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The Politics of War in the Nordic Countries, 2001-2014

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Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Thesis for the Degree of
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Summary

The terror attacks on 11 September 2001 radically altered states' perceptions of the international threat landscape. How are we responding and adjusting to the world that is thrust upon us after 9/11? The current security environment is characterized by elusive and evolving transnational threats and state against non-state actors (e.g. global terrorist networks) in a complex and globalized world. This thesis delves deeper into how the aftermath affected civil-military relations within the confines of preparing for and acting upon threats. It examines continuity and change in government-military relations of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden between 2001 and 2014, and to what extent participation in expeditionary warfare in a post-9/11 context have influenced changes. The dissertation develops a novel analytical framework based on critical realism, which brings together a peacetime and a wartime perspective. The analysis is based on a qualitative comparative study and exploits a wide range of sources, including elite interviews. Examining changing patterns of Nordic civil-military relations, the dissertation concludes that the four countries shared similar characteristics in 2001 but that their paths diverged towards 2014. The armed forces in Finland and Sweden have maintained a broad military capability of influence, while political authorities in Denmark and Norway have tightened the governance of its military. Having identified dynamics and tensions, the analysis demonstrates that the participation in expeditionary warfare in Afghanistan has posed stress and challenges to political and military authorities alike and played a role in shifting civil-military relations. The main finding of this thesis is that there is a social structure inherent in civil-military relations derived from power and anxiety, which is influenced by war. Overall, expeditionary warfare has had the greatest impact on Denmark, followed by Sweden and Norway, and a minor impact on Finland.

Sammendrag

Terrorangrepene 11. september 2001 førte til store endringer i staters oppfatning av det internasjonale trusselbildet. Hvordan responderer vi på og tilpasser oss epoken som fulgte 11. september? Dagens sikkerhetssituasjon domineres av transnasjonale trusler i stadig utvikling, samt stat mot ikke-statlige aktører (f.eks. globale terroristnettverk) i en kompleks og globalisert verden. Denne avhandlingen dykker dypere inn i hvordan dette har påvirket sivil-militære relasjoner innenfor rammen av å forberede og imøtekomme trusler. Den undersøker kontinuitet og endring i relasjoner mellom politiske myndigheter og militæret i Danmark, Finland, Norge og Sverige mellom 2001 og 2014, og i hvilket omfang ekspedisjonær krigføring har påvirket endringer. Avhandlingen utvikler et nytt analytisk rammeverk basert på kritisk realisme, som kombinerer et freds- og et krigsperspektiv. Analysen er basert på en kvalitativ komparativ studie, og utnytter et bredt spekter av kilder, inkludert eliteintervju. I undersøkelsen av endrede mønstre i nordiske sivil-militære relasjoner, konkluderer avhandlingen med at de fire landene hadde like karakteristikker i 2001, men at deres veier skilles frem mot 2014. Militæret i Finland og Sverige har beholdt en bred militær innflytelseskapasitet, mens politiske myndigheter i Danmark og Norge has strammet inn styringen av militæret. Analysen demonstrerer at deltakelsen i ekspedisjonær krigføring i Afghanistan førte til belastninger på både de politiske og militære lederskapene, og at dette har påvirket sivil-militære relasjoner. Avhandlingens hovedfunn er at det er en sosial struktur iboende i sivil-militære relasjoner utledet fra makt og angst, som påvirkes av krig. Overordnet har ekspedisjonær krigføring hatt størst virkning på Danmark, etterfulgt av Sverige og Norge, og minst på Finland.

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Trondheim, June 2019
Jannicke Fiskvik

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Abbreviations

ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
CHOD	Chief of Defence
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMISAF	Commander of International Security Assistance Force
EU	European Union
HQ	Headquarters
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOU	Norwegian Official Reports [*Norges Offentlige Utredninger*]
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OMLT	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace Programme (NATO)
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RC North	Regional Command North (ISAF)
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SAFHQ	Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOU	Swedish Official Reports [*Statens Offentlige Utredningar*]
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

INTRODUCTION

With the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11), there was a fundamental shift in perceptions of the international threat landscape. Visualized in the collapse of the twin towers of the World Trade Center, global terrorism emerged as one of the primary threats to state security and was placed high on states' foreign and security agendas. The international community moved into the new millennium with different types of security challenges, real or perceived. It is now experiencing a period of new threat perceptions not seen since the Cold War, in which the present security environment has shaped a new framework for the use of military force. During the Cold War, it was state against state and threats were relatively static and well understood. While we have not entered a completely different system, the current security environment is characterized by elusive and evolving transnational threats and state against non-state actors (e.g. terrorist networks) in a complex and uncertain globalized world. How are we responding and adjusting to the world that is thrust upon us after 11 September 2001? While there is a whole range of security issues that emerged post-9/11, among them a renewed emphasis on the need for effective intelligence services, the thesis delves deeper into how the aftermath affected civil-military relations within the confines of preparing for and acting upon threats. It analyses the relations between civilian authorities and the military in the Nordic countries, not focusing on the intelligence services, but on the traditional military in the context of the post-9/11 era.

In the aftermath of 9/11, many European states went 'out of area' with the United States to fight terrorist groups far away from their national borders. In addition, a subsequent United Nations (UN)-mandated peacekeeping mission to Afghanistan ensured the participation of a broader part of the international community. This included Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the four case studies examined in the dissertation. The Nordic countries have each promoted themselves as peace-advocating nations – supporting human rights, democracy and international law. They are ardent supporters of the UN and collective security and have traditionally been among the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations (Damrosch, 2003). These contributions have been mainly humanitarian in nature, accompanied by a reluctance to deploy combat forces (Jakobsen, 2006). Although some of these peacekeeping missions during the Cold War became high-intensive and resulted in casualties,[1] this approach to international affairs has evolved as their armed forces

[1] One example is the United Nations Operation in the Congo in the 1960s, which was characterized by limited consent and offensive operations (Jakobsen, 2006, p. 11). A UN peacekeeping force, which comprised at its peak strength nearly 20,000 troops, deployed to help restore stability to the today's Democratic Republic of Congo after it fell into conflict and disorder following independence (UN, 2001). Sweden deployed ground forces and aircraft totalling 6,300 military personnel, Norway also deployed ground forces and aircraft with 1,173 military personnel in total, and Denmark deployed nearly 1,000 troops (Danish Armed Forces, 2019; Norwegian Armed Forces, 2019). During the

are now participating in expeditionary missions in a changed security environment, using active military force and with it a higher risk of soldiers being killed in combat.

There are differences between the four countries, such as Denmark being decidedly more active in the use of force compared to the other Nordic countries. Nevertheless, the theatre of war in Afghanistan turned from one of peacekeeping to one where all the Nordic forces, not just the Danish, found themselves facing regular combat. This new battleground reality has led to different approaches across Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Concurrently, there have been shifts in civil-military relations. Notably, in Denmark and Norway the governments have tightened the governance of their armed forces, while the military leaderships in Finland and Sweden have sustained a broad military authority and influence. It is natural to assume that active participation in warfare influences the balance between civilian authorities and the military in a country. The question then becomes, why has the aftermath of 9/11 affected the Nordic countries differently? To address this puzzle the main research question of this thesis is:

> How has the civil-military balance of authority and influence in the Nordic countries changed between 2001 and 2014, and to what extent has expeditionary warfare influenced these changes?

History shows that wars have made the military a more forceful actor in politics. If we look at the United States, there have been evident tensions between the political establishment and the military. Donald Rumsfeld, first secretary of defence of president George W. Bush during the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, clashed with the uniformed services on the planning and conduct of US military operations in these two countries (Owens, 2011). Robert Gates, Rumsfeld's successor, fired, among others, two commanders of US forces in Afghanistan and forced the retirement of a combatant commander. Despite these actions, it has been argued that senior US military leaders opposed the Bush Administration's 2007 surge in Iraq, insisting on military advice be followed and subsequently worked against the implementation of the president's policy (Woodward, 2008, pp. 340-349). Then there is the public disagreement on military strategy between president Obama and the ground commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, and the latter's subsequent relief from command. Succeeding General David Petraeus, on the other hand, became a hero figure in a difficult situation where the US was fighting wars on two fronts, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. These incidents indicate turbulent civil-military relations in the adjustment of relations related to the use force to serve policy aims. Turning to the Nordic countries, there are examples of political leaders giving military leaders broader authority and influence when faced with demanding

mission, where Swedish forces were engaged in offensive combat operations, 16 Swedish soldiers were killed (Jakobsen, 2006, p. 34; Swedish Armed Forces, 2019).

missions, but also cases where the defence minister has ordered military commanders home from a mission because of a lack of trust in military judgement and, in other cases, reinforced a civilian conviction that something was about to get out of political control. Thus, shifting civil-military balance of authority and influence in wartime is an issue spanning large and small states. Moreover, this suggests that there is something fundamental about war and a dynamic in civil-military relations where the military actor at times grows more influential, while at other times, civilian leaders intervene and provide a great checks and balance on the military. While the conditions and specific outcomes are unclear, this dissertation sets out to provide answers by exploring continuity and change through a Nordic lens.

Broadly defined, civil-military relations concern social relations between the military and the wider society. More narrowly, it can also refer to political relations between civilian governments and its armed forces, which is the focus of this dissertation.[2] The basic premise in civil-military relations is that no matter how strong the military is or becomes, in a democracy, civilians are supposed to remain superior and the stronger actor in the overall power relations. Civilian control of the military by civilian officials elected by the people is essential, as the military command has no similar constitutional accountability to the state; however, it has a monopoly of violence. Too much military influence and autonomy would signify less politics and civilian control of the armed forces. This is problematic in a democracy. As Eliot Cohen notes, "there is nothing obvious or inevitable about the subordination of the armed forces to the wishes and purposes of the political leadership" (Cohen, 2003, p. 242). The 'balance' in civil-military relations involves civilians having the monopoly in decision-making while the military organization plays the role of the servant obeying political orders. However, because civilian control is a process and not a fact, there is a possibility of the civil-military balance shifting in favour of the military. As such, civil-military relations are a question of the relative influence of civilian leaders on military officials.

On the one hand, expeditionary warfare arguably pushes the civil-military balance in a military direction. There are five factors supporting this argument. First, there is the logic that war normally expands the influence of the military, which oversees the use of force (Finer, 1962, p. 64). Second, we have a material factor, in which military issues become more important in war, and military requirements, therefore, become a central part of foreign policy (Huntington, 1957, p. 345). Therefore, war demands large resources to address the needs of military capabilities. Furthermore, it creates links to the defence industry, which has an interest in increased military expenditure and

[2] The military in a larger sense can include paramilitary forces and private military forces. However, when addressing the military and armed forces, the thesis refers to the regular forces and the military branches of army, air force and navy.

procurement by the state. Third, we have what we call the 'politics of patriotism'. When armed forces are sent into combat, a political effect follows. The population generally supports the armed forces, who are risking their lives to defend their country. Moreover, it often increases the prestige of the military in the population. The fourth factor concerns an information asymmetry. Warfare involves complex military-strategic and military-technical issues – expertise that politicians are unlikely to have. In this regard, scholars emphasize that there is an information asymmetry to the advantage of the professionals (i.e. the military) (Bruneau & Tollefson, 2006; Feaver, 2003; Kohn, 1997). Lastly, following participation in war, there is a growing community of veterans. Politically, this community can act as an advocacy group pushing for increased support and resources for the military (Huntington, 1957, p. 88). Together these five factors can help explain why participation in expeditionary warfare might lead us to expect a more influential military.

On the other hand, it is also conceivable that expeditionary warfare leads to civilian leaders tightening the governance over its military. By reversing the abovementioned factors, they can support the argument that the balance may tip in a civilian direction. First, following the current security environment with the rise of insurgents and non-state actors in war, governments have turned to a 'comprehensive approach'. This approach involves political, civilian (e.g. aid and development agencies) and military instruments, by which the military becomes a smaller component in a larger machinery. Accordingly, there is arguably more micro-management of military affairs, at the expense of military authority and influence. Second, in terms of the material factor, the Nordic military contributions have been limited and, therefore, not necessarily in need of a larger military budget. Consequently, the defence industry might be less involved due to small military footprints. As for the third factor, 'politics of patriotism', the wars are being fought far away from national borders. While the Nordic population live in peace, their armed forces are fighting for causes other than homeland defence. If it is unclear to the population why the armed forces are engaged in conflict, it is arguably more difficult for the military elite to muster support among the wider public. Concerning the fourth factor of information asymmetry, it begs the question if the keeper of secrets is the Nordic military or the US military. Presumably, much of the information is in the hands of the Americans. Lastly, for the veterans' community, it would be reasonable to presume that the Nordic welfare model, a model that has been ranked top-10 by several international studies and rankings on economic success, social rights and inclusion, provides adequate support services for veterans including help re-integrating into civilian life. Accordingly, the same factors can lead us to expect stronger civilian governance of the military because of the involvement in expeditionary warfare.

Thus, mainstream analytical factors lead to two distinct scenarios. One goes in a military direction with expeditionary warfare leading to broader military authority and influence, while the other goes in a civilian direction of broader civilian authority and influence. Considering that these are two extreme scenarios, one is likely to find some less dramatic options between the two. There is also the possibility that expeditionary warfare has not led to major changes in the power balance between civilian and military actors and has had only minor effects on domestic civil-military relations. In this situation, we can expect continuity in these relations with few changes in the balance of authority and influence. What impact expeditionary warfare has had on shifting patterns of Nordic civil-military relations is a question this thesis intends to explore.

Civilian control of armed forces: an enduring and important challenge

The dissertation's research question connects to an important issue in democratic societies. The challenge and the questions posed within the area of civil-military relations are, more or less, as old as the history of politics itself. Several politicians, historians and political philosophers – from Pericles to Max Weber – have made important observations about the military's role and position within society. In this section, the thesis traces some of the key philosophical ideas from Ancient Greece to more contemporary research on civil-military relations, highlighting that the issue under examination here is an enduring one. The main point we can draw from the debate is that civilian control of armed forces, and thus restraint on military influence in society, is crucial in a democracy.

After the first battles of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens (431-404 BC), the Athenian politician Pericles held a funeral oration for Athenians who died on the battlefield. Such funerals were public rituals where the state chose a man "known for wise judgement and of high reputation" to speak at the funeral (Thucydides, 1998, p. 90). Pericles used the occasion to talk about the value of democracy. According to him, Athens distinguished itself from its neighbours by the virtues of Athenian democracy and direct participation of (some) its citizens in political life. Adult, male citizens (i.e. not foreign residents or slaves) were granted freedom, merit preceded class considerations, capacity over reputation, and poverty was no obstacle if the citizen was able to serve the state. However, although these citizens were granted freedom it did not mean that they were lawless:

> [I]n public we are especially law abiding because of fear, in our obedience both to anybody holding office and to the laws, above all those established to aid people who are wronged and those which, although unwritten, bring down acknowledged shame (Perikles in Thucydides, 1998, p. 92).

In the discourse, Pericles is clear about Sparta being a poorer state because every citizen grew up as a soldier. Athens, he argues on the other hand, with civilian supremacy, was a better state. The

fallen Athenian soldiers gave their life for a common good, not for wealth and fame. In the same vein, Socrates argues in Plato's *Republic* that while a city's guardians would protect the city from external attacks, they themselves represented a potential threat. Only by schooling the guardians with the right philosophical ideas about their place in society could one avoid this danger (Plato, 1994).

Turning to a modern age, the Prussian general and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), identified the central issue in civil-military relations when he wrote:

> [W]ar is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. […] The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose (Clausewitz, 1976 [1831], p. 87).

As this passage argues, it is necessary to connect military operations to policy purpose. For Clausewitz, it was clear that we should never think of war as something autonomous, but as an instrument of policy shaped and framed by politicians. The military are professionals in the 'management of violence', while policy, the purpose for which violence is managed, is strictly a civilian responsibility. Furthermore, Clausewitz stressed that the control of war (i.e. its political rationalization) was inherently difficult. To illustrate just how difficult it is, Clausewitz introduces what he calls the 'trinity' in his formulations of the relations between the military, the government, and the people. Clausewitz states that war has three elements, namely passion, the play of chance and probability and, lastly, reason (Clausewitz, 1976 [1831], p. 89). He connects these elements to three groups of actors in war: the people, the military commander and his army, and the government. Passion mainly concerns the people, where Clausewitz argues that passions that are to be ignited in war (e.g. hatred, enmity, courage) must already be inherent in the people. The play of chance and probability are connected primarily to the military commander and the army, both who are responsible for providing the instruments and plans necessary for the conduct of war. Reason – the political aims – are the business of the government alone. Because these tendencies are not fixed but variable in relation to each other, the trinity as such is there only superficially to illustrate the division of responsibilities, but more fundamentally, to highlight why civilian control of the armed forces is extremely difficult.

In his writings on *Politics as a vocation,* Max Weber (1864-1920) defines the modern state as an entity, which has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a given territory (Weber, 1994, p. 310). This is, according to him, a fundamental attribute of the state. Legitimacy, in this regard, is important. For the use of violence to be legitimate, the state (i.e. the political authority) must

authorize it. The state is held to be the only source of the 'right' to use violence. Moreover, for the state to survive, those ruled must comply with the authority demanded by those ruling:

> When, despite the arguments advanced by an official, his superior insists on the execution of an instruction which the official regards as mistaken, the official's honour consists in being able to carry out that instruction, on the *responsibility* of the man issuing it, conscientiously and precisely in the same way as if it corresponded with his own convictions. Without this supremely ethical discipline and self-denial the whole apparatus would disintegrate (Weber, 1994, pp. 330-331, original emphasis).

Weber recognizes that the logic behind politics as a vocation and bureaucracy is completely different. Accordingly, the modern state is built upon the 'official', including the military officer, obeying political authorities – even though he might disagree with the decision. Weber's concern was that without this obedience, the modern state as a legal-rational construct would cease to exist. This is Weber's key to modern legitimacy, in contrast to charismatic or traditional legitimacy, which he traces to earlier times. Whereas the politician must take on the exclusive, personal responsibility for what he does or for the decisions he makes – he cannot refuse or give this responsibility to others.

This classical debate also resonates in contemporary politics. In Dwight D. Eisenhower's farewell speech to the nation, when he stepped down as the 34th president of the United States, he expressed his concern about the dangers of massive military spending, especially deficit spending and government contracts with private military manufactures. What he calls the military-industrial complex is one of the main issues in his speech:

> [The] conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every State House, every office of the Federal Government. […] In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist (Eisenhower, 1961).

This conjunction of a large standing military establishment in peacetime and a large defence industry was unprecedented. Although Eisenhower acknowledges the importance of a strong military establishment to keep peace and discourage potential aggressors from attacking the state, he urged the population not to fail to "comprehend its grave implications" (Eisenhower, 1961). He argued that with so many resources being utilized, and with millions of American men and women engaged in the military establishment, the resources, livelihoods and the very structures of society are involved. This could lead to too much power in the hands of the military and industry if one is not aware of the inherent danger.

Thus, the issue of relations between the civilian sphere and politics on the one hand and the military officer and organization on the other is not new. The scientific study of civil-military relations, however, is relatively recent, and will be analysed further in Chapter 1. Two natural scholarly reference points in any contemporary debate on the political role of the military are Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. They both explored civilian control of armed forces and developed major theories for contemporary civil-military relations applicable to Western democracies in the 1950s and 1960s (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). As Huntington argues, "the problem of the modern state is not armed revolt but the relation of the [military] expert to the politician" (Huntington, 1957, p. 20). A central disagreement between the two was on how civilian control ought to be executed. Huntington prescribes a clear distinction between the military and civilian sphere, arguing that military professionalism and autonomy in military affairs would secure civilian control. Janowitz, on the other hand, counter-argues that the lines between the military and the political spheres are blurred. Accordingly, he argues for a citizen-soldier ideal and the involvement of civilian authorities. Another classic, following the institutional focus of Huntington, is Samuel Finer's work on the military and politics, where he insightfully questions why the military ever submits to civilian control: "Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. The military possess vastly superior organization, and they possess *arms*" (Finer, 1962, p. 4, original emphasis).

As Chapter 1 will demonstrate, the major theoretical issue that has dominated the field of research on civil-military relations concerns civilian control of the military. Tensions between technical specialists and political generalists is not confined to the civil-military sphere. Struggles for influence and control among political and bureaucratic constituencies are common in most aspects of public policy. However, the relationship between military and civilians is crucial precisely because of the monopoly of violence resting with the military institution. Civilian control over the armed forces is such an important issue and necessary because the military is a state's most powerful instrument with the ability to defend society and democracy and, by extension, it also has the power to destroy them.

Relevance of the study

One usually thinks of the contemporary Nordic countries as well organized and existing in civil-military bliss. None of the countries have experienced a military coup and the armed forces are financed directly and exclusively by the state.[3] In comparison to the problem of military coups, the

[3] Although Finland came close in its first years as an independent republic, it never came to a coup and civil-military relations have been stable in the aftermath (Ries, 1988).

relationship between Nordic politicians and the military might therefore seem a less obvious topic for analysis. However, such a perspective overlooks the fact that civilian control of the military is more nuanced than just preventing coup d'états. As the normative debate outlined above demonstrates, the issue of the military and its position in society is fundamental and important, even in democratic states where military takeovers are unlikely.

Considering the Nordic military participation in the 'global war on terror', there are voices in society who are concerned with what they see as a more powerful military organization. They point to increased military spending, the importance of the military in foreign policy, issues with information and increased prestige of the military in the population. In a feature article from 2010, Henning Sørensen, a military sociologist, provides several examples of what he considers breaches of democratic control with the Danish armed forces. Among them is a rise in number of military chiefs, diminished conscription resulting in less input of civilian values in the armed forces, and the distortion of information provided by the military to politicians or, in some instances, of not providing information at all (Sørensen, 2010). The Danish journalist Carsten Jensen points to an information asymmetry and is critical how the opinions of the military resonate in Danish media, something without question, which ends up silencing the debate on Danish participation in Afghanistan (Jensen, 2010). In their 2016 book *The war that never ends*, Jensen and Anders Hammer argue that the Danish contribution to the war effort in Afghanistan has primarily been a win for the political establishment, including the Danish Armed Forces, where the latter have received increased resources and a comprehensive modernization. They have also obtained greater prestige – especially among boys and young men (Jensen & Hammer, 2016, p. 332).

It has also been argued, in the case of Norway, that there has been a shift in power in a military direction at a time when the focus in Norwegian foreign policy is shifting from soft to hard power. This is connected to the increasingly central role of the military in counterterrorism and the increased allocation of resources towards the country's armed forces following its participation in NATO-led conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya (Egeland, 2011). Moreover, in an investigative piece on the role of Norwegian elite soldiers in Afghanistan, journalist Erling Borgen concludes that the Norwegian Special Forces constitute a democratic problem, as their activities are secret, and we know little about their training or actions as part of Task Force K-Bar[4] in Afghanistan (Borgen, 2009, p. 105).

[4] Task Force K-BAR was a special operation unit comprised of special operations teams from inter alia the USA, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Denmark and Germany.

The Swedish National Audit Office have highlighted difficulties in the governance of the Swedish Armed Forces. In a report from 2014, titled 'The Armed Forces – a challenge for the state', the audit office underlines how the government's governance of the country's military has been ambiguous and in turn has provided the military with a broad scope to direct the military establishment and activities (RiR 2014:8, 2014). Furthermore, the lack of political direction of the military in international operations, especially in Afghanistan, has in effect left important decisions to deployed personnel in the conflict zone (RiR 2011:14, 2011), indicating broader influence on the part of the military. The historian Wilhelm Agrell has also noted how military interest politics in international operations is more visible as international missions have received more attention (Agrell, 2010, p. 223). Considering the Nordic humanitarian focus and the aims to promote peace and international order, the Nordic states are countries that appreciate their peace nation traditions. New international dynamics and use of force can pose a difficult dilemma with the prospects of expeditionary warfare leading to a more influential military. Thus, there are some basic values, which are at risk if the domestic state monopoly is reduced in favour of the military and the latter's societal role increases.

The primary aim of this dissertation lies in contributing to a deeper understanding of how expeditionary warfare has influenced domestic civil-military relations in the four Nordic countries. Overall, the subject of civil-military relations is rarely discussed or examined when it comes to these states. There are also few studies that directly or adequately address the possible link between changes in civil-military relations and participation in expeditionary missions. One notable exception is Robert Petersen's Ph.D. thesis from 2012, *The Best ambassador: Civil-military relations and democratic control in Denmark 1991-2011*, which provides a thorough historical analysis of Danish civil-military relations and participation in international operations since the Cold War (R. Petersen, 2012). In addition, there are several books, book chapters and scientific articles that address specific issues from different approaches and concerns but have nevertheless been informative to this dissertation. The focus of this research can broadly be placed into two schools of scholarly attention, namely research on the Nordic countries' engagement in Afghanistan and research on defence reform in the last couple of decades. Without providing an exhaustive list, there are studies that have been central to this discussion and should be mentioned here.

First, there is some literature on the Nordic countries' engagement in Afghanistan, although the focus is not on civil-military relations per se. In the case of Sweden, there are two central books dealing with that country's role in Afghanistan, namely Wilhelm Agrell's *A war here and now: Sweden's path to armed conflict in Afghanistan* (Agrell, 2013) and Arita Holmberg and Jon Hallenberg's (eds.),

The Swedish Presence in Afghanistan (2017). While Agrell provides a critical historical assessment to Sweden's participation in Afghanistan, the edited volume takes a broader, more theoretical approach to Sweden's role in that conflict, as well as focusing on the security and defence transformations.[5] Among the Nordic countries, only Norway and Sweden have appointed independent commissions to evaluate their civilian and military engagement in Afghanistan. The Norwegian report came out in 2016 entitled *A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014* (NOU 2016:8, 2016), while the Swedish report, *Sweden in Afghanistan 2002-2014*, was published in 2017 (SOU 2017:16, 2017). These two reports have been essential to this thesis, as the commissions have had access to classified documents and conducted several interviews with central actors and thus provide important information. Moreover, Ida Maria Oma's Ph.D. thesis, *Small states and burden-sharing in allied operations abroad: The case of Norway in ISAF*, explores the evolution of Norway's military participation in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2010. Journalist Kristoffer Egeberg (2017) provides a detailed account of Norway's security and defence policy and the participation in international operations over the last three decades in the book *The Peace Nation Norway*. Journalists Lars Halskov and Jacob Svendsen offer a similarly thorough account of Denmark's war efforts between 2001 and 2012 in their book, *A country at war: How Denmark became belligerent – and politicians and generals fumbled in the dark* (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012). The canon of scholarly literature dealing with Finnish civil-military relations after the Cold War or Finland's participation in Afghanistan in English or Swedish is rather limited, apart from some useful contributions (e.g. Lepistö, 2012; Piiparinen, 2007; Salonius-Pasternak, 2012).[6] Overall, from a comparative perspective, most studies on the Nordic countries' engagement in Afghanistan are single case studies.[7]

The second school of literature that has been central to this dissertation examines Nordic defence reforms over the last decades. Among others, Wilhelm Agrell's book, *The illusion of peace: The rise and fall of the Swedish national defence*, deals with Swedish defence reform after the Cold War (Agrell, 2010). Olav Bogen and Magnus Håkenstad's *Balancing Act: The adaption of the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War*, provide a detailed account of the reforms and crossroads of the Norwegian defence establishment from 1990 to 2014 (Bogen & Håkenstad, 2015). While there is no similar account of Danish defence reforms, several books have contributed important insights (e.g. Heurlin, 2004;

[5] In addition, there are reports on the Swedish engagement that have been informative (e.g. FOI, 2016; Roosberg & Weibull, 2014).

[6] There are scholarly books on Finnish civil-military relations and the Finnish Defence Forces that deals with developments before the end of the Cold War, however, which provide a historical background (Ries, 1988; Stover, 1981).

[7] There are comparative studies done on the Nordic countries but without the civil-military relations aspect, e.g. the edited book by Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre, *Alike or Different? Scandinavian Approaches to Military interventions*, which explores and compares the strategic decision-making procedures in the four Nordic countries (Edström & Gyllensporre, 2014b) and the book *Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations* by Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2006).

Kristensen, 2013 (ed.); Lyng, 2000; N. Petersen, 2004). In addition, there are books, book chapters and articles that analyse the question of defence transformation in the Nordic countries, within single and comparative studies (e.g. Andersson, 2018; Heurlin, 2007c (ed.); Kronvall & Petersson, 2016; Matlary & Østerud, 2007 (eds.); Petersson, 2011a, 2018; Saxi, 2011).

This thesis fills the gap on Nordic civil-military relations by exploring in what ways, and to what extent, participation in expeditionary military missions after 11 September 2001 have influenced domestic civil-military relations through adopting a qualitative comparative study. While we do not fully understand the impact of warfare on shifts in civil-military relations, this dissertation demonstrates the underlying dynamics at play. The Nordic countries are interesting cases considering the variation between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in security policy outlooks and geostrategic positions, security affiliations, as well as varying levels of participation in international military operations in the aftermath of 9/11. The dissertation exploits a wide range of sources, including original information from nearly 40 interviews with central actors from both the civilian and military sides in all four countries. Going beyond the Nordic context, the study contributes to the wider debates on civil-military relations and to a deeper understanding of the relations between political authorities and the military in a post-9/11 context. Examining small, mature democracies in a comparative context and further theorizing on the subject by constructing a novel analytical framework, the dissertation exposes new insights into our understanding of democratic civil-military relations.

A critical realist approach

Civil-military relations is a complex, multi-dimensional subject. This thesis does not address Nordic civil-military relations in its entirety but adopts an analytical focus on political relations between civilian governments and military leaderships. The study furthermore acknowledges that civil-military relations are subject to domestic factors and political intent; changes can come from many directions and can be a result of a strained budgetary context and district politics. However, arguing that there are fundamental aspects of war that may alter the civil-military balance and considering the post-9/11 security environment, the dissertation examines war as a driving force for shifting civil-military relations. While the importance of civilian control of the military has an explicit normative dimension, this thesis focuses on the question to what extent has expeditionary warfare affected the civil-military balance of authority and influence domestically. The objective is to investigate civil-military relations in the Nordic countries regarding how they have changed between 2001 and 2014 and to what extent the participation in expeditionary warfare can explain these changes.

To investigate this complex issue, I argue that we lack the appropriate framework of understanding to approach civil-military relations post-9/11. Therefore, I construct a new analytical framework that follows a critical realist approach (see Chapter 2). The analysis centres on a theoretically informed narrative of the process in which the Nordic countries partake in the contemporary battlefield, through expeditionary warfare, and changes in civil-military relations. This does not include predicting interactions or patterns, but the use of abduction, involving a dialectical movement between theory and empirical data to understand the process and explanatory mechanisms. Critical realism provides the possibility to go beyond facts to grasp the deeper processes and factors that generate those facts. In other words, the dissertation goes beyond the observation that there are shifts in the dynamics of civil-military relations when at war, to determine why these shifts occur. One such explanation posits that there is something fundamental about war and civil-military relations that we cannot observe, but which plays a causally significant role. For the overall analytical framework of this thesis, I combine a peacetime and a wartime perspective with the argument that both are necessary to understand the process. Two aspects are central and of interest for this study. First, when, in civil-military relations, is the military actor more influential? Second, what aspects about contemporary war may shift the civil-military balance? Accordingly, I draw on different theoretical approaches and canons of academic literature.

For the peacetime perspective and investigation of when the military actor is influential, I have turned to a framework with an enduring influence on the field of civil-military relations, developed by Samuel Huntington in *The Soldier and the State* (1957). Since its publication, virtually all works and debates on the role of the military in politics have started from the premises argued by him – either to prove and argue in favour of their validity or to criticize and falsify. One of Huntington's major contributions is his initial framing of the empirical sphere. For the purposes of this dissertation, his concept of level of power in civil-military relations provides a fruitful starting point for conceptualizing fundamental dynamics in the relations between the civilian master and military servants. Thus, I use Huntington's theory as a template for my investigation of the civil-military balance of authority and influence. I additionally borrow from other important scholars and their theoretical arguments for my neo-Huntingtonian approach. While Michael Desch (1999) highlights structure as a fundamental driver for changes in civil-military relations, Morris Janowitz (1960), Samuel Finer (1962), Peter Feaver (2003) and Deborah Avant (1994) shed light on the political role of the military and how politics might shape the process of change.

The other main point of interest of this thesis is expeditionary warfare, particularly new aspects that emerged after the Cold War and 9/11. Concerning the wartime perspective, civil-military

relations theory addresses warfare as a source of shifting relations, but the insights are limited and therefore stand to benefit from a wider engagement with the scholarly literatures on the changing character of war and military innovation. The changing character of war literature provides further insight into the dynamics of war, while military innovation studies provide insight to the mechanisms underlined by Finer, Feaver and Avant in a war context. Drawing on insights from these literatures, I define the contemporary battlefield including an outline of its conditions and potential effects, which is further elaborated on in Chapter 2.

Thesis outline

The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a more thorough literature review of civil-military relations theory and explores variation in civilian control of the armed forces. This review will situate my dissertation more concretely within the existing research. More importantly, the chapter provides a definition of the dynamics inherent in civilian control of the military, highlighting central dimensions in the relationship between civilian and military leaders. Developing the concept of 'military capability of influence', 'the autonomous military actor' implies broad military capability of influence and 'the confined military actor' signifies narrow military capability of influence. Chapter 2 broadens the analytical framework by including literature on the changing character of war and military innovation studies and conceptualizes the wartime perspective. Furthermore, it describes the methodology (which is based on critical realism) and provides a specification of the analytical concepts that will be used in the subsequent chapters. Thus, the second chapter sets the stage for the empirical analysis. Chapter 3 analyses how patterns of civil-military relations have changed between 2001 and 2014 in the Nordic countries. The chapter finds that Denmark and Norway have moved in the trajectory of a confined military actor, while Finland and Sweden have maintained an autonomous military actor trajectory. Chapter 4 and 5 investigate war as a driver behind the changes analysed in Chapter 3 by examining the Afghanistan engagement post-9/11 of the four countries. Devoting analytical attention to the wartime dynamics at play to uncover potential links between expeditionary warfare and changing patterns of civil-military relations, Chapter 4 addresses Denmark and Norway, while Chapter 5 investigates Finland and Sweden. These chapters find that contemporary war has posed stress and challenges to political and military authorities alike and played a role in shifting civil-military relations. Overall, expeditionary warfare post-9/11 has had the greatest impact on Denmark, followed by Sweden and Norway, and a minor impact on Finland. The last chapter revisits the analytical framework in light of the empirical findings, assesses the findings and discusses the social structure inherent in civil-military relations based on the research. Additionally, the chapter briefly considers implications for Nordic civil-military relations in the post-2014 context.

CHAPTER 1

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY: THE AUTONOMOUS AND THE CONFINED MILITARY ACTOR

This dissertation asks to what extent expeditionary warfare has influenced changes in the civil-military balance of authority and influence in the Nordic countries since 9/11. In its broadest sense, the study connects to the enduring dilemma in civil-military relations within policy and academic circles; as Peter Feaver highlights:

> The civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do. […] The civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection (Feaver, 1996, pp. 149, 150).

For the latter point, civilian control of the military is essential. A corollary of civilian control is the question of military influence in society. Therefore, the research question of this thesis directs analytical attention to the field of civil-military relations to understand the interactions between civilian and military institutions and variations in civilian control of the military.

In established democracies, the question is not whether civilian control of the armed forces exists, rather to what degree.[8] The military might accept the principle of civilian control, however, there are ways to undermine or challenge it, implicitly or explicitly. Feaver argues that an adequate treatment of the dilemma in civil-military relations must "recognize that civilian control is more nuanced than simply preventing coups" (Feaver, 1996, p. 155). The possibility of the military evading or frustrating civilian control is present in established democracies. Besides the fact that the military is strong in terms of the possession of arms, it can also be powerful politically.

This chapter situates my research in a review of civil-military relations theory, focusing specifically on what the theoretical literature has to say concerning variations of civilian control of armed forces. The aim is to exploit the literature to clarify the grounds for investigating the dynamics in the civil-military relationship, and to discover when civilian control is weak and when civilian control is strong. The first section outlines the broad trends of civil-military relations literature, briefly describing the major areas of scholarly focus within the field. Then, the next section delves more deeply into the question of civilian control, laying out the prominent theories that explain

[8] In established democracies, the issue concerns governance rather than control of the armed forces. However, because civilian control is an established term in the civil-military relations literature, I will continue to use 'civilian control' in this chapter, recognizing the argument that governance may be a more proper term.

different patterns of civilian control and the potential of the military to be influential. Based on this literature review, the following section develops an overarching concept of 'military capability of influence', which is differentiated into two extreme points, namely 'the autonomous military actor' (i.e. weak civilian control), and conversely, 'the confined military actor' (i.e. strong civilian control). By using Huntington (1957) as a starting point – modified to the purposes of this thesis – the autonomous military actor is defined as one with a broad capability of influence; the confined military actor is defined as one with a narrower capacity to influence. The last section highlights shortfalls in the theoretical literature and briefly outlines the next step forward. For this study, current theory is insufficient in two significant aspects. First, while the literature address war as a source of shifting relations it does not elaborate on or discuss the dynamics of war. Second, and related to the first point, we have an incomplete framework of understanding this civilian-military relationship.

1.1 The field of civil-military relations

While most of this chapter focuses on a few key arguments, this section outlines the broader trends of the scholarly field of civil-military relations. The study of civil-military relations is diverse and covers numerous issues. This dissertation concentrates on variations in civilian control, which is just one of many areas of scholarly interest. Civil-military relations constitute an area that includes almost everything that concerns the military organization and its relations to the wider society. It is a distinctively multidisciplinary field, encompassing contributions from historians, political scientists and sociologists, who mutually engage in each other's work, drawing on the strengths of each field to generate an empirically and theoretically rich literature (Feaver, 1999). The central aspect that receives the greatest scholarly attention is the role of the military officer in relation to politics and politicians.

The literature on civil-military relations emerged in earnest after the Second World War, as a Cold War climate created new political realities for Western states. This is for the case for the US, which has received most scholarly attention when it comes to established democracies. It was in this context that Samuel Huntington wrote his *The Soldier and the State* (1957). Since its publication, his work frames the debate and continues to be an influential benchmark. It is a liberal, institutional theory, which investigates the interactions between political institutions, security imperatives and prevailing societal values. Ultimately, Huntington advocated 'objective civilian control', where the politicians make the political decision on the use of military force, but then leave the military professional with the autonomy to decide how to conduct military operations. Huntington's work

has generated several critiques throughout the years, both theoretical and empirical. Nonetheless, he remains influential in the field.

One of the first meaningful responses to Huntington came from Morris Janowitz. In *The Professional Soldier*, Janowitz provides a detailed "social and political portrait" of the American military (Janowitz, 1960). From a sociological perspective, he provides insights into the nature of the military and its position in society. Janowitz rejects Huntington's prescription of a clear division of the civilian and military spheres, arguing instead that the lines between them are blurred in a nuclear age. He concludes that the US should create a constabulary force rather than a military one, committed to the pragmatic use of limited force.

The works by Huntington and Janowitz sparked numerous studies on civil-military relations, which led to the two principal avenues that subsequently emerged. Following Huntington, the first is an institutionally-oriented canon of literature, focusing on how the relationship functions within the institutional framework of a given polity's government. An important contribution in this vein came from Samuel Finer (1962), who offered a systematic examination of the disposition of the military to intervene in politics as a function of its motive, mood and professionalism. In addition, this school of thought produced works addressing issues such as postcolonial adjustment, coups, and the role of the military in modernization and governance (e.g., Nordlinger, 1977; Perlmutter, 1977; Stepan, 1971; Welch, 1976). The second body of work is a sociologically-oriented examination of the military that followed Janowitz's approach. This work focuses on the integration of the military with society and looks primarily at the broader aspects of military and society (e.g., Edmonds, 1988; Larson, 1974; Moskos, 1976; Moskos & Wood, 1988). An important societal argument is that sharp differences in civilian and military ideas and cultures weaken civilian control of the military.

Throughout the Cold War period, Huntington and Janowitz remained the major works in the field with no serious challenges to their theories. Since the Cold War ended, however, civil-military studies experienced a scholarly revival. This was triggered by changes in the international environment, the extensive downsizing of Cold War forces, the emergence of new humanitarian missions, and an alleged 'gap' between the military and society in the US (Feaver & Seeler, 2009). On the subject of civilian control, several scholars address the subject of the appropriate level of civilian control (Bland, 1999; Cohen, 2003; Kohn, 1997), while other studies focus on the apparent gap between the civilian and military cultures and its consequences for civilian control (Feaver & Kohn, 2001; Holsti, 1998; Ricks, 1997; Strachan, 2003). Scholars following the sociological school of thought also provided new studies. In accordance with changes in society, many argue that

today's military appears subject to change with a loosening of many traditional roles, the citizen-soldier linkage, discipline and hierarchy (Burk, 2002; Edmunds, 2006; Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000).

Finally, the more recent wave of studies in the 1990s and early 2000s furthermore introduced new approaches and developed new arguments in civil-military relations theory. Michael Desch (1999), investigating civilian control of the military in the changing security environment, links variation in the intensity of international and domestic threats to identify conditions under which the strength of civilian control is likely to vary. Lastly, a group of scholars borrowed the insights of principal-agent theory from economics, modelling the civil-military relationship as a civilian principal engaging with a military agent (Avant, 1994; Feaver, 2003). Risa Brooks (2009) draws on both systemic theory and principal-agent insights to investigate what determines different levels of military effectiveness.

1.2 Foundational theories of civil-military relations

Where the previous section went broad, this section goes deep. I begin here by discussing the classical works of Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960), and then address the arguments of Finer (1962). Thereafter, I explore the arguments made by recent scholars, Desch (1999), Feaver (2003), and Avant (1993, 1994). While Desch highlights structure as the fundamental driver of civil-military relations, Feaver and Avant focus on the political role of the military and politics as shaping civil-military patterns. The aim of this section is to investigate the degree of civilian control and thus variation in the potential of the military to be influential, beginning with Huntington.

Huntington

The principal focus of Huntington's theory is the relationship between the officer corps and the state (Huntington, 1957). This theoretical approach is also the analytical point of interest of this thesis. One of his concerns was whether the United States would be able to sustain the large professional military establishment, which he saw as necessary, to succeed in the Cold War and, at the same time, preserve a military that was democratically appropriate.

What determines the pattern of civilian control? According to Huntington, two issues are decisive for understanding the more specific challenge of civil-military relations. The first is the functional imperative, namely threats to the security of the state. In other words, the external security threat – the very reason for having a military force in the first place. The second issue is comprised of two societal imperatives: the prevailing worldview of society and state structure. Regarding the worldview, Huntington identifies four ideologies: liberal antimilitary, conservative pro-military,

fascist pro-military, and Marxist antimilitary – arguing that the first one is the dominant ideology of the US. As for state structure, he refers to the legal-institutional framework of the state, such as the US Constitution. Huntington found that the societal imperatives (i.e. ideology and legal-institutional structure) had remained constant in recent US history. Accordingly, if his conclusions are right, we can expect that the explanation to changes in the US pattern of civil-military relations connects to change in the functional imperative. However, he does not provide much insight into the dynamics of external security threats; his focus rests, not surprisingly, on the Soviet Union in the Cold War era.

Aware of the tension between the desire of civilian control and the need for an effective military, Huntington outlines the pattern of civilian control that would ensure both: objective civilian control. Objective civilian control entails militarizing the military, making it a tool of the state. Moreover, it involves a clear distinction between civilian and military spheres, which would give the military autonomy in military affairs. However, the autonomy was not to be absolute. The politicians would determine policy and make the political decision on the use of military force, but then leave the execution of military policy to military professionals (Huntington, 1957, pp. 80-85). The antithesis is subjective civilian control. This pattern of civilian control involves civilianizing the military, making it a mirror of the state. Inherent in this model of civilian control is a denial of an independent military sphere. Subjective civilian control would indeed imply a maximization of civilian control. However, it is his worst-case scenario because it would also undermine the ability of the military to defend the state against external threats. Following Huntington, then, both objective and subjective civilian control confines the military politically, but subjective civilian control also hampers military effectiveness.

For Huntington, the key to objective civilian control and military effectiveness is military professionalism. By making the military professional, he argues, the result will be an apolitical entity with no desire to meddle in politics and who voluntarily subordinates themselves to civilian control. Huntington leans heavily on the theoretical ideal of professionalism, in which the qualities of expertise, responsibility and corporate loyalty are the key to military subordination (Huntington, 1957, p. 11). Put simply, a professional military obeys civilians. A military that does not obey is not professional and he argues, "A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state" (Huntington, 1957, p. 84). Accordingly, he relies on military professionalism to ensure civilian control.

Huntington's most enduring insight – whether adopted or criticized – is his patterns of objective civilian control and of subjective civilian control. However, he also provides other important

insights into changing power relations between civilian authorities and the military elite, which this thesis adopts. On the question of power relations between the politician and the general, Huntington defines power as "the capacity to control the behaviour of other people" (Huntington, 1957, p. 86). He operates with a level of power, which exists in two forms, namely formal authority and informal influence. Formal authority refers to the respective position of a group in a defined social structure and as such does not concern the individual but is an attribute of status and position. Huntington, therefore, defines authority, as ordered, structured, or legitimate power.

To analyse the pattern of authority, he sets forth three criteria: (1) level, (2) unity and (3) scope. The relative 'level of formal authority' concerns the position of the military in the governmental hierarchy. Huntington argues that this indicator is important as the direct surrounding circumstances, i.e. the 'governmental environment', has a greater immediate influence on military authority than the more basic and remote national environment (Huntington, 1957, p. 376). In other words, it matters where the military leadership is positioned: The higher the position in the hierarchy, the greater the opportunity to influence. The 'unity' criterion addresses the extent to which a group is structurally unified in relation to other groups (Huntington, 1957, p. 87). With a divided civilian authority, the military will be able to play civilians against one another and achieve greater autonomy. In contrast, in the case of unified civilians and divided military, civilian control over the military is stronger. The 'scope of formal authority' entails an investigation into what a group is formally authorized to exercise power. As Huntington points out, the authority of military groups is normally limited to military matters (Huntington, 1957, p. 88). However, if the chiefs-of-staff also have authority to advise the government with respect to other areas, such as the broader field of foreign policy, the scope of their authority expands significantly. In sum, following Huntington's criteria for authority, I expect that the higher level of authority, the greater unity of structure, and the broader scope of authority, the more autonomous a military actor will be relative to civilians. Conversely, the lower level of authority, the greater disunity in structure and the narrower scope of authority, the more confined a military actor will be.

Complementary to Huntington's formal authority are informal influences. The latter is outside the formal structure and involves aspects such as personality, wealth, knowledge, prestige, friendship and kinship (Huntington, 1957, pp. 88-89). In these areas, Huntington outlines four rough indices, which can indicate the relative power of the military in relation to political authority. The first is group affiliations to the officer corps and to its leaders. These affiliations may have been established with groups in society before entering the officer corps, or there can be special ties with parliamentary committees when in service, as well as post-service affiliations, e.g. through a

veterans' community. In such cases, influence of the military can increase in certain sectors of question. The second is economic and human resources subjected to the authority of the military. For example, the greater portion of national budget devoted to military purposes, large number of individuals working in the armed forces – civilian or military – the greater the possibility that the military can be influential. A third point is whether a retired officer can assume a position of authority in the civilian governmental structure. If this is the case, it could broaden the possibility of military influence; vice versa, if civilians enter positions within the military officer corps, military influence would narrow. The fourth concerns the prestige and popularity of the officer corps in society. Obviously, the higher prestige and popularity, the greater its influence. In addition to the institutional approach of looking into formal authority, these four indicators provide useful pointers to informal influences that can strengthen the political position of the military.

In conclusion, Huntington's work captures many of the fundamental dynamics in the relationship between the military expert and the politician. Moreover, for the development of the analytical framework of this dissertation, his 'level of power' provides a fruitful starting point. However, as I will discuss below, his notion of military professionalism is problematic.

Janowitz

In his landmark study, *The Professional Soldier* (1960), Morris Janowitz analyses changes in the political behaviour of the American military. Like Huntington, Janowitz focuses on civilian control and military professionalism. In contrast to Huntington, he argues that the changes in the new strategic context involves an unavoidable politicization of the military. The point of departure for Janowitz is the difficulty in making a clear distinction between the military sphere of activity and authority and the civilian sphere. He therefore prescribed a different solution to the civil-military problematique.

In terms of Huntington's issue of the security to the state, Janowitz explores further changes in security threats, the evolution of weapons technology and new ways of conducting war. In a departure from Huntington, Janowitz understands military professionalism as dynamic, and evolving in response to new sociological conditions. While Huntington argues that military professionalization is good for civilian control because it enhances the possibilities for greater military autonomy, Janowitz stresses that contemporary military professionalization tends to increase the difficulty of distinguishing military issues and activities from civilian ones. He points, for example, to the narrowing skill differential between the military and the civilian elite. New tasks for the military require that the professional officer engages in questions traditionally considered as civilian or political and that he develops more of the skills and orientations common to civilian

administrators and civilian leaders. The consequences of doing this for modern military professionalization, he states, is that the military profession is politicized (Janowitz, 1960, pp. 31-32). Therefore, the officer corps will not be a neutralized apolitical entity, but rather the opposite. This insight is supportive of my argument about military professionalization in the next section.

In light of the new Cold War strategic context, Janowitz proposes a new role and self-conception for the military – namely that of a constabulary force: "[…] the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory" (Janowitz, 1960, p. 418). As part of this concept, the distinctions between the peacetime and the wartime military disappears. It follows that the use of force in international relations has altered significantly that it makes more sense to Janowitz to focus on constabulary forces rather than military ones. According to him, the proposed constabulary force ensures both the professional competency of the military and prevent "the growth of a disruptive sense of frustration" (Janowitz, 1960, p. 435). Janowitz recognises, nonetheless, that the politicization of the military carries with it a challenge to civilian rule:

> Their activities as a pressure group, if responsible, circumscribed, and responsive to civilian authority are a part of the decision-making process of a political democracy. Yet, at a point, knowingly or unknowingly, efforts to act as a leadership group can transcend the limits of civilian supremacy (Janowitz, 1960, p. 343).

In terms of the dilemma in civil-military relations, Janowitz explores how a politicized military seeks to influence civilians and resist policy direction. For example, he notes that the American military has matched the greater centralization on national security matters in the civilian executive branch, with an intensified effort to gain access to the pinnacle of civilian power, the White House (Janowitz, 1960, p. 350). Following a focus towards a constabulary force, Janowitz is concerned with increased frustration in the military and that it will seek ways to influence politics. However, he does not develop further where this frustration might lead.

How did Janowitz portray the dynamics of civilian control? While Huntington focuses on institutional control, Janowitz understood civilian control in terms of societal control, measured in part as integration with society. Instead of military autonomy, he presents a theory focused on diminishing the difference between the two spheres. His answer to the new problems of civilian control raised by the constabulary force is greater civilian oversight at more levels of military affairs. He notes mainly three mechanisms by which civilians can maintain control over military forces and limit the political power of the military: (a) controlling the budget process, (b) allocating roles and missions and (c) advice to the head of government on foreign policy issues that have implications for the way the military is used (Janowitz, 1960, pp. 363-367). Beyond these political mechanisms,

however, Janowitz offers little insight on how best to maintain civilian control. In conclusion, Janowitz ends up with the primary control mechanism as Huntington:

> In the end, it is still necessary to return to the original point of departure; namely, the military establishment has a special environment because it alone has the organizational responsibility for preparing and managing war and combat. […] Although it can draw on the experiences of other organizations, the military establishment must find its own authority equilibrium (Janowitz, 1960, pp. 422-423).

Thus, Janowitz argues that the ethic of subordination can be a powerful part of the professionalization of the military, which, in turn, can contribute to civilian control. At the same time, he underlines important aspects of a changing security environment that are also valid today, almost 60 years later.

Finer

One central classic along the institutionally-oriented canon of literature is Samuel Finer's *Man on Horseback* (Finer, 1962). Finer, like Janowitz, emphasizes the military as a political actor and criticizes Huntington's approach for underestimating the problems of civilian control. He suggests that military professionalism could incline the military to engage in politics rather than keeping them from it.[9] Finer's central point is that all armies are inherently predisposed to political activity. What curbs their influence is less their own characteristics and more the context in which they are operating.

Finer acknowledges that military professionalism, to some extent, works against intervention in politics, as armed forces are confined to their specialized role and implies leaving the politicians to theirs. However, for the same reason, such professionalism also propels the military into politics. First, it opens a gap between the armed forces and civilians. Second, the anxieties of the professional officer drive him to intrude into the politician's control over foreign affairs and even over domestic matters where this frustrates and impinges the military task (Finer, 1962, pp. 188-189).

Flowing from the central purpose of fighting and winning wars, Finer highlights five distinctive features of the military organization: (1) a centralized command and centralization of authority, (2) hierarchy, where authority is de-personalized, (3) discipline based on the rule of obedience, (4) a network of communication – independent of civil authorities and, (5) *esprit de corps* grounded on service to a cause to the nation. Accordingly, in terms of the political strengths of the military, Finer pinpoints three political advantages the military has over civilian organizations: (a) a marked

[9] Huntington addresses some of these questions in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Huntington, 1968).

superiority in the organization, (b) a highly emotionalized symbolic status and, (c) a monopoly of arms (Finer, 1962, pp. 5-6). However, he notes the military also has its political weaknesses and stresses two in particular, namely (i) the technical ability to administer a community and (ii) the lack of legitimacy to rule.

Finer's main argument is that central to the level and degree of military activities lies in the level of the "political culture" of society or, in other words, the degree of public attachment to civilian institutions (Finer, 1962, pp. 78-79). For established democracies, with sound civilian institutions, Finer argues that we are not talking about military revolutions, but of a possible change in the balance of power, a point that resonates in this dissertation. When examining the motives and opportunities for the military to intervene, he focuses on non-democracies and devotes less attention to mature democracies. Thus, Finer's approach is a less useful tool for the subtler influence of the military in the context of the Nordic countries. Nonetheless, considering the increased professionalization of Western armed forces today, his insights that professionalization of the military strengthens not just the motives but also the power position of the group are useful for this dissertation. The implication is that professionalization raises the authority of the military as an expert and strengthens the members' consciousness of collectiveness.

Desch

While Finer emphasizes the political culture of society, Michael Desch (1999) stresses external aspects, focusing on the changing security environment in his investigation of civilian control of the military. Building on the scholarly tradition of structural realism, his theory argues that changes in the structural threat environment ultimately drive the relationship between civilian and military elites. For him, civil-military relations are good when civilian preferences prevail over the military; conversely, such relations are the opposite when military preferences prevail instead. He explains these variations in the pattern of civilian control as a function of two variables: (1) external and (2) internal threats. External threats are threats to the existential security of the state, while internal ones threaten the domestic stability of political elites. Desch does not exclude other variables emphasized by other works and acknowledges the importance of domestic influences (e.g., changes in political and military leadership, state structures, military organizations, and societal worldviews), but sees them as intervening variables that are affected by the threat environment.

Desch's theory suggests that times of high external threat and low internal threat leads to stronger civilian control of the military. In such an environment, the civilians and military will focus on a common threat, whereby civilian preferences will prevail over that of the military. On the other end, Desch argues that civilian control is weakest in times of low external threat and high internal

threat. Because civilians and military leaders in this situation lack a common external enemy, the fractious domestic political environment draws the military into political dispute. In other words, it is easier for civilians to control the military when they are facing primarily external security threats, and hardest when facing primarily domestic threats. When applied to the United States in the post-Cold War era, he finds that the less challenging international threat environment has weakened civilian control of the US military (Desch, 1999, p. 36).

His main argument is that structural factors account for shifting patterns of civil-military relations. The theory faces a more difficult situation, however, when a state faces a threat structure that consists of either low external and low internal threats, or high external and high internal threats. Acknowledging that the determinacy of structures varies, Desch emphasizes that other factors sometimes form actual outcomes in structurally indeterminate situations, of which military doctrine is the most important. He argues that aspects of a state's military doctrine have a greater independent role in strengthening or weakening civilian control in at least three ways (Desch, 1999, pp. 18-19). First, by determining what particular military resources will be employed, how they will be employed and where. A military that is oriented toward external threats are more amenable to civilian control than those that are oriented toward suppressing domestic threats. The second aspect focuses on how doctrine shapes the structure of military organizations as well as their cultures. Finally, he argues that military doctrine influences civilian control as a focal point for the convergence or divergence of civilian and military ideas about the use of force and the international environment. Overall, the strengths of Desch's theory rest on the fact that it offers a generalizable framework that captures broad trends in civil-military relationships. Moreover, it stresses structure as a source for change in civil-military relations. There are, however, some limitations. Its explanatory power is generally limited to macroscopic trends and it does not capture the dynamics of the changing character of war.

Feaver and Avant

Following a different literary school, others have based their approach on various forms of neo-institutionalist theories, drawing on the principal-agent framework developed in economics. Focusing on US civil-military relations, Peter Feaver (2003) applies a principal-agent model to explain when the more powerful military agent is likely to comply or not with the commands of the civilian government (i.e. the principal). Considering that military institutions enjoy an overwhelming advantage in coercive power, he questions how civilians can impose their will on their more powerful military agents.

The civil-military relationship is, in Feaver's theory, postulated as a principal-agent problem, and he uses a formal model and a rational-choice framework to explain the day-to-day level of civil-military behaviour. In a civil-military context, the civilian acts as the principal, contracting the military agent to provide security for the state. The dependent variable is conceptualized as a behavioural continuum between the ideal-types of 'working' and 'shirking', which Feaver defines as "working is doing things the way civilians want, and shirking is doing things the way those in the military want" (Feaver, 2003, p. 60). The independent variables that shape these outcomes are the respective civilian and military preferences, the civilians' monitoring costs, each side's payoffs for achieving its preferred outcome, the probability of the civilian detecting any shirking, and the probability that the civilian will punish any shirking it detects. The argument is that because agents have preferences of their own, these preferences might diverge from those of the principal, and therefore lead them to consider shirking instead of working. In sum, the model concerns civilians monitoring its military agents, and military agents determining whether to work or shirk based on the perceived likelihood for shirking to be discovered and to be punished.

Feaver puts forward four general patterns of civil-military relations triggered by different conditions. The first sees the military working under civilian non-intrusive monitoring (which corresponds with Huntington's objective control). The second has the military working under civilian intrusive monitoring (corresponding with Huntington's subjective control). In the third, one sees the military shirking under civilian non-intrusive monitoring, while in the fourth, one witnesses the military shirking under civilian intrusive monitoring. For his examination of the 1990s, Feaver finds that US civilian principals were in a relatively weakened position vis-à-vis its military agents, explained by a combination of a powerful and popular military leader and the absence of consensus regarding security affairs across the executive and legislative branches. Although there is no danger of coup or severe crisis, he finds that there are degrees of military resistance to civilian control in the US during that decade. In this regard, he points to techniques the military can employ, such as leaks to the media, lobbying the public and Congress, bureaucratic 'foot-dragging', and 'slow rolling' to frustrate the policy goals of civilian authorities (Feaver, 2003, p. 68). On the question of civilian control of the military, Feaver's agency theory corrects some of the weaknesses in Huntington's theoretical approach in that it is not dependent on the problematic concept of military professionalism to predict how and under what set of circumstances civilians will best be able to control the military instrument. It also highlights the political role of the military. However, the theory achieves its analytical rigour by severely limiting its scope. Arguably, it is too parsimonious, failing to explain enough international dynamics.

Employing a neo-institutionalist theory and drawing on the principal-agent framework, Deborah Avant (1994) emphasises the structure of domestic institutions and their impact on military organizations and doctrine. While Feaver focuses on a unitary civilian actor, Avant argues that civilian indecisiveness and unclear directions leave the military with room for manoeuvre. Furthermore, she points out that the degree to which the military presents a unified front also matters as it concerns the military's integrity (Avant, 1993). The higher degree of organizational integrity, the greater the ability to articulate preferences and pursue them as an actor in the political arena. Addressing the issue of unity, Avant argues that the main problem lies in the lack of consensus among the various civilian institutions and actors. Moreover, in her study, she finds that presidential systems invite the divided principal problem but have the benefit of stronger and more capable military forces. Parliamentary systems have the opposite strengths and weaknesses; the unified principal keeps the military responsive but at the expense of its strength and capacity. Accordingly, Avant brings a more nuanced approach to Huntington's unity/division argument. In view of the theories and arguments discussed in this section, I will in the following define the concepts of 'military capability of influence', 'the autonomous military actor' and its counterpart, 'the confined military actor'.

1.3 The autonomous and the confined military actor

Drawing on civil-military relations theory, this section conceptualizes fundamental dynamics in the relationship between the civilian master and military servants. As the literature highlights, civilian control of the military is a process, not a fact. This dissertation agrees with this point; however, because of unsatisfactory existing concepts, it draws together insights from the theories discussed above to define own concepts. Civilian control is complex and full of variations, in which the civil-military balance can shift in either direction. There is an opportunity for the military authorities to be influential but also an opportunity for civilian authorities to strengthen its control with the armed forces. To enable an analysis of the complex issue of shifting civil-military relations, it is necessary to draw out essential elements that can guide and shed light on the empirical investigation. In this endeavour, I use Huntington as a baseline. For the purpose of this thesis, the institutional aspect of the relationship between civilian and military authorities is most adequate as it focuses on changes in the relative power position of the military expert vis-à-vis civilian officials. Huntington's framework, however, is a flexible point of departure, in which I use other theories outlined above as context or as a mirror image to emphasize the neo-Huntingtonian perspective. While Desch's theory underlines structure as a fundamental driver for change, Janowitz, Finer, Feaver and Avant highlight the political role of the military, including how politics may shape the process of change.

