good or bad for the economy* (1–10) where higher values indicate that respondents evaluate immigration as being good for the economy. I consider this variable to be a precise measure of long term changes in a country's economic situation since it captures the economic aspect of the question. That is, it measures whether or not the respondent views outsiders as a threat to the economy rather than being a resource. The variable is from the European Social Survey and is repeatedly asked in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. This variable also correlates with other variables commonly used to measure various dimensions of immigration attitudes.

Economic indicators

Economic indicators provide statistical information about economic activity during cycles. In order to identify whether economic performance affects levels of tolerance, I examine attitude formation in the light of the country's scores on macroeconomic indicators over time. GDP is an indicator for total value added in a country, and also provides us with an expression of gross income from domestic production activity (World Bank, 2017a, b, c). *GDP growth* is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency (World Bank, 2017a, b, c). The per capita GDP is especially useful when comparing one country with another, as it shows the relative performance of the countries. A rise in per capita GDP signals growth in the economy and tends to reflect an increase in productivity. For the purpose of this study, it is useful to use the GDP per capita since the aim is to compare countries. While GDP refers to the total value of gods and services produced within a country's borders annually, GDP growth measures how fast the economy is growing. *Level of employment* is another commonly used indicator of the state of the economy. In many countries the unemployment reached critical levels after the financial crisis Krugman (2012). Low unemployment indicates that there is pressure on the labor market. Trends in the unemployment rate reflect the state of the economy, but the effect does not manifest itself immediately (World Bank, 2017a, b, c).

Fig. 1 Expected causal relationship between economic performance and immigration attitudes

Figure 1 illustrates the expected causal relationship between economic performance and immigration attitudes. For the purpose of this study I assume that the consequence of economic crisis where the macroeconomic measures change in a negative direction, may in turn impact attitude formation. The financial crisis is viewed as a natural experiment where a change in immigration attitudes after 2007 can be understood in view of the crisis.

In the following sections I will present tables with the numbers from the three economic indicators, GDP growth, GDP per capita, and unemployment rate.

Table 1 shows that GDP growth decreased in all 25 countries, between 2007 and 2009. Some countries experienced a more severe decrease than others, but the overall trend is negative. The table shows that the countries with the best performance are Poland, Norway, Cyprus, Switzerland, and Belgium. Slovenia, Russia, Finland, Estonia, and Ukraina have the most negative development. There are no clear trends in what geographical region the countries with the best performance on GDP growth originate from. Although, the worst performing countries are eastern European countries, with the exception of Finland. Until fall 2008, the Eastern European countries had enjoyed a prosperous decade.

Table 1 GDP growth (in percent of GDP)

	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013
Belgium	0.775	2.094	3.449	−2.253	1.798	0.201
Bulgaria	5.078	7.236	7.675	−3.586	1.915	0.862
Croatia	5.558	4.164	5.150	−7.384	−0.281	−1.064
Cyprus	2.476	3.724	4.281	−1.772	0.321	−5.934
Czech Repub.	3.603	6.533	5.603	−4.803	1.778	−0.484
Denmark	0.390	2.337	0.909	−4.907	1.337	0.933
Estonia	7.416	9.374	7.748	−14.724	7.597	1.937
Finland	1.994	2.780	5.185	−8.269	2.571	−0.758
France	0.820	1.608	2.361	−2.941	2.079	0.576
Germany	−0.710	0.707	3.261	−5.619	3.660	0.490
Greece	5.795	0.599	3.274	−4.301	−9.132	−3.241
Hungary	3.849	4.388	0.435	−6.600	1.662	2.096
Ireland	3.120	6.006	5.209	−4.627	2.985	1.639
Netherlands	0.284	2.160	3.698	−3.768	1.664	−0.190
Norway	0.920	2.625	2.985	−1.691	0.972	1.044
Poland	3.562	3.494	7.035	2.820	5.017	1.392
Portugal	−0.934	0.767	2.492	−2.978	−1.827	−1.130
Russia	7.796	6.376	8.535	−7.821	5.285	1.785
Slovakia	5.419	6.751	10.800	−5.423	2.819	1.491
Slovenia	2.842	4.003	6.942	−7.797	0.649	−1.132
Spain	3.188	3.723	3.769	−3.574	−0.999	−1.706
Sweden	2.386	2.818	3.405	−5.185	2.664	1.241
Switzerland	0.040	3.115	4.112	−2.222	1.693	1.852
Ukraine	9.400	2.700	7.900	−14.800	5.466	−0.027
United King.	3.326	3.096	2.357	−4.188	1.453	2.052

Table 2 GDP per capita (current US$)

	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013
Belgium	30,743,9	36,967,3	44,403,8	44,880,6	47,702,8	46,582,7
Bulgaria	2710,5	3893,7	5932,9	6969,6	7813,8	7674,9
Croatia	7805,9	10,224,3	13,546,7	14,157,1	14,539,2	13,574,7
Cyprus	20,293.4	25,324,5	31,386,6	32,105,8	32,233,8	27,908,0
Czech Repub.	9773,1	13,346,2	18,373,7	19,741,6	21,717,5	19,916,0
Denmark	45,458,8	48,799,8	58,487,0	58,163,3	61,753,7	61,191,2
Estonia	7174,7	10,338,3	16,586,4	14,726,3	17,454,8	19,072,2
Finland	32,816,2	38,969,2	48,288,5	47,107,2	50,790,7	49,638,1
France	29,691,2	34,879,7	41,600,6	41,631,1	43,810,2	42,554,1
Germany	30,360,0	34,696,6	41,814,8	41,732,7	46,810,3	46,530,9
Greece	18,477,6	22,551,7	28,827,3	29,711,0	25,916,3	21,874,8
Hungary	8423,4	11,206,0	13,907,5	13,029,9	14,118,1	13,667,7
Ireland	41,107,0	50,878,6	61,359,6	52,104,0	52,224,0	52,060,5
Netherlands	35,245,2	41,577,2	51,241,3	51,900,3	53,540,6	51,574,5
Norway	50,111,7	66,775,4	85.170,9	80,067,2	100,711,2	103,059,3
Poland	5693,5	8021,3	11,260,3	11,542,0	13,890,7	13,780,2
Portugal	15,772,7	18,784,9	22,780,1	23,064,0	23,196,2	21,618,7
Russia	2975,1	5323,5	9101,3	8562,8	14,212,1	15,543,7
Slovakia	8696,1	11,669,4	16,057,7	16,513,0	18,187,2	18,191,6
Slovenia	14,880,5	18,169,2	23,841,3	24,633,8	24,985,2	23,357,9
Spain	21,495,7	26,510,7	32,709,4	32,334,0	31,835,3	29,211,8
Sweden	36,961,4	43,085,4	53,324,4	46,207,1	59,593,3	60,283,2
Switzerland	48,087,6	54,952,7	63,555,2	69,927,47	88,415,6	85,112,5
Ukraine	1048,5	1828,7	3068,6	2545,5	3569,8	4029,7
United King.	34,174,0	41,732,6	50,134,3	38,262,2	41,412,3	42,724,1

From Table 2 we see that GDP per capita is lower in 13 of the 25 countries in 2009 compared to 2007. The financial crisis had a different impact on the various European countries. However, the macroeconomic indicators show a clear overall picture: all countries in this sample were affected by economic fluctuations to various degrees. Although, the impact is highly uneven across nations. Data from the World Bank (2017a, b, c) also shows that Germany, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, for example, are relatively unaffected, while countries such as Greece, Spain, and Ireland continue to experience recession. Table 1 shows that all countries except for Poland had a negative GDP growth in the period 2007–2009. Simultaneously many countries had a positive growth in GDP per capita (see Table 2). When one presents the numbers from the period 2007–2009, it may seem like Tables 1 and 2 give contrasting evidence where GDP in some countries is negative while per capita income is not affected. When the numbers are presented in a 2-year period, they will not capture this trend. World Bank data (2017a, b and c) shows that it was a substantial fall in GDP growth from 2008 to 2009, and this will not manifest in Table 2 since it does not display the numbers in the period 2007–2008 and onwards. Although, the reason that I present data from a 2-year period for these indicators is that it is more purposeful for the data analysis.

