Representationalism, Metaphysics, Naturalism:
Price, Horwich and Beyond

Jonathan Knowles

Abstract: Both Huw Price and Paul Horwich see themselves as anti-representationalists and anti-metaphysicians, views that they also see as inspired by or as having affinities with Wittgenstein's later philosophy. They differ, or would appear to, with respect to the question of naturalism, Price calling himself a 'subject naturalist', Horwich apparently rejecting naturalism, at least of a substantive variety. After presenting Price's argument that placement metaphysics depends on representationalism and his alternative 'global expressivist' account of discourse, I consider Horwich's objections to the argument and Price's response. I argue that Horwich's objections though suggestive do not succeed as they stand, and that his view is actually (on plausible assumptions) not as far from the kind of neo-Carnapian position Price defends. However, I go on to argue that Horwich is basically right that, at least given Price's commitment to naturalism, a form of placement metaphysics is still viable even once one rejects representationalism; though further that Horwich's Wittgensteinean critique of T-philosophy does not substantially impact on this assessment. Finally, I present my own take on the issues, inspired in part by Chomsky's conception of science and scientific enquiry, briefly defending a picture which promises to combine anti-representationalism and naturalism with a consistent rejection of metaphysics.

Until quite recently, a view that combined the idea that believing and asserting are fundamentally a matter of representing a mostly mind-independent world with the idea that that world, including the mental and representing parts, could be given a metaphysical rendering through the concepts of natural science was standard within analytic philosophy. With the recent (re-)emergence of deflationism about truth and pragmatist approaches to mind and language, this consensus is today at least seriously challenged. Two central thinkers in this wave are Paul Horwich and Huw Price. Though it is only Price that explicitly subscribes to 'pragmatism', both see themselves as what I call 'anti-representationalists', and also – at least in a significant sense – anti-metaphysicians. Their anti-representationalism consists both in a disavowal of truth and reference as substantial relations explanatory of meaning, and in seeing different domains of talk or

'discourses' as playing different kinds of roles in our lives. Their anti-metaphysicalism, though more difficult to characterize in a neutral way, shares at least the idea that a reductive, metaphysical form of naturalism is misguided. They both nevertheless uphold a kind of naturalistic commitment in aiming to provide a theory of language and language-use that does not regard a normatively laden notion of content as primitive.[1] Beyond this however there at least appear to be some significant divergences: Price expresses allegiance to a more general naturalist position he calls *subject naturalism*, whilst Horwich explicitly declares himself a non-naturalist when it comes to things like ethical values. We shall be investigating this and other apparent differences between the thinkers in the sequel.

A further point of convergence consists in the fact they both see their views as having important resonance (at least) with central themes of the later Wittgenstein.[2] Price writes:

> For my part, I have considerable sympathy with what I take to be two important ingredients of Wittgenstein's view, on any adequate interpretation. One of these ingredients plays down the theoretical significance of the idea that a function of (a large part of) language is to 'describe' or 'represent' reality. The other plays up the idea that the language concerned has many different functions, in a way that is not evident 'on the surface'. I'll call these ingredients *non-representationalism* and *functional pluralism,* respectively.[3]

---

[1] Paul Horwich, *Meaning* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), ch. 8; Huw Price "What should a deflationist about truth say about meaning?" in *Truth* (Philosophical Issues, Vol. 8), ed. Enrique Villanueva (California: Ridgeview, 1997).
[2] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).
[3] Huw Price, "Immodesty without Mirrors – Making Sense of Wittgenstein's Linguistic Pluralism," reprinted in Huw Price, *Naturalism without Mirrors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 201.

For Price, this picture of language has implications for a certain metaphysical project, as we shall see. Horwich meanwhile stresses Wittgenstein's scepticism to substantive theorizing in philosophy – to metaphysics more generally – in terms of our bewitchment by similarity of linguistic form. We assume 'that to take [say] our mathematical discourse at face value requires the adoption of a metaphysical picture with many attendant difficulties. […But] arithmetical discourse […] need [not] necessarily carry with [it] the proprietary of puzzlement about the nature, location and accessibility of [arithmetical] reality. […] Wittgenstein's therapy […] relieves the grip of these tempting oversimplifications.'[4]

   Though Wittgenstein is an important figure of the broader background, the details of Wittgenstein's views will not be central stage here (beyond the extent to which Horwich's own metaphilosophical position faithfully capture these, as he claims they do). Rather my aim is systematically to understand how anti-representationalism, anti-metaphysicalism and naturalism might interrelate. Price's work, perhaps uniquely in the contemporary debate, has been devoted explicitly to these issues, leading to the development of a position he terms *global expressivism*.[5] Horwich, however, also has views on them, as witnessed not least in a recent exchange with Price.[6] Insofar as he is a central thinker in the anti-representationalist camp, has much in common with Price, and yet professes to differ from Price concerning the implications of anti-representationalism for naturalism and metaphysics, it would appear fruitful to consider his take on these issues. In this paper I want to examine what the commitments amount to and how they fit

---

[4] Paul Horwich, *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15–16.
[5] Price, *Naturalism*; Huw Price (et al.), *Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
[6] Paul Horwich "Naturalism, Deflationism and the Relative Priority of Language and Metaphysics," in Price, *Expressivism*; Price, *Expressivism*, 178–186.

together for these two philosophers, and to compare and critically discuss the resultant overall views. I then want to suggest my own somewhat different understanding of how the ideas might fit together.[7]

The paper starts in section 1 with Price's argument against metaphysics from anti-representationalism, leading to a sketch of his global expressivism. In section 2 I present Horwich's critique of Price's argument and Price's attempt to defuse this, before offering my own appraisal of Horwich's position. I seek both to show that he is not as distant from Price as he presents himself, and also to provide my own (I hope clearer) understanding of what anti-representationalism involves and of its relation to metaphysics at a general level. This paves the way for a new critique of Price's anti-metaphysicalism in section 3, where I argue that Horwich – though not for exactly the reasons he gives – is basically right that anti-representationalism does not definitively rule out metaphysics. In section 4 I consider Horwich's Wittgensteinean critique of metaphysics and philosophy more generally; a full treatment of this is not feasible here but I will suggest it is at least unlikely to do the service of filling any gap left by Price's argument against metaphysics. Finally in section 5 I sketch what I think is a more promising anti-representationalist and anti-metaphysicalist, yet also distinctively naturalistic, picture, one which draws on the Wittgensteinean (and, as we shall, Carnapian) ideas that Price and Horwich build on, but also views about science and the nature of scientific enquiry that can be identified perhaps most clearly in the work of Noam Chomsky.

