Abstract

Denne masteroppgaven bruker en regresjonsbasert tilnærming med landår-data for å undersøke menneskerettighetsforholdene i stater som har separert seg fra en annen stat, da enten i gjennom løsrivelse eller oppdeling og på voldelig og fredelig vis. En god del empirisk forskning er gjort på slike stater, ofte med den hensikt å skulle utrede konsekvenser av slik separasjon og å finne ut om disse statene er vellykkede ut i fra gitte mål og kriterier. Følgelig har det blitt debattert mye rundt hva løsrivelser og oppdelinger fører med seg og fokuset har gjerne ligget på stater født ut av separatistkonflikter hvor da gjerne en etnisk gruppe ønsker å danne en egen stat. Aspekter som ofte er debattert og undersøkt er demokratisering (vil slike stater bli demokratiske stater?), menneskelige kostnader og om voldelige separasjoner fører til nye konflikter på grunn av ytterligere fragmentering samt fortsettende vold. Foreløpig virker menneskerettigheter og undertrykkelse å være et noenlunde oversett aspekt, noe som er betenkelig med tanke på at separatisme ofte legitimeres på bakgrunn av at man vil få et bedre liv, både sosialt og politisk, i en ny og egen stat. Separatister henviser ofte til å ha opplevd undertrykkelse og slike forhold kan undersøkes ved å anvende mål som dokumenterer respekten for individets personlige fysisk integritet og borgeres sivile friheter. Derfor vil menneskerettighetsforhold som mål på en ny stats ansvarlighet og tilregnelighet overfor egne innbyggere, samt hvordan den forholder seg til politisk opposisjon, tilføre en ny og interessant vinkling til debatten nevnt ovenfor. Mine generelle funn tilsier at det er vanskelig å finne en generell systematisk forskjell mellom separerte land og øvrige land i forhold til respekten for personlig fysisk integritet, men det kan antydes at separerte stater slår hardere ned på borgeres sivile friheter. Sistnevnte viser seg spesielt ved økende heterogenitet i en stats etniske komposisjon. Hva gjelder separasjonstype viser det seg at oppdelte stater er mer undertrykkende enn løsrevne stater under gitte omstendigheter. En bred definisjon på voldelig løsrivelse indikerer at dette vil innebære mindre respekt for fysisk integritet enn en fredelig løsrivelse, men funnet er ikke statistisk signifikant. Større statskapasitet, målt ved evnen til beskatning, innebærer heller ikke nødvendigvis bedre menneskerettighetsforhold slik tidligere forskning har vist; ved økende statskapasitet er separerte stater mer undertrykkende enn andre stater målt ved sivile friheter. Forhåpentligvis vil disse funnene kunne bidra til ny og bredere innsikt i ettervirkningene av separatisme.

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Foreword and acknowledgements

Writing a master thesis can at times be a real challenge, there are many approaches and aspects to consider and several, sometimes difficult, choices to be made. There is a lot to get involved in, especially when working with specific statistical models and techniques you are unfamiliar with. There is also much scholarly work to grasp and comprehend. But all of this is of course an important part of the learning process and the knowledge and insights gained from working countless hours on the thesis are indeed very rewarding. Along the way, I have received much appreciated help from both scholars and fellow students alike. I would therefore very much like to express my gratitude to all of you.

First and foremost, this thesis would not have seen the light of day without the guidance of my supervisor, Ole Magnus Theisen. From the start, his brilliant advice, support and patience has been invaluable to me and has helped me greatly in dealing with the challenges of writing a master thesis. His ideas and suggestions has inspired both research design and topics. Thanks to his sincere commitment, I can safely say that I have learned much more than I could have imagined when I first started writing this thesis.

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Any inaccuracies and errors in this work are solely my own.