Development in unemployment levels

Some of the more frequent complaints about immigrants are that they take jobs away from native workers, contribute to higher unemployment, and reduce wages and lower working conditions in selected occupations. Job-holders at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder are assumed to be most susceptible to these forms of labor market competition because low-skill and low-wage native workers have occupational characteristics similar to those of today's new immigrants (Borjas & Freeman, 1992; Simon, 1987). Some researchers have found that education, income, and occupational prestige are positively correlated with receptivity to immigration (Hoskin & Mishler, 1983; Simon, 1987). This has been especially prevalent in the light of the ongoing financial crisis. Since 2007–2008 Europe has experienced an economic crisis and frustration among the citizens has been increasing. The crisis has resulted in millions of people losing their jobs, and has set the world economy back for years. It is widely assumed that the long-standing economic crisis will increase negative attitudes toward immigration among the majority population in a country since this will increase the competition for jobs and other resources (Savelkoul et al., 2011).

Table 3 shows that the unemployment increased in most countries from 2007 to 2009, and that this negative trend continued in many countries throughout 2013. Some

Table 3 Unemployment (yearly in percent)

	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013
Belgium	7.7	8.4	7.5	7.9	7.1	8.4
Bulgaria	13.7	10.1	6.9	6.8	11.3	12.9
Croatia	13.9	12.6	9.9	9.2	13.7	17.3
Cyprus	4.1	5.3	3.9	5.4	7.9	15.9
Czech Repub.	7.5	7.9	5.3	6.7	6.7	7.0
Denmark	5.4	4.8	3.8	6.0	7.6	7
Estonia	11.3	8.0	4.6	13.5	12.3	8.6
Finland	10.5	8.4	6.9	8.2	7.8	8.2
France	8.8	8.9	8.1	9.1	9.2	10.4
Germany	9.8	11.2	8.7	7.7	5.8	5.2
Greece	9.4	10.0	8.4	9.6	17.9	27.5
Hungary	5.8	7.2	7.4	10.0	11.0	10.2
Ireland	4.5	4.3	4.7	12.0	14.6	13.0
Netherlands	3.6	4.7	3.2	3.4	5.0	7.2
Norway	4.2	4.4	2.5	3.1	3.2	3.4
Poland	19.4	17.7	9.6	8.2	9.6	10.3
Portugal	6.1	7.6	8.0	9.4	12.7	16.2
Russia	8.2	7.1	6.0	8.3	6.5	5.5
Sweden	5.6	7.5	6.2	8.4	7.8	8.1
Slovakia	17.1	16.3	11.1	12.0	13.6	14.2
Slovenia	6.5	6.5	4.8	5.9	8.2	10.1
Switzerland	4.1	4.4	3.7	4.1	4.4	4.8
Spain	11.3	9.1	8.2	17.9	21.4	26.1
Ukraine	9.1	7.2	6.4	8.8	7.9	7.2
United King.	4.8	4.8	5.3	7.5	8.0	7.5

countries stand out more than others, for example Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, and Spain. In other countries we observe that the negative trend continues throughout 2011 and 2013, especially prevalent in Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. This means that when it comes to unemployment, countries in some parts of Europe have been quite dramatically affected by the crisis. Norway, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Cyprus and Slovenia are the countries with the lowest increase in unemployment. Numbers from 2009 show a dramatic difference between Norway that has the lowest unemployment (3.1%), and Spain with the highest unemployment rate (17.9%).

Immigration attitudes over time

The starting point of the study is that the financial crisis can be viewed as a natural experiment where a change in attitudes after 2007 can be attributed to the crisis. In the following section I present data on European attitudes over time where countries are grouped into five different catagories. The groups are categorized as follows: Category 1) The least affected countries, Category 2) The second least affected countries, 3) Moderately affected countries, 4) Highly affected countries, and 5) Most affected countries. The data spans from 2002 to 2014, and the time variation is illustrated on graphs (Fig. 2).

The least affected countries

Category 1 contains of the countries that were least affected by the economic crisis. These countries show a relatively stable pattern of attitudes over time, and the impact of the crisis is mildly related to attitudinal changes. Although we observe that the countries with the most stable economic performance over time, also show most positive toward immigration, with Switzerland being the country that display the most positive attitudes since 2008. Switzerland had a minor increase in unemployment and a moderate decrease in GDP growth during the period (World Bank, 2017a, b, c). Overall, the immigrant attitudes in Norway, Netherlands, and Denmark show a similar pattern from 2002 to 2014. They display a minor increase in negative attitudes in the years following the crises. Denmark had the highest rise



Fig. 2 Immigration good or bad for the economy (1–10) (Source: ESS round 1–7 (2002–2014)

in negative attitudes, something that can be attributed to a substantial increase in unemployment in the years 2007–2009, compared with the other countries in category 1 (World Bank, 2017a, b, c). Overall, and despite some economic fluctuations, the financial crisis was only modestly associated with changes in attitudes in category 1. One explanation can be that these countries also had prosperous economies before the crisis. Especially Norway and Denmark, and to a certain extent the Netherlands, are also characterized by having robust welfare models which provide the citizens with a fair amount of economic security during economic hardship. Several studies in economic growth literature in recent years have also found social trust to be an important and robust determinant, and especially the Scandinavian countries have traditionally been high in levels of trust (see for example Kroknes, Jakobsen, & Grønning, 2015). Overall, countries with the most stable economic performance display little impact on immigration attitudes (Fig. 2).

The second least affected countries

Category 2 contains of countries in the data with the second best economic performance. Although all of these countries experienced negative impact on development measured by the macroeconomic indicators, there are still some variations (World Bank, 2017a, b, c). The pattern in Poland, France and United Kingdom changed litte from 2008 to 2014. Cyprus was the country with the largest increase in negative attitudes from 2006 to 2012, and also had the largest rise in unemployment (see Table 3). Despite that UK also had a decrease in GDP between 2007 and 2009, and an increase in the unemployment level (from 5.20 to 7.70%), immigration attitudes were quite stable in the same period. These results are also in line with Turner and Cross's (2015) study which compares European attitudes before and after the crisis (2002 and 2010). Countries that have relatively stable economies are not so vulnerable to sudden change. Exactly like Cyprus, Finland also had a substantial rise in unemployment (6.9 to 8.2%) in the period 2007 to 2011 (see Table 3). Finland, on the other hand, had a moderate increase in negative immigrant attitudes. One explanation can be that Finland is a Nordic country that is comparable to the Scandinavian countries where highly developed welfare states protect inhabitans against the most severe consequences of sudden economic changes. One the opposite, the case of Cyprus is more similar to other Southern European countries with weaker welfare states, where a larger increase of negative attitudes took place during and after the crisis (Fig. 3).

Moderately affected countries

Overall, the countries in this group have been moderately affected by the crisis. Although, Ireland is one of the countries in Europe that has been mostly affected, with an increase in unemployment by 125% from 2007 to 2009 (World Bank, 2017a, b, c), while youth unemployment approached 30% (Krugman, 2009). This negative spiral may have been a contributing factor to an increase in negative attitudes. Ireland has on the opposite shown more positive attitudes during periods of lower unemployment. There was a clear increase in negative attitudes commencing in 2006, reaching its lowest point in 2010. Positive attitudes increased after 2010, simoultaneously as the economy started to recover. In Sweden positive attitudes toward immigration was the trend from 2004 to 2010. Although, the attitudes were even more positive



Fig. 3 Immigration good or bad for the economy (1–10) (Source: ESS round 1–7 (2002–2014)

after the economy started to recover. German attitudes seem to be unaffected by the crisis despite experiencing a negative decline in GDP and in the unemployment rate (World Bank, 2017a, b, c). Since the reforms in immigration policy of the early 2000s, there has been a growing awareness of Germany as an immigration country. Since then there has been a strong commitment in the German population to making integration work. Incorporating migrants into the labor market and into the German society have also been federal priorities for the 10 years preceding the migration crisis (Abali, 2009). The crisis can be associated with an increase in negativ immigration attitudes in Slovenia, while more positive attitudes were prevalent in the period 2010–2012. While Slovenia experienced a considerable decline in GDP growth following the crisis, unemployment increased only moderately. This may indicate that it is not neceserraly GDP growth per se that is the most crucial indicator, and feelings of ethnic competition could rise as a result of an increase in unemployment. Slovenia and the Czech Republic display a similar pattern, where the crisis had a substantial negative effect on immigration attitudes especially after 2008. Interestingly, we can observe more positive attitudes in Slovenia than the Czech Republic despite a higher unemployment rate in Slovenia. Even so, the overall economic performance is slightly better in Slovenia, which may explain some of these differences. Czaika and Di Lillo (2018) have shown that the percentage of Slovenians with favorable attitudes to migrants from poorer countries outside Europe has declined by almost 4 percentage points in 2014 relative to 2002. They point out that there is also a trend in other European countries (for example Poland and The Netherlands) with more negative attitudes toward migrants from poorer countries outside Europe and more positive towards migrants of the same race or ethnic group. To sum up, the most prevalent finding in this group is the link between an increase in unemployment in Ireland and Czech Republic, and more skepticism toward immigration (Fig. 4).