---

[7] I should stress that I will be concerned for the most part here, following Price, with so-called 'placement' metaphysics, not metaphysics in its entirety (assuming this goes beyond the former). I should also mention at the outset another thinker who recently has had much to say about these issues, in a similar vein: Amie Thomasson. Though not central stage here, her views will play an important role in section 2.

1. 'Naturalism without Representationalism'

The above is the title of the paper in which Price's argument against metaphysics from anti-representationalism is most succinctly formulated;[8] it is also this argument that is the focus of Horwich's attack on Price. This section gives a presentation of it and of Price's global expressivism (henceforth *GE*).

The argument focuses on a metaphysical thesis Price calls *object naturalism* (henceforth *ON*): the reductive view that all truth or knowledge is fundamentally of natural scientific character; that in a sense 'all there is is the world studied by science.'[9] The problem for ON according to Price is not so much that it is false, but that it is, or at least is in danger of being, incoherent or at least somehow irrational. In this way Price's attack on ON turns into a more general attack on the kind of metaphysical theorizing, naturalistic or non-naturalistic, that lies behind it.

The argument proceeds via a dilemma: One can either understand ON as having a linguistic or conceptual starting point,[10] or in a material manner; but on neither understanding is ON coherently motivated (at least obviously). Though the latter understanding might appear to be more straightforward and indeed to be more what is intended by the content of ON, it is precisely one of Price's aims to show that the motivation for ON is not as clear as many seem to assume. Price considers the linguistic understanding first, arguing that while metaphysical issues may start in the linguistic

---

[8] Huw Price, "Naturalism without Representationalism," reprinted in Price, *Naturalism*.
Other papers that cover similar ground but with somewhat different foci are Huw Price, "The Semantic Foundations of Metaphysics," reprinted in Price, *Naturalism*, and Huw Price and Peter Menzies, "Is semantics in the plan?," in *Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism*, ed. David Braddon-Mitchell and Roberta Nola (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009).
[9] Price, "Naturalism," 185. The view is more standardly referred to as *metaphysical* naturalism; sometimes *physicalism*. The epistemological and ontological versions of the view are treated as equivalent by Price (given his purposes), and likewise here.
[10] I follow Price in glossing the linguistic versus conceptual distinction for present purposes (and like him will talk mostly in terms of language).

realm – as questions about what we mean by this or that term or locution, and how we might analyse it – a supporter of ON will have at some point to assume that linguistic items *represent* bits of extra-linguistic reality to take us from language to the world. ON will then be understood as claiming that all the *truth makers* of our true claims can, at least after these are subjected to a suitable process of analysis, be seen as natural or physical truth-makers (in some appropriately demarcated sense of 'natural' or 'physical'). This understanding of ON corresponds to the assumptions of what Price has called the 'Canberra plan', as pursued by people like David Lewis and Frank Jackson. It depends on there being substantial reference and truth relations, that is, ones which explain meaning by relating bits of language to bits of the world – that is, on *representationalism*.[11] Thus when we say that e.g. experiences or values are ultimately physical, we are saying that the *referents* of terms like 'pain', 'good', and so on are in fact physical in nature.

ON has then a fairly clear content when construed on the linguistic model. However, there is just one hitch: representationalism is not something you get for free, rather it is a substantial theoretical claim about how language functions.[12] Thus one needs at least what Price calls a *subject naturalistic* enquiry – into the nature of human language and thought, construed itself as a scientific project – prior to declaring ON viable. Moreover, representationalism is something Price thinks we have good reasons to be suspicious of as such a naturalistic theory of language; and that there is a promising alternative to it, semantic deflationism, which avoids the problems that infect

---

[11] Representationalism is not just the idea of there being truth-makers and truth-making relations. Semantic deflationary views can for example accept that moral states of affairs make moral statements true or false. Rather representationalism assumes that there is some *non-trivial* specification of reference that also allows for non-trivial truth-makers in a way that in turn makes space for ON.

[12] Indeed, it is not the only hitch for ON according to Price, for even if one accepts it there may be problems in understanding referential relations determinately enough to allow useful resolution of metaphysical questions; cf. Stephen Stich, *Deconstructing the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

representationalism. Though I think Price's arguments here are in fact quite convincing,[13] the general tenability of semantic deflationism and the anti-represetationalism which I see as attending it are things I am simply taking for granted here (though what they amount to will be important to get clear on in the following section). Our dialectical focus is thus the alleged link between representationalism and metaphysics, in particular Price's claim that if you start your metaphysics in the linguistic realm and yet deny representationalism, there is going to be a problem in so much as making sense of what a doctrine like ON could amount to.[14]

Let us now turn to the material understanding of ON, according to which 'we do metaphysics without semantic crutches.'[15] Here Price argues there are two fundamental problems. One rests on the idea that a supporter of ON should be able to frame an argument for her position. Such an argument can be mounted through the Canberra planners' idea that all semantic roles have to be filled by naturalistic occupiers; but this takes us back to the linguistic conception, and the problems with representationalism. Yet without this starting point, it is just not clear how one would frame a general argument for ON, and thus it wouldn't get off the ground.[16] The second problem is that the possibility of a deflationary treatment of discourse shows that 'the cat is out of the bag', as Price puts it: if we accept deflationism, we do not need to think in terms of any worldly items to

---

[13] For discussion and defence, see Jonathan Knowles, "Naturalism without Metaphysics," in *Realism, Science and Pragmatism*, ed. Kenneth Westphal (London: Routledge 2014), §2.

[14] Barring at least the eventuality that we can exhaustively *analyse* problematic claims, such as those of ethics, in terms of physical/naturalistic ones – a vindication of ON which Price it seems is in principle open to (pers. comm.), but presumably thinks so unlikely as to be not worth mentioning. The idea of purely 'conceptual' metaphysics is also discussed in the following section.

[15] Price, "Naturalism," 196.

[16] Ibid., 197.

which our words may correspond to understand their role in our lives, but rather can focus on explaining the talk itself.[17]

It is the latter idea that forms the project of GE, which Price describes more fully in subsequent work.[18] GE seeks to explain a discourse by looking at its underlying function, taking as its starting point a view of humans as natural, evolved beings in a natural environment, in accord with subject naturalism. It is a *global* project because, though different discourses serve different functions, an anti-representational, pragmatic explanation applies to each – including our talk about the natural world itself. Price allows that to explain the function of some vocabularies we will need to use their referring terms, while with others this will not be necessary (that is, we will only need to use the referring terms of other discourses).[19] This distinction is coordinate with another he makes between vocabularies that do and those that do not have an *e-representational* character.[20] E-representation for Price is a non-semantic relation of something like covariation or causation between the terms of a vocabulary and the items these terms genuinely semantically, albeit deflationistically, refer to in the natural world.[21] The bet is that in domains like ethics terms will not e-represent, whereas in, say, that of middle-sized dry goods or science – the domain of the natural, in a certain recognizable sense – they will. The distinction is not meant to be absolute, thus allowing gradations of e-representationality; nor is it given *a priori* which domains will and which will not turn out

---

[17] Ibid., 195 f.

