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# Semantic, Pragmatic and Syntactic Aspects of the English Coordinator *BUT* and its Equivalents in Romanian

Master's thesis in English Linguistics and Language Acquisition

Supervisor: Christopher Wilder

Trondheim, November 2018



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## Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>vii</b>
<b>Acknowledgments</b> .....	<b>viii</b>
<b>Chapter 1 – Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1. Three meanings of English <i>but</i> .....	1
1.1.1. General description.....	1
1.1.2. The three meanings of <i>but</i> .....	2
1.2. Arguments for the study .....	3
1.3. Izutsu’s (2008) claim with regard to Romanian coordinate conjunctions .....	5
1.4. Research questions .....	8
1.5. Significance of the study .....	8
1.6. Layout of the study .....	9
<b>Chapter 2 – Background of the study</b> .....	<b>10</b>
2.1. Introduction .....	10
2.2. The conjunction <i>but</i> in English .....	10
2.2.1. Meaning(s) .....	10
2.2.2. Position in the sentence .....	11
2.3. The Romanian equivalents of the conjunction <i>but</i> .....	12
2.3.1. Meaning(s) .....	12
2.3.2. Position in the sentence .....	13
2.3.3. Summary .....	15
2.4. The truth-conditions of <i>but</i> .....	15
2.4.1. Propositional logic symbols and methods of inference .....	16
2.4.2. Interim summary .....	18
2.5. Implicature .....	18
2.5.1. Grice’s conversational implicature .....	18
2.5.2. R. Lakoff (1971) .....	20
2.6. Izutsu’s (2008) system of interpreting the three <i>but</i> meanings.....	22
2.6.1. Discussion and summary .....	25
2.7. Relevance Theory .....	26
2.7.1. Summary.....	28
2.7.2. The cognitive relevance of <i>but</i> .....	29
2.8. Information structure properties of the three kinds of <i>but</i> sentence .....	29
2.8.1. Introduction .....	29
2.8.2. Focus .....	31
2.8.3. Topic .....	31
2.8.4. Contrastive topic .....	32
2.8.5. Contrastive focus .....	32
2.9. Discussion and summary .....	33
2.10. Summary table with the information structure and pragmatic requirements for the three <i>but</i> meanings .....	35
<b>Chapter 3 – The ‘three meanings’ of the English adversative <i>but</i></b> .....	<b>36</b>
3.1. Introduction .....	36
3.2. Denial-of-Expectation <i>but</i> .....	36
3.3. Contrast <i>but</i> .....	38
3.4. Symmetry vs. asymmetry – discussion .....	40

3.4.1. Izutsu's view on contrast <i>but</i> and denial-of-expectation <i>but</i> .....	41
3.5. Correction <i>but</i> .....	42
3.6. What makes correction <i>but</i> different .....	44
3.6.1. Izutsu's (2008) view.....	44
3.6.1.1. The ambiguity between denial-of-expectation and correction .....	44
3.6.2. Vicente's (2010) view .....	47
3.7. Summary table with the differences and similarities between the three <i>but</i> meanings in English based on various accounts .....	49
3.8. Relevance-theoretic approaches to the meaning of <i>but</i> .....	50
3.8.1. The contrast – denial-of-expectation distinction .....	51
3.9. Blakemore's relevance-theoretic approach to <i>but</i> .....	53
3.10. The discourse marker use of <i>but</i> .....	55
3.11. <i>But</i> in other languages .....	56
3.11.1. The case of Russian .....	57
3.11.1.1. Discussion.....	58
3.11.1.2. Summary.....	61
<b>Chapter 4 – Adversative conjunctions in Romanian .....</b>	<b>62</b>
4.1. Introduction .....	62
<b>Part 1 .....</b>	<b>62</b>
4.2. <i>But</i> in Romanian .....	62
4.2.1. Denial-of-expectation.....	63
4.2.1.1. Discussion and summary.....	65
4.2.2. Contrast .....	65
4.2.3. Thematic contrast .....	69
4.2.4. Correction .....	70
4.2.4.1. Conclusion.....	73
4.2.5. The Romanian <i>dar</i> and <i>însă</i> and the oriented semantic contrast .....	73
4.2.5.1. The oriented semantic contrast .....	75
4.2.5.2. Summary.....	76
4.2.6. The discourse marker use of Romanian <i>but</i> .....	76
<b>Part 2 .....</b>	<b>78</b>
4.3. Problem cases .....	78
4.3.1. The difference between <i>iar</i> and <i>dar</i> .....	79
4.3.1.1. Utterance-initial use .....	79
4.3.1.2. The sentence coordinator role .....	80
4.3.1.2.1. Discussion.....	82
4.3.1.3. Bîlbîie & Winterstein's (2011) constraints for the conjunction <i>iar</i> .....	84
4.3.1.3.1. Discussion.....	86
4.3.1.3.2. Personal claim.....	87
4.3.2. The difference between <i>dar</i> and <i>însă</i> .....	89
<b>Chapter 5 – Conclusion .....</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>References .....</b>	<b>92</b>

## Abstract

The present thesis investigates the semantic, pragmatic and syntactic aspects of the coordinating expression *but*, in both English and Romanian. *But* is a linguistic device that semantically has no ‘truth conditional’ value in isolation. According to Saeed (2016: 455), truth-conditional semantics represents “an approach to semantics that holds that knowing the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to knowing the conditions (in the world) under which it could be used to express a true proposition.” When behaving as sentence coordinator, however, *but* automatically ‘gains’ truth-conditional value as a logical conjunction (the same as *and*).

Blakemore (1989) claims that since *but* includes *and* in its meaning, it falls under the scope of truth-conditional semantics. Yet the fact that *but* mostly connects statements that express opposite ideas made her admit, similar to Grice (1989), that *but* means both *and* and ‘something else’. Grice sees the contrastive nature of *but* as no ordinary ‘truth-conditional’ meaning and classifies it as a *conventional implicature*. This basically means that the meaning of the conjunction *but* must be accounted for within a theory of pragmatics.

Previous literature on English *but* has suggested three types of meaning: contrast, denial-of-expectation, and correction. While in English the lexical form *but* is used in all cases, in Romanian there are four different words for it: *dar*, *însă*, *iar*, and *ci*. This thesis focuses on the claims of Izutsu (2008) according to whom *dar* and *însă* are used for denial-of-expectation, *iar* for contrast, and *ci* for correction. I will determine the extent to which Izutsu’s (2008) claims are well-founded by comparing her view with that of other authors, such as Zafiu (2005), Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011), and others.

By means of cross-linguistic evidence I hope to establish the requirements and restrictions that apply to the different meanings of *but*. For that I present different theories on the meaning of *but* as well as address two research questions. A major point of interest in the study is the functionality of the Romanian adversative conjunction *iar* which incorporates both the meaning of *and* and *but*. I am interested to find the conditions that cause it to behave as either, and whether there exist exceptional cases. I suggest that the contrast reading allows both *iar* and *dar* (but not *însă*), as long as there exists a two-way, plausible contrast in the clauses, that allows the reversibility of the conjuncts without any implication being cancelled. In a denial-of-expectation reading *dar* and *însă* are interchangeable. *Iar* can trigger a denial-of-expectation reading in non-plausible contrast pair situations only if it introduces a new topic. In such sentences replacement with *dar* is felicitous.

## Acknowledgments

“The road and the tale have both been long, would you not say so? The trip has been long, and the cost has been high... but no great thing was ever attained easily. A long tale, like a tall Tower, must be built a stone at a time.”

— **Stephen King**, *The Dark Tower*

Words cannot express the relief and the sense of accomplishment I am feeling as I write this. After what seemed like an eternity, I have finally managed to ‘build the Tower’. Hopefully a durable one.

I am hugely indebted to my thesis supervisor, Christopher Wilder, without the help of whom this paper would not have been possible. Thank you, Mr. Wilder, for your endless support and patience reading and providing feedback on my countless drafts. I am sure the process seemed as never-ending for you as it did for me. I feel I have learnt so much from this collaboration. And that is something I will always be grateful for!

*To my family*: I love and miss you guys. Thank you for your warm thoughts and constant moral support during this trying time. I dedicate this paper to you all.

*To my husband*: thank you for putting up with Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (\*me) during the past year(s). You are one of the most kindhearted persons I ever had the privilege to have in my life, and I feel so lucky. You have stood by me every step of the way. Thank you for supporting my ambitious plan for our future. I love you very much!

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## Chapter 1 - Introduction

### 1.1. Three meanings of English *but*

#### 1.1.1. General description

In English grammar, *but* is a linking word that connects clauses, words in the same clause, or sentences (all of which are known as conjuncts). *But* usually introduces an idea that comes as a contradiction to the previous. Consider the example below, where *but* is used as a *coordinating conjunction*:

(1) He agreed to meet her *but* didn't show up.

The next case is one where *but* can also be used as a *preposition*, with an exceptive<sup>1</sup> meaning:

(2) No one is perfect *but* me.

This meaning requires association with a universal ('every'/ 'all') or negative universal ('none'/ 'no') quantifier<sup>2</sup>.

As an *adverb*, *but* is often synonymous with *only*, indicating degree:

(3) She is *but* a child!

Finally, as a *noun*, *but* indicates an objection:

(4) No *buts* – just go clean your room!

The use of *but* as a coordinating conjunction, as showed in example (1), makes the topic of the present thesis, while its uses in examples (2)-(4) above will not be discussed further.

Since *but* introduces a statement that is usually very different from what has previously been said (see example (1)), most discussions revolve around its role as a contrastive discourse marker with a high pragmatic value (Fraser (1999), Blakemore (1987, 2002), and others). On this account, *but* has been referred to as concessive<sup>3</sup>, contrastive<sup>4</sup>, and adversative<sup>5</sup>, and it appears to be one of the most disputed words in the literature. A large number of theories with

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<sup>1</sup> In this context, *but* merely functions as a prepositional phrase in Romanian (neither of the four adversative conjunctions *iar/dar/însă/ci* – to be described in section 1.2. – are used for this exceptive meaning), and will not be included in the present analysis. See example below:

*Nimeni nu este perfect, [în afară de mine] / [cu excepția mea].*

No one not is perfect, outside of me-ACC / with exception mine

“No one is perfect, except me.”

<sup>2</sup> Wilder, Christopher, p. c. (October, 2017).

<sup>3</sup> Iten (2000), Malchukov (2004).

<sup>4</sup> Spenader & Maier (2009).

<sup>5</sup> Malchukov (2004), Zafiu (2005).

regard to its meaning and functionality were developed, yet no consensus on the analysis of the meaning of *but* exists today.

In order to account for its function in an utterance and better distinguish it from the category of *concepts* (words with truth-conditional value), Blakemore (1987, 2002) developed a relevance-theoretic<sup>6</sup> notion of ‘procedural meaning’ that discourse markers supposedly encode (as opposed to ‘conceptual’). According to Blakemore (2002), words encoding procedural meaning help guide the interpretation of the utterance on a certain path, as they impose constraints on inference.

A discussion that originated in the 1970s is that *but* may encode more than one meaning<sup>7</sup>, both in English and based on evidence from other languages. The meanings proposed in the literature are that of *contrast*<sup>8</sup>, *denial-of-expectation*<sup>9</sup>, *correction*<sup>10</sup>, and *compensation*<sup>11</sup>.

### 1.1.2. The three meanings of *but*

Consider the following example for **contrast**:

(5) The crab pulls backward, but the pike pulls down. Izutsu (2008: 650)

The contrast meaning is seen as depicting semantic contrast, i.e. a difference in meaning between the different conjuncts coordinated by *but*. The sentence displays a 2-way contrast type of pattern, where the first element<sup>12</sup> of the first clause (S1) contrasts with the first element of the second (S2). That is also the case with the attributes<sup>13</sup> of each of these elements. There does not seem to be any expectation arising from S1 that might be cancelled by S2. The sentence is two-way in the sense that there are two independent contrast items in each conjunct: ‘the crab’ contrasts with ‘the pike’, and ‘pulls backward’ contrasts with ‘pulls down’. The question whether these elements should be perfect lexical antonyms or not has occurred in discussions about contrast. I will tackle these issues in the specific contrast sections. The contrast pattern seems to be a clear [A1 B1] *but* [A2 B2].

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<sup>6</sup> The Relevance theory as developed by Sperber & Wilson (1986) in *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. For a better understanding of Blakemore’s (1989) procedural account of the meaning of *but*, basic aspects of the Relevance Theory will be presented in section. 2.7.

<sup>7</sup> By ‘meaning’ here we understand the meaning of the entire sentence containing the word *but*, which under certain circumstances (pragmatic restrictions, syntactic limitations, etc) can differ.

<sup>8</sup> R. Lakoff (1971), Blakemore (1989), Izutsu (2008).

<sup>9</sup> G. Lakoff (1971).

<sup>10</sup> Anscombe & Ducrot (1977), Abraham (1979), Iten (2000).

<sup>11</sup> The *compensation* meaning of *but* was coined by Abraham (1979), who suggested the use of the word *dafür* for German. I will adopt both Izutsu’s (2008: 656) and Iten’s (2000: 183, 191) arguments that this meaning is a subcategory of denial-of-expectation and will not treat it as an independent meaning. I will discuss it briefly in 3.11.

<sup>12</sup> Zafiu (2005: 243-4) refers to them as topics (or themes).

<sup>13</sup> The attribute, also known as the *comment* is an Information structure element that provides information about topic it succeeds.

An example for **denial-of-expectation** is:

(6) The piano is nice, but expensive. Izutsu (2008: 650)

This reading differs from the previous in that the expectation that arises from S1 does seem to be denied, or cancelled, by S2. Here, ‘the piano is nice’ triggers the expectation: we should buy it, whereas ‘the piano is expensive’ hints that we should not buy it. The denial-of-expectation reading does not require a 2-way contrast between the conjuncts. There is only one contrasting pair in the conjuncts in (6): *nice* vs. *expensive*. However, there are cases in which the denial reading displays a topic-comment pattern in both clauses, such as in the following example.:

(7) He is wearing a raincoat, but outside it is sunny.

The conjuncts in (7) both contain a topic part: *he* vs. *outside*, and a comment part: *is wearing a raincoat* vs. *it is sunny*. Yet there is no plausible semantic contrast between these pairs. On the other hand, there is a plausible expectation linked with S1 – if one is wearing a raincoat, then it is raining outside. This expectation is cancelled by S2, making it a clear case of denial. Interestingly, the topic-comment arrangement seems to indicate a [A1 B1] *but* [A2 B2] pattern, similar to contrast *but*, a matter to be discussed further in section 3.2.

The following example illustrates **correction**:

(8) John is not stupid, but lazy.

A special feature of correction-*but* is that the first conjunct must contain negation. The first conjunct denies the proposition that ‘John is stupid’, while the second asserts a different proposition, that ‘John is lazy’. This type of negation needs to be sentential, and not a constituent part of the word, as we will further see in section 3.5. The other features, two-way contrast, or expectation are lacking from this pattern. The sentence displays a single topic whose attributes (comments) are being contrasted. The negation in S1 requires a corrective element in S2. Here, ‘stupid’ is replaced by ‘lazy’. The pattern for the corrective-*but* would be [A1 NOT B1] *but* [B2].

## 1.2. Arguments for the study

What makes the analysis of *but* most interesting is that while in English there exists only one lexical word that encodes several meanings<sup>14</sup>, there are languages that specialize at least two different lexical forms, for different readings. See the table below:

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<sup>14</sup> There are, however, accounts that argue for a unitary semantics of *but*, such as that of Iten (2000: 203-205).

	<b>Contrast</b>	<b>Denial-of-expectation</b>	<b>Correction</b>
<b>German</b>	<i>aber</i>	<i>aber</i>	<i>sondern</i>
<b>Spanish</b>	<i>pero</i>	<i>pero</i>	<i>sino</i>
<b>French</b>	<i>mais</i>	<i>mais</i>	<i>mais</i>
<b>English</b>	<i>but</i>	<i>but</i>	<i>but</i>
<b>Romanian</b>	<i>Iar (dar?)</i>	<i>dar / însă</i>	<i>ci</i>

We thus have the case of German, with *aber* for the denial-of-expectation reading, and *sondern* for the correction reading. We experience the same phenomenon with Spanish (with *pero* and *sino*). In French the meaning of *but* is interpreted differently under the same lexical form, making it very similar to English. According to Iten (2000: 194, 198), Anscombe & Ducrot (1977) classify the French *but* ('mais') as 'mais<sub>PA</sub>' (for denial-of-expectation) and 'mais<sub>SN</sub>' (for correction). The *PA* attribute stands for the Spanish *pero* and the German *aber* initials, and *SN* for *sino*, respectively *sondern*.

Romanian provides four counterparts for the English conjunction *but*, in the form of *dar*, *însă*, *iar*, *ci*. While the literature agrees on the use of *ci* to mark correction, and that of *dar* and *însă* for denial-of-expectation, opinions are divided with regard to the precise role of *iar* as a contrast marker. Additionally, a highly debated topic is whether at least one of the denial-of-expectation markers can substitute it (see, for instance, 4.2.3. and 4.2.5.1.). The general contrast - denial-of-expectation distinction is addressed in 3.4. and 3.8.1.

This thesis will also discuss different theories on the meaning of *but*, among which that of G. Lakoff (1971), R. Lakoff (1971), Blakemore (1987, 1989, 2002), Iten (2000), Malchukov (2004), Zafiu (2005), Izutsu (2008), Vicente (2010), Bîlbiie & Winterstein (2011). These theories offer a somewhat chronological view on the interpretation of the meaning of *but*.

*But* functions as a logical conjunction, similar to *and*. Any conjoined sentence has the same truth conditions if either of them is used. In the literature *but* is seen as including *and* in its meaning<sup>15</sup>. However, most authors consider *but* to be more complex than *and* (hence the *concessive*, *contrastive*, or *adversative* appellation), and carry extra meaning that can only be determined pragmatically.

While it is true that pragmatic principles have a lot to do with interpreting a sentence, they are not the only prerequisite. In our case, it helps to look at languages that lexicalize several versions of the word *but* in order to realize that besides truth-conditions and the

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<sup>15</sup> For instance, Blakemore (1989). This aspect will be developed upon in Chapter 2, section 2.4.

pragmatic intuition, there are certain syntactic patterns these conjunctions create. That has a lot to do with the lexical form used. My aim is to understand all these requirements that combined make *but* mean something else than *and*.

This thesis will treat semantic, pragmatic and syntactic aspects of the English coordinator *but* and its equivalents in Romanian. This means that a great portion of it will describe how the conjunction *but* is translated and used in Romanian. The discussion will build upon Izutzu's (2008) proposal with regard to how Romanian lexicalizes the difference between the three meanings. This proposal is presented in the next section. I will compare Izutzu's view with that of Zafiu (2005). This will help paint a clearer picture on how *but* is used in Romanian and will determine the extent to which Izutzu's classification is well-founded. At the same time, I will use evidence from Russian, a language that resembles Romanian the most when it comes to coordinating conjunctions (except for the corrective *but*). For that, I will allocate it a special section (3.11.1.). The Russian language incorporates, according to Malchukov (2004: 183), three basic coordinating conjunctions: 'no' (with an adversative reading), 'i' (with an additive reading), and 'a' (with a contrastive reading).

### 1.3. Izutzu's (2008) claim with regard to Romanian coordinate conjunctions

Izutzu (2008: 650) argues that the difference between contrast, denial-of-expectation<sup>16</sup> and correction is lexicalized in Romanian by means of *iar* for the first category, *dar* and *însă* for the second, and *ci* for the third. Below we find examples for each:

#### Contrast:

- (9) Racul trage înapoi, iar știuca în jos. Izutzu (2008: 650)  
 crab-DEF pulls backward but/and pike-DEF in down  
 "The crab pulls backward, but/and the pike (pulls) down."

Here, Izutzu suggests that *însă* and *dar* are inappropriate for a contrast reading and that using them gives the sentence a denial-of-expectation meaning. *Ci* is fully incompatible in this case. Here, it is possible to replace *iar* by 'și' (*and*) without rendering the sentence infelicitous.

#### Denial-of-expectation:

- (10) Pianul este bun, însă/dar scump. Izutzu (2008: 650)  
 piano-DEF is nice but expensive  
 "The piano is nice, but expensive."

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<sup>16</sup> Izutzu (2008: 667) refers to denial-of-expectation as *concession*, adopting Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson's (2000) view that the "acknowledgment of two contradictory propositions seems to be related to the idea of concession (or conceding) in concessive sentences". Iten (2000: 171) asserts that the notion of 'concessive' meaning is often associated with the denial-of-expectation use (or its interpretation) and cites (Quirk et al., 1972, p. 674) in that "conjuncts signal the unexpected, surprising nature of what is being said in view of what was said before that".

This example does not allow the usage of either *iar* or *ci*.

Correction:

(11) Ion nu e prost, ci leneș. Izutsu (2008: 650)  
Ion not is stupid but lazy  
“Ion is not stupid, but lazy.”

Here, Izutsu gives no other arguments than the fact that *ci* is the only one that works for this example. We can deduce that it is because of the existence of the sentential negation, Izutsu decided that *dar* and *însă* are not possible. This, even if the sentence displays a single topic whose comments are being contrasted, a pattern that can be possible in denial-of-expectation. However, as I will discuss in **3.6.1.1.a**), using sentential negation in denial-of-expectation cases is not excluded. It is, however, not a requirement, as in the case of correction. The issue here is more likely related to the ellipsis, which is a specific requirement of correction. Even if, as we will see in **4.2.4.**, *ci* allows both ellipsis and the lack thereof, *dar* and *însă* always lack it.

This leaves the question of *iar*. We can guess that the reason it does not work in this case is because it does not introduce a topic, as in example (9), but merely a comment.

Essentially, what Izutsu (2008: 650) claims is that the conjunction *iar* is only used for contrast, *dar* and *însă* only for denial-of-expectation<sup>17</sup>, and *ci* is only used for correction. In this sense, the contrastive *pero* (Spanish) and *aber* (German) are similar to contrast *iar*, and the denial-of-expectation *pero* (Spanish) and *aber* (German) are associated with *dar* and *însă*. The same association is made between the conjunctions *sino* (Spanish) and *sondern* (German) and the corrective *ci* (ibid., p. 655). Interestingly, what she seems to indicate is that *pero* and *aber* seem to trigger both the contrast, and the denial-of-expectation reading in different circumstances. This is an important point in my analysis since, as far as Romanian is concerned, Izutsu highlights the difference between the three semantic categories in terms of distinct lexical and syntactic characteristics. The association between the conjunctions *sino* (Spanish) and *sondern* (German) and the Romanian corrective *ci* is pertinent, and Izutsu (2008: 667) recognizes that all three items need for a ‘morphologically independent negative’ or ‘polemic negation’ in the sense of Anscombe & Ducrot (1977) in their first conjunct.

As noted above, the two conjunctions *dar* and *însă* are said to be specialized for the denial-of-expectation reading. Importantly, Izutsu’s analysis *only* sees them fit for this kind of reading, and not the contrast reading, as seems to be the case in Spanish and German. We would

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<sup>17</sup> Section **3.4.1.** will show how Izutsu (2008) further distinguishes between *direct* and *indirect* concessive meaning, a difference made by whether it is the S2 itself, or the implicature of S2 that contradicts the implicature of S1.

expect that since the Romanian conjunctions for denial-of-expectation display different lexical forms, at least one of them would be able to encode contrast. This view seems to have been adopted by Zafiu<sup>18</sup> (2005), who sees the two conjunctions as interchangeable between the denial-of-expectation and the contrast reading.

As we will see in Chapter 4, section 4.2.2., *dar* and *însă* can both be part of a syntactic structure such as a ‘contrastive’ sentence in the sense Izutsu’s (2008: 650) example (9) without rendering the sentence ungrammatical or infelicitous. However, as a native speaker I will argue that only *dar* can encode a contrast meaning. That is not the case with *însă*, due to its lexical form that carries a denial-of-expectation ‘weight’ and causes the cancelation of the implication in the S1 even in 2-way coordinations.

The conjunction *iar* was classified by Zafiu (2005: 243-4) both as copulative (thus very similar to *and*), and as encoding ‘thematic contrast’<sup>19</sup>. This means that in order to be functional, it must contrast themes (or topics). One such example is:

- (12) Afară e frig, iar în sală e cald. (p. 251)  
Outside is cold, and/but in classroom/hall is warm.  
“Outside it is cold, but/and in the classroom it is warm.”

Example (12) suggests that the occurrence of *iar* is somehow limited to the ‘2-way contrast’ pattern, where each clause has its own topic. However, as we will see in section 4.3. on problem cases, it is not always the case that we have plausible contrast pairs. It will be interesting to see to what extent *iar* still encodes contrast in that case, respectively, to which extent it can be replaced by *dar* for the same purpose.

As concerns the Romanian corrective *ci*, both Izutsu (2008) and Zafiu (2005) agree on the need of a negated first conjunct. Below is Zafiu’s (2005: 249) example similar to Izutsu’s (2008: 650) sentence (11):

- (13) Ion nu doarme, ci ascultă muzică.  
Ion not sleeps, CONJ (he) listens music  
“Ion isn’t sleeping, but listening to music.”

As we can see, we have two different points of view:

- Izutsu claims that *iar* marks contrast<sup>20</sup>, Zafiu claims that *iar* marks thematic contrast.

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<sup>18</sup> All text retrieved from Zafiu’s (2005) Romanian paper is my own translation and interpretation.

<sup>19</sup> According to Krifka (2007: 41) “In the Prague School, the notion of topic is called ‘theme’ [...]”, an element also noted by Féry (2007: 169) in citing Halliday (1967-8), where the ‘theme’ (or topic) is bound to have an initial position in the sentence. These arguments would be in line with Zafiu’s (2005) notion of ‘thematic contrast’.