Adrian Tveit Lundemo Trondheim, February 23, 2017

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1.0 Introduction

In the early 19th century, the international political system consisted of only 25 members. About 200 years later this number has been increased significantly. Although numbers differ regarding the total number of states in the world, the United Nations had as many as 193 member states in 2015 which is also the year of the organization's 70th anniversary (Coggins 2011; United Nations n.d). And if the aspirations of ongoing secessionist and separatist movements were to be fulfilled this number might become even larger. Indeed, the second paragraph in the first article of the United Nations charter states that the self-determination of peoples is a principle that should be respected in pursuing the development of friendly relations among nations (United Nations n.d). The rationale for this stems from the evolving attention in international law to popular sovereignty, the protection of minorities and the right for all nations to be free from oppression by organizing their own states. But, this is not an entirely unproblematic issue. Although self-determination has achieved legal relevance, the application and the extent of such rights and principles can be interpreted in more than one way, which again leads to much discussion. Whether ethnic groups have a right to secede from a state is among the most disputed issues related to self-determination, and achieving this through the use of force is generally forbidden. That being said, it could be argued that ruthless discrimination and overt disregard of minorities' human rights could justify a right to secede in an armed context. Such a right may consequently be voiced by the victims. However, the conditions and contexts permitting such actions are, understandably, much debated (Doehring 2002).

Regardless of this, independence and separation is and has been sought by both non-violent and violent means. For instance, in Scotland and Catalonia, political mobilization has resulted in referendums for independence (though independence has not been achieved to date) which thus represents a peaceful endeavor. A contrasting example is Eritrea which emerged as an independent state after many years of war with Ethiopia (Guibernau 2013; Saideman et. al 2005). These are but some examples of secessionist movements past and present, violent and non-violent. There has even been calls for the drastic instrument of partition; the still on-going civil war in Syria, with hundreds of thousands dead, has brought back the idea that an imposed separation of the belligerents into new states may be the only way to improve this dismal situation (Stavridis 2016).

One of the purposes of this thesis is to examine the repressiveness of the "new" states emerging from *separation*, a term that encompasses both secessions and partitions. I focus on the specific sets of human rights known as personal integrity rights and civil liberties in an attempt to measure repression in a broad sense, thus capturing a wide specter of repression. I hope this will contribute to the academic discussion and theories linked to the effects and feasibility of separations like partitions and secessions. My research question is therefore:

Is there any systematic relationship between states emerging from separations and the level of repression compared to other states?

Why study human rights and repression? I choose this approach because human rights practices and conditions are connected to repression¹ and, as a measure of human welfare and general accountability, these aspects have not been emphasized much in the study of new states born from separations. The debate on separation has thus far focused on democratization, violence, forced population transfers and war-recurrence after the creation of new states (Sambanis 2000; Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998). The call for investigating other concepts of human welfare such as human rights violations has been voiced (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2009: 106, 116), but not necessarily addressed. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) briefly touches the subject of human rights conditions, measured by physical integrity rights, in new states in general relative to older states, but does not find any systematic difference between the two. Studying other aspects of human welfare and security are important since partitions and secessions are often justified on the grounds that it could end civil conflict and instability (Kaufmann 1996; 1998). The concept of self-determination, which have indeed established new states (Coggins 2011), is also often justified on the grounds that the citizens will be better off and, as mentioned before, the United Nations Charter defends self-determination (United Nations n.d). With their own state, separatists are now themselves in charge of their political and social well-being and could thus act as the guarantee for less repression and better human rights for their respective group.

¹ I use the terms human rights and repression often, and while both are conceptually connected, it is worth pointing out that human rights refer to fundamental common rights for all humans that are popularly agreed upon and guaranteed by treaties, whilst repression refers to a political instrument that violates these human rights in order to incapacitate political opposition (Hafner-burton 2014; Davenport & Inman 2012). This is covered more broadly in the theory section (2.0).