Fig. 4 Immigration good or bad for the economy (1–10) (Source: ESS round 1–7 (2002–2014)

Highly affected countries

This category contains of countries where the crisis had a severe impact. Although, there are considerable variation in attitudes among these countries. Spain and Bulgaria displayed a quite similar trend, with a rather substantial increase of negative attidues. In Portugal, there were more positive attitudes leading up to the crisis, while more negative attitudes manifested after the outbreak of the crisis. This trend corresponds with a substantial increase in unemployment during the next two years. While Greece did not experience a dramatic decrease in GDP growth, it had a 50% increase in unemployment**.** Greece also experienced a huge increase in general government debt (World Bank, 2017a, b, and c). Greece is also a major point of entry for hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants into the European Union, and it may be that immigrants have become a convenient scapegoat in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Greece shows the same pattern as Spain, with unemployment being the strongest indicator of economic downturn. Negative attitudes towards immigration increased steadily from 2006 to 2010, reversing the opposite trend which took place from 2002 to 2006. Expect for Croatia, which also has had low immigration, all of the countries in this group have shown patterns of more skepticism toward immigration. The increase in negative attitudes was more prevalent among the countries that were the most severely affected by the crisis (Fig. 5).

The most affected countries

Category 5 shows large variations among the countries with the worst economic performance, although with some inconsistencies in the pattern. Ukraine, Russia and Estonia show a dramatic decline in growth, while in Estonia unemployment rates had a dramatic increase in the period 2007 to 2009. Even so, these countries show a stable pattern in attitudes towards immigration. One explanation could be that with the exception of Russia, these countries have experienced limited immigration. The low numbers of immigration in Eastern European can explain why immigration attitudes may



Fig. 5 Immigration good or bad for the economy (1–10) (Source: ESS round 1–7 (2002–2014)

not be influenced to the same degree by economic fluctuations, when compared to countries with larger immigration. Overall, the largest groups of migrants in EU's Eastern European member states are also from countries that belonged to the Soviet Union and Yugoslav federations. Linguistic similarities and shared historical ties play a role among several of the Eastern European countries, and arguably this could explain why attitudes toward immigration in this region are generally more positive. In Ukraine the economic downturn seem to have had no effect on attitudes, while there was a moderate increase in negative attitudes in Estonia and Slovakia. Interestingly, Hungary showed an opposite pattern with more positive attitudes. It can be added that it may seem somewhat paradoxical that Hungary, which has had an uprising of support for the nationalist far right wing Jobbik party, does not show an increase in negative attitudes in this survey. In matters connected with immigrants, Jobbik's leaders are all-out opponents of accepting people from other cultural and religious circles into Hungary (Bartosz, 2017). However, having a high or low score on immigration attitudes is not automatically analogous to a rise in support for extreme fascist parties. Jobbik is known to be in opposition to refugees, and one could argue that this does not necessarily lead to overall skepticism toward labor immigration from neighboring countries (Fig. 6).

Discussion

From the descriptive data it is evident that many European countries have experienced that a negative shift in the economy goes along with more negative attitudes toward the immigration's contribution to the economy. Overall, the findings suggest that economic performance correlates with a change in attitudes. When the economy is stable or growing there are more positive attitudes, compared to when the economy is spiralling downwards. The descriptive data indicates that economic performance *does* influence immigration attitudes, especially in countries that were the most affected by the crisis. For the sake of capturing the time trends, I ran a descriptive analysis of attitudes



Fig. 6 Immigration good or bad for the economy (1–10) (Source: ESS round 1-7 (2002–2014)

and analyzed them in view of indicators of economic development. This simple test provides some indication of the variations in attitudes in light of economic change.

The theoretical starting point of the study was Scapegoat theory as well as the intergroup contact- and the group threat theory. The aim was to analyze attitude formation over time at an individual and a country level. Through time series data I explored attitudes toward immigration across 25 European countries. I expected to find that those countries with the most stable economic development are associated with more positive attitudes toward immigrations' contribution to the economy. The observations show that both group threat-, scapegoat- and ethnic competition theory might explain why people tend to be more skeptic toward immigration during times of economic crisis. In those countries with best economic performance the attitudes toward immigration are also more positive. The complementary nature of both ethnic competition theory and intergroup contact theory, can be illustrated by the negative correlation between mediating mechanisms as well as the support for a curvilinear relationship between out-group size and perceived ethnic threat. These results suggest that the two theories may complement each other, where *context* is the most determining factor. For the purpose of this study, economic context serves as a mediating factor, deciding which of the mechanisms that is most important. In countries with the worst economic performance the results show an opposite pattern, thus giving support both to Scapegoat theory and group threat theory. Whether intergroup contact- or group threat mechanisms is at work thus depends on the country's economic situation. Building on the concept of post-materialism, it may be possible to connect the two theories, showing the specific circumstances under which the two competing theories exert the greatest explanatory power. Since the economic condition is an important explanatory factor, those countries with the worst economic performance during the crisis show the most negative attitudes. Countries with stable economic performance are also the most tolerant, which gives support to Inglehart (1977) who states that a positive economic

development is linked with a move from absolute social norms toward tolerant, trusting, so-called post-modern values. People in these countries have adopted self-fulfilling values which moderate the majority's feelings of group threat. The surveys performed between 2002 and 2014 enabled me to compare the situation immediately prior to and immediately following the commencement of the economic crisis. It appears that some countries have developed more negative attitudes while others are more characterized by status quo. Countries with a stable economic performance over time, are not so affected by a sudden crisis. However, we see that a sudden large decline in GDP and an increase in unemployment often leads to an increase in negative attitudes, even in countries that leading up to the crisis were relatively stable. Ireland serves as a typical illustrative example of this, and suggests that changes in attitudes can be quite influenced by economic fluctuations. Stable economic performance seems to be an important indicator of high levels of tolerance toward immigration. One may argue that there are uncertainties linked to comparing the attitudes expressed by a historical event with the attitudes measured by a survey. Despite the potential flaw of causality, the descriptive data shows that countries with the lowest GDP before the crisis are those which display the highest rise in negative attitudes in the period following the crisis. The strongest economies seem to be less affected by a negative drop in GDP when it comes to attitudes.

Conclusion

This paper has examined European trends in attitudes toward immigration, and the the extent to which variations are associated with economic circumstances and concerns. The pattern is clear: the descriptive data indicates that scapegoating and feelings of group threat toward immigration may take place if they coincide with an economic downturn. By employing times series data of attitudes in combination with economic measures, the paper has investigated how economic standards, also referred to as development, can be a factor which explains variations over time. Overall, the empirical data from 25 European countries indicates that negative economic performance due to the 2007–2008 financial crisis coincided with more negative attitudes. Although, it is reasonable to assume that there are influences from national circumstances that are not only attributable to economic performance. There are for example variations between countries related to size of migrant workers, as well as the type of immigration. One could argue that high skilled labor can be perceived as a positive contribution to the economy, while low skilled labor from third world countries is perceived more negatively. The results show that the time variable was useful as this gave the opportunity to capture the variations both over time, *and* between countries. However, the crisis had a different economic impact on countries, especially between the more wealthy North- and Western European countries, compared to the Southern, and to some degree Eastern Europe. The data indicates that if a country is economically wealthy before the crisis, the impact of the economic downturn on attitudes will be relatively modest.This is especially prevalent among the countries in category 1 and 2.