<sup>20</sup> Here, there seem to be two types of contrast involved. Similar to Zafiu, Izutsu provides examples where there exists a two-way contrast, and each of the clauses display a theme (or a topic, as per ft. 19) see Part 1- 4.2.2., 4.2.3. The issue when discussing such contrast cases is to determine whether these themes are always symmetrical

- Izutsu claims that *dar* and *însă* mark only denial-of-expectation, Zafiu claims that *dar* and *însă* are interchangeable on the denial-of-expectation – contrast reading.
- Both Izutsu and Zafiu agree on the corrective function of the conjunction *ci*.

While Izutsu (2008) sees both *dar* and *însă* as encoding denial-of-expectation, Zafiu (2005: 248) sees differences between them that are context-dependent, where elements such as the speaker’s argumentative intention, the irreversibility and the final conclusion of the sentence play an important role in determining whether the meaning is that of denial-of-expectation (to be developed in Chapter 4). As regards the conjunction *iar*, Izutsu sees it as contrastive, whereas Zafiu sees it as encoding ‘thematic contrast’. While I neither deny that *iar* is contrastive, nor that *dar* can trigger a denial-of-expectation reading, I will argue that *dar* can also mark contrast, similar to *iar*, in 2-way contrast examples.

#### 1.4. Research Questions

In view of the elements described in 1.2. and 1.3., I will address two research questions:

- 1) I will seek a better understanding of the contrast – denial-of-expectation distinction, and how these two meanings differ from correction *but*.

Addressing this question will further our understanding of the ‘meanings’ of the English *but*, in its use as a coordinating conjunction / discourse marker.

- 2) I will determine the extent to which Izutsu’s (2008) classification of Romanian coordinate conjunctions is well-founded.

One of the main challenges is to determine what type of contrast Zafiu’s (2005) ‘thematic contrast’ is and to what extent it matches/differs from the one envisioned by Izutsu (2008) for *iar*. Special attention will be paid to patterns that allow the replacement of *iar* with *dar*. At the same time, the patterns for the other conjunctions will be observed.

This thesis does not only present clear-cut cases. In order to confirm or refute the elements described above, I will present a number of problem cases.

#### 1.5. Significance of the study

The present thesis seeks a better understanding of the meaning of the English *but* and its Romanian counterparts. Due to its controversial nature *but* can be placed in the category of ‘difficult words’ with a more-or-less direct impact for translators, language teachers, and second language learners. By exploring the special properties of the Romanian words *dar*, *însă*,

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or whether they can also constitute non-plausible contrast pairs, case in which one conjunction may be preferred over the other (*dar* vs. *iar*).



*iar* and *ci*, and comparing them with English *but*, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to the theoretical understanding of these particular ‘difficult words’. This thesis shows that the different kinds of *but* have complicated semantic, pragmatic and syntactic patterns. The results of this thesis could be useful in future linguistic investigations of these words in English and Romanian, and their equivalents in other languages. Secondly, the results could be useful for studying translation problems. Thirdly, they could be useful for studying second language acquisition questions: How are these words learned in foreign language instruction? What difficulties do they cause for second language learners? How can they be taught better?

## 1.6. Layout of the study

The present thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the concepts and terminology, arguments for the study, Izutsu’s (2008) proposal, research questions, and the significance of the study. I will now give a brief description of the thesis layout. Chapter 2 will provide basic information about conjunctions in the truth-conditional sense, some background on the Relevance theory and pragmatic principles, such as implicatures and context. This will help with understanding the difference of interpretation between contrast, denial-of-expectation, and correction, in terms of the relationship between the two conjuncts that *but* coordinates. Chapter 3 discusses the different meanings of *but* (denial-of-expectation, contrast and correction) as described in the English literature. I will present various theories on the English *but* and the restrictions that apply to each of these meanings. The three meanings will be framed in terms of Izutsu’s (2008) general claim. From Vicente’s (2010) paper I will retrieve specific syntactic requirements that help dissociate the patterns for the corrective and what he refers to as ‘counterexpectational’<sup>21</sup> *but*. Chapter 4 is divided in two parts. Part 1 focuses on the Romanian adversative conjunctions, discussing them one by one and making a parallel with the properties identified for the English *but*. Core cases will be presented where Izutsu’s (2008) general claims seem to apply. Part 2 revolves around problem cases: counter-examples for the typical ‘contrastive’ patterns will be introduced and discussed. In this section, I will use as arguments the syntactic- and information structure constraints envisioned by Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011) for the conjunction *iar*. Chapter 5 formulates an overall conclusion to the thesis.

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<sup>21</sup> Here, denial-of-expectation.

## Chapter 2 – Background of the study

### 2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will consider the way in which the conjunction *but* behaves in both English and Romanian. The starting topic is the truth conditions of *but*, and what makes *but* and *and* conjunctions in the logical sense (section 2.4.1). I will continue by describing useful tools that help speakers and hearers infer meaning in a sentence (section 2.5.) At the same time, I will present the basics of the Relevance-theoretic framework (2.7.), which paves the way for Blakemore's relevant-theoretic approach to *but* in Chapter 3. In order to understand the type of relationship that exists between the conjuncts coordinated by *but*, it is useful to touch upon notions of information structure (2.8.), such as *focus topic*, *contrastive topic*, or *comment*. Many authors (for instance, Hill (2002), Krifka (2007), or Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011)) have noticed a connection between the distribution of topic(s), comment(s) and focus in a sentence, and the semantics, respectively the syntax of the sentence. These different arrangements are expected to clarify the difference between the denial-of-expectation and contrast reading as concerns the focused element in a two-way contrast setting. At the same time, we will see how negation helps place focus on the element to be corrected/replaced – in the corrective reading.

### 2.2. The conjunction *but* in English

#### 2.2.1. Meaning(s)

In terms of the opposition relations it creates, the word *but* has been classified either as concessive<sup>22</sup>, adversative, or contrastive together with other expressions such as *however*, *on the contrary*, *on the other hand*, *nevertheless*. It is said to have:

a) a contrastive meaning (see also example (1)a.):

(14) John is tall *but* Bill is short.                      R. Lakoff (1971: 133), Iten (2000: 179)

b) a denial-of-expectation meaning (see also example (2)):

(15) John is a Republican *but* he is honest.      Iten (2000: 176)

c) a corrective meaning (see also example (8)):

(16) That isn't my sister *but* my mother.      (ibid., p. 181)

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<sup>22</sup> Iten (2000); Izutsu (2008: 647) with reference to (Jespersen, 1940; Halliday and Hasan, 1976; Quirk et al., 1985; Leech, 1989, and others).

### 2.2.2. Position in the sentence

As for the position in the sentence/utterance, English *but* will never stand in final position. That can also be said of other coordinating conjunctions, such as *and*, or *or*. As concerns the initial, or ‘non-standard’ use of *but*, as Iten (2000: 183) refers to it, it has the role of introducing a main clause and linking two separate utterances in a discourse (by means of a contrasting idea). This pragmatic- or discourse- type of *but* can be used in two ways, according to Iten (p. 184), i.e. to introduce either an utterance that continues a previous one, or an utterance that begins a new discourse. Iten’s (2000: 185) examples for these two instances are rendered below, the latter of which she retrieved from Rouchota (1998b: 25):

(17) A: John’s in Paris at the moment.  
B: But I’ve just seen him in Oxford street.

(18) [Peter puts some salmon on Mary’s plate]  
Mary: But I’m allergic to fish.

The *discourse marker* use of *but* was also identified by Fraser (1999), who finds a similar utterance-initial role for *and*. See the following examples:

(19) Sue left very late. **But** she arrived on time. Fraser (1999: 932)

(20) John can’t go. **And** Mary can’t go either. (ibid.)

In its use as coordinating conjunction, *but* can coordinate sentences, as in the example below:

(21) Tom is quick, *but* Harry is slow.

Similar to *and* and *or*, it can also coordinate phrases inside a single sentence. See the following examples depicting phrase coordination:

a) Adjective phrase:

(22) She ordered a very hot but tasty soup.

b) Noun phrase:

(23) Thirty men, but fifteen women joined the test.

c) Verb phrase:

(24) He lost but remained composed.

Interestingly, many linguists (such as Vicente (2010), whose claims are discussed in section 3.6.2.) believe that some apparent phrasal coordinations with *but* may in fact involve

coordinated sentences with ellipsis affecting the second conjunct. This is relevant in the case of corrective *but*. See, for instance, example (16) resumed below:

(25) That isn't my sister *but* my mother. Iten (2000: 181)

Here, the subject NP ('she') and the verb ('is') was deleted, i.e. everything in the sentence except the focused phrase ('my mother'). A full sentence might sound like this:

(26) That isn't my sister *but* she is my mother.

### 2.3. The Romanian equivalents of the conjunction *but*

#### 2.3.1. Meaning(s)

In Romanian, the expression *but* can translate as the following coordinating conjunctions: *dar*, *însă* (arguably used for both *contrast* and *denial-of-expectation*, as we will see in section 4.2.5.1.), *ci* (used for *correction*), and *iar* (which integrates *and* ('și') in its meaning and is seen as a symbol of *thematic contrast* as noted in section 1.3.). All of these are classified by Zafiu (2005) as 'adversative conjunctions'.

Below we have the meanings stated in 2.2.1. for English, translated into Romanian:

a) the contrastive meaning:

(27) John este înalt *iar* Bill este scund.  
John is tall *but/and* Bill is short.  
"John is tall but Bill is short."

b) the denial-of-expectation meaning:

(28) John este republican *dar/însă* este onest.  
John is republican *but* (he) is honest.  
"John is a Republican but he is honest."

c) the corrective meaning:

(29) Aceea nu este sora mea, *ci* mama mea.  
that not is sister-DEF mine, *but* mother-DEF mine.  
"That isn't my sister, but my mother."

Izutsu's (2008) classification of the Romanian coordinate conjunctions assigns them to specific semantic categories, under the model: *iar* for contrast, *dar*, *însă* for concession (or denial-of-expectation), and *ci* for correction. According to Izutsu (2008: 650, ft.), "*dar* is a conjunction favored in various types of discourse, whereas *însă* is associated more with written language." Keeping this in mind may help to establish a difference in use between the two.

As regards example (27), it is not only the conjunction *iar*, but also *dar*, *însă* that can be used without rendering the sentence semantically or grammatically unacceptable. However, while the former triggers the contrast meaning, the latter two are said to give rise to a denial-of-expectation reading, according to Izutsu (2008: 650-651). What Zafiu (2005: 248) would imply, however, is that both *dar* and *însă* can be used for the contrastive purpose here. As mentioned in 1.3., I would argue that only *dar* can encode contrast, while *însă*, would trigger a denial-of-expectation meaning, even in a two-way ‘contrast’ structure. More on that in 4.2.2., Chapter 4.

Example (28) indicates a denial-of-expectation reading, since apparently, the second conjunct (John is honest) denies an expectation linked with the first conjunct (Republicans are dishonest). In this case, both *dar* and *însă* are used for such reading. However, as Zafiu (2005: 248) suggests, there are cases in which there exists a clear opposition between the sense of the propositions, that allows the reversibility of the clauses, even if the topic is the same. Such examples will be further investigated in 4.2.2.

Example (29) is a corrective one that displays ellipsis in the second conjunct. Correction-*but* sentences in Romanian work both with ellipsis (example (11)), and without, as in example (30) below:

- (30) *Aceea nu este sora mea, ci este mama mea.*  
 that not is sister-DEF mine, *but is* mother-DEF mine.  
 “That isn’t my sister, but she is my mother.”

### 2.3.2. Position in the sentence

According to Izutsu (2008: 650, ft.), there are syntactic differences between *dar* and *însă*: “*dar* has a fixed position in a clause, whereas *însă* can appear in various positions of a clause.”. According to Zafiu (2005: 246-7), *dar* can act both as coordinating conjunction, and take utterance-initial position (the discourse *but* mentioned by Iten (2000: 183, 184-5) and discussed at 2.2.2. above). Concerning *însă*, Zafiu claims that apart from these positions, it can also be used in utterance-final position. She agrees, however, that it is more frequent that *însă* occurs as a coordinator and as utterance-final element than an utterance-initial one (ibid.)

#### a) *Dar* and *însă*:

In Zafiu’s (2008: 249) example below, we can observe *dar* in utterance-initial position:

- (31) *Iepurașul mergea liniștit prin pădure. Dar deodată în fața lui apare lupul.*  
 Bunny-DEF was going calm-ADV through forest. But suddenly in front his appears wolf-DEF  
 “The bunny was calmly walking through the forest. But, suddenly, the wolf appeared in front of him.”

According to Zafiu, it would not be impossible to use *însă* in this position. This is, however, one of the few instances that allow the use of *însă* utterance-initial.

As conjunctions, *dar* and *însă* can coordinate sentences, as in the example below:

- (32) Elena e frumoasă, *dar/însă* Gabriela e urâtă.  
Elena is beautiful, CONJ Gabriela is ugly.  
“Elena is beautiful, but Gabriela is ugly.”

According to Zafiu (2005: 247), the liberty of movement of *însă*, grants it an emphasis role, as in the following cases:

- (33) E simpatic, *însă* nu inspiră încredere. (ibid.)  
(he)is nice, CONJ not inspire confidence.  
“He is nice, *but* does not inspire confidence.”
- (34) E simpatic, nu inspiră *însă* încredere. (ibid.)  
(he)is nice, not inspire ADV confidence.  
“He is nice, but does not, *however*, inspire confidence.”
- (35) E simpatic, nu inspiră încredere *însă*. (ibid.)  
(he)is nice, not inspire confidence ADV.  
“He is nice; does not inspire confidence, *though*.”

It is only in example (33) that *însă* behaves a coordinating conjunction. In example (34) and (35) it behaves as an adverb and can be translated as *however*, respectively *though*.

Similar to English *but*, both *dar* and *însă* can coordinate phrases inside a single sentence.

An example for adjective phrase coordination could be:

- (36) A comandat o geantă mică *dar/însă* ieftină.  
(she) AUX-to have ordered a bag small CONJ cheap.  
“She ordered a small but cheap bag”

The next example depicts noun phrase coordination:

- (37) Femeia *dar/însă* niciodată bărbatul nu a reușit să nască prunci.  
Woman-DEF CONJ never man-DEF not AUX-to have succeeded to give birth babies  
“The woman but never the man managed to (ever) give birth to babies.”

Verb phrases can be coordinated as such:

- (38) John va încerca *dar/însă* va eșua.  
John will try CONJ will fail  
“John will try but will fail.”

#### **b) *Iar*:**

Both according to Izutsu (2008: 650-1) and Zafiu (2005: 251-2), the conjunction *iar* does not occur in utterance-initial and utterance-final positions. It can only coordinate sentences:

- (39) Eu sunt profesor de lingvistică, iar soția mea este profesoară de geografie.

I am teacher of linguistics CONJ wife-DEF my is teacher of geography.  
“I am a teacher of linguistics, but/and my wife is a teacher of geography.”

Izutsu (2008: 650)

(40) Dan doarme. *iar* Maria citește. Zafiu (2005: 252)  
Dan sleeps CONJ Maria reads  
“Dan is sleeping and/but Maria is reading.”

c) *Ci*:

*Ci* can only coordinate sentences (although at a first glance it may seem it coordinates phrases). It is essential that the first conjunct contain a non-constituent negation. The second conjunct displays ellipsis (deletion of the verb – which preserves the null subject in Romanian), which can be seen in the example below:

(41) Ion nu e prost, ci leneș. Izutsu’s (2008: 650)  
Ion not is stupid but lazy  
“Ion is not stupid, but lazy.”

### 2.3.3. Summary

In sections 2.2. and 2.3. I have introduced the three meanings of *but* and various syntactic uses in both English and Romanian. I will focus on these three meanings of English *but* and its Romanian lexical counterparts strictly in their use as sentence coordinators, ignoring thus any adverbial use (e.g. in the case of *însă*). I will, however, briefly discuss the utterance-initial (*discourse marker*) use of *but* in sections 3.10., 4.2.3. and 4.2.6.

## 2.4. The truth-conditions of *but*

As a conjunction, *but* has the same truth-conditions as *and* (they are both logical conjunctions). According to Blakemore (1989: 15), there is a common belief that *but* incorporates *and* in its meaning, which allows both conjuncts coordinated by it to fall under the scope of truth conditional semantics, i.e. the whole utterance is true only if S1 and S2 are true. However, she observes that “utterances with *but* have contrastive connotations often lacking in utterances with *and*.” (ibid.) Her examples, listed below, are supposed to illustrate the difference of interpretation:

(42) Tom has come but he has brought his dog.

(43) Tom has come and he has brought his dog.

These examples mean to show that *but* actually consists of ‘and+something else’ (Blakemore, 1989: 15), which means that apart from semantics, *but* is subject to pragmatic interpretation<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> The study of how meaning is transmitted based on context, and other factors, among which linguistic knowledge, background knowledge, intention, and so on.

What this means is that in trying to determine what this additional part of its meaning (the ‘something else’) is, the context of discourse is important. And that cannot be captured by lexical semantics<sup>24</sup> alone.

Grice (1989) suggested that this aspect of the meaning of *but* (the ‘contrastive connotation’) is a *conventional implicature*, i.e. an implicature not arising from conversational principles (where listeners and speakers cooperate so to make themselves understood), but one associated with the word *but* as part of its lexical meaning. According to Clark (2013: 61), an example of a linguistic expression that encodes a conventional implicature, as suggested by Grice (1989) is “therefore”. See example below:

(44) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. (Clark, 2013: 61)

The rationale provided by Grice (1989) for this is that “the causal connection between being English and being brave is encoded by the word *therefore* rather than depending on inference in a specific context.” (ibid., p. 61)

However, as we have seen, the word *but* is said to encode not one, but three meanings in English, which translate into four different lexical versions in Romanian. Even if *but* disposes of so many counterparts in Romanian, it is still not clear that in all cases, the specialized word(s) encode just one meaning (see, for instance, *dar/însă*, even *iar*).

#### 2.4.1. Propositional logic symbols and methods of inference

For a better understanding of the difference in interpretation between *and* and *but* sentences it is useful to consider the clauses of each of the examples noted in 2.4. as made up of propositional logic symbols. The most common symbols used in this type of logic  $P$  and  $Q$ <sup>25</sup>, each of which expresses propositional meaning (either expressed or unexpressed assumptions). As far as example (42) goes, we use *BUT* as a representation of the word *but*, so that  $P \text{ BUT } Q$  indicate the meaning of *S1 but S2* (example 42). Logically, if we took  $Q$  to constitute the negation of  $P$ , the speaker would just contradict herself, and we would obtain an infelicitous result. Consider example below:

(45) Tom has come, **but** he has not come. ( $P \text{ BUT } \neg P$ )

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<sup>24</sup> The study of meaning encoded in a word.

<sup>25</sup>  $P$  and  $Q$  are elements of propositional logic which stand for natural language elements (propositions e.g.  $S1$ ,  $S2$ ) and which by means of logical connectives (or operators) such as  $\&$  (*and*; logical conjunction),  $\vee$  (*or*; disjunction);  $\neg$  (*not*, negation),  $\rightarrow$  (*if...then*, material implication) determine the truth-value of the sentences. Since *but* is said to incorporate *and* in its meaning, it fits the profile of truth-conditional semantics. The challenge is to find the pragmatic requirements or restrictions that cause it to trigger a contrast, a denial-of-expectation, or a corrective reading.



Since *but* includes *and* in its meaning, then that would make for a logical contradiction such as:

(46) Tom has come **and** he has not come. (*P AND  $\neg$ P*)

So far, the truth conditions for both (45) and (46) are the same. The rules of propositional logic dictate that if any of the conjuncts connected by *and* (logical conjunction also known as  $\wedge$ ), is false, then the entire sentence will be false. This means that *P but  $\neg$ P* is necessarily false, i.e. a logical contradiction, in the sense of Saeed (2016: 4).

When we analyse sentences coordinated by both *and* and *but*, we need to consider the following: *P* equals the propositional meaning of S1, *Q* equals the propositional meaning of S2. As I argued above, *Q* cannot be a negation of *P*. Neither can *P* have the same denotation as *Q* (even if these were, let us say, identical), since that would mean that *P AND Q* and *P BUT Q* would mean the same as *P AND P* or *P BUT P*, which is informationally redundant. Therefore, the two variables must have a different denotation so that *Q* be distinguished from *P* and at the same time be true as *P*.

Let us resume example (43) below:

(47) Tom has come **and** he has brought his dog.

In this case, the meaning of S1 is plainly that ‘Tom is here’. The second conjunct introduces a statement that comes as an addition to what was stated before, with *and* behaving as a copulative. The meaning of S2 does not cancel in any way what was derived from S1, i.e. that Tom is here.

Now let us resume example (42) below:

(48) Tom has come **but** he has brought his dog.

This example paints a different picture. Here, normally, the first clause would suggest something like ‘Tom is here’. However, the hearer needs to invest time in reconstructing its meaning, guided by the presence of *but*, which has contrastive connotations. This meaning has to be opposite to the meaning of ‘he has brought his dog’. That in this context, can only be ‘Tom has not brought his dog’. In pragmatic terms, this is the **denial of the ‘expectation’** (or *R*, the implication) derived from *P* (S1) based on contextual assumptions (*IF P THEN R*). The search for the assumptions that enables the meaning of *but* to be satisfied is facilitated by means of inference rules. By means of the rule of valid inference, also known as Aristotle’s *modus*

*ponens*<sup>26</sup>, hearers can derive new valid propositions from existing ones, whenever needed. Modus ponens imposes the following interpretation:

- (49) Premise 1: If Tom has come, then he has not brought his dog.  
IF P THEN R = contextual assumption (*Tom wouldn't normally bring his dog*)  
Premise 2 = P Tom has come.  
Conclusion = R He has not brought his dog.

In (48), *Q* ('Tom has brought his dog') seems to contradict the conclusion that arises from *P*, i.e. Tom has not brought his dog (*R*). This makes *Q* (the fact that he did actually bring his dog) unexpected. The propositional logic formula for denial-of-expectation is taken to be *R BUT Q*.

### 2.4.2. Interim summary

What we could observe is that the contrastive connotation of *but* arises from the communication of what Blakemore (2002: 111) would refer to as: "an assumption which is contradictory to an assumption which the hearer believes to be true." There are many factors that can influence the way in which a *but*-sentence can be interpreted, and they are semantic, syntactic and pragmatic. The next section discusses implicatures. Relevance Theory presented in section 2.7. serves to show how the interpretation of the sentence as a whole is strongly linked to how the conjuncts are interpreted in relation with each other. The last section, 2.8. presents elements of Information structure, that will set the foundation for my claim regarding the function of the Romanian conjunctions explained in Chapter 4.

## 2.5. Implicature

Pragmatic processes are always at work to help the hearer retrieve the meaning of a sentence. When engaged in a conversation, the hearer will interpret what is being said based on her own life experience, background knowledge and expectations. Either by employing one such tool, or all of them, both speakers and hearers will try to adjust to a particular conversation at the time it occurs and derive the implicature of what is being expressed, either verbally or via body language.

### 2.5.1. Grice's conversational implicature

Philosopher Paul Grice (1975, 1978, 1989) proposed an approach that is supposed to guide speakers and hearers towards successful communication. This approach consists of what

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<sup>26</sup> *Modus ponens* is defined, according to Saeed (2016: 448), as: "A form of valid logical argument where, given a conditional claim in one line, the antecedent to the condition in the second line, you can deduce the consequent in the third, e.g. (i)  $A \rightarrow B$ ; (ii) A; (iii) B."

he refers to as the cooperative principle, and the definition for it (in Saeed 2016: 210) is as follows:

“Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the exchange in which you are engaged.” (Grice, 1989: 26)

This principle appeals to the skills of participants in a conversation to anticipate possible communication problems and adjust to the interlocutor’s needs in terms of giving clues to their own knowledge or beliefs. This contribution includes asserting, denying, presupposing and anticipating certain outcomes in the dialogue. Saeed (2016: 211) exemplifies four maxims that Grice (1975) also developed as a backup to this conversational cooperation:

- *The Maxim of Quality* advocates truthfulness in communication.
- *The Maxim of Quantity* requires that informative limit should not be exceeded a conversation.
- *The Maxim of Relevance* requires that the contribution is relevant in relation to the previous course of discussion.
- *The Maxim of Manner* argues for clarity, brevity and order in dialogue.

These maxims guide the speaker and hearer in situations where they need to fill in the gap between what is being said, or the explicit form, and what is being implied, the implicit form (or the implicature).

For the purpose of this section, I will use two examples that (should) observe the maxim of relevance, retrieved from Saeed (2016: 211-2), that illustrate how implicature is derived, respectively cancellable:

(50) A: Can I borrow ten euros?

B: My purse is in the hall. (Implicature: yes)

This example shows that the positive answer is not uttered, but implied. The way to derive it is by ‘accessing’ the context. Here, the context is the fact that people (women especially) usually carry money inside a purse. The speaker knows this, the hearer knows it, and the speaker also knows that the hearer knows it. This is a confirmation that: Yes, the money is there, all you need to do is go in the hall and get it.

Now follows the second example:

(51) A: Can I borrow ten euros?

B: My purse is in the hall. But don’t you dare touch it. I’m not lending you any more money.

Here, the implicature derived from the first sentence is yes. But the next sentences explicitly cancel it or override it. In Saeed's (2016) terms, it is 'defeasible'. Speaker B's response in example (51) shows that one way to cancel an implicature is by means of *but*.