Indeed, separatists often put emphasis on the violation of human rights, repression and oppression when they argue for self-determination, claiming that separation will liberate them from the yoke of their rulers. Such rhetoric can for example be found in a manifesto called *Our Struggle and its Goals* published by Eritrean separatists. Here, overt references are made to "oppression" and "human rights violated" as well as their wish for "Eritrean people to progress to being the master of their destiny" (Weldehaimanot & Taylor 2011: 569-570). The human rights approach should give us an impression of whether these states actually end up creating a better situation for their inhabitants by serving their own people or if they repress the population and consequently fail at this. The importance of this is evident since:

... it relates directly to one of the fundamental problems of politics, which is how an entity given the exclusive authority to enforce rules through physical coercion (the state) can be prevented from abusing that authority (Hill Jr. & Jones 2014: 661).

The sense of security for each individual that human rights entails, is arguably one of the most important services a state can offer its population (Englehart 2009: 163; Davenport 2007a: 2). It has also been pointed out that repression has not yet been too integrated with issues such as state-building and that state coercion is closely related to concepts of political order (Davenport 2007a: 19). I will also include the concept of state capacity for the study of repression and new states. This as an acknowledgement of the fact that the actions, policies and intentions of states are enabled or disabled by what their resources allow them to do. Such state capacity rests on a legitimate political order and well-functioning institutions (Hendrix 2010; Young 2009; Englehart 2009; Fukuyama 2014). By including observations of partitioned and seceded states "born" peacefully, the analysis can further highlight the effects of under which conditions a state was born, either from conflict or a more peaceful process. Employing a time series cross section analysis should show the development of these trends over time. This method is beneficial since policies and practices take time to implement and develop, especially after civil wars. It enables the analyst to observe different state features and the effect of various variables over time as well as determining what factors characterize new states. After all, the separation² of a state into more entities is something that happens at a given point in time; a simple cross-sectional study would miss the effects of time on the development of such states (Pevehouse & Brozek 2008). For this study, I have compiled and

 $^{^{2}}$ The terms separation, secession and partition will be discussed in the theory (2.0) and the method chapter (3.0).

assembled a new dataset and constructed several new variables and measures of my own³. By comparing values on variables such as human rights, democracy, economic development, state capacity etc. I expect findings that can supplement and/or test assumptions from the existing literature. This way, by studying the different experiences of these new states, I can test if seceded and partitioned states differ, in terms of repression, from other states in any significant way.

The emergence of new states through separations, for instance in the case of selfdetermination, could happen regardless of whether the international community, or certain powerful states, "wants" it to happen or not. It is therefore important to have a broad scholarly understanding of the phenomenon's implications and let such insights guide the type of policy aimed towards it. The insights gained here could inform us on what repression characteristics successful and unsuccessful new states bear. It is therefore relevant for both partitioning and secession as well as other autonomous arrangements and establishment of new political units.

³ The data, the coding and the construction of new variables will be discussed in the methods chapter. Additional info on coding can be found in the Appendix.

2.0 Theory, literature review and hypotheses

This section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature that serves as the main points of departure for my thesis. First, I briefly discuss some aspects of statehood and present some examples of different backgrounds for state formation. I then move on to a review of the literature and scholarly discussions on secession and partition before moving on to human rights and repression as well as aspects of state capacity and statehood. The terms separation, secession, partition, physical integrity rights, civil liberties, repression, state capacity and statehood are defined in each related subsection of this chapter as I go. Drawing on this theoretical framework, I develop a set of hypotheses.

2.1 What makes a state?

Statehood is defined by several criteria. Max Weber's influential definition declares that, among other things, a state is characterized by having the monopoly of legitimate violence within its jurisdiction (Weber 1919/1958; Jackson & Rosberg 1982). Becoming and constituting a proper state is, arguably, dependent on the ability to function as a state as well as being recognized as one. Legitimacy and recognition are important political issues in international relations and international law and there is consequently much debate and dispute concerning the *de facto* and *de jure* status for a large number of states. Statehood can be evaluated by different aspects and standards such as its empirical and juridical status. One may observe the empirical attributes of a state such as effective government, territory and population. At the same time, even though a state may possess such characteristics, it may lack the juridical and legitimate status needed to constitute a member of the international society of states. One such example is Transnistria, a state with quite limited recognition located between Ukraine and Moldova (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrniki 2004). This could also apply vice versa; an internationally recognized state lacking empirical attributes such as effective control and enforcement over its territorial jurisdiction. Present day Libya is an example of this; it lacks a strong central authority that can enforce laws and maintain peace. Thus, external and domestic legitimacy are two different sides of a state. These notions of statehood are important since they imply something about the strength and legitimacy of a state (Jackson & Rosberg 1982; Fukuyama 2014).