[18] Price, *Naturalism*, ch. 1; Price, *Expressivism*.

[19] Given this, 'global *expressivism*' might appear somewhat misleading as a label for Price's position. He is aware of this however – sometimes instead using 'global pragmatism' – the important point for him being that the account is not semantically representationalist (see e.g. Price, *Expressivism*, 176). See also below.

[20] Ibid., ch. 2.

[21] Price uses the term 'i-representation' to characterise this latter, 'language-internal' relation. Neither i-representation nor e-representation correspond to representation in the sense assumed by representationalism; in Price's view, the latter makes the mistake of merging what are in fact two separate notions. See ibid. for further discussion.

to be e-representational. But however things exactly pan out, Price's overall point is that

his non-representational enquiry into our different discourses will not leave any

significant question unanswered and hence no room for metaphysical quandaries.

How successful is Price's argument against ON or placement metaphysics more

generally? The first stage of it seems sound, but I think one might be forgiven for finding

the second set of arguments against ON, when understood as having a material starting

point – even when embellished in the way I have just indicated – somewhat less than

totally transparent. This it seems applies at least to Paul Horwich, to whose critique of

Price I now turn.

2. Horwich versus Price

The obvious commonality between Price and Horwich consists in what I am calling their

anti-representationalism (henceforth *AR*): a commitment to semantic deflationism, and an

embracement of something like functional pluralism about language. As noted they also

both deny that any theory of language or meaning must acknowledge as primitive some

normatively laden notion of content.[22] However, it would appear their views part ways

with respect to further issues concerning metaphysics and naturalism. In particular,

---

[22] There are some subtle differences between the two concerning their anti-representationalism. To start with, Price sees our concept of truth as having a primitive and *sui generis* normative function (Huw Price, "Truth as Convenient Friction," reprinted in Price, *Naturalism*), while Horwich sees the normativity attaching to truth-seeking as derivate (Paul Horwich, "The Value of Truth," *Noûs* 40 (2006)). Secondly, 'functional plurality' is Price's term (thus I say 'something like), and in his hands involves a stronger leaning towards a form of expressivism, something Horwich, at least insofar as he follows Wittgenstein, disavows (*Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*, 62, footnote). Finally there are differences with respect to how 'immodest' they view their respective theories of meaning as being (cf. Price, "What should a deflationist"). That said I think their commonalities in respect of anti-representationalism are more significant than their differences (and for the record I will not be questioning their 'immodesty' here, though for critical discussion of this see David Macarthur, "Subject Naturalism, Scientism and the Problem of Linguistic Meaning: Critical Remarks on Price's 'Naturalism Without Representationalism'" *Analasis: Revista de invetagacion filosofica*, 1 (2014)).

Horwich rejects Price's argument from AR against ON and metaphysics more generally.[23]

Horwich rejects ON alright, and indeed the viability of the kind of substantive

philosophical theorizing that metaphysics generally involves, but his reasons for doing

this are different and based on what he sees as Wittgenstein's critique of 'traditional

philosophy' (see section 4, below). He also states explicitly that he considers himself a

non-naturalist about things like ethics,[24] a commitment that might seem to place him

amongst the ranks of the incoherent metaphysicians by Price's standards.

It can seem odd that the two thinkers should really be so strongly at odds as

Horwich suggests, given their profound agreement on AR. In this section, I will try to

shed some light on this conundrum and identify what is really at stake between the two,

arguing that the gulf between them is less deep than Horwich suggests – even though he is

also right, as we shall go on to see, to reject Price's argument. I will do this partly with

reference to Price's commentary on Horwich's piece, though also by relying on my own

critical evaluation of Horwich's position, which I hope will also lead to a better

understanding of what AR involves and how it relates to metaphysics at a general level.

First however we need to look at Horwich's rendering of Price's argument against

ON and why he says he rejects it. According to Horwich, Price sees metaphysics as

having in the first instance a linguistic subject matter; that is, Price thinks (according to

Horwich) that '[m]etaphysical questions can be answered only insofar as they are

transformations of more basic linguo-conceptual questions.'[25] To be then *genuinely*

metaphysical – to be about the world and not just our concepts – a view like naturalism

(by which Horwich means ON) requires us to transpose these questions from a linguistic

[23] Horwich, "Naturalism".
[24] Ibid., §5.
[25] Ibid., 115.

to a material key; and this in turn requires substantive semantic relations (ibid.). AR thereby shows naturalism is 'impossible to establish.[26]

Horwich has several critical remarks about this argument, but his central objection is that though linguistic analysis may be a necessary preliminary to metaphysical concerns – in the sense that one needs to ask whether, say, ethical claims are so much as *in the business* of 'saying how things are' – it remains open once one has decided, as the case might be, that they are, that they might nevertheless be seen as uniformly false, a useful fiction, reducible to naturalistic truths of some kind, or whatever more subtle account the placement metaphysician might come up with.[27] Thus the linguistic starting point does not after all preclude the typical metaphysical gambits of ON, even if one rejects representationalism.

One can easily feel Horwich has misunderstood Price here – as Price himself suggests in his reply. As Price puts it, GE isn't meant to be 'a way of doing metaphysics in a pragmatist key [but] a way of doing something like anthropology [;…] not a matter of recasting issues of metaphysics as issues about language, but of abandoning the metaphysical questions altogether.'[28] On the other hand, Price accepts that metaphysics understood as conceptual analysis is legitimate;[29] a similar view is defended by Amie Thomasson in her Price-friendly defence of a neo-Carnapian approach to ontology.[30] An important issue thus does seem to be raised by Horwich – as indeed Price accepts[31] – which is to understand exactly why, if one rejects representationalism, one can only

---

[26] Ibid., 116.
[27] Ibid., 123–4.
[28] Price, *Expressivism*, 181.
[29] Pers. comm.
[30] Amie Thomasson, *Ontology Made Easy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
[31] Price, *Expressivism*, 182.

11

engage in this and not in *material* metaphysics – or metaphysics 'proper', as one might say.