In trying to account for this capacity of *but* to communicate contrast or surprise, Grice (1989) developed the notion of *conventional implicature* (in Clark (2013: 61)), also mentioned at section 2.4. The idea here is that the meaning encoded by *but* is not dependent on context, which means that the 'contrastive connotations' of *but* cannot be cancelled. Blakemore (1989) also debated whether *but* can go beyond its linguistic meaning (similar to that of *and*) and incorporate such an inference that guides the interpretation of an utterance. I will present these issues in Blakemore's relevance-theoretic approach to *but* (in Chapter 3, section 3.9.) after I convey the basics of Relevance Theory in section 2.7.

Still in the broad area of implicatures, I refer to Grice's development of another notion, that of *conversational implicature*. This basically stipulates that understanding an utterance requires both linguistic information and contextual knowledge. According to Saeed (2016: 213), Grice distinguished between *particularized conversational implicature* and *generalized conversational implicature*. The former refers to situations where in order to derive implicature, context is needed (see example (50)). The latter can be inferred without reference to a special context and has a more predictable character. Consider the following example:

(52) Some girls participated in the competition.

The word 'some' usually implies 'not all'. However, its meaning can be overridden by context:

(53) Some, in fact all girls, participated in the competition.

As a conclusion, conversational implicatures, both particularized and generalized, are generally cancellable (defeasible). On the other hand, as Grice pointed out, conventional implicatures (discussed above) are not cancellable. This means that in terms of the 'contrast' meaning of *but* (the 'something else' that *but* incorporates in addition to the 'logical *and*-meaning') is not cancellable.

### **2.5.2. R. Lakoff (1971)**

As we have seen so far, in trying to interpret the different meanings of *but* described in the literature, it does not suffice to look at the relationship between the conjuncts simply based on truth conditions. It is clear that *but* has different meaning requirements than *and*.

R. Lakoff (1971: 133) provides an example of a sentence that is an assertion in the logical conjunction (or truth-conditional) sense. See her example below:

(54) John is tall **and** he's no good at basketball.

Alternatively, R. Lakoff (ibid.) provides an example of a sentence that, according to her, "is composed of an assertion plus a presupposition", two elements that condition the use of *but*:

(55) John is tall **but** he's no good at basketball.

As far as example (55) is concerned, R. Lakoff (1971: 133) mentions the notion of presupposition, or "a general tendency or expectation". According to Saeed (2016: 451), for instance, presupposition can be defined in terms of "a proposition assumed by a speaker when making an assertion."

This example can be analysed as a **denial-of-expectation** one using, once again, the *modus ponens* method of inference:

(56) If John is tall, then he is good at basketball.

The implicature (*R*) that arises from the first conjunct (*P*) and the presupposition (*IF P THEN R*) is:

(57) John is good at basketball.

The basic meaning of example (55) above is *P but Q* where the same truth conditions as for '*P and Q* plus + (plus) presuppositions' apply.

The same Lakoff (1971: 133) claims no existence of an implicit relationship in the following example, also noted in (14) and classified as a **semantic opposition** (contrast) sentence:

(58) John is tall but Bill is short.

This means that whether the sentence is taken as a whole, or as separate conjuncts, John is tall only means that John is tall, and Bill is short only that Bill is short. The comparison here is two-way neutral. The fact that *John is tall* does not imply that we would expect him to be short as Bill, the same way as we would expect John to be good at basketball in example (55). In such a case, the basic meaning of the sentence above is *P but Q* where the same truth conditions as for *P and Q* apply (leave the presuppositions).

What Lakoff (1971) identified as presuppositions most often stem from context, whether it is conversational context, or background knowledge. Every sentence or utterance depends on

context information to become interpretable. In the next section, I will analyse the different conditions that *but* sentences impose on the context, from the perspective of Izutsu (2008).

## 2.6. Izutsu's (2008) system of interpreting the three *but* meanings

Before proceeding with this section, it is worth noting that all *but* meanings impose conditions on the context. This means that the interpretation of every *but* sentence/utterance depends on context information such as, for instance, discourse context and background context. According to Saeed (2016: 198), it is useful that, in terms of discourse context, the persons involved in conversing understand the topic under debate, which influences “the way they interpret the meaning of what they subsequently hear”. Similar to discourse context, background context is essential. The latter is a type of knowledge that, according to Saeed (2016: 199), includes elements of “background, common sense, encyclopaedic, sociocultural, and real-world knowledge.” All of these are contributing factors to our functioning as a normal citizen in a society. They enhance our ability to understand the limits of a particular conversation and help us assess the knowledge of our interlocutors.

In terms of the meaning of the sentences coordinated by *but*, Izutsu (2008) relies on the lexicalization of conjunctions' in different languages (among others Romanian) for disambiguation. Zafiu (2005), on the other hand, advocates for the usefulness of context when it comes to distinguishing between the denial-of-expectation and contrast.

Even if Romanian lexicalizes certain expressions that pick (at least) one meaning, the context these appear in seems to have a lot to do with how we interpret the entire sentence. The context in which Izutsu (2008: 656) sees all *but* sentences as interpretable is one characterized by “the mutual exclusiveness of different compared items (CIs) in a shared domain”. According to Izutsu (*ibid.*), the *mutual exclusiveness* and the *shared domain* point to the idea of “the co-presence of similarity and difference” which, according to her, dates back to Lakoff (1971: 132). She claims that the idea of a shared domain points to Lang's (1984) notion of ‘common integrator’. As we will see in 4.2.2., this is a notion that Zafiu (2005) also uses when discussing the common basis that allows pure contrast between terms.

This sub-section aims to establish briefly further criteria for the interpretation of each of the *but* meanings, based on the parameters retrieved from Izutsu's analysis. Her view with regard to contrast, denial-of-expectation and correction will be described at length in 3.4.1. and 3.6.1., Chapter 3. For now, it suffices to mention that the means Izutsu (2008: 656) uses for comparing the three semantic categories of opposition are the following parameters:

“(i) The mutual exclusiveness of different compared items (CIs) in a shared domain

- (ii) The number and type of compared items (CIs)
- (iii) The involvement of an assumption/assumptions
- (iv) The validity of segments<sup>27</sup> combined”

1. Denial-of-expectation:

In terms of denial-of-expectation, Izutsu (2008: 662) distinguishes between the *Direct concessive* and *Indirect concessive* subcases. In both subcases, the first conjunct (S1) triggers an implicature or an ‘expectation’ that we so far have referred to as *R*. Regarding the general parameters mentioned earlier, Izutsu (2008: 656) claims that denial-of-expectation “is about one and the same entity” (here, the compared item), involves the use of assumptions, and sees both segments (or conjuncts) as valid.

**a) Direct concessive:**

Consider the following example:

(59) John is poor, but he is happy.

Izutsu (2008: 649) only formulates the example for the first subcase in the form of *Although S1, S2* (rendered below), which is based on the assumption that if John is poor, then he is normally not happy:

(60) Although John is poor, he is happy.

Here, the implicature *R* derived from *P* (S1: John is poor) is that ‘John is not happy’. *Q* (S2: John is happy) contradicts the implicature *R*.

The parameters set by Izutsu (2008: 664) for Direct concessive are the following:

- “(i) Two different compared items (CIs) occupy mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain.
- (ii) The compared items (CIs) are two different tokens of the identical entity with one in an assumption and the other in a propositional content.
- (iii) The relevant assumption is formulated as ‘If S1, (then normally) not S2.’”

Point (i) compares the implicature ‘John is not happy’ with the statement ‘John is happy’. Point (ii) explains the fact that is the second conjunct (S2) itself that contradicts the implicature of S1. Point (iii) formulates the assumption that the implicature builds on.

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<sup>27</sup> What Izutsu (2008) refers to as ‘segments’ represents in fact the ‘conjuncts’ that are joined (or coordinated) by a connective.

**b) Indirect concessive:**

The example provided by Izutsu (*ibid.*) for the second subcase is the following:

(61) The car is stylish and spacious, but it is expensive.

This is an example that points to two conclusions, because of the existence of two assumptions: the implicature of S1 that ‘We will buy the car’ (since it is stylish and spacious), and the implicature of S2 that ‘We will not buy the car’ (since it is expensive).

The parameters set by Izutsu (2008: 664) for Direct concessive are the following:

- “(i) Two different compared items (CIs) occupy mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain.
- (ii) The compared items (CIs) are two different tokens of the identical entity with each evoked as a part of a different assumption.
- (iii) The relevant assumptions are formulated as ‘If S1, (then normally) C’ and ‘If S2, (then normally) not C.’”

Point (i) compares the implicature ‘We will buy the car’ with the implicature ‘We will not buy the car’. Point (ii) explains the fact that is the implicature of the second conjunct (S2) that contradicts the implicature of S1. Point (iii) formulates the two assumptions.

**2. Contrast:**

As far as contrast goes, Izutsu’s (2008: 658) example is the following:

(62) John is small, but Tom is big.

This example is one where Izutsu sees the necessity of at least two compared items for the creation of an opposition relation (here John and Tom), where the two must be explicitly differentiated.

The specific parameters used by Izutsu (2008: 661) for the contrast reading are indicated below:

- “(i) Two or more different compared items (CIs) occupy mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain.
- (ii) The compared items (CIs) must be explicitly differentiated.”

Point (i) compares ‘John’ with ‘Tom’. Point (ii) explains the fact that the two are explicitly different. For that reason, Izutsu (*ibid.*) claims that contrast does not involve any particular background assumptions. Similar to denial-of-expectation, contrast confirms the validity of both segments.



### 3. Correction:

Regarding correction, Izutsu (2008: 667-8) agrees it is necessary that it display a morphologically independent negation. The example below is one where Izutsu (ibid.) shows the difference of interpretation between a corrective (a.) and a denial (b.) sentence:

- (63) a. He likes not coffee but tea.  
b. He doesn't like coffee, but he likes tea.

According to Izutsu (2008: 668), the first sentence denies “a previous assertion or implication”. The second sentence displays a propositional negation that gives rise to a negative assertion. In terms of the general parameters, Izutsu (2008: 671) claims that it is two non-explicitly differentiated items that are being compared. If they were explicitly differentiated, then the sentence would not have a corrective character. See example below:

- (64) John is not American but Bill is British.                      Izutsu (2008: 671)

Furthermore, it is not the case that correction involves assumptions, because of the explicit negation. Finally, in terms of validity of the conjuncts, it is only the second assertion that is valid, while the first assertion ‘John is American’ is rendered invalid, also due to the negation (John is not American).

The specific parameters of correction are thus, according to Izutsu (ibid.), the following:

- “(i) Two different compared items (CIs) occupy mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain.  
(ii) The compared items (CIs) are two different tokens of the identical entity before and after removal/relocation.”

Point (i) compares the tokens ‘coffee’ with ‘tea’. Point (ii) explains the fact that the two are different tokens of the same entity (the person in example (63)a.b.).

#### **2.6.1. Discussion and summary**

The three meanings, denial-of-expectation, contrast and correction were analysed based on the four general parameters provided by Izutsu (2008). While they all have in common the first parameter, “the mutual exclusiveness of different compared items (CIs) in a shared domain”, they tend to differ in terms of number of compared items, involvement of assumptions, or validity of the segments. Denial-of-expectation is divided into two subcases: Direct concessive and Indirect concessive. Contrast is similar to denial-of-expectation in that it validates both conjuncts. It differs from it in that it does not formulate assumptions.

Furthermore, it compares not one, but two clearly differentiated items. Correction does not explicitly differentiate between the two items, and one segment (the first conjunct) is rendered invalid because of the negation.

In **3.6.1.1.**, Chapter 3, I will discuss the so-called ambiguity that Izutsu (2008) claims between denial-of-expectation and correction. Focus<sup>28</sup> elements (*broad*<sup>29</sup> *focus*, *narrow*<sup>30</sup> *focus*), to be introduced in section **2.8.** and mentioned in section **2.9.** and in Chapter 3, section **3.2.**, will be shown to play an important role in the interpretation of the two meanings. The primary and secondary focus elements specific to a contrast case will be discussed in section **2.8.** of the present chapter, and in Chapter 3, **3.3.** and **3.11.1.**

The examples analysed in section **2.6.** of the present chapter are considered to have a denial-of-expectation, a contrast and respectively a corrective reading. As far as truth-conditions go, both conjuncts coordinated by *but* need to be true in order for *but* to function as a logical conjunction, similar to *and*. As we have seen, there are certain pragmatic restrictions such as discourse context and background knowledge, that can help derive implicatures and help interpret the *but* sentences into that *something else* mentioned in section **2.4.**

The next section describes Relevance Theory, as developed by Sperber & Wilson (1986), a theory that seeks to account for how humans extract relevance in communication. Relevance Theory is built on a cognitive approach. As we will see, *but* is a cognitively relevant in that it guides the interpretation of the sentence it coordinates.

## **2.7. Relevance Theory**

As discussed in section **2.5.1.**, the act of communication requires both effort from the speaker and from the hearer. Apart from the skills either of them brings into conversation, such as truthfulness, clarity or order, observing the maxims of cooperation require something additional. Namely, context. The relevance of an assertion depends on the extent to which it relates to the topic under discussion, and the relevance of an answer depends on the extent to which it accurately answers a question. In a way, Grice's *Maxim of Relevance* seems to cover all other maxims: accuracy requires truth, the right amount of information, clarity, brevity, and order. In a broad way, these form the context for relevance.

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<sup>28</sup> Notions of information structure such as 'focus', 'comment', or 'topic' will be described in section **2.8.** See **2.8.5.** for a type of focus that is specific for corrective cases.

<sup>29</sup> See section **2.8.2.**

<sup>30</sup> *Idem.*

In what they coined as Relevance Theory, Sperber and Wilson (1986) use the term ‘relevance’ in association with the notion of cognitive effects, i.e. according to Clark (2013: 363) “adjustments to the way an individual represents the world”. The cognitive effects being referred to are unequivocally related to the now familiar idea of assumption, where:

- One (or more) new assumption(s) interact(s) with old assumptions so to derive new assumptions for the effect Clark refers to as ‘contextual implication’ (p. 364)

We could think of a potential scenario like:

(65) John will get drunk if he takes another beer.

(old assumption based on previous experience with John)

(66) John is taking another beer.

(new assumption based on observation)

Sentences (65) and (66) act as contextual premises, allowing the conclusion (65) to be inferred:

(67) John will get drunk.

(contextual implication based on (65) and (66))

- One (or more) new assumption(s) reinforces the ‘less strongly evidenced’ old assumption for the effect of ‘strengthening an existing assumption’ (ibid.)

We could think of a potential scenario like:

(68) John might be drunk.

(weak assumption based on what an acquaintance just told me)

(69) John is unfocused and is stumbling when he talks.

(new assumption based on current observation)

(70) If someone is unfocused and is stumbling when he talks, then he is drunk.

(contextual assumption based on experience)

(71) John is definitely drunk.

(strengthened assumption based on the new assumption (69) and the contextual assumption (70))

- One new assumption provides more evidence against an old one in for the effect of ‘contradicting an existing assumption’ (ibid.)

We could think of a potential scenario like:

(72) John never gets drunk.

(old assumption based on knowledge on how John behaves)

(73) John is drunk.

(new assumption based on current observation)

(74) John can get drunk, after all.

(elimination of a previously held assumption, based on what I can derive from the current observations)

### **2.7.1. Summary**

Relevance Theory is, therefore, a cognitive framework and is based on two main principles. According to Clark (2013: 365), the First Principle of Relevance, also known as the Cognitive Principle, states that:

(75) “Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.”

What this means is that in terms of communication, the human mind is in a constant search for relevance and aims to achieve the greatest amount of positive cognitive effects for as little processing effort as possible. The Second Principle of Relevance, also known as the Communicative Principle, combines the maxims developed by Grice together with the cooperative principle so to stipulate the following:

(76) “Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.” (ibid.).

Here, the ostensive stimulus, in terms of communication, refers to the situation in which the speaker signals both the intention to communicate and “the intention to inform the audience of one’s informative intention” (Clark, 2013: 366). Furthermore, this intention must be recognized by the audience. By doing so, the speaker guarantees to put to use all the communication tools and skills so to create a good communication environment. This in an effort to make it relevant enough so to be worth the processing effort of the audience.

The second principle merely creates scenarios for communication that are intentional, and which ‘advertise’ for (and are recognized as) carrying optimal relevance. However, that is not the only way in which humans communicate. As we can see from the potential scenarios above, John’s behaviour is non-verbal, in other words, non-ostensive. There are so many ways in which we can use body language to communicate something. And this kind of language complements and interplays with ostensive communication.

Gutt (2000: 24) affirms that human communication is enabled by “the ability to draw inferences from people’s behaviour”. From what we observed earlier, we were able to infer meaning from behaviour which otherwise would seem unintentional, or inexplicitly formulated. As such, we can conclude that the two principles can apply both to verbal and non-verbal communication.

### **2.7.2. The cognitive relevance of *but***

Although criticised by Blakemore (1987), Grice’s idea<sup>31</sup> of a category of implicatures (so-called conventional) that are encoded in linguistic expressions has opened new horizons on the possible semantics of *but*. This led to Blakemore’s (1987) development of a procedural meaning account, where *but* is seen as guiding the process of inference, behaving in a functional way. This opposed to content words. Later, in 2002, Blakemore will assert that: “*but* encodes the information that the relevance of the segment it introduces lies in the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination”. (p. 108) Although *but* does not contribute to the truth conditions of an utterance, its relevance is high because it has the capacity to guide the interpretation of a sentence. *But* does not encode an implicature. *But* constrains the range of possible implicatures (the context).

But according to Clark (2013: 310), there are other elements that encode procedural meaning, thus guiding the interpretation of a sentence/utterance. Those elements include, among others, prosody and syntactic structures. It is possible that they overlap in their function and cancel the context altogether. For instance, in two-way contrast sentences described in section 2.5.2. The next section describes elements of information structure that are very likely to influence the meaning of a sentence.

## **2.8. Information structure properties of the three kinds of *but* sentence**

### **2.8.1. Introduction**

Information structure concepts like ‘topic’, ‘focus’, ‘new’ or ‘given’ are known for bringing semanticists, phonologists and syntacticians on common linguistic ground. By means of various grammatical devices, including morphological marking for topicality<sup>32</sup>, or left-

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<sup>31</sup> Two problems with this approach, which Clark (2013: 315) also supports, are: 1. The labelling. All implicature is inferred. If conventional implicature is linguistically encoded, then it should not be called conventional implicature. 2. If the word *but* encodes an implicature, this should be easy to pinpoint.

<sup>32</sup> Topicality – the specification of a topic, usually an individual or a place/thing, commonly set at the beginning of a sentence/clause. In a sentence, a topic is usually followed by a comment on it.

dislocation<sup>33</sup>, these elements can be highlighted and their coordinates in a sentence can provide useful cross-linguistic clues to meaning and interpretation. Morphological marking (for instance, particle marking in Japanese<sup>34</sup>), provides clues for the topic of the sentence. *Givenness*, usually associated with deaccenting<sup>35</sup>, serves to indicate the denotation of an expression in the immediate Common Ground<sup>36</sup> content.

One of the most highly discussed information structure concepts is that of *focus*. That is because focus “indicates the presence of alternatives that are relevant for the interpretation of linguistic expressions.”<sup>37</sup> Generally, the focus<sup>38</sup> constituent is marked by phonological prominence (pitch accent or prosodic phrasing). While the pragmatic use of focus mostly includes confirmations, corrections, or answers to *wh*-questions, the semantic use concentrates on negations, or focus-sensitive particles (*only, even, also*).

Hill (2002, abstract) claims that “focus has an impact on syntax although it is semantic.”<sup>39</sup> A similar view is supported by Gussenhoven (2007: 188) in terms of position in a syntactic structure. According to Hill, focus features penetrate grammar in association with [*wh*] and [*tense*], and cross-linguistic and contrastive configurations between Romanian and English become visible while observing the parametric setting for [*wh/focus*] or [*tense/focus*]. One of her observations is that preverbal focus constructions in Romanian are compared with English clefts. An example for that could be:

(77) Susan este cea care a încuiat ușa.  
 Susan is that-FEM who AUX-to have locked door-DEF.  
 “It is Susan who locked the door.”

<sup>33</sup> This is specific to languages such as German, where it is necessary to interpret the dislocated phrases as topics, according to Endriss & Hinterwimmer, (2007: 84). See example below:

*Peter, den hab ich lange nicht mehr gesehen.*  
 Peter, RP-MASC.ACC.SING have I long not more seen  
 ‘I haven’t seen Peter for a long time anymore.’

<sup>34</sup> Japanese is a topic language, where the *wa* topic-marking particle is attached to the topic element so to indicate its function (see Portner & Yabushita (1998) in Endriss & Hinterwimmer, (2007: 84)

<sup>35</sup> Phonologically, lack of accent that signals that a sentence constituent is already known, or ‘given’. According to Féry (2007: 176), the phenomenon referred to as deaccenting often indicates givenness and backgroundness. From a syntactic point of view, it is associated with anaphoricity, by Krifka (2007: 8).

<sup>36</sup> According to Féry (2007: 163) “The Common Ground is the knowledge which the speaker assumes to be shared by herself and her interlocutor at the moment of utterance.” – a notion originally introduced by Stalnaker (1974). Later, in 1982, he integrated the ‘topic’ notion in a theory of communication revolving around the notion of Common Ground.

<sup>37</sup> Krifka’s definition of *focus* (2007: 4) differentiates between ‘expression focus’ and ‘denotation focus’. The former, pragmatic use of focus does not influence the truth conditions of the sentence, while the latter does. A differentiation influenced by Rooth’s *Alternative Semantics* (1985, 1992), wherein he distinguished ordinary meaning from focus meaning of expressions.

<sup>38</sup> Bilbîie & Winterstein (2011) refer to focus as *informational focus*, one that bears prosodic stress.

<sup>39</sup> *Focus, checking theory and fronting strategies in Romanian*, Hill (2002, Abstract).

The following sub-sections will present basic aspects of the *focus*, *topic*, *contrastive topic* and *contrastive topic* elements. Defining these concepts is especially relevant for *iar* sentences (topic+comment). In my endeavour to show that *iar* sentences encode contrast, I will present a view according to which *iar* is an information structure sensitive element that must introduce a topic, that of Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011), in **4.3.1.3**.

### **2.8.2. Focus**

According to Krifka (2007: 23) *focus* expresses either the highlight of the utterance, or what the ‘new’ element in the utterance is, and usually answers covert<sup>40</sup> *wh*-questions (what happened or what someone did, for example). Rooth (2007: 57) agrees that the location of focus shifts if the *wh*-question element changes. Krifka (ibid.) claims it is used pragmatically for correction or confirmation purposes. A function of focus, he states, is to indicate alternatives. (p. 39) Focus operates semantically by means of focus-sensitive particles that are associated with it. Such particles are usually “in a position in which they can scope over their focus.” (p. 27) Rooth subscribes to the idea that, in some cases, “focus has a truth-conditional semantic effect” (ibid.)

Rooth (2007: 58) also distinguishes between *broad* and *narrow* focus, where the former applies to a large phrase, while the latter is usually restricted to a single word.

As for focus accent, it is a pitch accent that the focus receives in virtue of the function it fulfils, usually as a comment to a topic newly introduced in the discourse<sup>41</sup>. (Féry, 2007: 165)

### **2.8.3. Topic**

Krifka (2007: 41) argues that what has been referred to as the ‘subject’ in a terminologically ill manner by Chafe (1976) is in fact the notion of *topic*, which is defined as follows: “The topic constituent identifies the entity or set of entities under which the information expressed in the comment constituent should be stored in the CG<sup>42</sup> content.” According to Krifka (ibid.), the Prague School referred to *topic* as ‘theme’<sup>43</sup>, a notion he advises against, since it encompasses ‘old information’, while there exist ‘new topics’ that basically are followed by a comment constituent containing information that should be added to the Common Ground content. Plainly put, in terms of communication, the *topic* introduces the

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<sup>40</sup> A question that is not uttered, but implicit in the discourse.

<sup>41</sup> See the example “My car broke down.” (Féry, 2007: 164-5) where the pitch falls both on *my car* and on *broke down*, as the latter is an information added to the Common Ground. Alternatively, an eventive reading only places the pitch accent on *car*, since the entire utterance is understood as a single event.

<sup>42</sup> Common Ground.

<sup>43</sup> Zafiu (2005) brings into discussion the *thematic contrast* that the Romanian adversative conjunction *iar* expresses, a notion that will be further discussed in **4.2.3**.

entity identified by the speaker, and the *comment* provides the information about the respective topic. This idea is synthesized in what Féry (2007: 168) refers to as an ‘aboutness topic’, or “a referent which the remainder of the sentence is about [...] crucially followed by a focus constituent.”

There seems to be a strong preference for having topics at the beginning of the sentence in many languages. Halliday (1967-8) claims it to be a condition necessary for a topic (or a ‘theme’) (in Féry, 2007: 169) In terms of topicality, Endriss & Hinterwimmer (2007: 83) mention an aboutness-relation between the topic and the rest of the clause. However, Féry (ibid.) argues that the sentence-initial is not a default position for topics, although, she agrees, it is preferred for the sake of functionality.

Endriss & Hinterwimmer (ibid.) present the view generally held by many linguists<sup>44</sup>, that “(weak) familiarity is a necessary property of topics”, since most prevalent are examples with proper nouns, pronouns, or definite descriptions. However, they agree to Reinhart’s (1981) view, and that of others<sup>45</sup> in that a topic is not necessarily familiar, since it can also consist of indefinite DPs<sup>46</sup> (p. 85). In terms of topicality, they further argue that “modified indefinites and other quantificational DPs are excluded from topic positions” (ibid.)

#### **2.8.4. Contrastive topic**

*Contrastive topics* are a popular area of research in the information structure framework, because they combine both topic and focus. According to Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011: 6), contrastive topics are “elements that have already been mentioned, or are salient in the discourse.” and “the informational structure of an utterance can be made explicit by using an overt<sup>47</sup> question (e.g. one that specifies the elements that will be the CT).”