As an institution, the military distinguishes itself from other parts of society. There are several characteristics about the military's organization, which we can draw from the classical works by Huntington, Janowitz and Finer. Essentially, it is the most powerful instrument of the state. It has a monopoly of arms, with the basic purpose of defending civil society and waging war. From this central purpose, the military organization is hierarchical with a centralized command, based on discipline, expertise in managing violence and individual values to fight and win wars. The military establishment alone has the organizational responsibility for preparing and managing war and combat. In his Ph.D. thesis, Kjell Inge Bjerga (2014) introduces the concept 'military exceptionalism', which highlights inherited perceptions of the unique role of the military in the central administration of the government, and thus the perception within the military organization that it cannot be governed like other government agencies. Although civilian control of the armed forces is essential in a democracy, the military organization can also be a significant political pressure group, as highlighted by Janowitz, Finer, Feaver and Avant. When it comes to the political role of the military, it faces pressures from civilian control, of which the locus rests with civilian governments. Because the military in a democracy does not have carte blanche, the semi-autonomy of the military involves a relative balance of influence and authority between civilian and military authorities. As such, the dynamics of civilian control, which can be weak and strong, determines the potential of the military to be influential.

Drawing on the work by Huntington and additional arguments of other theories, I develop the concept of 'military capability of influence'. Here, capability refers to the institutional perspective on the civil-military relationship, primarily based on Huntington's level of power and the criteria of level, unity and scope of military authority. In addition, the thesis follows Huntington in focusing on and conceptualizing military professionalization; however, it also moves to the macro-level of Finer and Janowitz. As discussed above, Huntington's concept of military professionalization is problematic. The problem lies in his value-based notion that a military that obeys civilian authority is professional, but it is not professional if it is disobedient. From the review of civil-military relations theory, the effects and consequences expected to stem from a professionalization of the armed forces depend on how it is defined. While Huntington (1957) mainly refers to a micro-level professionalization – the socialization of the individuals into the profession and its ethos – this dissertation focuses on the broader transformation of the profession as a group. Following Finer (1962), professionalization makes the military a more distinct group, which can lead to a cultural gap to civilian authorities and wider society. In turn, this strengthens the consciousness of collectiveness and the position of the military, as an expert, is increased, as the group becomes more specialized. Janowitz (1960) highlights how changes in security threats, evolution in weapons

technology, and new ways to conduct war lead to new tasks, which, in turn, changes the military profession. A central point is that civilian control can vary in its intensity and thus lead to different roles for the military servants. Due to many variations, it is necessary to define military capability of influence and isolate essential elements to highlight when the military has a broad and a narrow capability of influence.

In this neo-Huntingtonian approach, 'the autonomous military actor' signifies broad military capability of influence. The conceptualization isolates four dimensions. First, the autonomous military actor has a high position in the governmental structure. Accordingly, the military has greater opportunity to influence politics, as the civilian layers of control between the military and the executive are few. Although military leaders still operate in a realm of constraints set by civilians, they can use a high level of institutional autonomy to promote self-interest to the executive power within the political frames. Second, the autonomous military actor is a unified organization, at the same time as civilian authorities are divided, which gives the military broader room for manoeuvre. As Avant stresses, a unified military enables it to act more strategically and is therefore more able to frustrate civilian control. Third, the military has a broad scope of authority. In this case, civilian authorities have given the military a broad range of roles, which increases its possibility to influence many issues. Accordingly, this can increase the difficulty of maintaining strong civilian control over every area. Lastly, the autonomous military actor has a high degree of professionalization. Consequently, the power position of the military is stronger because its authority as an expert is raised and its consciousness as a group is strengthened.

Conversely, we have 'the confined military actor', which signifies narrow military capability of influence. I apply the same four dimensions outlined above in this case. First, the confined military actor has a lower position in the governmental structure, which includes several layers of civilian control and no direct link between the military and the executive power. Second, the military is a divided organization. Civilians, on the other hand, are unified, in the sense of consensus and clear decisions from civilian policy-makers, which narrows the military's room for manoeuvre. Third, the confined military actor has a narrow scope of authority in the sense that the allocated roles are limited and there are tighter regulations on what the military can do. This means that civilian authorities allocate authority to the military leadership over a limited number of tasks, which makes it easier to control the actions of the armed forces. Fourth, there is a low degree of professionalization. Instead, there is a political emphasis on the citizen-soldier concept, integrating the military into society, which, as such, is a less distinct group. In sum, there is a confined military sphere and the military has a narrow capability of influence due to restrictions in access to executive

power, the lack of a single military voice because it is divided, a narrow scope in which it can perform its authority, and the military is closely integrated in society.

Finding appropriate labels for broad and narrow military capability has not been straightforward and I have considered many words to find the most fitting labels. For example, I considered using the strong and the weak military actor; however, I concluded that they are too black and white considering that the world I am looking at is very grey. Because 'autonomous' and 'confined' are not perfect either, an elaboration is in order. As for autonomous I am borrowing the term but not the whole definition. In the context of civil-military relations, the military have a certain amount of autonomy when a decision is made, but it is constrained because the politicians can take it back. Since certain parameters are set, for example political authorities controlling the purse strings, there are constraints to what the military can do. Nonetheless, this semi-autonomous nature is important, as the military actor may exploit this room for manoeuvre. Thus, depending on the character of civilian control, the autonomous military actor reflects broader autonomy, while the confined military actor highlights larger constraints on the semi-autonomous nature of the military. The following table outlines these two definitions along with their essential dimensions:

Autonomous military actor	**Confined military actor**
High position in governmental structure	Low position in governmental structure
Unified as an organization	Divided as an organization
Broad scope of authority allocated by civilian authorities	Narrow scope of authority. Tasks, mission and roles allocated are limited
High degree of professionalization	Low degree of professionalization

Table 1.1 *Essential dimensions of the autonomous and the confined military actor*

Overall, this neo-Huntingtonian approach provides a peacetime perspective. It addresses the dynamic process of the civil-military balance of influence and authority, in which the military capability of influence varies in light of civilian control. Accordingly, there is not a dichotomous outcome of either no civilian control or complete civilian control; rather there is a spectrum, highlighted by the two extreme points of the autonomous military actor and the confined military actor. It can shift in different directions or remain somewhere in between the two. In this process, Desch's theory clearly points to structure and threats as a fundamental driver for change. In underlining the political role of the military, Finer, Feaver and Avant highlight other mechanisms at play, in which politics shape the process. However, while their theories point to central mechanisms in driving and shaping the process, they do not explore in detail the dynamics at play in war. What happens to the domestic civil-military balance when countries and their armed forces participate in conflict?

1.4 The need of a wartime perspective

This section concludes the chapter by pointing out theoretical limitations within the field of civil-military relations, before outlining the next steps for the following chapter. Having reviewed the debate in the field of civil-military relations, it is clear that the theoretical literature has its limits. First, it is predominantly normative and often prescribes how democratic civil-military relations should function. As Feaver points out, because civilian control of the military is of such great policy importance, the normative approach often plays a central role in the study of civil-military relations (Feaver, 1999, p. 216). This thesis seeks to move beyond the normative prescription of civilian control, with the aim to understand how and to what extent contemporary expeditionary warfare might influence domestic civil-military relations. Second, most attention in the theoretical literature that addresses Western, industrialized countries still focuses on the case study of the US – which is logical considering the US being the only remaining superpower, but which also makes it a challenge as a framework for other countries. Third, and more importantly, Huntington and others focus on the nation-state as the central feature of civil-military relations and therefore make the theorizing domestic. While civil-military relations theory addresses warfare as a source of shifting relations, the insights are limited because the literature does not address the dynamics at play during military conflicts. For war as a more fundamental driver, the academic literature on the changing character of war provides further insights into war dynamics. As for politics shaping the process of change, military innovation studies elaborate on military change in wartime. Therefore, civil-military relations theory stands to benefit from a wider engagement with these two canons of literature.

In conclusion, for the purposes of this dissertation, the assessment of current civil-military relation theory reveals insufficient attention to two key aspects. First, the dynamics of the changing character of war, and second the framework of understanding. The changing character of war, developments in information technology, and contemporary military innovation all have implications for civil-military relations and, in turn, alters in fundamental ways its conditions and thus how it should be analysed. While civil-military relations theory points to the potential link between warfare and civil-military relations, it does not elaborate on how and in which ways. This means that we need to understand three key questions; first, what is the character of contemporary warfare; second, which conditions follow military change in wartime; and last, but not least, what does this mean for a neo-Huntingtonian analysis. Therefore, we need to look to other fields of research to grasp the conditions under which civil-military relations are functioning and broaden the analytical framework. This is the aim of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

HUNTINGTON MEETS THE CONTEMPORARY BATTLEFIELD: METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first, the aim is to understand wartime dynamics and to explore what it is about the character of the contemporary battlefield that may change the domestic civil-military balance of authority and influence. Civil-military relations theory pays insufficient attention to international dynamics – more specifically the dynamics at play during military conflicts. Thus, a part of this chapter's aim is to cultivate civil-military relations theory by drawing on insights from the literature on the changing character of war and military innovation in wartime. The changing character of war literature provides insight into more fundamental dynamics in war and is connected to the focus of Desch's work. Military innovation studies connect to the mechanisms highlighted by Finer, Feaver and Avant that may shape the process of change and provide insights into these in a war context. Because civil-military relations theory does not elaborate on how war evolves and in what ways war dynamics might affect the civil-military balance, we need to bring in a more nuanced wartime perspective.

The second part of this chapter fleshes out the analytical framework and the methodology of the neo-Huntingtonian analysis. To investigate the main research question, I conduct a qualitative comparative case study of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The analytical framework integrates the peacetime and wartime perspectives and guides the empirical inquiry in the following chapters. The methodology builds upon critical realism; the study centres around a theoretically informed narrative of the process where the Nordic countries, through expeditionary warfare, partake in the contemporary battlefield and changes in the civil-military balance. I am exploring the dynamic interplay between structural conditions of the contemporary battlefield, factors that shape how states respond to these conditions, and the civil-military dimension. I do not use theory to predict interactions or patterns but to develop concepts to understand the process and the explanatory mechanisms within it. The second part begins by outlining the ontological and epistemological foundations of critical realism, the role of theory and the method of abduction. Then it discusses the case selection, provides a specification of the analytical concepts and, lastly, outlines the wide range of sources exploited in the dissertation.

2.1 The changing character of war and military change

In the new security environment after the end of the Cold War, two connected trends have emerged on the international stage. First, contemporary wars are seldom major interstate wars; instead, many

of them are intrastate wars and often take place among weaker powers of the world. Second, Western states are transforming their military organizations to reflect a new and broader security environment. Although these two trends are closely connected, they highlight different mechanisms. The character of war is more fundamental and causal, while defence transformation in different countries point to mechanisms that might shape the effects conditioned by war and external threats. To fill the gap in civil-military relations theory for the purposes of this thesis, I look beyond civil-military relations literature for insights into essential dynamics from a wartime perspective. The aim is to broaden the analytical framework and add pieces to this complex puzzle. What is it about the wartime dynamics at play that may cause changes in the civil-military balance? The following two sections discuss the changing character of war and military innovation in wartime respectively.

2.1.1 The contemporary battlefield: Complex lethality

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increased number of intrastate wars in form of civil wars, armed rebellions, ethnic cleansing and insurgencies. Instead of major interstate wars, Western states are engaged in a flurry of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, humanitarian interventions, counterinsurgency operations and state building. Accordingly, there is a common perception that the face of war and of warfare has changed. For the wartime perspective, we need to know what is happening in contemporary armed conflicts, where Western states have gone into the contemporary battlefield through expeditionary warfare. As Desch highlights, structure, and thus war, is a fundamental driver in civil-military relations. This section uses the changing character of war literature to understand the underlying dynamics of contemporary armed conflicts and to develop a conception of the contemporary battlefield and its structural conditions. The contemporary battlefield is here defined as 'complex lethality'.

To understand war in the chaotic 1990s, there are those who argue that contemporary wars have been transformed and that we are entering a period dominated by new kinds of warfare. Central arguments in this regard are that war and warfare are being changed from its state-centricity, and that states no longer will be the dominant actors. Martin van Creveld emphasizes that there is a new form of armed conflict developing, arguing that low-intensity conflict will be the dominant wars of our time, where guerrillas, bandits and terrorists will oust regular armed forces (van Creveld, 1991). Along similar lines, Mary Kaldor (1999) argues in *New and Old Wars* that a new type of organized violence is replacing major interstate war, stressing that these 'new wars' must be understood in the context of globalization. Based on the argument that the states' monopoly of legitimate violence has broken down and because violence is more likely to be undertaken at the individual level, interstate war has lost its original definition according to Kaldor. One of her central

arguments is that 'new wars' blurs old distinctions, making it "difficult to distinguish between the political and economic public and private, military and civil, so it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between war and peace" (Kaldor, 1999, p. 110). Providing a different line of argumentation, General Rupert Smith, based on his many years of service and experience from the battlefield, argues that there has been a paradigm shift in war. Focusing on Western countries and their participation in international operations in the post-Cold War era, his point of departure is that Western states have failed to find utility of force in contemporary wars. Smith's thesis is that what he terms the paradigm of "war amongst the people" has replaced the old paradigm of interstate industrial war (Smith, 2007). Characteristics of the old paradigm are conscription, mobilization, a defence-industrial complex, and a predefined command and control apparatus of a state. In contrast, the paradigm of 'war amongst the people' is based on the concept of a continuous crisscrossing between confrontation and conflict, regardless of whether a state is facing another state or a non-state actor (Smith, 2007, p. 19). Rather than war and peace, there is no predefined sequence according to Smith, nor is peace necessarily either the beginning or the end.

Other scholars emphasize that it is primarily the character of war that has changed, and not the nature of war itself.[10] In a volume edited by Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, resulting from the 'Oxford Changing Character of War Programme', the authors argue that the perception of newness is often not so much a matter of empirical change but a change in our conceptual perception of war (Strachan & Scheipers, 2011). This is not to say that there have not been any changes in the last decades. Tracing changes in the practice of war over the past 500 years, several chapters in the volume conclude that the character of war is constantly changing. According to the authors, the most striking factual changes in contemporary times are the unlocking of the close relationship between the war and the state, and between war and the nation. Strachan (2011) argues that one of the central challenges facing international relations today is that we do not really know how to define war. According to him, one reason for this is that wars have become fuzzy at the edges; while war in its purist form rests on the overwhelming force to achieve victory, in practice, the aim of the state today is often to employ the minimum use of force and to keep that force in theatre based on consent – as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Colin Gray (2005) underlines that war is a relationship between belligerents, not necessarily states. Because the character of war changes according to its political, social and technological contexts, war in the twenty-first century cannot closely resemble its forerunners in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, Gray maintains that the

[10] While the nature of war constitutes the universal elements that distinguish it from all other activities, the basic notion of the character of war is that wars have their distinctive features and can potentially change following its political, social and technological contexts (Strachan, 2011, pp. 9-10).

nature of war remains unchanged: it is "organized violence threatened or waged for political purposes" (Gray, 2005, p. 30).[11] Although scholars disagree on whether the general nature of war itself has changed, as well as the character of war, they all highlight important characteristics of contemporary armed conflicts that differ from conventional war. This dissertation agrees with the argument that changes primarily concerns the character of war; yet, it borrows insights from both sides of the academic debate to extract what is new about contemporary conflicts. Broadly, scholars highlight five core characteristics for the contemporary battlefield: (a) interests in war, (b) geography, (c) actors in war, (d) modes of warfare and (e) the application of rules of war. Each will be addressed below with conventional war as the point of comparison to clarify changes.

First, scholars highlight a change in the interests in war. Compared to conventional war, there are few vital interests. For many parties, contemporary armed conflict is not about survival or a 'war of necessity'; instead there is a range of security and humanitarian interests involved. In this regard, Smith (2007) underlines that the worlds of security and defence have become closely intertwined, especially since the events of 11 September 2001. In contemporary conflicts, there is interest in promoting greater security through social improvement, where war is used as state building, and to educate for freedom. Many parties involved seek to create conditions in which humanitarian activity can take place, as well a conceptual space for diplomacy and economic incentives (Coker, 2007; Smith, 2007, p. 272). Of course, there are also interests, for example, in countering insurgency and terrorists, however, violent activity has been closely aligned with that of non-violent activity, such as reconstruction, development and governance. Mats Berdal (2007) finds that, although it has always existed, the uneasy coexistence of altruistic motives with interest-based and power-political considerations of intervening powers has become more acute and brought into sharper relief. One of Emile Simpson's (2012) central arguments is that armed force is increasingly used directly to seek political outcomes, whereas in war as traditionally conceived, armed force is used within a military domain to set military conditions for a political solution. Moreover, Simpson argues that outcomes of many contemporary conflicts are not exclusively defined against an enemy as in conventional war, but towards various audiences, of which civilians are central. Consequently, scholars emphasize that the population is no longer a secondary but a primary aim; it involves 'winning hearts and minds' of the people. The decisive combat occurs in and about the minds of civilians, not on the battlefield (Gray, 2007, p. 43; Smith, 2007). Accordingly, the ends for which

[11] Stathis Kalyvas (2001) offers a potent and different critique of the distinction between old and new by Kaldor and van Creveld, in which he argues that although civil wars differ from each other in several respects, the available evidence suggest that these differences tend to be less pronounced than usually argued. Moreover, he stresses that civil wars may not cluster themselves neatly and dichotomously around the end of the Cold War and that the aftermath has affected how civil wars are interpreted and coded by both participants and observers.

force is used have become more complex. This contrasts with conventional war, which involves vital interests of survival and territorial defence where the situation faced by the military is one of defence addressed to threats. In contemporary conflicts, interests have shifted towards a wider security concept.

The second feature is geography and can be seen in connection with the first feature, interests in war. Contemporary conflicts tend to take place in the weaker powers of the world (van Creveld, 1991, p. 212). Since most contemporary conflicts are about a broadened security concept and increasingly humanitarian in purpose, the armed conflicts Western states are engaged in are far removed from their own societies. In the case of Western states, we have the deployment of armed forces to fight abroad far away from national borders and established bases, something that is termed expeditionary warfare (Smith, 2007). Whereas conventional war usually takes place at proximity to own borders, Western states and their military are conducting these operations at great strategic distance. Consequently, there is a need for expeditionary-capable armed forces.

A third feature concerns the different actors in war. Whereas conventional war in general is combat between states and their regular armed forces, contemporary armed conflict involves a range of actors, both state and non-state. In fact, both sides are mostly non-state. On the contemporary battlefield, there is a multiplicity of fighting units, such as guerrillas, local warlords, police forces, mercenary groups and paramilitary groups, as well as regular, state-controlled armed forces (Kaldor, 1999; Smith, 2007; van Creveld, 1991). For the latter group, they often operate in some form of multinational groupings, such as 'coalition of the willing', or under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, we have civilian organizations on the battlefield such as humanitarian non-governmental organizations, international humanitarian organizations and international agencies providing aid, loans or other kinds of humanitarian assistance. As van Creveld points out, there is an intermingling where not only armed forces but also the political communities on whose behalf they operate are involved (van Creveld, 1991, p. 194). Furthermore, Simpson (2012) highlights that in contemporary armed conflict, you do not have two polarized sides, rather you have sides in contemporary conflict that are less distinct. Although conventional war involves several parties as well, they are typically separated and aligned as two sets of allies, e.g. the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance in World War I. Today's armed conflicts, in contrast, involve competition between many actors in a fragmented political environment. Accordingly, in contemporary conflict, we have a complex mix of actors, both state and non-state, military and civilian. This also means that the military is not necessarily the only or primary actor on the contemporary battlefield.

The fourth feature highlights how war is fought or modes of warfare. Conventional war typically involves regular warfare meaning combat between regular armed forces of states. In contemporary conflicts, the overall tendency is towards what can be termed irregular warfare. The basic notion in irregular warfare is that it is combat between armed forces of states and other non-state adversaries (Gray, 2007). As such, irregular warfare is a broad term, which can take a variety of forms and be practiced in different modes, even within the same conflict, such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and counterinsurgency. Although these terms all have their own character traits, they share the common feature of being combat between state and non-state actors.[12] Moreover, while it is possible to distinguish between regular and irregular warfare, contemporary conflicts often involve a mixture of both, in which there is a blurring of warfare categories. As Gray points out, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003, can all three be seen as cases of interstate conflict (Gray, 2005, p. 170). The distinction is also less clear in practice, as successful regulars will become more irregular, while successful irregulars will become more regular; the fighting itself causes opponents to become more like each other to exploit weaknesses as well as strengths (Gray, 2005, pp. 199-215; van Creveld, 1991, p. 174). An example of this is that regular forces, more specifically special operations forces (SOF), can wage war in an irregular unconventional way. In this regard, Gray underlines that if regulars are to do well in campaigns against irregulars, they must adapt at least some of the characteristics and modus operandi of the irregular foe (Gray, 2005, p. 215). Moreover, in the case of counterinsurgency, more expertise and a different kind of expertise is needed (Schadlow & Lacquement Jr, 2009). Consequently, as military tasks become more complicated, so the quality of personnel needed rises dramatically.

Furthermore, in irregular warfare, there are stark dissimilarities; the asymmetrical aspect is generally extreme compared to the recognisably symmetrical mode of combat in regular warfare, which is typical for conventional war. That said, there is always an element of asymmetry in war, also in regular warfare, as every state is distinctive with unique strengths and weaknesses. The difference here, however, is that in irregular warfare the degree of asymmetry is significantly higher (Gray, 2005, pp. 227-232). It is combat between the strong and technologically advanced state's armed forces against a weak and resource-challenged adversary. Therefore, the weaker opponent seeks to avoid open confrontation, unless it is of its own choosing. As such, military engagements can take place against enemies disguised as civilians because moving amongst the people is the guerrilla fighter's proven method of neutralizing the strength of his stronger opponent (Smith, 2007, p.

[12] Note that there are other definitions of irregular warfare, see e.g. Kalyvas and Balcells (2010).

280). Not least, due to the world of confrontation and conflict and the blurred lines between war and peace, political and military activities are constantly inter-mingled.

The technological dimension also affects the conduct of war. Although there is always a technological dimension to war, contemporary conflicts are characterized by the new information age of warfare. Based on information technology innovations, some military analysts have argued that a revolution in military affairs (RMA) is underway, by which dramatic developments in the field of military technology are leading to a radical change in warfare.[13] This notion gained further attention with the overwhelming American victory in the First Gulf War in 1991 (Kronvall, 2011). The information revolution has re-shaped war, for the most part exploited by technically advanced countries. With the rise of information technologies, scholars have highlighted that the regular armed forces will be an increasingly joint force as new technologies make the number of soldiers and platforms less important than networks and communications (Cohen, 2004; Dandeker, 2006). In contrast to independent military services operating separately, jointness involves an emphasis on unity and linking platforms and systems of individual services into a common network to maximise its effects (Kronvall, 2011, p. 261). Thus, the technological character creates conditions in which regular armed forces must operate joint to take advantage of developments in technology.

Finally, there is the application of rules of war. The Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) were codified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and address wounded and sick soldiers during war, prisoners of war, and the protection of non-combatants. Rules for what constitutes legitimate warfare were developed before World War Two, but were later codified and new rules were added because of the atrocities of that war (Freedman, 2017, pp. 29-31; ICRC, 2010).[14] The Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols are at the core of international humanitarian law and regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. However, it is difficult to distinguish and define wars in terms of international law when it concerns states fighting non-state actors (Smith, 2007, p. 386; Strachan, 2011). Moreover, it is harder to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants following irregular warfare. As Simpson points out, the relevant international law is constructed on the basis that it is possible to define specific 'military' targets: "Yet the idea that one can distinguish between 'military' and 'political' targets, when strategy uses force directly for political effect, is problematic" (Simpson, 2012, p. 235). While the rules of armed conflict are the same, it has been argued that they do not fit contemporary conflicts, as modern law on armed

[13] RMA can be understood as a process based on dramatic developments in the field of military technology. In terms of basic capabilities, RMA entails the possibility to strike with great accuracy, irrespective of range; the ability to penetrate defensive barriers by using stealth technology and unmanned warfare; and, a greater flow of information with the ability to move information quickly across a joint battle network (Adamsky, 2010; Kober, 2005).
[14] For example, before the Second World War, the rules were concerned only with combatants and not civilians.

conflict was not written to define and protect the rights of the irregular (Gray, 2005, p. 213). Thus, the application of the rules has become decidedly more complex.

In conclusion, conventional war involves regular armed forces waging war for vital interests of states, seeking victory through the decisive defeat of the enemies' forces on the battlefield. Battles are the decisive encounters, and the meaning of victory and defeat in a conventional war is relatively clear to most belligerents involved (Beckett, 2011; Gray, 2007, p. 46). Accordingly, war takes place within a military domain, where soldiers know how to win, and the generals understand the task they must set the troops to ensure the right military outcomes and the conditions necessary for a political solution. In contrast, for the contemporary battlefield, a central point in the academic literature on war is that the lines between war and peace are less clear, and war and policy are even more deeply intertwined. One reason for this unclarity is that the security threats to the Western democracies rarely come in the form of an invading army. What we have then is 'expeditionary war' waged at a distance for reasons, which immediately do not seem to concern the national interest. It has been argued that with no clear end of war, armed forces increasingly have to reject the appropriateness of classical definitions of military victory (Strachan, 2011). While military defeat of the enemy might be desirable, it is not essential. Rather, the political defeat of the belligerent is most important, in which the decisive combat occurs in and about the minds of civilians. In this regard, combat is not the only means of war, but it is used in conjunction with other means to achieve political results more directly (Simpson, 2012). Consequently, violence take place alongside other political activity.

Irrespective of whether we are talking about conventional war or contemporary armed conflicts, there are similar features. Fighting and combat is what distinguish war from other activities; what makes war unique is the fact that it is the most dangerous activity of all (Gray, 2005; van Creveld, 1991, p. 165). However, scholars also emphasize that war is not simply continuous fighting. As an analytical concept, war also involves periods of inaction or non-violence (Simpson, 2012; Strachan, 2011, p. 9). Action in war includes both violent and non-violent activity. To cite Carl von Clausewitz, "War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy" (Clausewitz, 1976 [1831], p. 87). A central point of departure, therefore, is that armed conflict assumes a degree of intensity, which can vary.

Based on the features that characterize contemporary armed conflict discussed above, we can conceptualize the contemporary battlefield with its underlying dynamics and causal mechanisms. The contemporary battlefield is here conceptualized as 'complex lethality'. This concept highlights the complexity of contemporary armed conflicts; the aims for which we use force is more complex, war is waged at a distance from own borders, there is a mix of state and non-state actors, irregular

warfare, and a complex application of rules of war. However, although political and military activities largely are blurred in contemporary conflicts, elements of war, as more traditionally defined, remain in place. War involves fighting, it is a brutal and dangerous business, and people are killed; it is lethal. Furthermore, because complex lethality can vary in its intensity, it provides conditions with causal importance that can both broaden as well as narrow military capability of influence.

Complex lethality can widen military capability of influence. What is distinctive about contemporary armed conflict is that the lines between political and military activity is less clear. Nonetheless, in the case of high intensity, the contemporary battlefield arguably resembles a 'war-like' situation with high-intensity combat operations. Consequently, there is more use of military means to reach military ends, involving the use of force in the military domain. The situation requires military technical expertise in the use of force and the military as the manager of violence, which can broaden military authority and influence. Accordingly, the authority to structure and conduct military operations is likely to be delegated to military commanders. Facing an irregular foe, the contemporary battlefield conditions a different doctrinal focus and strategy other than conventional war. It also requires more highly trained personnel and the linking of platforms and systems of individual services into a common network to maximise their effects. In turn, this may contribute to a professionalized, unified military.

Complex lethality can also narrow military capability of influence. With low intensity in the contemporary battlefield, there are few (if any) combat operations. Consequently, there is a conceptual space enabling a strongly integrated use of civilian and military means, as well as formulation of military objectives beyond warfare. Moreover, there is likely to be intensive political involvement in the conflict, as both political and military acts must be closely aligned. As such, low intensity provides conditions for politicians to micromanage the conflict. The application of a comprehensive approach has become increasingly central to Western states, of which the essence is to create a stable and secure environment through a strongly integrated use of civilian and military assets (Lindley-French, Cornish, & Rathmell, 2012; Ringsmose, 2011). Thus, the application of armed force takes place in a political domain, seeking directly political outcomes. The military, then, becomes a small wheel in a larger machinery as political and military activity is mixed, which in turn narrows military authority and influence.

In conclusion, high-intensity complex lethality conditions a broader military capability of influence. In contrast, with low-intensity complex lethality follows conditions that might narrow military capability of influence. However, in reality, there are other mechanisms that come into play and affect the outcome, which is the subject of the next section.

2.1.2 Contexts: Priority, Exposure and Partner

In light of a new security climate and the changing character of war, there has been an ongoing and wide-ranging transformation of Western armed forces during the past two decades. There is a transformation from deterrence to expeditionary warfare, from attrition to manoeuvre, and from a conscription-based military to professional forces (King, 2011). Scholarship on military innovation broadly concerns how and why military organizations change. As Stephen Rosen makes clear "Almost everything we know in theory about large bureaucracies suggests not only that they are hard to change, but that they are *designed not to change*" (Rosen, 1991, p. 2, original emphasis). The main puzzle driving these studies is that countries' military structures are large bureaucracies, conservative in nature and disinclined to undertake major changes; yet, change does happen. Thus, a central point in military innovation studies is that the military do change from time to time, however, because it is not naturally inclined to change, the various ways and the extent of change depends on contextual factors. Therefore, relevant for this thesis is the point that although the contemporary battlefield entails structural conditions that serve as a source of change, there are other mechanisms that need to be considered when analysing the wartime perspective. Much of the scholarly work on military change focus on innovation as a top-down process, in which senior leadership induces military change. The main scholarly debate concerns rival theoretical models of top-down (civilian or military led) innovation.[15] However, recent studies of contemporary cases emphasize the process of bottom-up adaptation, partly in response to the challenges of learning lessons from the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq (Griffin, 2016, p. 2). Military adaptation can be defined as "change to strategy, force generation, and/or military plans and operations, taking in response to operational challenges and campaign pressures" (Farrell, 2013, p. 2). Military adaptation thus occurs when experiences on the ground collide with the top-down, peacetime-derived strategy and doctrine. Accordingly, states and their armed forces are forced to adapt so as not to lose the war, and as such, it involves a bottom-up process. In turn, Farrell argues, when military adaptation "involves doctrinal or structural change, or the acquisition of a brand new technology, it crosses the threshold into innovation" (Farrell, 2010, p. 570). As such, adaptation in wartime can lead to innovation or major military change.

Drawing on military innovation studies, the argument presented here is how the conditions of the contemporary battlefield manifest in change at home depends on contextual factors. Accordingly, these factors can either reinforce or frustrate the effects of complex lethality. Moreover, they may shape how and to what extent states and their armed forces respond to these conditions and challenges. The literature broadly suggests three contextual factors: (i) priority following political-

[15] For an overview of the scholarship on military innovation, see Adam Grissom (2006) and Stuart Griffin (2016).

strategic considerations, (ii) the extent of exposure to operational challenges and (iii) military partners on the battlefield.

Priority

First, the effect of structural conditions of complex lethality are arguably shaped by political-strategic considerations within a state. Many scholars underline the importance of geopolitics and a changing threat to national security in shaping military change. Geopolitical factors and proximity to the threat affect the formulation of defence policy and the purpose of having armed forces. One line of argument is that military change occurs when changes in the international security environment drive civilians to intervene in military affairs and institute change (Posen, 1986). Another view is that key military leaders do not necessarily respond so much to civilian direction as to structural characteristics of the security environment, and that military organizations must and do innovate by choice (Avant, 1994; Nielsen, 2010; Rosen, 1991). Although the literature disagrees on the effectiveness of civilian intervention, or if it is even required in military innovation, a central finding is that leadership matters because someone needs to lead military change. Moreover, regardless of whether civilians or the military lead change, the general pattern is that political-strategic considerations provide parameters within which the armed forces operate based on interpretations of the international environment.

Other studies look more broadly at domestic politics and the domestic political situation in shaping military adaptation and innovation. The bottom line is that domestic politics are important in how states wage war. It has been argued that in cases of armed conflict that are not about survival, domestic politics are of greater significance (Farrell, Osinga, & Russell, 2013). This point reflects the trend that for Western states, contemporary armed conflicts seldom involve vital interests, but are waged for other security and humanitarian interests than territorial defence. In this regard, the degree of public support for the mission, financial pressures, and legal constraints may affect decisions concerning the use of force. In turn, this might affect decisions about the extent of involvement, how to get involved and the content of the contribution, where to send armed forces, and which tasks the military is to perform on the battlefield.

From these insights I have the concept of 'priority'. Applied to the contemporary battlefield, the political-strategic focus suggests that national priority, that is, the extent to which the participation is prioritized, is central in shaping the conditions of complex lethality. Presumably, states concerned with a threat in their vicinity will be less likely to prioritize an armed conflict far away from national borders. Conversely, if there is no immediate security threat, priority may be on international operations and broader security concerns. Drawing on this, I expect states and their armed forces that prioritize international tasks and are engaged extensively in expeditionary warfare to be more

receptive and exposed to structural conditions for change. Furthermore, I expect the military in states that prioritize national defence task and have less intensive participation to face less pressures to change.

Exposure

A second factor concerns to what extent deployed armed forces are exposed to operational challenges. For military adaptation in wartime, scholars consider operational challenges as an essential driver for change. In terms of operational challenges, Farrell, Rynning and Terriff argue that operations might affect innovation in three ways; first, it can enable the military to test and refine new doctrine, structures and technologies. Second, it might lead the military to identify significant shortfalls in its capabilities. Third, operational experience may help the military organization to understand the emerging or future character of war (Farrell, Rynning, & Terriff, 2013, p. 13). The proposition is that military organizations adapt following operational challenges and experiences indicating that their battlefield effectiveness is insufficient or inappropriate. This can follow from new enemy tactics, intense combat over a protracted period and/or great strategic distance (Farrell, 2013, p. 9). Furthermore, new operational challenges can also follow the arrival of new technologies on the battlefield or adaptive use of old technologies by adversaries (Farrell, 2010). This in turn generates requirements of new technological capabilities, which again demand large military expenditures. Most studies on military innovation emphasize the role of technological change. However, an important insight in this regard is that technology alone does not lead to major military changes, but necessitates new doctrinal thinking, organizational form and operational approach to take advantage of the possibilities brought by developments in information and communications technology.

The link between experiences and doctrinal changes has received increased attention due to the difficulties encountered by Western military organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the 1991 Gulf War focused military attention on the future of conventional war, military operations in the aftermath of 9/11 changed the dynamics, where Western military minds turned to the return of irregular warfare. Consequently, attention was also directed from conventional warfare towards counterinsurgency and stability operations (Farrell, Osinga, et al., 2013; Schadlow & Lacquement Jr, 2009). Considering the military's force structure, John Allen Williams observes that the focus on counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations in turn leads to a renewed emphasis on special operation forces and the doctrine supporting them (Williams, 2008, p. 203). Drawing on insights from operational challenges, I have the concept of 'exposure', where I expect the military exposed to intensive combat to be more receptive to military adaptation and innovation, especially if it perceives a need to improve its operational effectiveness. This could result in changes in force

structure and/or in military doctrine. Conversely, I expect armed forces less exposed to intensive combat to be more resistant to change, as they will not face the same operational challenges and thus less likely to induce changes in force structure and/or in military doctrine.

Partner

A third factor stresses that while military change can go through innovation and adaptation, change can also occur through military emulation. Emulation involves importing new tools and approaches to war through copying other military organizations (Farrell & Terriff, 2002, p. 6). Accordingly, we have the concept of 'partner', which concerns the military partner on the battlefield. This aspect is of particular importance to smaller powers, which usually do not have the means or resources to make great strides in military innovation or develop own military thinking and doctrines (Bjerga & Haaland, 2010). Moreover, major powers have access to larger resources and tend to take the political and military lead and are, as such, of greater importance. Terry Terriff underlines that although some military organizations consciously innovate and do create something new, it is far timelier and cost efficient to copy or model solutions by a successful organization to shared problems (Terriff, 2002, p. 6). Two motives have been suggested for emulation. One motive is if there is an uncertain relationship between means and ends. That is, when an organization faces uncertainty it might copy colleagues from abroad, which it perceives as successful and victorious. A second motive stems from professionalization and professional networks, where professional networks that span organizations provide the basis for the development of common norms and serve to facilitate the transfer of new models (Farrell & Terriff, 2010; Terriff, 2002). This also applies to the contemporary battlefield, where states usually operate in a multinational grouping and their military organizations interact with each other more closely, including sharing information and expertise to learn and develop together.

In terms of emulation, the current military transformation and the emphasis on information technology is strongly dominated by the US, and empirical studies show that this has had radical consequences for force compositions and military organizations in other Western countries (Farrell, Terriff, & Osinga, 2010; Østerud & Matlary, 2007). The events of 9/11 and its aftermath became a catalyst for Washington to press forward more forcefully the need for military change corresponding with changes in the geopolitical environment. Many European forces have faced particular pressures to transform and adapt to ensure interoperability with US forces (Norheim-Martinsen, 2015). For Washington's European allies, a great deal of pressure has been funnelled through NATO. Frans Osinga (2010) argues that this military alliance has been an obvious and important avenue of infusion of US military ideas and technology. For the contemporary battlefield, I expect countries that cooperate with major powers, such as the US, to face pressures

as well as opportunities through professional networks to adapt to the ideas and technology of their larger military partners. Related to this, I also assume NATO membership to increase pressure to reform for countries with less intensive participation in operations. Conversely, I expect countries that either have no particular military partner in the battlefield or have partnered with smaller powers, to face less pressure to adapt to new ideas and technology of their partners. The distinction between collaborating with a smaller versus a major power lies in that major powers usually have more resources and takes on greater responsibility in the military operation, which arguably leads to greater pressures for the partnering military to adapt.

2.1.3 The peacetime perspective meets the wartime reality: Implications

This section takes a step back to the broader peacetime and wartime perspectives. As argued in Chapter 1, there are pieces we must add to the puzzle. While civil-military relations theory sheds light on the dynamics in civil-military relations mostly from a peacetime perspective, we need additional factors from a wartime perspective to understand changes and the process as a whole. Overall, we have a process, in which Western states partake in the contemporary battlefield through expeditionary warfare. Within this process, there is a dynamic interplay of structural conditions of the contemporary battlefield (the concept of complex lethality), contextual factors that shape how states respond to structural conditions (the concepts of priority, exposure and partner), and the outcome in which changes manifest (the concept of military capability of influence). Although I do not predict pathways to outcomes, we need to examine these five concepts to understand the process of expeditionary warfare and what is happening in this dissertation's four case studies. In this section, I point out some implications we should look for in the analysis.

At this fulcrum of the peacetime and the wartime perspectives, complex lethality provides new conditions and challenges that may alter the civil-military balance of authority and influence. The question examined here is given these conditions and challenges, what is the impact on military capability of influence? In the context of high-intensity complex lethality, we can expect the use of military force in a military domain. This includes the military performing more traditional military tasks, a higher demand for military expertise, high-end capabilities, and professional soldiers, efforts for jointness and common networks, and increased military expenditures. In turn, this might affect force structure, doctrinal thinking, and changes in the military organization accordingly. More importantly, the implication is that the military capability of influence broadens as civilian decision-makers in a high-intensity context will rely on military expertise and therefore conditions broader authority and influence of the military actor, which will have a more important role in foreign policy. Overall, the high intensity of complex lethality will support an autonomous military actor and challenge a confined military actor.

The low intensity of complex lethality enables the use of military force in a political domain, where the military is not the primary actor on the battlefield. In such a scenario, we should be able to observe closer alignment of political, civilian and military means, with the military performing non-traditional military tasks. In turn, this could lead to a closer alignment of military and political spheres in civil-military relations and greater political involvement in military affairs. Moreover, there are likely to be less pressures to develop a professionalized military or a unified military organization, and a doctrine influenced by a comprehensive approach combining civilian and military means. Arguably, military expertise and rationale becomes less important and implies a narrower military capability of influence. Thus, low-intensity complex lethality will support a confined military actor, as political involvement in military affairs and tight civilian governance is likely to continue. For the same reasons, this context will challenge the autonomous military actor, as politicians are likely to become more involved and make use of military means in a political domain, in which the authority and influence of the military actor will be more confined.

The different implications outlined above will depend on contextual factors, which can frustrate or reinforce the effects of complex lethality. The concept of priority plays a role in how and to what extent the conditions affects domestic processes. A national priority on participating in international operations reinforces these effects, as there will be incentives to change the military organization to be suitable for the operational environment and the character of war. Conversely, with a priority on territorial defence, international operations are less important and will, as such, frustrate the effects of complex lethality. In terms of the concept of exposure, high exposure to operational challenges may reinforce the effects that broadens military capability of influence, as it will demand broader military authority, additional expenditures and a military focus. Conversely, low exposure can reinforce the effects of low-intensity complex lethality following the use of force in a political domain, which might narrow military capability of influence. Lastly, turning to the concept of partner, a significant partner can apply pressure for military change despite there being low intensity, but it can also be a model to emulate when the military actor encounters high intensity.

Because different cases can vary with the concepts of priority, exposure and partner, this affects how the conditions that flow from complex lethality may influence the outcome in the domestic civil-military balance. Although we have some expectations of how the concepts are connected, these mechanisms can reinforce or frustrate the manifestations of each other. Moreover, whether they will actually act or behave in this way is a different matter. Therefore, I do not develop an outline of the relationship between the concepts, as the extent they play a role will be different from case to case. How to apply such 'open-ended theory' is the subject of the next section.

2.2 Methodology and analytical framework

For the investigation into the potential link between expeditionary warfare and changes in civil-military relations patterns, the research strategy is neither positivist nor interpretivist, but follows the path of critical realism.[16] In terms of ontology, critical realism joins positivism in the assumption that the world exists independently of the mind and our knowledge-making practices. However, it departs from positivism by insisting that the external world exists in such a way that we only have access to parts of it (Fletcher, 2017; Jackson, 2011). Central to this latter point is a stratification of reality, which can be divided into the real, the actual, and the empirical (Bhaskar, 1975). Causal structures or causal mechanisms exist at the 'real level', where inherent properties in a structure act as causal powers to produce events. At the 'actual level' of reality, there is a pattern of events whether we experience or interpret them. These true occurrences are often different from what we observe at the 'empirical level', which constitutes the part of reality as we experience them. Just because we can only observe the tip of the iceberg (i.e. the empirical level) that does not mean that the unobservable two-thirds are not there or disconnected from what we see. Accordingly, critical realists do not restrict knowledge to those aspects of reality that can be more or less directly observed, experienced and measured. Instead, they argue that there are real but unobservable objects, namely structures and mechanisms that we cannot perceive, but that exercise important effects in that part of the world we can perceive (Jackson, 2011, p. 77). Thus, following a transfactual logic, critical realism holds out the possibility to go beyond empirical facts to grasp the deeper processes and factors that generate those facts, and that it is possible to generate knowledge of, in principle, unobservable objects.

Epistemologically, critical realism concerns conjecturing the existence of unobservable and undetectable structures with causal importance, which exist on the real level of reality. Because of the stratified reality, social structures cannot be reduced to their observable manifestations and are not just defined by the observable patterns of action that they cause on the empirical level. Rather, as Jackson underlines, they are "defined in terms of a range of possibilities that might or might not be observed, much as the capacity to engage in repressive action against dissenters cannot be equated with the actual repressing of dissent" (Jackson, 2011, p. 103). It is important to note that human agency is not deterministically reduced to social structure. The latter makes people act in certain ways, but it does not compel them to do so (Lewis, 2000). Thus, social structures are casually important in that they make a difference to the course of events by influencing the actions people

[16] Critical realism is a strand of what is generally called 'scientific realism' or 'realism'. It shares certain commitments in common with other strands of (scientific) realism but focuses specifically on elaborating those claims in the context of the study of the social world (Jackson, 2011, p. 76).

choose to undertake. Accordingly, the approach involves an analysis of mechanisms, contexts, and outcomes – investigating social conditions under which a causal power of a structure manifests in the world. Herein follows the sense that critical realism is 'critical', in that it requires a critique of and going beyond observable forms to the underlying social structures that generate them. The challenge is to explain social phenomena in terms of causal powers of particular social structures and their complex interactions in specific contexts (Elger, 2012). Because critical realism sees the world as an open system with many active mechanisms, in which causal powers of entities might or might not be empirically manifest in any given situation, prediction is impossible, and explanation is at best an account of what did happen. Therefore, explanation, and not prediction, becomes the object of scientific knowledge (Jackson, 2011, p. 120; Joseph & Wight, 2010, p. 11). As an alternative to the positivist focus on systematic cross-case variation, critical realism focuses on 'constitutive explanation' (Wendt, 1998). A cause is not a matter of relations between two events, separated and demarcated from each other (cause and effect). In a critical realist perspective, causes are about objects or relations and their nature. As Jackson notes, "critical realists prefer a 'causal story' that is 'holistic' rather than one that seeks to put forward any kind of 'ultimate cause'" (Jackson, 2011, p. 110). The focus is on accounting for complex causality of various causes in specific historical contexts (Kurki, 2008, p. 286). Therefore, following the critical realist path, I am not predicting interactions or patterns, or testing hypotheses, but I use concepts to understand the process and the explanatory mechanisms within it, which are context specific.

In a critical realist research strategy, theory plays a significant role for two important reasons. First, since the world is an open system with numerous active mechanisms, we rely on theorizing to outline which factors and mechanisms we should focus on in the collection of data. Second, because the empirical aspect is only a part of the real world in the eyes of critical realists, theory can help us get closer to reality by gaining knowledge of structures and causal mechanisms during events. Thus, theorizing is important for the analysis, as it works as an interpretive framework by which we analyse observations on the empirical level (Jackson, 2011, p. 110). As Danermark et al. underline, "The aim is not to classify reality from prearranged systems but rather to inform analyses, interpretations and explanations of the social reality (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002, p. 140). Accordingly, in developing an appropriate apparatus, I have defined concepts to make sense of and understand the process of expeditionary warfare and changes in civil-military relations. Drawing on civil-military relations theory, I have conceptualized the dynamics in the civil-military balance as military capability of influence. With insights from the academic literature on the changing character of war, I have defined the contemporary battlefield with its underlying mechanisms as complex lethality. Moreover, military innovation studies have provided insights to

three additional mechanisms that may shape effects: the concepts of priority, exposure and partner. Overall, these five concepts are heuristic devices to interpret and make sense of social life, which I specify further in section 2.2.2 below.

Having developed an appropriate apparatus for the analysis, the next step is an intensive empirical study of the combinations of factors and underlying mechanisms and how they together contribute to the specific outcome (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 146). In this endeavour, abductive inference is central in critical realism research. In the analysis, abductive inference is used to identify structures when analysing empirical data (Bergene, 2007, p. 15; Jackson, 2011, pp. 94-95). With the analytical apparatus of concepts as a starting point, abduction is a form of reasoning that works by generating plausible explanations from available data. In other words, it is to infer, on an ongoing basis, the existence of social structures from other, indirect evidence. Abduction differs from deduction in that the conclusion is not given in the premise. Rather, the conclusion provides new insights as an outcome of our interpretation or explanation of something with the help of the general theoretical framework that has been constructed outside the empirical investigation itself (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1994, pp. 41-46). Accordingly, abduction entails a dialectical movement between empirical data and theory in seeking to explain an empirical event. Another inference important in a critical realist analysis is retroduction, which closely resembles abduction but with a slight difference. When it comes to concrete research, the border between abductive and retroductive inference is not very distinct (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 146). Retroduction infers by asking 'what made this possible'. It is a dialectical research process enabled by both empirical observation and the complementary procedure of transcendental argument. Through retroduction, then, my aim is to describe and explain the social structure inherent in civil-military relations, outlining the essential characteristics of the structure.

For the empirical investigation of the causal complex, I conduct a qualitative comparative case study. To identify unobservable structures, several critical realist researchers have identified the case study method as a fruitful approach to explore the interaction of structure, events, actions and context (Bergene, 2007; Easton, 2010; Wynn Jr & Williams, 2012). By enquiring into the causes of specific events, we are targeting the how and why questions associated with explanatory case research (Yin, 2014, p. 10). From a critical realist perspective, the aim with case studies is to shed light on common abstract processes that, at first sight, might not appear to be empirically similar. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2014, p. 16). Moreover, the concern is to set specific social processes in context, both within and surrounding the case. Critical realism seeks to circumscribe the possible

effects of a factor by investigating the complex and case specific ways factors combine to produce specific outcomes. The comparison of cases, then, enables the analysis to elucidate the variety of ways the causal complex, that is of interest, plays out in practice. In contrast to positivism, critical realists compare, not to isolate but to individuate (Jackson, 2011, p. 111). The purpose is to utilize the detailed causal explanations of the mechanisms at work in a given setting to obtain insights into how and why a similar mechanism could lead to different or perhaps similar outcomes in a different setting. This in turn can help to clarify the extent of the real-world potential of the causal mechanisms. Thus, while all concepts play a role in the selected cases, the extent and level they do so will be different in each case. By applying a methodological approach consistent with critical realism, case comparison provides an empirical foundation for retroduction, to sort out contingent differences to arrive at the common and more universal (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 205). In conclusion, an important strength in case studies is that they are well suited for exploring the many aspects of complex causality.

A significant challenge for such research is that the world is an 'open system', in which it is not a trivial exercise to go from observations of what did happen to the identification of important causal powers behind observed outcomes. Reality entails numerous generative mechanisms and structures that can affect each other and lead to events, which we might observe at the empirical level. Herein lies the recognition that no theory can give an exhaustive explanation when researching complex social processes and phenomena. Moreover, one study cannot address the whole complexity of reality, necessitating a confinement of studying certain components but not others (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 110). While there are several actors in play when it comes to civil-military relations, for instance national parliaments, media, public opinion, military intelligence services, as well as the different branches of the armed forces, I focus on two levels, namely the political leadership and the military executive. While the choice of the elite level leads me to exclude potentially important actors, it is impossible to capture the entirety of civil-military relations in one dissertation. I have chosen to focus on government-military relations, as it is the arena in which the relationship is practiced on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, although defence transformation and changes in the civil-military balance are subject to domestic factors and political intent, I argue that war entails a fundamental causal power that is not present in peacetime. The research task is undoubtedly complex. Changes in civil-military relations are multifaceted with many nuances and sources of change. Yet, while I acknowledge the importance of factors, such as a strained budgetary environment, the trend towards new public management and district politics, the focus is on examining fundamental aspects of war that may alter the dynamics of civil-military relations.

The analysis covers the timeline between 2001 and 2014. The choice of 2001 as a starting point follows the argument that while the end of the Cold War was a watershed along with other implications for the transformation of many states' armed forces, the era of expeditionary warfare began or evolved significantly after 2001. During the Cold War it was a structural system of state against state and where we knew the rules. Now, there is a new cycle dominated by global terrorism, hybrid threats and more often state against non-state. Although I do not imply that there is a new system, the international community is facing a changed security environment. In this timeline, I have chosen to investigate expeditionary warfare in Afghanistan, as it is the most intense and long-lasting conflict in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. The long engagement in Afghanistan, which proved to be both complex and lethal, appears to be an important factor in several respects. Moreover, by studying a critical situation we can learn more about underlying dynamics, as it puts civil-military relations in sharper relief, conditions are challenged, and structures and mechanisms are more clearly apparent (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 104). Therefore, Afghanistan is used to capture the potential influence and consequences of expeditionary warfare in the context of the civil-military balance of authority and influence. The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is important and allows for a more direct comparison of the Nordic countries because they have all participated in this mission between 2002 and 2014. Moreover, considering that military organizations are conservative and military change takes time, the timeline explored in this thesis allows for an analysis of continuity and change. There is a deliberate ending of the thesis in 2014. Although Western states still have military personnel in Afghanistan, they significantly reduced their military contribution by this year. The specific timeline ends at the time when the four case studies concluded their involvement in ISAF, as this NATO-led mission ended. Although I have selected a timeline, it is a moving target due to on-going processes, which also makes it difficult to examine. The year 2014 makes an end point of the thesis but not the conflict or further developments in the international threat landscape, where this dissertation looks at a piece of the larger picture.

2.2.1 Case selection

As discussed above, critical realists use case comparison to clarify the variety of ways causal factors and the complexes into which they are arranged play out in practice. For this purpose, case selection broadly follows two criteria. First, case selection is not primarily based on differences in outcome, but the researcher selects cases consciously based on a belief that they display the operation of the structures and mechanisms delineated by the chosen theoretical framework (Bergene, 2007, p. 22; Danermark et al., 2002, p. 205). Because a given causal complex in a critical realist perspective is only sufficient and not necessary for producing the outcome in question, comparing cases in which

a complex occurs with cases in which it does not is unlikely to yield many useful insights (Jackson, 2011, p. 110). Second, the chosen cases should be contrasted with other aspects, which vary in theoretically interesting properties, to obtain insights into how and why similar mechanisms can lead to different or similar outcomes in different contexts.

The cases chosen for this study are Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway.[17] The interest in the Nordic countries is based on the face that these are small, mature democracies, which have become more active in the use of military force abroad. Empirically, these four cases are interesting as one usually thinks of them as being in a civil-military bliss, considering that their military establishments are part of a broad popular mediation between civil society and the state. They are all dependent on international institutions and greater powers, and share similarities of culture, climate, religion and demography. Importantly, these four small democracies all have a military organization and thus civil-military relations. Considering the focus in civil-military relations literature on the case study of US (the only remaining superpower) or countries experiencing military coups, the analysis of small, established democracies brings further insights to this topic. Another important common denominator is that all the cases have been in Afghanistan as part of the UN-mandated ISAF mission in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, leading to a selection that reflects the existence of events, which are representative of the phenomena I am aiming to explain.

Theoretically, there are striking differences between the cases in defence postures, as well as variations in security policy outlook and geostrategic positions. Two of them are militarily unaligned (Finland, Sweden) and the other two are founding members of NATO (Denmark, Norway). [18] Moreover, all four countries have gone through military reforms the last decades, although to different degrees and with varying content and presumably for different reasons. Last, but not least, there is variation in the Nordic countries when it comes to the extent of their involvement in expeditionary missions after 11 September 2001. As such, the Nordic countries provide a scale of engagement, in which Finland has been the most cautious of the four, while Denmark comes out as the most active. With differences on dimensions central for the analysis, the comparative study of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden brings forth the possibility to enhance our general knowledge on important aspects concerning the potential impact of expeditionary warfare on domestic civil-military relations. Table 2.1 below provides a general comparison of the four case studies:

[17] Although Iceland is a Nordic country and a member of NATO, I have omitted Iceland from the study because it does not have armed forces and thus no civil-military relations.

[18] There are also differences between the Nordic countries in terms of the EU, where Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members, although Denmark has an opt-out from EU defence cooperation. Norway is not an EU member, however, cooperates closely with the EU on defence issues, for example through participation in EU's Battle Groups.

	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden
Territory	43,094 km^2	338,145 km^2	323,802 km^2	450,295 km^2
Population	5 593 785	5 498 211	5 265 158	9 880 604
Government system	Constitutional monarchy	Presidential republic	Constitutional monarchy	Constitutional monarchy
GDP	$291bn	$207bn	$398bn	$484bn
Military expenditure	$3.45bn (1.18 % of GDP)	$2.99bn (1.44 % of GDP)	$5.51bn (1.38 % of GDP)	$5.26bn (1.09 % of GDP)
Active troops (reserves)	17,200 (53,500)	22,200 (354,000)	23,550 (45,940)	29,750 (-)
Security affiliation	Aligned	Unaligned (NATO partner)	Aligned	Unaligned (NATO partner)

Table 2.1 *The Nordic countries in comparison*[19]

Having chosen the cases, the next step is to collect data on each case with a view to comparing, and subsequently, explaining the similarities and differences identified. However, to identify structures and generative mechanisms, it is arguably necessary to supplement this external analysis with an internal analysis of each case, employing the same theoretical framework to all four cases, and thereby undertaking a theoretical comparison. By so doing, it is possible to see to what extent context and contingent factors mediated the operation of causal mechanisms in each case. The aim is to compare several interaction situations to discern the structure all the cases have in common. From a critical realist perspective, theory is not associated with generality in the sense of repeated series of events but with determining the nature of things and structures and uncover characteristics that are necessary for them being those kind of objects (Danermark et al., 2002, pp. 120, 205). Accordingly, generalization is arrived at by means of retroductive inference, moving from the concrete to the abstract.

2.2.2 Concept specification

Having delineated the broader analytical framework for the analysis, this section takes the central concepts developed in Chapter 1 and the first part of this chapter a step further. Because the theoretically developed concepts provide guidelines for data collection and outlines a framework for the empirical analysis, we need to specify the concepts. With a starting point in critical realism, we have specific expectations of the conceptualization and specification, in which the concepts define, distinguish and discern certain properties. Accordingly, the conceptualization should strive to discern those properties that are decisive for social activities, relationships and institutions to be

[19] Population size, economy, military expenditure and military manpower are taken from IISS The Military Balance 2016 (IISS, 2016). The percentages are mine and may vary from public records. Territory represents the most up to date figures available from The World Factbook (CIA, n.d.).

what they are and not something completely different (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 122). Since abstract concepts are isolations of aspects of concrete phenomena, they are not about dividing events into categorical boxes. Therefore, I do not use the abstract concepts to classify or predict concrete observations. Rather, they are tools to shed light on what we observe.

2.2.2.1 Military capability of influence

In the conceptualization of the dynamics of civilian control of the military, the overarching concept developed in Chapter 1 is 'military capability of influence'. Considering that civil-military relations are complex and full of variations, I have differentiated the overarching concept into two extreme points, namely 'the autonomous military actor' and 'the confined military actor'. The autonomous military actor has certain characteristics along four dimensions: (1) detached from its civilian counterpart, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), (2) unified, in the sense that the organization is centralized and under one strong command, (3) has a broad scope in terms of military doctrine, with little civilian interference; (4) is made up by professional soldiers. On the other end of the spectrum is the confined military actor, which has the following characteristics: (1) embedded in the civilian MoD (note that here the chief of defence is weak, not able to take advantage of the concentrated power in his hands); (2) is divided and decentralized; (3) is exposed to civilian involvement in military doctrine formulation; and, (4) is mainly based on conscripted personnel. Based on the four isolated dimensions, I have developed the following model:



Figure 2.1 *Model of military capability of influence*

As Figure 2.1 shows, the outcome is on a spectrum between the autonomous and the confined military actor. The aim of using the differentiated concept is to interpret the data when analysing the trajectory of the four case studies. By exploring the four dimensions as a whole, this can help shed light on the nature of the relationship between the civilian master and military servants in the four countries respectively.

I have four dimensions, which I use to interpret and analyse the empirical data: (a) level of military authority, (b) unity of military authority, (c) scope of military authority and (d) military professionalization. While formal authority is of the essence of the concepts, the dimensions will include and integrate elements of informal influence. Although I use the isolated dimensions to guide the collection of empirical data and structure the evidence, the analysis will also include interpretive content, drawn from the qualitative study of documents and interviews with key actors in the four case studies. For each dimension, I develop a model based on two qualitative types of

outcome (indicating broad and narrow military capability of influence) along a capability spectrum. This reveals the scope of the dimensions. In the specification, it is important that all four dimensions touch upon the civil-military interface. Moreover, they need to be analytically distinct and at the same time complementary so that, combined, they can bring forth possible nuances. By being flexible and susceptible to nuances, they can guide the analysis and interpretation of the empirical data, rather than being tied in a straitjacket. Finally, the dimensions must be of a general nature to strengthen the standardization of the internal analysis and to facilitate an external cross-case comparison. Below, I discuss the four dimensions in more detail.

Level of military authority

The level of military authority provides an institutional perspective for the analysis, which focuses on the position of the military in the hierarchy of governmental authority. As Huntington argues, the higher level the military occupies, the more influence it is likely to have. For the institutional perspective, my focus is on the chief of defence (CHOD) as the head of military authority and charged with implementing policy and with operational responsibility for the armed forces. By assessing the formal position of the CHOD in the governmental structure, this aspect gives an indication of the institutional capacity to influence. More specifically, this involves the question of whether the CHOD is integrated into or detached from the MoD. If the military leadership is detached from its political master, it increases military autonomy and the ability to articulate its own interests. If the CHOD is drawn into the MoD, however, this indicates less military autonomy. Integrating the military leadership increases the chance of political interference in military affairs as well as political micro-management. Conceptually, this dimension captures the sense of autonomy and influence of the military from an institutional perspective.

It is important to note for the level of military authority, however, that there is a question of access and autonomy. Integrated into the MoD, the military leadership arguably has closer access to political processes and thereby an opportunity to influence policy. Considering that the position of the CHOD entails a strong concentration of power in one post, politicians can end up with a chief of defence, who makes use of his position to increase military influence. Here the aspect of informal influence enters the equation. If there is an instance of a strong CHOD, he can take advantage of a closer position in the MoD to influence politics. A weak CHOD, on the other hand, will be easier to control and it will narrow the military capability of influence. In evaluating the strength of the CHOD, Huntington's informal influences of economic and humanitarian resources subjected to the authority of the military can shed light on this issue by examining the size and expertise of the staff of the top civilian leader versus those of the chief of defence. A larger staff size would signify a greater planning capacity, through which the CHOD can exercise significant influence at the

MoD. Moreover, interviews with key actors on their perception of the balance between political authorities and the CHOD are important to consider, as they can provide insights into the day-to-day relationship.



Figure 2.2 *Level of military authority*

In Figure 2.2, if the military leadership with the position of the CHOD is detached from its political masters, it broadens the military capability of influence, allowing him to define military interests without the risk of interference of other actors, and thus limits political micro-management. At the other end of the spectrum, where the CHOD is integrated into the MoD, there is a narrow military capability of influence, as the possibility to formulate military interests is limited. However, because the CHOD entails a strong concentration of power in one post, the abovementioned informal influences are important to consider.

Unity of military authority

The unity of military authority provides an organizational perspective for the analysis. As previously noted, Huntington argues that a structurally unified group possesses great advantages in dealing with a structurally disunited group. Accordingly, the analysis of the unity in military authority includes an investigation into whether the military is a structurally unified group in relation to the MoD and executive power. More specifically, this dimension looks at the internal power relations within the military organization with a focus on the central level. These power relations can shift, either with authority being delegated outwards in the organization or accumulated at the top military level. When unified, the military can act more strategically towards the political level. Moreover, the unity in military authority intertwines with issues of centralization and decentralization. As Avant stresses, a centralized staff leads to a greater ability to pursue its own interests in the political arena, a weakening of competition within the military as the office of the chief of defence is strengthened vis-à-vis the armed services and civilian policy-makers have fewer sources from which they receive military advice (Avant, 1994). A unified military actor can increase the information asymmetry in civil-military relations as the military advice becomes monopolized. If there is a case of decentralization, including multiple locations, or even a transfer of responsibilities from the military to civilian authorities, this will narrow the military capability of influence. As such, a united military is an actor that is autonomous in terms of its ability to pursue own interests. A divided military, on the other hand, depicts a fractious organization.