The main findings give support to both the scapegoat theory (Macionis & Plummer, 2008), group threat- (Blalock, 1967), and ethnic competition theory (Savelkoul et al., 2011) since they all predict that economic downturn is expected to lead to more negative attitudes. According to scapegoat theory, a continuation of economic decline can

lead to an increase in feelings of threat, a position that is supported by the data in this study. Economic downturns can in reality also lead to an increased struggle over resources, and if the economy continues to deteriorate, European countries may over time experience increased skepticism toward immigration. The majority population may in turn adopt more of the values associated with the survival dimension, which according to Inglehart (1997), has traditionally been more characteristic of non-Western societies. An economic decline can lead to more competition in the labor market over low-skill jobs, which in turn may lead to increased feelings of group threat, where people become increasingly sceptical of economic competition from immigrants over resources and jobs. If the unemployment rises and people experience fewer economic opportunities, it may potentially lead to a situation where immigrants are increasingly viewed as scapegoats. Both Blalock (1967) and Kinloch (1974) suggested that improved economic conditions contribute to improved ethnic relations and to diminished discriminatory attitudes. The data in this study suggest that even if a country displays a trend with positive immigration attitudes, these may quickly change if the country experiences a sudden economic downturn. Ireland is a striking example of this, where changes in attitudes quickly seemed to coincide with the economic crisis. Positive attitudes toward immigration seem to be related to stable economic conditions.

The findings presented in this study suggest that the financial crisis has increased European citizen's skepticism toward immigration, especially in the most affected countries. By employing commonly used economic indicators, I have been able to investigate several European countries over a longer time span. In sum, this study contributes to the understanding of the relationship between economic performance and immigrant attitudes, and how this particularly is related to a severe economic crisis. A crisis may contribute to increased opposition to immigration, and the rise of anti-immigration sentiment can be observed several years after the beginning of the crisis. In sum, this study contributes to the understanding of how economic performance may influence attitudes toward immigration. At the present stage, several years after the beginning of the crisis, many Europeans are still unemployed or underemployed. In some of the worst economically performing countries we also observe that the skepticism toward immigration continues long after the start of the crisis. Finally, although this study has examined one consistent question over time, questions that measure other dimensions could give a broader understanding of how attitudes towards immigration are related to economic fluctuations. Further research could also explore in more detail where and under what circumstances negative opposition toward immigration may occur.

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Availability of data and materials
The datasets generated and/or analysed during the current study are available in the following repositories:
Data from European Social Survey:
ESS Round 1: European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002). Data file edition 6.5. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
ESS Round 2: European Social Survey Round 2 Data (2004). Data file edition 3.5. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
ESS Round 3: European Social Survey Round 3 Data (2006). Data file edition 3.6. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data (2008). Data file edition 4.4. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data (2010). Data file edition 3.3. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.

ESS Round 6: European Social Survey Round 6 Data (2012). Data file edition 2.3. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
ESS Round 7: European Social Survey Round 7 Data (2014). Data file edition 2.1. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.
World Bank Data:
World Bank. (2017). GDP per capita growth (annual %). Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ (Downloaded 06.10.2017).
World Bank. (2017). Unemployment (yearly in percent). Available at http://data.worldbank.org/ (Downloaded 06.10.2017).
World Bank. 2017. GDP per capita (current US$). Available at http://data.worldbank.org/ (Downloaded 06.10.2017).
The data that support the findings of this study are available from ESS and The World Bank. but restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license for the current study, and so are not publicly available. Data are however available from the authors upon reasonable request and with permission of Joachim Vogt Isaksen.

Author's contributions
The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.

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Paper IV

The Framing of Immigration and Integration in Sweden and Norway: A Comparative Study of Official Government Reports

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Joachim Vogt Isaksen

The Framing of Immigration and Integration in Sweden and Norway: A Comparative Study of Official Government Reports

Abstract

This paper presents an overview of the landscape of immigration and integration policies in Sweden and Norway. The study sheds light over differences and similarities between these countries, based on an analysis of official government documents in the period 2010–2018. Empirically, a variety of topics concerned with immigration and integration policies are analyzed, such as immigration policies, how immigration influences the welfare state, integration issues, policy plans, and different integration measures. Furthermore, the study explores how problems are defined, the source of the problem, who is responsible, and what are the kinds of solutions that are suggested. The findings show that although there are many similarities, some distinct differences are observed in the framing of immigration and integration policies. Not only do the countries focus on different topics but also have different evaluations of problems and solutions. As the analysis shows, these differences were quite consistent during the eight-year period.

Keywords: Immigration policy, integration, frames, welfare, policy documents

Introduction

During the last decade, most European countries experienced increased immigration, with a heightened intensity during the refugee crisis of 2015. This situation presents a considerable challenge to authorities at all levels (local, regional, and national) in Europe. In the short term, it is a matter of providing shelter and food for thousands of people arriving at a very short notice. In the longer term, the challenge is to integrate and include the newcomers into European societies in general, such as the education system and labour market. This article consists of a comparative study of Sweden and Norway, both of which share a Scandinavian welfare model with a comprehensive welfare sector. Both countries aim at a high degree of participation at the labour market in addition to universalistic welfare benefits. Another commonality is that since the 1970s, immigrants in Sweden and Norway have been relatively similar concerning causes for migration. Brochmann & Hagelund (2011: 15) noted that in an early phase, immigration in the Scandinavian countries was characterized by labour migrants and a relatively high proportion of humanitarian migrants after the "immigration stops" in the mid-1970s. Olwig (2011: 179-180) pointed out that the three Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and Denmark) provide an interesting and fruitful framework of comparison. They share a parallel history of migration, being dominated by out-migration until the 1960s and 1970s, after which they experienced a great increase in unskilled foreign labour migrants needed in industries. Following a brief period during the 1960s, of relatively liberal immigration policy, the Scandinavian countries have increasingly instituted restrictions so that immigration has virtually become possible only through family reunification or the conferral of refugee status. Olwig further noted that immigration increasingly appeared in the political discourses of these countries as social problems with relevance not only to immigration control regimes but also to social policy. As such, the welfare system has provided an important framework for integrating immigrants and refugees in the Scandinavian countries. This study explores whether some of the same political discourses that Olwig (2011) found in his study may also be observed in official policy documents in Norway and Sweden. What particularly has been in focus for the present study is how reports frame immigration and integration issues, what kinds of discourse can be identified in these documents, how are the discussions played out, which analyses are used, which topics dominate, and lastly, what do Sweden and Norway have in common concerning the understanding of themes related to immigration and integration, and what differentiates these countries?

Immigration and welfare sustainability

Research have shown that in the Scandinavian context, the welfare state plays an important role as a framework for politicians when defining problems and solutions to issues related to immigration and integration. Overall, the welfare state's most important role has historically been to take care of its citizen's well-being, and in the Scandinavian countries, the welfare state has been given huge responsibility in taking care of immigrants. For example, some politicians and researchers have asked whether the welfare state is able to combine immigration with economic sustainability. Brochmann & Hagelund (2011) have analyzed patterns in the discourses concerning the issue of immigration and welfare in Scandinavia. Their analysis of the Scandinavian welfare states shows that the integration policy has changed quite considerably in the decades since the advent of the new post-war immigration. While maintaining a common ground in the Nordic welfare model, the three countries have gone through a process of divergence in the sense of adopting different approaches to integration and multiculturalism – institutionally and ideologically (Brochmann & Hagelund 2011: 22). However, there is an ongoing discussion on whether Norway really has had a multiculturalist approach (see for example Gressgård 2010).