Since contrastive topics usually imply the existence of alternatives in discourse, Krifka (2007: 44), set out to perform a focus-within-topic analysis. In terms of accent, Krifka agrees that they are “topics with a rising accent.” (ibid.)

#### **2.8.5. Contrastive focus**

According to Selkirk (2007: 126) *contrastive focus* helps determine the semantic interpretation of the sentence and affects both truth conditions and conversational implicatures. She uses the following examples:

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<sup>44</sup> Cf. Hockett (1958); Kuno (1972); Gundel (1988); Portner & Yabushita (1998).

<sup>45</sup> Molnar (1993) and Frey (2000, 2004).

<sup>46</sup> Determiner phrases (article + noun: ‘the boy’, demonstrative + noun: ‘this boy’, possessive + noun: ‘my boy’, quantifier + noun: ‘many boys’, interrogative + noun: ‘which boy’, etc.)

<sup>47</sup> A question that is actually uttered in the discourse.



(78) I gave one to Sarah, not to Caitlin.

and

(79) I only gave one to Sarah.

She indicates that “the meaning of the sentence includes a specification that there exist alternatives to the proposition expressed by the sentence which are identical to that proposition except for different substitutions for the contrastively focused constituent.” (ibid.)

Zimmermann (2007: 147) put forth a contribution on Contrastive Focus that treats notions like ‘hearer expectation’ and ‘discourse expectability’, on the premise that “the less expected a given content is judged to be for the hearer, relative to the Common Ground, the more likely a speaker is to mark this content by means of special grammatical devices, giving rise to emphasis.” Contrastive focus marking is assumed to be “typically absent in answers to *wh*-questions [...] and typically present in correcting statements.” (ibid., p. 154)

For instance, let us rephrase the example (78) into:

(80) I didn’t give one to Caitlin, but to Sarah.

Here, the sentence preserves the contrastive focus marking despite the sentential negation added in the first clause.

## 2.9. Discussion and summary

Denial of expectation uses the same topic in both conjuncts. The second conjunct uses the same entity to cancel or deny the implicature of S1. The entity in the second conjunct will therefore take the form of an anaphora, usually in the form of a personal pronoun. Anaphoricity is, as mentioned in 2.8.1. (footnote 35), associated with deaccenting. This means that the topic of the second conjunct will not be focused (stressed), but instead given (or familiar). What is focused is then the entire conjunct, since it is the implications of the two conjuncts that are being compared. See R. Lakoff’s (1971: 133) example (55), resumed below:

(81) [John is tall]<sub>BROAD FOCUS</sub> **but** [he’s no good at basketball]<sub>BROAD FOCUS</sub>.

Denial-of-expectation *but* sentences, thus, do not involve contrastive topics, and they do not involve narrow contrastive focus (unlike correction *but*). Each of the two conjuncts has its own focus, which is typically ‘broad focus’.

In 2.7.2. we saw that *but* is seen as constraining the context (the range of possible implicatures). But at the same time, so do prosodic elements and syntactic structures. It may be so that these elements overlap. In 2.8.3., and 2.8.4., I cited sources that claim that *topics*,

respectively *contrastive topics* display weak familiarity and are salient in the discourse. This, while comments represent elements that are new and should be added to the Common Ground content (the knowledge shared between the speaker and the hearer at the time of the utterance). As noted in Féry (2007: 165), section **2.8.2.**, the comment to a topic that was recently introduced in the discourse bears a pitch accent. Finally, as seen in **2.8.1.**, it is the focus constituent that is marked by phonological prominence (pitch accent). In the case of contrast-*but* both S1 and S2 show a parallel two-part topic-comment structure. I suggest that in such cases, there is a so-called primary<sup>48</sup> stress that falls on the attributes (comments). The topics will display a secondary stress.

Let us reconsider Lakoff's (1971: 133) example (14) with the elements described:

(82) [John]*SECONDARY FOCUS* is [tall]*PRIMARY FOCUS* **but** [Bill]*SECONDARY FOCUS* is [short]*PRIMARY FOCUS*

Correction cases involve an implicature and an assertion. In correction cases, it is negation that has a great influence on where the focus is placed. The negation takes, in this case, scope over the following element.

In section **2.8.5.** I discussed the notion of *contrastive focus*, which according to Zimmermann (2007: 154), is specific to corrective cases. Example (16), reproduced below, illustrates this:

(83) That isn't [my sister]*CONTRASTIVE FOCUS* but [my mother]*CONTRASTIVE FOCUS*

As mentioned in **2.6.**, the pragmatic and syntactic interpretation of the three meanings of *but* will be discussed at length in Chapter 3.

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<sup>48</sup> Wilder, Christopher, (p. c., October, 2017) suggested that given the fact that both elements in S2 (topic and comment) contrast with the elements in S1, they should both be prominent to some extent. For such purpose, it is indicated to use notions such as 'primary' or 'secondary' stress (focus).

**2.10. Summary table with the information structure and pragmatic requirements for the three *but* meanings**

<p><b>The three meanings of <i>BUT</i></b></p>	<p><b>Pragmatic and Information structure requirements</b></p>	
<p><b><i>Denial-of-expectation</i></b></p>	<p>- <i>assertion + implicature (assertion + presupposition in the sense of Lakoff (1971))</i>  <u>Izutsu (2008) claims:</u>  <b>- mutual exclusiveness of different compared items (CIs) in a shared domain</b>                      - entity compared with itself                      - one assumption in Direct concessive                      - two assumptions in Indirect concessive                      - validation of both conjuncts in all cases</p>	<p><i>Broad focus on each conjunct</i></p>
<p><b><i>Contrast</i></b></p>	<p>- <i>No background assumptions</i>                      - <i>semantic opposition in the sense of Lakoff (1971)</i>  <u>Izutsu (2008) claims:</u>  <b>- mutual exclusiveness of different compared items (CIs) in a shared domain</b>                      - comparison of two clearly differentiated elements                      - lack of assumptions                      - validation of both conjuncts</p>	<p><i>Primary focus on comments</i>  <i>Secondary focus on topics</i></p>
<p><b><i>Correction</i></b></p>	<p>- <i>implicature and assertion</i>                      - <i>morphologically independent negation in the 1<sup>st</sup> conjunct</i>  <u>Izutsu (2008) claims:</u>  <b>- mutual exclusiveness of different compared items (CIs) in a shared domain</b>                      - comparison of two tokens of the same entity                      - can build on previous assumptions                      - 1<sup>st</sup> conjunct invalid, 2<sup>nd</sup> valid</p>	<p><i>Focus placed on element after negation,</i>  <i>Contrastive focus</i></p>

## Chapter 3 – The ‘three meanings’ of the English adversative *but*

### 3.1. Introduction

In this chapter I will discuss different meanings of the English *but* (denial-of-expectation, contrast and correction), and the restrictions that apply to each of them according to the literature. I will briefly compare English with other languages, including Spanish, German and Russian. By analysing previous theories about the English *but*, I aim to differentiate between the denial-of-expectation *but* and the contrast *but* on the one hand, and between denial-of-expectation *but* and corrective *but* on the other. For that purpose, I will address different syntactic requirements (in Vicente’s (2010) sense), as well as different semantic and pragmatic requirements in terms of the two conjuncts. Lastly, I will consider how these meanings fit into Izutsu’s (2008) general claim.

The examples below show the three meanings of English *but*, as noted in the literature:

#### A) Contrast:

- |   |                       |
|---|-----------------------|
| (84) a. John is tall but Bill is short. | R. Lakoff (1971: 133) |
| b. Susan is tall but Mary is short.     | Blakemore (1989: 16)  |
| c. John is rich, but Tom is poor.       | Izutsu (2008: 648)    |

#### B) Denial-of-expectation:

- |   |                      |
|---|----------------------|
| (85) John is a Republican but he is honest. | G. Lakoff (1971: 67) |
|---|----------------------|

#### C) Correction:

- |  |                  |
|--|------------------|
| (86) That isn’t my sister but my mother. | Iten (2000: 181) |
|--|------------------|

### 3.2. Denial-of-Expectation *but*

According to Iten (2000: 176), G. Lakoff (1971: 67) proposed an example (see (85) above), where *but* is assigned this type of interpretation:

- (87) John is a Republican but he is honest.

Iten acknowledges that this example is one which, according to R. Lakoff (1971) this time, “involve[s] an implication relation between the two conjuncts”, where the first one (*John is a Republican*) “implies an assumption that is then contradicted by the second conjunct” (ibid.), which is *he is honest*. Therefore, what primarily seems to define denial-of-expectation is: the

implicature (or the expectation) that arises from the first conjunct (S1) is denied by the assertion in the second conjunct (S2).

A second feature that seems to differentiate it from, for example, the Contrast reading (to be described in section 3.3.), is that it does not need a ‘two-way contrast’ pattern. This means that denial-of-expectation is characterized by asymmetry<sup>49</sup>. Thus, if we try to reverse the two conjuncts, the result would sound strange. One such example (also noted as (55)) characterized by irreversibility is shown below. It contains, according to R. Lakoff (1971: 133), an assertion and a presupposition<sup>50</sup> which need to go hand in hand for the entire sentence to gain meaning:

(88) John is tall but he’s no good at basketball.

Here, R. Lakoff claims that “the conjunction as a whole is asserted: *John is tall and he’s no good at basketball.*”, (ibid.), and the presupposition is that when someone is tall, he/she is expected to be good at playing basketball. R. Lakoff calls this use of *but* denial-of-expectation. This example is very similar to G. Lakoff’s (1971: 67) example (84) reproduced below:

(89) John is a Republican but he is honest.

In both cases, if the conjuncts should be reversed, the sentences would sound odd:

(90) ?John is no good at basketball but he’s tall.

(91) ?John is honest but he is a Republican.

What is notable as a third characteristic of the denial-of-expectation reading, in dissociation with the correction reading this time, is the lack of a negated first conjunct. To be noted that while denial-of-expectation *can* feature a negated first conjunct (see example below), it is not a requirement, as in the case of correction:

(92) He didn’t win but he ran well<sup>51</sup>.

This creates a certain implication in S1 (*he didn’t run well*) which is then contradicted by S2 (*but he ran well*).

As we will see in section 3.5., the negated first conjunct is an explicit feature of correction *but*, and the absence of it rules out the corrective meaning. What seems to be a pattern for

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<sup>49</sup> Even if denial-of-expectation does not need a two-way contrast, it is compatible with it (yet it displays only one, not two different topics that contrast with each other). In section 4.2.2. I will provide some interesting examples characterized by reversibility, according to Zafiu (2005: 248), that can feature *dar* (and presumably *însă*) ions.

<sup>50</sup> As mentioned in section 2.5.2.

<sup>51</sup> Wilder, Christopher, (p. c., May, 2018)

denial-of-expectation is the fact that each conjunct must contain a focus. This was expressed in section 2.9., in example (81), resumed below:

(93) [John is tall]<sub>BROAD FOCUS</sub> **but** [he's no good at basketball]<sub>BROAD FOCUS</sub>.

This pattern is also visible for G. Lakoff's (1971: 67) example (85):

(94) [John is a Republican]<sub>BROAD FOCUS</sub> **but** [he is honest]<sub>BROAD FOCUS</sub>.

If we were to analyse the topic-comment pattern that denial-of-expectation creates, this one would not seem to reflect an [A1 B1] *but* [A2 B2]<sup>52</sup> condition. That is due to the anaphoric element in the form of a personal pronoun. Thus, looking at the examples (93) and (94) above, we see the topic *John* contrasting with the topic *he*. Even if the topics do not differ in meaning, it would probably be possible to analyse the denial pattern as [A1 B1] *but* [A2 B2], since the topics *do* differ in form.

On the other hand, notice how the example below differs from (93) and (94) above in terms of meaning and syntax:

(95) John asked Mary a question but she didn't answer<sup>53</sup>.

We can see that *John* semantically contrasts with *she*. At the same time we can see that 'she' is the anaphoric element of something already mentioned in S1, characterized by givenness and backgroundness (also see section 2.8.1., footnote 35). Because it is again the case that the implicature of the first conjunct is contradicted by S2, which requires broad focus over each conjunct, this sentence is a denial-of-expectation one. This case, too, raises a question about whether denial-of-expectation *but* sentences can have a [A1 B1] *but* [A2 B2].

Interestingly, the translation of these examples into Romanian would allow the use of *dar/însă*. It would even allow the forced use of *iar* because of the existence of the said topic, in a sentence that is grammatical. This is what I would call a 'dummy' contrast pattern: the contrast pairs are in fact not plausible, and the construction is infelicitous for contrast. More on this topic in section 4.3.

### 3.3. Contrast *but*

In sections 1.1. and 2.2.1., we could also see that one of the meanings of *but* is that of contrast. The main specificity of the *contrast* example listed below (also shown as example

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<sup>52</sup> Where A1 and A2 would be two separate topic phrases, and B1 and B2 two separate focus phrases.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. ft. 4.

(84b.), presented by Blakemore (1989: 16), is the parallel Topic-Comment structure in the conjuncts, which gives a two-way contrast:

(96) Susan is tall but Mary is short.

In the sense of R. Lakoff (1971: 133) this makes the case of a ‘semantic opposition’ *but*. Semantic opposition but sentences feature antonyms (a semantic opposite relationship between the comment parts, *tall* and *short*, in this case). Her example is also one that allows the two conjuncts can be reversed, without causing any relationship to be disrupted (p. 133):

(97) John hates ice cream but I like it.

Below we can see examples (96) and (97) reversed. As mentioned above, this does not render the sentences odd:

(98) Mary is short but Susan is tall.

(99) I like ice cream but John hates it.

R. Lakoff points out that *but* “has some of the properties of *and*, plus some complexities of its own. Like *and*, *but* requires a common topic.” (p. 131) What she seems to be referring to is surely not cases where the topic is identical in both (e.g. anaphora) but where “the two members of the conjunct joined by *but* must be related to one another, in some way”, where “the relationship is based on semantic rather than purely lexical similarity.” (ibid.) In this contrastive reading, the conjuncts contain antonyms and “no conclusion about the second member of the conjunct is derivable from the first”. (R. Lakoff, 1971: 133). This idea of a ‘common topic’ appears to be similar to what Izutsu (2008) refers to as ‘shared domain’. This was discussed in section 2.6. and will be expanded on in 3.4.1. and 4.2.2.

As we can observe, the contrastive pattern is somewhere along the lines: [A1 B1] *but* [A2 B2]. It involves no denial of the implicature in S1 by the second conjunct. What makes it similar to the case of denial-of-expectation, however, is that it does not require the existence of a negated conjunct in the first clause. Nonetheless, contrast can display a negated first conjunct, as in the example below:

(100) John didn’t arrive, but Mary did arrive.

In contrast sentences, the primary focus is on the comments and the secondary on the topic. This will be discussed in 3.11.1., 4.2.3. and 4.3.1.2.1.

### 3.4. Symmetry vs. asymmetry - discussion

A great deal of discussions in the literature revolve around the distinction between the *contrast vs. denial of expectation* meaning, which dates back to G. Lakoff (1971). It was the same year that R. Lakoff (1971) distinguished between a semantic opposition *but* and a denial-of-expectation *but*. This triggered a discussion about symmetry vs. asymmetry.

R. Lakoff's main arguments regarding the semantic opposition *but* can be associated with what she refers to as symmetric *and* (pp. 135-6). The common denominator here is the 'independence' of the conjuncts: their reversibility, with no change in meaning of the sentence as a whole. Yet, since *but* differs from *and*, R. Lakoff's approach to semantic opposition *but* is that of a 'symmetric *and* + presupposition of difference in meaning'<sup>54</sup>, as in her example (p. 135):

(101) Fords can go fast, but Oldsmobiles are safe.

This example is one which, according to R. Lakoff, presents two different virtues of cars (hence, the above-mentioned difference in meaning).

On the other hand, the denial-of-expectation *but* is associated with an asymmetric *and* that does *not* allow the reversibility of the conjuncts. The example provided by R. Lakoff (ibid.) is the following:

(102) Fords can go fast, but Harry will never get a ticket for speeding.

This example involves, according to R. Lakoff, a presupposition (*Harry has a Ford*) and a causation (ability to go fast leads to speeding, speeding leads to getting a ticket). This set of properties would, according to R. Lakoff (p. 141), naturally allow that the denial-of-expectation *but* undergo replaceability with the subordinating conjunction *although*<sup>55</sup>. This is basically a paraphrasability of *P but Q* with *although P, Q*, where *although* integrates the presupposed conjunct in its meaning.

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<sup>54</sup> I take presupposition of difference in meaning to be different than the usual presupposition associated with an implicature.

<sup>55</sup> According to Izutsu (2008: 647), this way of paraphrasing with *although* clarifies the semantic distinction between the concessive and the simple contrast (where *although* signals the former). Izutsu refers to denial-of-expectation as concession. This term is generally used in the context of subordinate clauses introduced by subordinating conjunctions: here, *but* sentences paraphrased by *although*. Such sentences can only take a denial-of-expectation reading (even if they were previously semantic opposition sentences). Substitution with *although* does not apply to corrective cases because of the sentential negation in S1, which creates the expectation of an upcoming corrective clause (which undoubtedly follows) and does not signal the unexpected. In principle, neither contrast (in the symmetrical, reversible sense), nor corrective cases should be described as concessive.



### 3.4.1. Izutsu's view on the contrast *but* and denial-of-expectation *but*

As mentioned in 2.6., Chapter 2, when describing the contrast, denial-of-expectation and correction<sup>56</sup> meanings, Izutsu (2008: 656) argues for a common denominator that characterizes all meanings: ‘mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain’. By *domain* she understands “a context for the characterization of a semantic unit” (p. 659).

Izutsu sees contrast as a “simple opposition between the propositional contents of two symmetrical clauses” (p. 658). One of the examples provided by her is the following:

(103) I've read sixty pages, whereas she's read only twenty. (p. 648)

This example works as a *but* sentence, as shown below:

(104) I've read sixty pages, *but* she's read only twenty.

Here, “the compared items (CIs) must be explicitly differentiated.”, and “the speaker simply asserts the validity of both S1 and S2; neither claim is rejected.” (p. 661).

As far as the denial-of-expectation reading goes, she differentiates between two categories: direct- and indirect concessive. The former signals an unexpected relation between clauses, where the comparison is made between the assumption evoked from S1 and the propositional content of S2. The direct concessive type of reading is one where *but* can be replaced by *although*. It allows the invocation of assumptions by means of the *if... then* formula (as seen mentioned in the literature). Izutsu illustrates the pattern (also see example (59)):

(105) a. Although John is poor, he is happy<sup>57</sup>. (p. 662)  
b. If John is poor, (then normally) he is not happy.

The latter, indirect concessive type of reading, invokes the comparison of different assumptions. Izutsu (*ibid.*) provides such an example:

(106) The car is stylish and spacious, but it is expensive.

In her opinion, this example cannot follow the same patterns as the direct concessive, as it will become infelicitous:

(107) ?If the car is stylish and spacious, (then normally) it is not expensive.

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<sup>56</sup> To be discussed in the next section 3.5.

<sup>57</sup> Both this example and example (105) have been mentioned in 2.6., Chapter 2.

Although not mentioned, example (106) would also sound odd with *although*, since we would normally expect that if a car is stylish and spacious, it is expensive:

(108) ?Although the car is stylish and spacious, it is expensive.

Therefore, Izutsu's (2008: 666) predictions with how such a sentence should behave in terms of assumptions are "‘If S1, (then normally) C’ and ‘If S2, (then normally) not C.’". The results are:

(109) If the car is stylish and spacious, (then normally) it is expensive.

(110) If the car is expensive, (then normally) it is not is stylish and spacious.

Depending on the conclusion, the results are infelicitous if the arguments are reversed (the conclusion is determined by the speaker's argumentative choice):

(111) #I will buy the car: The car is stylish and spacious, but it is expensive.

(112) I will buy the car: The car is expensive, but it is stylish and spacious.

While the first example is unacceptable, the second is. If the conclusion is different, we will only perceive the first example that follows as acceptable:

(113) I will not buy the car: The car is stylish and spacious, but it is expensive.

(114) #I will not buy the car: The car is expensive, but it is stylish and spacious.

To conclude, the way in which Izutsu (2008) sees contrast is similar to R. Lakoff's (1971) idea of a semantic opposition *but*. R. Lakoff (1971: 131) suggests that *but* is similar to *and* in that they both require a 'common topic'. The validity of both S1 and S2 is asserted by the speaker, and there exists no other presupposition than difference in meaning ('mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain'). In terms of the denial-of-expectation (or concessive) reading, Izutsu's view involves a direct concessive *but*, and an indirect concessive *but*.

### 3.5. Correction *but*

There are many accounts for the corrective use of *but*. Iten (2000) presents a comprehensive review of previous views on it. She considers Abraham's (1979) account, where correction *but* is associated with the German 'sondern'. According to Abraham, this type of *but* excludes the denial-of-expectation effect. Iten (2000: 181) provides the following example, also noted in section 3.1. as number (86):

(115) That isn't my sister, but my mother.

Iten (ibid.) agrees that this example could be regarded as denial-of-expectation as long as it lacks ellipsis, in the form:

(116) That isn't my sister, but it is my mother. (emphasis mine)

At the same time, she argues that the only viable German conjunction in this case would be *aber*, typical for the denial reading, not *sondern*.

In corrective patterns, using negation (*isn't*, *n't*) helps the speaker narrow down on the meaning, since as we have seen, in a correction case, negation places the focus on the element to be corrected. This means that negation can help the speaker trigger various presuppositions, and direct the meaning of the sentence based on her preferences.

Iten (2000: 193-4) provides a second account on the corrective *but*, by Anscombe & Ducrot (1977), where a certain use of the word *mais* in French, *Mais<sub>SN</sub>*, has a corrective reading. According to these authors, the negation in correction *but* sentences is 'polemic'. It signals an objection to a potential utterance – not only a preceding utterance. According to Iten (2000: 196), their polemic negation is similar to Horn's (1985, 1989) metalinguistic negation. Iten cites Carston (1996b: 320) in that "[...] the scope of the negation operator, or some of it at least, is echoically used, in the sense of Sperber and Wilson (1986), Wilson and Sperber (1988[b], 1992)." This *echoic use* refers to the fact that a speaker can raise objections regarding presuppositions, register, or phonetic forms. I provide some examples for each type of objection:

(117) Those who wrote the Gospels were not three, but four. (What you presupposed to be true is wrong)

(118) It's not 'What's up?', but 'How do you do?'. (Your register is wrong)

(119) He doesn't play footBALL<sup>58</sup>, but FOOTball. (Your pronunciation is wrong)

The two accounts provided by Iten (2000) have in common the fact that the negation in the first clause is explicit, or non-incorporated. In terms of the A & D's account, both *Q* (the correction) and *P* (the utterance that should be corrected) should characterize the same kind of fact, and *Q* should be able to provide clear refutation of *P*. This is consistent with Izusu's (2008: 669) idea of 'shared domain' that she agrees applies to all meanings (including correction):

(120) John is not American but British.

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<sup>58</sup> The letters in caps mark prosodic stress.

This example features the nationality domain, while the next, also provided by Izutsu, invokes different domains, which renders it unacceptable:

(121) ??*John is not American but handsome.* (ibid.)

Iten (2002: 194) also provides an example for the corrective use of *but* that involves the same domain, which can be captured in the form of ‘your words are wrong’:

(122) Peter didn’t attend the peace talks but tend the pea stalks.

This example involves ‘metalinguistic correction’, similar to examples (118) and (119). This means that they do not involve correction of the sentence meaning / ‘proposition expressed’ in *P*, but of the linguistic form of *P*.

What seems to be common territory in examples (116) - (122) is that in the second clause there should exist an identical entity to the one in the first (an idea expressed by Izutsu at page 670). Example (121) features John, and example (122) features Peter. I would agree that Iten’s example (122) invokes a correction of the semantic item that is almost identical phonetically. Thus, we have a shared domain – the phonetic area –, and mutually exclusive meanings.

### **3.6. What makes correction *but* different**

#### **3.6.1. Izutsu’s (2008) view**

As mentioned in section 3.4.1., according to Izutsu (2008: 656) the common denominator for all three meanings is ‘mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain’. In the case of corrective reading she argues for the comparison of two different features, or tokens, of the same entity “before and after removal/relocation.” Similar to Iten (2000), Izutsu acknowledges the specific syntactic features of the corrective sentence, in terms of “the presence of a morphologically independent negative and the deletion of repeated items in the second conjunct”<sup>59</sup> (p. 654), in the sense of A & D’s (1977) account of the French *Mais<sub>SN</sub>*.

##### **3.6.1.1. The ambiguity between denial-of-expectation and correction**

Interestingly, using a relatively similar example to example (114), Izutsu (2008: 652) argues that the interpretation between denial-of-expectation and corrective is ambiguous:

(123) Mary is not stupid but ugly.

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<sup>59</sup> Ellipsis.

The negation in the corrective *but* reading *needs* to have a metalinguistic<sup>60</sup> role. This means it dominates the propositional material and does not form an integrating part of what it denies. Thus, negation in a corrective setting can be sentential<sup>61</sup> (non-constituent), or constituent. The two notions will be explained below:

### a) Sentential negation

Contracted negations will always have a sentential character<sup>62</sup>. Consider example (123) above. The syntactic analysis of this example can be done in virtue of the ellipsis that characterizes the corrective reading:

(124) [S<sub>1</sub>Mary isn't [FOCUS=AP stupid]] but [S<sub>2</sub> ~~she is~~ [FOCUS=AP lazy]]<sup>63</sup>.

The meaning of this example is thus *[NOT P] BUT Q*<sup>64</sup>, where *P* stands for 'Mary is stupid', and *Q* for 'Mary is lazy'. The focus on each conjunct is broad.