Figure 2.3 *Unity of military authority*

A unified military actor, as outlined in Figure 2.3, signifies broader military capability of influence as power is centralized and the military is thus able to act more strategically in the pursuit of its own interests at the political level. Similarly, a structurally divided military indicates narrower military capability of influence as power is dispersed and there is a stronger competition within the military organization, making it easier for civilians to curb military capability of influence.

Scope of military authority

In Huntington's theory, the scope of military authority refers to the responsibility of the military over which the politicians have authorized it to exercise power. Huntington is rather broad on this point, and if this study were to examine every task over which the military has the authority to exercise power, it would be unmanageably complex. Therefore, I operationalize this dimension to provide a functional perspective of military capability of influence. The function in this regard is the character of war and the issue of interest is military doctrine.[20] Doctrine at the strategic level finds itself at the interface between political objectives (ends) and operational capabilities (means) and is built on an appreciation of the nature of war itself (Strachan, 2006). As Desch (1999) argues, military doctrine is potentially important as it determines which military resources will be employed, how they will be used, and where.

There are, however, some caveats to be employed when looking at doctrines. Not all military organizations have a doctrinal tradition, as well as doctrine can have a different meaning, function, and relative importance. Nevertheless, this does not indicate that one should not consider military doctrine, but that it is done with caution. Naturally, the military will always have a broad scope when it comes to military doctrine. However, as studies on the changing character of war make clear, the military is likely to be among several actors on the battlefield as the line between political and military activities is blurred. Politicians may be more inclined to get involved in the development of military doctrines.

In the investigation of this dimension, I am focusing on the strategic surface of contact to the political. For the functional perspective, two aspects are central to investigate. First, whether the country is preparing for war and territorial defence (or if the military doctrine points towards crisis

[20] Doctrine can be found on different levels: strategic, operative and tactical level (see Høiback, 2011). For the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on doctrines at the strategic level.

management). What is the purpose of the military, and which functions will the military perform on the battlefield? Second, the extent of involvement of civilians in the doctrine development process. Do civilian decision-makers accept or challenge doctrine development within the armed forces? Accordingly, I am examining the extent of civilian interference in the doctrine development process, as such intervention will challenge military authority and their influence. The more civilians are involved, the narrower the military scope. A broad military scope captures the idea of a war-preparing country, in which the formulation of military doctrine is left to the military professionals. A narrow military scope involves a broader security focus, which invites civilian involvement in military affairs and the use of military force in a political domain.



Figure 2.4 *Scope of military authority*

In Figure 2.4, if the military has a broad scope when it comes to military doctrine with little political interference, and the perception is that the military is the key actor in the process this indicates broader military capability of influence. However, if the military has a narrow scope and civilian interference curbs military authority with the perception that the military is a smaller wheel in a larger machinery, this indicates narrow military capability of influence.

Military professionalization

The dimension of military professionalization provides a sociological perspective for the analysis, examining the character of military service. Departing from Huntington's ideal-political concept of military professionalism, I move to the macro-level with a dynamic understanding of military professionalization. As Janowitz (1960) argues, the concept itself needs to be broadened due to new missions, roles and demands for quality and different expertise. Furthermore, the type of recruitment system matters because of its impact on the way the military is integrated into society. A professionalized all-volunteer military becomes a more distinct group within society. In addition, the fewer that serve as conscripts, the fewer politicians there are who have served in the military, which arguably widens the gap between military and civilian spheres and lessen the understanding of the military organization in political circles. Conversely, a military based on conscription increases social integration of the military organization into society.

For this dimension, the central question is, who serves in the military. Professional soldiers have both different cultures and perspectives than the civil society because they are geared for war and are employed on a permanent or contractual basis. Conversely, conscripts are only temporarily in the military organization before going back to civilian life. Accordingly, a professional forces-based

military carries the idea that the military is a distinct group from other parts of society. A military based on conscription captures a military closely embedded in society.



Figure 2.5 *Military professionalization*

A military actor with a majority of professional soldiers, as show in Figure 2.5, indicates broad military capability of influence as the military becomes a more distinct group from civil society. It also strengthens the military's position as an expert. A military more broadly based on conscripted personnel points to a narrow military capability of influence as the military is more exposed to civilian influences and the perception that the military largely is integrated into society.

2.2.2.2 Complex lethality, priority, exposure and partner

In the first part of this chapter, I discussed the wartime perspective and constructed relevant concepts for the analysis. I defined the structural conditions of the contemporary battlefield as complex lethality, and the contextual factors as concepts of priority, partner, and exposure. Accordingly, this section operationalizes these concepts and puts forth essential aspects the analysis will investigate. As with military capability of influence, the qualitative inquiry includes a document study and interviews with key actors, as well as drawing on existing scholarly research.

Complex lethality is more fundamental and causal for all cases. In the analysis of complex lethality, I will explore dynamics in the actors' interests in the war, who the actors are, modes of warfare and issues related to the Law of Armed Conflict. As previously discussed, complex lethality can vary in its intensity. Accordingly, the analysis investigates variation in intensity along a spectrum from low to high. The exploration of this variation makes use of a qualitative assessment of the situation as well as indicators of violence based on quantitative data. Central indicators are duration, numbers of persons and types of forces participating in the fighting, type of military equipment, and the number of casualties. However, it is important to be aware that these quantitative data are not necessarily objective information about intensity. This is illustrated by the late-twentieth-century attempts to compile casualty databases, which face difficulties in defining what counts as a 'death' or 'injury' attributable to the war. While such sources of information are valuable for discussing war, they can also be flawed and biased. Lawrence Freedman reminds us that methodology in these situations is tricky, based on the understanding that there is no one right way to collect and interpret the data (Freedman, 2017, pp. 124-133). Therefore, it is necessary to include a qualitative assessment, in which quantitative data will be treated as suggestions. In a high-intensity context, complex lethality is likely to incline civilian leaders to leave decisions and actions to the military

professional, which promotes the use of military force in a military domain. In a low-intensity setting, complex lethality inclines civilian leaders to get more involved in military actions and enables the use of military force in a political domain.

The concepts of priority, exposure, and partner are contextual, as there are likely to be variations in each case. For the concept of priority, I will investigate the national core mission and the prioritized security tasks. How important is the mission from a national perspective? Is the national priority focused on non-territorial threats and a wider security agenda that dominate the strategic analysis, or on territorial military threats? This can be established by looking at the defence and security policies, including the tasks of the armed forces and the use of armed force, and relative numbers deployed. Moreover, an important question is how national authorities conceptualize the mission, as it arguably matters how the state in question approaches the operation, whether these are stability operations and reconstruction, or kinetic and offensive operations. As argued, I expect states that prioritize international tasks and are engaged extensively in Afghanistan to be more receptive to structural conditions for change. Conversely, I expect states' military organizations that prioritize national defence tasks and have less intensive participation to face less pressure to change.

How challenging is the mission? To investigate the concept of exposure, the analysis makes a qualitative assessment of the operational challenges faced by the cases, the types of forces deployed and military equipment, as well as looking into number of soldiers killed in the conflict. For this concept, it will also be informative to include where in Afghanistan the armed forces in question are deployed and stationed, as some Afghan provinces have been (and are) more dangerous than others. The interpretation of exposure includes the perception of actors of the situation on the ground and how events are perceived back home. As stated above, the expectation is that armed forces exposed to intensive combat and operational challenges to be more receptive to military adaptation and innovation, while armed forces that do not face the same intensity will have fewer incentives to adapt to the structural conditions.

Finally, the concept of partner reflects the constricted institutional capacity of smaller states to develop own military concepts and doctrines, which can lead them to emulate other military organizations – either because of pressure from partner for interoperability or from the opportunity to learn through professional networks. How dependent on partners is the mission? The analysis entails an investigation into the aspect of military partnership and whether the state's armed forces are working primarily alone or operating in an integrated way with another state's military. Moreover, as argued above, it matters whether that military partner is a minor or a major power.

The expectation for this factor is that countries operating with major powers are more likely to face pressures as well as opportunities to adapt to the partner's ideas and technology.

2.2.3 Sources

This dissertation makes use of multiple sources of evidence. The broad range of sources include primary and secondary documentation, supplemented with interview material. The study of documents addresses a variety of documents, such as governmental documents, official reports, administrative documents, minutes of parliamentary meetings, and newspaper articles. For this purpose, I have used data triangulation, which involves whether multiple sources of evidence provide information of the same phenomenon. As such, it helps in strengthening the construct validity of the case study in the development of convergent evidence (Yin, 2014, p. 119). I have completed all the translations from Danish, Norwegian and Swedish to English. While I do not speak or read Finnish, Swedish is an official language in Finland and official government documents are published in both languages. Nevertheless, many parliamentary debates and non-government documents are not translated from Finnish. Another challenge with the Finnish case is that there has been limited research conducted on the Finnish Defence Forces after the Cold War in the English or Swedish languages, especially on civil-military relations. Interviews have therefore been important. Moreover, for the Afghanistan engagement, I gained access to declassified Swedish military end-of-tour reports. Since Finnish and Swedish troops cooperated closely in Afghanistan, I have been able to deduce information that is relevant also for the Finnish military engagement.

For the analysis of the character of war in Afghanistan, I made use of the extensive scholarly research that has been done on the Afghanistan war post-9/11. To evaluate the intensity of the armed conflict in Afghanistan, I needed data on indicators of violence. This was retrieved from reports and documentation published by the UN, ISAF/NATO and the US. As previously noted, such data must be treated with caution. Accordingly, an additional qualitative assessment of intensity was crucial, where scholarly research served this purpose. For the contextual concepts of priority, exposure and partner, I required information on each case. Here relevant information concerned the national core mission of the armed forces, which I retrieved from official government documents. Moreover, I gathered information on the military units the four countries deployed to Afghanistan, to what extent the military cooperated with other states' military structures, including where the armed forces were stationed in Afghanistan. Finally, I gathered information on the national approach to the engagement in Afghanistan. In this regard, information was acquired from specific national reports on Afghanistan, annual military reports and parliamentary reports (White Papers) from each country, which address that country's

participation in Afghanistan. There is also a growing number of biographies, novels by soldiers, journalists, and officials, who have written about the operations in Afghanistan, which have provided additional sources of information.

For the inquiry into military capability of influence, I collected information on the domestic institutional structure, how the peacetime military organization is organized, military doctrine, as well as information concerning the recruitment system. Primary sources central for investigating these aspects consist mainly of official documents and reports produced in the long-term defence planning process of each country. Long-term defence planning is a sequential and formalized process, in which expert contributions and political directions leads to decisions about the development and tasks of the armed forces and how it will be accommodated. Moreover, the process of long-term defence planning finds itself in the intersection between the political and military sphere. Here, white papers, propositions, defence budgets, statements made by the national governments in general, and ministries of defence in particular, as well as annual reports, strategic military doctrines and other key documents and statistics issued by the military defence establishments have been central. In addition, parliamentary proceedings, parliamentary reports by standing committees on foreign affairs and defence, and reports by expert committees provided additional information and context.

An important limitation of the abovementioned primary sources is that they are mainly political documents in which the role and position of the military might be difficult to detect. Nonetheless, the Nordic armed forces are publishing annual military reports and budget proposals. In addition, in Norway and Sweden, for example, the political elites ask the chief of defence to provide expert advice for defence development, which are publicly available. Moreover, dealing with security and defence policy limits the access to primary sources since a great deal of the information remains classified for national security reasons. In addition, the analysis is of recent (and on-going) developments, which makes it even more difficult to gain access to primary sources. Information from qualitative interviews was therefore important as to strengthen the analysis and acquire further insight into the issues of interest.

The interviews conducted for this thesis have been shorter case study interviews and semi-structured, each lasting approximately one hour. The interview guide consists of general questions asked of all interviewees, both military and civilian, in all four countries. It was important that the questions followed the analytical framework with neutral wording. Words that would 'trigger' unwanted associations, such as doctrine, was deliberately avoided. I have conducted interviews with key official persons from the four countries. The aim of the qualitative interviews was to verify the findings from the empirical analysis of changes in civil-military relations based on written

primary and secondary sources. Considering the long period, some interviewees had to remember processes and events that goes back over a decade in time, which can be a challenge. Therefore, I have, so far as possible, controlled information from interviewees against other available sources. Moreover, I have primarily used the information to illuminate the various topics of interest.

The interviewees were current and former high-ranking military officers, politicians and senior government officials in the Ministries of Defence in all countries. In my approach to the interviewees, I also made efforts to interview approximately the same positions in all four countries, which was largely successful. If someone was unavailable or did not respond to the request, I contacted the next person on my list of key interviewees. For each country, I have interviewed 3-4 actors from the military leadership and 3-4 actors from the political leadership and civilian MoD bureaucracy. In total, I have conducted 39 interviews. The participants are anonymized in the dissertation, and in the case of citation, they are referred to based on the position of the participant (e.g. top-level civil servant or top-level officer).[21]

It is essential to remember that documents are always written in a specific context and for some purpose and target audience other than those of the conducted case study. An important aspect of document analysis is that the researcher must assess the sources relative to the context in which they are formulated (Thagaard, 2009, p. 63). By being aware of this and trying to identify the objectives of the documents, it is less likely for the researcher to be misled by documentary evidence and more likely to be critical in interpreting the contents (Yin, 2014, p. 108). In addition, secondary sources were essential for assessing the context, including background material, newspaper articles, relevant books and journal articles. To retrieve relevant newspaper articles, I made use of *Atekst (Retriever)*, which is a database providing access to Danish, Finnish-Swedish, Norwegian and Swedish newspapers. The database includes historical and contemporary newspaper material. Because *Atekst* includes few Danish newspapers, I have in addition used the database *Infomedia*, which provides electronic access to articles and archives of most Danish newspapers. Moreover, I have used existing research to supplement the primary sources and to provide additional perspectives.

2.3 Summary

This chapter began by outlining the wartime perspective, arguing that the analysis requires additional pieces of the puzzle to understand the process. The contemporary battlefield was conceptualized as complex lethality, while contextual factors on a state level include national

[21] The Data Protection Official for Research at the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) has given its approval of the study.

priority, exposure to operational challenges, and the military partner on the battlefield. The argument presented here is that structural conditions alone cannot account for the scope, pace and extent of change; there are other mechanisms in play, which might reinforce or frustrate the effects of war. In the second part, the chapter has discussed the methods used in this thesis and developed the analytical framework based on critical realism. To analyse and interpret causal connections of expeditionary warfare and the civil-military balance is a complex research task. The five concepts outlined form the basis of the analytical framework, which outlines expected causal mechanisms in the process of expeditionary warfare and implications we should look for in the empirical analysis. The approach to address the main research question is twofold. In the first step, I examine the patterns of change in the civil-military balance in the case studies. More specifically, I aim to investigate *how* it has changed over time, asking whether the military actor has a broader or a narrower capability of influence (Chapter 3). In the second step, I analyse to what extent expeditionary warfare has influenced changes (Chapter 4 and 5). In conclusion, I am exploring concepts to make sense of the causal story. In this picture, expeditionary warfare is a process, in which states have gone into the contemporary battlefield. Invariably, war throws up challenges that require states and their military organization to adapt, which may shape the civil-military balance at home. However, to understand the ways states respond to these external conditions, one must investigate how they are translated through state-level factors.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSING THE PATTERN OF CHANGE: POST-9/11 NORDIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

This chapter analyses continuity and change in the pattern of civil-military relations in the Nordic countries. The aim is to analyse the *how* question of the thesis. How has the civil-military balance of authority and influence in the Nordic countries changed between 2001 and 2014? Although the geostrategic positions of the four countries have not changed (see map 3.1), the events of 9/11 changed the perceptions of the security environment. The post-9/11 world involves a broader threat landscape in an increasingly complex and uncertain globalized world.

Map 3.1 *The geostrategic position of the Nordic countries*

Addressing the peacetime perspective, chapter four provides four different stories, in which Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden diverge in their pattern of change. First, leading up to 2001, the analysis shows that all countries had a military actor with a broad military capability of influence. The military commands were relatively large compared to the ministries of defence, with a high level of authority and broad scope in military affairs. Except for Finland, there were notable

tensions between the political and military actors by 2001, arguably mostly so in Norway where the defence minister initiated a larger process to regain control of a military that perceived itself on equal footing with the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Overall, Finland stands out in the analysis. Compared to the three other Nordic countries, there have been minor changes in this country and the military actor has maintained its broad capability of influence. The Swedish military actor has also maintained a broad capability of influence yet with a major transformation of the military organization. In contrast, there has been a gradual shift in Norway from an autonomous to a confined military actor. While the Danish military actor had a broad military capability of influence until 2010, by which time the dynamics shifted, and political authorities changed the governance structure of the armed forces leading to a confined military actor. The table below provides a general overview of the changes in the Nordic countries:

		2001	**2014**
Denmark	*Level*	CHOD inst. & physically detached	CHOD co-located with MoD
	Unity	Command authority over 3 levels	Joint HQ & functional services
	Scope	Territorial defence + int. tasks	International tasks
	Prof.	7880 conscripts	4159 conscripts
Finland	*Level*	CHOD institutionally detached	*No formal changes*
	Unity	Decentralized but unified	Joint control and command system
	Scope	Territorial defence	+ military crisis management
	Prof.	31,878 conscripts	24,993 conscripts
Norway	*Level*	CHOD inst. & physically detached	CHOD integrated with MoD
	Unity	Three HQ	Joint headquarters
	Scope	Territorial defence	+ international tasks
	Prof.	16,500 conscripts	6,983 conscripts
Sweden	*Level*	CHOD inst. & physically detached	*No formal changes*
	Unity	Concentration authority in one HQ	Centralization of all command
	Scope	Terr. defence, international tasks	Int. tasks, assert territorial integrity
	Prof.	16,948 conscripts	Conscription suspended

Table 3.1 *Overview of main changes in the military capability of influence*

The chapter addresses each country separately, providing two snapshots of the situation in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden respectively based on an intensive empirical inquiry into the military capability of influence. The first section addresses the civil-military balance in 2001, while the second analyses where the countries were by 2014 and how the situation changed from 2001. The last section provides a summary of the analysis and prepares the ground for the examination of the wartime perspective in the following chapters.

3.1 Denmark

Denmark is a founding member of NATO and joined the European Communities in 1973. The country can be described as a sceptical EU member and has negotiated several opt-outs from the

integration project since the early 1990s, among them defence cooperation. With the 1992 defence agreement (Danish MoD, 1992, appendix 5),[22] the Danish Armed Forces took the first steps in adjusting missions and structures following the collapse of the direct invasion threat against the country. During the 1990s, defence policy moved centre stage and the decade marked the beginning of a more activist foreign policy. Overall, the Danish Armed Forces had a broad military capability of influence by 2001. The chief of defence (CHOD) along with the Defence Command had a high level, and a broad scope, of military authority. Although military authority was delegated on three levels within the military organization, the military organization was relatively unified. The picture of the Danish Armed Forces in 2014 is of a confined military actor. During the 2000s, the military had a broad military capability of influence for much of the period. However, the 2010s signify a turning point, in which civilian decision-makers gradually tightened the political governance of its military. The decision in 2014 to co-locate the CHOD and his staff with the MoD, including moving the responsibility of personnel, materiel, establishment and defence budget to civilian directorates, narrowed the military capability of influence considerably.

3.1.1 Danish military capability of influence at 2001

In 2001, Denmark's armed forces were in the process of implementing the defence agreement covering the period 2000-2004. While the military organization faced rationalizations and budget cuts, the government viewed it necessary to have a military defence. Danish foreign policy followed a new direction, namely turning a predominantly cautious and passive policy mode into a more engaged and active one. Although this process started in the 1990s, there are scholars who argue that there was a further shift after 11 September 2001, in which Danish activism gained a new dimension (Heurlin, 2007b, p. 88; Rynning, 2003).[23] Accordingly, there were enlarged opportunities for foreign policy activism and with it followed a strong political inclination to use military means.

A central aspect of the broad military capability of influence was a high level of military authority with a sharp distinction between the MoD and the Defence Command. The Defence Command was physically and institutionally separate from the MoD, and had its location in Vedbæk, north of Copenhagen. While the CHOD is head of the Armed Forces, this command is under the responsibility of the defence minister, who therefore technically is the supreme authority (Håkenstad & Larsen, 2012, p. 45). In the Danish system, the defence minister has a strong position with responsibility for defence planning and a broad mandate to use the armed forces when

[22] Main documents in Danish defence policy are the parliamentary 'defence agreements', which are formed from discussions and preparations between the major political parties both in opposition and in government. These are political agreements on the Danish Armed Forces and are normally published in a five-year cycle.
[23] Note that there are other scholars who argue that activism in Danish foreign policy is not something new, and that it can be traced back to the nineteenth century (see Branner, 2013; Branner & Kelstrup, 2000).

necessary. However, tradition is to seek parliamentary consent in all cases where Danish troops need to use force to complete their tasks except if Denmark is attacked by another country (Folketinget, 2017). The task of the MoD is to support the work of the minister and provide a structure for political work. At the time, the Defence Command was relatively huge compared to other agencies in the central administration of Denmark, and consisted of twelve subjected authorities (Lyng, 2000). Moreover, the Defence Command had 433 employees compared to 183 in the MoD (R. Petersen, 2012, p. 46). Accordingly, there was a significant difference between the two institutions, where the Defence Command had a broader capacity of inquiry. Additionally, the CHOD was responsible for the military's management of tasks and financial framework, including personnel, materiel, defence budget, establishment, and infrastructure. He had overall responsibility and as such the opportunity to distribute resources between the different areas within the given political framework. When something was politically approved, it was up to the military leadership to implement decisions with allocated resources. Overall, this indicates a high level of military authority.

That it was custom for the Armed Forces to appoint their chief of defence provides an example of broad military authority. At the time, the military had influence over who would take up leading military positions. In practice, the position of the CHOD has been rotated between the services to secure the internal service balance. It was also implicit that the CHOD and the chief of staff could not come from the same service (R. Petersen, 2012, pp. 47, 381). This does not mean that politicians had no say in the process. Hans Hækkerup, defence minister at the time, was clear on the importance of him choosing the persons he (and by extension his government) wanted to serve in that role. Moreover, he found that it was important from time to time to demonstrate to the military system who was in charge (Hækkerup, 2002, p. 171). Nonetheless, the options of the politicians were limited as the defence minister was to choose between candidates the Armed Forces had shortlisted for promotion.

The broad military authority also occasionally caused tense relations between the political and military levels, exemplified with the two so-called Hvidt cases. During 2001 and early 2002, limited political guidance and broad military autonomy led the CHOD into highly political issues. On 26 March 2001, members of the EU Military Committee gathered to vote for a new chair of the committee. Mario Arpino, the Italian CHOD, was the favourite. However, General Christian Hvidt, Danish CHOD between 1996 and 2002, voted for Gustav Hägglund, the Finnish CHOD, who ended up being elected. The Italians were furious that their candidate had lost by one vote. It was later revealed that Hvidt had been active in securing the election of Hägglund (Maressa, 2001).

Hvidt had corresponded with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which he explained the situation and that he, in the lack of competent candidates from NATO countries, worked to get Hägglund elected. After a month, he received a reply from the MFA saying that a NATO country should be prioritized and that Hvidt should keep in mind the defence opt-out Denmark had in the EU (R. Petersen, 2012, p. 285). Due to the late reply and vague formulations, Hvidt did not feel committed to change course. Shortly after, members of the military committee voted, and the issue exploded politically in Denmark (Mylenberg, 2001). Another issue that strained the relationship took place in the spring of 2002, in relation to the discharge parade of General Hvidt. The media argued that the parade would signify an extravagant waste of money (*Ekstra Bladet* claimed it would cost 40 million Danish Crones, while the Defence Command insisted it would only cost 300.000). The matter caused a poisonous atmosphere between Svend Aage Jensby, defence minister, which sought to reduce the size of the parade, and Hvidt, who felt wronged by the press and let down by his minister (R. Petersen, 2012, p. 286). These incidents indicate tensions in Danish civil-military relations at the time, where the first case is one of the CHOD being in the sphere of politics.

In addition to the CHOD being the highest military advisor in political decision concerning the Armed Forces, there was a significant monopoly of information in the military. Naturally, no one can compete with the military when it comes to expert knowledge on military matters. According to Bertel Heurlin, the most important strength of the Danish Armed Forces was that they had almost a "monopoly on information and expertise" (Heurlin, 2004, p. 84). This monopoly was not because the military possesses all knowledge but related to the point that for most of the Cold War and into the 1990s, defence issues were not particularly important in Danish politics.[24] In fact, defence policy was not even a central topic in the formulation of national security policy (Clemmesen, 1995). While the expert knowledge of the military was a theoretical advantage during the Cold War, this is of greater significance when politicians use their armed forces actively.

From a functional perspective, Copenhagen's focus gradually turned towards international tasks throughout the 1990s. During the Cold War, the Armed Forces kept its role as a stand-by mobilized defence. In this period, it was structured for one specific task, to guard against an invasion of the country (N. Petersen, 2004, pp. 441-443). As the Soviet Union dissolved, the geopolitical position of Denmark improved considerably. Following the 1993 Defence Law, military regulars now had

[24] During the Cold War, Danish decision-makers viewed professional military involvement in defence policymaking process as useful, because it diminished the risk of open criticism and thus of an undesirable public debate. It also made a strong opposition from NATO authorities unlikely. Based on proposals from the Armed Forces, discrete negotiations would take place between key parties, and ending in an agreement covering the next couple of years. Consequently, a limited number of politicians developed an expertise on the area (Clemmesen, 1995).

a duty to perform service outside Danish borders (Forsvarsloven, 1993). The Defence Commission of 1997 recommended to maintain territorial defence and to strengthen the international engagement (Danish Defence Commission of 1997, 1998). Although there were disagreements within the Commission, these did not revolve around whether the armed forces were useful or not; there was a broad consensus that it was necessary for the country to have a defence (Heurlin, 2004, pp. 257-8). To maintain Denmark's direct and indirect security, the Commission found it necessary that the armed forces were able to fight efficiently and to solve classical defence tasks in addition to prioritized international tasks. The Commission's report repeats several times that "the armed forces must be able to fight" (Danish Defence Commission of 1997, 1998, pp. 31, 100, 174), thereby emphasizing the main function of the military. The 1999 defence agreement established a stronger international focus by strengthening the capacity for international operations, increasing material investments and prioritizing mobility (Danish MoD, 2000). It entailed a shift in focus from mobilization to crisis management with an emphasis on reaction forces. Nevertheless, although international tasks were in focus, territorial defence remained a central task for the military (Danish Defence Minister, 2000, p. 11). A new Defence Law of 2001 outlined the main tasks for the Armed Forces, namely (i) prevent conflicts and war; (ii) preserve the sovereignty of Denmark; (iii) secure the continuing existence and integrity of an independent Denmark; and (iv) support a peaceful development in the world with respect to human rights (Forsvarsloven, 2001). Thus, the gradual international focus of the 1990s was enshrined into law.

Furthermore, concerning the scope of military authority, the defence agreements guide the Armed Forces in a five-year cycle, in which the military executive has a broad scope to prioritize and distribute resources. Importantly, there appears to have been little political involvement into the military sphere regarding doctrine development. There are operational and tactical doctrines within the armed services, but Denmark has no joint doctrine. For the joint level, and as a basis for military operations and activity, the country relies on NATO doctrines, in which Danish decision-makers have little influence (Bjerga, 2011, p. 170; Lund, 2017; Nørby, 2017). The military leadership also proved to be a primus motor for new ideas and changes in the military organization and an eager contributor to the activist policy after the end of the Cold War. For example, the initiative to send heavy weapons (e.g. tanks) as part of the United Nations Protection Force to the Balkans in the 1990s came from the Defence Command (R. Petersen, 2012, Chapter 7). Furthermore, international operations in the 1990s suggest that the Defence Command was in control of the process of decisions taken regarding operations in Balkan. In his research on Danish civil-military relations from 1990 to 2011, Robert Petersen found no indications of political interventions in the

military decision process during the 1990s (R. Petersen, 2012, p. 277).[25] Accordingly, into the 2000s, there are indications of a broad scope of military authority concerning how to use armed force and with a focus on traditional military tasks.

In terms of unity of military authority, the military leadership underwent a larger reform by 2001 following the recommendations of the Defence Commission of 1997 (1998). The result was the abolition of the inspector generals of the services with their staff, and a delegation of the command of the Danish Armed Forces over three levels of authorities, as shown in the figure below.



Figure 3.1 *Organigram of the Danish Armed Forces at 2001*[26]

The reorganization of the military leadership re-established a service-oriented management of the activities of each service, and a pooling of service expertise on level II, while the overall planning, management and control were preserved in the Defence Command at level I. Level III entailed several regiments, squadrons, naval stations, air bases and military schools. Consequently, there was a decentralization of responsibility of budget and authority from the Defence Command to subordinate operative commands (Lyng, 2000, p. 198). Accordingly, in 2001, the operative commands were responsible for development, education, and the deployment of forces for their respective services. Similarly, the Danish military system was characterized by delegation and

[25] This is also confirmed in interviews with former Danish top-level officers. See Appendix I.
[26] The organigram is drawn based on Defence Command Denmark (2004, appendix 5) and Lyng (2000).

responsibility, in which the Defence Command was a mix of leadership and management.[27] With overall planning management and control at Level I, the role of the CHOD was to delegate authority and allocate resources. Moreover, the military leadership has over the years been organized increasingly 'joint', in which military advice to political leaders has been monopolized to a higher degree (Larsen, 2012). Thus, there was an aspect of a unified military organization, although authority was delegated over three levels.

Turning to the dimension of military professionalization, general conscription formed the basis of the Armed Forces and politicians deemed it important to maintain the system. At the same time, there were also steps towards professionalization with more professionalized units and niche capabilities. The 1992 defence agreement established The Danish International Brigade, a deployable mechanized brigade of 4,500 soldiers, which consisted of 80 per cent contracted personnel (Danish MoD, 1992). As mentioned above, the debate in the 1997 Defence Commission was at time sharp, where conscription was one of the more heated issues (Heurlin, 2004). Although a majority of the members supported the 'Danish model', which combined conscripted and employed personnel, the country's Social Liberal Party, a government party at the time, wanted to suspend conscription altogether (Danish Defence Commission of 1997, 1998, p. 416). The other political parties viewed the option of abolishing conscription as unrealistic because it would not be possible to recruit enough volunteers, as well as the fact that a professional military would be too costly (Danish Defence Commission of 1997, 1998, pp. 163-165, 232). The 1999 defence agreement increased the number of special operations forces (SOF) but also maintained conscription, although due to a slimmed wartime structure, it led to fewer number of conscripts, reduced from 81,000 to 65,000 soldiers (Danish MoD, 2000). However, downscaling the number of conscripts is not something new in the Danish context and the downward trend has been evident since the 1970s (Sørensen, 2000). While the 1990s saw more professional soldiers and fewer conscripts, conscription remained a pillar in the defence concept. From a sociological perspective, then, Denmark had a mixed system but with an emphasis on the conscript soldier.

In conclusion, for the year 2001, the military actor had a broad military capability of influence following a CHOD that was institutionally detached with broad scope of military authority and a relatively unified military organization. After general elections on 20 September 2001, the new coalition government proclaimed a more active foreign policy in a changed security environment. This included a more prominent role for the military. For the first time since the 1924 election, the Social Democrats did not win a majority of seats in parliament (N. Petersen, 2004, p. 16). The

[27] Interview 6. See Appendix I.

winning coalition formed a bourgeois government led by prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen who stated in the Folketing (Danish parliament),

> We [the government] aspire that Denmark openly and engaged assumes a responsibility for creating and securing freedom and peace in the world. We are proud of the values that the Danish society builds upon. It is the consciousness of our Danish roots that will give us Danes the energy to engage internationally (A. F. Rasmussen, 2001).

3.1.2 Danish military capability of influence at 2014

By 2014, the Danish Armed Forces had gone through a foundational restructuring and taken major steps in developing its international focus, including abolishing the mobilization army and territorial defence. The story after 2001 is also one of political authorities tightening their governance of the military. To comprehend the many changes, we need to take a step back to 2003. In that year, the government formed a group of experts led by Hans Henrik Bruun with the mandate to deliver a report on the new security policy conditions affecting Danish defence policy. The report concluded that there was no longer any conventional threat against the country and drafted a new military organization (Danish MFA, 2003b). The group proposed that in the future, the military should focus on two core tasks, specifically (1) total defence, including the ability to meet terrorist acts and their impact, and (2) setting up internationally deployable capabilities with emphasis on rapid deployment. The latter was for short-term and focused international contributions, rather than a long-term presence in areas with low conflict intensity (Danish MFA, 2003b, pp. 35-36). It was a 'first in, and first out' line of thinking.

Of interest in this process after 2001 is the line of action of the military leadership, which points to a broad military capability of influence and the role of the military as a primus motor in the process. Immediately after the publication of the Bruun Report the Defence Command presented its own proposal for restructuring the Armed Forces. The military leadership had participated in producing the Bruun Report and grasped the chance to bring changes to the military organization (Heurlin, 2007a, p. 123). Having made sure he had a unison military organization behind the issue, General Jesper Helsø, CHOD, went public with a far-reaching proposal (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, pp. 217-218). For the first time, with the so-called C-note,[28] the military leadership officially published its thoughts on defence development before the political negotiations on a new defence agreement had taken place (P. E. Rasmussen, 2017). The consequence was that the ideas and wishes of the military became publicly known before the political parties discussed the issue behind closed doors. The philosophy behind the military proposal was that the return on investment of Danish

[28] 'Capacity note', 'Kapasitetsnotatet' in Danish.

taxpayers was low. Most of the resources went to parts of the military organization that the country no longer needed, such as mobilization defence. Moreover, the Danish Armed Forces could not react quickly enough when it came to deployment (Cordsen, 2003). Accordingly, the C-note had three purposes: better use of the resources for the effect politicians wanted; improvement of the ability to deploy ready units on missions; lastly, following on from purpose one and two, the military could meet the government's desire to have a military tool ready at hand in the post-9/11 context.[29] At this stage, the political actors were not involved. Helsø summoned a meeting with the civilian heads of department of the Ministry of Finance, the Prime Minister's Office, the MFA and the MoD, to discuss the upcoming defence agreement. Yet, Helsø made sure he had the support of the defence minister later in the process (*Berlingske*, 2004). The proposal entailed abolishing territorial defence and total mobilization defence. In its replacement would be a 'leaner, but meaner' defence. Accordingly, the Armed Forces would move from a threat-based to a capacity-based defence – slimmer but also more powerful and deployable (R. Petersen, 2012, p. 296). This shows that the role of the military had changed; the military leadership had gone out publicly and offensive, indicating broad military capability of influence. Although the political answer for reform differed somewhat from the C-note, it reflects the military's proposal.

The 2004 defence agreement marked a decisive turning point and led to major changes in the military. Reflecting the proposals from the Bruun group and the Defence Command, the defence agreement signified a more foundational restructuring of the military organization. With it, Copenhagen abandoned territorial defence and abolished the Danish International Brigade as the military organization was restructured for international operations. Moreover, the political parties that were part of the defence agreement, both in opposition and government,[30] decided to increase the capability in two areas, international deployable military capabilities and the ability to meet terror acts and their impact (Danish MoD, 2004). The reform, however, did require some sacrifices, among other the submarines. Moreover, the Agreement included a formal level of ambition to have a deployable and sustainable capability of 2,000 soldiers ready for the full range of operations, from 'high intensity' to lower-scale engagements (Danish MoD, 2004, p. 5).

From a functional perspective, Denmark created a global role for the Armed Forces, including new tasks, after 2001. Having reviewed the present and future tasks of the military, the 2008 Defence Commission found that the current legislation did not cover two central areas sufficiently. First, the changing role of the armed forces concerning total defence, where the military's role in national

[29] Interview 6. See Appendix I
[30] Left, Conservative People's Party, Social Democrats, Danish People's Party, Danish Social Liberal Party, and Christian Democrats. See Appendix III.

emergency and crisis preparedness had gone from being the lead actor to assisting among others the police if resources allowed it. Second, the legislation did not cover new tasks, such as support for military capacity building, comprehensive approach and reconstruction (Danish Defence Commission of 2008, 2009, p. 113). Against this background, the Commission proposed a change in the existing legislation. This change was to highlight that the most important task of the military was still the defence of Denmark but also that this task would take place further away from Danish territory then was presupposed in the security policy premises behind the current Law on Defence from 2001 (Danish Defence Commission of 2008, 2009, pp. 114-115). In other words, the defence of Denmark was seen in a context of broader security threats. Along the lines of the 2008 Defence Commission, the 2009 defence agreement divided the tasks of the armed forces into two pillars, international and national tasks (Danish MoD, 2009). National tasks concern territorial surveillance and upholding sovereignty, as well as support Danish society in civilian tasks, whereas international tasks typically fall within the areas of armed conflict, stabilization tasks and international crisis management. Departing from the focus on short-term engagements in the first half of the 2000s, the 2009 defence agreement highlighted the expectation of continued international requests for Danish military participation in long-term operations. Accordingly, Denmark discarded the strategy of 'first in, first out'. The 2012 defence agreement had an unchanged task portfolio for the Armed Forces (Danish MoD, 2012a). As such, it followed up upon the international and expeditionary focus of the Danish Armed Forces.

The major reorganization of the Armed Forces also had implications for the conscription system. Conscript education was reduced to four months with a specific focus on tasks within homeland defence. Furthermore, the annual number of conscripts had decreased from 7,880 in 2001 to 4,159 in 2014.[31] The Bruun Report, for example, argued that the traditional education for conscripts had lost its relevance in the present security situation. The report concluded, however, to maintain a system of conscription for the purposes of tasks centred on homeland defence and as a source of recruitment of professional soldiers (Danish MFA, 2003b, p. 25). The Defence Command went further in its C-note, which proposed an entirely new kind of conscription, limited to three months. The proposed education focus entailed basic requirements, such as knowledge of first aid and guarding borders, which would increase civilian security. The political parties approved these proposals in the 2004 defence agreement, with which they restructured conscription to the purposes of homeland defence and introduced a four-month basic military service, enabling conscripts to solve society-related problems relating to crises or catastrophes (Danish MoD, 2004).

[31] See Appendix IV.

That agreement cut conscription down to a minimum, where contracted and employed personnel became the essential element in the Danish Armed Forces. In practice, the limited number of conscripts signifies that all are volunteers. Today, Danish conscription is recruitment-based, where conscripts can deploy abroad for military operations if they attend an eight-month additional education after their four-month basic training. As for the Danish SOF, they have increased in number and received more resources and additional materiel. The 2004 defence agreement increased the number of the Hunter corps to 135 special operation soldiers, and the Danish Frogmen Corps to 90. In the subsequent 2012 defence agreement, the Hunter Corps and the Frogman Corps were merged under a joint special operations command (Danish MoD, 2012a), making the Danish SOF a de facto service. There has also been a change in the role of the SOF in that they are now used more broadly.[32] Thus, there has been an increased professionalization of the Danish Armed Forces, where conscripts are educated for tasks concerning total defence, while professional forces are deployed to expeditionary missions. Accordingly, the country's focus is on the expeditionary capabilities of the military and the combat-capable part of the organization. By 2014, the Danish Armed Forces consisted mainly of professional soldiers, and consequently a more distinct group in society.

From an organizational perspective, the military took its first step towards more unity within the military command structure with the 2004 defence agreement, which led to a centralization of staff and support structures. In the new unified structure, the administration of personnel, materiel, establishment, allocation of defence spending, and information technology within the armed forces formed five joint functional services under the authority of the Defence Command. The Personnel Service of the Danish Armed Forces was established by 2005, while 2006 marked the beginning of the new Joint Material Service, Informatics Service, Accounts Service, and Health Service. However, the reorganization process did not go smoothly. There was much discontent with the new Personnel Service and many military officials quit the armed forces between 2004 and 2008 (R. Petersen, 2012, pp. 364-5). Furthermore, in terms of unity and cohesion, the results were limited because there were still separate operative commands for each of the armed services (i.e. Army, Navy and Air force). This changed in 2014.

As an addition to the 2012 defence agreement, politicians decided in 2014 to abolish the Defence Command in its current form and established a command, which included operational elements of the current Defence Command, the Admiral Danish Fleet, the Army operational Command, the Tactical Air Command, the Arctic Command, and the Special Operations Command (Danish

[32] This was pointed out in several Danish interviews (See Appendix I).

MoD, 2014b). While administratively united, geographically, this is not the case because the new Joint Defence Command has four different locations. The CHOD and parts of his staff are in Copenhagen; the Special Operations Command is located in Aalborg, the Arctic Command in Nuuk, Greenland, and the others in Karup, Jutland. The Defence Command at the time argued for locating the Special Operations Command in Copenhagen due to the strategic aspect and limit the decentralization – but to no avail. The decision on locations was made for political reasons, against the wishes of the military.[33] Thus, the unity of military authority has been centralized organization-wise but also scattered on several locations.

Lastly, there have also been major changes in the level of military authority since 2001. Discussions about integrating the CHOD and the Defence Command with the MoD emerged in political circles several times during the 2000s. In 2003, for example, Søren Gade and Troels Lund Poulsen, two politicians from the Liberal Party in government, argued that the upcoming negotiations of a new defence agreement should rationalize and slim down the military leadership. They wanted to merge the Defence Command with the MoD because they found there to be an "unhealthy competition between the MoD and the Defence Command" (Poulsen & Gade, 2003, p. 59). The question of a reorganization was concluded in the 2004 defence agreement. It resulted in not only preserving the authority of the military leadership but also of strengthening it. As a compromise, the political parties of the agreement decided to move the Defence Command from its location in Vedbæk to the centre of Copenhagen. In 2005, the CHOD, along with the Defence Command, moved to Copenhagen, so that it would be as geographically close to the MoD as possible. Institutionally, however, they were still separate, and the Defence Command maintained its original organizational form. That same year, the MoD had reduced its staff from approximately 160 to 130 employees. This reduction followed the decision to move a range of tasks from the MoD to the Defence Staff. The MoD structure went from four to three divisions, and from eleven to eight offices (Danish Defence Minister, 2006, p. 42), thereby reducing the already small ministry governing the military. In other words, by mid-2000s, the military leadership strengthened its institutional capability of influence vis-à-vis the MoD. However, into the 2010s, the political level started to tighten its governance with the military leadership.

In 2008, Gade made it possible to fill the position of chief of staff through a merit-based process. He also established a new position of a director general directly under the CHOD, which was also filled through an application process (R. Petersen, 2012, p. 381). These steps were followed by Nick Hækkerup who became defence minister in 2011 as centre left political parties emerged

[33] Interview 1. See Appendix I.

victorious in the general election. In the following year, he decided to publicly advertise the position of CHOD and thereby break with tradition. From now on, candidates had to send a job application to the MoD, which would then make the decision on whom to appoint. Henceforward, 'everyone' with a military background can apply for the position and it would not necessarily be the chief of staff who succeeded the CHOD in office (Brøndum, 2012). Thus, with these initial steps, political authorities began narrowing the military capability of influence.

One of Hækkerup's more decisive moves was a proposal for a larger change to the organization of government-military relations. The proposal was to integrate the MoD and the Defence Command. This proved to be a difficult process and it did not turn out as planned, as the political parties in opposition were strongly opposed to the idea. One of the goals of the Thorning-Schmidt I government was to modernize the military leadership, although the program for government of 2011 did not mention an integration of the Defence Command with the MoD (Danish Government, 2011). In November 2011, Hækkerup appointed a working group with a mandate to present possible models for restructuring the military leadership. The MoD led the group with representatives from the Prime Minister's Office, the MFA, the MoD, the Ministry of Finance and the Defence Command, and handed the report to the defence minister in 2012 (Danish MoD, 2012b). The work on the report turned into a long process because of a complicated process.[34] There was also much resistance against a reform in both the military, especially among retired officers, and scholars (Aagaard, 2012). The pressure for major reforms in the military leadership caused former generals and admirals to launch a media offensive arguing against the reform plans (Halskov, Skærbæk, & Mads, 2012). In return, Hækkerup argued that disloyal and narrow-minded people occupied important positions in the Armed Forces stating that "There are some Colonel Hackel types who are running their own political agendas. They are very troublesome, narrow-minded and in my point of view not beneficial for the Danish Armed Forces" (Hækkerup quoted in Arnfred, 2013). Consequently, the relations between the political and the military levels turned frosty. In March 2013, the government proposed changes to the Defence Law, which would broaden the defence minister's mandate to change the organization of the military leadership to a broader extent than was possible with the existing law (Danish MoD, 2013). In a parliamentary debate, opposition political parties were furious, arguing that the government went on its own path. Many in parliament were opposed to the change because they feared a politicization of military advice (Folketinget, 2013). However, in parliament, the government succeeded in convincing

[34] Noted in interview 3 and 7. See Appendix I.

sufficient numbers. Thus, on 12 June 2013, the law proposal was amended with 55 against 45 votes, which made a larger reorganization possible.

In 2014, the political parties of the defence agreement agreed to co-locate the CHOD and parts of his staff with the MoD, although the two organizations were still institutionally separate (Danish MoD, 2014b). Because of the disagreements between the government and the opposition, the result was a compromise with no integration but a physical co-location where the post of the CHOD with his own staff was maintained. However, it was an integration of sorts, in the sense that in the new institutional set-up, the supporting agencies (established in 2005) for material and acquisition, personnel and infrastructure became civilian directorates and directly subordinate to the minister and the MoD, including long-term planning and the defence budget, leading to a centralization of power in that department, as seen in the following organigram.



Figure 3.2 *Organigram of the Danish Ministry of Defence and subjected authorities at 2014*[35]

The director general in the new structure is a three-star lieutenant general who naturally has broad knowledge about military matters. He has the task of coordinating all the authorities (listed in Figure 3.2) and reports directly to the head of the MoD. As such, the role functions like the chief

[35] The organigram is taken from Danish MoD (2018c).

of staff in the Defence Command. Thus, with these changes, the CHOD only has operational authority (see figure 3.3) and without general management responsibility.



Figure 3.3 *Organigram of the Danish Joint Defence Command at 2014*[36]

With the change in 2014, the CHOD can no longer distribute resources between areas but can issue directives to the different authorities subjected to the MoD when he needs, for example, more people or new equipment. The CHOD remains a military advisor for operations and military matters, and if necessary, can go directly to the defence minister. Nevertheless, with this decision, the political leadership significantly curbed the military capability of influence.

There have been significant changes in the case of Denmark. The activist foreign policy has significantly changed the tasks of the country's armed forces, which now have an international focus and an increased number of professional soldiers. The dynamics in the relationship between the political leadership and the military leadership has also changed. Through the years, the military has taken the initiative on several reforms and changes in Danish defence policy. It has had a broad capability of influence with a high level and broad scope of military authority, which the military leadership has used to promote its own military viewpoints to the political level within the existing political framework. However, there has been a gradual shift of power from 2001 to 2014, in which the military capability of influence has narrowed, leading to a confined military actor.

3.2 Finland

From being in the shadow of the Soviet Union for much of the latter half of the twentieth century, Finland found itself in a different geopolitical situation as its large neighbour in the East rapidly dissolved in the early 1990s. In the post-Cold War world, the government moved away from the policy of neutrality and adopted a policy of active participation in international political and security policy cooperation (Finnish Government, 1995). The EU membership was a large step in the new direction – made possible with the end of the East-West divide. Finland entered the EU in 1995

[36] The organigram is taken from the Defence Command Denmark (2016).

and joined NATO's Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) in 1994, although NATO membership was out of the question. A membership does not have majority support in the public and opponents of joining the alliance are concerned that it will cause Finland to be designated a potential enemy of Russia and provoke retaliation from Moscow.[37] For historical reasons, the military institution has an important position in Finland. Lessons learned throughout history have resulted in a security and defence policy characterized by reassurance and deterrence policies. The primary aim of the country's foreign and security policy is to avoid becoming a party to a military conflict and remain military unaligned (Finnish Government, 2016). For these policies to be credible, Helsinki have deemed a strong military capability to support them as necessary.

In general, the picture of Finland portrays continuity and consistency. The pattern in the Finnish case is that of an autonomous military actor in 2001 maintaining its broad military capability of influence. The Finnish Defence Forces have not undergone the same kind of defence transformation as the other Nordic countries; this arguably because the Finnish perception of the security environment has not caused a need for major changes in security and defence policies. Nonetheless, there have been changes to the military. The analysis shows that the most notable changes are in the ability of the Finnish Defence Forces to participate in international crisis management operations, a joint defence command, and increased professionalization. Although for the latter, it is important to note that conscription continues to be a pillar in the defence concept. While the formal organization of government-military relations have stayed the same, there have been informal changes in the relationship between the political and military levels.

3.2.1 Finnish military capability of influence at 2001

At the turn of the millennium, the Defence Forces constituted an autonomous military actor. The military leadership had a high level of military authority with an institutionally strong CHOD and a unified military organization. The military leadership had a large degree of freedom for manoeuvre within the political framework, although resources provided the scope of authority. Furthermore, there was a broad scope of military authority, in which the monopoly of information is significant in the Finnish case. Overall, there is a high degree of trust in the military institution in Finland.[38] Although conscription is a central pillar in the defence concept, the other aspects indicate broad military capability of influence.

[37] There is, however, more readiness to discuss the issue and there have been studies on the potential implications of full Finnish NATO membership (see Finnish MFA, 2007, 2016).
[38] Noted in several interviews with Finnish officials. See Appendix I.

Finland differs from the other Nordic countries in that the country is a presidential republic. The president is the Supreme Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces and has a crucial role in military matters, unlike the crowns of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Although the power of the president in general has been downscaled, his or her role is still important.[39] With the president as Supreme Commander, the chief of defence is directly subordinate to him/her and has a high level of authority in this regard. The CHOD has operational command of all services under the president and he has a special operational authority when it comes to international operations (Westling, Laaksonen, & Huhtinen, 2016), although with a consultation procedure with the government. Concerning defence planning, the president and, by extension, the CHOD have significant influence in military matters (Constitution of Finland, 2000, Chapter 5, 12). The CHOD and the Defence Command with its semi-autonomous military staff is responsible for translating political guidelines into concrete plans for developing military capabilities (Håkenstad & Larsen, 2012, p. 37). In turn, the strength of these two actors means that the defence minister and the MoD in Finland are not as dominant as in Denmark and Norway.

The Defence Command was, and still is, institutionally separate but physically co-located with the MoD. It is dualistic in its nature as it is both operational headquarters for the CHOD and administrative agency for the MoD. The predominantly military Defence Command had some 500 employees, and a greater planning capacity than the MoD, which had about 150 employees. The MoD cannot give direct orders to the CHOD, only administrative orders to the Defence Command. The ministry has administrative authority on budget, legislative and organizational matters, as well as translating defence policy into more concrete policy guidelines for the Defence Forces.[40] The government oversees the white paper process and decides what should be done and which ministry is to lead the process. Overall, however, the military leadership has a broad scope of military authority. The Defence Forces are an integral part of the security and defence policy process with a range of channels of influence; they receive the political mandate from the government, the tasks, and then do all the detailed planning (Håkenstad & Larsen, 2012, pp. 39-41). Overall, strategic planning happens in the Defence Command and the military doctrines are not publicly available. Even field manuals are not public, and there is a different culture about what is secret in Finland compared to the other Nordic countries. In Finland, there is a small political elite and officials, mainly in key ministries, that decides Finnish security and defence policy and

[39] 1 March 2000, Finland adopted a new constitution which strengthened the parliamentary democracy. The reform entailed a clear shift in power from the president to parliament via the government (Meinander, 2006, p. 242). Following the Finnish Constitution, the president of Finland is independent from the government and government offices, thus including the MoD. While the president is responsible for Finnish foreign policy, in the new constitution of 2000, EU affairs are the domain of the government (Constitution of Finland, 2000).
[40] Interviews with Finnish top-level civil servants and officers. See Appendix I.

dominates the foreign policy debate. A legacy from the Cold War era, in which it was virtually prohibited for ordinary citizens to take part in discussions in foreign policy, appears to prevail to some extent (Laitinen, 2006, p. 56). The closest one gets to understanding Finnish military doctrines are the government White Papers on security and defence. Consequently, the high level of military authority and the military's role in defence planning connects to the functional perspective with limited political interference in military affairs.

From a functional perspective, the core principles of the Finnish defence policy were the same in 2001 as they had been in the early 1990s. A credible defence capability, military unalignment, a territorial defence system and general conscription. The primary task of the Defence Forces in 2001 was territorial defence. The government outlined four threat scenarios it viewed as likely, namely (i) political or military pressure, implying limited use of military power against Finland; (ii) a strategic attack aiming to paralyze vital strategic targets and to subjugate national leadership; (iii) a large-scale offensive, aimed at seizing strategical areas or making use of Finnish territory for actions against a third party; and (iv) regional crises with repercussions for Finland (Finnish Government, 2001). Overall, the government outlined three main tasks of the military based on these threat scenarios. The primary objective was in all situations to guarantee Finnish sovereignty, safeguard the population, prevent exploitation of Finnish territory, and safeguard the government. Second task was to support civil society. At 2001, the government sought to increase the capability of the defence forces to participate in cooperation with other actors in society as required by the threat scenarios (Finnish Government, 2001). The third task was to have a capability for managing crises in unstable regions outside Finland's borders, including preparation for and participation in international crisis management operations. In this regard, the objectives of national and international action were from a Finnish perspective seen as consistent with each other.

Regarding participation in international operations, Helsinki made amendments to the Peacekeeping Act, which came into effect in 2001. This made it possible for Finland to participate legally in military crisis management operations conducted by the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the EU or NATO, however, on the condition that the mission had a UN Security Council (UNSC) or OSCE mandate (Finnish Government, 2001, pp. 36, 70-71). Moreover, the total number of Finnish peacekeepers serving in different operations could not exceed 2000 at any time. As crisis management became a part of the Defence Law, this responsibility was placed in the hands of the military leadership. Under the revised Peacekeeping Act, there was a transfer of the preparing and execution of peacekeeping activities from the MoD to the Defence Forces. Before this change, the MoD and a training centre were responsible for

international operations. Henceforward, the MFA and the MoD were responsible for the political preparation, guidance and supervision of military crisis management, while the Defence Forces were responsible for the practical implementation of crisis management. Thus, the military leadership got more responsibility over an area that previously belonged to the MoD, broadening its scope of authority.

From an organizational perspective, there are two key words when it comes to understanding the structure of the Defence Forces, namely (a) decentralization and (b) land force heavy. First, the armed services have a high standing in society and the service chiefs have an important role when it comes to capability development. Moreover, in 2001, the services had the responsibility over their own logistics and material procurement as opposed to a joint process for all armed services. For the defence concept to function, a decentralized organization is necessary, and it is deemed important that the services are semi-independent as Finland is a large country to cover (Andersson, 2018, pp. 349-350). Second, the military is land force heavy, in which the Defence Command, in practice, was an Army Command. One could say that, organizationally, there were three armies in the Defence Forces as the country was divided in three districts (eastern, western, and northern), each with its own army command.[41] There were no Army chief and all three commands were directly subjected to the CHOD. Nevertheless, in 2001, there was a step towards centralization. In January 2001, the government introduced organizational changes to the Defence Forces, integrating the planning, command and control, and intelligence systems of all services into one joint system (Finnish Government, 2001, p. 55). Moreover, the 2001 government report on security and defence policy argued for a reduction in the number of regional formations and command levels.[42] However, the military retained the command system at national, regional and local levels, which ensured a more decentralized organization. Despite the decentralized organization, the Defence Forces is highly unitary organization with a broad culture of loyalty. Although there is supposedly much internal debate within the military, there are few leakages to the media and to the political level.[43] In conclusion, this indicates strong unity of military authority.

Just as decentralization is central in the organization of the Defence Forces, conscription remains a corner stone in the defence concept. Although the military environment of Finland changed after the Cold War, this did not lead the country to revise its defence concept (Eduskunta Defence

[41] Highlighted in several interviews with top-level officers. See Appendix I.
[42] The security and defence policy reports make a broad assessment of Finland's security and defence policy. They are the government's basic position and set out the principles and objectives for this policy and provide a framework for its implementation in the different sectors, including the military (Finnish MoD, 2019). These White Papers are issued approximately every four years and have a eight- to ten-year outlook (Håkenstad & Larsen, 2012, p. 39).
[43] Noted in the many interviews with Finnish top-level officers and civil servants in the MoD. See Appendix I.

Committee, 2001; Finnish Government, 2001). The government viewed general conscription as the most economical and efficient model, even after the USSR had collapsed, which allowed the Defence Forces to defend the entire territory of Finland. However, the 2001 government report on security and defence policy aimed to reduce the wartime strength of the Defence Forces to a maximum strength of 350,000 by the end of 2008 (Finnish Government, 2001, p. 54), whereas the annual number of conscripts for 2001 was 31,878.[44] The White Paper also outlined a reduction in the number of operational regiments and improvement in firepower and mobility of the operational forces. Moreover, regarding the development of the personnel system, it was the view of the government that the military needed enough professional, motivated personnel and quality to carry out the required duties both in wartime and under normal circumstances. In that regard, the government set out to upgrade three Jaeger brigades in the Army to readiness brigades (Finnish Government, 2001, p. 64). Thus, although conscription is central, there was an incremental focus on professional and rapid reaction capabilities.

Overall, the situation in 2001 involved an autonomous military actor in the context of civil-military relations. The military had a strong institutional position, broad scope of military authority and a unified military organization. Thus, within existing political framework, there was a broad room for manoeuvre to the Finnish Defence Forces.

3.2.2 Finnish military capability of influence at 2014

Since the first reforms outlined in the 1997 and 2001 White Papers, the Finnish Defence Forces have gone through several changes, of which the biggest restructure since the end of World War II was complete in 2008 (Finnish Defence Forces, 2009). However, the country has not transformed its military organization to the same extent as its Nordic neighbours. Territorial defence and general conscription continue to form basic pillars in the Finnish defence concept. By 2014, the Defence Forces have also retained a broad military capability of influence because of more unity from an organizational perspective and few changes in the level and scope of military authority.

Regarding the functional perspective, a new Defence Forces Act of 2007 regrouped and collected the package of responsibilities of the Defence Forces into four main tasks: (1) military defence of the country, (2) support of other civilian authorities, (3) assistance to another EU member state, and (4) participation in international crisis management (Finnish Defence Forces Act, 2007). The first outlines the primary task of the military, namely the defence of the territory and independence

[44] For an overview of conscript numbers see Appendix IV.

of the country. The main goal is to maintain a credible military defence capability to prevent and counter military offensives against Finland. As part of territorial defence, the government underlined the role of the military as a threshold defence that can prevent a strategic attack, which builds on the logic of deterrence and not defence, as the latter would be too costly (Finnish Government, 2012). According to the 'MoD Strategy 2025', this is done by maintaining the deterrent threshold for the use of force against the country high enough, so that it outweighs the perceived benefits of attack (Finnish MoD, 2006a). Thus, the primary task of the military remains territorial defence and, significantly, the data does not indicate any changes in the broad scope of military authority.

The support of other civilian authorities in their security responsibilities, the second main task of the military, has received more focus. The Cold War concept of total defence has changed with an expansion of the Defence Law concerning military assistance to civilian purposes and tasks (Finnish Defence Forces, 2006). Accordingly, the law allows the Defence Forces to use all means necessary to assist civil society. However, the threshold to use the military in such assistance is high.[45] A central document in this regard is 'The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society', first published in 2003, which builds on a comprehensive concept of security and considers the increased internationalization and changes in the security situation and society structures (Finnish Government, 2003; Finnish MoD, 2006b, 2010).[46] However, in this second task, in many cases the primary responder is some other actor in the state administration besides the Defence Forces (Salminen, 2011). Although there is an increased focus on a broader security concept, the main task of the Finnish Defence Forces remains territorial defence.

The revision of the Defence Forces Act also included a third task of support and assistance to another EU member state under the EU's solidarity clause in the scope of application. Nevertheless, it excluded the use of force in assistance from the scope (Finnish Defence Forces Act, 2007). According to the solidarity clause, the joint action extends beyond the European Security and Defence Policy with the possibility of using non-military instruments.[47] Another clause that was considered in Helsinki was the mutual assistance obligation in the Treaty of Lisbon.[48] Because it differed from the solidarity clause by associating primarily with armed aggression, the Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee called for a thorough report on the effects of the obligation.

[45] This was highlighted in several interviews with Finnish top-level civil servants and military officers. See Appendix I.
[46] Note that after 2014, Finland has published a new Security Strategy for Society (Finnish Government, 2017b).
[47] The solidarity clause provides provisions for joint efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and to aid another EU member in the event of natural or man-made disasters (EUR-Lex, 2018).
[48] The mutual defence clause comprises the provision of aid and assistance to another EU country in the event of armed aggression on its territory, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter (EUR-Lex, 2019).

Evaluating the key dimensions of the clause, the report found that its political context suggests room for interpretation. However, it also stresses that the content of the clause constitutes a new obligation for Finland that "increasingly intensifies all commitments which Finland already otherwise has vis-à-vis the EU and the ESDP" (Tiilikainen, 2008, p. 37). Accordingly, the government has interpreted the clause that each member state will individually decide on the provision of, and forms of, assistance. Moreover, Helsinki will improve its capacity to provide and receive assistance and determine the need to review its legislation to create the necessary legal framework for a possible implementation (Finnish Government, 2012, pp. 91-92).[49] While Finland prepares for international collaboration and develops its ability to provide and receive support, this issue indicates concern in terms of the country's aim to avoid becoming a party to a military conflict.