As the starting point of this study I have used official formulated goals in the Norwegian immigration policy, as well as formulations from official policy documents. The official line in the Norwegian immigration policy has been directed towards integration, where the ideal is that immigrants must be able to adjust to the Norwegian society, while at the same given the opportunity to sustain their own culture of origin. However, there has been a concern for the state's ability to cope with challenges, especially during times of increased immigration. One key concern is that although the comprehensive welfare states depend on high employment rates, yet may have institutional features that may exclude immigrants from the labour markets. Economists Barth & Moene (2009) noted that the Scandinavian labour markets are characterized by high entry-level wages and are accordingly difficult to enter for people with low or unknown productivity. Additionally, high-skilled workers tend to have lower unemployment rates than low-skilled workers. This can increase the barrier to the labour markets for immigrants with low skills. Despite being similar in many aspects, understanding of immigration may also vary in Sweden and Norway. This paper focuses on common themes and discussions such as challenges related to immigration, the responsibility of the welfare states regarding integration, and how such issues can be interpreted differently.

Integration of immigrants in Sweden and Norway

According to Breidahl & Fersch (2018), there is a shared feature of the Scandinavian countries' self-understanding and their respective immigrant integration models. Activation policies targeting newly arrived immigrants exemplify how the ambition of states to promote functional, individual autonomy is also an important, ongoing process in diverse policy areas of the welfare state and not restricted to early integration instruments. Breidahl & Fersch's (2018) study of the Scandinavian welfare states demonstrates that while the countries differ on a number of counts with respect to immigration control, national integration philosophies and citizenship policies, the activation policies aimed at newly arrived immigrants share several features. The main conclusion is that there is a strong interconnection between activation policies and the civic turn and that this seems to be exceptional to the Scandinavian welfare states. The study illustrates how path-dependency policy traditions emphasize the influence of common institutional features of the Scandinavian welfare states. Furthermore, these policies have been closely related to, and inseparable from, more general welfare state changes. Hernes (2018) also found similarities in the Scandinavian integration policies and pointed out that these policies converged as a result of the refugee crisis in 2015. Her study involved policies of permanent residence, citizenship, family reunification, and access to social benefits. The analysis of policy processes found that a logic of regulatory competition led to goal convergence, as all three countries explicitly adapted their policies relative to other countries' policies. Nonetheless, when comparing the configuration of policy instruments and their settings, the cross-national gap persisted as all three countries took restrictive steps, thus showing traits of path dependency.

The making of a report

Politicians often meet complex challenges and are dependent on specialized expert knowledge in order to govern and make well-informed decisions. Turner (2003) noted that an "expertification" of politics has taken place. While politicians earlier based their professional advice from a well-educated staff of permanent officials, they now ask for advice from expert groups, scientific counsellors, contract researchers, and committees where researchers are represented. According to Lentsch & Weingart (2011), the relationship between science, expertise and politics has gradually become more interconnected. The Nordic countries have had a long tradition of using bureaucratic competence on certain issues, as well as input from external actors, in the process of policy formation. Different committees and boards have been used in Norway since 1814, and the tradition of evaluation goes further back than the political

parties, parliamentarism, and modern mass politics (Arter 2008: 1969; Solvang & Moren 1974). The Norwegian Official Reports (NOUs) are published after the Norwegian Parliament requests the government to establish a committee on a certain issue. A review of committees appointed by the Norwegian government shows an increase in the use of researchers in the committees. This can be explained by a general trend towards using expert knowledge as a foundation for policy shaping. While the number of researchers used in NOU committees has risen (Hesstvedt 2018), in Sweden, there is an increasing tendency to appoint bureaucrats in committees working on State public reports (SOUs) (Petersson 2015). The SOU committees can be regarded as equivalent to the NOU committees, and the result from their work is published as "State public reports" (SOUs). For simplicity`s sake I for the most part refer to these reports as "Swedish reports". These SOU committees are appointed by the Government of Sweden. Although experts have usually been drawn from the government administration to the Swedish committees, one can also find many examples of representatives from interest organizations and parties in the "expert" category (Meijer 1969). One interpretation of the use of government officials has been that the committees may function as a prolonging of the "governments long arm" (Öberg 2011). The composition of members appointed in Sweden and Norway shows a mix between researchers, bureaucrats, consultants, as well as unified groups of politicians recruited from the national parliament. These kinds of reports often attract a great deal of public attention and may influence public debate as well as policy solutions. Even if the conclusions in the documents do not automatically translate into practical policy, they are important since they can influence much of the political agenda and public discussion.

Method

Framing is a method that is most frequently used within studies of the media but is often also applied within other areas such as in the study of policies or other documents. According to Goffman (1986), frames are abstractions that people use to organize and structure message meanings in their everyday lives, and the frames that they internalize greatly influence how data are interpreted, processed, and communicated. Framing is at the centre of the immigration and integration debate. Framing in this context has to do with how "immigration" has shaped politics, defining what counts as "problems" and constraining the debate to a certain set of issues. According to Entman (1993), framing is a process whereby the author(s) selects some aspects of a perceived reality and makes them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual

interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item. According to De Vreese (2005: 53), from a researcher's perspective, two main strategies exist in defining frames. The first is inductive where no predefined frames are used and frames emerge during the course of analysis. The second is deductive where texts are analyzed using frames that are defined and operationalized prior to the investigation. This study uses a combination of inductive-based frames that were identified after studying the data material as well as deductive frames that were identified through a qualitative pre-study of the documents. I commence with the assumption that different representations of the problem are pre-articulated. These representations include a diagnosis (what is the problem, where is it located, and what/who causes this problem?) connected to a prognosis (how should the problem be resolved, which ends and means should be used, and who is responsible for the solution?) and a rationale or call to action (what courses of action are recommended and who is responsible for this?).[1] These elements of a frame are translated into an analytical tool that contains categories (see Tables 1 and 2). I rely partly on Entman's (1993) four processes of identifying frames, namely, how to define problems, diagnosing causes, make moral judgements, and make suggestions for remedies. Building on Entman's approach, the documents were further divided into three overarching divisions: 1) problem definition, 2) problem source, and 3) responsibility and solution. First, *the problem definition* is concerned with how the issue is defined, what conditions apply when investigating the problem, and what are the premises for the evaluation of the problem? Second, the *problem source* deals with the reason or cause of the problem, what makes it difficult to deal sufficiently with the problem, and which resources are available in order to "fix" the problem. Third, *responsibility and solution* have to do with who is seen as having an obligation to deal with the issue, who is accountable, and who has the opportunity to influence the outcome. The solution also has to do with which kinds of overarching tools are useful and available in order to deal with the problem. The same issue can also be dealt with through contradictory frames such as a problem- or a resource-oriented frame. The problem-oriented perspective focuses on immigration as having negative effects and is therefore framed as a burden, and sometimes even as undesirable. This perspective points to certain negative outcomes of immigration as well as potential future problems. Although, even if the problem-oriented focus can normatively be interpreted as something negative, it can on the other hand be understood as a realistic analysis of a situation that needs to be acknowledged and dealt with in a proper manner. Simultaneously, an overly optimistic focus on immigration can normatively be

interpreted as something positive, but at the opposite as naïve since it may not deal sufficiently with possible negative outcomes.

Data material

The empirical data are based on Swedish and Norwegian reports of the period 2010–2018. The reports are publicly available in the archives of the government official homepages of Sweden and Norway. The Norwegian reports are available at Regjeringen.no and the Swedish reports at Riksdagen.se. In Norway, these documents are called as NOUs (Norges offentlige utredninger; Regjeringen 2018). In Sweden, the equivalent documents are called as *The State Public Reports* (Statens offentliga utredningar 2018), abbreviated as SOU. The eight-year period was used in order to compare similarities and differences over time. The data were categorized within frames, and the analysis contained a discussion on a selection of documents that illustrate main trends in the data material. In order to ensure a wide scope of the content, every relevant document covered by the search words "immigration" and "integration" was included from 2010 to 2018, and the selection of reports consisted of seven NOUs and seven SOUs. There were other reports that contained the search words, but these were excluded since neither immigration nor integration was their central theme. Typically, the selection of reports covered overarching themes or questions that influence the societies in both short and long-term perspectives I looked for the overall focus and topics within immigration and integration, and obtained an overview of the themes after searching these words. I reviewed the most relevant parts of the reports that covered immigration and/or integration, and selected parts that either presented the themes in the title or in other parts of the reports. For the analysis, I used the parts that were especially suited to illustrate main tendencies in the data material. These parts consisted of both a description of problems and solutions, which are illustrated in Table 1. It was useful to categorize the reports into two main frames: 1) immigration and integration in a welfare perspective and 2) integration, social services and education. The first frame was predefined and based on some of the core discussions in the immigration debate (see for example Brochmann & Hagelund 2011) and was consistent with findings in the data material. The second frame was developed after a closer reading of the reports. They were further analysed through a problem- and a resource-oriented focus, which was inspired by Vliegenthart & Roggeband's (2007) study of how the Dutch media frames immigration and integration. The reports that did not cover the two main frames were excluded from the analysis.