I believe it is important to bear in mind these empirical and juridical aspects when discussing self-determination and the creation of new states through separation. Legal and recognized status is imperative to position the new state in an international and diplomatic context.

Effective government and control affects this as well, but most importantly, it is needed for any new state to actually constitute a state and, ideally, provide the necessary services for the inhabitants. Consequently, if these *de jure* and *de facto* attributes are observed after a state separation, the breakaway state has made a considerable transformation from being a separatist endeavor to actually resembling a recognized political actor. If not, one could say it is just another project of state formation and state building gone wrong where accountability and legitimacy suffers from the new state's failure to consolidate its status and constitute a responsible policy.

2.2 The many ways states have come into existence

This thesis focus on the formation of states through separations like secession and partition in the later parts of the 20th century and up to our days. But there are other ways that states have entered the international system. Giving a concise yet satisfactory outline on this is a difficult and exhausting task. I will therefore limit myself to a few examples provided by modern history. Some formations⁴ were influenced and endorsed by great power politics, such as for instance the revival of the Polish state after the First World War or the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 to name a very few. Wars and conflict have been significant and important factors present in many state formations and was, for instance, among the several processes leading to the respective unifications of Italy and Germany. Revolutions also paved the way for state formation in many cases, among them for instance Belgium, the United States of America and the Soviet Union (Rich 2003; Palmer, Colton & Kramer 2007; Roberts 2007). Although these phenomena are related to each other in some ways, great power politics, wars and revolutions have crafted states throughout history and as Graph 1 shows, states in the modern sense of the word have emerged steadily up to our own days. The first hundred years after the Napoleonic era experienced a generally slow rising trend, but with some decline around 1860. The graph shows a large and steady increase in states after the Second World War. This cohort is the decolonization of Africa and Asia (Coggins 2011; Shipway 2008). The next big surge occurs after the Cold War when the communist federations broke up (Glaurdić 2011; Suny 2011; O'Leary 2007). As the graph displays, the number of independent states have continued to rise since that time, although more slowly.

⁴ Indeed, these examples share many similarities to secessions and partitions and, in a broader context, some of them could well be understood as separations. I merely provide these examples to put the emergence of new states in context with various political processes.



Graph 1: Growth in international system members⁵ since 1816. Source: Correlates of War Project (2011).

2.3 The emergence of new states through separation

I will begin with my definition of the term separation which encompasses both secession and partition. Separation involves that a given territory in a state is detached and made into a new state and a new political unit. This can be facilitated by both violent and non-violent means and the very territorial separation can be executed along fresh or more previously established borders (Sambanis 2000; Kaumann 1998; O'Leary 2007). Thus, each case of separation can be characterized by many specific traits, but the main idea is that there are now two or more states where there was only one before. This political and territorial fragmentation is the main important component that is mutual to all such cases.

Furthermore, one can argue that the separation of a state can occur in two more specific ways of detachment⁶; by partition and by secession. Partition is executed by separating the belligerents in civil wars. As such, it can be an instrument to end conflict. The sovereign state experiencing conflict is partitioned; a territorial separation which divides the state and produces two or more political units (often states) where before there was only one (Sambanis 2000; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2009). Two well-known examples are the partitions of

⁵ COW's criteria for statehood are diplomatic connections with France and Great Britain and a population greater than 500 000 in the period before 1920. After 1920, a population greater than 500 000, diplomatic connection with two major powers and UN or League of Nations-membership is needed to qualify as a state (Correlates of War Project 2011).