The fourth main task of the Defence Forces is participation in international crisis management, in which there have been significant developments. Finland has become more active internationally, although far from Danish activism because of the aim to stay out of military conflicts, and aims to contribute to the UN, to the EU, and to NATO through the more limited Partnership for Peace. This follows an acknowledgement in Helsinki that the maintenance of security in a globalized and interdependent operating environment demands more international cooperation and an active foreign and security policy (Finnish Government, 2012, pp. 15-18). As such, the country has expanded its role abroad in military operations and moved from a contributor of large infantry and military observer contingents to contributing highly specialized skills and, to a small extent, SOF (Salminen, 2011). Although Finland is a traditional peacekeeping country, in keeping with a military neutral tradition, there has been several changes in the law whereby the Defence Forces can participate in sharper operations (Tiilikainen, 2008, pp. 37-38; Vesa, 2007). Moreover, where it previously was the Army who sent soldiers to peacekeeping and crisis management operations, both the Navy and the Air Forces have since 2008 had the capability to participate internationally as well. The Navy was, in 2008 for example, actively involved in international operations, while the Air Force has participated in international exercises and developed its own readiness unit for international operations (Finnish Defence Forces, 2009). Notably, Finland also stands out compared to the other Nordic countries in that it still relies on volunteers for international operations because the CHOD, according to the law, cannot order regular officers abroad. In conclusion for the functional perspective, the Finnish military actor continues to focus on territorial defence and traditional military tasks and maintains its broad scope of military authority.

[49] This was changed in July 2017, enabling the provision and receipt of military aid.

Conscription continues to be a pillar in the defence concept. There is broad support for conscription in the government, the parliament, military, and society alike (Laitinen, 2006). Nonetheless, there is more focus on quality rather than quantity, and there has been a continuous decline in the size of reserves. The decline can be attributed as a result of the end of the Cold War and reduced defence budgets. What is interesting about the Finnish case is the professionalization of the conscript system. Helsinki has acknowledged the need for more competence. Instead of taking steps towards an all-volunteer force, the country's solution has been to professionalize conscription, aiming among other things to increase the competence of conscripts (Finnish MoD, 2006a). The point of departure is that since Finnish conscripts are already highly educated, it is possible for officers to train them for demanding tasks within their present period of military service. In this way, a large enough number of personnel are trained subsequently to be recruited to international crisis management tasks and as regular personnel of the Defence Forces. Nevertheless, it is emphasized that the need for skills does not infer conversion to professional armed forces (Finnish MoD, 2006a, p. 18). Instead, professionalization in the Finnish case means skills development as well as leveraging the professionalism and competence of the rest of society.

More importantly, besides changes in the conscription system, Finland has also allocated more resources to develop niche capabilities and specialized units since 2001. This focus followed the acknowledgement that the large grey mass of conscripts was too slow in mobilization and that readiness and spearhead capabilities were needed. In this regard, main attention has been on central requirements in international crisis management as well as to maintain Finnish competence in high technology, quality and professional expertise (Finnish Government, 2004, p. 101). In 2004, the military established a new unit, the Special Jaeger Battalion (Finnish Defence Forces, 2005). This battalion is a special operation force and a part of the Utti Jaeger Regiment, which has become the main hub of the Finnish SOF. The Defence Forces established the Utti Jaeger Regiment in 1997, which was later professionalized in the end of the 1990s. The Defence Forces have also been committed to train soldiers specialized in warfare in urban areas (Finnish Defence Forces, 2005, p. 30). The government has expressed its hope that Finland would deploy more specialized units and niche capabilities to crisis management tasks (Finnish Government, 2009a, p. 100). The SOF number have increased and has become more important, however, not to the same degree as their Danish and Norwegian counterparts. Thus, behind the focus of conscription, there is an emphasis on niche capabilities and military professionalization.

As for the organizational perspective of the military, the new command and administration structure decided in 2001 became operational in 2008, and the military organization has now an

integrated command and control system for all services, as well as a joint intelligence and surveillance system. Moreover, the Defence Forces adopted the NATO planning system in 2002 and NATO's communication system in 2004. Consequently, the operating language in the Navy and the Air Forces is currently English. Most importantly, in 2008, the Army became an independent service (Finnish Defence Forces, 2009). This was a separate decision that succeeded the defence reform, in which Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, in his tenure as CHOD, was a driving force. He wanted clearer lines of responsibility and centralize planning power. The existing structure with three army operative commands was complicated and it was difficult to use resources wisely.[50] Moreover, by organizing the Army as a service like the Navy and the Air Force, it was easier to streamline the organization. The Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters are each responsible for their own performance, development and activities, as well as leading the operations of their own services in accordance with the tasks assigned by the CHOD (Finnish Government, 2004, p. 106). There was, however, some debate regarding the location of the new Army HQ. The military wanted to be closer to Helsinki, although the political decision was to locate it to Mikkeli. Nevertheless, overall, the military viewed this as a minor issue.[51] The aim of the latest reform from 2012, which was first initiated by the chief of defence General Jarmo Lindberg, was to achieve maximum overall benefit from centralization (Defence Forces 2015). Overall, the Defence Command was streamlined, and following the 2012 reform, the military abolished an entire level of permanent staff in the military leadership. Finland now has a joint defence command, also in the sense of international operations and exercises, which reflects the indicated unity of military authority. The organigram below provides a broad overview of the Finnish defence establishment and chains of command:

[50] Interview 22, 23, and 24. See Appendix I.
[51] Interview 17, 23, 24. See Appendix I.



Figure 3.4 *Organigram of the Finnish defence establishment and chain of command at 2014*[52]

Although there have not been any formal changes in the statutes regarding the relationship between the political and military levels, there are informal changes. While there is a detached institutional structure, military and political levels meet frequently. A relatively recent practice is an informal meeting arena with the CHOD, the chief of staff, the defence minister and the permanent secretary (indicated by the dotted box in Figure 3.4 above). The purpose of the meetings is to discuss issues to ensure transparency and avoid surprises. There is also an increase in the number of meetings between the MoD and the Defence Command, where department heads meet his or her counterpart regularly. Moreover, the chief of staff has been invited to the minister-led group of MoD officials, which is something new, as he has never attended these meetings before. Moreover, in the allocation of minister posts in government, the defence minister was for decades the last to be appointed. However, the political importance of the defence minister has increased the last

[52] This organigram is mainly compiled based on information from interviews.

decade, with a more pronounced role and larger agenda.[53] Thus, there are more contact points between civilian and military spheres, which can be attributed to a more unpredictable security environment.

Overall, the changes in the Finnish case from 2001 to 2014 have been modest compared to the other Nordic countries. The military actor has maintained its broad capability of influence with high level of authority, unity of military authority and broad scope in military authority, in which the military leadership play a significant role in the development of Finnish security and defence policy. Moreover, the main task for the Defence Forces remains preparing for territorial defence. The significant changes are identified in the crisis management capabilities, which the Defence Forces have developed according to NATO standards and forms, and a move from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations. Although conscription remains a solid pillar in the defence concept, there is in addition focus on professional units and niche capabilities.

3.3 Norway

Norway is a Nordic country with large territory, long costal line and with borders to Russia in the north. Furthermore, it is a founding member of NATO and although it has rejected EU membership twice following referendums in 1972 and in 1994, the country participates extensively in the security and defence policies of the Union. During the 1990s, new debates about the purpose of the Norwegian Armed Forces emerged because of a changed security environment (Græger, 2007; Haaland, 2008). Nevertheless, there was a long-term uncertainty in Norway about how Russia would evolve in the post-USSR world. Consequently, a slow transition to the changed security environment characterizes the first decade after the Cold War. While most Western countries adjusted their traditional priorities, doctrines and operational concepts as the Cold War ended, the Norwegian Armed Forces were still concentrated in the north of the country with anti-invasion priorities as their primary focus. This changed at the turn of the millennium as the country initiated fundamental reforms to its defence structures.

In the following analysis of the development in Norway's military capability of influence, the available data indicate that the Armed Forces have moved from being an autonomous military actor in 2001 to become a confined military actor in 2014. In 2001, the military had a broad capability of influence; the Defence Command was large and influential compared to MoD and the military was still a defence organization based on invasion defence, with a large amount of resources spent to maintain a large military establishment. Moreover, the Defence Command was solely

[53] This paragraph is based on information from interviews with Finnish top- level civil servants and officers. See Appendix I.

responsible for producing military doctrine with little or no civilian influence apart from general political directions. While conscription constituted a main pillar in the defence concept, there were steps taken towards increased number of professional soldiers. However, the military capability of influence has narrowed over the years towards 2014. This follows from mainly the integration of the chief of defence into the MoD, but also regarding the scope of military authority. Civilian authorities were much more involved in military doctrine development, and although the military organization has a higher degree of professionalization and is more unified from an organizational perspective, the decentralization of the inspector generals of the armed services challenges the unity of military authority. Nevertheless, the integration model is not a black and white picture as the Norwegian case also highlights the importance of informal influences, in which the capability of influence can vary following the ability of the CHOD to take advantage of the existing scope of action.

3.3.1 Norwegian military capability of influence at 2001

In 2001, the defence establishment found itself in one of the biggest economic crises in its history. In addition to financial difficulties, there was an imbalance between aims and structure, and a troubled relationship between the political and military elites. In the current scholarly literature on the Norwegian defence establishment and reform in the wake of the Cold War, many scholars have labelled the 1990s as a "lost decade" (Bogen & Håkenstad, 2015; Børresen, Gjeseth, & Tamnes, 2004; Græger, 2007; Heier, 2000). The attempt to reform in the early 1990s had failed due to insufficient efforts and financial difficulties, and at the turn of the millennium, it was clear to both civilian policy-makers and military leaders that an extensive reform of the defence establishment was necessary. The document central for the reform in the new millennium was the 2001 White Paper, which emphasized that the defence establishment was in a deep and long-lasting structural crisis. The White Paper defined a 'double imbalance' between resources and ambitions, and between the structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces and their tasks (Norwegian MoD, 2001).[54] Despite financial difficulties, the Norwegian Armed Forces constituted an autonomous military actor in 2001.

At that time, the High Command was a large and influential institution, institutionally and physically separate from the MoD, located at Huseby, west of Oslo. The High Command consisted of 1,400 personnel as opposed to the 200 MoD employees. It was significantly larger and had a broader capacity of inquiry than that of the personnel light MoD bureaucracy, which affected the

[54] Previous White Papers had also described a mismatch between capacity and tasks, but this because of an underfinanced and disintegrating structure that did not manage to maintain the traditional tasks. In addition, the 2001 White Paper singled out an operative imbalance, equal to the economical imbalance.

relationship between the two institutions. Moreover, the CHOD was in a unique position with several informal ways to influence decisions but also formal possibilities. The Defence Study of the CHOD, a tradition since 1985, has been a central opportunity of influence, in which the military leadership can publicly present its advice on defence developments in the framework of a larger report. The CHOD is also the only head of agency in Norway that has his own appendix in government's proposition to parliament. There was an established perception in the top military leadership that the military had a special position in the central government apparatus, and therefore should not be subjected to the same management as other civilian directorates and government agencies (Bjerga, 2014, p. 463). The MoD experienced the military as an agency difficult to govern, leading Eldbjørg Løwer, defence minister, to confront another imbalance in the defence establishment, namely the relationship between the political and military levels.

Løwer took office as defence minister in 1999. In a documentary by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), she described how she met a military establishment that saw itself on equal footing with the civilian MoD and was outside political control (Toverud & Hansen, 2004). The relationship between the political and military leadership had been strained for a long time, where the communication between the MoD and the High Command functioned poorly. Moreover, within the military system, there was much resistance against the reform process initiated in the 1990s and a desire to maintain invasion defence as the main military task (Egeberg, 2017, pp. 156-157). In this context, Løwer initiated, in 2000, a meeting with the military leadership at Holmenkollen Park Hotel in Oslo. This to improve cooperation between the political and military levels and find necessary steps for a reform to solve organizational and economic challenges facing the defence establishment. To aid the process, Løwer invited two consultants, a decision that antagonized the military leadership. The perception of the military leadership was that they also wanted the lines of communication to be improved but felt that the MoD did not meet them halfway (Egeberg, 2017, p. 159). Nevertheless, there was a breakthrough. The result of the so-called 'Holmenkollen process' was an agreement of seven measures that would speed up the reform of the Armed Forces. The two first points were a reorganization of the Defence Command and a co-location of the MoD and the Defence Command at Huseby (Norwegian MoD, 2000b). Thus, measures were taken to change the institutional relationship between the civilian and military levels.

Løwer acknowledged later in a parliamentary hearing that the situation had been difficult and that there was a lack of trust between the MoD and the Defence Command (Stortinget, 2010). Moreover, as the work with the long-term defence plan proceeded, there was a tug of war between the defence minister and the CHOD about who would keep the reins during the process (Bogen

& Håkenstad, 2015, p. 100). General Sigurd Frisvold, CHOD, established 'Project Argus' in January 2000, which was an independent organ with a broad authority, directly subjected to himself. This was to ensure that the defence establishment fulfilled the central reform goals, as well as to guarantee that he as the CHOD had a channel of influence vis-à-vis a MoD that was sceptical to the ability of the Armed Forces to reform themselves (Bjerga, 2014, p. 464). This move indicates that the military leadership sought to preserve military autonomy and the ability to articulate own interests.

Løwer did not stay defence minister for long, as the Bondevik government resigned on 17 March 2000 following a vote of confidence in the Storting (Norwegian parliament).[55] Bjørn Tore Godal succeeded as defence minister and felt, like his predecessor, that the military had not acknowledged the need for reform, and he supported the process initiated by Løwer (Egeberg, 2017, p. 163). Shortly after, the new Stoltenberg I minority government opted for an integration of the MoD and the High Command. However, a majority in parliament rejected this proposal, arguing that it would impinge the autonomous position of the CHOD (Norwegian Defence Committee, 2001). Nevertheless, parliament agreed on a co-location of the political and military leadership, although with a formal and institutional separation in structure. Both the CHOD and the defence policy committee supported the idea of co-location (Norwegian High Command, 2000b; NOU 2000:20, 2000). In June 2001, the Storting decided to abolish the current High Command and, in its stead, establish a new Defence Staff co-located with the MoD as early as possible (by 31 December 2004 at the latest). Consequently, there was a shift in the level of military authority as the large and autonomous High Command was reduced and brought closer to the MoD.

Concerning the unity of military authority, the inspector generals of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force had to a large extent an independence of action in the 1990s. Each inspector general, positioned in the High Command, had a large staff and was responsible for education and force production for their respective services. However, at the end of the decade, several strategic functions were transferred from the general inspectors to the Joint Defence Staff. Although the Storting decided to co-locate the top military leadership with the MoD in 2001, the position of the general inspectors in the new structure had not changed. Parliament asked the government to come back to it with a proposal on what to do with the general inspectors of each service in the new structure (Norwegian Defence Committee, 2001). There was much discussion on this subject and on attempts at simplifying and unifying operative command structure. Both the chief of defence and the defence policy committee of 2000 recommended replacing the two current operative HQs

[55] See Appendix III

with one national joint operative one (Norwegian High Command, 2000b; NOU 2000:20, 2000). Instead, the decision taken by the Storting resulted in three different locations for the HQ (Norwegian MoD, 2001). One joint operative HQ was located in Jåtta, with two commands for northern and southern Norway located in Bodø and Trondheim respectively. From an organizational perspective, then, the Armed Forces were not more unified in terms of operative command.

From a functional perspective, there were large discussions around the issue of reforming the defence establishment, the defence concept, and the tasks of the Armed Forces. The 1998 long-term defence plan, in effect from 1999, still had defence against invasion of the northern part of the country as the core goal of the armed forces (Norwegian MoD, 1998). At the same time, however, it increased the expectations of the Armed Forces in other areas, such as international operations. In 1998, the MoD started working on a White Paper on the adaptation of the armed forces for increased participation in international operation, developed by a small group of persons affiliated with the security policy department in the MoD; although, there was resistance of the proposal, as large parts of the military organization still viewed invasion defence as their main task (Bogen & Håkenstad, 2015, p. 97). The conclusion of the so-called 'Intops White Paper' was that improvement of the ability of the Armed Forces to participate in international was decisive "both for the credibility of the Armed Forces in Norway and Norway's credibility internationally" (Norwegian MoD, 1999, section 1.1), and recommended a model for earmarked deployable units. In 2000, parliament adopted the Intops White Paper and set a high ambition level for Norwegian participation in international operations (Norwegian Defence Committee, 2000). Thus, from the political level a more international focus was set for the Armed Forces, against the wishes of the military organization.

After having long adhered to the task of invasion defence, the military leadership gradually embraced international operations as a central task of the Armed Forces. On the military side, the 2000 Defence Study published by Frisvold was a surprise to those who still believed in the large, old invasion defence.[56] As mentioned, the defence studies are an important channel of influence for the CHOD. The study was a clear breach with earlier thinking, in which Frisvold introduced the principle of resource-based planning (Norwegian High Command, 2000b). He made it clear that it was not a military recommendation, but a statement that the policy of the government (i.e. reduced defence budget) was about to deter the Armed Forces from fulfilling its main task, and to

[56] General Arne Solli, former CHOD, had initiated the Defence Study, but as he left office, General Frisvold took over in his tenure as CHOD.

highlight for both government and parliament what they could get, and not get, for defence allocation (Rønne, 2000). Overall, the study considered two different structural models, each built around its primary task 'threshold defence'. One emphasized national tasks and 'alliance-adapted defence', while the other outlined a military organization that would function as a contribution to an allied defence structure for both home and abroad (Norwegian High Command, 2000b, p. 3). The final military recommendation was a compromise built on both alternatives. Although the concept of threshold defence emphasized challenges in Norway's immediate neighbourhood, it did not include a focus on the invasion defence. This is important because the Norwegian Armed Forces had been designed to cater for the invasion defence of one part of the country; now, the military had to reprioritize.

Adjustments to include international operations were reflected in the joint military doctrine. Military doctrine development was in the hands of the CHOD and the Defence Command. The joint doctrine at the time was published in 2000 and built upon the first joint doctrine from 1995. The 1995 doctrine had been a top-down led process with only the general political framework given by the MoD as direction. In Norway, military theory and analyses of military power both during and after the Cold War had mainly taken place within institutions of the military establishment that worked with doctrine development, conducting research and educating officers, without any specific political involvement (Græger, 2007, pp. 11-12). In the 2000 doctrine, the primary task of the Armed Forces was defined to be a war deterring function. While the primary task in peacetime was force production, the doctrine acknowledged that the tasks of the military outside the country in peacetime was becoming an important part of Norwegian contributions to international peace and stability, and thereby indirect defence of Norway (Norwegian High Command, 2000a, p. 107). Overall, the military had broader tasks and there was little political involvement in doctrine development, signifying a broad scope of military authority.

With the 2001 White Paper, there is a notable shift from focusing on territorial defence and broader mobilized armed forces, to quantitative reductions, flexibility and more rapid deployable units. In parliamentary debates on the 2001 long-term defence plan, parts of the opposition argued that the government over-emphasized international operations (Norwegian Defence Committee, 2001, pp. 27-32). Nonetheless, Oslo finally abandoned the concept of invasion defence, and was as such a clear shift from previous defence thinking. The government also wanted to change the current defence concept (a national balanced defence, allied military and international cooperation, total defence, and conscription) to a 'modern and flexible defence, allied and international defence cooperation, conscription, and civil-military cooperation' (Norwegian MoD, 2001). Input from the

parliamentary defence committee resulted in a moderation of the government's principle of a 'modern and flexible defence' to a 'national, balanced and flexible defence' (Norwegian Defence Committee, 2001). Regardless, the direction was now set. Freed from the task of invasion defence, the Armed Forces were to be available for missions abroad, in accordance with the ideas set out in the 'Intops White Paper'.

On the dimension of military professionalization, there was a notable shift from focusing on territorial defence and broader mobilized forces, to quantitative reductions, flexibility and more rapid deployable units. Yet, conscription remained the backbone of the defence structure and central for recruitment of officers. Conscription has been an important pillar in the defence concept throughout Norway's history (Håkenstad, 2010; I. Johansen, 2010, 2016). However, a new element that emerged in the long-term defence plan published in 2001 was that the needs of the Armed Forces were to be directional regarding the number of persons recruited for mandatory military service. In parliamentary debates, the opposition warned against this. They were concerned that it would hollow out conscription as a recruitment system and in the long term, lead to a creeping implementation of a professionalized military (Norwegian Defence Committee, 2001, p. 40). Yet, a majority in parliament agreed with the principle that the needs of the military, and not the size of the cohorts, should be directional for the number of drafted conscripts. In the 2000 joint doctrine, it was underlined that a large conscripted defence could not answer the demands of quality. However, the High Command acknowledged that conscription had to continue to be one of the pillars in the defence concept. This because, without conscription, the basis for recruitment would disappear and it was an important contribution to maintain a strong defence will in society. From the military's perspective, although the continuation of conscription was inherent in its mandate, it was recommended a reduction by half of recruits, and a different military service time with twelve months in the armed services and four months for the Home Guard (Frisvold, 2000; Norwegian High Command, 2000a, p. 137). Thus, the military leadership pushed for a reduction in conscripts.

During the 1990s, there had been an increase in the number of professional soldiers in the military. Most important in this regard was the establishment of the Telemark Battalion in 1993, which was the first fully professionalized army battalion in the history of the Norwegian defence establishment (Børresen et al., 2004, p. 191; Hammerstad & Jahr, 1995). As part of the 2001 long-term defence plan, it was also decided to develop the Norwegian special operations forces further (Norwegian MoD, 2001). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the government and the military leadership did not prioritize the SOF in terms of resources and considered dismantling the units (Melien, 2014, p. 28). However, during the 1990s, both the political and military leadership started to acknowledge the

strategic importance and necessity of SOF. Several missions abroad at the end of the 1990s made it clear that they were too small both to perform national peacetime tasks and to provide international contributions. Consequently, the government gave the SOF a higher priority. After participating in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean Sea, the SOF received political acceptance as a relevant and suitable resource in international operations (Hammersmark, 2015). In the period between 1998 and 2001, the SOF modified their primary focus from domestic counterterrorist missions to include broader SOF missions.

By 2001, the military actor had a broad capability of influence, especially from an institutional and functional perspective. There were evident frosty relations between the political and military levels, marked by poor communication and a military leadership set in its ways. However, there were also signs of change, in which the Holmenkollen process was the beginning of shifting government-military relations. There was also an increased international focus, signalling a new era for the Norwegian Armed Forces.

3.3.2 Norwegian military capability of influence at 2014

The picture of the Norwegian Armed Forces is quite different by 2014. After a turbulent decade, the military had completed several reforms. The many changes resulted in a narrowing of military capability of influence. Perhaps the most significant change was the integration of the CHOD and parts of his staff with the MoD. Although the decision to integrate came in 2002, the change in the governance apparatus took time. The military leadership saw its position of power threatened and fought against the change. Support came from conservative sections in the political landscape and other actors who argued that the CHOD's autonomous position guaranteed independent and professional guidance to politicians on military affairs (Bogen & Håkenstad, 2015, p. 127). However, the driving force behind the reform, a small group of government officials in the MoD, had support from the political leadership, first from Løwer, then Godal when he took office. Later, Kristin Krohn Devold became the defence minister who established the integrated civil-military leadership in 2003. Throughout the period, there were several adjustments. A real gathering of the central leadership apparatus came first after Frisvold left the office of CHOD and the new building at the Akershus Fortress was finished in 2006.

The so-called Integrated Strategic Management organization,[57] which replaced the old High Command, carries out the political, strategic and management tasks of a government office and

[57] 'Integrert Strategisk Lederskap' (ISL) in Norwegian.

the strategic functions associated with a military staff.[58] The new Defence Staff, however, remained outside the MoD structure and took over the remaining management responsibilities following the integration of the CHOD and the strategic functions of the former High Command. Although the Defence Staff still is a significant institution and is deeply involved in the long-term defence plan process, it does not have the independence of its predecessor (Håkenstad & Larsen, 2012, p. 19). Moreover, on the personnel side, the military employees in the Defence Staff were reduced to 184 in the new organization, while civilian employees in the MoD now number 300. This is a noteworthy change from 2001 when 1,400 were employed in the Defence Command and 200 employed in the MoD. With strategic integration, there is more detailed political control when it comes to allocation of defence spending, organization, and administration. On the question of the level of military authority, however, it is not easy to pinpoint, as it is difficult to draw the line between the military and political spheres. One aspect is that the defence minister and the MoD bureaucracy is closer to the CHOD and can as such exercise tighter political control. Moreover, integration challenges the position of the CHOD as chief of the Armed Forces, who is in a tension between the military organization and the political level. This because he now combines two roles, the highest military advisor in the MoD and head of the armed forces, and the new position in the government structure makes it more difficult to distinguish between these two. In turn, the different decision-making processes might appear unclear to the outside. Another aspect is that the CHOD has an easy access to the political leadership and is closer to political processes. With a strong CHOD, he can adapt to the situation and have greater influence. Thus, military capability of influence goes in waves depending on how the CHOD takes advantage of possibilities.[59]



Figure 3.5 *Organigram of the Norwegian Integrated Strategic Leadership*[60]

[58] Note that it is a strategic integration, not operational, where the Norwegian Joint Headquarters is in Northern Norway.
[59] This became clear after the Norwegian interview round, in which interviewees pointed to both an increased influence of the CHOD and decreased influence.
[60] The organigram is compiled based on information from the Norwegian MoD's web pages (Norwegian MoD, n.d.).

The civil-military integrated strategic leadership (Figure 3.5) also affected the scope of military authority. From being a small bureaucracy, the MoD is now a premise provider (Næss, 2011). This is highlighted with the first strategic concept paper issued by the MoD in 2004 (Norwegian MoD, 2004c). In the hierarchy of documents in the defence establishment, the MoD's strategic concept is subordinated to strategic-political documents such as the long-term defence plan; however, it is superior to documents like the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine and concepts for the structural development of the military. Moreover, with the integration of the CHOD into the MoD, this brought the development of military doctrine closer to the defence minister and thereby increased his/her control of the process. Accordingly, the political leadership became more involved in the formulation of doctrine than before (Bjerga & Haaland, 2010). In 2007, the CHOD published a new joint operational doctrine. Compared to the 2000 joint doctrine it differs in several ways, for example, by not representing a normative guide on how to plan and conduct military operations. Instead, the purpose of the 2007 doctrine was to explain the new purpose and role of the military profession in the post-9/11 era (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2007). The work on the 2007 doctrine was also organized differently with more ministerial involvement, and while it was still a military document and not a political one, the MoD became jointly responsible (see Bjerga, 2011, pp. 195-198). Furthermore, in 2008, the MoD changed the long-term defence planning system from a four-year cycle to a system of continuous planning. The new system implies that plans and policy decisions are made when perceived as necessary, rather than in accordance with a five-year plan. Central actors in the ministry had perceived the old system as a straitjacket, which sometimes forced decisions to be made prematurely or to be postponed unnecessarily (Håkenstad & Larsen, 2012, p. 21). It was also seen as a hindrance to political involvement, as a new defence minister wanting to revise aspects of policy might be obliged to wait for several years while the sequential process ran its course. In 2009, the MoD revised and republished the strategic concept (Norwegian MoD, 2009a), confirming the determination of civilian authorities to maintain a written security policy doctrine at the strategic level. The content of the Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine of 2014 broadly follows the previous editions, except that a lot of general military theory and the chapter on the military profession has been removed (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2014). According to Slensvik and Ydstebø (2015), it appears that the MoD was even more involved in this edition of the joint doctrine. Overall, this indicates a narrower scope of military authority.

As previously mentioned, the 2001 long-term defence plan left the position of the inspector generals in the new structure undecided. With the change of governments in the summer of 2002, the Bondevik II government and the Labour Party agreed to position the inspector generals in the new Defence Staff, responsible for executing decisions regarding their armed services respectively

and force production (Norwegian MoD, 2000a). The inspector generals, however, were worried as they only had a modest staff of approximately 23 persons each as support in this work. They had also lost their responsibility on issues related to personnel (Børresen et al., 2004, p. 312). In 2008, the Storting decided to take the inspector generals and their staff functions out of the Defence Staff and relocate them with their respective services' main base of activity (Norwegian Defence Committee, 2008), shown in figure 3.6 below. Accordingly, the inspector general for the Army is located at Bardufoss and the inspector general for the Navy in Bergen, while the inspector general maintained his location in Oslo as the decision on the base structure of the Air Force awaited the procurement of new combat aircraft (Norwegian Defence Committee, 2008, p. 24). The relocation of the inspector generals met significant resistance within the military organization. General Sverre Diesen, CHOD at the time, argued strongly against the decision and emphasized that a relocation would make the day-to-day management of the military establishment difficult (Norwegian Defence Committee, 2008, p. 69). There has also been tensions between the CHOD and the service chiefs, where the loyalty to own service is stronger than to the overall organization.[61] This is not something unique to the Norwegian case but is evident in most military organizations. In 2009, the government established the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, unifying military command under the CHOD. It is located in Northern Norway and has the overall command and control of all military activity in Norway. Thus, while there is more unity of military authority, the different locations suggest a mixed picture from an organizational perspective.



Figure 3.6 *Organigram of the Norwegian Armed Forces*[62]

[61] Interview 9 and 13 (see Appendix I).

[62] In addition to directly subordinated commanders the organization includes the Head of the Defence Logistics Organization, Head of the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Medical Services, Head of the Norwegian Defence University College, Head of the Norwegian Armed Forces HR and Conscription Centre, and Head of the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Support Services (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2018a).

Since 2001, there has been a significant professionalization of the Armed Forces, in which an increasing part of the combat forces consist of professional units. The last mobilization division was abolished in 2006 after state budget negotiations (Håkenstad, 2010, p. 7; Norwegian MoD, 2006, pp. 14, 90). Moreover, Oslo has heightened its focus on spearhead capabilities and the number of conscripted personnel has declined.[63] In 2002, the Armed Forces estimated the need of enrolling 13,588 new recruits for military service; for 2013 the estimated number was 8,448. Furthermore, in 2002, 11,991 recruits completed their basic training, while in 2012 the number was 7,468.[64] In other words, in a decade, there has been a decline of almost 38 per cent in the number of Norwegian citizens enrolled for military service. However, another interesting aspect is the introduction of mandatory conscription for women in 2015. Conscription as such is more diversified. More significantly is the development of the special operations forces. While politicians discussed shutting down the units in the 1990s, the special operations forces became its own service in 2014. The same year, the Norwegian Armed Forces Special Operations Command established a new troop consisting of female soldiers. Overall, the SOF are considered as one of the big winners in the terms of resources and personnel expansion during these reform processes (Melien, 2014). SOF has also a bigger role in both political and military strategic documents, evident in both the joint doctrine and strategic concepts of the MoD (see Norwegian Armed Forces, 2014, pp. 118-122; Norwegian MoD, 2004c).

Overall, the dynamics have shifted in the case of Norway – from an autonomous to a confined military actor. The process has been a gradual one and despite the trend of increased number of professional soldiers, the picture in general portrays a narrower military capability of influence in 2014, compared to 2001. Thus, there is more professionalization and more unity from an organizational perspective. Yet, shifts in level and scope of military authority have notably confined the military actor.

3.4 Sweden

Sweden has a long-standing tradition of military unalignment and neutrality, although Swedish neutrality during the Cold War had a westward tilt.[65] Scholars have argued that the Swedish policy of neutrality has been a flexible adaption to the power relations in the world (Agrell, 2015; Andrén, 1978). As the Cold War ended, an uncertainty regarding developments in the security environment

[63] 1 January 2016, the Norwegian Armed Forces reintroduced non-commissioned officers in all armed services, having had a single rank tier since 1930. The Specialist Corps lance corporal and corporal ranks are reserved for enlisted personnel, while the rank of private is for conscripts only (Bentzrød, 2015; Norwegian Armed Forces, 2016).
[64] See Appendix IV.
[65] Sweden also had a flexible approach to neutrality during the Second World War (Agrell, 2015), although unlike Norway, the country decided to maintain that policy after 1945.

lingered in the country. Stockholm viewed the developments in Eastern Europe as unpredictable, especially in Russia (Swedish MoD, 1992). Although the military strategic conditions in northern Europe remained unchanged in Swedish eyes at the time, the new political situation also enabled cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy with other European states. Sweden joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) in 1994 and the EU in 1995 together with the other military unaligned Austria and Finland. Since then, the country has been one of the most active EU members urging for a greater role of the EU in crisis management activities (Andersson, 2007, p. 152). Since the 1990s, Sweden's defence policy and its armed forces have undergone a major transformation, which has led to a drastic reduction in wartime forces and peacetime defence establishment.

From 2001 to 2014, the journey of Sweden and its Armed Forces has been a transformative one. The analysis of this case portrays a picture of an autonomous military actor. The country took steps in unifying its military organization in the early 1990s, where further reforms from 2000 and onwards aimed to consolidate this change. In 2001, the military leadership had a semi-independent role vis-à-vis its political masters and in continuation had a broad scope of military authority. At the same time, general conscription remained a central pillar. By 2014, although with major reforms, the military actor has maintained its broad military capability of influence. There was a more unified Swedish military actor based on an all-volunteer professional force with a joint doctrine. Although the institutional relationship between the political and military levels remained formally unchanged, there has been informal changes leading to a closer dialogue between political and military levels, as well as attempts of more detailed political control. Nonetheless, available data indicates that the broad military capability of influence persists.

3.4.1 Swedish military capability of influence at 2001

By 2001, the 2000 defence bill outlined new reforms, taking advantage of a so-called 'operative timeout', in which the beneficial geopolitical situation of Sweden made a reform possible while the operative ability went down.[66] There were considerable cuts in the defence budget as Stockholm sought to get as much out of the 'peace dividend' as possible, and the Armed Forces were without a clearly defined task. Nevertheless, overall, the Swedish military actor had a broad military capability of influence in 2001.

From an institutional perspective, the military leadership had a high level of military authority. In 1994, the Riksdag (Swedish parliament) decided to organize the Swedish Armed Forces within a

[66] The Swedish defence bills ('*försvarsbeslut*' in Swedish) are central in the long-term defence planning and are, when approved in parliament, the main means of political guidance for the armed forces (Håkenstad & Larsen, 2012, p. 27).

single unified government agency, headed by the CHOD (Swedish MoD, 1992).[67] Henceforth, he had sole authority, and became the point of contact with the political level. Previously, the Armed Forces consisted of numerous semi-independent authorities, while the CHOD was operative chief in the event of war or conflict. Although the military organization became one authority, the strict separation between the political and military level did not change. The separation between the MoD and the Armed Forces follows the Swedish constitution. The constitution prohibits cabinet ministers from intervening directly in the day-to-day operations of these agencies, which are semi-autonomous entities with high independency in their limited spheres of autonomy (Ruffa, 2013). Formally, the defence minister is the head of the ministry and tasked with supervising the activities of the various government agencies under the MoD. However, the defence minister, like other Swedish ministers, has a restricted role, especially compared to his/her Danish and Norwegian counterparts (Håkenstad & Larsen, 2012, pp. 25-26). Accordingly, in the Swedish system of government in general, there is a clear separation of the political level and administrative level. Moreover, the size and strength of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters (SAFHQ) relative to the MoD is significant. It is a large institution with approximately 1,300 employees and has responsibility for security policy analysis, among other areas. The MoD, on the other hand, has approximately 130 employees. With a limited capacity, the MoD is dependent on input from the SAFHQ when producing policy documents. From an institutional perspective, then, the military has a strong position and authority.

Concerning the organization of the military leadership, the decision in 1994 unified military authority into the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, the highest level of command in the Armed Forces. The collection of authority followed official reports that criticized how the Headquarters functioned (SOU 1991:112, 1991) and created better formal conditions for the CHOD to govern the military organization (Hedin, 2011, pp. 239-240). The service chiefs were disbanded as agencies, although the services as establishments still existed in a more subordinated function. The new HQ had a much larger staff, reflecting the fusion between the Defence Staff and the three service staffs.[68] Despite this reorganization, the prevailing perception by 2001 was that the service chiefs did more harm than good; they had separate budgets and own culture, which challenged the efforts towards a joint organization. It became clear that the service chiefs still had considerable influence and largely operated as before, and that it was necessary to break the influence of the armed services over planning and production of wartime forces (Agrell, 2010, pp.

[67] In Sweden, the term 'Supreme Commander' is used for the military chief of the Swedish Armed Forces, however, I will here use the term 'chief of defence' like in the other three Nordic cases.
[68] It was organized in four units, operation leadership, and leaderships for the Army, Air Force and Navy.

115-116). Therefore, following the 1999 defence bill, the government outlined a major change in the military leadership, which abolished several command levels with accompanied staff. Moreover, the reform included organizing four military districts with territorial command (Swedish MoD, 1999a, pp. 132-134). These military districts were established as successors to the former defence area and military area staffs and their territorial tasks (Hedin, 2011, p. 143). Overall, to a high degree, command was centralized in one HQ with operative command joint for all services. The organization of the highest level of command in the Swedish Armed Forces at 2001 is shown in the following organigram:



Figure 3.7 *Organigram of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters at 2001*[69]

The new organization reduced the influence of the services, and the CHOD and his staff in the SAFHQ were in more control of the military organization. This proved to be important when Owe Wiktorin, chief of defence, presented his proposal for changing the organization from an invasion defence to an operational defence. Not all actors within the Swedish Armed Forces were in favour of the radical restructure; however, as argued by Wilhelm Agrell (2010, p. 124), with the reorganization of the military leadership, opponents of these changes were unable to get their voices heard because of the centralization of military authority. The change in the internal power balance within the military organization was also evident to the political level. The proposal for a new direction did not come from the government or the defence commission, but from the highest representatives of the Armed Forces as a unified military actor.

In terms of a functional perspective, up until the 2000s, the military was organized and structured to solve one main task, namely the invasion defence of the country. In the first half of the 1990s, a sense of uncertainty lingered concerning the developments in the threat picture, and neither the

[69] The organigram is mainly compiled based on information from interviews with Swedish top-level officers and civil servants. See Appendix I.

political nor the military leadership viewed the situation as merely positive (Agrell, 2010, Chapter 4). However, the many defence bills in the latter half of the 1990s had shifted towards the view that the invasion scenario no longer was realistic (Swedish Defence Commission, 1995). Moreover, with the 1995/1996 defence bill, participation in international peace-support operations became an ordinary task for the military, alongside defending Sweden against armed aggression (Swedish MoD, 1996). Overall, the 1999/2001 defence bill outlined four main tasks for the Armed Forces: defending Sweden against armed attack, maintaining sovereignty, contributing to peace and security, and supporting civil society in strains during peacetime (Swedish MoD, 1999a). The defence bill was also more open in its description of problems and aspiration for change. It introduced some of the ideas and concepts highlighted in the years to come, for example a mission-based defence as a counterpart to the old invasion-based defence (Hedin, 2011). Emerging from the Cold War with an outdated army, Stockholm had made ambitious attempts to modernize the Army in the mid-1990s. However, the levels in the defence budget – given government priorities – were not sufficient, even to support an army organization reduced by half and, at the same time, meet reasonable requirements for capability. Therefore, the 1999/2001 defence bill outlined large organizational cuts (Swedish MoD, 1999a). However, it also included heavy reductions in the defence budget as to collect a 'peace dividend'. While there was a continued emphasis on territorial defence, the capability to participate in international operations had become a high-prioritized task for the Armed Forces, were the government underlined that all units in the mission-based defence, in principle, were to be used in international missions (Swedish MoD, 2001). Moreover, in the early 2000s, the military abandoned the mobilization defence system and began to store military materiel in a few central locations (Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, p. 24). By 2001, then, a different perception of threats and new ideas for the Armed Forces had taken hold.

A broad military capability to develop new ideas is exemplified by the point that the redefinition of the threat picture did not happen at the political level but came from military representatives. With the capacity for developing new ideas, the military leadership, not the politicians or the MoD bureaucracy, was a driving force for reform and change in the military organization. The MoD was far too small to do such planning and be an initiator of ideas.[70] However, the political level had the power of the purse, and with heavy reductions in the defence budget, the military leadership had to prioritize. Accordingly, the military leadership promoted an international focus because there were not enough resources to focus both on territorial defence and international operations. While the 1999 Defence Commission argued for keeping parts of the basic organization (Swedish

[70] Highlighted in interview 26. See Appendix I

Defence Commission, 1999), the military rejected this, as it was necessary to prioritize.[71] Departing from the pessimistic view in the early 1990s, the CHOD no longer tried to legitimize continuity, but aimed for a radical reform of military organization and structure. At the request of the government in 1998 to plan for a development of alternative future structures, Wiktorin, CHOD, presented three alternatives. None of the alternatives involved a traditional territorial defence structure but three alternatives for a radically changed and quantitatively reduced military organization, by which Wiktorin was prepared to make a choice between old and new (Agrell, 2010, pp. 122-124). It entailed a revolution in the perspective of future warfare, strategic principles and the tasks of the armed forces. The view of the military leadership was that such a transformation was possible due to a 'strategic timeout'. The man behind the concept was Johan Kihl, an Army lieutenant general, who in 1996 became chief of the strategy division within the SAFHQ and was a proponent of a radical restructuring of the military organization. Because an armed attack in the form of a conventional invasion of Sweden was unrealistic, this opened the window for the military to require an ability of manoeuvre warfare and conduct joint operations (Agrell, 2010, pp. 117-118). This shift, with the military leadership as primus motor for reform, reflects the broad autonomy and institutional position of the CHOD and the SAFHQ. The 1999 defence bill, which was developed in three stages, signified an end of the invasion defence and the emergence of an organization that could defend the country against a more limited attack other than an invasion and participate in the international security cooperation. The government outlined a reform of the Armed Forces' structure, in which the military was to organize as a mission-based defence[72] (Swedish MoD, 1999a, 1999b). However, the budget was less than the CHOD was led to believe when they agreed to embark on a reform agenda. The restructuring of the Armed Forces' budget, which saw significant cuts, created bitterness in the military leadership. The political leadership, on the other hand, was sceptical of the military's management abilities (Agrell, 2010, p. 129). Thus, in the beginning of the 2000s, relations between the political and military levels were frosty.

From a sociological perspective, although the 1999 defence bill outlined sharp reductions in the basic and operational organizations, a traditional force production perspective remained. Accordingly, conscription continued to be the model for supplying the Armed Forces with soldiers, which completely dominated the activity in the Army's regiments (Hedin, 2011, p. 37). The idea of conscription has been important in Sweden and the concept of 'People's Defence' has remained strong in Swedish defence thinking since the late 1980s. During the 1990s, politicians stressed that the country must not adopt a model of a professional army and that it was important to have

[71] Interview 30. See Appendix I.
[72] 'Insatsorganisation' in Swedish.

conscription to maintain ties with the civil society (Swedish MoD, 1992, pp. 38-39; 1995, p. 35). The same arguments were applied to the 1999/2001 defence bill, which maintained the conscription system albeit with a reduction in number of conscripts (Swedish MoD, 1999b, p. 131; 2001, pp. 181). The military leadership, however, was of another opinion. In the view of the Armed Forces, the existing recruitment system did not reflect the demands of the future organization, especially in the question of officers. Thus, they proposed a new system for personnel recruitment. Nevertheless, while the military communicated their needs to the political authorities of a reduced need for employed personnel and a smaller volume of conscripts, the government aimed at a larger volume of conscripts than what the military leadership outlined (Swedish MoD, 1999a, pp. 109-110). At the same time, the defence bill gave more attention to SOF, emphasizing the ability of SOF to operate against sabotage and terror threats considering the current military threat picture (Swedish MoD, 1999a, p. 39). Thus, the idea of conscription remained strong, yet professional units received increased political attention.

Overall, the Armed Forces constituted an autonomous military actor in 2001. The CHOD and the SAFHQ had an institutional dominance and, in turn, this enabled the military actor to be a primus motor behind the radical reform introduced at the start of the new millennium. Moreover, the military organization had become unified with a reduction of the influence of service chiefs, enabling the CHOD to advance the idea of a new military organization.

3.4.2 Swedish military capability of influence at 2014

In the years between 2001 and 2014, the military went through a dramatic transformation. A watershed came with the 2004 defence bill, which outlined a foundational change of the Armed Forces. This culminated in the 2009 defence bill, although the results were perhaps not what the military leadership had in mind; these defence bills brought further cuts in the defence budget. The changes in this period broadened the military capability of influence, although it was a considerably smaller organization compared to 2001.

One of the more decisive changes in the Armed Forces concerns military professionalization, in which Sweden has gone through a transformation to an all-volunteer professional force. The large number of conscripts had become an obstacle draining resources and many within the military establishment saw the recruitment system as an ineffective system (Dalsjö, 2017, p. 13; Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, p. 26; Syrén, 2006a, p. 30). Moreover, there were recruitment problems and inefficiencies in the employment of officers, where the military leadership argued that the existing competence structure as well as an aging officer corps were unacceptable for a mission-based defence, in which international operations were increasingly important (Hedin, 2011, pp. 166-167).

Thus, with a focus on international operations as one of the military's main tasks coupled with the dismantling of the invasion defence, conscription was considered from a different perspective. In this process, the military became a driving force for change, as they had to handle recruitment problems (see Agrell, 2010, Chapter 9). The change to an all-volunteer military organization came in stages.

In the 2004 defence bill, the government predicted a decreased need for conscripts, and the direction for the Armed Forces was not to take out more conscripts than what was needed for the mission-based defence. However, in order to secure the capability to face an armed attack in the future, the central pillar was still conscription, although through a changed system (Swedish MoD, 2004, pp. 82-83). With the 2004 defence bill, the opposition of government authorities towards professional lower ranks in the army was softened (Hedin, 2011, p. 37). Consequently, if not formally, conscription became voluntary in practice with a mixed form of conscription and professional soldiers. In the 2008 budget proposal, the Armed Forces forwarded several recommendations to the government that pointed towards a professional army (Swedish Armed Forces, 2007b). The proposal reflected developments within the European Security and Defence Policy, as well as the country's cooperation with NATO. A shift in the personnel system also received support from the 2008 Defence Commission, which underlined that all units combined had to have a qualified ability of combat across the scale from low-intensive to high-intensive conflict levels to create security and maintain peace in conflict areas (Swedish Defence Commission, 2008, p. 31). The subsequent 2009 defence bill highlighted the need for a new personnel system and signified an end to conscription in peacetime and the start of a recruitment of soldiers on a volunteer basis. The government viewed this as essential for the development of a mission-based defence and stated its ambition to increase the use, accessibility and flexibility of the Armed Forces, which presupposed that all units in the military organization were staffed with volunteer personnel (Swedish MoD, 2009, p. 48). Accordingly, the army was organized in seven manoeuvre battalions of professional, all-volunteer soldiers. As Ångström and Noreen make clear, these units were intended to serve as the basic building blocks and act as the 'fighting unit' (Ångström & Noreen, 2017, p. 46). Another important aspect of the 2009 defence bill is that it introduced a new system of ranks by establishing two categories of officers, commissioned and non-commissioned officers, the latter termed specialist officers. Yet, the conversion to non-commissioned officers has only affected a small number of individuals to date (Hedin, 2011, p. 188). Overall, as part of the transformation to a mission-based defence, political authorities allowed conscription to remain dormant in peacetime. The Swedish Armed Forces became an all-volunteer

professional force with mandatory international service for officers and a changed system of ranks. Thus, this change leads to a different kind of military organization, distinct from civil society.

In terms of unity of military authority, there have been further changes in the military leadership since 2001. An influential concept that was used in earnest after the 1999-2001 defence bills was 'networked-based defence'. Agrell argues that this concept was not only about the introduction of new techniques with a link to the technical vision on future warfare of the 1990s but also about breaking down hierarchies and introducing a 'flat' organization (Agrell, 2010, pp. 173-174). Yet, instead, the process led to more planning, intelligence support and operative command being centralized into the growing SAFHQ. The years 2002-2004 brought further centralization, in which all command in the military was from 2004 centralized to the HQ (Hedin, 2011, p. 143). There was a concentration of leadership questions, as all regional chiefs were disbanded and the service chiefs, who lost one star in rank, were brought into the central command. Within this organization, there was a concentration of decision-making processes, which was placed in the close circle of the CHOD. As the service chiefs descended in the organization, they have a relative weak position and little influence over developments and changes in their respective services.[73] The 2004 defence bill outlined that all development processes in the military were to be coordinated and directed towards development within the framework of the 'network-based defence' concept (Swedish MoD, 2004, p. 77). Overall, there are two main processes; Chief Production is responsible for force production, while Chief Operations make use of the units that are produced (see figure 3.8).



Figure 3.8 *Organigram of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters at 2014*[74]

[73] Noted in interview 26, 30, 31, 32, 33. See Appendix I.
[74] The organigram is constructed based on information from interviews with top-level officers. See Appendix I.

The reorganization of the military leadership has been a complicated process. Although 'network-based defence' was a conceptual solution in the early 2000s, and treated extensively in the 2004 defence bill, Stockholm gradually moved away from the concept and it was barely mentioned in the 2009 defence bill (Hedin, 2011, pp. 114-117, 132). The many changes have also created discontent within the military organization. Magnus Petersson finds that the defence transformation in Sweden had weak internal support with both low internal and external legitimacy (Petersson, 2011a, p. 715), and Ola Hedin notes that the military is not the homogeneous organization that the combined authority since 1994 might suggest (Hedin, 2011, pp. 31-33). One indication of this is how General Håkan Syrén, during his tenure as CHOD, sought to convey the message of the necessity of reform throughout the Swedish Armed Forces and change the mind-set of the military organization (Syrén, 2006a, 2007). There is one HQ, but service identity remains and is protected. Nevertheless, although the organizational picture is not black and white, the centralization of command and decision-making power indicates significant unity of military authority. Moreover, while service rivalry exists, loyalty is expected when the CHOD decides.[75]

From a functional perspective, the 2004 defence bill entailed an important shift, in which the government listed international tasks first and the defence of Sweden against an armed attack as number three. The Armed Forces were to be flexible, with the ability to conduct war and solve the tasks demanded by the Riksdag and the government (Swedish MoD, 2004, pp. 31, 33). Thus, the preparedness of the military organization was to be primarily for conducting international missions and assert territorial integrity (Agrell, 2010, p. 214; Hedin, 2011, p. 98). Moreover, the defence bill directed focus towards developing the Swedish contribution to the EU's rapid reaction forces (Swedish MoD, 2004, p. 12). From the military leadership's perspective, the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the EU battle groups were important for the defence development, in which the latter became a tool for promoting the transformation of the military organization (Syren 2007, pp. 31-34). In a report from 2008, the Defence Commission still considered an armed attack against the country as an unlikely scenario in the near future (Swedish Defence Commission, 2008). The important point was that efforts, both international and national, were to be viewed as normal activity for the military organization. The 2009 defence bill was a further step towards the internationalization of the military and the focus on international missions.[76] The Swedish Armed Forces were now to be a 'both and' organization (Syrén, 2007). Accordingly, in addition to the international focus, the 2009 defence bill demanded that units were to be on standby and combat

[75] Highlighted in interview 27, 28, 30. See Appendix I.
[76] Note that Sweden's military has been involved in missions abroad for decades under UN mandates (Jakobsen, 2006). However, that was alongside a primary focus on territorial defence.

ready within three months. However, this requirement was not taken seriously by the military who, as argued by Robert Dalsjö, "was both jaded by impossible demands in the past and set in its ways" (Dalsjö, 2017, p. 16). Another aspect of the defence bill is that the Armed Forces were to defend Sweden and promote security on Swedish territory, in the country's vicinity and outside (Swedish MoD, 2009, p. 36). Therefore, there was to be one set of forces for all tasks at home, in the near abroad and overseas. In 2009, Stockholm also issued a declaration of solidarity in its security policy that covers EU member states, as well as Iceland and Norway. Under this declaration, Sweden should also have the capability to give and receive military assistance. Despite international operations being one of the main tasks of the Armed Forces, the obligation to serve in international operations for officers was not regulated until the autumn of 2010, although this obligation also applies to newly qualified officers from 2004 onwards (Hedin, 2011; Regulation (2010:651), 2010). Thus, the focus on international tasks only increased, in which international operations – and not defence of the territory against armed aggression – have become the decisive task for the Swedish military actor in practice.

Accompanying the many defence reforms and shifts in roles, Sweden has revised its military strategic doctrine of 2002 twice, in 2011 and 2016. Importantly, this process took place within military ranks, with little involvement from the political level and the MoD bureaucracy, indicating a broad scope of military authority.[77] In 2002, the SAFHQ published its first military strategic doctrine. This followed a need to explain what the Armed Forces should do and how, as the broad military organization did not exist anymore, where everything became smaller with a focus on the international part (Swedish Armed Forces, 2002). This first military doctrine was clearly influenced by the national perspective, despite international tasks receiving greater attention (Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, p. 70). Moreover, expected effects of network-based defence and the 'revolution in military affairs' constituted benchmarks and ideas presented in the 2002 doctrine.[78] Already in 2006, work began on revising the 2002 military strategic doctrine, which was completed in 2011 (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011b). The decision of revision followed the need to adapt the doctrine to the internationalization and transformation of the military organization (Hartikainen, 2008, p. 28). The 2011 military strategic doctrine contains a new conflict spectre from high-intensity to low-intensity effort against both regular and irregular adversaries (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011b). While the

[77] The 2016 doctrine, however, was outsourced to the Defence University College in Stockholm (Swedish Armed Forces, 2016).
[78] In 2005, the Swedish Armed Forces issued a doctrine for joint operations, as well as one for operations at sea, land, and air (Swedish Armed Forces, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). The point was to elaborate on the 2002 doctrine and what this doctrine signified in practice. The Swedish Armed Forces replaced these documents with a joint operative doctrine in 2014 (Swedish Armed Forces, 2014b).

2002 doctrine had a focus on manoeuvre warfare, the 2012 version focused on crisis management.[79] Although overall political guidelines, defence bills and annual regulation letters colours the content of the doctrines, the data suggest that there is a broad scope of military authority in terms of doctrine development. At the same time, the functional perspective suggests an increased focus on crisis management, yet this does not appear to have enlarged political involvement in doctrine development.

Concerning the level of military authority, there have not been any formal changes in the institutional relationship between the MoD and the CHOD. The latter still has a strong institutional position due to the Swedish constitution, in which the Armed Forces are subject to ministerial powers in terms of directing operations, but the MoD does not have powers to intervene in the Armed Forces' application of the law or the exercise of its authority (Hedin, 2011, p. 239; Swedish Armed Forces, 2018a). Nevertheless, there are informal changes. Each year, the MoD allocates resources to the Armed Forces accompanied with annual regulation letters. These letters have become more comprehensive with numerous pages of how to spend resources, whereby the MoD seeks to ensure control of decisions through a higher level of details in the instructions. Although regulation letters often are very detailed, this is more about a control function than radical proposals, as the MoD cannot initiate large changes or directly intervene in day-to-day operations.[80] Although the power of the purse remains, in practice, it does not lead to alternative developments than the Armed Forces propose themselves. Moreover, the governance of the Armed Forces has partly been subject to general trends in central government administration over the period. The trends include a transition from detailed governance by rules to more extensive governance by objectives and results, where the idea behind was that the authorities should be allowed to decide on their own budget based on objectives and appropriation decided by government authorities (Hedin, 2011). Furthermore, previous governments have placed a good deal of focus on the size of the SAFHQ with several attempts to downsize the institution. The changes, however, have been mostly cosmetic.[81] In the preparations of the 2009 defence bill, the Defence Commission suggested transferring the responsibility of strategic planning and long-term directions, which were in the hands of the SAFHQ, to the MoD. However, the government disagreed, arguing that the military

[79] The current doctrine is more strategic with an overall perspective that would work in either perspective. A challenge addressed in the doctrine is that Swedish legislation since World War Two has been static in the distinction between war and peace, however today much warfare happens in peacetime, and the military must function in the whole spectre (Swedish Armed Forces, 2016).

[80] The number of pages of these regulation letters have varied. The most detailed one is the regulation letter for the 2006 budget year with 49 pages. Overall, the number of pages was highest at the government period of the conservative parties from 2006, however, it subsided from 2010 an onwards, around 30 pages. The regulation letters can be found at https://www.esv.se/statsliggaren/regleringsbrev/?RBID=19178

[81] Also noted in interview 26, 34 and 36. See Appendix I.

leadership should perform both strategic and operative management as it was a matter for the authority (Swedish MoD, 2009, p. 54). Yet, in 2005, the government appointed a civil director general in the Defence Command aimed at strengthening the management competence in the Armed Forces. Moreover, the dialogue between political and military levels has intensified, where the Swedish participation in sharper operations have required the SAFHQ to inform the government more often. In addition, since the end of the 2000s, regular meetings between the CHOD and the defence minister have taken place. For the most part, we see continuity from an institutional perspective. However, while there have not been formal changes in the level of military authority, the MoD has attempted to strengthen the governance of the military. In turn, this suggests that the power of the purse aspect is central in this relationship as it allows for room for manoeuvre despite the constitutional constraints on the MoD.

Overall, the Swedish military actor has maintained much of its broad capability of influence. The CHOD and the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters continues to have a strong institutional position, accompanied by a broad scope of military authority and a shift to an all-volunteer professional force. Over the years, reorganizations of the military leadership have led to a centralization of command and decision-making processes, leading to a more unified military actor. Although there have been informal changes, reduced defence budget and a smaller military organization, the Swedish case portrays an autonomous military actor from 2001 to 2014.

3.5 The Nordic pictures

The analysis of the changing patterns of Nordic civil-military balance of authority and influence, before and after 2001 as a focus point, provides a Nordic picture characterized by similarities and differences, continuity and change. There are notable dynamics in Nordic civil-military relations with major defence reforms but also differences in the pace of changes and how extensive they have been, from minor to more transformative changes. Overall, we are dealing with four different storylines. At the same time, by 2014 a divide is found between Finland and Sweden with an autonomous military actor on the one hand, and Denmark and Norway with a confined military actor on the other.

In Denmark and Norway, political authorities have tightened the governance of its Armed Forces. This shift, however, has taken place at different times in these two countries. The Norwegian military actor had a broad military capability of influence in 2001, but gradually it narrowed with tighter political governance and civilian involvement in military matters. Although the empirical data suggest a trend of increased military professionalization, changes in level and scope of military authority have contributed to a confined military actor. In contrast, the Danish military actor

broadened its military capability of influence in the years after 2001, with a peak in the mid-2000s. Nevertheless, the Danish military capability of influence narrowed considerably from 2012 onwards. This followed larger changes in the level and scope of military authority, which significantly contributed to a confined military actor with confinements of the semi-autonomy of the military.

Overall, the Finnish and Swedish military actor has in some respect broadened its capability of influence, although both were an autonomous military actor in 2001. Moreover, the Finnish case broadly portrays continuity, while the Swedish case involves major changes in the Swedish Armed Forces. With subtle changes, Finnish civil-military relations have been relatively stable, where the Finnish military actor has maintained its broad capability of influence with high level, unity and broad scope of military authority. While Finland continues to build on conscription, there is also indications of military professionalization. The Swedish Armed Forces have gone through a major transformation involving a shift from a territorial defence-based organization to a mission-based military with all-volunteer professional forces. Moreover, there is a continued high level and broad scope of military authority, and more unity following a centralization of command and decision-making processes in the military leadership. By 2014, then, Finland and Sweden continue to have an autonomous military actor.

Alongside the dynamics and shifts identified in this chapter, the four Nordic countries have been engaged in demanding expeditionary missions, most notably Afghanistan, in which there is a difference between the countries in how active and risk-willing they have been in the use of armed force abroad. The following chapters will address the Nordic countries from a wartime perspective, analysing first the process of Denmark and Norway and then Finland and Sweden.

Map 3.2 *The Nordic countries and Afghanistan*

CHAPTER 4

THE CONFINED MILITARY ACTOR: DENMARK AND NORWAY

In the period after 2001, political authorities in Denmark and Norway tightened the control of their Armed Forces by bringing the military leadership closer to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and through increased political involvement in military affairs. During the same period, the armed forces of both countries have participated in their most demanding military operations in recent times. However, Denmark's participation has been decisively more robust and demanding than that of Norway. Copenhagen decided to participate in the 2003 Iraq War and later a deployment of a significant contribution to the Helmand province in Afghanistan, one of the most peril areas in that country. In contrast, Norway abstained from joining the US-led coalition in Iraq and assumed the role as lead nation for one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the relative calmer Northern Afghanistan. Yet, both countries have moved in the trajectory of a confined military actor.

This chapter explores the causal story of Denmark and Norway. The aim is to uncover potential links between expeditionary warfare and changing patterns of civil-military relations, and most importantly, how these two phenomena are linked. The more than decade-long involvement in Afghanistan is used to capture the interplay between the underlying dynamics of war and contextual factors, and to identify tendencies at the empirical level of reality. Danish and Norwegian military engagement in Afghanistan has not been a homogenous long-term one, but a combination of smaller and larger contributions. In addition, both countries have contributed significant sums of development aid to Afghanistan, as well as police officers and civilian experts. However, the focus in this chapter is on the main military contributions.

The chapter begins with analysing the character of war in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, considering the concept of complex lethality. Paying attention to contextual factors and other active mechanisms in play, the chapter explores, in-depth, the national priorities of Denmark and Norway, their exposure to operational challenges, and their military partners on the battlefield accordingly. Although all factors are part of a causal complex, the chapter gives each analytical attention to evaluate significance and effect. Taking the analysis one step further, the last section summarizes the analysis of the wartime perspective and evaluates the impact on civil-military relations in Copenhagen and Oslo drawing on the observations in light of the analytical framework.

4.1 Complex lethality

11 September 2001 marked a shift in international relations. Global security dynamics changed as it became clear that the terrorist group al-Qaida had managed to strike the United States at important economic, political and military locations. Even the world's military superpower was vulnerable to attacks. The broad international response to these events was shock and resulted in declarations of support to the US. In an increasingly globalized world, the US and leading NATO countries decided to fight threats where they occurred or at their source of origin, far away from own national borders. On 7 October 2001, Washington initiated Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which marked the beginning of what would turn into a long war in Afghanistan. This section analyses the character of war in Afghanistan considering the concept of complex lethality by inquiring into interests, actors, modes of warfare, and issue of the Laws of Armed Conflict, to identify central dynamics.