Table 1. Framing of immigration in a welfare perspective

Frame	**Problem orientation**	**Resource orientation**
Problem definition – Sweden	Migrants meet barriers on the path to permanent job	Migrants are important future members of the labour work force. Migrants rejuvenate an ageing population
Problem definition – Norway	Immigration may have some unfortunate effects. One main concern of migrants is being too costly for the welfare state	Potential desirable effects of immigration, especially depending on the type of new arrivals
Problem source – Sweden	Low competence among immigrants, language barriers, and discrimination	How to improve integration, quality of social service provision as well as education system
Problem source – Norway	Low competence among immigrants; language barriers, dependent on type of migrants; cultural barriers	How to improve integration and increase quality of social service provision as well as the education system
Responsibility and solution – Sweden	The political system and the Swedish majority population, employees	International responsibility to receive refugees. Create better incentives for immigrants to work
Responsibility and solution – Norway	Political system and social services	Improve social services, create better incentives for immigrants to work, and reduce welfare generosity

Welfare sustainability: Is immigration a problem or a resource for the welfare state?

Table 1 illustrates some main trends concerning the issue of welfare sustainability and immigration. This issue can have both a problem-oriented frame and a resource-oriented frame. In a problem-oriented frame, Swedish reports overall focus on job barriers, low competence among immigrants, discrimination among the Swedish majority population, and prejudice among employees. The reports evaluate the problem as having to do with the Swedish society, where integration tools and social services need improvement. In a resource-oriented perspective, the Swedish reports evaluate migrants as important in order to maintain a large public sector, and that migrants, particularly from the EEA (European Economic Area), make an important contribution. Overall, the Swedish reports are quite concerned with an international responsibility to live up to international conventions and obligations to receive refugees. Even if the documents from the two countries identify some of the same problems, Norwegian reports overall have a more problem-oriented focus, for example, they

overall question whether immigration is *sustainable* in a welfare perspective, while Swedish reports evaluate immigration as *necessary* in order to maintain the welfare state. I will discuss welfare and sustainability more closely in the next two sections. Overall, the Norwegian reports point to some potentially desirable effects of immigration. However, problems are more emphasized, such as concerns about low competence among immigrants in addition to language and cultural barriers.

Sweden: Immigration is necessary in order to maintain the Swedish welfare

As a starting point, an SOU from 2010 shows that the attitude towards immigration is positive. Immigration is seen as playing an important role in a country's development, especially in the light of globalization. "This influences all countries and demands, both when it comes to national and international cooperation" (SOU 2010: 40). Even if the document overall portrays immigration as a necessary contribution to the labour force, there is also a focus on why foreign-born immigrants have a weaker position at the labour market (p. 116). It states that there are several reasons for this, including a weak network, poor language, low competence, etc. However, these problems are seen as practical reasons for the lack of integration, and the main reason is discrimination and prejudice by employers (SOU 2010: 40, p. 117). The report states that circular migration can lead to advantages for the destination country since the migrant "is a source of demanded labour force that is needed in order for the host country to function" (p. 28). In addition, immigrants are seen as a source of tax income for the state. Migration is characterized as a win-win situation, since it can have advantages for both the migrants and the host country. The report "Migration, Aging Population and Public Finances" (SOU 2015: 95) takes up an issue related to the kind of challenge an aging population represents for the future financing of the public sector in Sweden. The demographic change was the proportion of pensioners in the population has rapidly increased during 2014; immigration is here framed as something positive: "Immigration leads with certainty to a rejuvenation of the Swedish population. This rejuvenation is clearly seen in migration patterns in recent years" (SOU 2015: 95). Furthermore, immigration is seen as a solution to the demographic challenge of an aging population.

Overall, the trend revealed in the Swedish reports between 2010 and 2018 is quite consistent. There is overall a resource-based orientation where immigration is regarded as beneficial for the society. Even if some challenges related to newly arrived migrants are thematized, the advantages are overall seen as outweighing the burdens. The reports clearly state that the

country is dependent on migration in order to maintain the welfare state and to finance the public sector. Furthermore, they focus on the Swedish responsibility to live up to its international obligation to receive immigrants.

Norway: Is immigration compatible with the maintenance of the welfare model?

Unlike Sweden, the focus in Norway is more on problems related to immigration and integration. In the report "Welfare and Migration" (NOU 2011: 7), the welfare state is seen as the framework for immigration policy. "If the Norwegian welfare state in itself is to be considered a social integration project, new issues are raised when new large groups of people who have not gone through the basic socialization in Norway settle here" (p. 7). Immigration is seen as having both desirable and unfortunate effects when considered from a welfare state perspective. However, the consequences of migration for the development of the welfare model are perceived as being dependent on the type of new arrivals, the resources they bring, and the extent to which they are integrated into the Norwegian working life and the society (NOU 2011: 7). Unlike the Swedish reports that framed immigration as a solution to consequences of an ageing population, the above-mentioned NOU report points out that the combination of an ageing population and low employment rates in significant population groups may challenge the sustainability of the model in the long run. Overall, immigration is seen as bringing specific challenges to the Norwegian welfare model as it presupposes large labour participation and a relatively equal income distribution in order to maintain a generous and universal welfare state. One concern is that wide-ranging welfare programs could undermine the incentives to search for paid work. The NOU concludes that both immigration and emigration affect the sustainability and function of the welfare model, and the increased costs of financing of the model in the long term may challenge the population's support for equal distribution and generous programs.

Other reports focussed on measures directed towards immigrants. The report "Work-Related Measures" NOU (2012: 6) deals with adjustments made towards family-related and humanitarian migration. The report "Wage Configuration in View of New Economic Developmental Traits" (NOU 2016: 15) concludes: "In order to maintain a large welfare state in future years, Norway is dependent on a huge work effort". This implies that more immigrants need to participate in the job market and remain there throughout the retirement age. This is in line with the report "Integration and Trust" (NOU 2017: 2), which deals with

the long-term consequences of high levels of immigration. The main conclusion is that "high immigration, entailing an influx of people with little ability to provide for themselves, will represent an additional challenge and increase the pressure on public finances." The Norwegian welfare model is perceived as both a resource and a problem when considered in the light of the integration of immigrants and their descendants. As the report states: "The model is vulnerable to the immigration of a high number of adults with low qualifications" (NOU 2017: 2, p. 20). When comparing the twin NOUs from 2011 and 2017, it is interesting to note that many of the themes and conclusions were similar, even if the composition of the two committees was different. This may indicate that the mandate given can be just as important as the composition of the committees. Both reports focussed strongly on how immigration might influence the sustainability of the welfare state. The main difference was that the first report focussed on labour migration, while the second dealt more with refugees. Both reports led to public debate on how failed integration could threaten the Norwegian welfare model and laid out the foundation for many of the problems and solutions that were later presented. For example, the director of the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Organization (NAV) suggested several new integration measures after the report.

From a problem-oriented perspective, Norway overall focuses on long-term negative effects on the welfare system, low competence, and lack of qualifications among immigrants, in addition to language and cultural barriers, whereas from a resource-oriented perspective, immigration is framed as having potentially desirable effects. However, this depends on the success of integration, the type of immigration, and whether social services can be properly equipped in order to improve integration. Overall, the pattern over time shows that the Norwegian reports compared to the Swedish reports draw a far more pessimistic picture of the effect immigration has on welfare sustainability.