As we can observe, the English correction restriction requires an elliptical second clause. Thus, as Izutsu (2008: 655) argues, what we observe in example (124) is a deletion of the subject and the copular verb<sup>65</sup> in S<sub>2</sub>.

According to my supervisor<sup>66</sup>, the denial-of-expectation reading is very difficult to get for example (123). This would suggest that Izutsu's claim of ambiguity is wrong. Only the corresponding sentence without ellipsis would have a denial-of-expectation reading:

(125) Mary isn't stupid, but *she is* lazy.

Izutsu (2008: 652) observes that one can distinguish a corrective *but* sentence by inserting a 'rather' or 'instead' in the second conjunct. This does not disturb the ellipsis format. Izutsu's example cited from (Pusch, 1975:58) is rendered below:

(126) Mary isn't stupid, but *instead* (or *rather*) ugly.

Although possible, there is no requirement of a sentential negation in denial-of-expectation cases. Example (92), resumed below, cannot pass the 'corrective' for several reasons:

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<sup>60</sup> When referring to negation, the term sentential and metalinguistic seem to be used interchangeably in the literature. However, they are two separate items. Metalinguistic negation refers to the whole range of negations that operate outside the morphology of a word. It does include, among others, the sentential vs. constituent type, wide vs. narrow scope, and so on.

<sup>61</sup> As opposed to negation incorporated in a word: see 'improbable' as opposed to 'not probable'. Sentential negation negates a sentence, a clause, or a proposition (takes wide scope over the entire construction).

<sup>62</sup> Wilder, Christopher, (p. c., May, 2018).

<sup>63</sup> Cf. previous footnote.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. previous two footnotes.

<sup>65</sup> A copular verb, among which the most common is 'to be', connects the subject to its complement.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. footnote 64.

(127) He didn't win but he ran well.

Even if it displays contracted negation in S1, there is no ellipsis in the S2. Furthermore, the presence of the repeated subject (*he*) in S2 suggests that this sentence is not corrective. As mentioned in 3.6.1., all three types of *but* sentences display 'mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain', where the corrective reading requires the comparison of two different features of the same entity.

In Chapter 2 section 2.2.2. I explained that *but* can coordinate phrases inside a sentence, for instance adjective phrases (example (22)), noun phrases (example (23)), or verb phrases (example (24)). Even if in example (123) *but* coordinates (at a first glance) adjective phrases, it is nonetheless a clear example of sentence coordination via ellipsis, as shown in (124). At the same time, it displays sentential negation, fulfilling the criteria for corrective reading. Denial-of-expectation, on the other hand is a candidate for displaying phrase coordination. That is visible in example (24), chapter 2, resumed below:

(128) He lost but remained composed.

Here, the implicature of the fact that he lost ('if he lost, he might be expected to lose his composure'), is cancelled by S2 ('he remained composed'). Some may challenge the example (128) in the sense that it might involve sentential conjuncts with ellipsis of the subject in the second conjunct. This capacity of denial-of-expectation to allow its conjuncts to be smaller than clauses has been explored by Vicente (2010), the claims of whom are presented in more detail in section 3.6.2. Interestingly, Vicente (2010: 410-1) argues that while correction *but* is restricted to clausal coordination, denial *but* is able to both mimic corrective *but* and have subclausal constituents. What then perhaps remains as an argument for the capacity of denial *but* to allow phrasal coordination, is its freedom of not having to display sentential negation at the same time.

### **b) Constituent negation**

In terms of constituent negation, it is useful to present Krifka's (2007: 26) example, that seems to validate correction *but*:

(129) Not [BILL]<sub>F</sub> stole the cookie, but [JOHN]<sub>F</sub>

Krifka (2007: 27) claims that negation has been analysed as a focus-sensitive particle. This means that it can take scope over its focus. Although the negation in example (129) is constituent syntactically (narrow scope), it can have a truth-conditional semantic effect on the

meaning of the sentence. This means that the negation denies the entire proposition, not only the immediate element. This can be an argument for the fact that the second conjunct can undergo ellipsis. Example (129) does not have an acceptable equivalent with sentential negation in a simple sentence, possibly because of the fact that negation needs to associate with a focus to its right, as also agreed to by Krifka (2007) above. Thus, example (130)a. will sound odd, while (130)b. will be felicitous due to the cleft structure used:

- (130) a. ?Bill didn't steal the cookie, but John.  
b. It wasn't Bill that stole the cookie, but John.

Moreover, examples (129) and (130)b. have the same meaning.

It would appear that corrective *but* can be licensed both by sentential negation (wide scope, covering the entire clause or sentence) and constituent negation (narrow scope, covering a phrase such as PP, VP, AP, and so on). However, even if the syntax displays a constituent negation (for instance, at the beginning of the clause), the meaning of the clause seems to be retrieved if the scope extends to the whole proposition, not just the immediate element. This would mean that constituent negation can become sentential. It is not the case the other way around. I take both this semantic effect upon the propositional content and the necessity of the second clause to undergo ellipsis as a sign of sentential negation (a wide-scope one that essentially characterizes correction *but* sentences). This view is also held by Vicente (2010).

### 3.6.2. Vicente's (2010) view

In a paper on the syntax of adversative coordination, Vicente (2010: 383-4) also discusses the topic of metalinguistic negation. Citing Horn (1989: 397ff), he claims it as a separate phenomenon from regular negation since it cannot be morphologically incorporated into a word. Furthermore, metalinguistic negation cannot license negative polarity items (Vicente (2010: 384).

Vicente has tackled, among other things, the subject of ambiguity between denial-of-expectation and correction, similar to Izutsu (2008). In a discussion on the scope of negation, he argues that a problem like this exists in English because of the lexicalization of a single word (*but*). He brings in evidence from Spanish, which, to some extent is similar to Romanian in that it specializes a different word for the concessive reading (*pero*), as opposed to corrective (*sino*).

According to Vicente (2010: 386) the explanation for this rests in the fact that corrective *but* in English, lexicalized as *but*, has different requirements with regard to conjuncts. While *but* (specifically corrective *but*) can only coordinate clauses in virtue of its nature, it is so that

replacement with *and* would trigger a coordination between smaller constituents (and a concessive reading). In this case, the need for ellipsis would be null. He illustrates this in the following examples:

(131) Gabriel didn't drink beer but champagne.

(132) Gabriel didn't drink beer and champagne.

While the first sentence can be interpreted as a correction case with negation in S1 and ellipsis in S2, the second allows the negation to take scope over both conjuncts, as follows:

(133) Gabriel didn't [drink beer] but [champagne].

(134) Gabriel didn't [drink beer and champagne].

In his discussion, he makes a distinction between corrective *but* and what he refers to as 'counterexpectational' *but*. His claims are that difference in meaning can be illustrated syntactically, not merely semantically or pragmatically.

In terms of syntax, Vicente (2010: 385) asserts the following:

“a. Corrective *but* (*sino*) always requires its conjuncts to be full clauses.

b. Counterexpectational *but* (*pero*) allows its conjuncts to be smaller than clauses.”

His arguments include the fact that corrective *but* is only licenced by sentential negation (p. 384) As far as the counterexpectational *but* goes, he agrees that it “does not entail the denial of the first conjunct” but instead introduces an implicature (ibid.)

Counterexpectational *but* is less restricted than corrective *but* in this aspect as, according to Vicente, it is able to both display the behaviour of corrective *but*, and coordinate elements such as adjectives, DPs or adverbs. Furthermore, it is crucial that counterexpectational *but* does not require sentential negation in the first conjunct, as corrective *but* does. We can interpret Vicente's (2010: 382) example (135) as denial, and example (136) (ibid.) as corrective:

(135) Amanda ate three apples but one banana.

(136) Amanda didn't eat one apple but (rather) three bananas.



### 3.7. Summary table with the differences and similarities between the three *but* meanings in English based on various accounts

The three meanings of <i>BUT</i>	Differences and similarities			
<b><i>Denial-of-expectation</i></b>	- denial of implicature - broad focus over each of the conjuncts	- no two-way contrast necessary	- irreversibility (or infelicitous reversibility) of conjuncts	- can display sentential negation in the 1 <sup>st</sup> conjunct, although not a requirement.
<p>Izutsu (2008): a) direct concessive <i>but</i>: contradictory conclusions, but also help retrieve the stronger argument for the conclusion after <i>but</i>. Felicitous even if the arguments are reversed.  b) indirect concessive <i>but</i>: conclusion depends on the speaker's argumentative choice</p> <p>Vicente (2010): counterexpectational <i>but</i> introduces an implicature, allows coordination of clausal and/or subclausal constituents.</p>				
<b><i>Contrast</i></b>	- no denial of implicature	- two-way contrast pattern - semantic opposition - presupposition of diff. in meaning	- felicitous reversibility of conjuncts	- can display sentential negation in the 1 <sup>st</sup> conjunct, although not a requirement.
R. Lakoff (1971): semantic opposition <i>but</i> seen as 'symmetric <i>and</i> + presupposition of difference in meaning'				
<b><i>Correction</i></b>	- expected denial of an implicature, no denial of implicature in the sense of the d.o.e. meaning - narrow focus that operates via focus-sensitive particles - can display both narrow-scope, constituent negation and wide-scope, sentential negation. The former sometimes becomes the latter.	- no two-way contrast necessary - contrast between different features of the same entity	- irreversibility (or infelicitous reversibility) of conjuncts	- negated 1 <sup>st</sup> conjunct necessary (denial of focused part in S1 by means of metalinguistic negation and replacement thereof with corrective expression in an elliptical structure.)
Izutsu (2008): ambiguity between denial-of-expectation and correction reading depending on the type of focus (broad/narrow).				
Vicente (2010): corrective <i>but</i> requires denial, requires coordination of full clauses.				

### 3.8. Relevance-theoretic approaches to the meaning of *but*

As we could see, R. Lakoff (1971) associates *but* with *and* in both its symmetric and asymmetric use. A more recent view, that of Blakemore (1989), distinguishes between a contrast reading that integrates *and* in the meaning of *but*, and a denial-of-expectation reading that does not<sup>67</sup>. What she means by this is that, in terms of denial-of-expectation, *but* no longer plays the role of a coordinator that joins two sentences into one, but that of a discourse marker that introduces an independent sentence. As such, *but* cannot have the meaning of a logical connective (truth-conditional value), but instead it is highly dependent on pragmatic interpretation. Therefore, what others see as a connected ‘S1 *but* S2’ denial-of-expectation sentence, Blakemore sees as a sequence of two independent utterances: ‘S1. *But* S2’.

Blakemore (1989: 16) claims that R. Lakoff’s (1971) account sees context as only playing a role in interpreting denial-of-expectation, not contrast *but*, or, as Lakoff refers to it, ‘semantic contrast’<sup>68</sup>. Blakemore thinks of it as important in both cases, and she claims that the “distinction between semantics and pragmatics cannot be maintained” and all sentences containing *but* must be analysed based on context, which plays an important role in interpretation (ibid.). Her procedural account sees *but* as a linguistic means for constraining the pragmatic interpretation of utterances (here, *the context*).

On the other hand, the unitary account of *but* formulated by Iten (2000) sees no difference between the contrast and the denial-of-expectation meaning. Iten (2000: 203-205) claims that *but* is not characterized by ambiguity, but instead receives the interpretation from the linguistic environment in which it appears. Her account supports Blakemore’s (1987, 1989) procedural account of the meaning of *but*.

Iten (2000) argues that while Blakemore’s (1987) account of *but* supports the *P. But Q*<sup>69</sup> (denial) structure of *P but Q* (contrast) for any reading of *but*, her (1989) account seems to view *but* as having more than one meaning (discussed above), which involves different interpretation procedures. According to this latter account, the denial-of expectation reading sees *but* as a discourse connective, while the contrast reading sees it as a conjunction. Iten disagrees with Blakemore’s way of seeing only contrast *but* as a conjunction – her stance is that *but* behaves

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<sup>67</sup> This claim is of course not about casting doubt on the fact that denial-of-expectation does include the ‘logical’ or ‘truth-functional’ properties of *and*, in the sense that both conjuncts (S1 and S2) must be true, for ‘S1 *but* S2’ to be true.

<sup>68</sup> The term ‘semantic’ here is merely taken as linked to the lexical meaning of the word, and not involving what we refer to as the pragmatic tools of inference (otherwise known as a process of deriving certain conclusions) such as context, presupposition or implicature, among others, which help with the process of inference during communication.

<sup>69</sup> *But* is viewed as discourse-initial in this formula.

the same way in both circumstances, whether or not “the ‘connection’ they express can also be expressed by juxtaposed or conjoined sentences” (2000: 225)

As mentioned above, in terms of the contrast – denial of expectation distinction, Iten argues that there is none. She claims that there is a mistaken idea that some languages, such as German or Spanish, lexicalize items in order to express both contrast and denial of expectation, and brings in evidence that the same expression (*aber, pero*) is used for both, depending on interpretation, while a second expression (*sondern, sino*) is used for correction. While this is a situation similar to that in Romanian, where the expressions *dar* and *însă* (used for contrast and d.o.e.) are interchangeable based on interpretation, we will see that there exists an element, independent from German or Spanish, which integrates both the meaning of *but* and *and*. This expression, translating as *iar*, is seen as one of contrast (Izutsu 2008: 650). It functions as sentence coordinator, and its meaning overlaps with the meaning of the Romanian *dar* (*but*) and *și* (*and*); it is most commonly used for indicating a two-way contrast, often featuring antonyms (tall/short). Consider, for instance, Lakoff’s (1971: 133) example in (Iten, 2000: 179) translated to Romanian, where both *iar* and *dar* can encode contrast, for reasons I will discuss in section 4.2.2.:

(137) *John is tall but Bill is short.*

John este înalt, *iar/dar* Bill este scund.

Since *but* functions as a coordinator (it connects two conjuncts in a sentence/utterance), it is safe to assume that this sentence/utterance is uttered by the same speaker.

### 3.8.1. The contrast – denial-of-expectation distinction

While the distinction between the corrective meaning and the contrast/denial-of-expectation one is lexically supported by languages such as German (*sondern/aber*) and Spanish (*pero/sino*)<sup>70</sup>, most discussions revolve around the distinction between the *contrast vs. denial of expectation* meaning. Opinions are divided between a coordinated contrast reading that integrates *and* in the meaning of *but*, and a denial-of-expectation reading that does not (Blakemore, 1989), and a unitary account of *but* that sees no difference between contrast and denial of expectation (Iten, 2000).

According to Iten (2000: 220-1), Blakemore’s (1987) Relevance-theoretic account of the meaning of *but* included arguments in favour of a discourse connective *but* with a denial-of-

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<sup>70</sup> Distinction mentioned in Iten (2000) and Izutsu (2008). Izutsu (2008: 652) would argue that there exists an ambiguity in interpretation between correction and concession, which depends on whether or not it is the predicate in each sentence that is being contrasted.

expectation meaning for both *P. But Q* and *P but Q* readings, whereas in the (1989) version she appears to assign *but* a conjunctive function in the contrast reading (*P but Q*) – an approach that integrates *and* in its meaning. This latter view is refuted by Iten’s (2000) analysis, where she argues for a unitary account on the meaning of *but* in that there exists no clear difference between contrast and denial of expectation. Apparently, according to her, the question that is easiest to answer is ‘how’ *but* is used, rather than ‘what’ *but* means. (p. 226). While the first question would be the only suitable one for a language that lexicalizes a single word for all meanings, it is not so for one that specializes several words for each of the meanings. Such a language could potentially answer both questions equally well: *how*, in terms of grammatical features and syntactic position, and *what* in terms of a semantic and pragmatic interpretation.

Interestingly, Blakemore’s (2002) analysis of *but* brings arguments in favour of a unitary semantics of *but*, where there exists no difference between *contrast but* and *denial of expectation but*, and thus no lexical ambiguity. In terms of contrast, Blakemore claims that it is “not always determined by the linguistically encoded meanings of the words used” (p. 99), which means that sometimes the contrast must be derived based on contextual assumptions. Blakemore shows that such ‘contrasting’ contextual implications can also be recovered using the conjunction *and*, where there exists no lexical indication of contrast. (ibid.) Furthermore, Blakemore argues that *but* and *and* cannot be substituted with each other with the same effect (of showing contrast), because *but* activates an inference that contradicts and eliminates assumptions (thus giving rise to a surprising element), while *and* helps ‘contrast’ parallel contextual implications. Two examples used by her to illustrate it are:

(138) The wettest weather has been in Preston where they have had 15 mm of rain and the driest weather has been in Ashford where there has been only 3 mm of rain.

and

(139) Larry wants tea but Sue wants wine. (pp. 100-1).

In terms of the assumption that is being contradicted and eliminated by *but*, specific to denial-of-expectation, it has to be (presumed) manifest to the hearer. According to Blakemore, “for an utterance to achieve relevance<sup>71</sup> as a contradiction, it must communicate an assumption which is contradictory to an assumption which the hearer believes to be true.”<sup>72</sup> (p. 111)

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<sup>71</sup> The notion of relevance in communication and what it involves will be clarified in the next sub-section.

<sup>72</sup> This is known as *manifestness*, which according to Blakemore (2002: 69) is a matter of the degree in which a set of assumptions (which constitute the ‘cognitive environment’, according to Sperber and Wilson (1995)) are manifest to a person. The higher the degree of manifestness, the greater the contrastive effect in the second clause introduced by *but*. This is especially visible in corrective sentences.

Iten's (2000: 230) view, as concerns the manifestness of the denied assumption, is slightly different than Blakemore's. While Blakemore takes the denied assumption to be manifest, Iten claims it to be 'accessible in context' (p. 228), where it is not the propositional content that contradicts the assumption, but the implication of it. Such an 'indirect denial of expectation' account developed by Iten is considered to be a good account insofar it accounts for the utterance- and discourse-initial uses of *but*, since "[...] the presence of *but* right at the beginning of [the] utterance alerts [...] that the utterance is going to be relevant as a denial of an accessible assumption." (2000: 219).

### **3.9. Blakemore's relevance-theoretic approach to *but***

Blakemore (1989) bases her analysis on Sperber and Wilson's (1986) framework according to which, upon interpreting utterances, hearers aim for extracting relevant information, and for that the role of context is important. Blakemore (1989: 16) proposes that there are expressions, such as *but*, *therefore* or *after all*, which do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance, but function as a constraint on the hearer's choice of context.

Employing Stalnaker's (1974) idea of pragmatic presupposition, Blakemore argues that the hearer, besides trying to obtain 'new information about the world', will try to strengthen personal assumptions and beliefs based on presented evidence. Therefore, the new information will be processed "in a context of existing assumptions" (p. 18), which can be either strengthened or cancelled.

As concerns utterances and/or propositions, she states that "the relevance of one is *dependent* on the interpretation of the other" (p. 22), and that "to say that the relevance of a proposition depends on the interpretation of the other is to say that each is consistent with the Principle of Relevance individually." (p. 24) She further argues that given a situation of two conjoined propositions, in the form of *P but Q*, the relevance is retrieved from the entire sentence rather than each of the conjuncts separately:

Let us take the examples below:

(140) Julia is coming to the party.

This is an assertion which is relevant on its own.

(141) Julia is coming to the party *but* will leave early.

This is a case of a conjoined proposition that has relevance over the individual conjuncts. As we can observe, *but*, functioning as a coordinator, helps retrieve the relevance of the entire sentence.

Below we observe the difference between what Blakemore calls two meanings of *but*: ‘denial-of-expectation’ and ‘contrast’.

### Denial-of-expectation

According to Blakemore (1989: 25) denial-of-expectation is the situation in which a hearer, departing from assumption  $P$  when hearing an utterance that conveys not  $P$  ( $\neg P$ ), will adopt the assumption  $\neg P$  as more relevant, as per the speaker’s intention. Example (141) above can serve as proof: the hearer is presented with the assertion that Julia is coming to the party (thus deriving the assumption that she will stay throughout), then hears that she will leave early. This will make the hearer adjust her beliefs and find more relevant the fact that Julia will leave early than her staying throughout.

Blakemore takes G. Lakoff’s (1971: 67) example (89), one that Iten (2000) also employs, as relevant for illustrating this use:

(142) John is a Republican, but he’s honest.

In Blakemore’s (1989: 26) own words, “the use of *but* [...] indicates that the hearer is expected to have derived the proposition [John is not honest] from the proposition in the first clause”, and “*but* indicates that the proposition it introduces is relevant as a denial of an ‘expectation’[...]”, therefore “but constrains the interpretation of the preceding proposition.”

### Contrast

Blakemore claims that her example (p. 16), resumed below, seems to “form a conjoined proposition” (p. 28) and not follow the denial-of-expectation pattern:

(143) Susan is tall but Mary is short.

She claims that “*but* can be embedded in the scope of the logical operators like *if...then*” (p. 28-9), thus *but* can be part of a conjoined utterance. This means that besides having the same truth-conditions as *and*, this type of contrast has the same type of coordination.

If we take example (140) and reformulate it below as contrastive, we can test the embedding:

- (144) a. Julia is coming to the party *but* Mark is not.  
b. If Julia is coming to the party *but* Mark is not, then we will not have fun.

What constitutes a point of relevance in the case of contrast examples is that, according to Blakemore, is the fact that the activities described in each conjunct are different, which means that “the hearer is expected to recover two parallel sets of contextual implications each member of which predicates a property that is incompatible with the property in the corresponding implication in the other set” (p. 30). It is not to say that the contrast case involves actual ‘cancelling’ or ‘denying’ an implication of S1 by S2. Furthermore, she argues for a sort of intonation pattern specific to the use of contrast *but* that may, together with the word *but*, serve constrain the context.

As an overall conclusion, Blakemore (1989) suggests that the purpose of *but* helps the hearer establish an incompatibility: between propositions, in the case of denial-of-expectation, and between predicates (properties) in the case of contrast (p. 31). As concerns denial-of-expectation, the second clause negates the proposition derived from the first. In the contrast case no assumption is derived from the first clause, and the first clause merely serves oppositely interpret the properties mentioned in the second.

### **3.10. The discourse marker use of *but***

Anscombe & Ducrot’s (1977) account sees the corrective sentence as one uttered by the same speaker (see example (86), in Iten (2000: 181)). Yet, interestingly, there are cases in which correction *but* can occur in a discourse-initial position if uttered by a second speaker, provided it is understood as the continuation of the first speaker’s idea. Iten’s (2000: 197) example for that is the following:

- (145) A: Peter isn’t a hero...  
B: But a complete and utter prat.

This is a case in which *but* would translate as *sondern* in German and *ci* in Romanian. It would be possible for it to translate as denial-of-expectation *dar* only if it lacked ellipsis, in the form ‘But **he is** a complete....’.

The following example is also one where in which a second speaker continues the first speaker’s idea:

- (146) Speaker 1: John is tall...  
Speaker 2: But Bill is short.

While it is tempting to consider this utterance-initial *but* as a conjunction, it would be perhaps safer to treat it as a discourse marker (with a high pragmatic value) for now. In English its use seems to be limited to the denial-of-expectation meaning for a number of reasons: firstly, it deviates from the typical two-way contrast, single coordinated sentence. Second, it introduces

the second speaker's argumentative choice. As we have previously seen, the argumentative choice is a condition of the denial-of-expectation reading. In Romanian, for instance, this type of *but* translates as *dar*. This shows the versatile character of *dar* to encode both contrast in a one-speaker sentence, and as denial-of-expectation in a scenario like the one above.

However, if we were to consider discourse *but* as a conjunction in the sense of Iten (2000: 225), then perhaps we could account for the use of *iar* or *ci* in an initial position. In section **4.3.1.1**. I will discuss cases in which *but* in the form of *iar* could take utterance initial position.

In an utterance-initial position, English *but* is regarded in the literature as a discourse marker in the sense of Fraser (1999), as noted in section **2.2.2**. An example retrieved from Fraser (1999: 945) shows this very denial-of-expectation use:

(147) A: James is not in his office.  
B: But I just saw him there.

Also noted in **2.2.2**. is Iten's (2000: 185) example of utterance-initial *but* that begins a new discourse, which I reproduce below:

(148) [Peter puts some salmon on Mary's plate]  
Mary: But I'm allergic to fish.

In both of these cases *but* does not translate as *sondern* or *ci*. It translates as *aber* (in German), and only *dar* and not *însă* in Romanian, for reasons that I will discuss in Chapter 4 (see **4.2.6**).

### **3.11. But in other languages**

As mentioned in sections **1.2**. and **3.5**. in 1977 Anscombe & Ducrot addressed the meaning of the French *but* ('*mais*') and concluded that it classifies as '*mais<sub>PA</sub>*' (denial-of-expectation) and '*mais<sub>SN</sub>*' (corrective). In Iten (2000: 194, 198) we can find examples for both:

Correction:

(149) That isn't my sister, but my mother.

Denial of expectation:

(150) It's raining but I need some fresh air.

At the same time, there are languages, as shown by Abraham (1979), that also seem to distinguish between a corrective and a denial-of-expectation *but*, by lexicalizing a word for each of the meanings, such as German (*sondern/aber*) and Spanish (*sino, pero*).



Additionally, Abraham acknowledges a ‘compensation’ meaning of *but* translated into the German word *dafür*. Izutsu (2008: 656, ft. 12) cites an example by Abraham (1979: 113) where the German word *dafür* displays a compensatory meaning, as such:

(151) Sie ist klein, dafür wohl proportioniert.  
She is small but well shaped  
“She is small, but nevertheless well shaped.”

This use is, as both Izutsu (*ibid.*), Iten (2000: 183) and Abraham (1979: 114) would agree, very similar to and overlapping with the denial-of-expectation *aber*. As we can see, *dafür* translates as ‘but nevertheless’ into English, and involves a different interpretation than a simple *but*. In Romanian it would translate as: *dar totuși* (‘but still’), *cu toate astea* (‘nonetheless’ or ‘nevertheless’). For that reason, I will overlook this compensatory meaning and focus on the denial-of-expectation meaning as described earlier, for both Romanian and English.