Price, recall, had two arguments for this claim. Firstly, representationalist semantics is part of the Canberra plan's standard 'toolkit' and gives a framework for mounting an argument for ON. To this, Horwich replies that there might be other motivations for ON, and moreover that the point doesn't affect non-naturalistic metaphysical positions.[32] Price largely concedes the force of this, stressing instead his 'the-cat-is-out-of-the-bag' argument. As Price explains, this builds on the idea that as far as 'saying how things are' is concerned, there is no deep distinction between assertoric vocabularies that do and don't do this to be revealed by linguistic analysis; that is, the fact-stating/non-fact-stating distinction is deflated along with truth. Metaphysics is then by-passed by focussing on explaining how we *talk*: to explain some vocabularies we will need to make use of the referring terms – those which have a more e-representational character – but to explain others not. The bet is that with domains like ethics this will not be the case. But the metaphysical– or, rather, *meta*-metaphysical – point is that there is no further issue to be addressed or resolved.[33]

Is Horwich thus rebutted? Insofar as his objection rests on not seeing how deflationary Price intends to be – indeed, as far as I can see, as he himself should be as a good anti-representationalist – I think the answer is yes; moreover, it does seem that Horwich's main point against Price is that the possibility of metaphysical enquiry is beholden to this question of factuality that it is one of the points of prior linguistic analysis to sort out. Price thus seems to win this particular skirmish. However, I do not in

---

[32] Horwich, "Naturalism," 123 fn.
[33] Price, *Expressivism*, 182–4.

the end think Price's argument in fact rules out material metaphysics, as we shall in section 3. What I therefore want to do in the rest of this section is offer a somewhat more general critique of Horwich's position, viewed as the idea that there is in principle *no* connection between AR and the possibility of metaphysics. This will then provide us with a cleaner backdrop for understanding where the limitations in Price's argument really lie, as well as how to understand the relationship between our three central concepts more appropriately.

When all's said and done, the intuitive heart of Horwich's response to Price seems to be the following: the fact that *'X' refers to X (or Xs)* does not express a substantive semantic relation does not logically entail that there is nothing substantive to say about the existence or nature of X (or Xs). Now I think we can all agree with that. However, it would be a mistake to think doing so amounts to accepting that AR has no implications for one's take on metaphysics whatsoever. After all, semantic deflationism has to be couched within a wider theory of meaning. To begin with, as Horwich himself has pointed out,[34] deflationism about truth brings deflationism about reference and satisfaction in its wake, and *vice versa*, in virtue of their interdefinability. Furthermore, once reference is deflated, then so plausibly is ontological commitment, something Thomasson, inspired by Horwich, has argued explicitly.[35] Moreover, since all facts about reference and truth fall out of facts about use, of some kind – again, according to Horwich not least, but presumably in fact any anti-representationalist – and since ontological commitment falls out of facts about reference, it seems we can conclude that we don't

---

[34] Paul Horwich, *From a Deflationary Point of View* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 79.
[35] Amie Thomasson, "Deflationism in semantics and metaphysics," in *Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning*, ed. Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For example, for a singular term, 'n', to refer (at all) is just for there *to be* an x such that x = n (ibid., 197–8).

need, as Thomasson has put it, ontological premises to introduce an ontologically-committing vocabulary.

The above is in line with a (certain) *neo-Carnapian* approach to ontology.[36] On this view, our linguistic activity is conceived as divided into different discourses or (to use Carnap's phrase) *frameworks* that are individuated by proprietary sets of rules – discourses we to an extent naturally find ourselves with, but may also modify or even introduce *ab initio* for various different practical or theoretical purposes. We use expressions in accord with the relevant rules, and on that basis, relying on simple logical inference and/or sense experience, arrive at existential claims. For example, given the rules for arithmetic, we justifiably say that there is a prime number between two and five, and can therefore conclude, trivially, that there are numbers. Given the rules for the discourse of medium-sized dry goods, I can establish by sight that there is a chair in my office. And so on. These are what Carnap would call answers to *internal* ontological questions, and as such are perfectly kosher. *External* ontological claims or questions, by contrast, are not, precisely because they are posed from outside all linguistic frameworks and thereby lack the necessary setting which gives them the only sense such questions can have.

Now one might think that a sense to 'external' ontological questions could be given by focussing on what kinds of terms are in contact with a fully *mind-independent*

---

[36] Rudolf Carnap, "Semantics, Empiricism and Ontology," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 4 (1950); Thomasson, *Ontology*; Huw Price, "Metaphysics after Carnap: The Ghost who Walks?" reprinted in Price *Naturalism*. I say 'certain' because there are other neo-Carnapian positions in the contemporary literature that adopt a different take on the significance of Carnap's views on ontology (e.g. Eli Hirsch, *Quantifier Variance and Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)). I am not concerned here with whose reading is most correct, but I should stress that the interpretation adopted here is one with intimate connections to AR – somthing at least Hirsch does not stress – and moreover whose pluralism is meant to be of a *vertical* rather than *horizontal* character (cf. Huw Price, "Metaphysical Pluralism," reprinted in Price *Naturalism*).

reality, as opposed to those that merely arise from our deployment of terms in relation to appropriate rules of use. However, the notion of 'mind-independent reality' is surely one that an anti-representationalist should reject: for the idea of such a reality seems impossible to extricate from the idea that reference is a matter of us or our concepts standing in some genuine, substantive relation to something non-linguistic or non-mental.[37] Thus external questions can only ever be pragmatic questions that ask why we talk the way we do, whether we do well in adopting and employing these modes of discourse, and so on.

What all this shows then is that a kind of *deflationary ontological pluralism* emerges as a default position for an anti-representationalist. Given the various different ways we talk, and given that relevant empirical and other conditions are fulfilled, it follows trivially that we are ontologically committed to at least most of what many traditional or so-called 'serious' metaphysicians have devoted large amounts of energy to questioning and/or seeking to vindicate in other terms: mental states, ethical and aesthetic values, medium-sized dry goods, numbers and so on, as well as entities of non-fundamental science. If this is the right way to understand AR – and I submit it is hard to see any viable alternative – then on the face of it there are no deep questions of the kind a view like ON seeks to ask, and which Horwich thinks it leaves on the table. Moreover, being committed to say, values, as something non-natural (i.e. non-*scientifically* natural), as Horwich is, should not be understood as a substantial commitment that needs some

---

[37] Though this point strikes me as deeply intuitive, it deserves a fuller treatment; space considerations preclude this here. It is clearly related to Putnam's model-theoretic attack on metaphysical realism (cf. Hilary Putnam, *Realism and Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), for a recent defence of which see Tim Button, *The Limits of Realism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013)). For an attempted defence of the point on my own part, which also considers Michael Devitt's view that realism is independent of semantic issues, see Knowles, "Naturalism," 205-7. Thomasson provides an independent defence against the 'we are talking about mind-independent reality' riposte from the metaphysician, cf. Thomasson, *Ontology*, ch. 10.

special argument to support, but viewed simply as an upshot out of the neo-Carnapian framework and the fact that we engage rationally in ethical discourse. *Pace* his own apparent understanding of the situation, then, Horwich need not be seen as infringing Price's anti-metaphysicalist conclusion insofar as he describes himself as a non-naturalist about ethics (and certain other domains).