Integration – a task for the welfare state

Both Swedish and Norwegian reports emphasize the responsibility of the welfare state for the integration of the newly arrived immigrants. The governments are perceived as having responsibility through different social services and the education system. While both countries focus on service provision and the education system, the Swedish reports also attach more weight to the responsibility of the majority population, more specifically related to prevention of negative migrant attitudes as well as the responsibility of employers with regard to hiring

more foreigners. Compared to Norwegian reports, the Swedish reports frame integration more in relation to other political issues such as the promotion of human rights, economic policy, immigration policy, and discrimination policy.

Table 2. Framing of integration, social services, and education

Frame	**Problem orientation**	**Resource orientation**
Problem definition – Sweden	How can Swedish society be better prepared for integration? Concern of hostility towards immigrants among the majority population	Immigrants can be a valuable contribution to the national economy. Refugees can be a future resource for their country of origin if or when they return
Problem definition – Norway	Difficult to integrate refugees, inequality, conflicting values, and crime rate. Cultural differences may weaken the foundation of unity and trust and the legitimacy of the Norwegian model	European Union citizens are a valuable contribution to the national economy
Problem source – Sweden	Integration is difficult because the Swedish system has not been sufficiently prepared to receive many immigrants. Hostility and discrimination exist among Swedes	How to create better systems for receiving immigrants and increase the capacity within the services
Problem source – Norway	Integration is difficult because of too much pressure on the social services and education system	How to create better systems for receiving immigrants and increase the capacity within the services
Responsibility and solution – Sweden	Sweden needs to improve services. Increased immigration from outside of Europe may increase pressure on the system	Work-related measures through the state and improve education for immigrants
Responsibility and solution – Norway	Increased immigration from outside of Europe may increase pressure on the system	Work-related measures through the state

Table 2 shows some of the main trends in the issues of integration, social services, and education. Swedish and Norwegian reports combined elements from both problem- and

resource-oriented perspectives. From a problem-oriented perspective, Swedish reports focus on how the Swedish society overall can be better prepared for integration while there is also much weight attached to the hostility towards immigrants among the Swedish majority population. To a certain degree, the level of integration is explained by failings of the Swedish system in not being sufficiently prepared to receive immigrants. Integration is regarded as a responsibility of the Swedish society, and as such, the integration tools and social services need to be improved. From a resource-oriented perspective, immigrants are framed as an important contribution and something from which the Swedish society may benefit. Immigration into Sweden is regarded as something that will continue, and restriction on the number of immigrants is not an issue. The outcome of integration is framed as being dependent on the efforts of the Swedish society and the majority population. While both countries attach considerable weight to the responsibility of the state and social services, Swedish reports are more concerned with the responsibility of the Swedish majority population and private actors, such as employers when recruiting immigrants. From a problem-oriented perspective, Norwegian reports overall focus on barriers towards integration such as conflicting values between the Norwegian majority and the new ethnic groups, challenges related to cultural differences, and that immigration exerts too much pressure on the social services and the education system. There are also concerns related to how increased immigration may weaken the foundation of unity and trust among the majority population. From a resource-oriented perspective, immigration is framed as having potentially desirable effects such as the contribution of highly qualified workers from the European Economic Area. The type of immigration, the success of integration, and whether social services can be better equipped in order to improve integration are seen as the main factors that will decide whether immigration overall can have desirable effects for the Norwegian society.

Sweden – barriers to work, education, and immigrant hostility

The report, "The Way to Work – Job Market Policy, Education and Job Market Integration" (SOU 2010: 88) emphasizes that many important factors explain the labour market situation for immigrants in Sweden. Among the main factors discussed are education, earlier job market experience, language skills, network, employer's preferences, ethnic discrimination, and policy interventions. State and policy measures are considered as important, but there is also a focus on how the Swedish population can become better prepared and make a greater effort in the integration process. The report "The Xenophobe Within" (SOU 2012: 74, p. 29) notes that "the main threat to vulnerable groups is not the extremist groups in our society;

instead it is the attitude of the masses". The conclusion is that many Swedes are still guilty of various forms of everyday racism. It continues: combined with the "wrong signals from leading politicians this can quickly evolve into more severe forms of xenophobia" (SOU 2012: 74, p. 29). Furthermore, the report states that the work against more "brutal forms of xenophobia must begin with the xenophobia observed in everyday situations. We must start with ourselves" (SOU 2012: 74, p. 29). Considerable weight is attached to the commitment to live up to "Sweden's international responsibility" (SOU 2017: 12 p. 306) and to "learn from experience and develop insight to improve the future readiness" (SOU 2017: 12, p. 330-335). In addition, the institutions' role and responsibility is emphasized when it comes to integration. The report "More Newcomer Students Must Achieve Connection to High School (SOU 2017: 54) focuses on the schools' responsibility to implement measures to improve results among newly-arrived immigrants in schools.

Swedish optimism

> Experience shows that different ethnic groups can coexist side by side very well, without automatically falling into conflict. The fact that there are different groups in a country is not a problem in itself; it is what the people and their leaders make of the situation that determines whether the groups will live in peace or, in a worst-case scenario, fight bloody wars. Experience also shows that people are flexible. We are well suited to live well in many different cultural contexts. Additionally, each cultural environment offers not one but several types of lives (SOU 2012: 74, p. 29).

While Swedish reports also address challenges, they are overall quite optimistic when it comes to immigration and its consequences, and is considered as a contribution to the development of the society. One report uses the concept *circular migration* where immigration is described as having a developing potential for the country of origin as well as for the receiving country, especially related to fulfilling a need for employment (SOU 2011: 28, p. 278). There was also a self-critical view on the handling of the refugee crisis during 2015. One report points to failings within the reception system and that this made the situation more difficult for the newly-arrived refugees (SOU 2017: 12, pp. 336-432). Overall, Swedish institutions, as well as society and population in general, are addressed as the main causes for failings in the integration of immigrants.

Norway – a balance between pessimism and optimism

> Immigration has both desirable and unfortunate effects when considered in a welfare state perspective. The consequences of migration for the development of the welfare model depend on the type of new arrivals, the resources they bring and the extent to which they are integrated in Norwegian working life and society (NOU 2011: 7).

The statement above illustrates the Norwegian position on immigration, which overall can be summarized in two main points: 1) immigration can have both positive and negative consequences and 2) immigration must be evaluated on the background of its effect on the welfare state. The NOU (2017: 3) highlights that Norway historically has been a relatively homogeneous country, both ethnically and culturally, and states that "gender equality and social equality have become essential pillars for achieving support and legitimacy in Norwegian politics since the establishment of welfare institutions". While the Swedish discourse largely highlighted positive effects of immigration, the Norwegian discussion is more ambivalent. This was stable in Norway during the period 2010–2018 and is illustrated in the three reports (NOU 2010: 7, NOU 2011: 7, and NOU 2017: 2). The report "Diversity and Coping – Multilingual Children, Youth and Adolescents in the Education System" (NOU 2010: 7) suggests a whole range of measures, and the weight is put on the responsibility of the education system. The report emphasizes the value of multi-language and cultural competence in the labour market. Even though the report highlights certain challenges faced by people with a minority language, it overall draws an optimistic picture. It concludes that many multilingual children succeed within the education system (NOU 2010: 7, p. 11). The report "Better Integration – Goals, Strategies, Measures" (NOU 2011: 14) states that immigrants are relatively well integrated in the labour market and a relatively high proportion of Norwegians born to immigrant parents attain higher education. At the same time, it is highlighted that problems with integration need to be solved. The NOU (2013: 9), dealing with future challenges for the police, addresses the situation whereby immigrants from specific countries are heavily overrepresented in the crime statistics. In comparison, statistics treating crimes carried out by immigrants are not presented in any of the Swedish documents. Negative consequences of immigration can be illustrated by the following quote from the report "Integration and Trust" (NOU 2017: 17):

> The majority have reason to be concerned about the erosion of egalitarian values due to society's increasing cultural heterogeneity. These types of issues spark a great deal of engagement in Norwegian society and, in recent years, that debate has been characterized by conflict, often with strong public disagreements.