Russian is another language that lexicalizes different meanings of *but* separately. There are three conjunctions, ‘*no*’, ‘*a*’, and ‘*i*’, which have an adversative, a contrastive, and an additive role, respectively. The three conjunctions are very similar with the Romanian *dar/însă*, *iar* and *și* (and). In addition, Romanian lexicalizes a corrective *but* (*ci*). In the next sub-section I will discuss the Russian case in parallel with the Romanian one.

### 3.11.1. The case of Russian

As mentioned in Chapter 1, section 1.2., in order to understand how Romanian adversatives function, it is worth comparing it with Russian, a language that specializes three separate conjunctions for *but*. According to Malchukov (2004: 183), there is the conjunction ‘*no*’ (with an adversative reading), the conjunction ‘*i*’ (with an additive reading), and the conjunction ‘*a*’ (with a contrastive reading).

The conjunction ‘*a*’ is semantically related to both *no* and *i*, and Malchukov (2004) claims that at times it can encode:

- semantic opposition – where there exists a two-way contrast between the conjuncts, and English *but* can be substituted by *and*,
- addition – where the second conjunct appears to derive from, or provide an assessment the first conjunct, a case which in English is strictly limited to the use of *and*,
- incompatibility – a denial-of-expectation reading where the replacement of *but* with *and* is possible.

Providing Russian as a reference language is helpful for this analysis since the above-mentioned conjunctions are very similar to the adversatives in Romanian. The conjunctions

*dar* and *însă* function similarly to *no*, triggering an incompatible, denial-of-expectation reading. The contrastive conjunction *iar* integrates the meaning of both *but* and *and* (thus *no* and *i*), similar to *a*.

So far, some similarities were detected between Russian and Romanian. Romanian differs from Russian in that it specializes not one, but two conjunctions for the denial-of-expectation purpose, *dar* and *însă*, with some differences in register (formal/informal), frequency of occurrence, and position in the utterance. But as we will see, the situation is not only black-and-white. I will use evidence from Russian, as well as my native intuition to provide proof that the Romanian *dar* can also function as *iar*, encoding semantic opposition, under certain conditions. As far as other languages go, Romanian displays similarities with German and Spanish regarding the conjunction *ci* (for correction).

### 3.11.1.1. Discussion

#### a) The adversative ‘no’

According to Malchukov (2004: 180), the conjunction ‘*no*’ can express denial-of-expectation, contradiction, and restriction, as shown in the examples below:

(152) Vanja prostudilsja, no poshel v shkolu.  
V. caught.cold but went to school.  
“Vanja caught a cold, but went to school.”

(153) Kostjum krasivyj, no dorogoj.  
suit beautiful but expensive.  
“The suit is beautiful, but expensive.”

(154) On pobezhzal, no upal.  
he started.to.run but fell  
“He started to run, but fell.”

The contradiction and restriction examples (153) and (154) both fall under ‘denial-of-expectation’, even if Malchukov presents them separately from it. A first indicative of that is the reference (in S2) to the same entity mentioned in S1, which puts a broad focus on each of the conjuncts. A second indicative is the fact that S2 denies the expectation in S1.

Example (153) is rather similar to Izutsu’s indirect concessive example (106), reproduced below:

(155) The car is stylish and spacious, but it is expensive.

It involves the existence of two assumptions, and the conclusion depends on the speaker’s argumentative choice. The analysis of this example as an indirect concessive one is similar to that of example (167) which can be consulted in 4.2.1.

Example (154) is a direct concessive one in the sense of Izutzu (2008), where *but* is replaceable by *although*:

(156) *Although he started to run, he fell.*

It involves only one assumption; the second conjunct itself ('he fell') that contradicts the implicature of S1('if one starts to run, he would normally not be expected to fall')

We can associate these uses with the Romanian *dar* and *însă*, in translation from Russian:

(157) *Vanja a răcit, dar/însă a mers la școală.*  
Vanja AUX-to have chilled CONJ AUX-to have gone to school.  
"Vanja caught a cold, but went to school."

(158) *Costumul e frumos, dar/însă scump.*  
Suit-DEF is beautiful CONJ expensive.  
"The suit is beautiful, but expensive."

(159) *El a început să alerge, dar/însă a căzut.*  
he AUX-to have started to run CONJ AUX-to have fallen  
"He started to run, but fell."

Both *dar* and *însă* express in this case denial-of-expectation, contradiction, and restriction in the sense of Malchukov (2004).

#### b) The contrastive 'a'

The contrastive '*a*' (*but/and*), can signal contrast (semantic opposition), addition and incompatibility, according to Malchukov (2004: 183), as in the examples below:

(160) *Petja starateljniy, a Vanja lenivyj.*  
P. diligent CONJ V. lazy.  
"Petja is diligent, *but/and* Vanja is lazy."

(161) *Vremja uxodit bystro, a s nim uxodjat ljudi.*  
time passes quickly and with it pass people  
"Time passes quickly, *and, but/and* with it people pass away."

(162) *Zima, a idet dozhdj.*  
winter CONJ goes rain  
"It's winter, *but, and* it is raining."

Below, I rendered the contrast example (160) into Romanian using all the available conjunctions (except the corrective *but*) that encode a relation of opposition. The reading of each of the examples is explained:

(163) a. *Petja este harnică, iar Vanja este leneșă.*  
Petja is diligent CONJ Vanja is lazy.  
"Petja is diligent, *but/and* Vanja is lazy."

- b. Petja este harnică, *dar* Vanja este leneșă.  
 Petja is diligent CONJ Vanja is lazy.  
 “Petja is diligent, *but* Vanja is lazy.”
- c. Petja este harnică, *însă* Vanja este leneșă.  
 Petja is diligent CONJ Vanja is lazy.  
 “Petja is diligent, *but* Vanja is lazy.”

In (163)a. we have a two-way lexical contrast that simply presents the characteristics of the two girls (harnică/leneșă), and *iar* introduces a new topic and the comment for it and helps create a symmetrical pattern. As explained in Chapter 2, section 2.8., the focus elements in a contrast case are as follows: Petja, respectively Vanja are marked by secondary focus, while ‘harnică’ (diligent) and ‘leneșă’ (lazy) are marked by primary focus.

(163)b. is also a contrast case and allows the replacement of *iar* with *dar*, where *dar* behaves identically. The possibility for *dar* to behave as *iar* will be explained extensively in 4.3.1.2., 4.2.2. and 4.2.3., in the next chapter.

Even if (163)c., displays ‘syntactic parallelism and lexical antonymy’ in the sense of Zafiu (2005: 248) I believe that the sentence is a clear case of denial-of-expectation, because of the use of *însă*<sup>73</sup>. Using similar examples, in 4.2.2. I will argue that this is a case where the denial-of-expectation meaning is encoded in the very lexical form of the conjunction. *Însă* here is perfectly replaceable with *dar* for a denial-of-expectation reading.

Further, I reproduce the Russian example (161) below. Here, the use of the Romanian *dar* or *însă* as denial-of-expectation would be odd. It is *și* (the Russian additive conjunction ‘i’, or ‘and’) and *iar* that are preferred for triggering the additive effect:

- (164) Vremea trece repede, *și/iar* cu ea trec și oamenii.  
 time passes quickly and/but with her pass also people-DEF  
 “Time passes quickly, *and, but/and* with it people pass away.”

Example (164) makes for a non-plausible contrast pair situation that will be discussed in 4.3. **Problem cases**, Chapter 4.

Finally, the incompatibility example (162) is translated below:

- (165) Este iarnă, *dar/însă* / *\*iar* / *și* plouă.  
 Is winter *but,* / *\*but/and* / *and* rains.  
 “It is winter, and it is raining.”

In Romanian there is no expletive ‘it’, and this sentence is considered infelicitous because there is no topic following *iar*. This, too, is a problematic example that will be discussed in 4.3.

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<sup>73</sup> According to Șăineanu (1929), the conjunction *însă* indicates a “more energetic opposition relationship than *dar*” (Universal Dictionary of Romanian Language, 6<sup>th</sup> edition)

Using *dar*, *însă* and *și* ('and') is, however, felicitous in (165); all of them seem to trigger the denial-of-expectation effect. Alternatively, we have example (166), where *iar* could also work for a denial-of-expectation meaning, provided it introduces a topic:

(166) Este iarnă, *dar/însă* / *iar* / *și* afară plouă.  
Is winter *but*, / *but/and* / *and* outside rains.  
"It is winter, and it is raining outside."

This example can would be useful in canceling the assumption people have in general about winter (it is raining when it should be snowing).

### 3.11.1.2. Summary

According to Malchukov (2004: 185), "the contrastive function may serve as an intermediate link between additive coordination and adversative coordination."<sup>74</sup> From the examples used in this sub-section, I can conclude that *iar* displaying a function similar to that of the Russian 'a', where *iar* only fits a contrastive pattern as long as it contrasts two topics and two comments. Apparently, coordinating a plausible contrast pair is not always a requirement with *iar* (see example (166), where 'Este iarnă' (it is winter) and 'afară plouă' (outside it is raining) do not constitute plausible contrastive pairs). In the denial-of-expectation reading these do not necessarily need to form plausible contrast pairs, but *iar* necessarily needs to introduce a new topic and the comment for it. Moreover, *iar* seems to work both with perfect antonyms and without. In the next chapter I will discuss *iar* and other Romanian adversatives that stand for *but*, and the patterns they create. Problem cases will be presented in part 2 of the chapter.

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<sup>74</sup> The talk involves the Russian 'a' (with a contrastive reading).

## Chapter 4 – Adversative conjunctions in Romanian

### 4.1. Introduction

This chapter is divided into two main parts and presents different view on the meaning(s) of *but* once translated into Romanian, retrieved from Zafiu (2005), Izutsu (2008) or Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011). The first part describes the way in which Romanian adversative conjunctions work, and compares them with English *but*. I will test to see if Izutsu's (2008) general claims for each of the meanings apply. The second part revolves around problem cases: counter-examples for the typical 'contrastive' patterns will be introduced and discussed. Here I will use as arguments the syntactic- and information structure constraints envisioned by Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011) for the conjunction *iar*. At the same time, I will argue that *dar* has a contrast use in addition to a denial-of-expectation use. In accounting for the use of *dar* and *însă*, which are considered to encode contrast, respectively denial of expectation, Zafiu (2005: 248) claims "no clear separation" and "an almost undecidable oscillation"<sup>75</sup> (p. 248). In an attempt to establish a clear separation, I will indicate certain patterns that allow the occurrence of one, but not the other. In terms of the conjunction *ci*, I will show that there is no ambiguity between concession and correction, as Izutsu claims for English.

### Part 1

### 4.2. *But* in Romanian

The English word *but* has several adversative counterparts in Romanian, including: *dar*, *însă*, and *ci*. The first two operate well on the denial-of-expectation reading<sup>76</sup>, while the third is specialized for the corrective reading. Opinions are divided with regard to *iar*, a fourth adversative conjunction. Izutsu (2008) sees it as encoding contrast. Zafiu (2005) argues that it encodes 'thematic contrast', and sees *iar* as having a copulative value, similar to *and* (Romanian: *și*). As mentioned in section 3.11.1., *iar* behaves similar to the Russian contrastive conjunction 'а', (which functions as both *and* and *but*) except in the incompatibility reading (see example (165)), where it does not introduce a topic.

I will start by illustrating examples that are unique for each meaning (retrieved from Izutsu (2008) and Zafiu (2005)). I will check whether these have same requirements as the English *but*, and discuss the authors' views in parallel.

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<sup>75</sup> The 'oscillation' here is interpreted as instances where *dar* and *însă* can be used interchangeably.

<sup>76</sup> The use of these conjunctions is highly debated. Zafiu (2005) claims perfect operability and interchangeability between contrast and denial-of-expectation, while Izutsu (2008) sees them both as marking denial.

#### 4.2.1. Denial-of-expectation

Consider Izutsu's (2008: 650) example for what she refers to as the concessive *însă* and *dar*, retrieved from Schick (1998: 47):

(167) Pianul este bun, însă/dar/\*iar/\*ci scump.  
piano-DEF is nice but expensive  
“The piano is nice, but expensive.”

As we can see, *iar* and *ci* cannot be used in this case as they do not encode denial-of-expectation. As shown in sections 2.6., 2.9. and 2.10., one of the differences between the denial-of-expectation and contrast is that in the former the comparison takes place not between two entities, but it is the same entity is being compared with itself. Therefore, it is the implications of each conjunct that are being compared (with a broad focus on each conjunct). This means that, as stated in 2.9., 2.10., 3.2., 3.6.1.1., and 3.7., the entire conjunct will be under focus (broad). Example (167) above involves phrasal coordination (AP *but* AP).

There are, however denial-of-expectation *but* sentences that involve sentence coordination. Consider the next felicitous example (Izutsu's original example with an added verb) that uses the adversative conjunctions *însă/dar*:

(168) Pianul este bun, însă/dar este scump.  
piano-DEF is nice but is expensive  
“The piano is nice, but it is expensive.”

Now, the same Izutsu (2008: 656) described a feature for all *but* meanings (in 2.6.): ‘mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain’, where by *domain* she means “a context for the characterization of a semantic unit” (p. 659). Here, the domain is the features of the piano. ‘Nice’ and ‘expensive’ are mutually exclusive in the sense that they are different tokens of the same entity. It is not so clear, however, that they are perfect (or close to perfect) antonyms, such as ‘poor’ and ‘happy’ in example (105), section 3.4.1.

As discussed in section 3.2., an important feature of denial-of-expectation is that the implicature from the first conjunct (S1) is denied by S2. However, as noted in 2.6. and 3.4.1. Izutsu recognizes a type of indirect denial-of-expectation meaning that does not undergo replacement with *although*. This would then be an example where the conclusion is determined by the speaker's argumentative choice and preferences, i.e. the conclusion can change if the arguments are reversed:

(169) a. I will not buy it: The piano is nice, but expensive. (I will not make a compromise)  
b. ?I will not buy it: The piano is expensive, but nice.

(170) a. I will buy it: The piano is expensive, but nice. (I will make a compromise)

b. ?I will buy it: The piano is nice, but expensive.

It would thus seem that if the tokens are not perfect antonyms, the interpretation of the *but* sentence can vary. Based on the elements described above, I can conclude and agree to the fact that Izutsu's (2008: 650) example (167) is **indirect concessive**.

As regards the difference between *dar* and *însă*, Izutsu claims the former is more common in different types of discourse and has a fixed position in the clause, while the latter is associated with written language (more formal) and can be in any position.

A rather different case is Zafiu's<sup>77</sup> (2005: 244) example of denial-of-expectation:

(171) Plouă, *dar* e destul de cald.  
Rains<sup>78</sup> but is quite of warm  
"It is raining, but it is quite warm."

The denial-of-expectation effect is determined by the first opposition element and is described by Zafiu (2005: 247) as a situation where "the first element introduces a statement with a concessive role, which the second contradicts, presenting the decisive argument." I would agree that here too, *dar* can be replaced by *însă*:

(172) Plouă, *însă* e destul de cald.  
Rains but is quite of warm  
"It is raining, but it is quite warm."

Here, the implicature from the first conjunct 'it is raining' is cancelled by 'it is quite warm' based on our background knowledge that rain is cold/creates a colder environment. This example is more abstract than (167) in the sense that it compares meteorological implications, not attributes (comments) of the same entity. The focus is also broad and marks each conjunct separately. Replacement with *although* is possible, and that allows contradictory conclusions. The stronger argument for the conclusion is retrieved, and the example gives a felicitous reading upon reversing the arguments:

(173) Spring weather is capricious: It is raining, but it is quite warm.

(174) Spring weather is capricious: It is quite warm, but it is raining.

This can be considered a **direct concessive** case in the sense of Izutsu (2008).

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<sup>77</sup> All text retrieved from Zafiu (2005) is my own translation and interpretation.

<sup>78</sup> The Romanian language does not distinguish between the present simple and the present continuous form of the verb (thus context and certain adverbs help infer the actual time of the action).



#### 4.2.1.1. Discussion and Summary

The examples (167) and (168) confirm Vicente's (2010) claim with regard to denial-of-expectation *but* according to which denial-of-expectation *but* can involve phrasal coordination. At the same time, they confirm the use of the adversative conjunctions *însă/dar* for this purpose, as claimed by Izutsu (2008). Example (167) is an indirect concessive one.

Zafiu (2005) agrees to the use of *însă/dar* for the denial-of-expectation reading. Her example (171) is a direct concessive one in the sense of Izutsu (2008).

When it comes to position in the sentence, Izutsu and Zafiu seem to hold slightly different views. Izutsu (2008) sees *dar* as having a fixed position, i.e. as a sentence coordinator. Zafiu (2005) agrees that it can also hold an utterance-initial position. As regards *însă*, Izutsu claims it can be used in any position, while Zafiu argues in favour of its function as a coordinator and an utterance-final element, rather than utterance-initial. For instance, Zafiu (2005) claims that “as a discourse marker signalling surprise, disagreement, etc., thus as a pragmatic connector in a dialogue, only *dar* is used (especially in the *da'* form)” (p. 247). She bases her claims on the fact that “out of the first 50 occurrences of the conjunction *însă* in the novel<sup>79</sup> [...], only 2 occur utterance-initial. [...] In the book<sup>80</sup> [...] within the first 50 occurrences of the conjunction, there are slightly more that occur utterance-initial – 14 – but the ratio remains favourable to those interspersed.” However, Zafiu (2005: 247) agrees to the fact that *însă* disposes of liberty of movement (either front, centre, or end) within the syntactic unit that is connected to a previous one. This was described in 2.3.2. a), Ch.2, examples (33) – (35).

The denial-of-expectation pattern featuring *but* as a coordinator is similar to the one I generally describe for the English denial *but*, i.e. [A1 B1] *but* [A1 B2], where the topic of S2 is an anaphoric element.

#### 4.2.2. Contrast

Izutsu's (2008: 650) example for what she refers to as contrast *iar*, retrieved from (1998: 44) is:

(175) Racul      trage înapoi,      iar/#însă/#dar/\*ci ştiuca      în jos.  
crab-DEF pulls backward but/and      pike-DEF in down  
“The crab pulls backward, but/and      the pike (pulls) down.”

Izutsu considers that neither *însă* nor *dar* are appropriate for contrast, as she believes they trigger a concessive meaning (p. 651). By marking them with a # sign she agrees, however, to the fact that the sentences are not ungrammatical. *Ci* is not possible, since it marks correction,

<sup>79</sup> Camil Petrescu, *Ultima noapte de dragoste, întâia noapte de război*. (Last night of love, first night of war)

<sup>80</sup> Gabriel Liiceanu, *Jurnalul de la Păltiniş*. (The Păltiniş Diary)

and using it would result in an ungrammatical sentence. As discussed in section 3.5., corrective *but* requires negation in S1, and that is not present in example (175).

Zafiu (2005: 248) claims that “between true contrast and the denial of expectation, there is no clear separation, but rather an almost undecidable oscillation”. True contrast is defined as “a clear opposition between the sense of the propositions, often defined by syntactic parallelism and lexical antonymy” (ibid.). The condition is that the entire structure be characterized by reversibility of the conjuncts that would cause no change in the meaning or the conclusion of the entire sentence. Below, we have Zafiu’s (2005: 248) example what she considers semantic contrast (as opposed to thematic contrast that is to be discussed in 4.2.3.):

(176) Ion e bogat, **dar** Vasile e sărac.  
Ion is rich CONJ Vasile is poor.  
“Ion is rich, but Vasile is poor.”

The example above seems to allow the use of *dar*. Her next example (p. 245) seems to suggest that contrasting content can be retrieved from conjuncts joined by *însă*, also:

(177) Ion e gras, **însă** Dan e slab. (here, bold mine)  
Ion is fat CONJ Dan is thin.  
“Ion is fat, but Dan is thin.”

According to Zafiu (2005: 248), “the *semantic contrast* or the *semantic opposition* (in the sense of Lakoff 1971), is the closest situation to traditionally defining the adversative relationship”, where there exists “a clear opposition between the sense of the propositions, often defined by syntactic parallelism and lexical antonymy”.

Interestingly, Zafiu (2005: 248) provides the following examples:

(178) Mașina e aceeași, **dar** vopsită altfel.  
Car-DEF is the same-F but painted-F differently.  
“The car is the same, but painted differently.”

(179) Această modă creează idei, **dar** distruge tradiții.  
This-F trend creates ideas but destroys traditions.  
“This trend creates ideas, but destroys traditions.”

(180) Pe tine te aștept, **dar** pe el nu.  
You-NOM I-NOM wait but him-NOM not.  
“You, I wait for, but him I don’t.”

Even if, at a first glance, these seem to be cases of contrast (where replacement with *însă* would be felicitous), they appear to have more in common with what Izutsu (2008) describes as *direct concessive*. For instance, it concerns only one entity that ‘carries out’ the action (the car, the trend, the person waiting). It compares two tokens of the same entity, where one is part of an

assumption (the car is the same then I would expect it not to be painted differently), and one is a proposition (it is painted differently). This model allows paraphrasing with *although*.

On the other hand, Zafiu considers, example (176) an instance of pure contrast, and she claims that “pure contrast should not allow equivalence with a concessive structure [...]” (p. 248) Citing Lang (1984), she affirms that pure contrast between terms is possible when there is a common basis (*common thematic integrator*) (ibid.). The common basis, or common thematic integrator is what R. Lakoff (1971: 131) refers to as a *common topic*. This, in turn, is similar to what Izutsu (2008) claims to constitute a ‘shared domain’.

Zafiu (2005: 247) argues for an *oriented semantic contrast* relationship (to be discussed further in 4.2.5.) between conjuncts linked by *dar* and *însă*. Even if most contexts allow the use of both, there are cases in which the interpretation of the sentence differs. That has to do with the meaning encoded in the lexical form. This can make it so that the sentence using one lexical form can depict semantic opposition, while the same sentence using the other lexical form can be interpreted based on the speaker’s argumentative intention, and thus gain a denial-of-expectation meaning. Let us reconsider example (177):

(181) Ion e gras, **însă** Dan e slab.  
Ion is fat CONJ Dan is thin.  
“Ion is fat, but Dan is thin.”

Even if this example displays syntactic parallelism and lexical antonymy, it is my intuition as a native speaker of Romanian that *însă* expresses a stronger opposition than *dar* and carries denial-of-expectation weight. It appears to give rise to the expectation that if Ion is fat he would be considered unfit in a certain context, and that Ion, by being thin, would be just fit. I believe that the ‘concessive structure’ that Zafiu (2005: 248) referred to earlier while citing Lang (1984) is encoded in the very lexical form of the word. Izutsu (2008: 651) claims that *dar* and *însă* are preferred in contexts “where the preceding utterance implies some expectation or assumption”. I believe that is fully true with *însă*, and only possible, but not required, with *dar*.

On the other hand, I claim that example (176) above can qualify as a case of contrast. As such, it can felicitously feature *iar* as conjunction in expressing a simple comparison between what Izutsu (2008: 661) claims to be two ‘explicitly differentiated’ items (as mentioned in 2.6.), without Ion’s being rich invoking any expectation about Vasile’s being poor:

(182) Ion e bogat, **iar** Vasile e sărac.  
Ion is rich but/and Vasile is poor.  
“Ion is rich, but Vasile is poor.”

The example above is strikingly similar to R. Lakoff's (1971: 133) example (137) mentioned at 3.8. Lakoff affirms that "no conclusion about the second member of the conjunct is derivable from the first":

(183) John is tall but Bill is short.

This is a view I support: in a semantic opposition example, the use of *dar* is possible. While I agree that *însă* does trigger a denial-of-expectation reading, in Izutsu's example (175), as concerns the use of *dar* the fact that "the sentence no longer expresses a simple contrast between two situations" (Izutsu, p. 651) is rejected. As shown above, *dar* can feature in examples with syntactic parallelism, whether they display lexical antonymy or not.

Examples (176) and (183) could make the case of pure contrast, since we have clear antonyms: rich/poor, tall/short. However, a contrast case could also be defined by semantic rather than lexical similarity, according to the same R. Lakoff (1971: 131), who provides a semantically felicitous, and a semantically infelicitous example:

(184) John has a yacht, but Bill has a \$30,000 mortgage on his home.

(185) ?John has a house, but Bill has a sore toe.

According to Lakoff (1971: 132), the first example works because it involves property ownership and combines similarity with difference, whereas the second signals oddity due to lack of similarity. What I can conclude, based on Lakoff's affirmations and the evidence presented, is that a common basis allows semantic similarity. However, I disagree to the fact that it "forces *but* rather than *and*" (ibid.). I support the idea that Izutsu's example (175) works perfectly with *iar* for this kind of contrast. In fact, it makes perfect sense to use both *dar*, *iar*, and *și* ('and'), even if the relationship of the contrasted pairs is not very plausible (at least at a first glance). The common thematic integrator (or the common basis) in Izutsu's example (175) is the direction. There is semantic similarity in the sense that both entities 'pull', and there is an opposition in propositions in terms of different directions. Although *backward/down* are not perfect antonyms, we have seen that that is not a requirement, but merely a common occurrence.

The fact that *dar* can adapt to semantic opposition situations (with or without lexical antonymy) in a two-way contrast setting, shows its capacity not only to evade the denial-of-expectation reading (something we cannot say about *însă*), but also to be associated with *iar* (but/and) in cases where there is no direct implication between the conjuncts and reversibility between them is possible. For semantic contrast the pattern is, thus, [A1 B1] *but* [A2 B2].