⁶ A more technical term I use synonymously with separation.

Ireland and Cyprus (Kaufmann 1998). And then, there is secession. To be concise; in such cases, separatist aim to establish a new state for themselves by seceding from their host state. They actively pursue this as a political goal and may base their cause on established historical claims and a better political status for their national homeland which they have previously enjoyed (O'Leary 2007).

There is some academic disagreement on whether secessions and partitions should be identified as two separate phenomena or if they more or less constitute the same concept, and because of this, some scholars classify the same historical cases in slightly different terms. For instance, the case of Abkhazia in Georgia has been referred to as a de facto separation, a secession and a partition in the literature. In other words, for this single case we find three different terms employed in three different works (Chapman & Roeder 2007; Kaufmann 1998; Sambanis 2000). Sometimes, two or more terms are merged or used interchangeably. Sambanis (2000) employs a broad definition and considers instances of partition and secession to be combinable, using the term partition to denote all such cases. He treats partition as a war outcome that separates belligerents and involves both the adjustment of borders and demographical changes such as population transfers. These implications are also relevant for secessions. O'Leary (2007), on the other hand, strongly argues that partition and secession constitute different phenomena, and consequently, should be analyzed separately. His reasoning is that while secession also constitute a detachment, it is different because an ethnic group deliberately seeks divorce from its "host" country⁷. This is usually based on an established claim with historical foundations (ancient or more recent depending on the specific case). The division line or border is also based on a previous territorial status⁸. In contrast, partition is defined as "a fresh border cut through at least one community's national homeland, creating at least two separate political units under different sovereigns or authorities" (O'Leary 2007: 888). So while partition, generally speaking, also means dividing a political entity into two or more parts it is made different by its political context. Who implements it, how it is implemented and why it is implemented differs a bit from secession. The partition form of separation creates an entirely novel border and it is not necessarily instigated by separatists with specific territorial goals, it is rather an "arbitrary" final state

⁷ The old state is often called the rump state and the new state is called the successor state.


⁸ That is not to say that new states formed by secessions always need to correspond with total precision to the formerly established border. One cannot expect to be able to operate with such a strict conceptual framework. The main idea is that the "shaping" of the new state is intended to follow and be adjusted to a more discernible ethnic homeland (O'Leary 2007).

product as a result of conflict and political negotiations. Partitions does not necessarily have any clear prior political status or historical precedents. Cyprus, for example, was partitioned by the Turkish army, the border cut was fresh as it did not correspond to any demarcation under independent Cyprus or the British colonial rule (O'Leary 2007). One might also add that it is not exactly clear which state is the rump state and which is the successor state in the case of partitions.

Regardless of these more or less competing notions, I believe the two phenomena share some common ground. Although I certainly acknowledge their important distinctions, I argue that for my purposes these phenomena can be analyzed together under the term *separation* as long as the goal for this is made clear. This choice is guided by the fact that both, at the very least, result in the creation of new political units from a separation process. This involves a new political, social and economic situation for the respective citizens, not to mention a change in the international system of members (Sambanis 2000; Kaufmann 1998, Coggins 2011; Etzioni 1992-1993). I believe it is important to understand the consequences of separations regardless of whether a state or political unit was born specifically from secession or partition. Of course, that is not to undermine the importance and relevance of analyzing partition and secession separately. As an acknowledgement of these distinctions and as a contribution to the debate, I will conduct a hypothesis test (H₇-H₈) for any systematic difference between the two phenomena.

Since the given definitions vary to such an extent, some operational choices must be made to clarify the actual universe of cases. Because Sambanis (2000), Kaufmann (1996; 1998) and O'Leary (2007) understand the terms secession and partition somewhat differently, a strict adherence to just one of these respective definitions would effectively exclude some cases justified and included by another. This means that I cannot make use of all the cases identified by the literature if I choose to limit myself to just one of these competing definitions. However, I aim to analyze as many cases as reasonable in order to connect with the broadest range of the literature. Because the terms are used interchangeably and the definitions that are applied in the scholarship sometimes differ substantially, not to mention that they often are at odds with each other, I feel compelled to develop my own definitions to guide the case selection. These definitions aim to be more comprehensive, but they will naturally draw on the conceptual scheme laid out in the established scholarship.