Even if pessimistic concerns were more prevalent during the later reports, the main tendency throughout the period was a combination of pessimism and optimism.

Differences and similarities between Sweden and Norway

One important distinction between Sweden and Norway is that the Swedish reports highlight immigration as a positive contribution to the Swedish welfare state, while in Norway, it is seen as something that *potentially* can be positive but still challenges welfare sustainability. Problems related to integration in the Swedish reports are attributed to failings from the Swedish society and the majority population. In the Norwegian reports, on the other hand, the role of the majority society is not a topic of discussion. There is also a concern for discrimination and racism among Swedes, characterized as xenophobia (SOU 2012: 74, p. 29). Although the Swedish reports generally had a positive outlook on immigration, they after the refugee crisis focussed more on the challenges. This can especially be observed in the SOU (2017: 12), with an evaluation of the handling of the refugee situation in Sweden in 2015, by mapping out the chronology of the events, andanalysing the governments' and the municipalities` responsibility and readiness beforehand. Even if the report problematizes immigration, the focus is more on the Swedish handling of the situation, suggesting different measures on how to improve the reception of the newly arrivals. Even if there has been a dramatic shift in the public discussion in Sweden after the refugee crisis and the politics tilted from a liberal towards a more restrictive line of the refugee policy, this shift was not so prevalent in these reports. Although it could be argued that this is somewhat in line with the established political parties in Sweden that have been avoidant when it comes to discussing difficult sides of immigration and integration. In the Norwegian reports however, problems with integration are regarded more as a natural consequence of immigration, especially prevalent in the reports "Welfare and Migration" (NOU 2011: 14) and "Integration and Trust" (NOU 2017: 2). These two reports are known as the "Brochmann reports". The first report from 2011 evaluated the connection between international migration and the sustainability of the welfare state. Right after the refugee crisis in 2015, the government appointed a committee that evaluated the consequences of a large increase in refugees. The mandate of the second Brochmann report (NOU 2017: 2) was based on the previous report. The first report

was highly controversial, largely because it calculated the costs of immigration, while the second report gained less public attention even if this one also calculated costs. The first report concluded that the economic consequences of migration in general depend on the type of new arrivals, the resources they bring, and the extent to which they are integrated in the Norwegian working life and society. The second report calculated the costs more in detail, depending on the land groups the immigrants originated from. The overall conclusion was that immigrants from what was defined as land group 1 (Western Europe and North-America) and land group 2 (EU countries in Central and Eastern Europe) were the most economically beneficent. Even if the second report sparked some public debate on the validity and methodology of how the calculations were estimated, it gained less public attention on this issue compared to the discussions following the first report. One obvious reason for the lower public attention might be that the use of calculations had gradually become a more "naturalized" part of the Norwegian immigration debate. Another aspect worth noting is that after the first Brochmann report in 2011, it has been an increasing concern over whether the welfare state can handle large immigration of low-skilled labour. This concern was shared by many important actors and political parties. In Sweden, in comparison, it was more commonly argued that immigration is gainful. Although in Norway, this was a more common argument before the first Brochmann report, while afterward, this was seldom mentioned. One may assume that the report may have influenced the public debate on this issue. Two different governments with different political colours appointed the two committees, namely, the left-wing government in 2011 and the centre/right-wing in 2017. The mandates of these two reports were similar as they both were asked to analyse the long-term consequences of migration on the future of the welfare state. When comparing the two countries, the main conclusion was that Sweden had a more resource-oriented focus compared to Norway, although they both considered the consequences of immigration and the challenges related to the integration process. Both countries tended to frame immigration and integration in the light of a welfare context, although the framing was quite different. Reports in both countries recommend that more resources should be used on public measures. In contrast to Swedish reports, Norwegian reports emphasized that large immigration is difficult to combine with generous welfare benefit arrangements. One response discussed is a general restriction on welfare and longer waiting periods for immigrants to gain access to welfare benefits (NOU 2011: 7 and NOU 2017: 2, respectively). Swedish reports, on the other hand, conclude that immigration is a necessary supposition for the long-term economic survival of the welfare state. The main reason given is that immigrants fill an important need for jobs and contribute

to maintain the size of the public sector. Another important difference is on the cost aspect of immigration. While Norwegian reports calculate costs and problems related to high expenses stemming from immigration, the Swedish reports conclude that immigration overall is economically beneficial and do not try to make an overall calculation of costs. Finally, one may add that the commissions in Sweden and Norway have been asked to perform different tasks over the 8-year period, and the differences in mandates may explain variations in framing and conclusions.

To what extent are policy differences driven by differences in framing and do differences in framing reflect differences in policies? What are the political consequences of these differences? Although research is often used to legitimate political choices and prioritizations, the road from research-based reports to politics can be complicated. Accordingly, it may be difficult to "measure" to what extent it is a link between the framing observed in official documents and actual policy in these two countries. One could analyse such committees as a prolonged arm of politicians, appointed and governed by the government. Consequently, one could expect that the premises and conclusions of these reports may depend on the political colour of the government that orders these reports. Another interpretation is that the committees represent the government's attempt to gather expert knowledge as an essential foundation for the shaping of policies and that the researchers are neutral to any politicized conclusion. A more thorough answer to these empirical questions would require an analysis of how the committee members are appointed and whether the members are chosen based on ideological/normative standpoints.

The difference in how calculations are used may lead to a legitimation of a more liberal stand either on immigration or on the opposite increased restriction. In the debate in the aftermath of the refugee crisis, one argument that was often made was that it was not *how many* but *who* that arrives. For example, the Norwegian Prime minister Erna Solberg argued that the refugee flow would cost around 40–50 billions.[1]

Conclusion

Governmental reports often attract a great deal of public attention and may influence public debate as well as policy solutions. Even if the conclusions in the documents do not automatically translate into practical policy, they are often important since they influence the political agenda and the public discussion. In many aspects, Norway and Sweden are two

similar countries; they are neighbours, they have large and generous welfare states, they have a knowledge-intensive job market, and they are culturally relatively similar. Yet, the reports reveal that there are some distinct differences in the discussion of immigration and integration. While both countries consider the welfare state as an important framework when these issues are considered, the conclusions vary substantially. Norwegian reports are more problem oriented compared to the Swedish reports. One could argue that Sweden has reason to be more sceptical due to specific problems related to immigration. In this sense, Norway's more problem-based orientation, with a larger focus on difficulties related to certain issues such as low employment and conflicting values between majority/minority, etc., might also be interpreted as more willingness to cope with challenges that need to be dealt with. Another interpretation of Sweden's more optimistic outlook could be due to its membership of the EU, its international orientation, and "perceived obligation" to view migration as a resource rather than a problem.

Even if there are many common issues that are evaluated in both countries, the emphasis is quite different. A little simplified, one might conclude that Norway sees immigration and integration as something that the society is able to deal with, depending on resources within the social services as well as the numbers of immigrants. Sweden also considers the success of immigration and integration as dependent on the reception system and social services but places more weight on the responsibility of the Swedish society as a whole. Some findings are in line with Brochmann & Hagelund's study from 2011, where there is still a tendency in Sweden to blame racism and discrimination for the failings of integration, while Norwegian reports focus more on public institutions. There is a stronger concern for how immigration may lead to increased conflict between the host population and the immigrants, especially in the Norwegian reports. Furthermore, it is pointed out that this may challenge the foundation and legitimacy of the welfare state. One might conclude that the opposite pattern is prevalent in the Swedish reports. There is an overall positive outlook in Sweden on cultural diversity, and immigrants are considered as a resource rather than a burden for the welfare state.

These reports represent one of the main sources of legitimation of government-led policy and provide a broad picture of important discourses on immigration and integration. Discussions on immigration and integration in such documents can arguably be normative, and they can certainly have policy implications. As such, they provide a valuable insight into the foundation of policy formulation. Even if Sweden and Norway are similar in many aspects,

this study reveals that at the official level, there are some striking differences in the framing of issues related to immigration and integration.

Note

1. https://www.nettavisen.no/politikk/erna-solberg---flyktningestrommen-vil-koste-norge-40-50-mrd-kroner/3423146564.html.

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