### 4.2.3. Thematic contrast

According to (Zafiu 2005: 251-2), the conjunction *iar* marks *thematic contrast*, thus the contrast between subjects or themes, and it has a copulative value which makes it very similar to *and*. The effect triggered by *iar* is, according to Zafiu, ‘non-oriented semantic contrast’, which is said to lead to no relevant conclusion. Her example is noted below:

- (186) Afară e frig, iar în sală e cald.  
Outside is cold, and/but in classroom/hall is warm.  
“Outside it is cold, but/and in the classroom it is warm.”

Here, she argues for the reversibility of the conjuncts (premises): neither *iar* nor the order of the conjuncts contributes to argumentative orientation. The conclusion here can vary from “*It’s not good anywhere*”, and “*It is better to stay indoors.*”

This example is strikingly similar to Izutsu’s (2008: 650) example (175) in that the conclusion there can be either: *None pulls the right/wrong way*, *Both pull the right/wrong way* *The crab pulls right/wrong* or *The pike pulls right/wrong*.

Zafiu (ibid.) replaces *iar* with *dar*, respectively *și* (and), which seem to work equally well, in the same example:

- (187) Afară e frig, dar în sală e cald.  
Outside is cold, but in classroom/hall is warm.  
“Outside it is cold, but in the classroom it is warm.”

- (188) Afară e frig, și în sală e cald.  
Outside is cold, and in classroom/hall is warm.  
“Outside it is cold, and in the classroom it is warm”

According to Izutsu (2008: 651) *iar* is preferred in contexts where “a simple comparison is suggested between two situations”, whereas *dar* and *însă*, as mentioned in 4.2.2., involve a previous expectation or assumption. But, as we have seen, *dar* is flexible and can also function very well in contexts where no assumption is cancelled, and no expectation is denied.

As it would appear, Izutsu’s (2008) examples of ‘contrast’- and Zafiu’s (2005) examples of ‘thematic contrast’-*iar* seem to support the hypothesis that *iar* would require a two-way contrast. There exists lexical and/or semantic similarity between the conjuncts: *The crab/the pike – pull backwards/downwards*, or *outside/in the classroom – cold/warm*. This makes it similar to R. Lakoff’s semantic opposition *but*. *Iar* must be followed by a new or ‘different’ topic (which is, in turn, followed by a comment in the form of the remainder of the sentence). This would mean that the function of *iar* is that of changing topics (or introduce new themes). Even if *dar* does not need to introduce a new topic, the fact that it can replace *iar* shows its compatibility with topic-change situations. *Dar* functions well in symmetric situations with

plausible contrast pairs. In part 2 of the present chapter I will present cases of non-plausible contrast pairs so to observe compatibility with *iar* and *dar*.

The common thematic contrast-*iar* pattern displays a [A1 B1] *but/and* [A2 B2] form, where the second proposition contains a number of elements which contrast pairwise (are put in opposition with) the same number of elements contained by the previous one. Although *iar* has little, if any occurrence as an utterance/sentence initial conjunction, there are some exceptions worth mentioning<sup>81</sup>.

As regards both thematic contrast *iar* and semantic opposition *dar* I assert that, similar to the English contrast *but* patterns, the comments are marked by primary focus, and the topics by secondary focus.

#### 4.2.4. Correction

Izutsu's (2008: 650) example for what she refers to as corrective *ci*, retrieved from Schick (1998: 52) is:

(189) Ion nu e prost, ci/\*iar/#însă/#dar leneș.  
Ion not is stupid but lazy  
“Ion is not stupid, but lazy.”

This example features sentential negation. Furthermore, it displays ellipsis in the sense that the verb, which in this case preserves the null subject, has been deleted. Were we to replace *ci* with *dar* or *însă* in Romanian we would, indeed, obtain a concessive reading, provided the sentence lacked ellipsis:

(190) Ion nu e prost, însă/dar e leneș.  
Ion not is stupid but (he) is lazy  
“Ion is not stupid, but he is lazy.”

As mentioned in **3.6.1.1.**, Chapter 3, it is possible that the sentence gain a denial-of-expectation meaning, even if the first conjunct displays sentential negation. The requirement is that it not display ellipsis in the second conjunct.

Both examples above display sentential negation, that takes wide scope over the entire first clause. In English that can be tested by doing the contraction test (*is not* turns to *isn't*). However, in Romanian, using contraction is not possible.

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<sup>81</sup> There are cases in which the Vb+Subj elements can be preceded by *iar* with a temporal adverb function signalling repetition; see example (219) in **4.3.1.1.**, which is an expression of complaint or saturation with regard to a certain habit/action. Also, see example (218) in **4.2.6.**, where the conjunction *iar* does hold utterance-initial position as long as a second speaker continues the idea of a first speaker.

Note that in English, it is essential that a sentence display ellipsis in S2 in order to have a corrective character. In Romanian, example (190) can function equally well as a correction, with or without ellipsis. The only requirement is that only *ci*, not any other coordinator, be used. Thus, the lexical form of the Romanian corrective-*but* helps disambiguate the meaning. See the following example:

- (191) a. Ion nu e prost, *ci* leneș.  
 Ion not is stupid but lazy  
 “Ion is not stupid, but lazy.”
- b. Ion nu e prost, *ci* este leneș.  
 Ion not is stupid but (he) is lazy  
 “Ion is not stupid, but he is lazy.”

Moreover, in Romanian the negation can also occur right before the word that is to be corrected (after the verb) and replaced in the second conjunct. Similar to English, this negation can occur as constituent, taking narrow scope over its focus. In Romanian, this puts a great deal of emphasis on the word that is under the scope of the negation. Note the following example:

- (192) Ion e nu prost, *ci* leneș.  
 Ion is not stupid but lazy  
 “Ion is not stupid, but lazy.”

Only this is a case which, like English, allows no other structure than ellipsis for a corrective reading. It comes as close as it gets in terms of similarity, to example (129) resumed below:

- (193) Not [BILL]<sub>F</sub> stole the cookie, but [JOHN]<sub>F</sub>

Because Romanian specializes *ci* for correction, it is impossible to interpret a sentence that contains it otherwise, whether it displays ellipsis or not. As concerns example (192) above, there is no danger to interpret ‘nu prost’ (*not stupid*) as ‘intelligent’. This rules out the denial-of-expectation meaning. Furthermore, it is not possible to obtain an incorporated-negation word (non+stupid) that would cause the sentence to be odd. Even if, in this particular case, that also applies to English, there are situations where that happens. Such is the following example:

- (194) \*This is **improbable**, but merely possible.

This proves that in Romanian there cannot be ambiguity between concession and correction, as Izutsu suggested for English in 3.6.1.1.

Replacement with *iar* is not possible since, as discussed in 4.2.3., *iar* needs to introduce a new topic (or theme) and cannot directly precede a comment.

Moving further, Zafiu’s (2005: 249) example for corrective *ci* is the following:

(195) Ion nu doarme, *ci* ascultă muzică.  
Ion not sleeps, CONJ (he) listens music  
“Ion isn’t sleeping, but listening to music.”

According to (Zafiu, 2005: 249), *ci* helps facilitate the *polemic correction* of an explicitly negated hypothesis – it does not just follow a “negative proposition”, as that can also be a specificity of denial-of-expectation, or thematic contrast. The ‘polemic’ negation is also an argument brought by A & D (1977) (see section 3.5.) This is shown in Zafiu’s examples (ibid.):

(196) Ion nu doarme, *dar* a închis telefonul.  
Ion not sleeps, but (he) has closed the phone.  
“Ion isn’t sleeping, but (he) has closed his phone.”

(197) Ion nu doarme, *iar* Maria nu ascultă muzică.  
Ion not sleeps, and Maria not listens music.  
“Ion isn’t sleeping, and Maria isn’t listening to music.”

The Romanian *ci* thus carries out the corrective function in Iten’s (2000: 181) example (86) reproduced below:

(198) That isn’t my sister but my mother.  
Aceea este nu (a) mea soră *ci* (a) mea mamă.  
“Aceea nu este sora mea, *ci* mama mea.”

The Romanian translation for it is:

(199) Aceea nu este sora mea, *ci* mama mea.  
That not is sister-DEF mine, but mother-DEF mine.  
“That isn’t my sister but my mother.”

According to Zafiu, the corrected elements may vary from pure lexical opposition (not *smart* – but *stupid*), to minimally opposed (not intelligent but relatively smart) (p. 250). Her further examples (ibid.) include:

(200) *Nu e „dăștept”, ci deștept.*  
Not (he) is ‘suh-mart’ but ‘smart’  
“He’s not “suh-mart”, but ‘smart’.”

(201) *Nu doarme, ci veghează*  
Not (he/she/it) sleeps but watches over  
“He/she/it’s not sleeping, but watching over (someone)”

(202) *Doarme nu bine, ci agitat.*  
He/she/it sleeps not well but agitated  
“He/she doesn’t sleep well, but agitated”

Example (200) is, similar to example (119) in 3.5., one where the phonetic form is corrected (in Romanian, *dăștept* is also part of a different register, slang). Example (201) objects to a presupposition, while the last example is similar to (192) and emphasizes on the sleep quality.



#### 4.2.4.1. Conclusion

From the discussion in this subsection, we can conclude that, similar to English, the corrective *but* requires a [A1 NOT B1] *but* [B2] pattern. The Romanian *ci* is mostly used as a sentence coordinator. What is specific to both languages is the fact that the first clause disposes of explicit, or non-lexical negation. Although accounts differ, what seems to be the case with the corrective *but* is that it does not always highlight pure lexical opposition, but also minimally-opposed contrasted elements (as Zafiu suggests). In view of these arguments, the intuition here is that a shared domain as suggested by Izutsu is necessary for a sentence to achieve relevance as corrective. Furthermore, the specific parameter for correction set by Izutsu (2008: 671) concerning two different tokens of the same entity before and after removal/relocation apply very well to the Romanian cases.

#### 4.2.5. The Romanian *dar* and *însă* and the oriented semantic contrast

In terms of the denial-of-expectation – contrast distinction, as far as Romanian is concerned, we can observe the distribution of the same two linguistic devices (*dar* and *însă*) between which, according to Zafiu, (2005: 248), there exists an *oriented semantic contrast relationship*, where the contrast and denial-of expectation effects seem to be context-dependent, and the occurrence of one over the other is determined by the speaker’s argumentative intention. As mentioned in 4.1. and 4.2.2., Zafiu (2005: 248) claims an ‘undecidable oscillation’ between pure contrast and denial of expectation.

Zafiu (2005: 246) claims that *dar* and *însă* are interchangeable in the denial-of-expectation and contrast reading. In her opinion, these expressions function equally well on three incidence levels, formulated by Sweetser (1990) and supplemented by Lang (2000), in terms of “a) propositional contents (at a semantic level), b) truth-value utterances (at an epistemic level) and c) speech acts (at a pragmatic level).”

Below we can see an example for each level:

- (203) E<sup>82</sup>            optimist,            *dar*            face            declarații            prudente.  
(He) is    optimist-INDEF,    CONJ-*but*    (he) makes    statements    prudent (pl.)  
“He’s optimistic, but he makes cautious statements.”

This example is, according to Zafiu, one where “opposition is achieved at the semantic level of the explicit content and of the implications” (ibid.)

- (204) E            optimist,            *dar*            nu            are            multe            motive.  
(He) is    optimist-INDEF,    CONJ-*but*    not            (he) have            many            reasons.

---

<sup>82</sup> ‘E’ is the short form of ‘ESTE’ (the verb *to be* in 3<sup>rd</sup> pers., sg.)

“He’s optimistic, but he doesn’t have many reasons to be”

This is an example where Zafiu (2005: 246) observes a contrast between two epistemic actions of the speaker, in the form “*I acknowledge* (that he is optimistic), *but I know* (that he hasn’t many reasons to be).”

(205) E           optimist.   *Dar* e chiar așa, sau se preface?  
Is   optimist-INDEF. *But* is really so, or fakes-REFL?  
“He’s optimistic. But is he truly so/is it really so, or he fakes it?”

This is a level where *dar* usually has a greater occurrence than *însă*, with an utterance-initial, dialogue marker function. However, in this case, it can be replaced by *însă* for reasons I will discuss in 4.2.6.

Zafiu’s explanation is that the connectors that function at the denial-of-expectation level have “a clear argumentative orientation”, which is “reflected by the irreversibility of the connected elements” (ibid.) The two types of relationships exemplified are (note that both *dar* and *însă* are felicitous in the examples below):

a) One where the second proposition introduces the conclusion of the argument, that comes to contradict the implication of the first proposition, as in example:

(206) Plouă, *dar* plecăm în excursie.  
Rains but leave-PL in/on trip.  
“It’s raining, but we’re going on a trip.”

This example is very similar to Iten’s (2000: 171) example:

(207) It was raining **but** Peter went out. (*P BUT Q*)

The structure is specific to denial-of-expectation. In (206) our ‘going on a trip’ (*Q*) contradicts and eliminates the assumption (*R*) that when it rains (*P*), people would not be expected to go on a trip ( $\neg Q$ ). Example (206) brings about the incompatibility specific to denial-of expectation and the lack of reversibility that also characterizes Lakoff’s (1971: 67) example (87) mentioned in Iten (2000: 176) and restated below:

(208) John is a Republican but he is honest.

At the same time, (206) shows the distinguishing marks of Izutsu’s (2008) direct concessive subcase that allows a paraphrase with *although*, and involves a proposition and an implicature.

b) The implication of the second proposition contradicts the implication of the of the first proposition, as in the example:

(209) Plouă, *dar* mie ploaia îmi place.  
Rains but me-D rain me-D like.  
“It’s raining, but I like/enjoy rain.”

The same as with (206), if we were to reverse the conjuncts in (209) the result would sound odd, and the second conjunct would fail to contradict the assumption of the first conjunct:

(210) \*Mie ploaia îmi place, *dar* plouă.  
Me-D rain me-D like CONJ rains.  
“I like/enjoy rain, but it rains.”

What is more, (209) makes for a case of indirect concessive in the sense of Izutsu (2008), one that does not allow a paraphrase with *although*, and involves two implicatures.

#### 4.2.5.1. The oriented semantic contrast

Zafiu (2005: 247) describes the *oriented semantic contrast* relationship as one where differences only occur in context, based on factors such as the speaker’s argumentative intention. The two following examples, which can simultaneously be interpreted as pure semantic opposition and denial-of-expectation illustrate the difference:

(211) Plouă la București, *dar* la Sinaia e soare.  
Rains at/in Bucharest but at/in Sinaia is sun.  
“It is raining in Bucharest, but in Sinaia it is sunny.”

(212) La Sinaia e soare *dar* la București plouă.  
In Sinaia is sun but at/in Bucharest rains.  
“In Sinaia it is sunny, but in Bucharest it is raining.”

These two examples can allow the use of *dar*, *însă* and even *iar*. The situation in which both are interpreted as the reversible-type semantic opposition, according to Zafiu (ibid.), is when the conclusion of both is “weather is versatile”. An important point she makes is that “if certain particularized implications occur within the given communication context (of the kind “I’m happy”, “I’m angry”, “come to Sinaia”, “we’re not going back to Bucharest”, etc.)”, this causes irreversibility, and semantic opposition is replaced by an ‘indirect-type’ denial-of-expectation.

As I argued in 4.2.2., I take the *oriented semantic contrast* relationship to be one in which the meaning encoded in the lexical form (either *dar* or *însă*) has a lot to do with the interpretation of the sentence. While sentences coordinated by *iar* and *dar* can create the perfect environment for the contrast meaning, using *însă* in the same sentence can turn it into denial-of-expectation. This is also possible by using *dar*, but not a requirement. That phenomenon was argued for example (177).

#### 4.2.5.2. Summary

The three levels documented by Zafiu (2005) serve to explain the frequency of occurrence of the Romanian coordinate conjunctions that function as adversatives. The semantic level captures both the occurrence of the denial-of-expectation connectives in the form of *dar* and *însă*, and the co-occurrence of *dar* and *iar* in the existence of a common thematic integrator (common basis), where the former minimally requires semantic similarity and difference between conjuncts, and the latter semantic, and not necessarily lexical similarity. The epistemic level example (204) is one that only allows the occurrence of *dar* and *însă*, with *iar* being off limits due to lack of a new topic. Finally, the pragmatic level allows the occurrence of both *dar* and *însă* (where the former is more frequent than the latter) and prohibits the use of *iar*.

Izutsu (2008: 651) only sees *iar* as fit for contrast, while she claims that *dar* and *însă* are used for denial-of-expectation. Zafiu (2005: 247) argues for an *oriented semantic contrast* relationship between *dar* and *însă*, where the meaning is retrieved based on the speaker's argumentative intention. Zafiu provides examples for what she refers to as semantic contrast using *dar* and *însă* with patterns that fit Izutsu's view for *iar*. While she did not clearly express this fact, Zafiu (2005: 245) suggested that 'contrasting content' can also be retrieved from sentences coordinated by *însă*, such as (177), resumed below:

(213) Ion e gras, **însă** Dan e slab.  
Ion is fat CONJ Dan is thin.  
"Ion is fat, but Dan is thin."

What I argued, however, regarding these types of examples, is that *însă* expresses a stronger opposition relationship than *dar* due to its lexical form, causing a denial-of-expectation reading even in cases of lexical antonymy. Even if this could also be possible with *dar*, I claim that *dar* is more flexible and can also coordinate reversible contrast sentences where no assumption is cancelled, and no expectation is denied.

#### 4.2.6. The discourse marker use of Romanian *but*

Consider example (205) reproduced below:

(214) E           optimist.   *Dar* e chiar așa, sau se preface?           (Zafiu, 2005: 246)  
Is   optimist-INDEF. *But* is really so, or fakes-REFL?  
"He's optimistic. But is he truly so/is it really so, or he fakes it?"

As mentioned in 4.2.5., in utterance-initial position, *dar* has a greater occurrence than *însă*. Zafiu (2005: 246) claims that these expressions function equally well on three incidence levels, including the pragmatic level that example (214) above is situated on. This means that this example could function well with both *dar* and *însă*. It is an example performed by the same

speaker. This utterance would not qualify as part of a dialogue, instead it seems to resemble a private thought. If it were part of a dialogue, Zafiu (2005) would only support *dar* on utterance-initial position, not *însă*. In that sense, similar to Blakemore (1989) and Fraser (1999) she would view *dar* as a discourse marker.

Concerning the utterance-initial use of *dar*, it seems that Izutsu's (2008) view is similar to that of Iten's (2000) discussed at section 3.9., who sees denial-of-expectation *but* only as a coordinating conjunction (similar to contrast *but*). Furthermore, Izutsu does see *însă* as fitting into a discourse marker pattern (utterance-initial).

In 3.10. I discussed the occurrence of utterance-initial *but* (for instance, in a case where one speaker continues another speaker's idea in a dialogue). I mentioned the fact that it can translate as *dar* in non-elliptical cases. It, however, cannot translate as *însă*. In my opinion, *însă* sounds odd in such a dialogue, since *însă*, similar to the arguments provided above, seems to rather signal the continuation of one's own idea rather than someone else's. Below, I resume Fraser (1999: 945) example (147), to illustrate this:

(215) A: James is not in his office.

James este nu în al lui birou.

“James nu este in biroul lui.”

B: But I just saw him there.

Dar eu tocmai AUX-to have seen (pe el) acolo.

“*Dar*/\**însă* tocmai I-am vazut acolo.”

The example below, however, felicitously allows both *dar* and *însă* utterance-initial:

(216) Bill talking to himself: James claims he is not in the office. But I just saw him there.

Another setting that can allow the use of *însă* (and also *dar*) utterance-initial is a more formal, or a literary one:

(217) He had waited for her all night. But she only showed up at dawn.

My belief is in accordance with both Izutsu's (2008) idea of *însă* having a more formal character and occurring most often in written language, and Zafiu's (2005) claims and evidence from literary work that *însă* behaves the same. As regards the utterance-initial position that Izutsu (2008) claims possible for *însă*, I am inclined to agree only to its use as such as shown above: Same speaker – new idea, and literary or formal text. It is likely that Zafiu (2005) found such examples in the texts studied.

Izutsu's view (2008), that *dar* does not go beyond its coordinator function, is similar to Iten's (2000) for English *but*. It was refuted by means of examples (215) – (217), and Zafiu's (2005) arguments.

Evidence put forth by Zafiu in 4.2.4. with regard to the corrective *ci* shows that utterance-initial position is seldom-occurring because of strong connection to negation. The role of *ci* is not a discursive one. However, as noted in section 3.10. it is possible to use *ci* in a case where a second speaker continues the idea of the first; see Iten's (2000: 197) example (145). The correction reading is possible because of the existence of the negation in S1, and the use of the lexical form *ci*.

As regards the conjunction *iar*, it can only function utterance-initial if there is no ellipsis, similar to *dar* and, as I discussed in 4.2.3. (footnote 81), if the second speaker continues the idea of the first. I also explained that a feature of *iar* is that of introducing a new topic. The example (145) noted in 3.10. is rendered below:

(218) A: Peter isn't a hero...  
Peter nu este un erou...  
"Peter nu este un erou."

B: But Anna is a complete and utter prat.  
Iar Anna este o total-F fraier-F  
"Iar Anna este o fraieră totală."

It would seem that all Romanian adversative conjunctions can occur in utterance-initial position and preserve their original meaning provided certain requirements are met: adjustment to any type of dialogue and narrative text for *dar*, narrative text for *însă*, two-speaker dialogue with negation in S1 for *ci*, two-speaker dialogue with a new topic in S2 for *iar*. To some extent, it would seem that all other authors' views on the English *but* also apply for Romanian *but*. Iten's (2000) in the sense that *but* behaves as a conjunction in all cases. Blakemore's (1989) and Fraser's (1999) in the sense that utterance-initial *but* can have a denial-of-expectation meaning. What seems to be a missing link is the fact that even if on utterance-initial positions, the adversatives preserve the meaning they have as one-sentence coordinators in their special lexical form.

## Part 2

### 4.3. Problem cases

This section focuses on extraordinary cases that do not fit the patterns described for *but* in Romanian. As mentioned in section 1.3., Zafiu (2005) and Izutsu (2008) hold rather different views with regard to Romanian adversative conjunctions. These views are resumed below:

- Izutsu claims that *iar* marks contrast, Zafiu claims that *iar* marks thematic contrast
- Izutsu claims that *dar* and *însă* mark only denial-of-expectation, Zafiu claims that *dar* and *însă* are interchangeable on the denial-of-expectation – contrast reading.
- Both Izutsu and Zafiu agree on the corrective function of the conjunction *ci*.

I will begin by discussing the difference between contrast and thematic contrast. This is followed by a presentation of Bîlbîie & Winterstein’s (2011) proposal concerning the contrast conjunction *iar*.

Where Izutsu sees only *iar* as encoding contrast, Zafiu agrees that function is fulfilled by *dar*. As opposed to Izutsu, Zafiu sees *iar* as encoding thematic contrast. I suggest that *dar* can also fit Izutsu’s pattern for contrast, as long as it, too, introduces a new topic.

#### 4.3.1. The difference between *iar* and *dar*

In order to observe the differences between these two conjunctions, it is useful to take a look at patterns that allow their use. I will begin with the utterance-initial *but*.

##### 4.3.1.1. Utterance-initial use

As we could see in 2.2.2., 3.10. this kind of *but* has been discussed in the literature as a discourse marker (discourse *but*) by Blakemore (1989) and Fraser (1999). In 3.9. I noted Blakemore’s (1989) view that discourse markers are limited to the denial-of-expectation use, i.e. they no longer coordinate one sentence, but are used for introducing an independent sentence. I also mentioned that Iten (2000) sees both contrast and denial-of-expectation *but* as a coordinator, regardless of its use. As regards the Romanian utterance-initial *dar*, Izutsu (2008) holds the same view. Zafiu (2005), on the other hand, agrees with Blakemore (1989) and Fraser (1999).

In 4.2.3. I mentioned the fact that *iar*, as a conjunction, has little if any occurrence in utterance-initial position. However, as a temporal adverb, *iar* can be placed at the beginning of the sentence, so to signal repetition. See the following example:

(219) *Iar* doarme Dan.  
 Again sleeps Dan.  
 “Dan is sleeping *again*.”

In her paper, Zafiu (2005) does not provide any arguments regarding its utterance-initial use as a conjunction (or discourse marker). But as I discussed in 4.2.6., *iar* can function utterance-initial provided it introduces a new topic, and that there is no ellipsis (example (218)). The model could also work if the second sentence displayed a negation (**is not a...**).

*Dar* could work just fine in the context of example (218), i.e. encoding contrast, if a speaker continues the idea of another. See example below:

(220) A: Peter isn't a hero...  
Peter nu este un erou...  
"Peter nu este un erou."

B: But Anna **is** a complete and utter prat.  
Dar Anna este o total-F fraier-F  
"Dar Anna este o fraieră totală."

*Dar* is felicitous here whether the first sentence displays a negation or not. However, *dar* would be infelicitous if the second sentence displayed a negation, at the same time as the first (**is not a...**).

As opposed to *iar*, *dar* can be used in utterance-initial position without the second speaker's having to introduce a new topic in the second sentence. This triggers a denial-of-expectation reading:

(221) A: Peter isn't a hero...  
Peter nu este un erou...  
"Peter nu este un erou."

B: But **is** a complete and utter prat.  
Dar este un total-M fraier  
"Dar este un fraier total."

As a conclusion, both *dar* and *iar* can function utterance-initial, *dar* for the contrast and denial-of-expectation meaning, and *iar* only for contrast. This view contradicts that of Blakemore (1989) in that utterance-*but* is limited to the denial-of-expectation use.

#### 4.3.1.2. The sentence coordinator role

In 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. I argued for the ability of *dar* to behave as *iar* in a two-way contrast symmetrical pattern where there exists semantic and/or lexical similarity between the conjuncts. But is it always the case that *iar* and *dar* can coordinate plausible contrast pairs?