Figure 1: Overview of new states classification



So, at the outset, we have the formation of new states. I start by employing the inclusive term separation. As mentioned, this term comprises both secessions and partitions in my work, be they violent or not. Isolated from my separation term are cases of overseas decolonization, even though they also produced new independent states. I choose this approach because the scholarship in general also exclude overseas colonies from their conceptual framework. Kaufmann (1998: 126) argues that most overseas colonies were never an integral part of the metropolitan state and that the residing colonist, being a small part of the population, were foreigners to the locals. In other words, it is argued that this type of state formation comes from a slightly different political setting, even though these states were considered a subordinated part of another state. Decolonization does not correspond to secessions and partitions in O'Leary's (2007: 893-894) reasoning either; he refers to overseas decolonization as the downsizing of regimes and maintain that these colonies do not share the same territorial status as the metropolitan center. O'Leary (2007: 892, 897) thus agrees with Kaufmann on that particular point; overseas colonies are not part of the rump state's integrated territorial and political core in the same way as break-away regions. Thus, in this literature's conceptual framework, Great Britain's loss of Nigeria, for example, does not constitute a territorial separation like a secession or partition (Shipway 2008).

The term secession is sometimes used in a very general and loose sense in various academic literatures. For example, you may read about South Sudan and learn that the separation that

took place there is referred to as a secession (LeRiche & Arnold 2013), but no specific definition of secession is given, no criteria are given to determine the specific type of separation. The term is simply accepted as a term that implies a separation from another state. The case of South Sudan, although regularly understood as secession, would not be readily accepted as a secession by O'Leary's (2007) standards, since the people of southern Sudan has not enjoyed any previously established territorial unit for themselves, although some separate administration during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (LeRiche & Arnold 2013; Collins 2008). I extend the framework somewhat and develop a more inclusive set of criteria that accounts more for the variation⁹ in how the secession term is often used. In my work, a case is characterized as a secession if the new state had a former status as an independent state or autonomy or if the new state's territory was formerly subjected to another state than the rump state¹⁰.

A state that has come into existence by separation from another state and meet one of these criteria are therefore to be classified as a case of secession. Revisiting the case of South Sudan as an example, it is clear that this case meets one of these criteria, namely the second one as the territory (as well as the rest of Sudan) was under British control as a part of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (Collins 2008). This was before it was a part of independent Sudan (LeRiche & Arnold 2013). Montenegro's peaceful secession is an example of the first criteria (Roberts 2007), and Eritrea's violent secession is yet another example of the second criteria, the area being once subjected to Italy as a colony with its own borders (O'Leary 2007). Note how any of the new criteria are applicable to both non-violent and violent cases of secessions.

As I plan to test if there are any systematic differences between the two separation types secession and partition, I must also designate which cases are partition cases. Sambanis (2000) use the partition term for all cases, and all of them are violent. I use his cases as well, although I refer to his cases in the broad sense; as separations. That means my subsequent classification of typical partition cases are not guided by Sambanis' wide use of the term.

⁹ This way, new states emerging from more "unintended" secessions, where independence was gained although not as much explicitly sought, are included as well as secessions more firmly based on historical claims and intentionally sought for. Kazakhstan is, arguably, an example of the former case as the secession became more a product of necessity and independence sentiments were not particularly widespread (Olcott 2002: 32-35).
¹⁰ In cases like these, it may not be entirely reasonable to expect that the secession followed a previously established homeland or territorial border. The second criterion is meant to reflect the many different preconditions, intentions and causes that are related to separatism as each case can be distinguished from another in many ways.