As part of the international intervention in Afghanistan, there were several interests in play. As part of the proclaimed 'war on terror', the American-led OEF was an anti-terror operation to eliminate al-Qaida and to end the Taliban regime (Bowman & Dale, 2009; Burke, 2011, p. 47). Washington decided on the use of force in self-defence as a response to the terrorist attacks by al-Qaida, rather than an act for which Afghanistan was considered responsible. Yet, Afghanistan was attacked because the Bush Administration considered that the country was providing a safe haven for and assisting al-Qaida members, and refusing to hand over members of that organization. There was a broad international agreement that the US had provision for self-defence after the terror attacks (UNSC, 2001a). While the US went to war with narrowly defined counterterrorism objectives and a vaguely defined humanitarian mission, the international community wanted to build a unitary Afghan state through a comprehensive military and civilian engagement (Bird & Marshall, 2011, pp. 94-95; Russell, 2013). The Bonn Agreement became central to the interest in building a new Afghan state, signed by primarily Afghan actors in December 2001, under the auspices of the UN special representative, Lakhdar Brahimi. The agreement established an interim government and provided a road map for rebuilding the country with a strong focus on state institutions (Bonn Agreement, 2001). To signal that the UN and its members were committed to a new post-Taliban order, the UNSC mandated an international stabilization force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to assist the government in Kabul in establishing a secure environment for reconstruction (UNSC, 2001b). In 2003, ISAF adopted a more ambitious set of objectives, and the mission expanded both geographically and in scope. In a larger international discussion about post-conflict reconstruction and nation building, the argument of many involved states and international actors was that ISAF had to expand beyond Kabul to extend the authority of the

interim government (Suhrke, 2011, pp. 74-75). It had been able to secure Kabul and the surrounding areas, however, the situation in the rest of the country remained unsecure and dominated by warlords, militias and smugglers (Bird & Marshall, 2011, pp. 141-147). The UN Resolution 1510, adopted in 2003, expanded ISAF's area of operation to "all parts of the country", where the international force was to help create a secure environment for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, in response to the concerns of aid agencies, and to provide security assistance "for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement" (UNSC, 2003). By the end of the 2000s, ISAF included stability and security operations, assistance to develop the Afghan National Security Forces, support of reconstruction needs, assistance to humanitarian and counter-narcotics operations, and assistance to disarm illegal armed groups.[82]

Within in this broad array of interests, there was throughout the intervention a tension between the dominant strategic priority of the US to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida and Taliban" and the more ambitious nation building of ISAF, the latter which the Bush Administration showed little interest (Berdal & Suhrke, 2018, p. 68; Russell, 2013). Furthermore, Washington had soon set its sight on neighbouring Iraq justified as part of the so-called 'global war on terror', in which the invasion of Afghanistan represented only the opening phase. Based on the belief that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons, an US-led coalition mounted an invasion in 2003, before the UN had the chance to finish their inspections in Iraq. The issue of Iraq caused a deep split in the transatlantic relationship, with France and Germany, in particular, voicing strong criticisms against the intervention (Lindley-French, 2007, pp. 13-15). Despite the lack of a UN mandate, several states interpreted the situation to give provision for an invasion because Iraq had not complied with UN Resolution 1441.[83] Importantly, the US strategic priority of removing Saddam Hussein from power significantly affected its level of commitment to the war in Afghanistan (Russell, 2013, p. 57). After the invasion of Iraq, the US neither had the time nor the resources to continue OEF in the whole of Afghanistan. Consequently, the resources and political attention the US government devoted to the Iraq war came at the expense of Afghanistan and shifted the dynamics.

[82] In 2006, the Afghan Compact succeeded the Bonn Agreement. Following consultations between the Afghan government and the UN, the Afghan compact involved several goals, such as increasing security, drug reduction, establishing an efficient public administration, as well as economic and social development (Afghanistan Compact, 2006). Furthermore, in the spring of 2007, NATO got more involved in the training and equipping of the Afghan National Army. At the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009, NATO established the NATO training mission – Afghanistan within ISAF to enhance and coordinate efforts to train Afghan Security Forces (NATO, 2009).

[83] The UNSC adopted UN resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002 after a speech by Bush, calling on the UN to enforce previous resolutions against Iraq (Nye, 2009, p. 194). Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq had not complied with UN resolutions after the 1991 Gulf War, but which could be rectified if Iraq under Saddam Hussein allowed unrestricted inspections of its facilities. Resolution 1441 also stated that "[…] false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations" (UNSC, 2002b).

Just as there were several interests at play in the lead up to and after the invasion, the international engagement in Afghanistan was also extensive, with several different actors. In the aftermath of 9/11, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its 52-year history, underlining the terrorist attacks on the US as an attack on all member states. However, Washington never asked for a joint action by NATO but went ahead with a 'coalition of the willing' – letting "the mission define the coalition" (Rumsfeld, 2001). Nevertheless, the broader international community was involved from the outset of the new Afghanistan, where the Bonn Agreement included involvement along three lines: security, governance, and development (Bonn Agreement, 2001). At a donor's conference in Tokyo in January 2002, participating states organized an aid and development programme thematically in five pillars with a lead nation for each pillar. The US took the lead in rebuilding the Afghan National Army, Germany assumed the lead in rebuilding the Afghan National Police, Italy in reconstructing a judicial system, Britain in setting up a counternarcotic programme, and Japan in disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating militias of warlords (Rynning, 2012, p. 44). In late March 2002, the military strategic situation was complicated further, as UN Resolution 1401 established, in parallel, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (UNSC, 2002a). The aim was to gather the existing UN presence in one mission, where the UNAMA would coordinate the work of multiple UN agencies in the country. As for ISAF, initially led by the British, a multinational force comprising about 5,000 troops was deployed to Kabul in 2002. The arrangement where different countries led ISAF on a rotational basis ended in 2003, as NATO assumed command of the international force. From being marginalized in the first phase of the intervention, the alliance now became a substantial actor in Afghanistan. NATO's arrival changed the political dynamics of the engagement. NATO member states declared ISAF to be their "key priority", underlining the importance of the first ground operation of the alliance outside the Euro-Atlantic area (NATO, 2004). Placing the alliance's credibility on the line became an incentive for member states to increase their individual commitments to avoid the appearance of collective failure (Suhrke, 2011, p. 84). Accordingly, several governments contributed to ISAF for strategic reasons related to their relationship with NATO or their bilateral relationship with Washington, but with limited interest in and often no prior experience in Afghanistan.

As with the complex picture of international actors in Afghanistan, the country itself was a fragmented political community that had lacked a strong centralized state. Internally, Afghanistan has 34 provinces, subdivided into almost 400 districts. The country is a multi-ethnic Muslim state, with the Pashtuns as the dominant group estimated at 40-42 percent of the population. Other major Afghan groups include the Tajiks at 27-30 percent, the Hazara at 15 percent, and the Uzbek and Turkmen at 9-10 percent of the total population (Bird & Marshall, 2011, pp. 11-18; Collins,

2016, pp. 8-12). After the removal of the Taliban regime, warlords and local strongmen emerged as central actors with little interest in accepting Kabul's authority; instead they exploited the power represented by international forces. As the principal local ally of US forces, the Afghan Northern Alliance secured considerable political power. The Bonn Agreement gave the inner circle of the Northern Alliance several important positions in the central government, including the ministries of Interior, Defence and Foreign Affairs (Suhrke, 2011, p. 77). Moreover, a lack of coordination between international civilian actors, combined with ever-larger sums of development aid, was creating serious problems related to corruption and parallel bureaucratic power structures. Significantly, under the surface of the overall perception of the initial military missions as a success, the Taliban had already begun, by September 2002, a comprehensive guerrilla warriors recruitment campaign among Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan to begin a new war (Burke, 2011, pp. 303-310). By March 2003, there were signs of increased insurgency in Afghanistan and, in 2006, the Taliban was strong enough to move down from the mountains and into the heavily populated areas in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces in Southern Afghanistan (Bird & Marshall, 2011, pp. 141-7; Giustozzi, 2013, p. 244-245). Thus, the Taliban was returning as a central actor in Afghanistan. With a rebirth of narcotics industry and a new atmosphere of lawlessness, bandits, drug-running operators and long-standing conflicts over land and water, often meshed with the militant's jihad against the Afghan government and its international supporters, complicated the security environment further. With its activities and offensive approach, the Taliban and other armed groups had a central role in how the dynamics in the armed conflict in Afghanistan evolved.

With shifting dynamics, the Afghanistan intervention involved different phases and modes of warfare. The first phase of OEF concerned traditional warfare to topple the Taliban regime. Instead of an invasion with large military contingents, the Pentagon opted for a light footprint in Afghanistan by using Special Operations Forces (SOF), paramilitary teams from the CIA, and air force, in cooperation with the Northern Alliance, who were fighting the Taliban on the ground (Woodward, 2003). Nearing the end of 2001, the Taliban regime was falling apart, and al-Qaida was fleeing the country. OEF continued with much force during the spring and summer of 2002, especially in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. A year later, the Bush Administration announced that OEF had "moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities" (CNN, 2003). However, it was not interested in nation building or taking responsibility for the aftermath of the invasion. As Bush stated, "We will not stay. We don't do police work. We need a core of a coalition of the willing […] and then pass these tasks to others" (Bush quoted in Bird & Marshall, 2011, p. 94). Based on a broad perception that the mission in Afghanistan was complete, Washington turned its focus to Iraq and left smaller contingents in

Afghanistan to hunt for remaining al-Qaida and Taliban fighters. The preliminary successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq supported the vision, set in motion by Donald Rumsfeld, US defence secretary, of a transformation of the military, directed towards high-technology, rapidly deployed, short-duration combat mission, which would avoid the quagmire of nation building (Bird & Marshall, 2011, pp. 49-51; Raitasalo, 2008, pp. 90-1; Russell, 2013, pp. 61-63). Thus, the war in Afghanistan became a powerful factor that gave further impetus to the view of a high-tech 'revolution in military affairs' changing the ground rules of contemporary warfare.

In contrast to OEF, ISAF was not concerned with counterterrorism, but focused instead on humanitarian and stabilization operations to support the Afghan interim government in establishing a secure environment for reconstruction. The distinction between OEF and ISAF became less distinct, however, as the intervention evolved. Taking over the latter, NATO decided to extend its area of responsibility in four stages in a counter clock manner starting with Northern Afghanistan.[84] With the main purpose of contributing to the enforcement of Kabul's authority in the many Afghan provinces, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) became central in NATO's ISAF strategy (Rynning, 2012, p. 49). By including both civilian and military elements, the aim of the PRT concept was to create synergy effects that could mitigate against the lack of military resources. The extensive military infrastructure consisted of task forces to support the PRTs and, since 2006, regional command headquarters to run regional state-building efforts (see map 4.1 below). For the expansion to the south, NATO's operational plan endorsed December 2005 outlined a gradual build-up of ISAF forces to replace US-led coalition forces (NATO, 2005, p. A-1). Moreover, to enable the PRTs to perform their tasks, the plan underlined the necessity of security operations ranging from "local force protection in a permissive environment to decisive, pro-active military ground and air manoeuvre" (NATO, 2005, p. 4). Throughout 2006, more allied contributions arrived in Afghanistan to keep NATO's expansion on track. In this process, the UNAMA remained marginalized while ISAF and the US-led OEF stood strong. With an increased presence of international forces, the military became a premise and service provider for development aid (Hynek & Marton, 2012). It overshadowed the civilian effort and contributed to a strengthening of the military leadership of the international engagement with a focus on military operations.

[84] First to the north in December 2003, with stage one completed in October 2004. ISAF then proceeded west in February 2005 and completed second stage on 1 September 2005. In July 2006, as part of stage three, ISAF assumed command of Southern Afghanistan from US-led coalition forces. In October 2006 with the expansion to the east, NATO had responsibility for the entire country (NATO, 2015).

Map 4.1 *Locations ISAF Regional Commands and Provincial Reconstruction Teams year 2009*

During 2005-2006, the security situation in Afghanistan significantly worsened as violence escalated. The expansion of ISAF to Southern and Eastern Afghanistan met more resistance than expected, and international forces began taking casualties in rising numbers. While there were 60 international casualties in 2004, 131 died in 2005 and 191 in 2006 (Livingston & O'Hanlon, 2014, p. 11). Many allies contributed troops on the basis that ISAF's focus would be on post-conflict stability operations. However, as violence escalated, and it extended its responsibilities, contributing states began to realize that ISAF was at war and that the mission would have to change (Bowman & Dale, 2009, p. 14). The levels of violence increased steadily each year through to 2009, reaching one thousand violent monthly incidents in the summer of 2009 (Flynn, 2009). The war became more aggressive and kinetic in nature as international forces moved into more contested areas such as Kandahar and Helmand (Russell, 2013, p. 71). Moreover, facing the surge of international forces and suffering considerable attrition in heavy fighting, the insurgents changed from conventional to asymmetric tactics as their primary mode of warfare (Farrell & Gordon, 2009, p. 676; Giustozzi, 2013). There was an increased use of suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), directed at international and Afghan forces, non-governmental organizations, public officials and civilians, who supported the Afghan government. Overall, IEDs now caused

most casualties in ISAF (Cambell & Shapiro, 2009, p. 6, figure 1.3). The situation deteriorated as time went on, with civilians among the highest casualties.[85] The intensification of military operations resulted in mounting civilian deaths and a growing sense among Afghan civilians that ISAF was a hostile occupying force (Berdal & Suhrke, 2018, p. 70). According to a study by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 2009, 96 per cent of the Afghan population reported having been impacted by the armed conflict in some way (ICRC, 2009). Considering these developments, NATO began promoting a 'comprehensive approach' followed by coordination efforts to involve more civilian resources and to limit expectations for the outcomes of purely military operations (Rynning, 2012). Comprehensive planning and action, including the integration of the full range of military and non-military instruments, came to dominate the very top of NATO's agenda (NATO, 2008). Thus, conflict dynamics indicate high-intensity complex lethality with increasing number of casualties, both civilian and military, increased troop numbers, and shifting modes of warfare leading to a different pattern of enemy activity.

The deployment to the south also muddled the distinction between the PRTs, designed as instruments for peacebuilding, and US-led OEF forces fighting a war. The escalating violence and focus on combat operations contributed to a merger of the two commands, in addition to a US desire for greater unity of command (Bird & Marshall, 2011, p. 219; Rynning, 2012, p.164). In June 2008, the newly appointed Commander of ISAF (COMISAF), General David McKiernan, also became commander of OEF. Although the two commands came under one hat without formally unifying the command structures, they became organizationally indistinguishable and the joint force became more uniform (Suhrke, 2011, p. 73). Within one year General McKiernan was relieved from command and replaced by General Stanley McChrystal, who, in an assessment of the security situation, highlighted two threats faced by ISAF: organized insurgent groups and a crisis of popular confidence, which needed to be addressed to avoid mission failure (McChrystal, 2009).[86] This would require increased troop numbers, fuelling the central debate in NATO of burden sharing and complaints by the US that NATO members were not pulling their weight (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014). A light military footprint was no longer viable. While allied combat battalions increased from fourteen to twenty, US forces surged from eight to twenty-three between January 2008 and September 2009. The surge followed a new American strategy, announced by president Obama on 27 March 2009, signalling a new phase in the US war in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration stepped up drone attacks against insurgents and increased US civilian and military

[85] UNAMA reported of 1523 conflict-related deaths of civilians in 2007, and 2412 in 2009 (UNAMA, 2008, 2010).
[86] The report was confidential but was leaked to the press and appeared in the Washington Post (Rynning, 2012, p. 61).

assets in the hope of creating conditions favourable for peace (Obama, 2009b). Within this framework, the COMISAF General McChrystal introduced in June 2009 a new strategy underlining the move towards a people-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) approach and winning 'hearts and minds' to address the dire situation (McChrystal & Hall, 2009). Going forward, COIN became central in ISAF's operation concept, which led to increased military focus in the coordination with civilian effort.[87] As the security political situation changed, ISAF's military operations changed character. They went from limited goals of stabilizing the main centres to using large conventional military forces in comprehensive operations to secure control in larger areas. In this process, the UNAMA remained marginalized.

At the end of 2011, the international engagement in Afghanistan moved into a new phase focusing on transferring responsibility to Afghan authorities. On 1 December 2009, Obama committed 30,000 additional troops, but at the same time, he announced that he would not support an endless war in Afghanistan and noted his attention to begin a withdrawal of US troops in the middle of 2011 (Obama, 2009a). Despite the surge of troops, the situation was described as worse than ever, as the number of people killed increased from 2009 and the last years of the war. At the summit in Lisbon November 2010, NATO agreed on an exit plan with the aim of handing over control of security to Afghan forces (NATO, 2010). The entire ISAF mission transformed into a so-called transition process, where ISAF forces shifted from a combat to a support role of advising, training and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces. In parallel with a transition of security to Afghan forces, there was a gradual reduction of international forces and on 31 December 2014, ISAF officially ended.

The 9/11 terror attacks and its aftermath also raised several legal dilemmas from an international law perspective. For one, attacks by non-state actors with a global reach challenged the view of a neat division of armed conflict into the two spheres of international and non-international.[88] This was evident in the multiple legal interpretations of the basis for the conflict with al-Qaida, in which there was a lack of consensus on the legal categorization of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent conflict (R. E. Brooks, 2004; Watkin, 2004). Second, the US proclaimed 'war on terror' was problematic. It was not an armed conflict per se, but rather a multifaceted counterterrorism

[87] NATO adopted the COIN-based approach at the top summit in Bratislava on 22-23 October 2009, as the alliance reviewed the recommendations by General McChrystal for a strategy change. The lack of a common doctrine had made it difficult to integrate the COIN mind-set and subsequent techniques in a standardized way within nations. Therefore, the North Atlantic Council tasked NATO military authorities with presenting a common doctrine, which they developed between 2009 and 2011 (Kronvall & Petersson, 2016, p. 286).

[88] As noted by Rosa E. Brooks, the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts traditionally has great significance; if a conflict is declared to be internal, it does not trigger the law of armed conflict except for the minimal provisions of Common Article 3 (R. E. Brooks, 2004, pp. 704, 712).

campaign, often carried out in states where there was no armed conflict. (McDonald, 2002; Murphy, 2003). Furthermore, by its very nature, the war on terror did not have an end and did not target one actor – as confirmed by president Bush in his early speeches, nothing less than terrorism itself was the target (Bird & Marshall, 2011, p. 57). Yet, the use of the war on terror to launch a military attack on a third country, as in the case of Afghanistan, assumed the characteristics of an armed conflict. The initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom constituted an international armed conflict between the US and its allies against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as understood by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols (Bellal, Giacca, & Casey-Maslen, 2011; ICRC, 2016; McDonald, 2002). Following the establishment of the interim Afghan government in June 2002, there is, in general, a consensus that the international armed conflict moved to become a non-international armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reclassified the situation as a non-international armed conflict between the new Afghan government supported by coalition states and the Taliban and other non-state armed groups (ICRC, 2016). The UNAMA and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Crime Court reached the same conclusion, as did scholarly sources (Bellal et al., 2011; ICC, 2016, p. 44; UNAMA, 2014; Watkin, 2004, p. 4). Yet, many European partners of ISAF conceptualized the mission conducted by their armed forces not as armed conflict or counterinsurgency, but as stabilization and reconstruction.

Another legal issue was the status of detainees held by the US in connection with its 'global war on terror'. Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention was at the centre of the controversy regarding the status of captured Taliban and al-Qaida fighters because it makes clear the category of people that are entitled of war status (Murphy, 2003, p. 262). With the argument that one could not easily apply the Geneva Conventions to contemporary conflicts, Washington interpreted Article 4 in a way that the detainees did not fall under this category and thereby not entitled to prisoners of war status. Instead, the Bush Administration decided to characterize them as 'unlawful combatants' with no legal rights (Gilmore, 2002; US Department of State, 2002).[89] While the Bush Administration acknowledged that the Third Geneva Convention applied to the Taliban, they argued that Taliban fighters had forfeited their protection by violating humanitarian law and through their association with al-Qaida. These arguments were heavily criticized, and Guantanamo Bay soon became an international symbol of US rights abuses in the post-9/11 era (Ellis, 2016). With revelations of torture, mistreatment of prisoners and non-regulated use of force in

[89] Lawful combatants are immunized for their acts of violence during the conflict, and if captured, they must be treated as prisoners of war. They cannot be punished and must be released by the end of the conflict. In contrast, unlawful combatants are who in one way or another violate the law of armed conflict, either by failing to comply with formal definitions of lawful combatants or by committing a war crime (Brooks, p. 731).

Afghanistan and Iraq, the war on terror became increasingly controversial (Burke, 2011, pp. 89-94, 134-5). The changing character of conflict challenged the customary boundaries that separate war and peace, civilians and combatants, as well as lawful and unlawful belligerents.

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A series of complex factors affected the dynamics in the Afghanistan war, in which the environment reflected different social, political and military dimensions. The Afghanistan war post-9/11 was characterized by a complex actor picture, often difficult to grasp, different goals, broad interests and mandates, geographically distant from national borders of states involved in ISAF, shifting modes of warfare, and challenges in terms of the Law of Armed Conflict. The situation in 2001 with a perceived victory of the US and allied forces developed to an intensive armed conflict, where the dynamics of complex lethality, including the flow of belligerent activity, dictated the development of the international engagement and the ISAF mission. As the war dragged on, the intensity heightened and by 2007/8, the insurgency and civil war had spread across the country. Indicators of intensity show high casualty rates, increase in troop numbers, and an international effort that was fragmented with a series of multiple interventions. The deteriorating situation undermined civilian efforts and emphasized the military aspect of the conflict. In turn, the initial stabilization mission turned to become a combat mission, though with focus on a comprehensive approach, coupled with a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. In the course of events, both civilian and military leaders faced a range of difficult questions. It did not turn out the way central decision-makers had foreseen but developed to become more extensive, long term, and complex. In conclusion, there were inherent dynamics in the events that unfolded from the year 2001 onwards, which challenged and put stress on both the political and the military levels.

4.2 Priority

The aftermath of 11 September 2001 had significant impact on Danish and Norwegian national priorities alike. However, while Denmark has turned international in its priority, Norway has kept a foot in homeland defence and the other in international operations. These national priorities have been central in shaping the type of contribution, as well as influencing where Danish and Norwegian governments have deployed their forces. In turn, this has shaped the impact of complex lethality.

In the case of Denmark, there is a clear trend of prioritization of international operations and broader security threats. A shift from the footnote policies during the Cold War to more intensive

military participation in the 1990s had put the country on a path of activism in its foreign policy.[90] After 9/11, Danish perception of threats changed, and Danish activism took further steps along the same path. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism – issues that the 1997 Defence Commission (1998) had barely addressed – became an important part of Danish security and defence policy. Accordingly, Danish military activism came with a new dimension: protection of Danish society in a broader sense and ensuring the security of society (Heurlin, 2007b). Regarding the geopolitical situation, it is widely agreed that the country enjoys an advantageous location, geographically speaking (Danish MFA, 2003b; Danish MoD, 2012a). Although the perception in Copenhagen has been that there is no direct conventional threat against Denmark, there is instead a complex threat picture with a range of global challenges of economic, social and political character, which can have indirect consequences for Danish security:

> The threats of the 21st century are fundamentally different from those we stood up against during the Cold War and the first years after the fall of the Wall. The nightmare is no longer the annihilating nuclear war, but massive destructive attacks from global terror networks or desperate regimes, which have positioned themselves outside the international community (Danish Government, 2004, p. 5).

The political debate in the Folketing after the terror attacks 11 September 2001, highlights this further shift in Danish priorities, which during the 1990s had increasingly turned international in its focus. On 13 December 2001, Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller forwarded a proposal to parliament on military participation in the international effort against terror networks in Afghanistan. The proposal emphasized that Denmark should oblige the request by the US, and that it was necessary to meet the terror threat against international peace and security with all necessary means, including military force (Danish MFA, 2001).[91] A large majority of the Folketing voted in favour of sending military contributions to support OEF (Folketinget, 2001a). Before the vote, however, the character of the Danish military contribution resulted in a debate between the government and the opposition. Parliamentarians also reacted to the rapid treatment of the proposal. The parliamentary debates took place only a couple of days before the conference in London with the UN's forthcoming peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan and a possible UN stabilization force on the agenda. The opposition argued that Denmark should wait until after the conference in London and prioritize the possible UN mission over OEF (Folketinget, 2001b). The Social Democrats were concerned about the country's profile by contributing to OEF and stated

[90] The so-called footnote period in the 1980s refers to a period in which a majority of opposition parties headed by the Social Democrats managed to direct and control official NATO policy, forcing the government to take critical positions in NATO and pursuing the opposition's policy goals by 'footnoting' communiques they were against (Pedersen, 2013; Petersson & Saxi, 2013, pp. 766-7).

[91] The contribution involved a C-130 transport aircraft, F-16 combat aircraft, and Special Operation Forces (SOF), by which the government intended the Danish contribution to participate in all parts of the coalition's ongoing operations.

that they would rather support a humanitarian peacekeeping mission under the UN flag, which would be in line with the long Danish tradition of contributing peacekeeping forces. However, they also felt bound by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen's, former prime minister, statements in support of the US when they were in government.[92] This wavering caused other political parties to accuse the Social Democrats for going back to their footnote policies of the Cold War. Refuting these insinuations, the Social Democrats argued that they were in favour of the proposal but wanted to voice their concerns nevertheless (Folketinget, 2001b). In the end, after a remarkable speedy process, the Folketing passed the proposal with 101 in favour and 11 against.[93]

Another turning point in Danish foreign and security policy was the decision to join the US-led coalition in the invasion of Iraq. That Denmark engaged its armed forces in an international war led by the Americans, without a UN mandate, was something decisively new (Heurlin, 2007b, p. 74). The Iraq debate caused deep tensions between the opposition and the government supported by the Danish People's Party. There was an intense debate in the Folketing on 21 March 2003, with a small parliamentary majority for a military contribution (Folketinget, 2003b).[94] Initially, Denmark contributed a medical team, staff officers, and naval forces, including a submarine (Danish MFA, 2003c). The contribution was primarily symbolic but nevertheless a political signal with the Danish flag as part of the coalition. For Anders Fogh Rasmussen, prime minister, this was important:

> We cannot just sail under the flag of comfort and let others fight for freedom and peace. […] The decision to participate in the international coalition is a confrontation with the passive adaptation policy. It is an expression of Denmark being prepared to defend important values by providing a military contribution. This entails that Denmark comes forward and becomes visible on the international stage (Fogh Rasmussen quoted in Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, pp. 210-11).

After the invasion, he wanted to make sure that Denmark participated decisively in the upcoming international stabilization force. On 6 May 2003, the government put forward a proposal for a six months participation by sending 380 troops to the British occupation sector in Southern Iraq (Danish MFA, 2003a). This time the opposition supported the engagement in Iraq (Folketinget, 2003a), and in June, the Danish contingent of combat troops were deployed to southern Iraq. For the military leadership, it was important that the Armed Forces became a larger part of the mission after the invasion. This because, by this time, the military was working on its proposal for a radical

[92] There was a change in government in November 2001, see Appendix III.
[93] The Socialist People's Party and the Red-Green Alliance voted against, together with two members of the Danish Social Democrats.
[94] The proposal for a parliament decision on Danish military participation in a multinational effort in Iraq passed with 61 votes (Liberal Party, Danish People's Party and the Conservative Party) against 50 votes (Social Democrats, Socialist People's Party, the Social Liberal Party, the Red-Green Alliance, Christian Democrats and Siumut) (Folketinget, 2003b, p. 120).

reform, the so-called C-note discussed in Chapter 3, and saw the quick and successful invasion of Iraq as a political trump card, which underlined the importance of defence transformation (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, pp. 214-217). Following political-strategic arguments, the need to transform to become relevant was a strong motivation for the military (Petersson, 2018, p. 369). Although Sven Jensby, defence minister, initially believed the military needed a consolidating defence agreement after several reforms, events abroad dictated the reform agenda at home and the prime minister wanted stronger military tools at his disposal. Thus, in the end, Jensby gave his support to the military proposal for reform (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, pp. 217-18). Overall, this suggests an autonomous actor and broad military authority, enabled by political will to use the armed forces and a military actor taking advantage of the situation to become relevant in a new era. There are several factors coinciding, including military will and political support for change, fuelled by international events.

As for other troop-contributing countries, Iraq became a difficult endeavour for Denmark. By 2005, the country was contemplating a larger role in Afghanistan as a way out of Iraq without antagonizing its US ally. Afghanistan had returned to the Danish political agenda in 2004, as NATO began expanding the ISAF mission geographically. Until then, Copenhagen only maintained a smaller military presence with small mobile observation teams responsible for reconstruction tasks as part of the German-led PRT in Fayzabad and at the Estonian-led PRT in Chaghcharan,[95] in addition to a communication unit at ISAF's Headquarters in Kabul (Danish MFA, 2003d). Copenhagen considered a contribution to Southern Afghanistan where the need of troops was greatest – reflecting the ambition of Danish activism and national priority of international operations. Officially, there were two main reasons for a deeper Danish involvement in Afghanistan. To prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorism and contribute to transform the country to a growing democracy with respect for human rights.

The Danish priority on addressing broad security threats and international operations provided an opportunity for an extensive use of the Armed Forces. The prevailing perception was that the challenges and risks had changed dramatically – underlining the importance of the military as a tool in an active foreign and security policy. The 2004 defence agreement clearly expresses the shift in security thinking – a shift in focus from territorial defence to expeditionary forces and international tasks (Danish MoD, 2004). For this priority, Denmark needed a different military organization.

[95] Fayzabad is an Afghan city in northeast Afghanistan and the provincial capital of Badakhshan Province. Chaghcharan is a town and a district in central Afghanistan and serves as the provincial capital of Ghor (see map 4.1 above).

Accordingly, the country moved from a threat-based defence to a capability-based defence with an increased professionalization of the Armed Forces. With fewer conscripts and a focus on professional soldiers, the military arguably became a more distinct group in society with a new purpose and rationale. Yet, with a tight defence budget, the military had to prioritize, which resulted in abolishing the submarines and the land-based air defence (Heurlin, 2007b, pp. 71-72). Following the 2008 Defence Commission, the 2009 defence agreement underlined that international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states signified the primary threats against Danish security (Danish MoD, 2009). The 2012 version continues the active foreign and security policy, in which the Armed Forces are to continue to carry the country's share of the burden in NATO, through contributions to international efforts and develop relevant military capabilities (Danish MoD, 2012a). Thus, there is in Denmark a prioritization of international operations, including the more dangerous and challenging ones.

In contrast to Danish activism, Norway has kept one foot in homeland defence and the other in international operations. By the turn of the millennium, invasion defence was still the priority, and the Armed Forces were structured accordingly. Three aspects have been central in the debate about Norwegian defence, namely (1) Norway is a small state neighbouring a great power; (2) the ability to defend Norway depends on military aid from its allies and (3) Norway is different from other small states due to its sovereignty over vast ocean areas, a sovereignty which over time has been greatly expanded through the Law of the Sea Convention (Børresen et al., 2004; Skogrand, 2004). Accordingly, Russia is a key factor and NATO membership remains a cornerstone in Oslo's security and defence policy thinking. Additionally, since Norway's independence in 1905, idealism has also been an important part of Norwegian foreign policy (Riste, 2001), reflecting the self-perception of the country as a small state, seeking neutrality (though abandoned after 1945) and peace. Nevertheless, international operations and expeditionary capabilities have become more important. An improved ability to take part in international operations at short notice became one of the main goals into the 2000s. International military units became a top priority; they received the most modern equipment, and in 2004, participation in international operations became mandatory for professional officers (Haaland, 2007, p. 502; 2008). That same year, the MoD issued its first strategic concept paper for the Armed Forces, which addressed the challenges of the new international climate. One element that stands out is that the strategic concept opens up for intervention in international crises, though the concept underlines that such interventions need to be firmly anchored in international law and have broad international support (Norwegian MoD,

2004c).[96] Although there are still divergent views within the Norwegian Armed Forces, the military leadership has embraced a new international role for the military, and has aimed to build a force that can take part at the top end of the intensity scale (Haaland, 2007, p. 506). Thus, both the political and the military levels in Norway have endorsed a higher priority of international operations and expeditionary capabilities.

Like Denmark, Norway contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom with Special Operations Forces and combat aircraft. There was a broad majority behind the government proposal presented to the Storting in December 2001 (Stortinget, 2001a). In the parliamentary debate, political parties underlined the changing security environment, in which the terrorist attacks proved that the international community is facing new threats to peace and security (Stortinget, 2001b). The arguments in favour of Norwegian participation in OEF centred on solidarity with the US, Norway's closest ally, and to prove the country's relevance within NATO. As Kristin Krohn Devold, defence minister, stated in parliament:

> In addition to our self-interest in participation in the fight against terrorism, it is most central for Norway to demonstrate that we have the ability and willingness to fulfil our collective defence obligations set out in the Atlantic Treaty Article 5, and the expectations that follows our long-term and long-lasting security policy cooperation with the US (Stortinget, 2001a, p. 600).

For Norway's overall Afghanistan engagement, being a good ally was central. The Norwegian Commission of Inquiry on Afghanistan found that the first and single most important objective for the engagement was to demonstrate Norway's reliability as a dependable ally of the US, an objective that was also deemed vital to 'safeguard' NATO (NOU 2016:8, 2016).[97] During the first years in Afghanistan, OEF had the highest priority, while participation in ISAF was motivated by broader foreign policy objectives and partly served to balance and soften Norway's military profile in the fight against international terrorism (Oma, 2015, pp. 53-4). In contrast to Denmark, Norway did not participate in the intervention of Iraq. Instead, it contributed with an engineer company to assist the civilian reconstruction process as part of the UN-mandated stabilization force after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime.[98] In addition, the government strengthened the military contribution to Afghanistan. Oslo was concerned about a marginalization in NATO in the wake

[96] The concept furthermore emphasises the importance of NATO, the necessity of securing the Northern areas, and the need to contribute to peace, stability and further development of the international legal system – issues that can be identified as important in Norwegian security and defence policy since the end of the Second World War.
[97] The Commission identified three core objectives, where the other two involved assisting the US in the 'global war on terror' by preventing Afghanistan once again becoming a safe haven for terrorist networks, and to help build a democratic, legitimate and properly functioning Afghan state along Western lines (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 10).
[98] The Norwegian contribution in the aftermath of the invasion has been interpreted as an effort to repair the relationship with the US and as a compensation for not participating in the actual Iraq war (Græger, 2005).

of tensions in transatlantic relations following Iraq, the decline in US commitment to the alliance, and developments in the European Union's European Security and Defence Policy, and related developments in the NATO-EU relationship (Norwegian MFA, 2004). Norway therefore welcomed the decision of the North Atlantic Council to have NATO assume command of ISAF, and Oslo's priority shifted from OEF to ISAF. Accordingly, by late 2003, the Norwegian contribution to ISAF started to increase significantly (Oma, 2015, pp. 61-62). Arguably, these decisions were connected to the dual priority on homeland defence and international operations. The latter whereby the country could prove its worth as an ally, which in turn would safeguard its homeland defence, which is dependent on both the US and NATO.

During the second half of 2004, Afghanistan had become the main engagement abroad of the Norwegian Armed Forces. In November 2003, a mechanized infantry company from the professional Telemark Battalion deployed to Kabul, and in May 2004, the government announced a contribution of 30 troops to the British-led PRT Meymaneh in Northern Afghanistan (Norwegian MoD, 2004b). When the question of a contribution to the PRT concept emerged, Norway considered the participation as a part of its alliance obligations (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 27; Stortinget, 2004). Another incentive for the shift was that the war on terror had become increasingly controversial, as discussed in the section above, also in Norway. A further culmination came with the decision to assume the role as lead nation of the PRT Meymaneh in the Faryab province on 1 September 2005, whereby Norway became a more important actor in Afghanistan. Norwegian military planners and development officers were critical in assuming responsibility for a PRT, however. It was not something Norway had done before, it was, moreover, expensive and the military leadership considered the PRT tasks to be at the margins of core military activities (Oma, 2015, p. 65). From a military perspective, the small size and isolated location of the PRTs were potential sources of great security, supply and logistics challenges. Yet, the political level did not heed the military advice. Berdal and Surhke highlight that "the desire to appear relevant and visible to allies was more important" to political authorities (Berdal & Suhrke, 2018, p. 80). This indicates a more confined military actor, with the political level not deferring to military advice but other political considerations and using the armed forces for non-traditional military tasks. Soon after the decision, the main part of Norway's contingent transferred from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif to relieve British commitments for the northern PRTs.

Norway maintained its force concentration in the north in the following years. The PRT Meymaneh and a quick reaction force of about 200 troops in Mazar-e Sharif remained the core of the country's commitment to ISAF. By the end of 2007, the contribution had grown from 350 to 500 military

personnel (Oma, 2015, p. 77). Moreover, for the government entering office in 2005,[99] state building and development became particularly important. In 2006, it launched a revised policy approach to activities in Afghanistan with greater focus on civilian efforts (Stortinget, 2006). This was part of the program for government of 2005, which underlined Norway as a "distinct peace nation", working for a strengthened UN (Norwegian Government, 2005, pp. 5-6). Consequently, although Norway did not spend as much money on development aid as on the military effort, it appeared as a more significant civilian actor than a military contributor (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 76). This also provided a relief for the government, as the military participation was more problematic for the coalition government of 2005, where the Socialist Left was dealing with agitation within its ranks over the war in Afghanistan (Egeberg, 2017). As ISAF became engaged in fierce combat with the expansion to the east and south, there was increased allied pressure for Norway to contribute to Southern Afghanistan (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 36). This created a dilemma for the government, who feared that not meeting US and allied requests would damage the country's standing among its allies. Oslo kept turning down these requests, however, and remained in the north. Berdal and Suhrke (2018, p. 82) argue that, as compensation, the government extended the deployment of Special Forces to Kabul in 2007, whose impact was politically and operationally more visible to the US. Thus, the necessity of being a good ally and allied pressure manifested in an increased engagement in Northern Afghanistan and an extended use of the Norwegian SOF.

While international operations have become more important in Norwegian defence policy, a focus on homeland defence remains strong. It is an explicit political ambition to maintain the double focus on international operations and to uphold a substantial military presence in northern Norway (Haaland, 2007, p. 504). As Håkon Lunde Saxi argues, "to maintain a national ability for crisis management as well as invite allies 'home' to compensate for the asymmetrical relations between Norway and Russia are still central in Norwegian defence policy" (Saxi, 2011, p. 43). Thus, the defence structure has been designed to cater for the military's presence in the north as a priority (Norwegian Government, 2009, pp. 5-6). Indicative of this priority is the government's promotion of its 'core area initiative' in NATO in 2008. The initiative was an attempt to draw attention to security policy challenges within the alliance's geographical areas and focused on the 'High North' as an important strategic priority area for Norway in the years ahead (Norwegian MFA, 2009). Furthermore, the revised MoD strategic concept, published in 2009, gives particular priority to three areas: (a) the High North; (b) active participation in operations abroad, conducted within the framework of the UN; and (c) continued adaption and modernization of the Norwegian Armed Forces (Norwegian MoD, 2009a). Accordingly, the challenges in the country's own region make it

[99] See Appendix III.

important to maintain a full-spectrum defence and preserve the alliance as an organisation based on collective defence and consensus as key principles. However, ensuring allied attention to Norway's northern region is perceived as demanding and that it is closely related to Norwegian willingness to contribute to NATO operations. The strategic concept underlines that the key tasks of the country's armed forces are to contribute to the prevention of and handling of security challenges faced by Norway and areas under its jurisdiction. In the current globalized world, these tasks must be carried out at home and abroad (Norwegian MoD, 2009, p. 35). Norwegian priority is thus both on territorial defence in the north and on broader security threats.

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There are differences between Danish and Norwegian priorities, which in turn has influenced their contributions to international operations, including Afghanistan, both in terms of the extent and the content of their contribution. This connects to the political will to use force, which becomes important in wars of choice rather than necessity. At the same time, there are similarities, in which both countries have become more international in their priorities and security outlooks, emphasizing NATO and partaking in enforcement operations. Nevertheless, Denmark has gone much further than Norway and has in this period always been one step ahead. The political-strategic considerations behind the priorities have provided parameters within which the Danish and the Norwegian military can operate based on interpretations of the international environment. In turn, this has both enabled and restrained actions and activities by the armed forces. In the case of Denmark, a growing political will to use armed force internationally coupled with a willingness and appetite for reform in the military leadership enabled a major transformation of the Danish Armed Forces. Copenhagen's priority on broader security threats and international missions shaped an offensive military contribution and provided an opportunity for the military to become expeditionary with a focus on the sharp end with broad military authority.

The analysis of Norway provides a different picture. In contrast to Denmark, Norwegian decision-makers have been ambivalent towards the role of its Armed Forces and have not perceived the same need to pursue an activism like Denmark. Magnus Petersson has found similar motivations for military transformation in Denmark and Norway, although Norway differs in threat assessment and therefore has tried to keep a full-spectrum defence force, while Denmark has cut whole defence systems (Petersson, 2018). Overall, as noted by Haaland, it is evident that most Norwegian politicians prefer to highlight the non-military aspects of Norway's engagement in international operations and the humanitarian aspects of military efforts (Haaland, 2007, pp. 505-6). Yet, the acknowledged importance of NATO in Norwegian security and defence policy has fuelled the need of military reform to prove its reliability as an ally and to ensure interoperability with allies. In turn,

this has led to a focus on professional units and a military prepared for demanding operations. However, while Denmark opted to make hard priorities for its capability-based defence, Norway has not considered such drastic measures as abolishing its submarines, for example, needed of its northern regions. Not least, the difference in priorities is also evident regarding where the Danish and Norwegian governments have engaged their armed forces, and how they have conceptualized the missions. Thus, the priorities have manifested in different roles for the Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces.

4.3 Exposure

In the first years of the war in Afghanistan, the exposure to operational challenges was limited for both countries. Into 2003, however, the situation changed for Danish forces with increased exposure, first in Iraq and later in Southern Afghanistan. Situated in the calmer Northern Afghanistan, the threat level for the Norwegian Armed Forces was relatively low. Yet, while national priorities kept the Norwegian Armed Forces away from the most demanding areas in Afghanistan, a changing security situation from 2007 onwards led to significant exposure for the Norwegian forces as well. During the engagement in Afghanistan, there were significant changes in force posture, reinforcements, increased force protection, additional expenditures and casualties in both cases.

Initially, ISAF was not a priority and the bulk of Danish and Norwegian military resources went into the US-led OEF. While the military footprint in ISAF was light, mainly consisting of Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel, both states deployed their sharpest end, SOF and combat aircraft, to OEF. In January 2002, Danish and Norwegian SOF joined Task Force K-Bar in Kandahar, Southern Afghanistan.[100] Task Force K-Bar operated under US command in a wide variety of missions, including tracking and taking down fleeing al-Qaida and Taliban fighters, gathering intelligence and advising the Northern Alliance (Bensahel, 2003, p. 11). For the most part, the Danish and Norwegian SOF did not participate in the battles themselves but performed reconnaissance tasks and observations of Taliban and al-Qaida movements in the nearby area. Overall, the engagement and exposure in OEF was limited. That is not to say that the missions of the Special Forces were without danger. The reconnaissance missions involved being embedded and observing – often for several days, where the lack of water became a serious problem (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, p. 130; Rathsack, 2009). There was also the risk of being discovered by enemy forces. The Norwegian delegation to NATO noted that the participation in OEF provided

[100] Task Force K-Bar was an international battle force with approximately 1,300 SOF from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, and the US.

considerable gains in the form of unique experience of frontline coalition operations in a high-risk environment (Oma, 2015, pp. 53-54). The military leaderships in Copenhagen and Oslo were eager to make use of special forces, where the mission to Afghanistan was important for both Danish and Norwegian SOF, who had struggled to justify their existence during the 1990s and were close to being abolished (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, p. 93; Melien, 2014). Afghanistan was therefore seen as an opportunity for them to prove their relevance. Moreover, the SOF contributions happened almost exclusively on military premises. The Norwegian defence minister wanted few national restrictions on the contribution. After political discussions in Oslo, the Norwegian SOF's Rules of Engagement (ROE) gave them broad room for manoeuvre (Hammersmark, 2015, pp. 75-76). In the Danish case, the chief of defence received regular reports from the unit and the Danish SOF could participate in all forms of military actions, as there were no Danish reservations (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, p. 94 ; R. Petersen, 2012, pp. 443-445). Thus, the deployment of SOF suggests a broad military authority in the initial phase of the engagement. Danish and Norwegian SOF deployed to Afghanistan in several rounds, and during the period developed into robust regiments with increased numbers and resources. Despite limited exposure, professional units in the Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces gained more experience, and they became more appreciated on the political level as a 'tool' in foreign policy.

The Danish and the Norwegian contingents of combat aircraft that joined the European Participating Air Forces under US command in Kirgizstan also faced limited exposure. Overall, Western forces were superior in the air, as the Taliban had a rudimentary air-defence system that did not pose a significant threat (Bird & Marshall, 2011, p. 78). Moreover, as Anthony King underlines, the primary mission of Europe's air forces is no longer interdiction and nuclear attack as during the Cold War but are increasingly oriented to tactical close air support missions for ground forces (King, 2011, pp. 149-150). The six Norwegian combat aircraft operated from 1 October 2002 to 1 April 2003. The Norwegian F-16 dropped the first bombs in January 2003, which was the first time Norwegian combat aircraft had bombed targets on ground since the Second World War.[101] Norwegian authorities had a number of self-imposed restrictions for the use of the F-16 under OEF, in order to reduce the risk of Norwegian combat aircraft being involved in incidental airstrikes, and to ensure continued domestic political support (Frost-Nielsen, 2011). In contrast, the Danish F-16 contingent appears to have had fewer restrictions. The Danish F-16 operated from October 2002 to 30 September 2003, during which they flew 372 missions (R. Petersen, 2012, pp. 449-450). While playing an important role in Afghanistan, the air forces had a

[101] In contrast to the participation in the 1999 Kosovo intervention, the Norwegian deployment of F-16 combat aircraft had upgraded to air-to-ground capacity (Børresen et al., 2004, pp. 223-224; Espenes & Haug, 2012).

supporting function. In sum, the risk and exposure for the air forces were considerably lower, compared to that of the ground forces.

In contrast to the initial period in Afghanistan, Denmark faced a different situation in Iraq with significantly more exposure to operational challenges. A seemingly quick and successful military victory turned into a long-dragged out war. On the ground in Iraq, there was a complex actor picture with a range of militias and fractious parties, as well as corruption infecting the post-intervention Iraqi state. After the 2005 election in Iraq, the situation quickly deteriorated and, in 2006, one could talk of civil war simultaneously with an ongoing insurgency against Western forces (Burke, 2011, Chapter 6). It was a complex situation faced by the Danish military, which was further complicated by the Mohammed Cartoon crisis that hit the country. The publication of Mohammed cartoons by the Danish daily *Jyllands-Posten*'s on 30 September 2005 led to protests around the world, including violent demonstrations and riots in several Muslim countries (BBC, 2006; Burke, 2011, pp. 229-233; Reynolds, 2006). The tensions reached a peak when the Norwegian Christian newspaper *Magazinet* reprinted the disputed cartoons on 10 January 2006. Furious demonstrators attacked Danish and Norwegian embassies in some countries including in Syria; Danish and Norwegian flags were also burned (CNN, 2006). In Southern Iraq, the Danish contingent reported an increase in forceful protests, demonstrations and threats against them (R. Petersen, 2012, p. 417). In April 2005, it was still possible for troops to patrol in unarmoured vehicles. By autumn, however, the number of IEDs against patrols increased, leading to the first Danish military casualty in October 2005. Due to security concerns, Danish civilian aid organizations gradually withdrew from Iraq. The organizations also refused to work under military protection because that would violate their principles of being neutral in war (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, p. 324). At this point, the government launched in 2004 its 'Concerted Plan and Action' (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2004). Accordingly, civilian experts from the MFA would together with deployed soldiers begin the reconstruction of Iraq and fill the vacuum after the aid organizations that had left the country. This was far more ambitious than the civil-military coordination (CIMIC) projects, which involved helping locals with smaller civilian projects with the aim of building trust, the maintenance of installations like electricity supply and setting up football fields. In Iraq, however, none of the larger projects were finished as the Danish contingent was absorbed with other tasks including providing security in the region; it also lacked an overall plan or strategy that prioritized projects (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012). By 2007, seven soldiers had lost their lives in Iraq, and the continuous fighting raised critical questions in the Folketing.

Denmark faced several additional challenges in Iraq. One was what to do with prisoners of war, which led to one of the first serious divide between the political and the military levels. Following revelations of torture of Iraqi prisoners by American forces at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad, Søren Gade, defence minister, sent a letter to the Defence Command in May 2004. In it, Gade demanded the military leadership to tighten oversight of persons retained by Danish troops and notify him if there were suspicions of misconduct by Danish officers (Danish Defence Committee, 2006). The defence minister wanted to increase the effort to prevent that something similar happened in the Danish contingent and that detained persons were not exposed to conduct that violated the Geneva Conventions. In his reply, General Helsø, CHOD, assured the minister that the Defence Command was already working intensively with the issue (Bjerre, Larsen, & Stougaard, 2008, pp. 150-151). However, on 23 July, Helsø notified Gade that there was an ongoing internal inquiry in Iraq of possible torture of prisoners by a Danish officer. The inquiry ended with the Danish force commander in Iraq sending Captain Annemette Hommel home in August 2004 after accusations of refusing Iraqi prisoners' water during interrogations and forcing them to sit in uncomfortable positions. Gade immediately notified parliament, and shortly after, the issue unsurprisingly exploded in the Danish media. Subsequently, Gade ordered the battalion leadership home, as he no longer trusted the judgement of the officers (Heurlin, 2007b, p. 83). This decision is significant in that the defence minister directly intervened in what many viewed as a military matter (R. Petersen, 2012, p. 408). Notably, the Danish military actor was challenged in a central military affair and the incident indicates that the political level had its concerns in a complex and unfamiliar situation, probing the defence minister to intervene in military authority.

Turning to the Norwegian forces, they continued to operate under relative limited exposure after the government shifted attention from OEF to ISAF during 2003. By the end of November 2003, the Telemark Task Force arrived in Kabul, organized as a quick reaction force with about 180 soldiers and heavy military equipment, including infantry fighting vehicles. Their task was to guard and secure the delegates gathering in Kabul to discuss and ratify a new constitution for Afghanistan (Oma, 2015, p. 63). After the grand assembly (*Loya Jirga*), the task force continued its deployment (Norwegian MoD, 2004a). Oslo chose to assume responsibility for security of Kabul police districts 4 and 10, as the Defence Staff considered this mission best suited to the existing organization and equipment of the Telemark Task Force (Oma, 2015, p. 64). Moreover, other mission alternatives were discarded due to the threat stemming from mines and unexploded ordnance outside Kabul city. Nevertheless, the two police districts still carried risk. In May 2004, a convoy in Kabul came under fire, leading to the first Norwegian soldier casualty in Afghanistan. The event did not lead to significant changes to the contribution, however. In June 2004, a mechanized infantry company

replaced the Telemark Task Force and joined Battle Group 3 of the Kabul Multinational Brigade together with Belgium and Hungary (Norwegian MoD, 2004b). In 2006, this mission ended as Norway opted to deploy a robust quick reaction force of about 200 troops to the city Mazar-e Sharif in the Bahlk province in Northern Afghanistan to relieve British commitments.

Arriving in the Faryab province in Northern Afghanistan in 2004, first under British command and later as lead nation, Norwegian contingents spent the first couple of years on mostly uneventful patrols in the province (Suhrke, 2011, p. 89). The core military capability of the PRT was three mobile observation teams, who had the task of conducting long-range patrols in the province to collect information, establish situational awareness and share information with the aim of extending the reach of Kabul's authority in Faryab. Each team comprised six or seven lightly equipped soldiers with soft-skin all-terrain vehicles, and it was possible to patrol Meymaneh, the capital city of Faryab, without wearing helmets or body armour (Oma, 2015, p. 72). Despite the calm environment, there were more pressing challenges related to power politics, where internal rivalry characterized political dynamics in the province (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 114). Although the Taliban was defeated, there was an apparent conflict between the Uzbek leader General Dostum and the Tajik leader Atta, the two victorious warlords in the north. Taking the cue from the British, the Norwegians lay low vis-à-vis local power holders dominated by Dostum. They went on patrols to 'show flag', to observe and to drink tea with local leaders. Although there were concerns about local issues of security and justice, the Norwegians had few means to address local rivalry (Suhrke, 2011, p. 90). Thus, the Norwegian forces kept a low profile in Faryab and faced limited exposure in terms of operational challenges.

As lead nation from 2005, the government used the commitment in Northern Afghanistan to portray the Norwegian effort as 'civilian as possible' and emphasized the role of the military as a stabilization force. The military-led PRT Meymaneh had stabilization as its main task. Most significantly, the government in Oslo set out a clear divide between civilian and military personnel and their tasks. The Norwegian MFA was a driving force of the civilian-military divide and underlined the process as one where the military stabilized and created security for development through a civilian effort (NOU 2016:8, 2016, pp. 27, 112). For better coordination between the different elements of Norway's engagement, the government established in early 2006 the State Secretary Committee for Afghanistan, known as the Afghanistan Forum.[102] The intention was to provide a unitary leadership and for the Forum to serve as a decision-making pipeline on

[102] Members of the committee were the state secretaries of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister's Office and Ministry of Justice.

Afghanistan-related issues (de Coning, Lurås, Schia, & Ulriksen, 2009). In reality, it functioned mainly as an arena for information sharing and less for discussing how to strengthen coordination between the different areas (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 31). When the government agreed to assume the responsibility for the PRT Meymaneh, there was a clear military recommendation to build a new camp outside the city close to the airstrip, as it would be easier to protect the camp and reduce the risk of civilian casualties. Yet, the political level opted for moving into the former British base, an old bank building in the city centre. Despite Norwegian reservations about integrating civilian and military efforts, the argument was made that the camp's location in the city centre would strengthen the soft profile and create trust in the population (Egeberg, 2017, p. 392). As lead nation, then, the government promoted the civilian and soft profile and confined the military actor.

Oslo inherited the British PRT concept, which was unfamiliar to the Armed Forces and entailed a different structure compared to the force structure at home. Military planners increased the number of mobile observation teams from three to five to enable patrols of larger areas of the province, and doubled the Norwegian contingent to 50, mainly to strengthen staff and support functions now that the country had the lead nation role (Oma, 2015, p. 73). More significant than the slight increase in personnel was the fact that the British, when leaving for the south, took with them their sanitation personnel and helicopter capacity. At the time, NATO did not have its own helicopters in the northern region. Although Germany, the lead nation of the Regional Command North (RC North), had helicopters stationed in Uzbekistan (300 kilometres from Meymaneh), these were part of the national support structure for German troops and not under ISAF command (Egeberg, 2017, pp. 393-394). Moreover, the German helicopters had strict ROE and could not fly in the dark or to places that had not been cleared of mines. Thus, the Norwegian contingent in Faryab was small and lacked central capacities. Nevertheless, the troops did not face the same exposure as the Danish troops who, in 2006, deployed to Southern Afghanistan.

Danish experiences in Helmand differed significantly from the initial engagement in Afghanistan. By 2006, the Danish contingent consisted of 290 troops. It became part of the British-led Task Force Helmand assigned to the PRT Lashkar Gah under Regional Command South, with Camp Bastion serving as a logistical hub for all operations (Danish MFA, 2006; Folketinget, 2006). The military leadership viewed the mission in Iraq as an essential precondition and experience for the Danish army's effort in Southern Afghanistan (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, p. 345). Helmand was one of the toughest parts of the country; the population in Helmand was more sincerely supportive of the Taliban ideology, and its tribal networks were more fragmented, with narcotics interests and corruption characterizing the political complexity to a far greater degree compared to other Afghan

regions (Farrell & Gordon, 2009). It did not take long before Danish forces were involved in intensive fighting. As the contingent became operational in July 2006, its first task was to relieve British troops besieged in Musa Qala 70 kilometres from Camp Bastion (see map 4.2 below). The mission turned violent much to the surprise of the military leadership in Copenhagen (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, p. 413). Throughout August 2006, Danish forces were attacked about 50 times and they called for 78 defensive airstrikes to defeat Taliban fighters (R. Petersen, 2012, p. 457). When the news of the battle of Musa Qala reached Copenhagen, there were strong reactions in the Folketing and support wavered in both right- and left-wing parties. As Mogens Lykketoft, social democrat, stated, "We are not there to seek a war with the Taliban. We are there to support the launch of civilian development" (Lykketoft quoted in *Ritzau*, 2006). At the end of August, the government insisted on the withdrawal of their troops from Musa Qala, and Gade managed to restore domestic consensus and support of the continued Afghanistan engagement (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, p. 432; King, 2011, p. 259). Musa Qala became a reality check for politicians who believed that Helmand would be easier than Iraq. Before this battle, politicians believed that it was possible to keep reconstruction work and warfare against the Taliban strictly apart. After, the balance tipped in favour of focusing on combat operations.



Map 4.2 *Major cities and military camps in central Helmand*

After their entanglement with the Taliban in Musa Qala, the Danes participated in several British and Canadian-led operations in both Helmand and Kandahar provinces. This included several clearance operations, which were of a more mobile nature. By October 2006, a new British Brigade had arrived with a new concept of operations that changed the Danish operational pattern. The new concept continued to build on the clear-hold-build philosophy. The new element was a greater emphasis on manoeuvrability (Jakobsen & Thruelsen, 2011). To avoid the isolating 'platoon house' strategy,[103] the new British brigade created several mobile operations groups to conduct long-range patrols over large areas in order to detect and destroy enemy forces and thus prevent them from mounting large-scale attacks on the small contingents garrisoning the towns in Helmand (Farrell & Gordon, 2009). In addition, the British commander wanted to establish a more permanent presence and sought to create a network of forward operating bases, such as Sandford, Keenan, and Armadillo inside the Green Zone, an agricultural area along Helmand River stretching north of Gereshk (see map 4.2 above). ISAF troops also conducted more CIMIC work and quick impact projects with the aim of establishing a dialogue and positive relations with the local population. With insufficient forces to hold the cleared areas, however, the Taliban was able to return once ISAF forces had moved on to the next area (Grey, 2009, pp. 61-65). Thus, high exposure and a combat focus continued to characterize the Danish engagement in Helmand.

In 2007, a broad parliamentary majority agreed to increase the Danish contingent to 640 troops (Folketinget, 2007c). Referring to Musa Qala, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service increased its warnings in an annex to the parliamentary proposal, stressing that "The security situation is critical in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, in which the Taliban dominates the insurgency […]. It is highly likely that the extent of attacks from insurgencies and terror groups in the spring of 2007 will grow and reach a level like the one in late summer of 2006" (Danish Defence Intelligence Service, 2007, p. 1). The aim of the government was to increase the numbers so that the Danish contingent would constitute an independent battalion associated with Task Force Helmand. In the Defence Command in Copenhagen, it had always been the plan to deploy more troops to Helmand. As the government committed itself in taking part in NATO's expansion of the ISAF mission, Helsø was determined to use the opportunity to deploy a battalion-sized battle group (M. V. Rasmussen, 2013a, p. 141). A sharp decrease in forces to the Balkans and Iraq made an increase possible for an already strained army (Defence Command Denmark, 2008, pp. 13-14). Forming a battalion that could operate independently, Denmark took charge of its own area of operation,

[103] During the summer of 2006, the British force commander deployed units to the towns of Sangin, Now Sad and Musa Qala, spreading Task Force Helmand thin over a large area. Consequently, isolated pockets of British soldiers were besieged in 'platoon houses', as hostile forces assaulted them on a daily basis (Farrell & Gordon, 2009, p. 670).

Battle Group Centre, which consisted of Gereshk town and the middle part of the Green Zone. In the summer of 2007, the Danish battalion moved to the new main operating base Price outside Gereshk. Moreover, while the Danish MoD and the MFA stressed the comprehensive approach and the reconstruction side of the mission, the Danish forces ignored these tasks, as the military wanted to demonstrate commitment to the NATO transformation agenda and conduct expeditionary missions that included combat (M. V. Rasmussen, 2013a, p. 143). Overall, this indicates an autonomous military actor set on traditional military tasks.

In September 2007, British and Danish forces initiated an offensive war. Adapting to changing circumstances, these troops were to make their way into Taliban-dominated areas and remove the enemy with massive use of force. The British commander gave the Danish battalion the task of clearing the southern part of Upper Gereshk Valley, while British forces would clear their way south from the city of Sangin so that the two areas would melt together to a Taliban-free zone providing security and stability for the population. The mission resulted in heavy combat, and the battle on the eastern Helmand riverbank was the first of several kinetic operations, where the Danish battle group with hundreds of British soldiers advanced north along Helmand River (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, p. 465). With forward operating base Sandford as point of departure, which was now under Danish command, Danish troops attacked the enemy almost daily. While British and Danish forces were successful in their advances with the main effort concentrated on military defeat of the enemy, the focused use of force had additional consequences. The heavy-handed approach by ISAF forces and their increased reliance on defence airstrikes became deeply unpopular with the civilian population. Moreover, due to demanding geographical and operative conditions, there were significant stresses on materiel and support functions, as well as additional expenditures following maintenance (Defence Command Denmark, 2008).

Back home in Denmark, a central issue concerned tanks. Having seen the difficulties of the terrain and the hardship and casualties suffered by the British at their forward operating bases in the Green Zone, the Danish commander telephoned home to request reinforcements in the form of a tank platoon (Jakobsen & Thruelsen, 2011, p. 86). Initially, the Defence Command did not recommend sending tanks fearing that it would send a signal that the current effort was unsuccessful (Defence Command Denmark, 2007a). However, by the parliamentary debate on the issue, the Defence Command turned in its recommendation as many in the military and those on ground in Helmand argued in favour. According to Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, the Danish army had a strong schema for how to conduct operations at the tactical level, and was rigorous in its assessment of its needs, especially in terms of materiel and planning (M. V. Rasmussen, 2013a, p. 147). Military advice and

force protection weighed heavily in the parliamentary debate (Folketinget, 2007a, 2007b). Considering it a military matter, the Folketing approved the proposal, and in early November 2007, four Leopard tanks arrived in Afghanistan. The issue of tanks shows how military expertise and authority dominated the debate once the Danish battle group was committed, indicating an autonomous military actor. Consequently, as violence escalated, Denmark reinforced its contingent with heavy army material.