Consider example Zafiu's (2005: 252), below:

(222) *Afară plouă, iar noi ascultăm muzică.*  
Outside rains, and/but we listen music.  
"Outside it is raining, and/but we are listening to music". (ibid)

Zafiu's suggestion is that clearly opposing elements are more likely to sharpen the contrast, while less opposing elements are much less marked lexically. In example (222) above *iar* seems to work with a less sharp contrast pattern. Although the [A1 B1] but/and [A2 B2] formula is



preserved, the elements in the two conjuncts do not form plausible contrast pairs: *outside* ≠ *we*, *it is raining* ≠ *we are listening to music*. It is two situations that are contrasted here.

Now, let us replace *iar* with *dar*:

- (223) ?*Afară plouă, dar noi ascultăm muzică.*  
Outside rains, but we listen music.  
“Outside it is raining, but we are listening to music”.

Although at a first glance, example (223) seems to have a denial-of-expectation reading, replacement with *dar* is in fact infelicitous. What seems to be commonplace in (222) and (223) is the opposite semantic and/or lexical value of the conjuncts. In this case, it is unclear to me how the action of ‘listening to music’ may contradict an expectation from S1. If anything, the fact that ‘it is raining’ should suggest that one would rather stay indoor (perhaps listening to music), since rain, and getting wet, usually cause an unpleasant feeling.

As concerns example (222), because of the non-plausibility of the contrasted pairs, it seems that the function of *iar*, which I claimed to be similar to that of the Russian ‘*a*’ (with a contrastive reading) in 3.11.1., shifts towards that of the Russian ‘*i*’ (with an additive reading). Malchukov (2004: 183) also agrees that the conjunction ‘*a*’ is semantically related to both ‘*no*’ (with an adversative reading) and *i*. What this means is that in this case, the *iar* in example (222) has a similar function to that of the Romanian ‘*și*’ (and), i.e. a copulative one. Furthermore, it involves a change in topic<sup>83</sup>. I argue for this meaning and not for a denial-of-expectation meaning, which would employ, for instance the Russian adversative *no*, because of the interpretation of the two clauses: one does not seem to cancel the other, for the same reasons I used for example (223).

However, as also discussed in 3.11.1., it is possible for *iar* to trigger the denial-of-expectation effect in a non-plausible contrast pair situation (as long as it contrasts two different themes). Triggering a denial-of-expectation can happen, as discussed in section 3.2., as long as S2 contains a proposition that cancels the expectation from S1. Recall example (162) and its Romanian version (166) with an added theme in the second conjunct:

- (224) *Zima, a idet dozhdj.*  
winter CONJ goes rain  
“It’s winter, *but*, *and* it is raining.”

- (225) *Este iarnă, dar/însă / iar / și afară plouă.*  
Is winter *but*, / *but/and* / *and* outside rains.  
“It is winter, and it is raining outside.”

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<sup>83</sup> More on the topic change function of *iar* to be discussed in 4.3.1.3.

The topic introduced by *iar* cancels the assumption people generally hold about winter (instead of snowing, it is raining).

Further, consider Zafiu's example (ibid.):

- (226) *E optimist, iar asta mă miră.* (ibid.)  
 (He) is optimistic, but/and this me amazes  
 "He's optimistic, and this<sup>84</sup> surprises me."

Again, this is an example with non-plausible contrast pairs. Similar to example (222), it involves topic change, and *iar* has a copulative function. While *iar* can in this context be replaced by 'și' (and), replacement with *dar* sounds unacceptable to me in Romanian:

- (227) \**E optimist, dar asta mă miră.* (ibid.)  
 (He) is optimistic, but this me amazes  
 "He's optimistic, but this surprises me."

It seems that the difference between the usual contrast and the thematic contrast envisioned by Zafiu (2005) rests in the fact that the latter also allows the coordination of non-plausible contrast pairs (which form a non-symmetrical structure). Although the function of *iar* of introducing S2 topics (or themes) usually in the form of subjects remains, it is not a requirement that these form perfect contrast pairs with the topics in S1.

#### 4.3.1.2.1. Discussion

Zafiu (2005: 252) agrees that the next example is an ungrammatical one since, as a rule, *iar* does not contrast comments associated with the same subject (or theme). According to her, the referential identity of the subject cannot be preserved via an anaphoric element. That, as we have seen in section 3.2., is only specific to the denial-of-expectation reading. Therefore, replacement with *dar* is felicitous here:

- (228) \**Dan doarme, iar e agitat.*  
 Dan sleeps, and/but (he) is agitated.  
 "Dan is sleeping, and/but is agitated"
- (229) *Dan doarme, dar e agitat.*  
 Dan sleeps, but (he) is agitated.  
 "Dan is sleeping, but is agitated"

*Iar* could be possible here if there existed two contrastive topics and two comment phrases, as below:

- (230) Dan doarme, iar Cristi e agitat.

---

<sup>84</sup> 'Asta' literally means 'this', but in this context, 'that' sounds more natural in English. 'That' translates as 'Aceea' (formal) or 'Aia' (informal) for feminine, and 'Acela' (formal) or 'Ăla' (informal) for masculine.

Dan sleeps, and/but Cristi is agitated.  
“Dan is sleeping, and/but Cristi is agitated”

In a similar manner we can test example (167) in 4.2.1. resumed below:

(231) Pianul este bun, însă/dar/\*iar/\*ci scump.  
piano-DEF is nice but expensive  
“The piano is nice, but expensive.”

The example would be felicitous with *iar* if the piano would be contrasted, for instance, with a violin in S2. Otherwise, the example is merely felicitous with *dar* and *însă* for an (indirect) concessive reading in the sense of Izutsu (2008).

On the other hand, we have Zafiu’s (2005: 244) example of denial-of-expectation mentioned in 4.2.1.:

(232) Plouă, dar e destul de cald.  
Rains but (it is) quite warm  
“It is raining, but it is quite warm.”

In this case, *dar* could be replaced by *iar* only if *iar* introduced a topic (for instance ‘outside’). This would then be marked by non-symmetry as described earlier:

(233) Plouă, iar afară e destul de cald.  
Rains but/and outside is quite of warm  
“It is raining, but outside it is quite warm.”

The example above is similar to (232) in that they both encode denial-of-expectation.

According to Zafiu (2005: 252), as a rule, *iar* is prevented from being followed by a verbal form “since the contrast position is within its proximity and the predicate is always thematic”. What Zafiu means is that the predicate (the verb) cannot follow *iar* since it must combine with two other elements so to complete a proposition. Therefore, the verb needs to have ‘someone’ to perform the action and ‘something’ that the action can be performed on. In (233) above the verb ‘e’ has ‘afară’ in front, and ‘destul de cald’ after. ‘Afară’ will become the topic of the clause, and thus gain secondary focus. It is followed by the comment, that feature a primary focus. This was mentioned in section 3.3. and 3.11.1. and will be addressed in 4.3.1.3., where I present Bîlbîie & Winterstein’s (2011) claim that *iar* needs to be followed by an element salient in discourse and not focused:

Zafiu’s (2005: 252) ungrammatical example is rendered below:

(234) \*Doarme Dan<sup>85</sup>, iar citește Maria.

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<sup>85</sup> The ‘Doarme Dan’ order is correct only if taken out of the contrastive pattern. The focus rests on the type and time of the action performed by the subject, rather than on the subject himself. The rest of the construction is ungrammatical because *iar* was shown to introduce the thematic element that is being contrasted (and this is not

Sleeps Dan, and reads Maria  
“\*Is sleeping Dan, and is reading Maria.”

My intuition here is that both replacement with *dar*, or *însă* yields unacceptable examples for the same reason:

(235) \**Doarme Dan, dar citește Maria.*

(236) \**Doarme Dan, însă citește Maria.*

To conclude, as a sentence coordinator *iar* can encode both contrast in the sense of Izutsu (2008) and thematic contrast in the sense of Zafiu (2005) in a plausible contrast pair setting, and denial-of-expectation in a non-plausible contrast pair setting as long as it introduces a new topic. *Dar* can encode contrast or semantic opposition, similar to *iar*, only if present in a two-way contrast pattern with plausible contrast pairs. In non-plausible contrast pairs, *dar* sentences are rendered unacceptable. This makes the difference between contrast and thematic contrast a matter of symmetry that *iar* could do without. In sentences that do not involve a new topic (where the same topic is preserved) in S2, *dar* encodes denial-of-expectation, while *iar* is infelicitous. Finally, neither *iar*, *dar* (even *însă*) can be immediately followed by a predicate (that was shown to always bear primary focus).

#### 4.3.1.3. Bîlbîie & Winterstein’s (2011) constraints for the conjunction *iar*

Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011: 3) see *iar* as an information structure sensitive element and suggest two constraints for it in its specific contrastive meaning.

The **first constraint** suggested by Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011: 4) for *iar* is the ‘double contrastiveness’ constraint, which requires that *iar* coordinate two contrastive pairs. They also argue that replacement with *și* (and) is often felicitous. Tests based on speakers’ preferences, however, show that “the preferred placement of the element that answers the question is at the end of the conjunct, whereas the element already present in the question appears right after *iar*.” (p. 5) This would mean that what follows after *iar* lacks (primary) focus since it already appeared in the question, even if, according to Krifka (2007: 44)<sup>86</sup>, these are “topics with a rising accent.” (bear prosodic accent).

After testing different contexts by using overt questions (that mention elements that are salient in discourse, or *contrastive topics*), Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011: 6) formulate a **second**

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the case). A case in which the “*Doarme Dan, iar citește Maria*”. would be grammatical is if *iar* acted as a temporal adverb with the function of signalling repetition (‘again’) and it would take scope over each of the two propositions, as such: *Iar doarme Dan, și iar citește Maria*. In this case, we would need a different conjunction *și* (‘and’) to connect the two. Otherwise, a simple comma would do.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. sub-section 2.8.4.

**constraint** that is precisely that: “*iar* must be followed by a contrastive topic and cannot immediately followed by informational focus<sup>87</sup>”.

As also mentioned in **2.8.4.**, Chapter 2, Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011: 6), see contrastive topics as “elements that have already been mentioned, or are salient in the discourse.”. They further claim that “the informational structure of an utterance can be made explicit by using an overt question”. That is to say, the overt question already specifies the elements contained in the contrastive topic (the topic that is introduced by *iar*).

Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011: 3) base their arguments both on the previous literature and speaker preference tests. They argue that in the literature, the specificity of *iar* is that of only connecting clausal constituents. Additionally, *iar* cannot be followed by a tensed verb. Consider the three following examples (ibid.):

(237) Dan a mâncat un măr roșu, {și/\**iar*} o pară verde.  
Dan has eaten a red apple, {and/IAR} a green pear.

(238) Dan mănâncă o banană, {și/*iar*} Maria bea un suc.  
Dan is eating a banana, {and/IAR} Maria is drinking juice.

(239) Dan mănâncă o banană, *iar* \*(*apoi*) bea un suc.  
Dan is eating a banana, IAR then is drinking juice.

The first example shows a case that does not allow the use of *iar* since the coordination is phrasal, not clausal. Only the use of *și* (and) is felicitous. The second example shows a case where *iar* coordinates clauses and introduces a theme (a topic). Both *iar* and *și* are felicitous here. The third example shows how *iar* is prohibited from being directly followed by a tensed verb (a time adverb indicating sequence must be added). In this example, *și* would be felicitous without adding an adverb.

In section **4.3.1.2.1.** I mentioned an example suggested by Zafiu (2005: 252) that was ungrammatical due to the fact that *iar* was followed by a verbal form. The example is resumed below:

(240) \**Doarme Dan, iar citește Maria.*  
Sleeps Dan, and reads Maria  
“\*Is sleeping Dan, and is reading Maria.”

Her arguments point to the fact that the verb cannot follow *iar* because it is a primary focused element. Based on the elements discussed in section **4.2.3.**, the function of *iar* is that of changing topics, by introducing a theme (or topic) that contrasts with the theme (topic) in the first clause.

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<sup>87</sup> According to Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011: 6), “*informational foci* are defined as the constituents that answer a question”.

Zafiu's (2005: 252) correct example is rendered below:

- (241) Dan doarme, iar Maria citește.  
Dan sleeps, and Maria reads  
“Dan is sleeping, and Maria is reading.”

So far, we can note that Bîlbîie & Winterstein's (2011) claims are in accordance with those of Zafiu (2005) in that: *iar* needs to coordinate two contrastive pairs, *iar* needs to introduce a contrastive topic (new topic) that does not coincide with an informational focus (the element that answers the question). The latter requirement points to the fact that *iar* must not be followed by the verbal form discussed earlier, which bears new information about the topic and is defined by primary focus.

In 4.3.1.2. I noted that there are cases that do not involve plausible contrast pairs (even if *iar* does coordinate two contrast pairs). Example (222) is one that I argued that *iar* has a copulative, topic changing role, similar to the Russian ‘*i*’ (with an additive reading). I argued that the example was not denial-of-expectation since no expectation from S1 was cancelled by S2.

Alternatively, I mentioned Zafiu's (2005: 244) example (232) that I described as having the potential of a denial-of-expectation sentence if *dar* were replaced with *iar*, and *iar* introduced a topic (‘outside’). The result was expressed in example (233) resumed below:

- (242) Plouă, iar afară e destul de cald.  
Rains but/and outside is quite of warm  
“It is raining, but outside it is quite warm.”

Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011: 3-4) also argue that *iar* can be used both additively, and to convey a denial-of-expectation meaning. Their examples below (ibid.) show an additive, respectively a denial case.

- (243) Ninge, e ora două noaptea, iar eu scriu.  
It's snowing, it's 2 o'clock in the morning, IAR I'm writing.
- (244) Sunt 40 de grade afară, iar Maria are trei pulovere pe ea.  
There are 40 degrees outside, IAR Maria has three pulls on her.

This confirms the similarity of *iar* with the Russian contrastive conjunction ‘*a*’ (with a contrastive reading), described in sections 3.11.1. and 4.3.1.2. and its flexibility to either shift towards the meaning of ‘*i*’ (with an additive reading), or the meaning of ‘*no*’ (with an adversative reading), as claimed by Malchukov (2004: 183).

#### 4.3.1.3.1. Discussion

##### a) Informational focus and contrastive topic supported:

Let us resume Izutsu's (2008: 650) contrast example (175) in section 4.2.2.:

(245) Racul trage înapoi, iar știuca în jos.  
crab-DEF pulls backward but/and pike-DEF in down  
“The crab pulls backward, but/and the pike (pulls) down.”

It is easy to observe the following aspects: it connects clauses, *iar* is not followed by a tensed verb but by a new topic, the sentence observes the double contrastiveness rule. At the same time, it is easy to conceive an overt question for it, such as: *Which direction do the animals pull?* Were we to have the question: *Who pulls in these directions?*, the example would sound as follows (note the salience of the word preceded by *iar*):

(246) Înapoi trage racul, iar în jos știuca.  
“Backward pulls the crab, but/and downwards pulls the pike.”

So far, we notice that *iar* observes the information structure requirements put forth by Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011).

b) Double contrastiveness supported:

According to Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011: 12), *iar* needs to coordinate two contrastive topics, even if sometimes the contrast pairs are not plausible.

#### 4.3.1.3.2. Personal claim

In examples that conform to the double contrastive pattern suggested by Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011), such as the ones depicting semantic contrast mentioned in sections 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. I argued that *iar* can be replaced by *dar*. Although *dar* is usually used for a denial-of-expectation cases, where it is directly followed by an information focus, it so happens that in a two-way, plausible contrast pair case it can mimic the behaviour of *iar* and introduce contrastive topics that are not marked by informational focus. See the following two examples, the first of which was noted as (167) in 4.2.1.:

(247) Pianul este bun, însă/dar scump.  
piano-DEF is nice but expensive  
“The piano is nice, but expensive.”

(248) Pianul este bun, însă/dar/iar vioara este scumpă.  
piano-DEF is nice but/and violin-DEF is expensive  
“The piano is nice, but/and the violin is expensive.”

The first example shows a case where the coordinating conjunction does not coordinate clauses, as Bîlbîie & Winterstein (2011) argued for *iar*. Therefore, the adversative used must only be *dar* or *însă*, the markers of denial-of-expectation. The arguments for this are retrieved from Vicente (2010), who claims that ‘counterexpectational’ *but* allows its conjuncts to be smaller than clauses, and from Zafiu (2005), who argues that in *iar*-sentences the referential identity of

the subject cannot be preserved via an anaphoric element. In example (247), the second clause preserves the referential identity of the same item (the piano).

The second example allows the use of all three conjunctions (*dar*, *însă*, and *iar*). However, as I argued in 4.2.2., I do not consider that *însă* can encode pure contrast, as in Zafiu's example (177) even if it coordinates a two-way, plausible contrast pair. Zafiu (2005: 245) only suggested that contrasting content can be retrieved from clauses by *însă*, such as example (177); however, she did not offer this example as a clear-cut one for the semantic or thematic contrast meaning. I claimed that *însă* expresses a stronger opposition relationship between conjuncts than *dar*, and the denial-of-expectation meaning is encoded in the lexical form of the word.

Which leaves only *dar* in a position similar to *iar*. Zafiu (2005: 248) example of what she considers semantic contrast includes the use of *dar*. See example (176) resumed below:

(249) Ion e bogat, **dar** Vasile e sărac.  
Ion is rich CONJ Vasile is poor.  
“Ion is rich, but Vasile is poor.”

This example fulfils, for instance, the requirements that Bîlbiie & Winterstein (2011) set out for *iar*: double contrastiveness, where the conjunction coordinates two (plausible) contrastive pairs. *Dar*, similar to *iar*, introduces a contrastive topic that is not marked by informational focus. That can be tested by posing the following question: *What is the social status of the two?* The salient elements (the two, Ion and Vasile) constitute the topics of each conjunct.

As we can see from the examples provided in this section, the requirement for *dar* and *însă* in the sense of Izutsu (2008) are fulfilled. What Izutsu (2008) sees as merely contrast encoded by *iar*, Zafiu (2005) sees as thematic contrast. The semantic contrast meaning featuring syntactic parallelism and lexical antonymy is, according to Zafiu (2005) encoded by *dar*. In my opinion, is easy to also consider Izutsu's (2008: 650) example for contrast *iar*, as one of syntactic parallelism and lexical antonymy. Therefore, I consider it both grammatical and felicitous for *iar* to be replaced by *dar*:

(250) Racul trage înapoi, iar/dar știuca în jos.  
crab-DEF pulls backward CONJ pike-DEF in down  
“The crab pulls backward, and/but the pike (pulls) down.”

The thematic contrast Zafiu (2005) envisions for *iar* is its necessity to introduce new topics and to not allow verbal forms right after it, since that would mean that the referential identity must be preserved. This, as discussed before, is not a possibility with *iar*. Then it would seem that what sets contrast (semantic) contrast apart from thematic contrast, is the ability of *iar*, which Zafiu calls thematic, to fit into non-plausible contrast pair situations. These situations, as



argued in 4.3.1.2., do not allow replacement with *dar*, as they become infelicitous. Consider examples (226) and (227), resumed below:

(251) *E* *optimist*, *iar* *asta* *mă* *miră*. (ibid.)  
(He) is optimistic, but/and this me amazes  
“He’s optimistic, and this<sup>88</sup> surprises me.”

(252) \**E* *optimist*, *dar* *asta* *mă* *miră*. (ibid.)  
(He) is optimistic, but this me amazes  
“\*He’s optimistic, but this surprises me.”

In example (251), *iar* has a copulative function. To also expect that *dar* have a copulative function in a non-plausible contrast pair situation yields unacceptable results.

In 4.3.1.2.1. I also mentioned that there are certain denial cases coordinated by *dar*, that can also become denial cases coordinated by *iar*, provided *iar* is followed by a new topic. See examples (232) and (233) reproduced below:

(253) Plouă, *dar* e destul de cald.  
Rains but is quite of warm  
“It is raining, but it is quite warm.”

(254) Plouă, *iar* afară e destul de cald.  
Rains but/and outside is quite of warm  
“It is raining, but outside it is quite warm.”

Interestingly, example (254) can feature *dar* also. This means that if *iar* has a denial-of-expectation meaning in a non-plausible contrast pair situation, it can be replaced by *dar*.

#### 4.3.2. The difference between *dar* and *însă*

As mentioned in sections 3.10., and 4.3.1.1., both English and Romanian allow the denial-of-expectation reading of discourse-initial *but*. In 4.2.1.1. and 4.2.6. I argued that while *dar* can be used utterance-initial, as an element that introduces the idea of a second speaker in a dialogue, that is not possible for *însă* (see example (215)). If, however, the idea were continued by the same speaker, the use of *însă* would be felicitous (see example (216)). This example, together with the narrative text example (217) is one that allows the use of both *însă* and *dar*.

As concerns the use of *dar* or *însă* as sentence coordinators, they are, as discussed in the previous sub-section, used for the denial-of-expectation meaning. Even if both can coordinate two-way, plausible contrast pairs, it is the case that only *dar* can also encode semantic contrast, granting it a function similar to what Izutsu (2008) envisioned for what she calls contrast *iar*.

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<sup>88</sup> ‘Asta’ literally means ‘this’, but in this context, ‘that’ sounds more natural in English. ‘That’ translates as ‘Aceea’ (formal) or ‘Aia’ (informal) for feminine, and ‘Acela’ (formal) or ‘Ăla’ (informal) for masculine.

## Chapter 5 – Conclusion

Although there are some minor exceptions, the general conditions are the same for all three meanings, in both English and Romanian. All three meanings are characterized by ‘mutually exclusive regions in a shared domain’ in the sense of Izutsu (2008: 656), whose proposal constituted a major point of interest in this thesis:

- denial of the implication in S1 by S2 for denial-of-expectation,
- a two-way contrast pattern with semantic and/or lexical similarity for contrast,
- a negated first conjunct + ellipsis in the second conjunct for correction.

Among the points of view compared with regard to Romanian adversatives are that of Izutsu (2008) and Zafiu (2005), noted in section 1.2.

The discussion brought about the following three conclusions:

- While contrast *iar* in the sense of Izutsu was shown to only compare plausible contrast pairs (in symmetrical patterns), thematic contrast *iar* also allows the comparison of non-plausible contrast pairs (where it can have at times a copulative, and a denial-of-expectation meaning). Contrast *iar* allows replacement with *dar* in two-way, plausible settings. Thematic contrast *iar* allows replacement with *dar* in non-plausible settings only in its denial-of-expectation reading.
- Izutsu’s view is partially rejected, as I have shown that although denial-of-expectation can be marked by both *dar* and *însă*, *dar* also functions in a semantic opposition reading. As concerns Zafiu’s view, I agree that both conjunctions can function in all denial-of-expectation readings. However, I claim the contrast reading is only reserved for *dar* (respectively *iar*), not *însă*.
- Although Izutsu (2008) sees the English corrective *but* reading as ambiguous between concessive and corrective, in Romanian that is not the case.

All Romanian adversatives can be used in utterance-initial position. I have shown that *însă* can occur utterance-initial in cases where the same speaker continues own idea in a new sentence, and in narrative texts (examples (216) and (217) section 4.2.6.). *Dar* can occur utterance-initial in any type of dialogue and narrative text. *Iar* can function utterance-initial also as long as the second speaker continues the idea of the first one, and as long as *iar* introduces a new topic. *Ci* can also have an utterance-initial position if a second speaker continues the idea of the first. If we were to adopt Iten’s (2000) view that *but* behaves as a conjunction in all cases, we could account for the fact that Romanian preserve their meanings in all positions: *dar* and *însă* for the denial-of-expectation meaning, *iar* (and *dar*) for contrast, and *ci* for correction. This view would come as a contradiction, however, to that of Blakemore

(1989) that states that English *but* as an utterance-initial position discourse marker is limited to the denial-of-expectation meaning.

In section 1.4. I addressed two research questions, that involved:

1) seeking a better understanding of the contrast – denial-of-expectation distinction, and how these two meanings differ from correction *but*.

- the contrast-denial-of-expectation distinction was made in the sense that denial-of-expectation involves the denial of implicatures, while contrast does not. Denial-of-expectation claims the use of the same entity in the second clause, often in the form of an anaphoric pronoun. Contrast requires two different topics and two comments. While denial-of-expectation is marked by broad focus on each of the conjuncts, contrast is marked by primary focus on comments and secondary focus on topics.

- Izutsu (2008) argues for *direct concessive* and *indirect concessive* subcases, which were proven for Romanian, also (examples (167) and (171)).

- The difference between these two meanings and correction *but* is that they do not require a negated S1 (although it was shown that both can feature it). Vicente (2011) claimed that Counterexpectational *but*' (denial-of-expectation) allows coordination of both clauses and subclauses (while he sees it necessary for correction *but* to only connect clauses).

2) determining the extent to which Izutsu's (2008) classification of Romanian coordinate conjunctions is well-founded.

- In terms of contrast, Izutsu's (2008) claims are partially founded, as I have shown that not only does *iar* have a more complex function in its thematic position, but also that there are other conjunctions, notably *dar*, which can encode contrast.

- In terms of denial-of-expectation, Izutsu's (2008) claims are partially founded, as I have shown that even if *dar* and *însă* are specialized for denial-of-expectation, *dar* can also encode contrast.

- In terms of correction, Izutsu (2008) identifies the requirements for the corrective reading that are similar to English: negated first conjunct, ellipsis in S2. However, as I have shown, in Romanian it is possible to avoid ellipsis in S2, while still obtaining a corrective reading. That is not possible in English. Additionally, Izutsu (2008) claimed an ambiguity between the concessive and the corrective reading for English. I have shown that that cannot be the case in Romanian, because the lexical form disambiguates the meaning and allows non-elliptical S2 structures.

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