Hence, having specified my concept of secession, I choose to follow O'Leary's (2007) guidelines and suggestions for choosing and classifying partition cases, where the conceptual distinction insist that such a separation is more influenced by external factors and that it involves a fresh cut without considering territorial homelands (O'Leary 2007: 888, 899). This results in only a handful of cases. While this may seem somewhat arbitrary, it appears to be the most reasonable approach for any preliminary testing for substantial differences between human rights violations in secessions on one side and partitions on the other. My intention is to account for the potential implications of O'Leary's (2007) conceptual criticism. But, after all, the consequences of this choice is most decisive for these particular hypotheses (H₇-H₈) as the rest of the analysis focus mainly on overall separations in general.

As shown in Figure 1, separations in general can be both violent and non-violent. But what makes a separation violent? It is not necessarily easy to distinguish what makes a separation particularly violent or peaceful. As for the process of separation, we have examples (as given earlier) of both peaceful and violent secessions. Partition, being a response and proposed solution to conflict, is easily classified as a violent separation as there is conflict preceding the separation. A non-violent or peaceful partition is somewhat harder to conceive of inside the literature's conceptual framework. Theoretically speaking, a fresh cut partition could be applied to a peaceful context, but it is a bit hard to imagine what such a scenario would look like¹¹. My main argument and criteria for classification is that the separation from the state was violent if a given time period prior to actual separation was marked by organized conflict. A separation was also violent if it was sought through violent means by a rebel group, which is often the case of violent secessions in particular (Tir 2005). These two conditions are often present simultaneously. All in all, if we have a case of separation where there was separatist conflict in a given period of time¹² before independence, we have a case of violent separation by my definition.

As the previous elaborations have shown, it is always a bit difficult to classify and categorize cases in types of state formation, separation type and separation process as each case may contain aspects and nuances that complicate such evaluations. The choices that must be made is therefore always likely to attract some criticism, but one must stick to a coding scheme and

¹¹ Interestingly, Kaufmann (1998) lists the break-up of Czechoslovakia as a peaceful partition, although this is yet again contested by O'Leary (2007) who refers to this case as a "double-secession". No explanation is provided as to what a "double-secession" really means.

¹² This is discussed in the methods chapter (3.0).

follow that scheme accordingly.

2.4 The debate on the viability of separations

So what can we expect from separations¹³? There is an extensive scientific debate concerning the feasibility of separations in resolving ethnic conflicts. The debate is about whether this could be a means to an end or if it could prove to be ineffective and prolong conflict. Both the advocates of pro-separation as well as anti-separation present reasonable arguments in this debate. Kaufmann (1996; 1998) argues that separating the belligerents through partition, in the context of ethnic civil conflict, is a valid and suitable option when assessing the potential human costs of allowing a war to continue. The theoretical concept called the ethnic security dilemma comes from Posen (1993) and is of great importance for those who favor partition as a solution, among them Kaufmann. In a multi-ethnic environment with ethnic hostility and violence, each ethnic group must see to its own security if the centralized state cannot ensure (or does not want to) ensure them protection. Mobilization on either side threatens each group's safety and offensive action seems advantageous for any group to gain the upper hand. The security threat is mutual and the belligerents cannot hope to gain anything from demobilizing unless they are separated and territorially partitioned. Under such circumstances, the state is either not able to enforce security or an ethnic group does not trust it to provide security (Kaufmann 1996; Posen 1993). For instance, Mearsheimer and Van Evera (1995) endorsed (albeit somewhat reluctantly) partitioning of Bosnia on the grounds of the security threats facing ethnic groups following the fragmentation of Yugoslavia. To them, the security dilemma could be mitigated if these groups were to be separated.