I think this broader understanding of AR gives a better sense of how the position relates to metaphysics at a more general level than Horwich's commentary on Price's argument. Nevertheless, I think Horwich is in fact also right that the argument does not ultimately succeed in showing that AR rules out metaphysics. The next section explains why.

3. The real problems for Price's argument

I have just argued that AR has implications for metaphysics, in the sense that the kind of overall view that naturally accompanies semantic deflationism will lead by default to a deflationary ontological pluralism. However, it is important to stress that this is a *default*. The question thus needs to be addressed whether such a default could be coherently or rationally abrogated consistently with upholding AR. As things stand, given our natural and extant ways of talking, we are committed to the existence of numbers, values and so on, along with chairs, protons and electrical fields. But is this in principle compatible with someone coherently mounting a case against the fundamentality of the former quantities, or for the idea that they should somehow be reduced to the latter? I believe it is: there could, *pace* Price, be a project coherently described as (materialistically) metaphysical even once one gives up representationalism.

To see this, it is important firstly to emphasise that AR's rejection of the idea of

reference and truth playing substantive, meaning-constituting roles in no way implies a

rejection of the idea that our talk *has* semantic content: that it involves reference to

entities and *saying how things are* – in our ethical, mental and modal discourses as much

as our naturalistic ones. Now for Price of course all the theoretical and explanatory work

will be taking place at a different level from this – at the level where we focus on use and

function, which is moreover pluralistic. Nevertheless, he cannot and would not deny that

all discourses do purport to *say how things are*, and moreover in *a univocal sense* – at the

same time of course as different discourses say different things with respect to how things

are.[38]

Now let us imagine an anti-representationalist who, for whatever reason, wants to

prioritize or *valorize* our scientific talk over all other talk – our scientific or physical

account of how things are over all other accounts – and to seek to give an account of the

latter exclusively in terms of, or that is uniquely responsible to, the former. This needn't

proceed through conceptual analysis, rather it could be understood in terms of what

Carnap and later Quine called *explication*,[39] whereby a concept's role in a theory is taken

over by some other in virtue of the latter being an in some way more adequate concept

that fulfils the same purpose (e.g. *heat*'s role was taken over by that of *temperature*). Now

---

[38] Price commits himself to truth-conditional content both explicitly (*Expressivism*, 40) and implicitly in
view of his use of Brandom's inferential semantics (ibid., 34), which precisely seeks to understand the
notion of content in relation to normative practices. For a study of the various ways content inevitably
figures in Price's system, see also Lionel Shapiro, "Linguistic function and content: reflections on Price's
pragmatism," *Philosophical Quarterly*, 64 (2009).
    Some might think this commitment to content can play no substantive role within AR. Thus, in his
defence of semantic deflationism, Price argues for a quietist position about reference and truth, claiming
that one needn't deny in one's theoretical voice semantic properties, only not assert their existence, and not
make use of them ("Naturarlism," 191–2). However, from the position of one involved in the relevant
discourses, including semantic discourses, it stands fast that there are ethical truths, say, as well as physical
ones, and in the same sense – in whatever deflationary sense of 'truths' this is, from a theoretical
perspective – and that is all my argument requires.
[39] See e.g. W.V.O. Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), 258 ff.

Price wants to say that this anti-representationalist's commitment to ON must be incoherent or at least irrational – but can he be right?

Considering first the charge of incoherence, it seems this might be made to stick if one also upheld an absolute division between analytic and synthetic truth, or between rules of language and the substantive truths expressed by these. For then the idea that say ethical values might literally be reducible to physical states of affairs could be passed off as a kind of 'category mistake'. Now Carnap certainly sought to uphold such a distinction; but Quine famously attacked and rejected it,[40] and in this he has been followed by many since. Moreover, there would seem nothing about the analytic-synthetic distinction that would make it obviously endemic to AR: indeed, Price presents his own GE as a natural successor to Carnap's own pluralism that precisely does without it, basing itself instead on the idea of *functional* rather than semantic plurality.[41] Further, Quine himself seems reasonable to class as an anti-representationalist. To start with, he subscribes to disquotationalism about truth, a form of semantic deflationism;[42] whilst the idea of there being a plurality of linguistic frameworks is not one, arguably, he rejects, but rather sees as lacking fundamental significance when it comes to 'limning the true and ultimate structure of reality.'[43] I therefore see it as at least dialectically germane to appeal to the idea of an anti-representationalist position that rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction.[44]

---

[40] W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).

[41] Price, "Metaphysics after Carnap," 287.

[42] W.V.O. Quine, *Philosophy of Logic* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970).

[43] Quine, *Word and Object*, 221. I note that this quote should not be seen as indicating a commitment to some kind of metaphysical realism, that upholds the idea of reference being a substantial relation to 'reality-as-it-in-itself'. Quine is quite consistent in maintaining that what is real must be understood as a mere reflection of the referential terms of the relevant discourses (see e.g. W.V.O. Quine, "Reply to Dagfinn Føllesdal," in *The Philosophy of W.V. Quine*, ed. Lewis Hahn and Paul Schlipp (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986), 115. For further discussion see Antti Keskinen "Quine's Conception of Objects as

The upshot of this is that a kind of ON which simply puts the scientific discourse forward as the touchstone of what is true and real (or 'true' and 'real' if one insists) is not ruled out once one rejects AR. This might require seeing this metaphysical programme as somehow revisionary, but it is not at all clear, independently of what has already been said, why this should be problematic or make the position not qualify as a form of ON.

Coherence is one thing; rationality however another. Could Price object that the kind of Quinean, anti-representationalist version of ON just sketched is nevertheless deeply irrational – unmotivated, arbitrary or perverse, given its commitment to AR (as his argument sometimes suggests is the idea)? I would not deny that it in some sense runs counter to the pluralist spirit of AR; moreover, GE might on the face of it seem more in keeping with the latter. However, my Quinean need not deny that one can do the kind of work that Price thinks GE does, reflecting on the different natural functions our discourses have. But she will also point out that roughly the *same kind of naturalistic materials that GE helps itself to* – remember its commitment to subject naturalism! – can also serve as the basis for a metaphysical placement project. In other words: since both my Quinean and Price commit to naturalism of at least a somewhat substantive variety, and since both reject an absolute analytic-synthetic divide, it is just unclear what might be

---

Theoretical: Beyond Realism and Anti-realism," in *Realism, Science and Pragmatism*, ed. Kenneth Westphal (London: Routledge, 2014).