Following the British Helmand Road Map introduced in 2007, the Danish contingent changed operational patterns from reconnaissance in the desert and mountains in the Helmand province to operations in the more densely populated areas in the Green Zone. With a new strategy, the British changed the direction of the military campaign, giving priority to larger towns and the principal infrastructure that connected them (Farrell & Gordon, 2009, pp. 674-5). Furthermore, following developments on ground, the Danish government decided to withdraw its forces from other locations in Afghanistan and concentrate its military contribution in Helmand (Danish MFA, 2007). In the 2008 Danish Helmand Plan, it is stated that, "Altogether it has been possible to demonstrate immediate, visible results of the effort in Helmand. However, the dispersed priority areas and the lack of local foundation have limited the impact of the effort" (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2007). Compared to the relative stable Lashkar Gar, the capital of Helmand province, the government viewed the Gereshk area as particular problematic, in which a fragile post-conflict situation had turned into a full-scale battle. The Helmand Plan also noted the complex actor picture, in which Danish troops were not up against one consolidated actor, but a mix of regular warriors and persons who supported the Taliban, as well as criminals and warlords who preferred power structures to remain unchanged (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2007, p. 6). Accordingly, complex lethality challenged existing plans and pushed the government to refocus and reinforce the efforts.

While the Norwegian area of operations in Northern Afghanistan had remained mostly uneventful, an attack in February 2006 marked a change. As a reaction to the abovementioned Mohammed cartoons, angry Afghans attacked the PRT camp, some with grenades and anti-tank missiles. The attack was an awakening for both the political and the military leadership in Oslo. It broke the illusion of the Norwegian stabilization force, which was not consistent with the reality on the ground. The event underlined the almost non-existent sanitation capacity, the low troop number, and that the possibilities for evacuation or receiving support from RC North were slim due to large distances, terrain and weather conditions (Egeberg, 2017, pp. 391-400). At the time of the attack, most of the combat-trained troops were either on leave or on patrol in Faryab province. Only by chance, a Norwegian mobile observation team comprised of Special Forces had returned to camp

the previous evening to refuel and get fresh supplies. As the situation escalated, the main gate of the camp was destroyed, and several houses and vehicles were set on fire. After four hours of intensive combat, the ISAF forces started using sharp ammunition and killed three demonstrators. The riot first subsided after back-up support from a British quick reaction force, based in the city of Mazar-e Sharif, eventually arrived in Meymaneh after severe delays due to the limited number of transport helicopters. All the Norwegian Special Forces were injured, two of them seriously and had to be evacuated to the German field hospital in Mazar-e Sharif. The attack also increased Norwegian suspicion of General Dostum, as a PRT video had captured central persons in Dostum's political party among the rioters (Suhrke, 2011, pp. 92-93). After the attack, the government made several changes to the PRT. There was an increase in the size of the force to 200, as well as significant investments in infrastructure, including the construction of a new camp outside of Meymaneh city. One aspect about the new camp reveals how Norwegian authorities were unable to foresee developments. When the new camp was finished in the summer of 2007, it could accommodate a contingent of 250 personnel, but it was soon too small. A year later, the PRT comprised close to 400 personnel (Oma, 2015, p. 104). Higher exposure led the political level to defer to military advice on the camp's location; they made the military contingent more robust for the tasks in Afghanistan.

With a more challenging environment in Northern Afghanistan, the Norwegian government toned down its ambitions of state building. There were several violent incidents, with the trait of an insurgency approach, that beckoned a changing phase in the region and ISAF started to take casualties. In May 2007, an IED attack outside the Norwegian camp injured three Norwegian soldiers and killed one Finnish soldier. Consequently, the PRT changed its routines for patrolling and restricted movements in the provincial capital (Suhrke, 2011, p. 94). Nevertheless, in June, a patrol just outside Meymaneh city came under fire and one Norwegian soldier was wounded. A few months later, the car carrying the head of the PRT hit an IED, which destroyed the car although the officer survived. In November 2007, Norway suffered its first causality in Northern Afghanistan and second in total. Norwegian soldiers had hit a roadside bomb close to the camp with their unarmoured vehicle, which killed one soldier and severely wounded another. The deteriorating situation led Norway to consolidate its military presence in Faryab. During the summer of 2008, the deployment of the quick reaction force in Mazar-e Sharif ended, and Oslo handed the responsibility for providing the RC North with a quick reaction force over to the Germans (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 55). Notably, Norway reinforced the PRT Meymaneh with a detachment of helicopters for medical evacuation and a 100-strong infantry unit. The initiative for reinforcements came from Sverre Diesen, chief of defence. He wanted to make sure that the PRT

Meymaneh had its own quick reaction force, so that the Norwegian PRT no longer was dependent on the Germans. As for medical evacuation, the Norwegian Aeromedical Detachment was operational on 1 April 2008. It was provisional, and the military had to complete several adjustments (Oma, 2015, p. 110). As of 2008, the PRT Meymaneh, initially a marginal part of Norway's contribution to ISAF, became the main military component of the country's engagement in Afghanistan. The engagement got a higher military profile, in which the military leadership played an important role in ensuring reinforcements following higher exposure. This adds to the expectation that high-intensity complex lethality conditions broader authority to the military actor.



Map 4.3 *Faryab Province with district borders*

In addition to reinforcements, there was a change in the operational pattern of the PRT Meymaneh. From 2007 onwards, there was a more offensive Norwegian approach in Northern Afghanistan. The mobile observation teams and larger task units began seeking out troubled areas more often and frequently encountered insurgents. The result was several so-called pinprick operations aiming to disrupt the activity of insurgents (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 122). Based on patrols of the mobile observation teams and new security assessments, the Norwegians presumed that Ghormach, a district in neighbouring province Badghis under the Regional Command West, was the origin of several attacks in Faryab (see map 4.3 above). Ghormach was almost entirely Pashtun and

extraordinarily poor and neglected. Furthermore, a mountain range isolated the district from the provincial centre and cut off the Spanish-led PRT Badghis from patrolling in Ghormach. With limited presence and control by provincial authorities, Ghormach was de facto autonomous and thus a natural haven for insurgents and criminals (Suhrke, 2011, pp. 96-97). However, because the PRT Meymaneh was under the RC North it could in principle not cross into Ghormach without clearance from the Regional Command West, which discouraged interventions from other regional commands. Yet, the Norwegians succeeded in getting ISAF to authorize two operations into Ghormach from the RC North. In these pre-planned offensives, the Norwegian quick reaction force and units from the PRT Meymaneh were to the forefront, as German contingents had to stop at the provincial borders since the Bundestag in Berlin had restricted them from operating outside the RC North area. The two operations led to comprehensive battle contact with adversaries. During the first operation in November 2007, Harekate Yolo II, the military was able to clear the area of insurgents. However, having to withdraw from the area, so that reconstruction and political work could begin and according to regional command jurisdictions, the insurgents returned (Suhrke, 2011, pp. 96-97). Despite opposition from the UNAMA and aid workers, ISAF planned another offensive to clear the district. During Operation Karez, launched in May 2008, the PRT Meymaneh established a forward operating base in Ghormach (E. Johansen, 2011, p. 76). Yet, none of the operations had long-lasting effects as the Afghan forces, who were supposed to hold the area afterwards, never stayed (Oma, 2015, pp. 122-123). By 2008, Norway faced different dynamics and increased exposure, which led to reinforcements and a shift in operational approach – indicating broader military authority in directing the Norwegian military engagement.

In Helmand, several attacks against Danish forces during spring of 2008 signalled a change in tactics of the insurgents. During a patrol in the bazar in Gereshk, a suicide bomber hit, for the first time, Danes on patrol and killed two soldiers. After the attack, soldiers stopped patrolling in the bazar and the most crowded streets in the city. Later, an IED killed a soldier during combat in the Green Zone (Defence Command Denmark, 2011). In less than a year, eleven Danish soldiers died in Helmand. Although the political support did not waver, these losses caused a sense of need in the military leadership to show the Danish public, the soldiers and their next of kin that it was taking actions. In June 2008, with the situation on the ground deteriorating, Copenhagen decided to deploy a helicopter detachment to ISAF. The government's proposal followed a request from the Defence Command, who argued that helicopters would increase security and improve the Danish troops' ability to solve assigned tasks (Danish MFA, 2008b). The focus in the parliamentary debate was on force protection, which became increasingly important as Danish troops faced heavy

assaults (Folketinget, 2008). Evidently, military authority and expertise still had precedence in terms of the Danish military engagement in Afghanistan, indicating broad military authority.

The government, however, would soon be more involved in what was happening in Helmand. While there was no Danish strategy for Iraq, the war in Afghanistan led civilian decision-makers to develop an actual plan for 'winning' (Rynning & Ringsmose, 2008). At this point, there was widespread disquiet in the Danish Armed Forces with the mission in Afghanistan and many had quit because of the intense deployment frequency and large defence reforms leading to geographical relocations of personnel (Defence Command Denmark, 2008; M. V. Rasmussen, 2013a, p. 152). Moreover, Danish opinion polls showed, for the first time, a negative trend in the support for the military engagement (M. V. Rasmussen, 2013b, p. 273). The relief from the lack of strategy and decreasing support came from one of the parties more critical to the Afghanistan war, the Danish Social Liberal Party in opposition, which resulted in the Danish Afghanistan strategy covering the period 2008-2012. The strategy outlined a gradual reduction of the military effort, strengthening civilian efforts, and focusing on a comprehensive approach:

> The traditional line of thought of security and development efforts as a process, in which military forces first secure an area, followed by implementation of development activities, is not applicable to Afghanistan. The threat picture conditions specific demands of an active and flexible interplay between military and civilian efforts (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2008, p. 21).

In light of the security situation and the changing environment on the ground, the government considered that the initial period would involve an increase in number of troops to create conditions for expanding the authority of the Afghan government in Helmand. The foreign minister argued that "The effort shall be both humanitarian, military and civilian. […] However, when we are increasing the humanitarian and civilian effort, we must increase the military effort as well until we have created a peaceful and stable Afghanistan" (Møller quoted in Folketinget, 2008). At the strategic level, a Danish inter-ministerial Afghanistan working group was to coordinate the integrated effort. The group included actors from the Prime Minister's Office, the MFA, the MoD, the Defence Command, the National Police, and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service. Meeting on a weekly basis, the aim was to promote an integrated political, military and development aid effort in Afghanistan by implementing the Afghanistan strategy.

In addition to the strategy, the government also published annual Helmand Plans, the first of which was issued in December 2007. These plans outlined goals for the Danish efforts and expected effects, in which the government could politically control the overall Danish effort based on benchmarks and reports evaluating progress (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2007, 2009b, 2010,

2011). The political level began involving itself more in military matters on the ground. There are criticisms of the first Helmand Plan as a flawed document; nevertheless, it is commented that the fact that such a plan was made at all was a revolution in the Danish approach to military affairs (M. V. Rasmussen, 2013b). The development of these plans, however, did not include the military leadership, but were a result of an inter-ministerial cooperation between the MoD and the MFA (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2009a, p. 3). Both civilian experts and military officers were worried about the very concrete goals set out for 2008. They perceived the goals more as a need of civil servants in the MoD and the MFA, rather than a result of insight and understanding of stabilization and reconstruction in a war zone (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, p. 511). Overall, we can identify a clear shift, in which the political level in Denmark got more involved, confining the military actor.

The plan of a comprehensive approach faltered in the encounter with enemy forces. In December 2008, the Danish military contribution reached 750 in total (Danish MFA, 2008a; Folketinget, 2008). Throughout 2009, Danish troops performed several military operations, where many died after explosions of suicide bombers and IEDs. By the end of 2009, Denmark had suffered the highest number of casualties of all ISAF members relative to population size (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014, p. 4, table 1.1). The exposure was significant. The Defence Command increased counter-measurements against IEDs in cooperation with the British (Defence Command Denmark, 2010), and the Danish non-governmental organizations considered the areas of Danish deployment too dangerous for humanitarian workers (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2008, p. 13). Consequently, Danish troops participated in civilian projects to support a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan. Furthermore, with a population-centric approach, there were new demands in the way Danish armed forces solved tasks, and politicians tightened the ROE (Danish Defence Committee, 2006; R. Petersen, 2012, p. 490). Increasingly, Danish forces had to consider political or ethical consequences following the use of force. As one frustrated major told Danish media that "Everything is to be catalogued, reported and written down. […] We risk waiting to complete a task, which could have been solved quicker. Worst case scenario, it can lead to loss of life" (*Ritzau*, 2010). Accordingly, democracy and human rights were not only to be fought for but were to be embedded in the execution of tasks. Thus, as the engagement in Helmand dragged on, the Danish military actor became more confined.

In the case of Norway, the government formulated in 2009 a Norwegian strategy for a comprehensive civilian-military approach in Faryab to concretize political guidelines. The Faryab strategy was a joint effort by the Norwegian ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Justice, written on the backdrop of the new ISAF strategic direction and force requirements that focused

on transition and phasing out the international presence (see NATO, 2005, p. C-2-2; NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 119). The strategy underlined the aim to shift the military effort to support the capacity building of the Afghan National Security Forces, with a focus on Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) (Norwegian MFA, MoD, & MoJ, 2009). However, it did not provide clear guidelines, and few saw the document as useful in practice (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 119).[104] Thus, Norwegian PRT force commanders were left alone to develop and run operations in the province. As part of the 'Afghanization' agenda, the Norwegian military effort gradually developed and assumed a mentoring, partnering and supporting role to prepare the Afghans to take responsibility for provincial security. The first Norwegian OMLT contingent arrived in theatre in January 2009. Although the OMLT structure did not resemble any units in the Norwegian force structure back home, Diesen, chief of defence, saw the contribution as part of his professionalization agenda and an opportunity to support his effort towards a more professionalized organization (Oma, 2015, p. 132). The OMLTs required highly skilled personnel and provided younger officers with opportunities for valuable experience. Although the requirements for the OMLT led to vacancies in key positions in the manoeuvre battalions back home, NATO requirements served as a key argument to uphold the OMLT commitment (see Norwegian MoD, 2009b). Thus, the data suggests that the Norwegian military actor obtained broader authority in face of high-intensive complex lethality in its attempt to remain relevant and resulted in a further professionalization of the military organization. In contrast to the initial phase in Northern Afghanistan, the military leadership could now grasp the opportunity of core military tasks.

By 2009, the situation in Faryab had deteriorated significantly. Whether this was because the offensives in Ghormach had pressed insurgents to move into Faryab, or if the insurgency simply had expanded, was unclear (Suhrke, 2011, p. 97). Regardless, Oslo decided that new steps were necessary to address a problem that spanned Ghormach-Faryab borders by including Ghormach into Faryab, enabling the PRT free and regular access to the neighbouring district. Diesen was among the primary proponents of an expansion of the Norwegian area of responsibility, arguing that the insurgents were obviously aware of the boundary line between the Regional Command East and the Regional Command North (Oma, 2015, p. 125). Fearing an escalation, the RC North lead nation, Germany, opposed the Norwegian proposal with reference to Bundestag restriction to keep German forces in Afghanistan out of combat operations. The issue was particularly sensitive to the Germans who at this point were responsible for the quick reaction force in Mazar-e Sharif,

[104] Criticisms of the Faryab strategy concerns that it was too general to provide meaningful and concrete guidelines for the military operative effort, and that the strategy was more a presentation of ambitions rather than a strategy that reflected the realities on the ground (Halsne, 2013, pp. 118-119; NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 136).

whose purpose was to assist smaller operations in the RC North (Suhrke, 2011, pp. 97-98). Nevertheless, after intense diplomatic efforts, Norway managed to win support at a local and central level in Afghanistan for an expansion (NOU 2016:8, 2016, pp. 123-125). Crucially, Norway had support from the highest ISAF level. The COMISAF Dan K. McNeill shared Norway's frustration, where national caveats were continuously annoying him as they hampered the ISAF mission. He therefore welcomed the efforts of a small but eager ISAF nation that volunteered a proactive approach towards the enemy and his support arguably tipped the scale in favour of the Norwegian request (Suhrke, 2011, p. 99). In January 2009, Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan at the time, signed a decree that temporarily incorporated Ghormach district into Faryab. Thus, support through a military professional network was decisive for the Norwegian forces to become more proactive, arguably reinforcing military authority.

The inclusion of Ghormach led to a more proactive Norwegian approach and cemented the changed operational pattern. One of the consequences was that the infantry unit deployed to Faryab, designed for guard and escort duties, largely came to function as a manoeuvre unit in pre-planned concerted operations with increasingly heavy equipment, notably infantry fighting vehicles (Oma, 2015, p. 126). Acknowledging that the current pinprick operations would not solve the problems in Ghormach, the PRT commander chose to use the infantry unit in a preventive way to influence the situation instead of waiting passively for new assaults. Another consequence was that the Norwegian government in March 2009 decided to extend the deployment of the helicopter detachment by twelve months beyond 1 October 2009 (Norwegian MoD, 2009c, p. 14). Because the Afghanistan engagement strained the national helicopter capacity, opinion was divided within the Armed Forces (Oma, 2015, p. 127). The government chose to follow the CHOD's advice; he argued that the considerable risk for injured Norwegian soldiers made it more important to maintain an aeromedical capability than avoiding disadvantages at home that would follow from an extension. Consequently, the decision left the national helicopter capacity to a critical low level (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 55). By 2009, the Norwegian contingent comprised about 600 personnel. Thus, continued exposure and the conditions of complex lethality led to a reinforcement of the military engagement and contributed to consolidate military authority.

The security in the Faryab province continued to deteriorate in 2009 and into 2010. The Taliban was gaining local foothold by 2009, and by early 2010, insurgents were influential in large parts of the province. Initially, the government announced in October 2009 that it would withdraw the infantry unit in PRT Meymaneh with effect by the summer of 2010 (Norwegian MoD, 2009c, pp. 86-87). However, to enable continued partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces and to

ensure the safety of personnel in a demanding environment, the government changed its mind two months later (Norwegian MoD, 2010). Ida Maria Oma (2015, p. 138) points to a unison of military advice as decisive in this 180-degree turn of decision. By 2010, Norwegian forces were deeply involved in combat operations on a regular basis. There was high exposure and Norway suffered heavy losses. In the first half of 2010, IEDs killed five and injured nine soldiers in three separate events. In January 2010, a Norwegian soldier was killed in Ghormach, and in June, four Norwegian soldiers were killed in the Almar district in Faryab province. Significant concern for the lack of armouring and sanitation services led to a rapid procurement of materiel, such as new armoured vehicles, mine seekers and equipment for analysing explosives (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2011). At the end of the mission, the Norwegian focus centred on transferring the responsibility for security to Afghan Forces. Norway reduced its participation in combat operations and ended its presence in Ghormach. From 2012, there was a geographical withdrawal as the PRT Meymaneh closed on 1 October 2012.

In 2010, the strategic context in the Helmand province changed. By July, a 20,000-strong Marine Expeditionary Force from the US Marine Corps arrived in Helmand as part of the strategy of the Obama Administration. In the wake of the surge of American troops, ISAF formed Regional Command Southwest encompassing Nimroz and Helmand Provinces with the US as lead nation (US DoD, 2010). Consequently, Task Force Helmand came under the new regional command, including the Danish contingent. Moreover, the overstretched Helmand Task Force transferred the responsibility of the areas around Musa Qala, Kajaki and Sangin to American forces in March, June and September 2010 respectively (Jakobsen & Thruelsen, 2011, p. 96). With a decisive American presence, there was more focus on an integrated approach which increased the pressure on insurgents. At the beginning of April 2011, Denmark also deployed a SOF unit of about fifteen soldiers as part of an US-led Task Force based near Kabul for a period of three months. The aim was to gain valuable experience, which could be used during a prospective deployment of a Danish SOF contingent that would assume the role of training and partnership in the Helmand Province in 2012 (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2011, p. 20). In the 2010 Danish Helmand Plan, there is a notable shift of focus to transition to Afghan self-government, partnership with the Afghan National Army and people-centric areas (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2010). The plan reflected the political but not the military dimension; the aim was to reduce the military contribution, whether or not the task had been completed.[105] At the end of 2010, to free resources for the new mission, the Danish contingent gave up advanced bases in Helmand and started to concentrate on

[105] Interview 2. See Appendix I.

the town of Gereshk. During 2012, Denmark reduced its military contribution to about 650 soldiers, and the Danish contingent evolved to become a training, education and advising battalion. Consequently, the Danish military role gradually changed from that of combat and partnership to training, advising and support, leading up to 2014 (Danish MFA & Danish MoD, 2011). Thus, the shift in balance of a more confined military actor continued with more political level involvement and constraints on military authority and autonomy.

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In course of the engagement, Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces have faced significant exposure. Although the adversaries were ill equipped, the theatre proved dangerous enough with the flow of enemy activity. In this process, changes in the intensity of the situation influenced the effort. As the intensity of complex lethality heightened leading to higher exposure, there was an increased focus on the security of the deployed forces and the military units were more heavily armed. This is evident by the abovementioned measures taken, such as new equipment, armoured vehicles, reinforcements of helicopter detachments and infantry units, the use of Danish tanks, and moving the main operating base from the city centre to the outskirts in the case of Norway. Operational challenges on the battlefield furthermore led to additional military expenditures due to wear and tear of material and equipment. The missions proved to be more expensive than anticipated, where one reason was the exceptionally demanding conditions faced by the troops. One central issue in the 2008 Danish Defence Commission was the need to replace materiel lost in international operations, as the missions Denmark had engaged in had been more dangerous and costlier than foreseen when political authorities had decided upon the expeditionary doctrine (Danish Defence Commission of 2008, 2009). The operation in Afghanistan has also been costly for Norway, using some NOK 11.5 billion (USD 1.83 billion) for military purposes (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 183).

The missions have been a sobering experience for Danish and Norwegian forces and brought renewed awareness of the value of expertise, professionalization and experience in combat situations on the contemporary battlefield (Defence Command Denmark, 2007b, 2009; Norwegian Armed Forces, 2012, 2013). In Denmark, this has stressed the need to have contracted and employed personnel as the essential element in the military. As for Norway, who has not gone to similar length as Denmark in terms of limiting the number of conscripts, there were professional soldiers who deployed to the theatre in Afghanistan. Both the Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces, through experiences in warfare and more focus on professional units, have become more

professionalized in line with the new demands posed by complex lethality.[106] The many legacy issues that emerged during the conflict underline the demanding operations of Norwegian and Danish forces; in 2009, Danish authorities designated 5 September as official flag-flying day for Danish veterans, and in 2010, Denmark got a veteran policy (Defence Command Denmark, 2010, 2011). The awareness of the need to take care of veterans and how to do so systematically has also increased in Norway during the period 2001-2014 (Haaland, 2007, p. 50; Norwegian MoD, 2009d). The Norwegian Commission of Inquiry on Afghanistan found that it was the experience of Afghanistan that, in practice, brought the greatest transformation to the Norwegian Armed Forces' care of veterans (NOU 2016:8, 2016, pp. 182-4). There is also a new system for awards, a process in which General Diesen was a driving force because he sought to bring back a regimen that reflected what the Norwegian soldiers had been through in the new international missions (Egeberg, 2017, pp. 570-1). The analysis indicates a changed culture and focus of the military organizations and contributing to the professionalization of the military based on values naturally divergent from a civil society in peace.

In Afghanistan, Denmark suffered heavier losses than Norway with 43 casualties in total, 214 injured soldiers of which 32 severely injured (Danish MoD, 2014a). For the most part, the Danish Armed Forces played a traditional military role. Danish decision-makers were also relatively quick to realize the significance of deploying troops to the more dangerous and demanding areas. Comparing the many Danish parliamentary proposals for a military contribution, except for Iraq, the mandate became broader and sharper, broadening military authority. Partly, this followed the national priority discussed in section 4.2 but also the demanding situation on ground. The attempts to find a comprehensive approach failed in the encounter of enemies and Danish forces were engaged in heavy battles. Moreover, there are several episodes where the political level deferred to military expertise, such as on the issue of tanks and helicopters. A clear shift follows the introduction of an Afghanistan strategy and the annual Helmand Plans. Accordingly, civilian authorities became more involved in events on the ground, for example by setting down benchmarks for military engagement. This indicates that high intensity over time, with no solution in sight, pushes the political level to become more involved. Importantly, it led to a confinement of the previous autonomous military actor.

In the case of Norway, there is a significant shift in 2006/2007. Although the Norwegian priority differed, keeping the Armed Forces involved but out of harm's way, a chain of events led Norwegian forces into a war-like situation in which they were actually quite exposed. A total of ten

[106] Also noted in several interviews with Danish and Norwegian top-level officers. See Appendix I.

Norwegian soldiers died during the war in Afghanistan, 20 badly injured and a large number with minor injuries, as well as psychological traumas (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 55, figure 4.7). The data suggests that the Norwegian political level was more involved compared to Denmark; however, as the engagement became highly intensive this enabled the use of force in a more traditional military domain and the government toned down its state building ambitions. Accordingly, higher exposure led to a broader scope of military authority, in which the political level began deferring to military expertise. While the dynamics of complex lethality constrained the political level in the aim of state building, it enabled the military to go on the offensive and take an active approach to counter the insurgency. The Norwegian engagement got a more distinct military role. Moreover, this demanded an increase in force protection, reinforcements, and a sharper use of military force.

4.4 Partner

This section examines the significance of the concept of partner, which highlights pressure from partners as well as incentives to learn through professional networks and change through emulation. Denmark and Norway had different relations with military partners in the theatre of war. While Norway was stationed in a neighbouring province to the main British-led PRT in Mazar-e Sharif and later lead nation of the PRT Meymaneh, Denmark was fully integrated with British forces in Helmand. This partnership enabled a small military power such as Denmark to engage in the most difficult areas of Afghanistan. In contrast, Norway opted for independence as a PRT lead nation, through which the Norwegian government sought to promote a stabilizing and humanitarian effort and to avoid direct conflict with the Taliban. However, high intensity and strategic guidelines from ISAF challenged this path, in which a military professional network triggered an inner military logic.

In the case of Denmark, London was the preferred partner. When Copenhagen contemplated strengthening the Danish effort in Afghanistan, they considered cooperation with the British to be just right in terms of military engagement and level of ambition. Germany and the other Nordic countries had limited military ambitions and their military engagement was too small to guarantee the security of Danish troops. The Americans, on the other end, had a too high level of ambition, and US technological level was not something Danish forces could match (M. V. Rasmussen, 2013b, p. 270). Significantly, because the Danes wanted to participate in British operations to improve the operational capabilities of the army and to enhance goodwill in NATO, the government made the contingent available to its British partner without caveats (Jakobsen & Thruelsen, 2011, p. 98; M. V. Rasmussen, 2013b, p. 270). One exception, however, was the decision that constrained the Danish contingent from taking and interrogating prisoners after events in Iraq.

The Defence Command had initiated several measures after the Hommel case in Iraq, including the introduction of an additional mission-based education in humanitarian law and precisely stated guidelines for questioning and interrogation (Danish Defence Committee, 2006, p. 2). To avoid complications on the ground, however, a practice developed where Danish contingents avoided detaining suspects, and instead leaving Afghan and British troops to make arrests and carry out interrogations (Aagaard, 2009; Brøndum, 2008; Krog, 2010). With the decision in 2006 to deploy to Helmand, the Danish contingent became a small, integrated part of a larger framework nation battle group under British command.

Although Britain was the preferred partner both at the political and the military levels, there were some concerns. The MoD feared that the British would use Danish troops for tasks, which were either too dangerous or too unglamorous for the British to do themselves (M. V. Rasmussen, 2013b). This concern was one of the motivations for increasing the Danish contingent to a full battalion so that it could operate independently and take responsibility for its own area of operations, quite separate from British operations in the north and south of the province. Thus, it appears that civilian authorities were anxious of things getting out of control, although they had provided a contingent with few or no caveats. In parallel to the Danish increase in troop number, however, was an increase in British force numbers from just over 2,000 in 2006 to 8,000 in 2008 (King, 2011, p. 259). Consequently, the Danes remained a junior partner within Task Force Helmand. Jakobsen and Thruelsen (2011) have found that the decision in 2007 did little to enhance the leverage of Danish commanders towards their British partner, which was the intention. For the most part, the directives and shifting priorities of the British contingents shaped Danish actions and patterns of operation, as discussed in the section on exposure. This is among other exemplified by the British repeatedly overruling objections from Danish commanders in 2008-2010, where Danish units were used for operations outside Danish area of operations. This ultimately led to Danish contingents reluctantly having to abandon forward operating base Amarillo, which they had paid for with heavy causalities. Another example is the Danish Afghanistan strategy and Helmand Plans, which were closely coordinated with London and reflected the 2007 British Helmand Road Map that shifted the campaign focus from the Taliban to generating 'soft effects' and securing the population (Farrell & Gordon, 2009, pp. 674-5; M. V. Rasmussen, 2013a, p. 153). In this context, guidance from Denmark and orders from NATO's chain of command played a lesser role, as British commanders in Helmand rarely felt compelled to follow directives from the COMISAF and Regional Command South due to a British command structure that give each commander considerable leeway to define his own concept of operations (Farrell, 2010, p. 585). Simultaneously, one of the military's aims of the deployment to Helmand was to learn from the

British and further transform the Danish army to an expeditionary force. From a military perspective, then, the army was keen to demonstrate that they could operate alongside the British on an equal level, which would be proof that they had successfully transformed to an expeditionary force (M. V. Rasmussen, 2013a, p. 154). Although Danish forces had to adapt to the British concept of operations, this did not narrow the military capability of influence vis-à-vis political authorities in Copenhagen. On the contrary. This appears to have reinforced the military approach to the mission in Helmand.

At the same time, the scenario the MoD feared did not play out. In their analysis, Jakobsen and Thruelsen found nothing to suggest that British commanders gave Danish contingents tasks they did not give to their own units as well (Jakobsen & Thruelsen, 2011, p. 99). There are also aspects about the British-Danish partnership that indicate leeway for the smaller power. On the issue of tanks, the British were not enthusiastic about the idea. London had voiced some concerns, as they were responsible for logistics and did not view tanks as a critical capability. However, they also had other weapons systems with longer reach than the Danes had, and in the end, the British accepted Danish arguments for the necessity of tanks (Defence Command Denmark, 2007a). The other issue concerns the choice of Battle Group Centre, as the Danish contingent became an independent battalion capable of taking on its own area of operations. The British had divided the Green Zone in three Battle Group centres, and initially wanted Denmark to take charge of Battle Group South. The Danish Defence Command, however, preferred Battle Group Centre for logistical reasons and because Gereshk, the financial centre of Helmand, offered the best opportunities for the abovementioned Danish ambition of a comprehensive approach (Halskov & Svendsen, 2012, pp. 451-452). In the end, the British accepted the Danish request for Battle Group Centre in late June 2007. These events indicate that there was some leeway for the junior partner.

Overall, the British became an influential partner for Denmark. The Armed Forces also learned from the experiences of its larger partner and their internal discussions about the development of the military in the wake of war experiences. In the Danish case, there is a shift towards a clear prioritization of partners.[107] As outlined in their 2007 Vision Statement, "The Armed Forces must be a sought-after partner for prioritized alliance and coalition partners. In other words, we must measure our own capabilities in relation to our partners. This means at minimum the US and the UK" (Danish Armed Forces, 2007, p. 13). As the 2012 annual military report concludes, "there is a close Danish-British relationship and a great trust to Danish professionalism, which is based on years of operational and training partnership, not least in Iraq and Afghanistan (Defence Command

[107] This was also noted in several interviews with Danish top-level officers. See Appendix I.

Denmark, 2013, p. 66). Having demonstrated that they could deploy and employ forces effectively and operate alongside the larger British partner, this constituted a success at an organizational level in terms of the Danish military transformation.

In addition, adapting to British tactics and concept of operations, the military strategic discussions about the military concepts of RMA and COIN between larger partner countries and NATO has influenced Denmark. The situation of war with the Danish Army at the centre was the most significant item on the agenda in the Defence Commission of 2008 (2009), focusing on the necessity of a significant follow up of technology in the Danish Armed Forces. Moreover, strategic thinking focused on rediscovering the potential role of the military in relation to state building and counterinsurgency. This is evident in the Afghanistan strategy of 2008, with an emphasis on a population-centric approach and a focus on training and mentoring the Afghan National Army. The same can be noted in the 2010 defence agreement, which identifies the increasing need to participate in counterinsurgency warfare (Danish MoD, 2009). In other respects, Copenhagen continues to rely on NATO doctrines and has not developed its own national military doctrine. Overall, there is a distinctly different focus and rationale of the Danish Armed Forces, fuelled by the partnership with Britain in Helmand. This confirmed the success of the Danish transformation into an expeditionary force that can handle the realities of war. The experiences of combat alongside British forces arguably reinforced the military professional ideal, supporting the professionalization of the Danish Armed Forces.

Unlike Denmark, Norway did not have the same close partnership with a major military power in Afghanistan. As discussed above, the initial contribution to the British-led PRT Meymaneh was modest at just 25 military personnel. Furthermore, the PRT Meymaneh was a 'satellite' of the larger Britain-led PRT in Mazar-e Sharif in Bahlk province. Instead of close integration with US and British forces to the south, the government sought independence within ISAF operations by assuming responsibility for one of the PRTs in the north; indicative of this aim is the central argument in the Norwegian MoD that by taking a lead nation role, Norway would be in a better position to influence the PRT concept (Oma, 2015, p. 86). By carving out a niche in the north, it could pursue a more development-directed strategy in which military means were just an enabler (Ångström & Honig, 2012, pp. 677-678). Accordingly, as noted above, Oslo set the guidelines for the PRT Meymaneh, most significantly the divide between civilian and military efforts, in which the Norwegian forces were assigned stabilization tasks. These political guidelines were at odds with NATO's formally adopted counterinsurgency approach. Although the Norwegian government in principle accepted the new COIN-based approach to operations, it refused to use the word

counterinsurgency and consistently avoided civil-military integration (Andersen, 2013). This created a dilemma for the armed forces. A military report of September 2009 highlighted multifaceted pressures on Norwegian forces, which stemmed from NATO's COIN strategy and the distinctive Norwegian model (Lilland, 2010).[108] With this leeway as lead nation, the government was able to steer the military contribution and confined the military actor compared to Denmark. In the Norwegian model, it was more about coordination rather than integration. Moreover, the civilian component remained small and functionally narrow; this was partly because of recruitment problems but also because of the Norwegian MFA's principle that aid to Faryab was not to come at the expense of a general civilian effort in Afghanistan (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 114). The structure of the PRT Meymaneh did not include a CIMIC capability until mid-2011, and after 2007, no Norwegian funds were available for the PRT to carry out smaller reconstruction project. Accordingly, Norwegian forces rarely undertook community development or CIMIC projects, as the political level restricted them to do tasks defined as 'civilian' (de Coning et al., 2009; Gompelman, 2011). Political restrictions hindered effective coordination with the Norwegian-financed non-governmental organizations in the area of operations because the division of labour between military and civilian efforts. This changed with Washington's surge in 2010, however, where the US Agency for International Development established itself in Meymaneh and de facto constituted the civilian component from 2010. US forces took overall responsibility for the Ghormach district where the development agency planned and implemented projects in close cooperation with the military forces. Although the Norwegian PRT force commanders could not use these resources, they could in cooperation with the US Agency for International Development and American military identify where aid was needed (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 128). In addition, the counterinsurgency approach influenced Norwegian operations to some extent, as Norwegian military forces implemented central elements of COIN in other ways, for example by systematically trying to create legitimacy amongst the population in the area (Andersen, 2013). Thus, while Norwegian political authorities refrained from referring to COIN and maintain a civil-military divide, the military forces did indeed adapt to the overall counterinsurgency doctrine to which the US surge provided needed resources.

Although Norway had a lead nation role, partner dynamics in the form of professional networks and military organizational interests appear to have played a causally important role. As Astri Suhrke points out, there was nothing automatic or inevitable about the changed operational pattern

[108] As an effort to provide the military with better knowledge and insight in task solution, where military force formed one of many national instruments, Diesen, chief of defence, tasked Major general Jon B. Lilland to write a recommendation for how the Armed Forces could operationalize the comprehensive approach.

from 2007 onwards and the inclusion of Ghormach (Suhrke, 2011, pp. 99-100). While the political level in Oslo had concentrated the Norwegian military effort in the calmer north, the closest points of reference for the Norwegian Armed Forces, such as the British, the Canadians, the Americans and even the Danes, were in heavy battle in the south. In this context, Suhrke argues, professional incentives favoured decisive military action over a cautious strategy. Thus, professional incentives seem to be part of the explanation for the decision to include Ghormach into Faryab and an active approach. Furthermore, the military leadership had also preferred to deploy to the south with the British rather than assume responsibility for the PRT Meymaneh. Despite the operative risk by going south, Norwegian forces could have then focused on the sharp end of operations and have military safety with a robust support system of major military powers (Oma, 2015, p. 86). At the political level, it might appear as a puzzle that the government supported a more offensive line considering the reluctance to deploy forces to the south. However, in this context, the US and other allies had pressed Norway hard to share the burden as the situation deteriorated, and Oslo was worried of its standing in NATO. Accordingly, a more active approach in the north would change the impression after the refusal to deploy south. Thus, there appears to be indications of partner dynamics pushing towards both a confined and an autonomous military actor. Having the lead nation role, Norwegian political authorities had leeway to dictate the Norwegian engagement with a focus on a soft profile and dividing civilian and military means. Yet, professional networks and incentives pushed towards a more military offensive approach and fuelling the military professional ethos and culture. Accordingly, the picture is not black or white, but is grey in the face of complex lethality.

Another aspect evident in the case of Norway is that of having a reluctant partner. Situated in Northern Afghanistan, the Norwegian-led PRT was under the RC North, commanded by Germany. As discussed, the Germans had strict ROE and belonged in the category of most reluctant allies (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014, pp. 20, 146). With the decision to go on the offensive, Norway did not trust that the Germans would come to their rescue should developments demand it. Norwegian authorities, with CHOD Diesen as primary advocate, therefore decided to deploy a detachment of helicopters as discussed in the section on exposure. The surge of American forces during 2009, and particularly 2010, also played a role in that it lessened the reliance on the Germans and thus enabled further offensive operations in Ghormach and Faryab (Suhrke, 2011, p. 100). This indicates that whom you partner with matters. Moreover, it shows that in the face of uncertainty, with the risk of losing soldiers, the military leadership will use its authority to push for a more robust military contribution.

Overall, operating in a coalition context and in multinational military structures, have implied an accelerating technological and doctrinal development as part of the whole 'package deal'. Being the smaller partner, Norwegian Armed Forces have had to adjust to both materiel and operating procedures of the larger partners (Haaland, 2007, p. 505). In his tenure as chief of defence, Sverre Diesen signalled that taking part in high-intensity conflicts with allies should remain the goal in the continued reform process and that priority should be given to the more robust units (Diesen, 2006). When initiating a revision of the Joint Doctrine for the Armed Forces, the government underlined that doctrine "had to reflect new technological trends, including innovations such as precision-guided munitions and information technology, and concepts such as asymmetrical warfare and network-centric defence" (Bjerga & Haaland, 2010, p. 518). This aim is also visible in the 2009 Strategic Concept, which stresses that a relevant force must have a technological level that enables it to operate efficiently, both alone and together with allied forces (Norwegian MoD, 2009a, p. 80). Partly, this process follows more from NATO membership in general, and the importance of interoperability with allies and the close bilateral cooperation with the US (Norwegian Armed Forces, 2011, p. 94). Developments in the doctrines of important allies also appears to have restrained alternative courses of action. As argued by Diesen, "We are facing some fundamental developments, which leave us few choices but to adapt or to become militarily and security politically irrelevant" (Diesen, 2005, p. 164). Thus, there appears to be an anxiety in the military leadership of not being relevant and thus embracing international operations to further the transformation agenda towards a more professionalized military organization relevant in the face of a different security climate.

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Overall, the concept of partner played a role in both the cases. First, as smaller powers part of a coalition, Denmark and Norway followed for the most part guidelines and strategic principles provided by major powers. In the case of Denmark, London was an important partner, of which Denmark was dependent. That Denmark was able to 'punch above its weight' in its foreign policy activism, followed having a major power such as Britain as partner. On the other hand, this also restrained the leeway of Danish commanders who had to follow British strategies and concepts. Overall, however, it reinforced the more traditional military role of the Danish Armed Forces, focusing on combat and professional soldiers. The case of Norway indicates leeway to pursue other interests by opting for more independence as PRT lead nation, such as a division between civilian and military means. Nevertheless, the Norwegian Armed Forces did implement some of the COIN principles. Second, the data suggest the significance of a military professional network that has an impact on what is 'appropriate behaviour', which underlines professional networks as a basis for

the development of common norms and serves to facilitate the transfer of new models. The Danish Armed Forces clearly aspire to emulate its British and American partners as far as possible. In the case of Norway, military professional networks played a role in the decision to go offensive and prove its ability to conduct kinetic operations and its professionalization. Third, and a related point is that the Danish and the Norwegian Armed Forces are small organizations with little autonomous operational capacity, which provides incentives for reform along NATO and US line of thinking.

4.5 A security policy instrument: the organization of military force

In course of the Afghanistan mission, Denmark and Norway have faced a demanding environment that has forced the use of sharp military force. Complex lethality has presented stresses and challenges to political authorities and the military alike. The international engagement developed from a light to a heavy military footprint and grew increasingly complex as events unfolded on the ground. Drawing on the empirical investigation of the analytical factors of priority, exposure and partner, this section aims to identify the potential link between Danish and Norwegian participation in expeditionary warfare and changing patterns of civil-military relations, in which both countries have moved in the trajectory of a confined military actor.

In the case of Denmark, the analysis above indicates the use of force in a more traditional military domain for most of the engagement in Afghanistan with broad military authority. This follows a combination of several factors. The country's priority towards international operations and broader security threats manifested itself in full participation in sharp and expeditionary war efforts. Denmark was at the forefront, deploying its armed forces to the most dangerous areas, where the military faced high intensity and significant exposure. Despite attempts at a comprehensive approach in both Iraq and Afghanistan, high-intensity complex lethality conditioned limited room for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. There was a military focus on combat and a clear political deference to military expertise. The partnership with the British, involving offensive strategies against the insurgency in Helmand, reinforced this effect. In this context, the factors reinforced the role of the military as the professional with a broad operative authority. The government and parliament appear comfortable with deferring to the military having acknowledged the demanding situation and relatively early recognizing that Denmark was part of a war.

From 2008 onwards, however, there is a significant shift entailing more political involvement. While there was no strategy for Iraq, this changed with the later phase in Afghanistan. Arguably, with an increasingly difficult situation, and concerned with domestic support and the effects of war, there were attempts at the political level at strategic planning. Moreover, Helmand plans with benchmarks and new restrictions signify a change in the use of force in a political domain. There

is something puzzling about the development in the case of Denmark. Although the intensity of complex lethality was still high and Danish forces faced significant exposure, the data suggest that Denmark got so involved and deep into the engagement that the political level began to worry about developments on the ground, building up to a perception that they needed to take more control of a situation which was only turning for the worse. Through expeditionary warfare, the classical warrior-role of the Danish Armed Forces had a renaissance and contributed to further professionalization of the military, as the battles in Iraq and Afghanistan surpassed any prior military experiences. Yet, at the same time, the political level became more involved and Danish soldiers had to be conscious about political and ethical consequences of what they did, in one way or another.

After 2001, Denmark has fundamentally changed its military force from mobilization and peacekeeping forces to expeditionary combat forces. This can be explained by a combination of Danish priority leading to an extensive use of the armed forces, high exposure that has revealed requirements of contemporary warfare, and lessons learned from larger partners. Following Danish priority, the military organization had to change to be able to be at the forefront in international operations and manifested in increased alignment with the US and Britain. In accordance with American strategy, Denmark has gone in for a capacity-based approach, involving a broad range of capacities available for situations where Danish interests directly or indirectly are threatened and where Danish responsibility in international cooperation indicates as such. The Danish military leadership grasped the opportunity to reform and to become a relevant, sharp foreign and security policy instrument for a new security environment. Moreover, through the process of expeditionary warfare, Danish Armed Forces have acquired much practical experience in warfare together with allies and partners, which in turn has strengthened its ability to participate in international operations. War experiences have led to a clear priority on the combat part of the Danish military. There has been a centralization of support structures to transfer resources to the operative structure to adapt to new international demands, where experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for flexible, deployable military units (Defence Command Denmark, 2005, 2007b). Thus, the increased unity of the Danish military can be attributed to participation in expeditionary warfare. Another point is the increased professionalization of the Danish Armed forces. One example is the Danish Special Operation Forces, which have increased in number and received more material and resources. Moreover, following British forces in heavy fighting against the insurgency in Helmand required professional soldiers, reinforcements, and a focus on the operative end. As mentioned above, the change in doctrinal focus is also evident in both the Defence Commission of 2008 and the 2010 defence agreement. Moreover, in course of the Danish

transformation, the Danish Armed Forces have referred to their capabilities as a 'tool kit', which politicians can use for various tasks.

> We all, military and civilians, shall contribute to the core task – that soldiers can fight and win. That we are able to fight and win cover a long range of tasks and abilities, which we master. We can win in battle, but we can also win "hearts and minds" (Danish Armed Forces, 2007, p. 9).

This reflects the extent to which the armed forces have embraced a transformation from a force dedicated to fighting a war of necessity for homeland defence to a force fighting wars of choice. The Danish Armed Forces have now a different role in Denmark after years at war. The introduction of a veteran policy in 2010 and an official flag-flying day for Danish veterans underlines this changed role. There is a different rationale, with an emphasis on war and combat, and being able to deploy and employ military force efficiently.

Alongside a changed military organization, the political level has tightened the governance of the military. The military has become more actively involved in conflict as a security policy instrument in Danish foreign policy. Then again, the civilian leadership has taken measures to bring political and military spheres closer. In course of the period, the Danish Armed Forces have become strongly integrated with civilian institutions, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. Arguably, complex lethality has triggered a sense of loss of control on the political level in Denmark. There were already some tensions in civil-military relations in Iraq, and as Denmark got more involved in Afghanistan, the process has created a sense at the political level that it needs to get more involved. As Denmark has become deeply engaged in expeditionary missions, warfare has posed difficult dilemmas, culminating in civilian authorities being concerned about losing control and thereby provided incentives for closer political involvement in military affairs and confining the military actor. These worries have been building up throughout the long engagement in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, which proved difficult for the civilian master and military servants alike. Arguably, the use of sharp force has created a need for increased strategy thinking in defence policy and a closer dialogue between the political and military levels.

In the case of Norway, there is a different priority, and the government has not been as eager to be at the forefront in international operations compared to Denmark. The double national priority has resulted in a two-track approach, in which international operations have become more important but with continued emphasis on a broader national military presence, as well as securing allied aid should circumstances demand it. After the initial engagement in Operation Enduring Freedom, the country's focus led to a limited military engagement in the calmer Northern Afghanistan with the use of force in a political domain. The Norwegian government sought to

portray the engagement as civilian as possible and emphasized the military as an enabler of reconstruction and civilian efforts. Moreover, the political level often did not follow military advice and expertise, for example, when assuming the lead nation role of a PRT in Northern Afghanistan. The perception of the Norwegian contribution as a stabilization force led to the contribution to Faryab province being small compared to the size of the province and related tasks. This can be explained by Oslo's priority of homeland defence (it did not have the resources to spare) and 'save' its reputation as a dependable ally (taking a lead nation role), as well as grasping the opportunity to promote Norway as a 'peace nation'. That the intensity was low with little exposure enabled this focus, as well as there were no major partners on ground to dictate the Norwegian approach as the lead nation role provided some independence in choices.

When the intensity heightened after 2006, however, there was a shift in Norway's engagement. Increased exposure triggered a more robust military presence in Faryab and resulted in broader military authority, as the political level began deferring to military experts. Accordingly, the military contribution became more robust with an additional infantry unit and a detachment of helicopters, requested by the military leadership. Simultaneously, the government toned down its state-building ambitions. As the situation intensified, and the Norwegian forces faced significant exposure, the use of force took place in a more traditional military domain. The military gained a new role, conditioned by high-intensity complex lethality, coupled with incentives from a professional network of close allies and a national priority on proving the country's worth as an ally. In other words, high-intensity complex lethality conditioned this shift, in which it appeared sensible for the political leadership to enable broader military authority in the development of the Norwegian military mission.

Like Denmark, albeit at a slower pace and less expeditionary in its focus, Norway has transformed its Armed Forces into a security policy instrument. There has been a double focus on homeland defence and adapting to NATO. At the political level, there has been diverging views on the choice between a smaller structure towards high-intensity operations abroad and broad national military presence (Haaland, 2007, p. 506). After 11 September 2001, the need for reform became more acute and Norway has increasingly deployed combat-ready military units prepared for battle. War experiences have confirmed the need of professional soldiers that can handle the changing character of war, including promoting Special Operations Forces and niche capabilities and a prioritization of the deployable operative structure. Thus, practical experience of warfare has led to prioritizations in the defence reform, in which the parallel process of defence transformation and engagement in demanding operations have been mutually reinforcing. According to the 2009

strategic concept, "maximum resources are utilised to support the sharp end, and that logistics and support structure is tailored to meet the operational requirements of the sharp end" (Norwegian MoD, 2009a, p. 56). Oslo's priority on homeland defence, however, has prevented Norway from going so far as Denmark in the transformation agenda. While Denmark has followed for much part US line of military thinking, Norway has adopted the NATO line with broader national presence in mind. Like Denmark, the awareness of the need to take care of veterans and how to do so systematically has also increased in Norway during the period 2001-2014. In addition, the changed regimen for awards to soldiers indicate a changed culture. Overall, the Norwegian Armed Forces have a different role.

Norway decided in 2003 to integrate the CHOD with the MoD, bringing the political and military spheres closer together and changing the level of military authority. Although the decision came before the more demanding challenges in Afghanistan, the experiences of expeditionary warfare post-9/11 have arguably consolidated this model of political-military organization. Complex lethality has reinforced a civilian conviction that the government need to be more involved in other military affairs including in doctrine development and in confining the scope of military authority. This is notable in several important official documents, which underlines the importance of an integrated political and military leadership in the face of complex international operations and security environment. As the 2009 Strategic Concept stated:

> Close and persistent politico-military coordination is required, and political guidance will be provided during all phases of a military operation. Crisis management requires short lines of command in order to ensure political control and military efficiency. The integrated Ministry of Defence is important in this regard, in order to ensure close and persistent politico-military coordination (Norwegian MoD, 2009a, p. 66).

That the political level gave the military broader autonomy in Afghanistan concerning operational issues as the situation deteriorated did not manifest in a change in governance and level of military authority, but rather reinforced the existing model. Due to a complex situation on the ground there was a growing political need to keep close watch on military activities and that high-intensive operations are a 24/7 process that necessitates political involvement in international operations. Lastly, there is also a new governance model in the Norwegian Armed Forces in international operations, where central government documents have embraced the comprehensive approach as a foundation for conducting international operations (Norwegian MoD, 2008, p. 60; 2009a). Thus, instead of shifting governance, the dynamics of complex lethality appear to have cemented the integrated civil-military organization – contributing to a confined military actor.



Map 4.4 *Main location of Nordic forces in Afghanistan*

CHAPTER 5

THE AUTONOMOUS MILITARY ACTOR: FINLAND AND SWEDEN

This chapter turns to Finland and Sweden by focusing on their military campaigns in Afghanistan. In the period after 2001, the military in these two countries maintained a broad capability of influence. However, while continuity characterizes the development of the Finnish Defence Forces, the Swedish Armed Forces have gone through a major transformation. Simultaneously, Finnish and Swedish troops have participated in several international operations between 2001 and 2014 but none became as demanding as their decade-long deployment in Afghanistan. Although both countries have an autonomous military actor by 2014, their paths in Afghanistan differs. Finland has been far more cautious with a limited contribution, while Sweden assumed the lead nation role of one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the northern region with at one point 570 troops stationed in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, for both countries, the realities on the ground in Afghanistan developed into something else than Helsinki and Stockholm had imagined at the outset when they first deployed peacekeeping troops in 2002.

Chapter five investigates the process of Finnish and Swedish participation on the contemporary battlefield to identify how different factors operated in the two cases. While both countries contributed with development aid, police officers and civilian experts, the focus is on the military aspects. The aim is to uncover the potential impact of expeditionary warfare on domestic civil-military relations. Because Chapter 4 has outlined the character of war in Afghanistan from a general perspective, the following section of this chapter moves directly to examine the national priorities as a shaping factor of complex lethality. Then the chapter addresses Finland and Sweden on the contemporary battlefield in Afghanistan to investigate the exposure they faced between 2002 and 2014, before the third section examines the significance of the concept of partner. The last section adopts an overall perspective, summarizes the main findings and analyses the casual link between expeditionary warfare and shifts in Finnish and Swedish civil-military relations.

5.1 Priority

Analysing the significance of the concept of priority, there are differences between Finland and Sweden leading to different emphases regarding the importance of the mission in Afghanistan. With a clear priority on homeland defence, this has limited the scope of Finnish participation in terms of size of forces, its location and the types of missions that can legally be undertaken by

Finnish soldiers. In contrast, over the years, Sweden has shifted its priority from territorial defence to international missions, with an accompanied expeditionary focus of its Armed Forces, in which Afghanistan became gradually important with an expanding military deployment and a broader use of force.

In the case of Finland, there is strong continuity in certain aspects and change in others. Continuity is evident in the priority on national defence as the core objective of the Finnish Defence Forces. Finland was careful about the changing international patterns after the Cold War and remained cautious in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (Hellenberg & Pursiainen, 2004, p. 90). Due to historical experiences, geographical proximity and a long-shared border, Russia is, and has long been, perceived as the main potential threat that guides Finnish strategic thinking. The fact that more than 90 per cent of defence expenditures are dedicated to national defence underscores this point (Salo, 2012, p. 89). Moreover, Finland does not have capabilities specifically dedicated to international efforts but draws from its large national reserve. That the Defence Forces primarily were for international operations has in no way been apparent in Finland (Heurlin, 2007c, p. 28). Accordingly, the military develops with national defence in mind.

While there has been continuity in some respects, there have been major changes in Finland's international position the last three decades. First, in the mid-1990s, the country joined both NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the EU. Moreover, the existential threat picture was replaced by a more blurred one, where the international security situation has become more complex. Post-9/11, Finland has taken a more global turn and reduced the geopolitical influence on its security policy (Martelius, Salo, & Sallinen, 2007, p. 190). Over the years, government reports covering security and defence issues have become more international in their focus. The 2001 White Paper, for example, underlined that Finland did not face an immediate military threat and, in light of developments in international crisis management, outlined an upgrade of three Jaeger brigades to readiness brigades (Finnish Government, 2001). As the 2004 White Paper on security and defence policy make clear "rapid changes in the external environment means that Finland, too, has to put its security and defence policy in a wider context" (Finnish Government, 2004, p. 18). A broader security picture and the concept of 'comprehensive security' are more prominent in the 2009 and 2012 versions (Finnish Government, 2009a, 2012). Accordingly, there is a sort of mismatch between the overall foreign policy focus and defence development. While the foreign policy focus is on a broader security concept and a complex security environment (with no imminent threat against Finland), as well as on relations with the EU and NATO, Russia never

disappeared from the country's strategic thinking. Therefore, conventional defence of the territory continues to be the fundamental security priority and a guiding principle for defence development.

Overall, Finland prioritizes its territorial defence and focuses on its near abroad. However, this comes with an acknowledgement that the world is increasingly interdependent and that international cooperation in defence matters is important. Current Finnish defence thinking stresses that the country needs to continue to have a credible defence on its own, even though Helsinki no longer perceives a completely independent national defence as a viable concept (Haglund, 2012; Häkämies, 2009b; Wallin, 2011). As stated in the 2012 White Paper:

> Crisis management participation is a vehicle for international burden-sharing, raising international clout and improving competence. Participation in international burden-sharing strengthens the prospect of receiving assistance in crisis (Finnish Government, 2012, p. 53).

Although the international position of Finland has changed to become more aligned with other Western states particularly through membership of the EU, the country remains cautious in its foreign policy. In the minds of the public and decision-makers, peacekeeping is the central plank of deployed military forces in foreign policy. In general, Finland is sceptical towards embarking on military offensive operations abroad (Martelius et al., 2007). This cautious foreign policy bounds in a determination to stay out of great power conflicts. Urho Kekkonen, president for nearly 26 years during the Cold War, set the basic tenet for Finnish foreign policy in 1961 at the UN General Assembly stating "We see ourselves as physicians rather than judges; it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn, it is rather to diagnose and to try to cure" (Kekkonen, 1961). This approach resonates with one of his successors as president, Tarja Halonen, who stated that "A characteristic feature of Finland ever since she gained independence has been a determination to remain outside of international disputes – and especially armed conflicts" (Halonen, 2000). Instead, since 1956, the country has been active in international peacekeeping efforts and often refers to itself as a "peacekeeping superpower" (Halonen, 2005a; Niinistö, 2012b), and in 2000, international crisis management became a part of the Finnish Defence Law. In this regard, the UN and international law constitute a cornerstone in Finnish foreign and security policy. Finland highlights its support of ideals such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law enshrined in the UN Charter (Archer, 2003; Halonen, 2002a, 2003, 2005a). It has traditionally responded to international crises through the UN, as it did in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Halonen stated in her 2002 New Year's speech that:

> I am very pleased that the United Nations has a central role in actions against terrorism. […] The people of Afghanistan, who have suffered so much, must be helped and

> supported to repair the scars of destruction. This better tomorrow must be offered also to women and girls. Finland is involved in the reconstruction there [in Afghanistan] and we are preparing to send peacekeepers to the region (Halonen, 2002b).

Following a request from London in December 2001, Finland decided to deploy a contingent of 50 troops for enhancing civil-military coordination (CIMIC) in Kabul (Finnish Government, 2002). Debating the contribution, both the government and the Eduskunta (Finnish parliament) stressed the importance of the UN (Eduskunta, 2001; Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001, 2002). Accordingly, the point of departure for Finland's initial contribution to Afghanistan was the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001 and the UN-mandated International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF).[109]

In the first years in Afghanistan, ISAF did not have a high priority in the government. Moreover, parliamentarians, media and the public in general paid little attention to the Finnish contribution. Apart from a couple of addresses in the Eduskunta, Afghanistan was not on the Finnish radar (Salonius-Pasternak, 2012). Despite the shift from Kabul to Northern Afghanistan in 2004, Afghanistan was just one of nine different crisis management operations where the country had peacekeepers (Finnish Defence Forces, 2004). Above all, there was a focus on the development of the EU's crisis management tools, where Finland announced its participation in two EU Battle Groups, one in partnership with Germany and the Netherlands, and the other with Sweden, Norway and Estonia (Finnish Defence Forces, 2005, p. 15). In its foreign and security policy, Finland attributes the EU membership and the developments in the European Security and Defence Policy great importance and has participated in nearly all the EU operations (Halonen, 2006; Niinistö, 2012a). The process of the EU Battle Groups was a central factor for Finland to change its law on peacekeeping at the time. The position was that, as an EU member, it should also participate in the more demanding crisis management operations, which necessitated that "the law concedes Finnish participation in modern crisis management" (Finnish Government, 2006, p. 5). Until 2006, Finnish legislation did not permit the country's troops to take part in peace enforcement operations where force is used to stop combatants from fighting, as opposed to traditional peacekeeping where forces maintain the separation of two sides who have already ended their hostilities. This changed with the new Act on Military Crisis Management, which states:

> When carrying out service duties, soldiers serving in a military crisis management operation have the right to use the necessary force for carrying out their duties. Force

[109] From available data, Finnish participation in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was never a question. Nevertheless, Finland sent liaison officers to US Central Command (CENTCOM) at Tampa, Florida (US DoD, 2002). The Finnish liaison officers had the task of keeping Finnish decision-makers and the military leadership informed about the US Army's actions in Afghanistan and Iraq (HBL, 2005).

> may only be used to the extent necessary and for the duration necessary to carry out the task, in acceptable proportion to the goal of the operation and in accordance with the rules of engagement confirmed for the operation (Act on Military Crisis Management, 2006, 27 §).

Moreover, with the amendments, a UN or an OSCE mandate is no longer mandatory for deploying Finnish soldiers abroad. Another factor that played into the law amendments was the changing character of peacekeeping missions in general, where the government highlighted that the new crisis management law more accurately covered the content of the operations Finnish troops were participating in (Finnish Government, 2006).[110] Experience from peace enforcement missions appears to be an important factor in this regard.

In light of a more complex and demanding operating environment in international crisis management, the government issued in 2009 a comprehensive crisis management strategy. Although a comprehensive approach did not stray too far from Finnish established approach to international crisis management, the government aimed to develop the approach further. One of the strategy's main objectives is active participation in military crisis management, including demanding crisis management tasks (Finnish MFA, 2009, p. 7). The strategy underlines that this requires a strengthening of the comprehensive approach where military and civilian crisis management are mutually complementary. Based on the perception of military crisis management tasks being more demanding, in which rapid response and niche capabilities are increasingly important, Finland aims to develop military crisis management capabilities in accordance with international requirements. As the strategy stresses, "Finland, too, must be prepared to deploy rapidly and efficiently specialised military capabilities to international operations" (Finnish MFA, 2009, p. 54). Accordingly, Finland is placing more focus on the need to develop Finnish rapid reaction capabilities as well as niche capabilities and special materials for crisis management in response to changing needs in crisis (Finnish Government, 2009a; Häkämies, 2009a). This points to an increased professionalization of the Finnish Defence Forces and arguably contributes to reinforcing the autonomous military actor.

From 2007 onwards, Afghanistan received more attention in Finland and the engagement had a higher priority on the Finnish crisis management agenda. Following an increased awareness of the deteriorating situation in the country, parliamentarians began demanding more information from the government (Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2007a; Nitovuori, 2007).[111] Consequently,

[110] This was also highlighted in interviews with Finnish officials involved in the process (see Appendix I).

[111] The Finnish decision-making process on military crisis management is outlined in the Act on Military Crisis Management (Act on Military Crisis Management, 2006). The president, based on a proposal put forward by the government, takes the decisions on Finland's participation. After preparatory discussion of the matter by a joint

the second government report on Afghanistan came in October 2007, five years after the first report presented in 2002. It outlined a more comprehensive and focused approach in Afghanistan with efforts concentrated in Mazar-e Sharif in Northern Afghanistan (Finnish Government, 2007). Although the commitment was relatively limited, Finland increased its military contribution over the years, culminating in the deployment of 200 troops.

Overall, the government has highlighted crisis management as its key foreign policy instrument aiming to promote the stability of crisis areas in the world. At the same time, it argued that participation in international operations "improves Finland's own security and contributes to national defence and interoperability" (Finnish Government, 2009a, p. 99). Finnish politicians have always argued that participation in international military crisis management contribute to enhance Finland's defence capability. Among others, Halonen has stated, "Taking part in international operations develops the skill of our Defence Forces' regular personnel and reservists, thereby contributing to strengthening our national defence as well" (Halonen, 2002a). However, it is quite new that they are more specific about how Finnish Defence Forces are benefitting from international operations. In the peacekeeping days, the arguments concerned universal values, such as the importance of supporting the UN and burden sharing. Today, national territorial defence is often mentioned in the same breath as the benefits to be gained from international operations regarding personnel, training and defence levels (Haglund, 2013a; Halonen, 2002a, 2005b, 2006; Häkämies, 2007, 2010; Kääriäinen, 2005; Wallin, 2011). Nevertheless, Helsinki has been cautious about the use of military force internationally and has never wavered in the purpose of its Defence Forces after the Cold War, namely maintain territorial defence. The heart of the matter appears to be what one is willing to fight for; in Finland, the answer is 'the homeland'. The use of force is mainly for deterrence and not seen as a tool for reaching political aims on the international stage. Accordingly, the Finnish military actor has a broad authority and autonomy concerning territorial defence and military matters. However, as will become clear later in the section on exposure, when international operations become too intense, the military actor is more confined.

In contrast to Finland, Sweden has made a major shift in its foreign and security policy and in the national priority for its Armed Forces. Throughout the 1990s, there was an uncertainty in Stockholm regarding international developments and Russia (Edström & Gyllensporre, 2014a). At the end of the decade, however, the 1999 defence bill stated that great power war no longer

meeting of the president and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, and before a decision is made, the MoD may start measures to prepare and make provisions for participation. Before submitting a proposal concerning Finland's participation, the government must consult the Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee. If it concerns an operation that is a particularly demanding military challenge or an operation that is not based on a UNSC mandate, the government must consult the Eduskunta by submitting a report on the matter.

threatened the country and Stockholm adopted a broad security concept and issued several cuts in the defence budget. Although emphasis was still on territorial defence, international tasks became increasingly important (Swedish MoD, 1999a). After 2001, focus on territorial defence decreased in favour of a more international orientation and expeditionary peace support operations. Swedish politicians were short of a clear perception of the purpose of its Armed Forces given the lack of an existential threat, resulting in a focus on international operations as the answer. At the turn of the millennium, the 2001 defence bill forwarded an internationalization of the Swedish Armed Forces, with the aim to increase Sweden's capability for international operations. Although the government considered an invasion threat unlikely in the coming ten years, it emphasized that Swedish security policy had to face "other threats such as terrorist threats, information operations, as well as nuclear, biological and chemical armament, which directly affects Sweden" (Swedish MoD, 2001, p. 12). During the 2000s, international operations became a main preoccupation for the Armed Forces.

In the aftermath of 9/11, despite the growing importance of international missions, Sweden was more an onlooker than it was a contributor. Even after both the Bonn conference and the UN mandate for ISAF, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh expressed caution about a Swedish contribution, stating, "One should not rule out anything, but for now we are not planning any large troop contributions" (Lindh quoted in *TT*, 2001). The question of a contribution became more pressing in course of the EU summit on 14 December 2001 and the Swedish government became less hesitant. According to Lindh, Sweden had promised to discuss "a smaller Swedish security contingent," which could be supplemented with a mine clearance unit (Lindh quoted in *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2001). The government connected the initial contribution to Sweden's already long engagement in Afghanistan with provisions of development aid that began in the year 1982 and the many Swedish non-governmental organizations operating in the area. From Stockholm's point of view, it was also a signal that it is prepared to take responsibility for UN peacekeeping actively (Swedish MFA, 2001).[112] When Sweden finally decided to join ISAF, it wanted a quick deployment because it sought to avoid the same embarrassment linked to the delayed deployment to the Balkans in the 1990s. Moreover, the military leadership had already a clear perception of what Sweden should contribute with before the preparatory meetings between the troop contributing countries (Edström & Gyllensporre, 2014a, p. 127). With full parliamentary majority, Sweden

[112] According to the report of the Inquiry on Sweden's Engagement in Afghanistan, Sweden received several requests to participate in OEF but declined (SOU 2017:16, 2017, p. 87). From a Swedish perspective, the existing UN resolutions were not sufficient for OEF acting in Afghanistan pertaining to international law (Swedish MFA, 2004, p. 8). Despite the non-participation in OEF, Sweden sent liaison officers to US Central Command (CENTCOM) at Tampa, Florida (US DoD, 2002).

deployed an intelligence unit consisting of Special Operations Forces (SOF). On 8 May 2002, a government bill sought to expand the contribution until December 2002 with 32 troops (Swedish MFA, 2002a).[113] This time, the contribution was in line with what Denmark, Finland and Norway had offered ISAF, and in concurrence with what Sweden had offered in previous small mission, namely, mine clearance and civil-military coordination units (Agrell, 2013; Swedish MFA, 2002b). Overall, in the initial phase, Afghanistan was not particularly important in Sweden. A much larger issue in Sweden at that time was restructuring and downsizing the military organization, as discussed in Chapter 3. Yet, while Afghanistan initially was not a priority, international operations in general and the internationalization of the military were. Moreover, as the engagement in Afghanistan continued it became more important in Sweden.

The international focus continues with the 2004 defence bill, which portrays the Armed Forces as an important resource in an active Swedish security and defence policy. "Both Sweden and Europe face new threats, which are more multifaceted, less visible and more unpredictable. These threats and challenges arise from regional conflicts, states that are unravelling, organised crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism" (Swedish MoD, 2004, p. 14). The perception and evaluation of the international security situation followed the 2002 US National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy of 2003 (Dörfer, 2007, p. 124). In the defence bill, the government argued that national and international tasks were two sides of the same coin, highlighting that Swedish units were to handle the most complicated situations and the most difficult tasks. This was perceived as a prerequisite for the military's ability to contribute to the EU's Petersberg Tasks[114] in international crisis management (Swedish MoD, 2004). Furthermore, in June 2004, Stockholm agreed to assume the role as framework nation for one of the EU Battlegroups, the Nordic Battle Group, which was operational on 1 January 2008. This responsibility became a proclaimed standard against which the changes in the military organization were to be measured and strengthened the emphasis on the operative activity of the Armed Forces further (Swedish Armed Forces, 2008b, p. 23; Syrén, 2007, p. 7). Significantly, priority on internationalization, as well as professional and more robust forces, indicate a more important role for the armed forces in Swedish foreign and security policy – reinforcing the autonomous military actor.

[113] In Sweden, the Riksdag must give its consent regarding deployment of Swedish troops abroad in cases of peace enforcement operations/UN Chapter VII operations.
[114] The Petersberg Tasks are incorporated in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, where the Petersberg Declaration of 1992 announced the readiness of member states to make available a wide range of military forces for European-led military tasks. The tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management (Dover, 2013, pp. 246-247).

Sweden attributes great importance to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy in its security and defence policy. The government has described this policy as a central platform for Swedish security political interests (Swedish MFA, 2008b, p. 4). Moreover, the importance of the EU Battlegroups and the fact that the country has participated in almost all operations under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy underlines this point (Andersson, 2018, p. 355). Among them, the 2003 Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was the first military operation led by the EU autonomously outside Europe and was considered a milestone in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004; Ulriksen, Gourlay, & Mace, 2004). France assumed the lead nation role, and Sweden was quick to join. For the government, there were several arguments that coincided, including the importance of the EU, the UN, and the importance of Africa in Swedish foreign policy (Hederstedt, 2007). For the military leadership, Operation Artemis was a mission in which the military could prove its rapid reaction and its spearhead capability, special operations forces (SAFHQ, 2012, p. 25). Although the contribution was small and operation Artemis was short-term,[115] the swift contribution with SOF signalled a different approach in the use of force and showed that Sweden could be part of sharper operations. Notably, it highlights the ambition of the military to prove its relevance in a new era and regarding the country's priority of international missions.

Afghanistan received more attention in Sweden as the country followed Britain to Northern Afghanistan in 2004. This development followed external events, with NATO taking command of ISAF from October 2003, the decision to expand the mission across Afghanistan based on the renewed UN mandate, and the accompanied focus on PRTs (Agrell, 2013). As it became clear that London offered to take responsibility for the geographical expansion of ISAF to the north, a new Swedish government bill on Afghanistan highlighted and supported the PRT concept (Swedish MFA, 2004). Apart from the Left Party, the government had a broad majority for shifting focus and joining the expansion to Northern Afghanistan and, in February 2004, it ended its CIMIC contribution in Kabul (Riksdagen, 2004). Not long after, in March 2006, Sweden took the lead nation role of the PRT Mazar-e Sharif from the British, which left for Helmand in Southern Afghanistan. By taking command of one of ISAF's 25 PRTs, the country increased its effort in ISAF significantly and over the years increased its military contribution to roughly 500 troops. The government argued that the decision was as an effort to prevent risks that could threaten security in region and globally, including Swedish domestic security. In addition, the government underlined

[115] The UNSC adopted Resolution 1484 on 30 May 2003, authorizing the deployment of an Interim Emergency Force (IMEF) to Bunia with a task to secure the airport, protect internally displaced persons in camps and the civilians in the town (UN, 2003). Operation Artemis was launched on 12 June, and on 1 September 2003, responsibility for the security of the region was handed to the MONUC UN-mission

that by assuming the lead nation role the country's credibility in crisis management and in international cooperation under NATO command would increase (Swedish MFA, 2005). Interestingly, Sweden was the only non-NATO country to take a lead nation role – underlining a more active role on the international stage.

In 2008, the government published a national strategy for Swedish participation in international operations. The strategy highlights an increased international ambition for Sweden stating, "The overall goal is that Sweden is to take a larger and more coordinated responsibility in peace and security operations" (Swedish MFA, 2008b, p. 5). Significantly, while Swedish politicians have been sceptical towards using the military instrument for security policy purposes (Petersson, 2002), the strategy pointed to a more proactive role for Sweden, including on the issue of using military force:

> A military peace-support operation can use force in all these situations and in self-defence, but the use of force may also be permitted in other situations in which it would be allowed under international law. This view is shared within the EU. The right of self-defence is accompanied by a right for the state that is contributing troops, if it proves necessary in order to relieve its own personnel, to reinforce the operation and also use military means to evacuate the force (Swedish MFA, 2008b, p. 9).

The transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces culminated with the 2009 defence bill. The government had postponed this defence bill one year waiting an analysis on how Russian actions in Georgia in August 2008 would affect Sweden's defence needs. The assessment was that Russian motive for the intervention was driven by an expansionist geostrategy in the Caucasus, which was not believed would be replicated in the Baltics or towards former satellites in East- and Central Europe due to deterrence (i.e. Baltic memberships in NATO and the EU) and interdependence (i.e. trade with Europe) (Swedish MoD, 2009, pp. 24-25). The 2008 military conflict between Russia and Georgia did bring some changes, however, by which the defence bill demanded that all units were to be on standby within three months, in addition to maintaining the international focus. The Armed Forces were to be a 'both-and' organization with a focus on the near abroad and outside. Thus, there was a renewed focus on homeland defence, although international operations were still reshaping the development of the military. According to the defence bill, national threats related to incidents and crises and complex threats of an irregular nature, not an attack on Swedish territory (Swedish MoD, 2009, pp. 27-29). Accordingly, there was an emphasis on flexibility, availability and an adaptation to complex threats. Significantly, with the introduction of an all-volunteer professional forces the 'International Expeditionary Force' ended, which demonstrated the end of the previous separation between territorial defence and overseas deployments (Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, p. 28; Sundberg, 2017, p. 166). Sweden reintroduced non-commissioned officers and made international service mandatory for all employees within the Armed Forces if ordered

(Sundberg, 2017, p. 169). Notably, the bill states that "Sweden will not remain passive if a catastrophe or an attack should hit another Member country or Nordic country. We expect these countries to act similarly should Sweden be hit. Sweden should have the ability to give and receive military support" (Swedish MoD, 2009, p. 29). The threat picture painted by the Swedish government is broad, and there is a notable shift from a defence of the territory to a defence of national interests, which is redefined to mean more than just sovereign territory.

For many years, it was not politically correct in Sweden to talk about expeditionary warfare, yet, new terms became acceptable from 2008 onwards. Expeditionary missions and national interests were high on the country's agenda. Although Sweden has not gone so far as Danish activism, which can be ascribed to its military unalignment and political scepticism towards using military force for security policy purposes, it has been decisively more active in the use of military force on the international stage. The Swedish participation in the 2009 Libya intervention underlines this point. In Afghanistan, Sweden did not offer the ISAF operation fighter aircraft, which appeared to be a step too far for Swedish decision-makers. This changed with Libya, which marked the first time an unaligned country contributed to a NATO-led airpower intervention (Ydén, Berndtsson, & Petersson, 2019, p. 12). Although Swedish JAS Gripen combat aircraft only participated in upholding the UN no-fly zone and did not bomb ground targets, unlike the Danes and the Norwegians, this is a notable shift. Moreover, Libya was a game changer in that Sweden proved that its JAS Gripen could operate with NATO combat aircraft (Dahl, 2012, p. 83). Overall, the military has a new role in Swedish foreign policy, which arguably reinforces the autonomous military actor. The question of Swedish interests, however, have been a contested issue. Since the mid-1960s, an idealistic and altruistic line has dominated the official picture of Swedish foreign policy – often associated with the former prime minister, Olof Palme. The message was that Sweden was solely interested in what was morally and politically correct (Dalsjö, 2015, pp. 6-7). At the end of the 2000s, official Sweden began talking openly about having national interests. Ångström points out how the government bills on Afghanistan imply that Sweden was in Afghanistan not only to improve Afghan conditions but also to promote Swedish interests in other policy areas, such as support to NATO, and that the EU and NATO are highlighted as central institutions for Swedish security (Ångström, 2015, pp. 245-6). Accordingly, the Swedish rhetoric for Afghanistan stresses the need for Afghan security, while arguing that the mission was also about Swedish security. Moreover, while reinforcing the need of military forces, the narrative, Ångström and Noreen argue, insisted on upholding the ideals of peaceful conflict resolution and development as central objectives (Ångström & Noreen, 2017). Although there is talk about using the Swedish Armed Forces as a security political instrument, there has been a lack of clarity in what Swedish

national interests entail. Nevertheless, the defence of Swedish interests is now a part of the country's Defence Law (Swedish Defence Law (2010:449), 2010). Most importantly, this may take place on its own territory, in and beyond its immediate neighbourhood.

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The analysis of priority shows that there are significant differences between Finland and Sweden. In turn, this has shaped the two countries' approach to international operations and provided different parameters in which their armed forces can operate. Moreover, the priority has had significance for the direction and extent of defence reform. Regarding the extent of involvement in Afghanistan, Finland has been more cautious than Sweden; the centrality of homeland defence remains a decisive factor in the Finnish case rather than the wider neighbourhood and international operations as it has been for its Swedish neighbour. Finland's priority has not challenged the role of the autonomous military actor, which continues to play a central role in the security and defence policy. The military could continue its path though with more resources spent on rapid deployable and niche capabilities. While the relevance of the Finnish Defence Forces was never in doubt, the Swedish Armed Forces had to find a new rationale in which international operations became central. Thus, Swedish defence transformation has focused on making the military able to face a new international environment and more dangerous operations. The Swedish priority of increased international effort has also led to a change in the way the country uses its military instrument. Thus, the shift in priority opened a new door of relevance for the Swedish Armed Forces, which has become more central in Swedish foreign policy – arguably reinforcing the role of the autonomous actor.

5.2 Exposure

This section analyses the significance of exposure as a factor. The degree of exposure experienced by Finnish and Swedish forces have shifted through their military engagement in Afghanistan. Initially, the exposure to operational challenges was limited. However, there was a significant shift at the end of 2008 by which time the situation deteriorated leading to significant exposure to higher security risks. In turn, this led to a changed operational pattern of Finnish and Swedish forces, with heavier military equipment, procurement of new materiel, experiences in combat operation and irregular warfare, and challenges in the coordination of civilian and military efforts.

The two countries first deployed peacekeepers to Kabul as part of ISAF in 2002, based on the perception that their troops were participating in ensuring that the Bonn Agreement would hold (Eduskunta, 2001; Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001, 2002; Swedish MFA, 2001). The operational environment did not differ much from patterns of earlier peacekeeping or peace

enforcement operations to which Finland and Sweden had deployed peacekeepers during the 1990s. Finnish and Swedish troops alike had a low-key approach aiming at being accessible to the Afghan population. The tasks assigned to the troops included coordinating with development aid organizations, overseeing the implementation of the military technical part of the Bonn accords, mapping infrastructure projects, and conducting CIMIC activities. The military footprint was light, and the troops used soft skin vehicles and light armament. It was peacekeeping 'as usual'.

From 2004, the size, scope and mission of both Finnish and Swedish troops in Afghanistan changed significantly, involving a shift in focus from Kabul to Northern Afghanistan. The dynamics shifted as NATO assumed command of ISAF and decided to expand the mission across Afghanistan. Finland and Sweden joined the first stage of the expansion to the northern region. The main task was to stabilize the situation and the forces were organized in mobile observation teams, conducting patrols in the Northern provinces. Sweden joined the British-led PRT in Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh Province. Stockholm assessed the security risk in the area of operations as low to middle high, with limited risk for direct combat, but with inherent instability (Swedish MFA, 2004, 2005). In November 2005, however, a Swedish convoy hit an improvised explosive device (IED) killing two Swedish officers. The incident triggered a domestic debate on force protection and the threat assessment changed, leading to a recommendation of preparing the PRT to handle a high-threat security situation (Agrell, 2013, pp. 131-133; Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, pp. 39-42).[116] Following that attack, the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters decided to deploy an Improvised Explosive Device Disposal group to Northern Afghanistan, reinforced the soft-skin vehicles and supplied six armoured vehicles (Agrell, 2013, p. 133; Swedish Armed Forces, 2007c, p. 15). Furthermore, by the rotation of contingents in October 2006, the number of Swedish personnel increased to 250. Increasingly, resources were allocated to force protection following the dynamics on the ground, as Swedish forces faced higher exposure.

Finland deployed the main part of its military efforts to the PRT Meymaneh in Faryab Province, first under British command and later, from 2005, under Norwegian command. Due to a calm situation, the exposure was limited but because Finnish troops would be patrolling in small six-persons mobile observation teams, they received additional equipment for force protection, such as grenade pistols and sniper rifles (Grüne, 2006b). At the same time, Finnish forces had strict rules of engagement (ROE) set down by the government and were only to use force in self-defence and

[116] There had been different threat assessments stemming from the forces on ground in Afghanistan and the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) in Stockholm. The attack tipped the scale in favour of the military personnel on the ground in Afghanistan, and the attack led to the Swedish-led PRT receiving a significant increased level of force protection (see Agrell, 2013, pp. 130-133).

in exceptional circumstances (Finnish Government, 2002, p. 4). Accordingly, the many media reports of Finnish troops not responding to hostile fire are indicative for the first period of the engagement in Afghanistan (Grüne, 2006c; HBL, 2006, 2009a). As noted in Chapter 4, the calm in Faryab was only disturbed by the attack on the PRT camp located in Meymaneh city in February 2006. According to Norwegian accounts of the event, the Finnish officers and the Finnish second-in-command of the PRT were not involved in responding to the attack (Egeberg, 2017, p. 400). There were no Finnish injuries, and the Finnish Defence Command told the country's media that its soldiers had never been in any danger, and military personnel in Afghanistan did not view the situation as more dangerous than before (Bruun, 2006; Grüne, 2006a). For many years, Finland viewed local criminal networks and warlords as the most significant source of instability in the northern region (Finnish Government, 2007). In 2007, however, there were signs of a deteriorating situation. In one incident, a Finnish soldier died on foot patrol due to injuries sustained when an IED exploded. Following his death, a debate began about force protection and psychological support for personnel. Moreover, as a measure of the deteriorating situation, Finnish troops began using armoured vehicles (Eduskunta Defence Committee, 2007; Rentola, 2007). Thus, Finnish forces faced a deteriorating situation with higher exposure.

As mentioned above, Sweden took over the lead nation role of the PRT Mazar-e Sharif from Britain in March 2006. The PRT Mazar-e Sharif constituted a significant military challenge. Normally, the established PRTs in Afghanistan consisted of two provinces at the most, while this PRT comprised four provinces; Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan, and Sar-e Pul cover an area of about 56,000 km^2 with approximately 2.6 million citizens (see map 5.1 below). Little connected the provinces other than the composition being a legacy from the British when they were running these. The provinces differed significantly in security level and degree of development, and were politically multifaceted (SOU 2017:16, 2017, pp. 69-70). The military leadership opted to build a new PRT main operating base, Camp Northern Light, on the outskirts of Mazar-e Sharif, the third largest city in Afghanistan with 1.3 million citizens, provincial capital of the Bahlk province. As lead nation, Sweden was also responsible for three Provincial Offices (PO) in the other provinces. Other challenges included significant delays in the construction of the camp and the hiring of local security on a day-to-day basis for force protection of Camp Northern Light. This was viewed as a high risk, as the Swedish forces were unable to do a background check of the Afghans they employed (Swedish Armed Forces, 2007a). In 2007, the government increased the contingent to 275 troops, with the possibility of increasing the force contribution to 600 should developments on ground require it (Swedish MFA, 2007). Compared to the initial contribution of 35 troops, Sweden was now a heavy contributor to ISAF.



Map 5.1 *Provincial map of the PRT Mazar-e Sharif*

Assuming leadership of the PRT Mazar-e Sharif became a turning point in how Stockholm used its military forces. As for other ISAF nations, the PRT organization, which included both military and civilian dimensions, was unfamiliar to the Swedish Armed Forces. Compared to the organization of the mission-based defence at home, there were few recognizable elements (SAFHQ, 2012, p. 21; Swedish Armed Forces, 2008a, p. 40). Moreover, in assuming the lead nation role, the government emphasized a comprehensive approach. In June 2007, the government revised the existing cooperation strategy with Afghanistan for 2006-2008 and decided to direct 15-20 per cent of Swedish aid to the four provinces of the PRT (Swedish MFA, 2008a, p. 12). Ultimately, decision-makers decided the number of troops for each contingent, providing some scope for the mission. There was also a geographical restriction to Northern Afghanistan (Swedish MFA, 2007, p. 6). However, the government never provided guidelines from the central national level in Stockholm to the theatre in Northern Afghanistan for how the Swedish comprehensive approach was to be carried out. In his Ph.D. thesis examining the level discretion Swedish force commanders had in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2013, Magnus Johnsson found that Swedish force commanders had a considerable discretion in interpreting and framing the political overarching mission, the mission of their own force, as well as their force's concept of operations (Johnsson, 2017). This indicates a broad operational authority for the Swedish military in Afghanistan. Consequently, while the three lines of operations – security, governance, and development – were directive, in practice, the PRT Mazar-e Sharif focused on security and toned

down the two latter points because of an undersized structure and a minimal civilian component. Accordingly, the Swedish-led PRT had a dominating military feature.

Although Swedish force commanders had considerable discretion, they were restricted in the use of force. A new component appeared in the government bills from 2007 onwards, where political authorities in Stockholm spelled out the degree of violence that the Swedish forces were permitted to use (Swedish MFA, 2007, p. 5; 2009, p. 12). Jan Ångström and Erik Noreen underline that general formulations gave rise to several interpretations of the security situation, depending on how Swedish units perceived threats as well as the conflict situation. The issue, they argue, related to whether ISAF forces, and Swedish troops in particular, were involved in an armed conflict, a war, or something else (Noreen & Ångström, 2015, p. 289). In the 2007 government bill on Afghanistan the government officially mentioned the civil war in Afghanistan. Among parliamentarians and in the government, the perception was that there were three conflict levels in Afghanistan. First, armed conflict in the south, which had increased in intensity as NATO expanded the ISAF mission to the Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Second, terrorism and disturbances in the east, and third an instable post-conflict situation in the north and west (Swedish Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2007; Swedish MFA, 2007). While the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) revised the ROE in April 2006, signifying more leniency in the use of force, Swedish decision-makers interpreted the new ROE only to apply in armed conflict.[117] Because Stockholm did not perceive the situation in Northern Afghanistan as an armed conflict, they added national caveats, limiting the scope of Swedish troop to use lethal force (SOU 2017:16, 2017, p. 86). As Swedish forces faced higher exposure and intensity, it was questionable whether Swedish soldiers really were in combat or not. Supporters of the Afghanistan participation, however, wanted to downplay the image of war (Noreen & Ångström, 2015, p. 290). That the civil war also included Northern Afghanistan was first noted in the 2009 government bill on Afghanistan, though with continued emphasis that the situation differed from the south (Swedish MFA, 2009, p. 8). Thus, although the Swedish military had broad authority in Afghanistan, there were political restrictions on the use of force.

In 2007, Finland concentrated its military effort in the Swedish-led PRT Mazar-e Sharif, which became the primary military focus of its efforts in Afghanistan. Helsinki ended the CIMIC activities in Kabul, as well as its participation in the Norwegian-led PRT Meymaneh in the Faryab province. According to the 2007 government report on Afghanistan, the decision to withdraw from Faryab

[117] The new ROE stated that ISAF forces could attack an opponent that they perceived as threatening ISAF's freedom of movement, or opponents with realistic and identifiable threats resisted ISAF's attempts to fulfil its mandate. The ROE allowed for the use of violence in cases of protecting lives and prevent serious injuries; enforce detention; prevent detainees from escaping and prevent riots and disturbances (NOU 2016:8, 2016, p. 161, fn 15; SOU 2017:16, 2017, p. 85).

followed difficulties in command and support structures (Finnish Government, 2007, p. 5). Although the report does not provide any details about these difficulties, it presumably involved the issues the PRT Meymaneh had with sanitation and evacuation possibilities discussed in Chapter 4. Another incentive was to concentrate Finnish efforts in the PRT Mazar-e Sharif as a prerequisite for considering Finland's ability to take a PRT leadership at a later stage (Finnish MFA, Finnish MoD, & Finnish MoI, 2007). One of the new elements in the Finnish engagement was to take part in the training and development of the Afghan National Army. By July 2008, there were 119 Finnish troops in Afghanistan, which began operating in Operation Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) (Finnish MFA et al., 2007). By participating in this structure, the Eduskunta recognized the possibility of Finnish peacekeepers participating in the Afghan National Army's operative activity as was the case with other ISAF forces in Southern Afghanistan. Although the parliamentary committees viewed this scenario as unlikely in Northern Afghanistan, which they perceived as calm, the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees emphasized the importance that the OMLTs not only had geographical restriction to the north, but also strict operative requirements. According to the committees, these requirements should include that Finnish troops could only participate in the OMLT structure on brigade level and should be prohibited from participating in combat activities together with Afghan troops (Eduskunta Defence Committee, 2007, p. 9; Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2007b). This underlines the Finnish reluctance to use military force in international operations.

At the end of 2008, the situation took a major turn leading to high exposure and a heavier armoured effort in both cases. This was a significant shift. The initial CIMIC tasks were no longer viable and a deteriorating situation demanded sharper use of force. The Swedish contingent on rotation in Afghanistan from December 2008 to April 2009 reported that the primary aim of adversaries was now ISAF and not the Afghan National Security forces, which until then had faced more direct attacks (Swedish Armed Forces, 2009a). Finnish and Swedish troops came under fire and were involved in regular combat. Indicative of the worsened situation, the PRT Mazar-e Sharif experienced a doubling of incidents and a dramatic 40 per cent increase in IED attacks in the first half of 2009, compared to the first half of 2008 (Swedish Armed Forces, 2009b). Nevertheless, the Swedish government maintained that the north differed from other parts of Afghanistan, but that the level of violence was higher following an improved capability of the opponents' use of IEDs, their ability to attack, and Swedish forces operating in new areas (Swedish MFA, 2009). In Helsinki, the government continued to highlight criminal networks and tribal leaders as the most significant destabilizing factors in northern Afghanistan. The government's 2009 Afghanistan Action Programme placed the focus of the insurgency in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, mentioning

only that attacks had increased even in Northern Afghanistan (Finnish Government, 2009b, p. 4). The Eduskunta criticized the government reports for being too limited and general about the situation and demanded more information and briefings about what was happening on the ground (Eduskunta Defence Committee, 2009b; Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2009). Apparently, the situation in Northern Afghanistan was not what they were led to believe. While the initial focus was a light footprint aimed at creating stability and enabling state building efforts, the deteriorating situation in Northern Afghanistan made governance and development difficult and a security focus prevailed. This suggest that the dynamics of complex lethality challenged the aims and perceptions of the Finnish and Swedish governments and conditioned a military approach to the engagement and thus broader authority to the military actor.

Following the changed situation, the PRT Mazar-e Sharif shifted focus from stabilization to a combat mode. Instead of framework operations (i.e. collecting information and maintaining security for development in designated areas), the PRT began conducting 'focused operations' in smaller areas, with the aim of reducing the influence of insurgents (Swedish Armed Forces, 2009a). To improve command and output, there were also efforts to integrate the Finnish and Swedish contingents as much as possible (Swedish Armed Forces, 2009c). While Finnish troops in Afghanistan avoided responding to hostile fire so far as possible, media reports of them being attacked or participating in regular combat were no longer uncommon (see e.g. FNB, 2009; HBL, 2009b; HBL, 2009c). For the Afghan parliamentary elections in 2009, Finland decided to deploy nearly 100 additional soldiers to help with security, increasing the number of soldiers in Afghanistan to just over 200 (Finnish Government, 2009b). What is not clear from the government report to parliament was that approximately half of the soldiers were Finnish special operations forces, and the other half, volunteer reservists who had recently completed their conscript service in the Pori Brigade, which trains most of the soldiers for the Finnish Rapid Deployment Force. The Finnish Defence Command deployed a platoon of SOF and newly trained reservists to Afghanistan to see how they performed and how they measured up against professional NATO forces (Salonius-Pasternak, 2012, p. 178). Thus, the military leadership grasped the opportunity to test new capabilities, indicating a broad military authority in the case of Finland.

Although there was a broad understanding in Finland of the necessity of both civilian and military means, the roles became less distinct, especially as the security situation deteriorated. Increasingly, it became important for the country to maintain a humanitarian space and keep a clear division between military and civilian roles:

> There should be a clear allocation of work between different actors. Military personnel cannot take on a significant role in civilian crisis management. The situation in Afghanistan is completely different from the Balkans or in Lebanon, where Finnish soldiers participated in significant development and infrastructure projects to support civil society. The main task of the soldiers in Afghanistan is clearly to guarantee civilian actors a security environment that enables state building (Eduskunta Defence Committee, 2010, p. 3).

In terms of civilian crisis management, the MFA viewed the PRT concept as an exception, as it was unthinkable in Finland that civilian crisis management be subordinate to military crisis management (Grüne, 2007a). Moreover, Finnish aid organizations became frustrated, arguing that the line between military crisis management and humanitarian work endangered their work, as well as causing a politicization of development aid (FNB, 2007; Grüne, 2007b; Halonen, 2010; Tunér, 2007). A significant challenge was the numerous actors involved in the Afghanistan campaign, and it was noted that "even among the Finns the dialogue between civilian and military is hitching" (Buchert, 2008). Accordingly, complex lethality and the participation in PRTs that focused on security challenged the Finnish view on crisis management and the use of a comprehensive approach.

The Swedish civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan faced its own set of challenges. In line with the revised cooperation strategy of 2007, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) allocated about 100 million Swedish Krona (SEK) annually to the four provinces under Swedish responsibility. However, the PRT Mazar-e Sharif did not administer these resources, which limited the possibility of coordinating aid and development activities along the lines of operations (i.e. security, governance and development). SIDA focused on Kabul and central Afghan authorities and did not want to interact with the military. Swedish military thus had difficulties in getting assistance from SIDA for civilian oriented projects such as building bridges (Noreen & Ångström, 2015, p. 292). The Swedish contingents perceived the CIMIC projects as a challenge, as it created an expectation among the Afghan population that the PRT was designed for development in the area. However, because the projects were not the main activity, they did not have the resources to meet the expectations in the local population (Swedish Armed Forces, 2009c, pp. 163-164). Swedish forces therefore sought more access to civilian aid and resources, which led to friction between SIDA and the military (SOU 2017:16, 2017, p. 74). In autumn of 2009, the government announced its aim to strengthen the civilian element in the PRT Mazar-e Sharif by establishing a civilian function for coordinating the Swedish efforts and for contact with Afghan authorities (Swedish MFA, 2009). This function, a Senior Civilian Representative, was in place June 2010. The position was to be an equivalent to the military force commander and had responsibility for overall political guidance, civilian personnel and development. Political,

development and police advisors also accompanied the civilian representative. This change indicates some effort at coordinating civilian and military means. However, by 2010, Swedish force commanders began questioning the PRT concept, not necessarily the theory behind but the application of it, with too few resources and a poorly represented civilian component (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011e). Thus, both Finland and Sweden faced challenges in their efforts of a comprehensive approach and the Swedish-led PRT maintained its military feature.

Following the new ISAF counterinsurgency (COIN) approach, there were several changes to the Swedish contribution. In 2010, the government published a strategy for the country's overall effort in Afghanistan. The strategy reflected international developments and underlined the ISAF military strategy and the comprehensive approach as the solution to an ever-more complex effort. At the same time, the government set out a divide between civilian and military efforts:

> Comprehensive approach takes place by maintaining an appropriate role and responsibility allocation. It is important to strive for synergies, however, at the same time maintain a suitable division between security enhancing measures and development work, keeping the civilian and military role apart (Swedish Government, 2010, p. 18).

Although the strategy aimed at a gradual reduction of the military footprint, it underlined that "the single most important task of the international society and of the Swedish engagement in Afghanistan, is to bring the conflict to an end" (Swedish Government, 2010, p. 6). Accordingly, in 2011, the Swedish troop numbers remained at 500, with a possible increase of forces to 855 (Swedish MFA, 2010). Moreover, as Roosberg and Weibull (2014, p. 71) underline, although the Swedish strategy emphasized a comprehensive approach, there are still traces of the COIN concepts phases of clear, hold and build. Complex lethality conditioned a continued military focus. It reflected the deteriorating situation and the use of force as a strategic problem.

The Swedish contingent on rotation from November 2009 to May 2010 was a large OMLT contingent. The Swedish PRT commander characterized the new ISAF guidelines of 2009 as a paradigm shift (Swedish Armed Forces, 2010, p. 2). In addition to emphasizing mentoring and training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the new ISAF strategy also signalled a more active approach to ensure security in the Afghan provinces. This new approach meant that ISAF would take the initiative and capture insurgents. Successive Swedish contingents had previously identified two main problem areas within their area of operations. One was a Pashtun populated area about 40 kilometres west of Mazar-e Sharif spanning the districts Bahlk, Chahar Bolak and Chimtal, known as the Pashtun pocket (see map 5.2 below). Although ISAF forces had known the area to be problematic for a long time, the PRT had not attempted to establish a permanent presence there but instead conducted several focused operations. This now changed as

Swedish contingents set out to establish a forward operating base on Ali Zaid Hill in the power centre of the area (Swedish Armed Forces, 2010, pp. 43-44). Together with Afghan forces, the Swedish forces initiated Operation Ab Tamiz on 14 June 2010, aimed to take control and stop insurgent activity (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011e). With the finalization of the base on 28 June, conditions were in place for a permanent presence by the PRT and Afghan forces. During the following weeks, they held regular town meetings (*shouras*) with local leaders to build good relations with citizens and to gain support for development, primarily through quick impact projects. During the operation, it became clear to Swedish forces that COIN was not a sequential chain but that its phases was something that happened in parallel (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011e, p. 28). While the clear phase had been a relative success, the hold phase came with significant complications and higher exposure.



Map 5.2 *Problem areas, the PRT Mazer-e Sharif*

With increased awareness that Finnish troops had been active participants in battles and were regularly coming under fire (something not seen before in the long history of Finnish peacekeeping), led to a heated debate in the summer of 2009 as to whether Finland was at war in Afghanistan. There was a dawning realization that the character of ISAF had changed, and that ISAF forces were part of a war, which can be traced to the parliamentary reports on the effort in Afghanistan (Eduskunta Defence Committee, 2010; Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2007a, 2010). For many, the break from a traditional 'peaceful' habitus of the Finnish peacekeeper was

clear evidence that, if not at war, there has been at least a paradigm shift in the nature of Finnish involvement in crisis management operations (Archer et al., 2009). As the mission in Afghanistan became highly intensive with significant exposure for Finnish forces, tension increased between the perception of Finland as a traditional peacekeeping country and actual developments on the ground.

That war had reached Northern Afghanistan became particularly clear in 2010 with a further escalation of violence. Sweden suffered three more casualties, bringing the total to five. On 7 February 2010, hostile fire killed two Swedish officers and a local interpreter (Swedish Armed Forces, 2010). According to Wilhelm Agrell, these casualties had a different breakthrough in Sweden compared to the ones in 2005 where the focus in media had been on a technical question of armoured vehicles (Agrell, 2013, p. 241). For the first time, Sweden had war heroes, changing the Swedish self-perception of a nation that does not go to war to a realization that the country was at war going in Afghanistan, which carried with it the risk of Swedish casualties. Counter measures from insurgents led to higher exposure, where the contingent on rotation from May to November 2010 reported having faced more than 70 attacks consisting of complex ambushes, IED attacks, grenade fire and suicide bombers (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011e, pp. 5, 7, 17). On 16 October 2010, one of the IED attacks led to the death of another Swedish soldier. In this period, the Finnish-Swedish contingent participated in over thirty battles and faced fifteen bomb attacks. At least ten times, the predicament of the situation necessitated requests for American air support (Back, 2010). Notably, the number of incidents increased by a third compared to 2009.

Following ISAF's new strategy, Finland changed the organization of its troops from mobile observation teams to a traditional structure of platoons. During 2010, Finland's force contribution increased from 130 to more than 180, and by 2011, reached 195 troops (Finnish Government, 2010). According to Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, there were three motives behind these increases: security, drug trade, and humanitarian reasons (Bäck, 2010). Nevertheless, although military needs suggested a further increase, domestic politics also played a role. Due to the situation on the ground and new tasks, the military leadership and the Finnish MoD sought a higher increase in the number of troops. However, arguably for ideological reasons, Halonen, president of Finland at the time, did not approve this, which required the Defence Command to plan backwards from the maximum of 195 troops (Behr, Salonius-Pasternak, Giustozzi, Jansson, & Olsson, 2012, p. 10). As the situation on ground deteriorated, the Finnish mission in Afghanistan became more politicized. The situation appears to have triggered an anxiety at the political level that the engagement was about to get out of control.

Following high-intensity complex lethality, the period of high exposure led to a shift in the perception and demands of deployed Swedish forces. In May 2010, General Sverker Göranson, CHOD, formally decided to remove Swedish national caveats and expanded the possibilities for Swedish units to use force in conflict-related situations (SOU 2017:16, 2017, p. 86). This due to a deteriorating situation in which Swedish forces faced higher security risks and the subordination to the new ISAF strategy that led to military operations into areas controlled by insurgents. Thus, the Swedish ROE changed as Swedish forces acted more offensively rather than reactively, as had been the tradition in previous peacekeeping missions (Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, p. 49). In addition, from FS20, the twentieth follow-on force in Afghanistan, the organization of Swedish forces changed. The Swedish contingent abandoned the structure of Provincial Offices in Jowzjan, Sari Pul and Samangan, as well as the mobile observation team structure, for three fire companies and a light manoeuvre battalion (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011c, p. 6). The backdrop of the change in structure was partly the military's effort to return to a 'normal' unit structure but foremost because of the fundamentally changed task of the contingents after the counterinsurgency strategy's heavy footprint. The aim was to adapt equipment and structure to enable operative freedom for manoeuvre for more joint operations with Afghan and ISAF forces to ensure security, and to support and train the ANSF (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011d, pp. 24-8). While the change in organization of the Swedish force is barely mentioned in the government's 2010 parliament proposition (Swedish MFA, 2010, p. 23), this was a significant adaptation to the dynamics and events on the ground.

In the summer of 2011, the Swedish contingent permanently left Ali Zaid Hill. Many soldiers found the decision controversial and emotional because they had been in hard battles in the area with lives lost. Nevertheless, with an increasingly grave security situation in a large area of responsibility, a permanent presence demanded too many resources. Moreover, from a tactical perspective, the Swedish force commander found the effects of the effort to be low and did not fit with the needs of Swedish forces to solve their tasks (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011d, pp. 11, 28). With COIN operations and increased focus on the transition process including mentoring the ANSF, Swedish officers in Afghanistan voiced concerns about too many tasks and too few resources (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011c, 2011e). Because operations, such as Ab Tamiz, had required large resources for a long-term presence, this resulted in a limited role in other areas of the PRT Mazar-e Sharif, and insurgents were able to build new strongholds. Accordingly, the military threat from insurgents increased both in terms of numbers and in the number of attacks. The Swedish contingent attempted to hand over Ali Zaid Hill to Afghan security forces, but the Afghans showed little interest in taking over and credited the forward operating base little value. There was also a growing

scepticism towards the COIN concept. The contingent in Afghanistan from May to November in 2011 noted the concept to be a Western invention not fully understood by the Afghans. Therefore, Swedish officers stopped talking about COIN and its phases with Afghan forces when they planned and conducted operations (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011d, p. 12).

With the decision to leave Ali Zaid Hill, the PRT Mazar-e Sharif could focus on the second identified problem in its area of responsibility, namely the Tri-Provincial Area spanning the border region between Jowzjan, Sari Pol and Faryab provinces (see map 5.2 above). This area was not a strategic area like the Pashtun pocket but because of the COIN strategy, the PRT leadership perceived it necessary to address the area as part of its responsibility. In February 2011, as part of the task of mentoring and training the ANSF, Swedish and Finnish troops planned Operation Shariki in the districts Qush Tepah and Darzab in Jowzjan Province. This was the first larger operation led by Afghans with a supporting role from ISAF. Primarily, it was the first larger offensive operation where Swedish and Finnish forces participated in the planning, organization and later joined the operation (Agrell, 2013, p. 289). Operation Shariki was highly intensive over eleven days with close air support from ISAF (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011a). Although there were no Swedish or Finnish casualties, the ANSF lost several soldiers. That same month, a Finnish-Swedish convoy hit an IED resulting in a second Finnish casualty in Afghanistan. This fuelled the Finnish debate about its future role in Afghanistan, and Jyri Häkämies, defence minister, admitted that there was a "war-like situation" in Northern Afghanistan (Häkämies quoted in Lydén, 2011). A couple of months later, Finnish soldiers participated in a large offensive against insurgents together with about 2,000 Afghan forces (Mäkilä, 2010). Accordingly, high-intensity complex lethality following enemy activity led Finnish and Swedish soldiers into heavy battles.

Following the changing character of operations, there was in Finland an increased awareness that crisis management operations had become more demanding and that it required different kind of equipment and force protection. From the light footprint and armament in Kabul, the Finnish Defence Forces adapted their behaviour and tasks according to the operational environment following complex lethality. This is evident in the debate that intensified throughout 2009 and the expressed concerns of the risk following mentoring Afghan forces, as well as the measures of armoured vehicles against IEDs and increased use of protective gear (Eduskunta Defence Committee, 2009a, p. 3; Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2009, p. 3; 2010, p. 8; Finnish MFA, 2009, p. 56). Complex lethality in Afghanistan also led to higher expenditures and the use of capabilities that Finland previously had not used in peacekeeping operations. As the Finnish crisis management strategy of 2009 states:

> Costs have risen and the areas of operation are farther away as well as more challenging. Furthermore, Finland is expected to deploy more specialised units and niche capabilities to crisis management tasks. This is reflected in materiel and maintenance costs (Finnish MFA, 2009, p. 40).

Among the new capabilities operating in Afghanistan were Special Forces and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Another large issue was a Strategic Airlift Capability, which was limited in Afghanistan. Because Helsinki did not perceive this capability as necessary for the defence of Finland, cooperation on the issue provided Finland with a solution for this specific challenge.[118] Therefore, Finland sought to amend the capability shortfall through a joint international project, in which Finland joined ten NATO nations (and Sweden) in a strategic airlift capability (Finnish MFA, 2009, p. 51). In fact, Finland and Sweden were the only non-NATO members to participate in NATO's Strategic Airlift Capability initiative, established in 2008 (Petersson, 2011b, p. 116). While Finland procured materiel specifically for Afghanistan, including vehicles, desert camouflage, and air-condition for the vehicles, Afghanistan and international operations have not been the main reason for defence procurement in Finland.[119] In Finland, politicians do not want to be accused of taking resources from national defence priorities and it is important for them to tell the public that they are not wasting resources (Häkämies, 2011). Ultimately, domestic politics and needs of national defence development have guided the country's engagement in Afghanistan (Salonius-Pasternak, 2012). Arguably, this connects with Finnish priority on homeland defence and that Finland only deployed minor contingents to Afghanistan and did not have PRT-lead-nation responsibilities.

In contrast, in the case of Sweden, the increased focus on equipment and force protection in demanding environments led to the acquisition and modification of materiel. Stockholm procured helicopters, off-road military vehicles, body armour and crawlers specifically for Afghanistan (FOI, 2016, p. 25). Having responsibility for the PRT Mazar-e Sharif, a large area covering four provinces, in addition to a deteriorating security situation that increased the need for protection, were important factors for Sweden to procure new materiel for the Afghanistan conflict (Roosberg & Weibull, 2014; Sivertun, 2017). During mid-2009, because of imminent threats that included IEDs and higher exposure, the Swedish contingent in Afghanistan had urgent operative needs. Counter-IED measures and equipment was something that Swedish forces needed immediately. Although Sweden had a low number of casualties, there was still significant concern over the risks Swedish soldiers faced. However, the different military reports from Afghanistan underline a discrepancy between needs of capabilities and the procurement process back home in Sweden, which was perceived as too slow to meet the demands in the theatre of war (Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, pp.

[118] Interview 20 in Appendix I.
[119] Interview 20, 22 and 39 in Appendix I.

57-60; Swedish Armed Forces, 2007a, 2009a). The SAFHQ decided to procure the necessary materiel as quickly as possible to ensure the protection of their deployed military personnel. Often, this was not included in the standby list back home and additional expenditures went to new materiel through a systematic adaptation. In 2011, the procurement process was modified to include a special fast track for sensitive cases of defence procurement (Pettersson, 2012). One of the big issues was the purchasing of Black Hawk helicopters as medical evacuation capability because the offensive operations had revealed shortcomings in the traditional military sanitation capability (Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, pp. 50-51, 63). Sweden procured the helicopters from the US with the purpose of using them in Afghanistan, as there was a shortage of helicopters in the northern region. A Swedish medical evacuation capability was operational in Afghanistan in 2011 by the deployment of Helicopter 10B and later replaced by the new Black Hawk helicopters from 2013 (SOU 2017:16, 2017, pp. 91-2). The conditions of high-intensity complex lethality and high exposure led to higher military expenditures and reinforcements of the Swedish military engagement in Afghanistan.

The exit plan announced at the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon marked the beginning of a new phase in the ISAF mission. In this transition phase, 'Afghan ownership' was a central topic and concerned mostly supporting the ANSF through mentoring and training. In this period, the PRT Mazar-e Sharif centred on a supporting role to further ANSF capacity building and began the transition of security responsibility to Afghan security structures in three of the four provinces from the end of 2011 (Swedish Armed Forces, 2012). From 2012, the structure of the PRT Mazar-e Sharif changed to a civilian command and it evolved into a Transition Support Team. This signalled an important shift in focus for Sweden. In 2011, the Finnish government decided to withdraw 50 troops deployed a year earlier (Finnish Government, 2011). However, it was emphasized that tasks and size of the contingent went hand in hand, and that it was necessary to maintain a certain number of troops to be able to fulfil the tasks (Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012). Sweden decided to maintain 500 troops until the end of 2012, including personnel for dismantling camps and transport equipment back home (Swedish MFA, 2011). After 2012, Sweden withdrew 100 troops as part of a gradual reduction of its contribution.

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The analysis of exposure shows a development from a relative calm period with limited exposure for Finnish and Swedish forces and a focus on stabilization, to a decisively changed situation from 2009 onwards with high exposure. With a significant shift in intensity, the PRT concept and comprehensive approach faced hard realities, leading to a heavier military footprint. In the sequence of events, both the Swedish and Finnish military contribution gained a different profile.

Heightened intensity and exposure led to heavier equipment, increased focus on force protection, changed operational patterns, procurement of new materiel, experiences in combat operations and irregular warfare. With challenges resulting from an unpredictable and changing operating environment, Finland and Sweden have not been isolated from the dynamics of complex lethality, which forced peacekeepers to engage with hostile elements on numerous of occasions. In turn, complex lethality challenged the existing perception in Helsinki and Stockholm of Afghanistan being 'just another' peace support operation and the use of force in expeditionary missions. Considering the domestic debates of whether the military forces were part of a war or not, Afghanistan has served as a wake-up call, during which there has been a cumulative process of awareness in both Finland and Sweden that their forces were engaging in more dangerous and diverse missions.

Looking at the number of troops and responsibilities, Sweden was more heavily engaged in Afghanistan than Finland. Sweden also suffered a higher toll of casualties with five in total. In the case of Sweden, there were attempts at a comprehensive approach that failed in its encounter with insurgents. As the situation deteriorated, Sweden adapted its military forces to a more offensive approach. Although political authorities refrained from referring to counterinsurgency, the Swedish forces were adopting the principles. Significantly, the military leadership eased Swedish ROE, expanding the possibilities to use of force. Facing a difficult situation, the political level deferred to military expertise and presented the military with broad authority on the battlefield.

During the Afghanistan engagement, the Swedish Armed forces gained valuable experience, which is clear from the military reports and documents relating to their role. Being exposed to high-intensity complex lethality, they acquired knowledge of what was required in demanding combat operations and on combat operations against irregular adversaries. War experiences and demands have also led to a priority in the ongoing defence reform back home on the operative part, influencing unit structure and long-term formulations (Agrell, 2010, pp. 224-225; Hedin, 2011; Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, pp. 126, 129). Participating in a high-intensity conflict area has also contributed to a change in Swedish veteran policy. Sweden had policies directed towards the well-being of soldiers who had fought in conflict from the beginning of Sweden's engagement in peace support operations. However, fundamental changes in veteran policies came with the passing of a parliamentary bill in 2010, which set out a range of reforms (Swedish MoD, 2010). These included among other the creation of a special Veterans Division based at the SAFHQ and appointment of specific coordinators of veterans' affairs at all battalions. Moreover, Sweden instituted an official Veterans' Day celebration on 29 May each year and built a veterans' monument in Stockholm

(Roosberg & Weibull, 2014, pp. 81-85; SOU 2013:8, 2013; SOU 2014:27, 2014). Ralph Sundberg (2017) finds that although there were several factors that drove the reforms in Swedish veteran policies, e.g. the wide-ranging reforms of Swedish security and defence policies and the planning of the Nordic Battle Group, revealing shortcomings in veterans' policies, he finds that the Afghan factor was an important driver of the reforms.

Finland had a lower death toll than Sweden, with only two ISAF-related casualties during the engagement in Afghanistan. Although Finland focused on a comprehensive approach with a combination of political, civilian and military means, the intensity and degree of exposure dictated a military focus. Since 2001, the Defence Command and the armed services have had a stronger focus on crisis management, capabilities and measuring effect, including the establishment of a lessons learned system in 2010 (Salonius-Pasternak, 2012, p. 185).[120] Overall, Afghanistan has provided an opportunity to measure the current defence capability and develop training and equipment after identified shortcomings following the high-demanding missions (Finnish MFA, 2009, p. 50; Salonius-Pasternak, 2011, p. 5; Wallin, 2011). Considering Finnish veteran policy, there has not been major changes, which is still connected to past war experiences (Enestam, 2002; Niinistö, 2013). Overall, the generation of war veterans has been a powerful voice in politics, the defence budget, and culture in the post-war decades, especially in the 1960s and 1970s (Kettunen, 2018, p. 276). Nevertheless, following experiences in more demanding international operations, there is now more focus on crisis management personnel's security. Moreover, following the engagement in Afghanistan, increased psychological support of deployed soldiers became a topic (Eduskunta Defence Committee, 2010, p. 6; 2012, p. 4). Special considerations are given to coping, both mentally and physically, as well as the topic of pre-deployment training and debriefing after missions (Finnish MFA, 2009, p. 48; Haglund, 2013b). Overall, this suggests a different understanding of and approach to international operations.

While Finnish politicians were slow to recognize the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan entailing significant exposure and risks, the analysis indicates that the Finnish Defence Forces were more perceptive of developments on the ground, adapting along the way to the worsening conditions, for example by changing to a more traditional military structure of platoons. Moreover, the military even saw the opportunity to test new capabilities with the increase in military efforts before the 2009 Afghan parliamentary elections, which indicates broad military authority. Ultimately, however, there were limitations on the military's room for manoeuvre in Afghanistan, in which the political level kept Finland's military participation in check. Thus, there is a clear difference between Finland

[120] Also highlighted in interview 19 and 39. See Appendix I.

and Sweden concerning the use of force, which arguably relates to national priorities. Complex lethality with periods of high exposure conditioned a new situation for politicians in Finland and Sweden, which opted for broader military authority. This is especially evident in Sweden, while for the case of Finland there appears to be anxiety at the political level of the situation getting out of hand, as the conflict escalated in Northern Afghanistan.

5.3 Partner

Turning to the concept of partner, Sweden and Finland opted for slightly different approaches in Afghanistan. While Sweden assumed responsibility for a PRT in the northern region, Finland ultimately chose to operate jointly with Swedish forces in the PRT Mazar-e Sharif. Although Helsinki considered a lead nation role, it became instead an important partner for Sweden. Neither country integrated their forces with a major power on the ground; however, NATO as a coalition framework, including the operational guidelines of ISAF, influenced the Finnish and Swedish engagement in Afghanistan.

Sweden chose to assume responsibility for one of ISAF's PRTs, a choice that led to it becoming more important in NATO circles. Although the political level in Sweden often highlighted idealist and humanitarian reasons for Swedish engagement in Afghanistan, behind the rhetoric, the main reason for its participation was to demonstrate that its armed forces could conduct operations within a NATO framework (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 14). A report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) indicates that the Swedish engagement in ISAF, direct and indirect, provided the Swedish Armed Forces a position as a trustworthy and capable NATO partner, with insight and influence on a level that previously had not been possible without membership (FOI, 2016, pp. 81-88). In Afghanistan, the partnership with Britain, Germany and the US was central, and bilaterally it increased the degree of cooperation with these countries and their military structures (Agrell, 2013; FOI, 2016). This arguably connects with Swedish priority and 'solidarity security'. As Jan Ångström argues, for a mutual expectation of cooperation between Sweden and Western major powers to be credible and effective, this demands interoperability with Western forces (Ångström, 2015, pp. 247-8). Sweden did not go so far as to integrate its forces with NATO partners, however. With a certain degree of independence as lead nation, Sweden had the opportunity to pursue a more development-directed strategy in which military means were an enabler (Ångström & Honig, 2012, pp. 677-8). Nevertheless, as the dynamics in Afghanistan changed and the situation deteriorated, the PRT developed to create a dominant military feature. This also had implications for Finland.

Finland did not integrate its forces with a major power in Afghanistan but focused its engagement first in the Norwegian-led PRT Meymaneh and later in the Swedish-led PRT Mazar-e Sharif.[121] The PRT concept was vague and provisional and left room for national interpretation by the different lead nations. As stated in the PRT Handbook, "The PRT itself is neither a combat nor a development institution" (ISAF, 2012, p. 8). The Norwegian and Swedish-led PRTs stood out in that they focused heavily on security. As mentioned, the Norwegian PRT also included a clear separation between civilian and military means. This was in sharp contrast to the Finnish approach to crisis management, which sought to integrate civilian and military efforts. Tuoko Piiparinen (2007) underlines how the divergent perception of meaningful conflict management determined the way in which Finland and Norway conceived the role of the PRT Meymaneh, leading to a clash of mind-sets. In the Norwegian perspective, the military was an enabler for non-governmental organizations to work in the PRT's area of responsibilities. In contrast, Finland saw the PRT as an implementer as well as an enabler of reconstruction and contributed substantial direct financial assistance to reconstruction projects through the PRT. Thus, Finland gave their troops more leeway in terms of financial assistance to carry out projects, at the same time as the Norwegian-led PRT's focus on security enabled a military focus, reinforcing the authority of the Finnish military actor.

As part of the Swedish-led PRT, the military focus continued also for Finnish troops, as well as heightened exposure cemented this aspect. While high exposure played a role in the shift towards a more active approach in the operational pattern of Finnish forces, being integrated with the Swedish arguably reinforced this move. On tactical level, Finland made decisions to change its contribution and approach based on a combination of exposure and national interest, but in close cooperation with partners (Salonius-Pasternak, 2012, p. 181). This is also evident in the country's 'exit plan'. As the domestic debate intensified from 2009, many called for a withdrawal from Afghanistan. The government, however, emphasized that Finland could not pull out alone (Eduskunta Defence Committee, 2012; Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012). One can question the validity of this answer considering that there were no alliance or legal obligations that forced Finland to continue its military effort. However, being part of the NATO coalition and closely cooperating with other countries over a long period of time may have created a sense of obligation to stay the course. The decisions of partners appear to have been central for Finnish withdrawal plans and kept the Finnish military in theatre.

[121] According to the Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee, the discussion with Sweden of a possible rotation of the lead nation role had not given results, and that Sweden was prepared to deploy more military personnel to PRT Mazar-e Sharif (Eduskunta Foreign Affairs Committee, 2008, p. 8).

With initial symbolic contributions, Finland and Sweden did not join the international effort with a plan for 'winning' but relied on others to set both strategic goals and the overall approach used to achieve them. Thus, operating in a coalition context led by NATO, the strategic principles and military strategy outlined by major powers and the COMISAF in Kabul influenced the Finnish and Swedish engagement. This is especially clear with the COIN principles introduced to the Afghan theatre in 2009, which became a driver for a more offensive approach. From the ISAF headquarters in Kabul, it was expected that coalition partners followed McChrystal's directives (Kronvall & Petersson, 2016, p. 287). Being a part of the NATO-led coalition, there was an adaptation to the new concepts. As discussed in the section on exposure, while the Swedish government refrained from talking about counterinsurgency, the Swedish forces in Afghanistan adapted to central elements of the COIN strategy. Following an inner military logic, Swedish forces became part of a counterinsurgency operation that went beyond the original mission formulation given in the decision by the Riksdag (Sivertun, 2017, p. 109). Moreover, as Ångström and Noreen highlight, Swedish ISAF soldiers were already enrolled in counterinsurgency courses in Kabul in 2007 and were increasingly involved in counterinsurgency warfare, which culminated around 2010 (Ångström & Noreen, 2017, p. 42). As discussed in the section on exposure, Swedish forces changed their way of thinking and operating from a traditional peacebuilding and stabilization to counterinsurgency, in which they recognized that COIN was a separate form of conflict compared to traditional peacekeeping. Sweden removed many of the old peacekeeping 'restrictions' (i.e. the change of the ROE in 2010) and started to educate, train and operate more in accordance to the clear-hold-build concept. This indicates an autonomous military actor, who chose an operational pattern following partner guidelines rather than the original mission given by the government. Arguably, the lack of strategic guidelines from the political level in Stockholm enabled this room for manoeuvre. As part of the PRT Mazar-e Sharif, Finland also adapted its operational pattern and structure to the new COIN strategy while there were domestic discussions whether Finland was a part of a war. Thus, we see the same trend in the case of Finland as in Sweden in which the COIN principles became a driver for a new way of using force in international operations.

Another important change in 2010 involved Washington establishing itself in Northern Afghanistan and reaching full operational capability during the second half of that year. The enhanced American presence following the Obama Administration's surge strategy, also meant that ISAF forces in the north now had much needed support, including increased possibilities of airborne features in operations and strengthened field work capability. In the Finnish case, one concern was how the increase of American troops would affect the northern region of Afghanistan (Eduskunta Defence Committee, 2010). However, the Finnish government also saw the value in

increased American presence for the training of the Afghan National Army, but especially regarding strategic airlift capability and medical attention (Finnish Government, 2010). The surge of US forces to Northern Afghanistan also affected the PRT Mazar-e Sharif operationally, in that it led to more security operations, where both Finnish and Swedish forces along with Afghan forces conducted several operations (Swedish MFA, 2011; Ångström & Noreen, 2017, p. 290). Thus, with the support of a major power, Finnish and Swedish troops could engage in more offensive operations.

Although Finland and Sweden took different paths in ISAF's expansion to the north, they have their non-NATO membership in common. The joint base of the two countries in Mazar-e Sharif was of particular importance, as it provided the two partners with an unparalleled platform to take cooperation with NATO to an even closer and more confidential level. Ann-Sofie Dahl argues that in the practical work in the ground in Afghanistan, the dividing line between contributing non-allied partners and NATO members was in many ways blurred (Dahl, 2017, p. 80). Moreover, Sweden and Finland, together with Australia, were driving forces for increasing the co-influence of partner countries of NATO in crisis management operations. That Sweden was one of the three largest non-aligned contributors to ISAF provided a basis for these efforts (SOU 2017:16, 2017, p. 139). ISAF also proved valuable for further strengthening the interoperability of their forces with NATO (FOI, 2016, p. 86). This provided a broader professional network 'in action', and an arena for learning from and emulating other military organizations. Since joining NATO's PfP in 1994, Finland and Sweden have been eager participants (Møller & Petersson, 2019; Pesu, 2017; Petersson, 2011c). In this regard, the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of PfP, joined by Finland and Sweden in 1995, became the primary tool for achieving interoperability (Petersson, 2011b, p. 115). Both the Finnish and the Swedish military leadership have highlighted the importance of interoperability as a key concern in the modernization of the military in the 2000s and have argued that their armed forces are modern and useful for NATO purposes (Kaskeala, 2006; Syrén, 2006b). The partnership with NATO countries in Afghanistan reinforced an already existing cooperation and professional network through the NATO PfP.