[44] Of course, one might argue that such a construal of anti-representationalism is in fact untenable. Thomasson would appear to come close to doing this insofar as she sees the analytic-synthetic distinction as integral to her own neo-Carnapian programme (Thomasson, *Ontology*, ch. 7; Amie Thomasson, *Ordinary Objects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 2). Horwich also upholds the analytic-synthetic divide as part of his use-based theory of meaning (see e.g. *Meaning*, 60). To this I would respond, firstly, that it is not clear that the distinction is really so integral to Thomasson's project as she seems to think, insofar as, by her owns lights, application conditions for terms needn't involve statable rules of inference (cf. *Ontology*, 92); and secondly, with respect to Horwich, that I am not as convinced as he is that AR is well-served by a positive *theory* of meaning, even one based on use (see also Price "What should a deflationist").

irrational about an anti-representationalist form of ON that would not be irrational about GE.

There is more to say about this last point, especially in relation to Price's conception of what naturalism means for him and what GE aspires to, but for reasons of space we must leave the issue there for now.[45] Our conclusion is that there is (*modulo* objections rebutted elsewhere) no reason to think that a form of ON based on an anti-representationalist framework is either an incoherent or irrational project, given the kind of naturalism Price himself assumes.

4. Horwich's Wittgensteinean attack on T-philosophy

I have argued, on the one hand, *contra* Horwich, that AR naturally coheres with a neo-Carnapian picture of our linguistic practices that supports a default ontological pluralism, but on the other, *contra* Price, that one could on the basis of such a picture both coherently and rationally seek to metaphysically 'critique' these different ontological commitments by valorizing a particular vocabulary, such as science (at least given that vocabulary is valorized anyway). Insofar, AR-plus-metaphysics remains a coherent and indeed live combination, and Horwich's rejection of Price's argument is justified, though not exactly for the reasons he gives.

Horwich nevertheless thinks there are good arguments against ON and that it is somehow irrational, and similarly for other reductive though non-naturalistic programs.

---

[45] For a fuller presentation of the critique of Price proffered in this section, see Jonathan Knowles, "Global Expressivism and the Flight from Metaphysics," *Synthese* (2016), doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1166-1, accessed February 26, 2017. The details are of interest though their role is essentially to rebut possible objections to my arguments, especially the last. One thing I should emphasise here is that this does not depend on whether one's naturalism is precisely a form of physicalism, like Quine's, or a somewhat more liberal form that allows other natural scientific though possibly non-physical elements into its explanatory base, as Price's plausibly is: the position in question does not have to *be* Quine, but merely, in the senses discussed above, Quine*an*.

Here he draws on his Wittgenstein-inspired critique of what he calls T- – for *traditional* – philosophy.[46] Applied to ON, this critique amounts to claiming that it illicitly treats areas like the ethical and other common sense discourses as fit targets for a kind of scientific deep explanation that we find in the sciences, including biology and psychology. In particular, it involves – by scientific standards themselves – an illegitimate abstraction from central features of the data, such as the oft-noted 'weirdness' of ethical properties, as well as an equally illegitimate smoothing out of apparent counterexamples in the dataset by appeal to an ideal of simplicity.[47] For Horwich the only justification of this kind of treatment would be an antecedent faith in an underlying ethical 'deep reality', corresponding to the kind of deeper realities uncovered by science; but he thinks it is evident, on reflection, that our ethical concepts are simply too unruly and too idiosyncratic to expect that kind of treatment to apply to them.[48]

As suggested, Horwich's Wittgensteinean critique of T-philosophy extends beyond ON, for he also sees it as applicable to theorizing about topics like metaphysical necessity or aesthetic value that it is not clear could be seen as falling under the kind of 'placement' metaphysics ON is concerned with. For present purposes I want to put these latter kinds of cases aside.[49] For now the question is how it relates to the issues we have been looking at here in relation to ON and AR. Does it, in particular, plug a hole in Price's argument against ON?

---

[46] Horwich, *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*.
[47] Horwich, "Naturalism," 126.
[48] Ibid.
[49] For a more general critique of Horwich's book on Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, see Timothy Williamson, Review of *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy* by Paul Horwich, *European Journal of Philosophy,* 21 (2013).

It is very unclear to me that the critique of ON Horwich gives advances us very far beyond issues we have already canvassed. A natural reaction to Horwich's argument against ethical naturalism would be to see the *sui generis* nature of our ethical concepts it points up as reflecting their place in something like a Carnapian framework, *ipso facto* ensuring a reference for them independently of any consideration of their 'place in the natural world'. However, this would only hold by default, and thereby the argument would again be vulnerable to the kind of Quinean revisionist metaphysical gambit outlined in the previous section (*modulo* the provisos concerning the analytic-synthetic distinction; see note 44). I should emphasize that I am not decrying the kind of Wittgensteinean therapeutic reflection on the diversity our linguistic practices that Horwich points up; indeed, it would seem to cohere with and support the neo-Carnapian pluralistic picture. However, as far as at least *Horwich's* Wittgenstein is concerned, it is unclear it has any *further* significance; moreover, as we have seen, this is not sufficient in itself to render placement metaphysics incoherent.

We saw in the previous section that a possible response to this would be to accuse ON of irrationality. There I argued that this was at least not available to Price, who himself is a naturalist, albeit of a 'subject' (not 'object') variety. But could not Horwich disavow *any* antecedent commitment to naturalism (of a substantive variety at least), insisting indeed that naturalism itself represents an irrational philosophical theory?[50] If that is the case then both Price's and Quine's positive projects would have to be rejected – but at least, *a fortiori*, we would also have ruled out ON.

Exactly where Horwich stands on the issue of naturalism is a difficult issue to divine. On the one hand, he explicitly disavows naturalism in connection with domains

---

[50] He has indeed done this in discussion when I put the objection of the previous paragraph to him.

like ethics and arithmetic. On the other hand, he defends a non-normativist form of the

use theory of meaning, motivated in part at least by a wish to avoid an unreduced appeal

to normativity (see note 1) – something that would seem to presuppose some kind of

naturalistic commitment. So it is not clear his disavowal of naturalism is very self-

consistent.