At the turn of the millennium, interoperability thinking gained traction in Finland. Participation in NATO-led crisis management operations became increasingly important, and Finland has sought closer cooperation with NATO in the planning operations within the organization and the decision on planning (Finnish Government, 2001; Haglund, 2014; Häkämies, 2010). This is evident with the measures that the country adopted from NATO's planning system in 2002 and NATO communication system in 2004, as mentioned in Chapter 3. Moreover, the 2012 reform of the

Finnish Defence Forces brought the military organization more in line with other Western military organizations. Thus, the Afghanistan engagement has had an indirect effect, fuelling an ongoing process towards interoperability, for the most part following NATO standards. In addition to the Afghanistan engagement, however, there are other factors that have contributed to this trend, such as international exercises through the EU Battlegroups and NATO PfP. Official documents highlight that military management activities are based, above all, on NATO standards (Finnish MFA, 2009, p. 52). The Finnish Defence Forces train to ensure that Finland can deploy versatile and competent military personnel to international crisis management tasks. Enhanced international cooperation and interoperability also coincides with the need to address the downsizing of wartime troops and the acknowledgment, in Finland, that no west-European country today can sustain an independent defence (Häkämies, 2008).[122] Moreover, international operations have provided Finland with an opportunity to show strength and increase the credibility of its Defence Forces, and providing officers with experience of serving in multinational HQ and adopting new practices (Salonius-Pasternak, 2011). As highlighted in the 2009 government report on security and defence, participation in EU, NATO and OSCE-led crisis management operations requires interoperability and that Finland should make use of the capabilities developed in the EU and NATO battle groups in crisis management, including in Afghanistan (Finnish Government, 2009a, pp. 99-100). Overall, this underlines efforts at interoperability, in which Finland develops its capabilities modelled on international standards, to which Afghanistan provided an opportunity to develop these capabilities further.

Like Finland, there is a similar trend in the Swedish case. Following the Afghanistan engagement, there has been increased harmonization of Swedish staff and decision-making procedures with NATO standards (Ångström & Noreen, 2017, p. 43). While the military concepts of networked-based defence and RMA were central buzzwords that influenced Swedish defence transformation from the early 2000s, expeditionary missions within a coalition framework proved to be a de facto adaptation to NATO (Kronvall & Petersson, 2016). Magnus Petersson finds the Finnish and Swedish participation in NATO's Strategic Airlift capability to be an unusual commitment for two non-aligned states, which clearly signals that the two countries are prepared to integrate in NATO's defence structures (Petersson, 2011b, p. 116). The Swedish Official Inquiry of Sweden in Afghanistan also found that the participation in ISAF, including the responsibility following the lead nation role, contributed to develop the capability of the Swedish Armed Forces (SOU 2017:16, 2017, p. 27). While RMA and network-based defence influenced the 2002 Swedish military

[122] Noted also in interview 20 and 22. See Appendix I.

doctrine, international trends of stabilization, irregular warfare and the COIN concept influenced the revised 2011 version. The 2011 military doctrine stressed expeditionary capabilities, availability and flexibility, as well as including a comprehensive approach. Roosberg and Weibull have identified several strategic needs that arose during the Afghanistan engagement, which is directly addressed in the 2011 doctrine and argue that the engagement has heavily influenced the development of doctrines and concepts in Sweden (Roosberg & Weibull, 2014). In addition to experiences from high-intensity operations in Afghanistan, one can also identify other driving forces, including the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces to a mission-based military organization and preparations for the EU Battlegroups following the shift in Swedish priority at the turn of the millennium. Although Afghanistan has influenced the development of doctrines and concepts, there still exists a division between national and international tasks (Swedish Armed Forces, 2014a, p. 31; Ångström & Noreen, 2017). For example, while the comprehensive approach is connected to international operations, the main idea for the national defence of Sweden is joint operations in manoeuvre warfare (Swedish Armed Forces, 2011b, pp. 62, 147-8). As discussed in Chapter 3, the process of doctrine development has taken place within military circles and with little involvement from the political level. Yet, a comprehensive approach is now part of the military doctrine. In conclusion, Sweden has clearly been influenced by international trends and doctrinal thinking though a division between national and international tasks still exists.

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The concept of partner in the cases of Finland and Sweden appears to be significant in terms of the coalition context. Being part of the NATO-led coalition, the two countries could forge closer relations to the alliance. This entailed both incentives and pressures to adapt. Overall, there are two evident aspects of significance. First, pressures and incentives to adapt to partners in high-intensity operations, which is highlighted in how Finnish and Swedish forces adapted to and followed the strategic guidelines from ISAF guided by an inner military logic. Thus, the partnership with NATO sustained a military approach, which arguably reinforced the autonomous military actor in Finland and Sweden. Second, the concept of partner highlights a broader professional network where emulation can take place. The Afghanistan engagement became an opportunity to develop the partnership with NATO further, with additional incentives for learning from larger powers. Through the professional network, the Finnish and Swedish armed forces appeared to aspire interoperability as well as to emulate trends from coalition partners. As such, this indicates that the factor of partner is significant concerning military reform. Moreover, it provided the Finnish and Swedish military actor with international backing in terms of the necessity of reform to strengthen

the interoperability of their forces with NATO, reinforcing the position of the autonomous military actor.

5.4 Military autonomy: the organization of military force

The complex realities on the ground in Afghanistan forced both Finland and Sweden to consider their use of military force. While the initial focus was a light military footprint aimed at creating stability and enabling state building efforts, the deteriorating situation in Northern Afghanistan made these efforts more difficult. The significant shift in the security situation after 2008 led to a sharp use of force and an adaptation to high-intensity complex lethality. Neither Finland nor Sweden have been shielded from wartime dynamics at play, although complex lethality has affected the two countries to varying degrees. This section highlights significant shifts in the Finnish and Swedish engagement, and the potential link between expeditionary warfare and the autonomous military actor in civil-military relations of Finland and Sweden. The aim is to compare how the factors operated in the two cases and how this resulted in change.

In general, the Finnish military contribution to Afghanistan was symbolic and the mission was not particularly important. Finnish priority towards homeland defence shaped a restricted engagement in terms of both numbers and the use of force. The Finnish contribution was a small military contingent, which was to avoid using force as far as possible, and from 2004 restricted to the calmer Northern Afghanistan. Enabled by low-intensity complex lethality and limited exposure, the Finnish forces were there to stabilize and ensure secure conditions for humanitarian and civilian efforts in a political domain. Throughout, the focus has been on a comprehensive approach with a combination of political, civilian and military means to enable stabilization and reconstruction. As the intensity heightened from 2009 onwards, however, the Finnish military engagement changed to become more robust with increased numbers, heavier equipment and a deployment of Special Operations Forces. Following higher exposure, coupled with ISAF guidelines and joining Swedish forces in an offensive approach, Finnish forces ended up participating in regular combat and adapted to the situation with a more traditional military structure. While the political level was slow to recognize the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and discussed whether Finland was a part of a war, the analysis indicates that the military was continuously adapting to the worsening conditions. Moreover, the point that the military leadership used Afghanistan as an opportunity to test capabilities indicates broad military authority. There has been a cumulative process of awareness of the complex character of international crisis management operations, in which complex lethality has influenced Finland to move away from the traditional peacekeeping to a more active use of force. Ultimately, however, the deteriorating situation reinforced a civilian conviction

that the mission was about to get out of control. Accordingly, there was increased political governance of Finland's effort in the last part of the Afghanistan engagement. The increase to 200 troops was the threshold the president was willing to consent, despite the military leadership's wish to increase the number further. Thus, the engagement became more politicized as complex lethality challenged Finland's conceptualization of the mission.

The potential effects of complex lethality have not triggered large changes in the Finnish military organization. Finland's priority on homeland defence has manifested in a low priority of international operations and a relatively modest contribution. Arguably, the limited engagement and a cautious approach to foreign policy have frustrated any major effects from complex lethality and left few pressures or incentives for major military change or shifts in Finnish defence thinking. The shifts in from the organizational perspective, analysed in Chapter 3, appears to pertain more to the partnership with NATO. In Finland, it has been more about tweaking existing processes and policies rather than reinventing the Defence Forces. It is still voluntary for military personnel to participate in international operations and the purpose and the relevance of the military have never been publicly questioned. Although there has been a modernization, it has come at a slower pace compared to other Nordic countries. Nevertheless, the contemporary battlefield has provided an arena to test existing capabilities not previously used in international operations and brought experiences of warfare. In terms of professionalization of the Finnish Defence Forces there is more focus on rapid deployable forces, niche capabilities and specialized units, which has received most resources and attention. This is also seen in the Finnish SOF, whose importance has risen though its development has not gone so far as in the other Nordic countries. While most of the Finnish SOF is gathered in the Utti Jaeger Regiment, they are too small to be a service on their own.[123] Moreover, in practice, the Afghanistan engagement has enabled a furthering of interoperability with other Western military organizations in a NATO-led coalition over a long period. International institutions central to Finnish security policy (the EU and NATO) have changed in accordance with a shifting security environment and following international operations and pressure from Washington. Aiming at closer cooperation and interoperability, primarily following NATO standards, Finland has copied international standards and practices. These are contributing factors for the evident changes in the Finnish military organization with a joint defence command, increased focus on rapid forces and specialized units following international pressures regarding expectations of contributions, increasing the unity and professionalization of the military actor.

[123] Highlighted in interview 14, 23, 24 and 39. See Appendix I.

Similar with the extent of reform of the military organization, complex lethality has not challenged the model of governance of the military in Finland. Due to priority on homeland defence, a limited contribution and a relative short period of exposure to which the military adapted continuously, there were no major triggers that challenged the way policy was conducted domestically. The central role of the Finnish military remains the same with the same level of military authority, although with a different approach to international operations. More complex and demanding operations have changed Finland's participation in international crisis management, with more robust, quick reaction forces, focused on force protection, and a realization that sometimes the use of force is necessary. There is also an acknowledgement that today's international operations require political attention. Arguably, this has contributed to the informal changes in the level of military authority identified in Chapter 3. The military has maintained a broad autonomy, with its existence also evident in Afghanistan when the situation intensified leading to high exposure. Yet, when decision-makers perceive that things are about to go out of hand, they tighten the governance of foreign policy. In other words, there is some leeway in the military room for manoeuvre when the situation demands it, but with certain limitations.

With a clear international and expeditionary focus, Swedish priority differs significantly from Finland, which resulted in a deeper involvement in Afghanistan. Initially, the Swedish engagement was symbolic. The Swedish forces were a stabilization force with the task of enabling reconstruction and civilian efforts. Furthermore, low intensity and limited exposure enabled the political level to add national caveats on the use of force. Along with the shift in priority on international operations, however, Afghanistan became more important in Sweden, leading the country to take on a more significant role in the mission. The political level linked this both to humanitarian values, support to the UN, as well as Swedish security. Notably, as the situation deteriorated with higher exposure, there is a significant shift in the Swedish case including a changed pattern of military operations from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency. Heightened intensity enabled the military to operate in a more traditional military domain with broad military authority. Accordingly, the military leadership lifted national caveats on the use of force, the Swedish forces on the ground adopted counterinsurgency elements, and the military contingent became more robust with heavier equipment along with the acquisition of new capabilities. Furthermore, with Stockholm wanting to play a bigger international role, this led to a change in the way Swedish forces exercise military force. Although Sweden had a certain degree of independence as lead nation, coalition guidelines clearly influenced the Swedish engagement in Northern Afghanistan to follow the COIN principles and an offensive approach, reinforced by high exposure.

Sweden, in contrast to Finland, has completely changed its military organization. Significant in this regard was the Swedish priority on international mission, which demanded a different organization than the existing one. While it was unclear in the 1990s which role the Armed Forces would have, Swedish priority on international operations provided a focus when there was none and enabled a major military reform in Sweden. As such, participation in international operations have been essential in redesigning defence development in Sweden. Because Sweden was receptible to change in the military organization during the so-called 'strategic time-out' simultaneously with a more active approach internationally, the country's priority reinforced the impact of complex lethality. As international operations became the main priority of the Swedish Armed Forces, lessons gained and experiences from the Afghanistan engagement became more important and relevant and had a significant impact. For the military to be relevant in light of new political demands and foci, territorial defence and related capabilities became less important compared to demands following international operations. Afghanistan provided experiences in warfare, which has led to a prioritization in the Swedish Armed Forces concerning choice of equipment, focus on certain capabilities, and materiel procured specifically for Afghanistan. Moreover, the process of expeditionary warfare has also led to a changed mind-set in the Swedish Armed Forces, evident with the establishment of a veteran policy and increased recognition through medals and monuments; there are more officers with experience in combat, and a cumulative awareness of the complexity of international operations. In addition, the former division between national and international tasks is less apparent within the military organization, and experience in international operations have become central for upcoming officers. Thus, in the case of Sweden, there are two parallel processes, which influenced each other. The transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces has followed a three-step process through three defence bills (2000, 2004, 2009), beginning before the exposure to high-intensity complex lethality. Herein, the data suggest that the partnership with NATO and EU membership, including the EU Battle Groups, have played a central role. These findings are consistent with that of Holmberg and Hallenberg (eds., 2017) and suggest that changes are attributed to both priority and exposure. Overall, these processes have led to a professionalization of the Swedish Armed Forces, more unity in terms of a changed mind set and organizational changes consolidating the authority in the military leadership, although the latter appears to stem mostly from international developments in general. Also, the Swedish military actor continues to play a significant role concerning the development of the military organization, thus maintaining the autonomous military actor.

In contrast to the major changes in the military organization, there has been no formal changes in the Swedish political-military governance or in the level of military authority. With a shift in priority,

Swedish political authorities found themselves in uncharted waters, in which the high ambition level for the participation in international operations led to a change in the way the country uses its armed forces. Although the Swedish government issued an Afghanistan strategy, the military actor had broad authority. One central factor is the Swedish constitution that prevents major changes in the political governance of the military. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that the political level found itself in a new situation with a sharper use of force, in which civilian decision-makers have been comfortable with deferring to the military professional. At the same time, there have not been any serious civil-military tensions or other events in Afghanistan to trigger a sense of loss of control in the case of Sweden. Nevertheless, facing high-intensity complex lethality arguably led to more informal changes, in which the political level has initiated closer contact with the military level.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the preceding analysis of shifting patterns of Nordic civil-military relations and the Nordic countries' engagement in Afghanistan post-9/11, this final chapter concludes the analysis. The overall aim was to explore in what ways, and to what extent, expeditionary warfare in a post-9/11 context has influenced the civil-military balance of authority and influence. Combining a peacetime and a wartime perspective, the analysis has identified dynamics and tensions in Nordic civil-military relations and a participation in a complex mission in Afghanistan that has posed stresses and strains on political and military leaderships alike. Far from being an exhaustive explanation, the argument is that there is a social structure inherent in civil-military relations derived from power and anxiety, which is influenced by warfare. Overall, expeditionary warfare has had the greatest impact on Denmark, followed by Sweden and Norway, and a minor impact on Finland.

The first section of this chapter revisits the critical realist framework in light of the empirical analysis and reflects on key findings. Then the chapter discusses the social structure inherent in civil-military relations based on the present research. In the third section, I address the main contributions of this thesis and discuss challenges along the way. The fourth section discusses implications for Nordic civil-military relations in the current post-2014 context. The Nordic countries are facing new developments in the security situation, where it is relevant to contemplate whether the impact on the civil-military balance of authority and influence will be similar. Finally, the last section provides a concluding remark on central topics related to the overall theme, bringing the thesis to an end.

6.1 A critical realist framework: Key findings

Returning to the research question, the main aim of this study has been to investigate potential links between expeditionary warfare and shifting patterns of Nordic civil-military relations. This involves not just establishing that there is a link but more importantly, *how* these two phenomena are linked. To this end, a critical realist framework formed the basis for analysis. The central aim in critical realist research is to uncover social structures that are unobservable but causally important. The novel analytical framework has enabled an analysis of the potential influence of expeditionary military missions on domestic civil-military relations and the ability to expose new insights into warfare as a source of shifting relations. In the analytical framework, theory played a central role in the conceptualization of dynamics in civil-military relations and in the changing

character of war, providing focus areas for the inquiry. To answer the research question, the analysis has followed a two-step approach, where the developed concepts (military capability of influence, complex lethality, priority, exposure, and partner) have guided the empirical analysis, investigating *how* the civil-military balance of authority and influence in the Nordic countries has changed post-9/11, and to *what extent* expeditionary warfare has influenced these changes. This section draws together the findings across the four case studies to discuss differences and similar trends.

How has the civil-military balance of authority and influence in the Nordic countries changed between 2001 and 2014? Utilizing the concept of military capability of influence to analyse the trajectory of the four case studies, Chapter 3 revealed that the four countries shared similar characteristics at 2001 but that their paths differed towards 2014. The military actor in Finland and Sweden has maintained its broad military capability of influence, while political authorities in Denmark and Norway have tightened the governance of its military actor, narrowing the military capability of influence. Although the four indicators of level, unity, scope of military authority and military professionalization have broadly outlined these two different trajectories, the analysis has provided insight into important shifting dynamics in Nordic civil-military relations. It has been a question of relevance for the military organizations, a perceived need for defence reform and identified tensions in the relations between civilian and military spheres. While there have been significant changes in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the analysis of Finland shows subtler changes. The institutional perspective of the level of military authority can explain much of the difference between Denmark and Norway, on the one hand, and Finland and Sweden, on the other; the largest changes have taken place in the former two leading to a more confined military actor, whereas there have only been informal changes in Finland and Sweden.

In Denmark and Norway, there has been a shift from an autonomous to a confined military actor. Yet, the development of this trajectory has not happened in parallel. In the case of Norway, the shift has happened gradually from the early 2000s, with political decisions changing the level, unity and scope of military authority. At the turn of the millennium, the Norwegian military actor had broad military authority from an institutional, organizational and functional perspective. However, a shift is apparent from 2003, with changes in the governance of the military organization. This included the integration of the Norwegian CHOD into the MoD, which over time led to more civilian involvement in doctrine development. Moreover, there are tendencies of a more unified military organization, although this has been accompanied by a decentralization of service chiefs' positions that challenges this unity. Lastly, there is a significant trend of military professionalization, making the Norwegian Armed Forces a more distinct group in society. Yet, developments in level

and scope of military authority have contributed to a narrowing of military capability of influence. Although moving to the same outcome, the path of Denmark has been different. Throughout the 2000s, the analysis identified a broadening of the military capability of influence, with the military leadership having broad authority from an institutional, organizational, and a functional perspective and, in turn, it had a central role in setting the course for defence reform. Although military authority broadened over time, the analysis has identified a significant shift into the 2010s; central political decisions led to changes in the level, unity and scope of military authority, which narrowed the military capability of influence considerably. Denmark has integrated many of the responsibilities previously in the hands of the Danish chief of defence into the MoD, leaving the CHOD with operational authority only, as well as bringing the civilian and military spheres closer. Although the analysis identified a more unified actor from an organizational perspective, there has been a decentralization of service chiefs to different locations like in Norway. There has also been an extensive military professionalization of the Danish Armed Forces, making the organization a more distinct group in Danish society. Nevertheless, these changes in the level and scope of military authority have led to a confined military actor.

The analysis of Finland and Sweden revealed a different trajectory, in which the armed forces in these two countries were and continue to be an autonomous military actor in the period under investigation. Yet, while changes in Finland have been minor, the Swedish Armed Forces have undergone major defence reforms. In the case of Finland, there have not been any substantial changes. The civil-military balance has been stable from 2001 to 2014, in which the Finnish military actor has maintained a broad capability of influence. There have been no formal changes in the high level of military authority, and Finland continues to have a unified military actor with a strong military leadership that plays a central role in defence reforms and the direction of the Finnish Defence Forces. In contrast, there have been major reforms of the Swedish Armed Forces with a transformation from a military focusing on territorial defence to one with expeditionary focus and capabilities. At the same time, the analysis indicates that the broad military capability of influence in the case of Sweden from 2001 is also a valid statement for 2014. A significant aspect here is the level of military authority, in which the Swedish military actor remains institutionally semi-autonomous and influential. Although there have been efforts of tighter civilian governance of the Swedish military actor, the attempts have been modest. As for the organizational perspective, there are indications of a more unified military actor; this follows the central decision made in the 1990s that paved the way for a concentration of military authority in the hands of the CHOD, which was further consolidated after 2001. Furthermore, there is an evident military professionalization of the

Swedish Armed Forces where Sweden made conscription dormant in peacetime and moved to an all-volunteer professional force in 2009, indicating a more distinct organization within the society.

Having identified these changes, the next step of the analysis was to investigate the cases from a wartime perspective, analysing their more than decade-long engagement in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2014. The argument of this thesis is that to understand the different trajectories of the Nordic countries, we need to include an analysis and findings from a wartime perspective as part of the larger picture. The main objective was to analyse the impact of expeditionary warfare on identified changes in the civil-military balance of authority and influence in the four Nordic case studies.

To what extent has expeditionary warfare impacted civil-military relations in the four Nordic countries? The long engagement in Afghanistan has put civil-military relations in sharper relief with challenges concerning the balance between governance of foreign and security policy and a sensible deference to the military professional, difficulties in coordinating civilian and military efforts, and adaptations to a complex mission. Through the Afghanistan engagement, political authorities in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland have, to different degrees, involved their armed forces to the political sphere of war, using their military as a security policy instrument. Denmark comes forward as the most risk willing of the case studies. Whereas Danish political authorities accepted that Denmark indeed was part of a war, there were debates in Finland, Sweden and Norway whether they were.

Overall, war dynamics and events drove the engagement of the Nordic countries. The shifting dynamics were fuelled by the actions of numerous actors, notably the Taliban and insurgent groups who regained a foothold in Afghanistan and central decisions by Washington, a plurality of interests lacking an overall plan or strategy, different modes of warfare and dilemmas from an international humanitarian law perspective. What many participating countries presumed to be a peacekeeping operation turned into a deteriorating situation that necessitated kinetic action, where a military focus in the coordination with civilian efforts came to dominate the ISAF mission. Thus, a fundamental aspect of war is that it provides conditions for actions and agency, and thereby different roles for civilian and military actors. In the encounter with complex lethality in Afghanistan, there have been significant shifts in all four case studies. Yet, these shifts have taken place at different times and in different directions.

Despite different developments and degrees of involvement, there are common tendencies across the case studies, which strengthen the assumptions outlined in Chapter 2. In situations of low-intensity complex lethality, the tendency is a political level that is more involved and forwarding

guidelines and constraints for the military effort on the ground. This is especially clear in the case of Norway, Finland and Sweden in the initial phase of the ISAF mission. For these three cases, political authorities focused on stabilization and reconstruction through a comprehensive approach. Situated in the calmer Northern Afghanistan, the military forces of these three countries operated within set political parameters, including political directions that stressed tasks at the margins of core military activities. Low-intensity complex lethality conditioned more intense political governance of the campaign, where the military had the role as an enabler for civilian efforts and political aims of state building and stabilization. The military footprint was small, and the military actor was confined in terms of use of force and its scope of action.

In contrast, in high-intensity complex lethality, there is a tendency that broader authority and room for agency is given to the military actor. Denmark quite early faced high-intensity complex lethality, in which military needs and expertise played a central role. Danish political authorities provided a broad mandate and enabled broad military authority with several examples of the political level deferring to the military experts. This tendency is also evident in the case of Norway with the shift towards a deteriorating situation in Northern Afghanistan from 2006 onwards, and in the case of Sweden with the removal of national caveats on the use of force, as the intensity heightened at the end of 2008. The empirical analysis of Finland in Afghanistan indicated broad military authority and a military actor that continuously adapted to shifting dynamics, as well as more leniency concerning the use of sharp force beyond situations of self-defence as the situation intensified. The political aims of stabilization and peacekeeping faced harsh realities, leading to a different understanding of complex international missions and of the use of force. As the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish forces on the ground encountered high-intensity complex lethality, this led the political level to defer to the military professional and enable broader military authority. Yet, the Finnish engagement under high-intensity complex lethality reached a point where it was further politicized with the political level feared losing control and thus confined military authority. Interestingly, a similar tendency appears in the case of Denmark, which differs from initial expectations of the analytical framework. In the last phase of the engagement, Danish political authorities got more involved with attempts at strategic planning and benchmarks for evaluation after a significant period of high-intensity complex lethality. This indicates that when things go too far (in the wrong direction), although under conditions that favours broader military authority, the situation pushes political authorities to intervene. Thus, although Finland and Denmark are at their opposite ends when considering the degree of involvement, there are similar tendencies to be found across these two cases. This indicates a trigger of anxiety on in the political leadership in different contexts.

While the concept complex lethality as a driving factor is more fundamental and causal, the contextual factors of priority, exposure and partner, have influenced how and when the case studies have responded to structural conditions of complex lethality. These three factors have provided insight into different mechanisms with the potential to shape pressures and conditions for change. Priority has highlighted how political-strategic considerations provide parameters within which the military operates based on an interpretation of the international environment. Exposure placed a focus on the operational environment and pressures stemming from adversaries and operational challenges in theatre. In the analysis of the concept of partner, the focus was on constraints and pressures to adapt following actions and strategies of military partners on the battlefield, as well as the dependence of small states on larger states.

How important was the mission from a national perspective? Priority has proven to be a decisive factor in shaping the impact of complex lethality and in how authorities have translated the needs and requirements that arose during the Afghanistan engagement. Priority has also been important in how political leaderships conceptualized the mission and the purpose of their armed forces. The analysis showed that different priorities and political guidelines of the four case studies could both reinforce and frustrate effects deriving from complex lethality – a finding that corresponds with the expectations outlined in Chapter 2. Overall, priority has proven decisive for the extent of defence reforms and for shaping conditions for the room for manoeuvre of the military actor. Moreover, the analysis of priority has shed light on the point that the engagement in Afghanistan happened in parallel to extensive defence reforms, where these processes influenced each other in many events. In turn, this shaped the extent to which the countries translated the conditions of complex lethality.

Evaluating the concept of priority against the empirical findings, the analysis has shown that a priority on international missions and tasks, reinforces the impact of complex lethality. The cases of Denmark and Sweden illuminate this point. In Denmark, the shift in priority by Danish political authorities ensured a new relevance for the military actor and reinforced the argumentation of the necessity of defence reform. The international priority enabled a larger transformation of the Danish Armed Forces to change into a more suitable military organization for the current security environment. This manifested itself in a reform towards a professional and expeditionary military with a new purpose and rationale. Danish priority also manifested in a participation in the more demanding and dangerous expeditionary missions and political acceptance that Denmark was, in fact, part of a war. In the case of Sweden, the notable shift from territorial defence to a mission-based defence and focus on broader security threats opened a door of new relevance for the

Swedish Armed Forces. It provided the military actor with a central role in Swedish foreign policy and cemented the need for military reform. Unlike Denmark, however, the Swedish conceptualization of the mission in Afghanistan differed with a focus on stabilization and reconstruction, although exposure challenged this conceptualization, as well as Swedish security was part of political justifications. In sum, priority on broader security threats and international operations provided the Danish and Swedish military actor with an opening to address its anxiety of not being relevant and contributes to the explanation of a speedier process of defence reform in these two cases. Not least, it led to a changed domestic environment that could absorb pressures and incentives for change following events and dynamics of complex lethality.

In contrast, a priority on homeland defence frustrates the impact of complex lethality, as the events and dynamics of expeditionary warfare are of lesser importance, leading to fewer pressures and incentives for change. This is evident in the case of Finland, and partly in the case of Norway. Finland's priority on homeland defence and accompanied needs have provided the parameters for defence reform of the Finnish Defence Forces. Because territorial defence remains the most important task for the military, the engagement in international missions was of lesser importance from a national perspective. Nevertheless, the analysis also pointed to how the changed security environment has resulted in the need for rapid niche capabilities and international defence cooperation. Ultimately, the country's priority and its scepticism to use military force abroad have shaped Finnish contributions with a focus on peacekeeping and a small military contingent compared to the other Nordics. Because there are few changes in Finnish priority, the Finnish military actor has maintained its central role and broad authority in defence matters, which explains the limited changes in the pattern of Finnish civil-military relations. This also explains that the political level got more involved at the end of the Finnish engagement in Afghanistan; yet this did not influence the civil-military balance back home. In Norway, the priority is split between territorial defence and international operations. This has manifested itself in a double focus, both to maintain a full-spectrum defence as well as expeditionary capabilities. International tasks have become more important, with international units receiving top priority and the most modern equipment, and international operations becoming mandatory for professional officers. Yet, with attention to homeland defence, the expeditionary focus is not as prominent as in the case of Denmark and Sweden and contributes to the explanation why the speed of reform has been slower in Norway. The double priority can also explain how political authorities in Norway conceptualized the mission in Afghanistan where being a 'good ally' weighed heavily, including the point that Norway was a heavier contributor than Finland. This arguably follows the importance Norway places on NATO and the US, exemplified by the finding that the Norwegian military footprint

became heavier as NATO assumed command of ISAF in 2003. Thus, over time, the Afghanistan mission became more important from a national perspective and had a greater impact on priorities in defence reforms.

How challenging was the mission? The empirical analysis has shown that exposure was also a significant factor, which affected the four case studies. Once again, however, it is a matter of different degrees. Danish forces faced a harsh and challenging operational environment in Iraq and Southern Afghanistan. Denmark had a high rate of casualties relative to the population size, and the high degree of exposure led to more and heavier military materiel. The increase in the number of casualties from 2008 onwards resulted in a need in the military leadership to show action and to argue to the political level for the need of reinforcements. The operational environment also led to valuable experience in combat and a focus on professional units and the sharp end in the Armed Forces. Furthermore, challenges in Iraq, especially concerning the issue of prisoners of war, led to tensions between the political and military levels with a lack of trust and the defence minister intervening in military matters. Overall, however, the demanding operational environment created a central role for the military actor, in which its authority and expertise took precedence in the engagement. There was a focus on traditional military tasks of combat and kinetic operations, as high exposure made civilian efforts and reconstruction difficult. The demanding mission also provided the military leadership with an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the NATO transformation agenda and to conduct expeditionary missions that included combat.

Initially, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish forces faced limited exposure in Northern Afghanistan. However, the analysis identified a significant shift to high exposure, although this was of a shorter period than that of Danish forces, of which the number of casualties is one indicator. Despite the conceptualization of the mission as stabilization and peacekeeping, the three Nordic countries in Northern Afghanistan faced higher exposure as the situation deteriorated in the north. Notably, priority as a shaper became less dominant in the cases of Finland and Norway when faced with heightened exposure where both countries adapted to the changing operational environment. In the Norwegian case, higher exposure led to the need for combat-trained and professional troops. Heightened exposure led to a consolidation of the military presence and broader military authority, in which the military leadership was central to the process of reinforcements and enabled the military actor to take on traditional military tasks. Similar effects are evident in the case of Sweden and Finland. Overall, Swedish force commanders had broad military authority but with political confinements on the use of force. Nevertheless, the Swedish-led PRT had a dominant military feature, where heightened exposure led to reinforcements, a shift in the military focus to kinetic

operations, procurement of materiel and the Swedish CHOD lifting the restrictions on the use of force. Whereas the political level in Finland long maintained that the country was not a part of a war, military authorities appear to have been aware of the deteriorating situation with higher exposure for Finnish forces, and initiated measures accordingly with heavier army materiel, more force protection and a shift to a more traditional military structure. Overall, the Finnish military actor was influential in decisions made about the structure and outlook of the military contribution until the engagement was limited to 200 troops, as an apprehension of losing control was triggered on the political level.

Although the analysis of the four case studies shows different degrees of exposure there are similar trends. Facing high exposure, the military organizations have gotten experience in combat with an accompanied adaptation to a challenging operational environment with heavier military equipment, additional expenditures, focus on professional units and the sharp end, as well as developments in veteran policies, ceremonies and rewards. These empirical observations are consistent with the expectations following the concept of exposure. The exposure to demanding operational environments has contributed to the professionalization of the armed forces as the manager of violence, where the engagement has provided an arena to test capabilities and to identify shortcomings; this also in terms of a focus on technological developments, counterinsurgency, and difficulties following the attempts at a comprehensive approach. Accordingly, this has influenced priorities within the Nordic Armed Forces, which have been confronted with different environments than those in preparation for national defence.

How dependent on military partners was the mission? Denmark is the only case in which the forces were integrated with a major military power, while Finland, Sweden and Norway mostly cooperated with military forces of smaller states, including each other. As a junior partner of Britain, directives and shifting priorities of British contingents shaped Danish actions and patterns of operations. Although Danish forces had to adapt to the British concept of operations, this did not narrow military authority vis-à-vis the political leadership in Copenhagen. On the contrary, the data indicates that it reinforced the military approach to the mission in Helmand. A central aspect is that the Danish Armed Forces have been keen to demonstrate their ability to operate alongside British forces, reinforcing the need of reform and for further professionalization. Norway's and Sweden's lead nation role provided these countries with some leeway in shaping their own engagement. Yet, incentives stemming from military professional networks played an important role in the shift towards a more offensive approach. Consequently, following an inner military logic and ISAF strategic guidelines, Norwegian, Swedish, and to some extent Finnish forces took on a

pro-active role, leading them to encounter heavy combat with insurgents and thus higher exposure. Moreover, although Oslo, Stockholm and Helsinki refrained from talking about counterinsurgency, their forces adapted to elements of the counterinsurgency strategy.

Despite the differences between the four cases, it is possible to identify similar trends flowing from the concept of partner. First, operating in a coalition context led by NATO, the strategic principles and military strategy outlined by major powers influenced the engagement. Thus, larger military powers have the capacity to define the operational environment, where small states find themselves at the receiving end. Second, there is evidence of the trigger of an inner military logic and incentives stemming from a military professional network. This is best exemplified with the decision to expand the Norwegian area of operation by including the Ghormach district and Swedish and Finnish contingents' decision to seek out more problematic areas in the PRT Mazar-e Sharif. Third, the coalition context has provided an opportunity to further interoperability with important partners and NATO. Accordingly, the Afghanistan mission provided an opportunity to compare with other countries' units under demanding conditions over a long period and to adapt to international best practice – providing further impetus to the direction of defence reform. Interestingly, empirical observations contrary to expectations suggest that the difference between being and not being a NATO member appears not to be as important as initially presumed. Partnership and the strive of interoperability have fuelled similar trends in Finland and Sweden although they are both unaligned. Furthermore, because the Nordic countries only deployed smaller, tailor-made units and not been able to operate in major formations, the analysis does not indicate increased jointness linking the armed services or greater cooperation between larger units. Thus, some of the changes from an organizational perspective identified in Chapter 3 pertains more to adaptations to NATO reforms in general rather than experiences from the contemporary battlefield.

The analysis of the wartime perspective has highlighted how the Nordic military organizations have been brought into the political sphere of war as a security tool and as an important contributor to foreign and security policy. It is important to note that the factors examined are part of a causal complex, in which different mechanisms can reinforce and frustrate the effects of each other. Thus, it is the combination of factors, which can explain the different manifestations in the Nordic countries concerning shifting patterns of civil-military relations and the degree of impact of expeditionary warfare. At the same time, not all changes can be attributed to participation in expeditionary warfare, which underlines that together, the factors of the causal complex are sufficient but not necessary to produce a particular manifestation in military capability of influence.

Overall, the analytical framework has shed light on a complex process in which the empirical observations were often consistent with theoretical expectations, while some issues were expected but not observed (e.g. more jointness, importance of NATO membership) and other observed but not exactly as expected (e.g. the Danish government tightening governance under high-intensity complex lethality).

6.2 The inherent social structure of civil-military relations

Based on the findings of the analysis presented above, there is empirical evidence across the four case studies to indicate the existence of a social structure in civil-military relations. Arriving at the basic characteristics of this structure, civil-military relations requires both the civilian and military side to constitute such relations. More specifically, there is a social structure system where civil-military roles derive from the power and anxiety built into the social relationship between the civilian master and military servants. Thus, the occupancy of positions, which entails rights and obligations, as well as interests, lies at the heart of social structure and agency of people holding the positions.

The civilian master has the power to govern the military, delegate authority, determine the size, type and compositions of the armed forces, and authority to define military and national security doctrines and concepts of military reforms. Simultaneously, in these activities, political authorities are reliant on military expertise. There is a reliance as civilians often lack knowledge and understanding of military affairs. In turn, there is an accompanied anxiety of losing control as a function of the lack of understanding in general and dynamics of war that are difficult to anticipate. Therefore, the civilian leadership is trying to avoid that the semi-autonomy of the military expands beyond acceptable limits although what political authorities need to control is not always easy to answer. The military servants possess power from the role as a manager of violence and expertise in military matters. With the organizational responsibility for preparing and managing war and combat, this position provides the military actor with significant authority and room for manoeuvre. However, there is also an inherent anxiety of being micro-managed and of becoming irrelevant, and as such the military actor seeks to protect its own interests from outside control and strives to adapt to shifting conditions by taking on new roles to legitimate its institutional existence and budgetary demands.

The findings suggest that the link between expeditionary warfare and changes in the civil-military balance connects to this social structure. The effects have manifested themselves differently in the Nordic countries. However, what we can observe at the empirical level across the cases is that war acts as an efficient cause that might trigger these inherent anxieties and powers, which provide

incentives to follow particular courses of action. War dynamics can thus be a source of change that can frustrate or reinforce effects of processes already in motion, as evident in defence reforms and shifting priorities. While structures have certain liabilities and predispositions, individual and contingent processes precipitate and determine actual outcomes. Social activity requires both social structure and the driving force of human agency, where social structure affects the outcome by influencing actions as it facilitates and constrains human agency.

In conclusion, war provides new conditions of stress and challenges, which in certain events trigger the anxieties and powers inherent in the social structure of civil-military relations. As evidence from the empirical level indicate, war can influence the power at play in civil-military relations, for example, by reinforcing the role of the military servants as the manager of violence. But it can also trigger an anxiety on behalf of political authorities concerning whether they are in control, and the need to get involved if the military authority is exceeding what they are willing to accept. Furthermore, it poses questions to the military regarding which priorities and actions are necessary to be a relevant state instrument. As such, it can trigger an anxiety on the military level of not being relevant in a changing threat landscape. In turn, this influences actions. Because of social structure, people are disposed to act in certain ways. Importantly, however, it does not compel them to do so. Therefore, different combinations of social structure and human agency can lead to the same outcome, as seen in the cases of Finland and Sweden (broad military capability of influence) and the cases of Denmark and Norway (narrow military capability of influence). Lastly, the encounter with high-intensity complex lethality might have created a precedent for the future in which 'peacekeeping as usual' may no longer be perceived as an option – leading to changes in the tradition and culture of small states in terms of military contributions to international operations.

6.3 Contributions and challenges

The ability to analyse and uncover connections between conditions of the contemporary battlefield and outcomes in the civil-military balance forms a complex research task. This section highlights the novelty of this dissertation and discusses challenges along the way in the research process.

The novelty of the thesis lies in the creation of an analytical framework that allows us to reach a deeper and different understanding of Nordic civil-military relations by demonstrating the underlying dynamics at play. Although the Nordic countries are all small, mature democracies, civil-military relations in these cases are not straightforward but a topic that merits attention. Few studies directly examine this through a Nordic lens or adequately address the link between expeditionary warfare and changes in civil-military relations in a post-911 context. Much of the focus in existing research concerning defence reform and changes post-Cold War has seen this as a part of the wider

changes in the security and defence field. Consequently, the influence of the evolving engagement in expeditionary missions in recent times is largely overlooked. Empirically, the thesis has exposed insights into dilemmas and the stresses and challenges that derive from participating in complex military missions, and thus warfare as a source of shifting relations; it has identified the pattern of civil-military relations in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden and highlighted how the civil-military balance may change over time and the tensions inherent in such relations. In turn, the dissertation has shed light on implications following that the armed forces of the Nordic countries, today, are considered a political instrument and not only an institution for the territorial defence of these countries. The findings support the notion that war can play a significant role in shifting relations between the civilian master and military servants but more importantly, the analysis demonstrates how it plays a role.

By adopting a critical realist approach, the study has pushed boundaries. Although this thesis has not been concerned with theory development it has borrowed from existing theory from different disciplines in new ways and added new pieces to the puzzle. The civil-military relations literature has long concentrated on domestic factors in explaining the relationship between the political leadership and the military. By including insights from the academic literature on the changing character of war and military innovation studies, the dissertation has devoted analytical attention to the wartime dynamics at play. Looking through a critical realist lens, this has enabled an investigation of known phenomena from a different perspective. Theoretically, this thesis brings forth an original contribution to the literature on civil-military relations literature, the changing character of war and the development of Nordic security and defence by generating a novel analytical framework that brings together a peacetime and a wartime perspective. One can argue that the period under investigation and Afghanistan is an exception in the longer historical perspective; however, the point of this kind of case study is that we can learn much about structures and mechanisms by studying critical situations where conditions are challenged, and mechanisms are disturbed. Causal mechanisms, which are usually hidden as they are counteracted by other mechanisms, become more clearly apparent in certain situations. The Nordic populations live in peace, while units of their armed forces are fighting for causes other than homeland defence far away from own borders, in which the activities in the Afghanistan war are more an exception than a rule. Nevertheless, the active use of the armed forces puts civil-military relations in sharp relief. Thus, through critical situations we can learn about the conditions for the normal by studying the abnormal.

Reflecting on the approach and the research process, this dissertation cannot claim to have grasped the complex process in its entirety nor to have provided an exhaustive explanation for the changes in Nordic civil-military relations. The choice of focus on the elite level led to empirical limitations in which broader social relations between the military and the wider society was not fully captured by the research design. Nor was this the intention, as it would have been beyond the scope of one study. Moreover, the military engagement of the Nordic countries in Afghanistan are part of a greater whole and is not the only explanation for changes. Because the process is complex with a wide range of factors, there is an inherent challenge in attempts to isolate effects between the impact of wide-ranging reforms of security and defence policies and of complex expeditionary missions. Although all theories and concepts are a simplification of reality, adopting a critical realist approach has enabled the analysis to point out important driving forces for change and highlight tendencies evident on the empirical level across the case studies. For example, as the concept of priority has showed, experiences from participating in expeditionary warfare and a country's national priority can potentially fuel each other. Thus, there is an interplay of mechanisms, in which war as a driving factor has reinforced or frustrated effects of processes (e.g. defence reforms) already in motion.

There are risks that follows researching in 'real time'. Investigating the period between 2001 and 2014, the thesis addresses a contemporary phenomenon that is continuously developing, exemplified by the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and developments in the international threat landscape from 2014 onwards. Thus, the dissertation has looked at a piece of the larger picture. Consequently, there is room for further research. For example, it is a highly relevant research avenue in examining the intelligence side of these issues, both regarding how participation in expeditionary missions has altered the intelligence relations between the countries and possible consequences of a lack of information sharing, as well as the development of intelligence services considering the latest developments in the current security environment, which will be briefly discussed in the next section. Moreover, addressing contemporary security and military issues entails a restricted access to primary sources. I have therefore exploited a wide range of sources by necessity. Herein elite interviews have been central to provide additional perspectives to the study of documents.

Generalizations must be drawn with caution. From a critical realist perspective, as mentioned in Chapter 2, theory is not associated with generality in the sense of repeated series of events; generalization is arrived by moving from the concrete to the abstract. A central aim of this thesis was to discern the structure the cases have in common. The analysis has identified similar trends

across the four Nordic countries. In turn, this has shed light on common processes that, at first sight, did not appear to be empirically similar. Although the Nordic countries share similar characteristics that may be 'typical Nordic' (e.g. the Nordic welfare model), they also differ in theoretically interesting properties. In moving to the abstract, this suggests that the findings and empirical indications of a social structure inherent in civil-military relations are also relevant for countries other than the Nordic ones.

6.4 Nordic civil-military relations beyond 2014

> Everywhere we look, textbooks on political realism are being re-opened. In Finland, such books were never quite closed. Our history saw to that (Niinistö, 2015).

As the quote by Sauli Niinistö, current president of Finland, indicates, the security environment has developed further. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, there is a common Nordic view that the security situation in their vicinity has deteriorated. In 2015, the Nordic defence ministers stressed in a joint feature article, that the situation was no longer "business as usual" and that the Nordic countries had to adjust themselves to a new normal condition (Søreide, Wammen, Haglund, Sveinsson, & Hultqvist, 2015). Denmark is now focusing more on defence in its immediate neighbourhood, and Sweden is turning its security focus back eastwards towards Russia. While there is continuity in Finnish defence policy, the acknowledgement of the country's dependence on external support for its defence is notable. In Norway, there has been an intensified focus on its northern areas and territorial defence since 2014. All four Nordic countries still have troops in Afghanistan as part of the Resolute Support Mission, a NATO-led, non-combat mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions (NATO, 2019a).[124] However, the priority and concern of the Nordic countries is currently the altered security environment in Europe.

The latest Danish defence agreement highlights a new security situation and entails increasing the defence budget, strengthening the ability of the armed forces to solve tasks over a broad spectrum and improving the ability to operate with larger army formations that can be deployed within NATO's territory (Danish MoD, 2018a). The current Norwegian long-term defence plan stresses a deteriorating international security situation and involves a gradual increase in the defence budget and further adjustments to the long-term challenges facing Norwegian security, in which preparations to receive allied reinforcements remain a priority, along with investments in intelligence, surveillance and combat power (Norwegian MoD, 2016). While recent events have

[124] As of March 2019, Denmark has 155, Norway 54, Sweden 29, and Finland 24 troops contributing to the current mission in Afghanistan (NATO, 2019b).

confirmed that Finland has been on the right path with continued priority on territorial defence, there is a significant emphasis on international defence cooperation in the latest government defence report (Finnish Government, 2017a, pp. 16-18). Helsinki has sought a closer bilateral relationship with Washington, London and Berlin, and the EU as a security community has gained further momentum (Pesu, 2017). In the summer of 2017, the Finnish parliament voted in favour of a law that allows the military to compel employed soldiers to serve in overseas operations. The act entered into force on 1 July that year and enabled the provision and receipt of military assistance in the framework of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (Finnish Ministry of Interior, 2017). Like Helsinki, Stockholm has intensified its bilateral relations with the US and the UK and continues to emphasize multinational cooperation in the framework of its EU membership and partnership with NATO (Møller & Petersson, 2019, pp. 225-232). Furthermore, Sweden has increased the defence budget, reintroduced the conscription system and stresses the defence of its near abroad (Swedish MoD, 2015). A common acknowledgement is that the military organizations have become so small that they are vulnerable and that they have not been able to train or use larger formations.[125] Considering the latest developments, one can ask what implications this shift in threat perceptions and security environment has for Nordic civil-military relations. Will the effects be similar or different on the social structure inherent in civil-military relations?

There are indications that the effects will be different. The threat perception concerns developments in the near abroad, and for Finland and Norway, a neighbouring country. Thus, it involves more vital security interests and not a 'war of choice' that does not involve an existential threat to the state. Accordingly, the national interests in a potential conflict in the immediate neighbourhood will be different, as will the national priority of a country. Although the Nordic countries are still in Afghanistan, the military footprint and contribution is arguably too small to make a difference. It is not a national priority for any of the Nordic countries. Considering Michael Desch's theory (Desch, 1999), the security environment post-2014 will ensure stronger civilian control because of the focus on a common, more definable, threat. At the same time, we have a new set of challenges that are not as clear cut as the East-West divide during the Cold War. Today, the security environment is not clear-cut strategically with global terrorist networks, instability in the Middle East and North Africa, migration flows, threats from cyber space, and challenges following climate-related events. In the current information age, countering hybrid threats has become a priority for cooperation of NATO and the EU, in which the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), founded in 2017 and located in Helsinki,

[125] This was noted in several interviews across the four countries, in which this was commented to be one of the largest challenges, today, in the current security environment.

plays a central role (Hagelstam & Narinen, 2018). While there are multiple and different meanings of the term, one definition is:

> Hybrid threats are methods and activities that are targeted towards vulnerabilities of the opponent. Vulnerabilities can be created by many things, including historical memory, legislation, old practices, geostrategic factors, strong polarisation of society, technological disadvantages or ideological differences. If the interests and goals of the user of hybrid methods and activity are not achieved, the situation can escalate into hybrid warfare where the role of military and violence will increase significantly (Hybrid CoE, 2019).

It involves a wide range of means, conducted by state or non-state actors, and designed to blur the distinction between peace and war and to remain below the threshold of detection. The increased focus on such threats follows among other hacking attempts on for example the US but also European countries, believed to originate from Russia, China and North Korea, international influence campaigns on national and EU elections and the spread of disinformation. Russian military intervention in Ukraine also brought hybrid warfare into fashion, which refers to a blend of conventional warfare and non-conventional warfare containing non-military aspects (Cullen, 2018). Thus, threats are crossing political, economic, military, civil and information domains, in which it is often difficult to detect attacks before, or even long after, they have happened. Therefore, there are significant challenges when it comes to early warning and arguably necessitates closer coordination and cooperation of different state agencies. Consequently, there is a revived focus on total defence and Nordic governments are stressing societal security. This concerns especially Denmark, Norway and Sweden; there is a focus on how to adapt society resources across sectors to respond to new challenges and declared aims of building up total defence and strengthen the ability to mobilize in the events of crises or war (see Danish MoD, 2018b, 2019; Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2016; Swedish Government, 2015, 2018). Finland has maintained a focus on this issue through the government resolutions on the cross-administrative security strategy for society. Helsinki issued a new version in 2017 that reflects rapid changes and unpredictability for Finland's new foreign and security environment and stresses how "the dynamic nature of threats requires new operating approaches and broad-based cooperation between security actors" (Finnish Government, 2017b). With a renewed relevance related to homeland defence accompanied with a diffuse and unpredictable threat landscape that requires effective preparedness, this may lead to closer dialogue and interaction between civilian and military spheres.

Thus, presumably there is currently no anxiety within the military concerning its relevance; however, the intensified focus on total defence entails a closer connection between civilian and military spheres in terms of cooperation to ensure societal security and emphasis on a different role for the armed forces as part of total defence. As for the political leaderships, the current security

environment entails a high degree of uncertainty, where for example the cyber domain is becoming increasingly important with a digitalization of society and vulnerability of cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure and political decision-making systems. Potentially, there will be a dilemma between political leaderships providing greater authority to the armed forces to ensure effective response to such threats and continued oversight and civilian governance of the military.

6.5 Concluding remarks

The main statement of this thesis is that expeditionary warfare in complex conflicts may change civil-military relations and that it can be demonstrated and explained through case studies of the Nordic countries. The claimed relevance of this dissertation is that it is possible to uncover underlying dynamics, in which there is a value in departing from prevailing conceptualizations of civil-military relations to provide a different approach to formulate a novel analytical perspective. Moreover, the preceding analysis has underlined the relevance of analysing relations between political and military leaderships and the effect of war in states that are not the heaviest contributors in expeditionary missions. There is likely limited appetite among the Nordic, and other Western, countries for engagements with the magnitude like the Afghanistan mission. Nevertheless, this does not signify that new peace missions will not be mandated and deployed to accomplish complex tasks. Furthermore, the need of effective intelligence services and cyber defence, as well as the revived role of the armed forces in the framework of total defence, suggests that this will further challenge the civil-military balance of authority and influence. In conclusion, civil-military relations continue to be a highly relevant topic considering an ever-changing security environment with diffuse and unpredictable threats.

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Appendix I: Interviews

Interview 1 (Danish former top-level officer, Copenhagen, November 2017)

Interview 2 (Danish former top-level officer, Copenhagen, November 2017)

Interview 3 (Danish politician, Copenhagen, December 2017)

Interview 4 (Danish former top-level officer, Copenhagen, December 2017)

Interview 5 (Danish former top-level civil servant MoD, Copenhagen, December 2017)

Interview 6 (Danish former top-level officer MoD, Copenhagen, December 2017)

Interview 7 (Danish top-level civil servant MoD, Copenhagen, December 2017)

Interview 8 (Norwegian politician, Trondheim, February 2018)

Interview 9 (Norwegian top-level civil servant MoD, Oslo, February 2018)

Interview 10 (Norwegian top-level civil servant MoD, Oslo, February 2018)

Interview 11 (Norwegian former top-level officer, Oslo, February 2018)

Interview 12 (Norwegian top-level civil servant MoD, Oslo, February 2018)

Interview 13 (Norwegian former top-level officer, Oslo, February 2018)

Interview 14 (Finnish officer, Oslo, February 2018)

Interview 15 (Norwegian former top-level officer, Moelv, March 2018)

Interview 16 (Norwegian top-level officer, Oslo, April 2018)

Interview 17 (Finnish top-level civil servant MoD, Helsinki, April 2018)

Interview 18 (Finnish politician, Helsinki, April 2018)

Interview 19 (Finnish top-level civil servant MoD, Helsinki, April 2018)

Interview 20 (Finnish top-level civil servant MoD, Helsinki, April 2018)

Interview 21 (Norwegian officer, Helsinki, April 2018)

Interview 22 (Finnish former top-level officer, Helsinki, April 2018)

Interview 23 (Finnish top-level officer, Helsinki, April 2018)

Interview 24 (Finnish officer, Helsinki, April 2018)

Interview 25 (Swedish officer, Oslo, May 2018)

Interview 26 (Swedish politician, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 27 (Swedish former top-level officer, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 28 (Swedish former top-level officer, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 29 (Norwegian officer, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 30 (Swedish top-level officer, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 31 (Swedish former civil servant MoD, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 32 (Swedish top-level civil servant MoD, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 33 (Swedish officer, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 34 (Swedish top-level civil servant MoD, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 35 (Swedish officer, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 36 (Swedish former civil servant MoD and SAFHQ, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 37 (Swedish officer, Stockholm, May 2018)

Interview 38 (Finnish top-level officer, telephone interview, May 2018)

Interview 39 (Finnish top-level officer, telephone interview, May 2018)

Appendix II: Interview guide

1. Can you say something about the changing balance of influence between the Ministry of Defence and the chief of defence from 2001?
    a. In your opinion, what are the reasons for this development?

2. Can you say something about the organization of decision-making authority in the top military leadership from 2001?

3. In your assessment, how do political actors in government most effectively shape the use of military resources, including the use of force?
    a. In your view, have political actors become more or less effective at this over the last decade?

4. As international operations change in character, have [Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish] Armed Forces been used in different ways, for different tasks, and if so, how has [Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden] prepared for this?

5. Have professional soldiers, as compared to conscripts, become more vocal and influential in the armed forces, including in the debates over key defence decisions in parliament or the top of the military organization?

6. How has the character of warfare and military expeditions since 2001 influenced the [Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish] Armed Forces?
    a. What are the main legacies, and which challenges remain today?

Appendix III: Overview Nordic governments 2001-2014

Denmark

Period	Government	Parties	Prime Minister	Defence Minister	Chief of Defence
March 1998-Nov. 2001	Rasmussen IV	S, R	Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (S)	Hans Hækkerup (S)	**1996-2002** Christian Hvidt
Nov. 2001-Feb. 2005	Fogh Rasmussen I	V, K	Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V)	**2001-2004** Svend Aage Jensby (V) **2004-2005** Søren Gade Jensen (V)	**2002-2008** Jesper Helsø
Feb. 2005-Nov. 2007	Fogh Rasmussen II	V, KF	Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V)	Søren Gade Jensen (V)	
Nov. 2007-April 2009	Fogh Rasmussen III	V, KF	Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V)	Søren Gade Jensen (V)	**2008-2009** Tim Sloth-Jørgensen **2009** Bjørn Ingemann Bisserup
April 2009-Oct. 2011	Løkke Rasmussen I	V, KF	Lars Løkke Rasmussen (V)	**2007-2010** Søren Gade Jensen (V) **2010-2011** Gitte Lillelund Bech (V)	**2009-2011** Knud Bartels
Oct. 2011-Feb. 2014	Thorning-Schmidt I	S, R, SF	Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S)	**2011-2013** Nick Hækkerup (S) **2013-2014** Nicolai Halby Wammen (S)	**2012** Bjørn Ingemann Bisserup **2012-2017** Peter Bartram
Feb. 2014-June 2015	Thorning Schmidt II	S, R	Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S)	Nicolai Halby Wammen (S)	

Socialdemokraterne (S) – Social Democrats
Venstre (V) – Liberal Party
Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF) – Socialist People's Party
Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF) – Conservative People's Party
Det Radikale Venstre (R) – Danish Social Liberal Party
Liberal Alliance (I) – Liberal Alliance
Dansk Folkeparti (DF) – Danish People's Party

Finland

Period	Government	Parties	President	Prime Minister	Defence Minister	Chief of Defence
April 1999-April 2003	Lipponen II	SDP, Kok., RKP, Vas., Vihr.,	**1994-2000** Martti Oiva Kalevi Ahtisaari	Paavo Tapio Lipponen	Jan-Erik Enestam	**1994-2001:** Gustav Hägglund
April 2003-June 2003	Jäätteenmäki	Kesk., SDP, RKP		Anneli Tuulikki Jäätteenmäki	Matti Taneli Vanhanen	**2001-2009:** Juhani Kaskeala
			2000-2012: Tarja Kaarina Halonen			
June 2003-April 2007	Vanhanen	Kesk., SDP, RKP		Matti Taneli Vanhanen	Seppo Arimo Kääriäinen	
April 2007-June 2010	Vanhanen II	Kesk., Kok., RKP, Vihr.		Matti Taneli Vanhanen	Jyri Jukka Häkämies	**2009-2014:** Ari Puheloinen
June 2010-June 2011	Kiviniemi	Kesk., Kok., RKP, Vihr.	**2012-:** Sauli Niinistö	Mari Johanna Kiviniemi	Jyri Jukka Häkämies	
June 2011-June 2014	Katainen	Kok., SDP, RKP, Vas., Vihr., KD		Jyrki Tapani Katainen	**2011-2012:** Stefan Erik Wallin **2012-2014:** Carl Christoffer Haglund	**2014-:** Jarmo Lindberg
June 2014-May 2015	Stubb	Kok., SDP, RKP, Vihr., KD		Cai-Göran Alexander Stubb	Carl Christoffer Haglund	

Suomen Keskuta | *Centern i Finland* (Kesk.) – Centre Party
Perussuomalaiset | *Sannfinländarna* (PS) – True Finns Party
Kansallinen Kokoomus | *Samlingspartiet* (Kok.) – National Coalition Party
Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue | *Finlands socialdemokratiska parti* (SDP) – Social Democratic Party of Finland
Vihreät | *De gröna* (Vihr.) – The Greens of Finland
Vasemmistoliitto | *Vänsterförbundet* (Vas.) – Left Alliance
Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue | *Svenska folkpartiet* (RKP) – Swedish People's Party of Finland
Kristillisdemokraatit | *Kristdemokraterna* (KD) – Christian Democrats of Finland

Norway

Period	Government	Parties	Prime Minister	Defence Minister	Chief of Defence
Oct. 1997-March 2000	Bondevik I	KrF, Sp, V	Kjell Magne Bondevik (KrF)	**1997-1999:** Dag Jostein Fjærvoll **1999-2000:** Eldbjørg Løwer	**1994-1999:** Arne Solli **1999-2005:** Sigurd Frisvold **2005-2009:** Sverre Diesen **2009-2013:** Harald Sunde **2013-:** Haakon Bruun-Hanssen
March 2000-Oct. 2001	Stoltenberg I	Ap	Jens Stoltenberg (Ap)	Bjørn Tore Godal	
Oct. 2001-Oct. 2005	Bondevik II	KrF, H, V	Kjell Magne Bondevik (KrF)	Kristin Krohn Devold	
Oct. 2005-Oct. 2013	Stoltenberg II	Ap, Sp, SV	Jens Stoltenberg (Ap)	**2005-2009:** Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen **2009-2011:** Grete Faremo **2011-2012:** Espen Barth Eide **2012-2013:** Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen	
Oct. 2013-	Solberg	H, Frp	Erna Solberg (H)	**2013-2017** Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide	

Fremskrittspartiet (Frp) – Progress Party
Høyre (H) – Conservative Party
Venstre (V) – Liberal Party
Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF) – Christian People's Party
Senterpartiet (Sp) – Centre Party (former Farmer's Party)
Arbeiderpartiet (Ap) – Labour Party
Sosialistisk Venstre (SV) – Socialist Left Party

Sweden

Period	Government	Parties	Prime Minister	Defence Minister	Chief of Defence
March 1996- Oct. 2006	Persson	S	Göran Persson	**1994-1997:** Thage G. Peterson **1997-2002:** Björn von Sydow **Sept. 2002-Oct. 2002:** Lena Hjelm-Wallén **Oct. 2002-Nov. 2002:** Pär Nuder **2002-2006:** Leni Björklund	**1994-2000:** Owe Wiktorin **2000-2003:** Johan Hederstedt **2004-2009:** Håkan Syrén
Oct. 2006-Oct. 2014	Reinfeldt	M, C, L, KD	Fredrik Reinfeldt	**2006-2007:** Mikael Odenberg **2007-2012:** Sten Tolgfors **2012-2014:** Karin Enström	 **2009-2015:** Sverker Göranson
Oct. 2014-	Löfven	S, MP	Stefan Lövfen	Peter Hultqvist	

Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti (S) – Swedish Social Democratic Party
Moderata samlingspartiet (M) – Moderate Party
Sverigedemokraterna (SD) – Sweden Democrats
Miljöpartiet de Gröna (MP) – Green Party
Centerpartiet (C) – Centre Party
Vänstrepartiet (V) – Left Party
Liberalerna (L) – Liberals (former *Folkpartiet*)
Kristdemokraterna (KD) – Christian Democrats

Appendix IV: Number of conscripts in the Nordic countries[126]

Number of conscripts (active)				
	Denmark	**Finland**	**Norway**	**Sweden**
2000	7880	29 553	16 500	16 658
2001	N/A	31 878	N/A	16 948
2002	N/A	28 939	11 991	16 216
2003	N/A	28 718	N/A	17 211
2004	4864	29 815	N/A	13 946
2005	6290	26 679	N/A	10 169
2006	5660	26 717	N/A	10 990
2007	6119	27 045	N/A	4716
2008	6164	27 335	N/A	6804
2009	6048	27 900	7336	-
2010	5696	26 961	8458	-
2011	5067	25 989	7449	-
2012	4901	26 332	7917	-
2013	4244	25 048	7468	-
2014	4159	24 993	6983	-
2015	4286	24 554	7741	-
2016	3932	23 997	6857	-
2017	4214	24 282	7387	(4000 in 2018)

[126] The numbers come from several sources (see Danish MoD, 2012c, 2018d; Findikator, 2018; Norwegian Armed Forces, 2018b; Swedish Armed Forces, 2018b). Note that not all numbers include persons who have ended their military service before completing their period.