Even putting this (admittedly somewhat *ad hominen*) point to one side, however, I

think it can be reasonably questioned whether some form of naturalism, of a substantive

kind, can really be seen as arising primarily or at least exclusively from irrational 'T-

theoretic' philosophical thinking. As Price has recently argued,[51] whilst renouncing the

stringent ontological ideals of ON arguably has a lot going for it, we surely don't want on

the other hand to land up in a kind of blanket quietism (or 'soggy pluralism', as Blackburn

puts it[52]) which discerns no significant differences between our practices, and disallows

all external perspectives on them. Yet surely this is in a broad sense just what a naturalist

philosopher or scientist of the human seeks to provide us with (that is, in a way, one of

science's roles). This desire to avoid a soggy pluralism and to admit the perspective of

science into our understanding of our various different practices strikes me as laudable;

moreover, it can, as I hope to show in the final section, also help us finally to understand

why placement-style metaphysical questions might legitimately be demurred at. For now

however the point is simply that naturalism is not, at least at all obviously, the product of

dubious philosophical theorizing, but rather represents the legitimate aim of getting some

kind of third-person leverage on ourselves and our activities. And if that is so, I cannot

---

[51] Huw Price, "Idling and Sidling Toward Philosophical Peace," in *Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism*, ed. Steven Gross et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
[52] Simon Blackburn, "Pragmatism: All or Some?" in Price, *Expressivism*, 113.

see that Horwich's Wittgenstein-inspired points about the *sui generis* nature of (say)

ethical and arithmetical discourse suggest a reassessment of our conclusion from the

previous section: that ON is still on the table, even once we reject representationalism.

5. How to be an anti-representationalist anti-metaphysicalist naturalist

For someone suspicious of the traditional placement problems, rejecting

representationalism is certainly a step in the right direction. However, I have been arguing

that the form this insight takes in the overall views of Price and Horwich still fails to give

us the desired insulation from metaphysics.

In my view, the way forward here is to look again at what a science of humans – a

subject naturalistic enquiry – might tell us about ourselves and the capacities underlying

our different vocabularies. On something like the Canberra planners' view of things, such

enquiry would ideally vindicate representationalism; while on Price's 'Sydney plan',[53] i.e.

GE, we would theorise different vocabularies in a 'non-representationalist key' though

employing the notion of 'e-representation' to mark a divide between those vocabularies

that do and those that don't 'track' some environmental feature. If we reject

representationalism but also GE, what alternatives for subject naturalism remain?

My suggestion is based on ideas I find in the work of Noam Chomsky, though I

develop them in ways that go well beyond anything Chomsky has said (and might diverge

from some of his other claims). There is some inherent interest in developing an anti-

representationalist philosophy on the basis of Chomsky's work in view of the in some

sense clearly anti-representationalist approach he adopts to language, i.e. one that rejects

---

[53] The nomenclature is due to Jenann Ismael, "Naturalism on the Sydney plan," in *Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?*, ed. Matthew Haug (London: Routledge, 2015).

the assumption of '[quoting Scott Soames] "the central semantic fact about language […]

that it is used to represent the world"'.[54] Here I cannot go into Chomsky's 'internalist'

views of meaning, but will develop instead an anti-metaphysical form of AR that assumes

the neo-Carnapian picture of AR we have already sketched and builds on to these ideas of

Chomsky's about the nature of science and naturalistic enquiry into the mind.[55]

The first of these is what I call *radical anti-reductionism about science* (or *RAR*

for short), a view which is meant to be more faithful to what scientists actually do and say

than the picture that philosophers typically operate with.[56] According to RAR reduction is

not simply a mere ideal that much science in fact fails to live up to; rather, it is incoherent,

for there is no basic scientific level to which all others might be reduced. Though

unification is a genuine goal of science, it is only one of many, and in any case standardly

involves adjustments at both levels to be unified.[57] Furthermore, and relatedly, common

sense categories are not eliminated or vindicated through scientific discoveries, but are

simply left behind *as part of science* – a view John Collins, again drawing on Chomsky's

views, has called *metascientific eliminativism*.[58] Clearly such a view presupposes that the

representationalist idea on which only some of our talk latches onto the 'real' is defective

– so the neo-Carnapian framework I have been developing remains central to our overall

picture. What RAR adds is that science itself does not yield a picture of a Quinean 'desert

---

[54] Noam Chomsky, *New Horizons in the Study of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 132. This quote is also used approvingly by Price; see Huw Price, "Expressivism for two voices," in *Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism*, ed. Jonathan Knowles and Henrik Rydenfelt (Frankfurt: Peter Lang), 103, fn.
[55] See especially Chomsky, *New Horizons*, essays 4 and 5.
[56] See also John Dupré, *The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), and James Ladyman and Don Ross (et al.) *Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) for similar expressions of this kind of view.
[57] Chomsky, *New Horizons*, 82.
[58] John Collins, "Metascientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavoiur," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 58 (2007).

landscape' or even something similar that one might use for either a metaphysical

placement project or the kind of expressivist explanations that Price proposes. Scientific

theories concern themselves as such only with the proprietary 'level' they operate at; they

are not input to a metaphysical or indeed any other distinctively philosophical programme

of any kind. Of course, one might as a *philosopher* seek to argue that these theories

fruitfully can be used in this way. But it should give philosophers, at least those who call

themselves naturalists, pause for thought that science itself is not concerned with doing

this. (We will find further reason to reject the 'desert landscape' view of what science

provides below.)

Leaving things there however would precisely not do justice to what scientific

approaches presumably can tell us about our various different discourses – it would in

effect land us in the soggy pluralism a reasonable resistance to which we saw above was

sufficient to motivate some kind of naturalism, and hence gave the lie to Horwich's

argument against metaphysics.[59] But how now is naturalism to be conceived, if not as

thinking launched from the perspective of desert landscapes or something similar? The

idea here would be that there is nothing in RAR that precludes the idea of subject

naturalism, or, to use a Quinean term, a *naturalised epistemolog*y, that is, a project that

considers our 'scientific imaginings as activities within the world we imagine'[60] – though

for us seen as a psychological enquiry into the mental and/or neural substrates of, not just

science, but our various different domains of discourse.[61] Nothing in RAR, in other

---

[59] As with the argument against Price, I stress that what I reject in Horwich is not so much his end-point but how he reaches it. I agree with him that metaphysical placement projects are irrational, but we need to find out what naturalism can be such that metaphysics does not threaten as a consequence of it of before we can help ourselves to that conclusion.

[60] Quine, *Word and Object*, 5.

[61] James Higginbotham sees Chomsky's mentalistic psychology as a natural heir to Quine's programme of naturalised epistemology; see his "The Place of Natural Language," in *On Quine: New Essays*, ed. Paolo

words, precludes scientifically turning our gaze upon ourselves and exploring the underlying bases of our various discourses – both genealogically, and from a more cognitive science perspective, examining the sub-personal underpinnings of our thought and experience. This is of course very similar to what Price's GE seeks to do. But on the kind of picture I am proposing these studies have a different significance. On my view what anthropological and/or psychological studies can suggest is how, say, moral discourse in being underpinned by motivational states of particular kinds is unlikely to become a systematic, scientific discipline – by contrast with other vocabularies which have no such motivational underpinnings but are as far as we can see more purely 'conceptual'. Although such study is not ontologically significant, and also has no relation to any notion like 'e-representation', it stands to enrich, explain and possibly partially correct our common sense conceptions of what possibilities for systematic theorizing exist. Chomsky has himself suggested a 'science-forming faculty'[62] as one of the mind's modules, and in principle this might be part of what we uncover as the explanation for our ability to do physics and not, say, systematic ethics. But my claims here are independent of there being such a faculty in any substantive sense;[63] I use it here just to illustrate the kind of idea that a subject/epistemologically naturalistic science might make without adopting a 'desert landscape' conception of the tools available to it.

I should also underline that this view is in no way anti-realistic about things like ethical values; rather it suggests they figure in something like (what others have called) the *lifeworld*: our everyday world of ordinary objects and their properties that we interact

---

Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). It is in this piece I found the Quine quote.
[62] Chomsky, *New Horizons*, 82–3
[63] For discussion, see John Collins, "On the Very Idea of a Science Forming Faculty," *Dialectica* 56 (2002).

with, but which also depend constitutively for what they are on the possibilities we humans have for action. In invoking this notion of a lifeworld we also commit to the idea that certain other properties, centrally those of the most theoretical reaches of science, do not belong in it, and would thus perforce be referred to some other 'world in itself' (without any implication that this is an ultimate 'reality'). The legitimacy of a lifeworld is in my view in turn mandated by a proper scientific understanding of the nature of conscious experience – as something inherently world-involving and not 'in the head'.

These reflections clearly only point up ideas that would have to be explored in greater detail to be vindicated. Nevertheless, if we accept the outline they provide together with AR and RAR we can I think more clearly see the form of a thoroughly non-metaphysical picture of the relation between things like morality and science that nevertheless allows science to have something to say about the respective forms of natural understanding these categories involve – both through genealogy and sub-personal psychology, and also through the systematic description of the conscious, lived world.[64]

References

Blackburn, Simon. "Pragmatism: All or Some?" In Huw Price (et al.), *Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism*, 67–84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Button, Tim. *The Limits of Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Carnap, Rudolf. "Semantics, Empiricism and Ontology." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 4 (1950): 20–40.

Chomsky, Noam. *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Collins, John. "On the Very Idea of a Science Forming Faculty." *Dialectica* 56 (2002): 125–51.

Collins, John "Metascientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of

Skinner's Verbal Behavoiur." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 58 (2007): 625–58.

Dupré, John. *The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Higginbotham, James. "The Place of Natural Language." in *On Quine: New Essays*, edited by Paolo Leonardi and Marco Santambrogio, 113–139. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Hirsch, Eli. *Quantifier Variance and Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011

Horwich, Paul. *Meaning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Horwich, Paul. *From a Deflationary Point of View*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Horwich, Paul. "The Value of Truth." *Noûs*, 40 (2006): 347–360

Horwich, Paul. *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Horwich, Paul. "Naturalism, Deflationism and the Relative Priority of Language and Metaphysics." In Huw Price (et al.) *Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism,* 112–127. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Keskinen, Antti. "Quine's Conception of Objects as Theoretical: Beyond Realism and Anti-realism." In *Realism, Science and Pragmatism*, edited by Kenneth Westphal, 93–114. London: Routledge, 2014.

Knowles, Jonathan. "Naturalism without Metaphysics." In *Realism, Science and Pragmatism*, edited by Kenneth Westphal, 200–218. London: Routledge, 2014.

Knowles, Jonathan. "Global Expressivism and the Flight from Metaphysics." *Synthese*. Accessed February 26, 2017. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1166-1.

Ismael, Jenann. "Naturalism on the Sydney plan." In *Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?* edited by Matthew Haug, 87–104. London: Routledge, 2015.

Ladyman, James, and Don Ross (et al.). *Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Macarthur, David. "Subject Naturalism, Scientism and the Problem of Linguistic Meaning: Critical Remarks on Price's 'Naturalism Without Representationalism'" *Analasis: Revista de invetagacion filosofica*, 1 (2014): 69–85.

Price, Huw. "What should a deflationist about truth say about meaning?" in *Truth* (Philosophical Issues, Vol. 8), edited by Enrique Villanueva, 107–115. California: Ridgeview, 1997.

Price, Huw. "Immodesty without Mirrors – Making Sense of Wittgenstein's Linguistic Pluralism." Reprinted in his *Naturalism without Mirrors*, 200–227. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Price, Huw. *Naturalism without Mirrors*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Price, Huw "Naturalism without Representationalism." Reprinted in his *Naturalism without Mirrors*, 184–199. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Price, Huw. "The Semantic Foundations of Metaphysics." Reprinted in his *Naturalism without Mirrors*, 253–279. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Price, Huw. "Truth as Convenient Friction." Reprinted in his *Naturalism without Mirrors*, 163–183. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Price, Huw. "Metaphysics after Carnap: The Ghost who Walks?" Reprinted in his *Naturalism without Mirrors*, 280–303. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Price, Huw. "Metaphysical Pluralism." Reprinted in his *Naturalism without Mirrors*, 34–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Price, Huw. "Expressivism for two voices." In *Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism*, edited by Jonathan Knowles and Henrik Rydenfelt, 87–113. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2011.

Price, Huw (et al.). *Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Price, Huw. "Idling and Sidling Toward Philosophical Peace." In *Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism*, edited by Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams, 307–330. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Price, Huw, and Peter Menzies. "Is semantics in the plan?" In *Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism*, edited by David Braddon-Mitchell and Roberta Nola, 183–200. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009.

Putnam, Hilary. *Realism and Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Quine, W.V.O. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In his *From a Logical Point of View*, 20–46. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.

Quine, W.V.O. *Word and Object*. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1960.

Quine, W.V.O. *Philosophy of Logic*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Quine, W.V.O. "Reply to Dagfinn Føllesdal." In *The Philosophy of W.V. Quine*, edited by Lewis Hahn and Paul Schlipp, 114–115. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986.

Shapiro, Lionel. "Linguistic Function and Content: Reflections on Price's Pragmatism." *Philosophical Quarterly* 64 (2014): 497–506.

Thomasson, Amie. *Ordinary Objects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Thomasson, Amie. "Deflationism in semantics and metaphysics." In *Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning*, edited by Alexis Burgess and Brett Sherman, 185–213. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Thomasson, Amie. *Ontology Made Easy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Williamson, T. Review of *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy* by Paul Horwich. *European Journal of Philosophy,* 21 (2013): e7–e10.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953.