Although undertakings such as population transfers and securing post-conflict state viability can be quite costly consequences of implementing separations, Kaufmann deems it possible if the international community is sufficiently willing to see it through. In that sense, an improperly executed division process could result in a sub-optimal partition in which the efforts to reduce violence have failed. Focusing on the partitions of Ireland, India, Cyprus and Palestine, he also rejects the proposition that partitions generate undemocratic states, claiming that successor states are at least not less democratic than the predecessor states they originated

¹³ Note that the use of the term partition in the following debate and literature reviews implies the same as my use of the collective term separation. The works of Sambanis (2000) and Kaufmann (1996; 1998) have focused on using the term partition for both cases of partition and secession, regardless of competing notions from other scholars.

from (Kaufmann 1996; 1998). Sambanis (2000) challenges several of Kaufmann's claims and demonstrates empirically how separations does not succeed in establishing peaceful relations. That is, partition on average is shown to not reduce risks of war recurrence and violence short of war, called residual violence. He also suspects that if partition indeed succeeds in ending an ongoing intrastate war, conflict might still occur if residual minorities in the successor state are targeted by other hostile and mobilized groups. He also asserts that, in theory, interstate war could occur between newly separated and ethnically homogenous states if there are predatory incentives giving rise to new mobilizations. This would imply a mechanism where war could be restarted between the old and the new state if, for example, the old state wish to exact revenge upon the new state or gain back territory etc. However, Sambanis does not rule out separation as a last resort and he does not make any claims as to if separation in itself produces a downright worse situation than before. Other skeptics such as Etzioni (1992-1993) and Kumar (1997) assert that separation is generally a negative solution, arguing that it creates weak civil institutions and that it may undermine the further prospects of democracy. Both argue that separations have few stories of success. Etzioni (1992-1993) claims that selfdetermination movements are mostly destructive, spreading hostility and encouraging further fragmentation which again, supposedly, undermines the foundations of democracy as separatists obstruct governmental efforts of consolidation. Breaking up bigger political entities into more small ones does not necessarily give rise to new and more responsible governments. Kumar (1997) fear that partitioning is a "divide and quit"-policy as well as a catalyst for further fragmentation and conflict. Kumar also remarks that while partition has been viewed by some as a temporary solution, partitions have never been reversed¹⁴.

Although Sambanis' (2000) findings did not favor partition as a solution, other scholars have investigated the viability of alternative institutional arrangements to partition. Reanalyzing the data material of Sambanis (2000), Chapman and Roeder (2007) examine autonomy arrangements, unitarism (establishing a common government representing belligerents on either side) and so called de facto separation in addition to partition. Consequently, and in contrast to Sambanis, they end up finding that:

¹⁴ This claim is a bit peculiar, given the later unification of the two Germany's and Vietnam's (Corson & Minghi 1994). Perhaps these two cases do not correspond to Kumar's understanding and use of the term partition, which only further illustrates the academic "confusion" regarding secession, partition and case identification.

...partition is more effective than alternative institutions at reducing the likelihood of a recurrence of violence among the parties to the dispute and increasing the prospects that all will live under democratic rule (Chapman & Roeder 2007: 677).

Their study furthermore claims that states emerging from partition are likely to be "born democratic", meaning that in the first years of independence after partition, half of the new states can be classified as democratic (Polity-score more than 5 on the scale from -10 to +10). In addition, if they should happen to emerge as non-democratic they are still likely to experience democratization (Chapman & Roeder 2007). In response, Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) evaluate their models and data. They contend that Chapman and Roeder's (2007) pro-separation results are the products of using wrong cases (inaccurate classification) and data-coding mistakes. They rearrange the cases and analyze war recurrence. Based on the results, they maintain that partition in general does not facilitate the much anticipated post-conflict peace and consequently does not solve the main problem. However, they still admit that, given certain defined and narrow goals, partition could still work in some cases (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2009). The studies discussed above illustrate that the results of any analysis are quite sensitive to changes and adjustments in both number of cases/observations and competing definitions of the phenomena. It is therefore quite possible that if other definitions were employed in these studies, for example O'Leary's (2007) definitions, the results would be otherwise as key decisions in research such as operationalization and definitions have significant implications for both the number of observations and the empirical results.

The viability of separations could also be contingent on the violent or non-violent nature of the breakup. Analyzing secessions specifically, Tir (2005) both theorize and find that the violent or non-violent process of which the separation was formalized matters for prospective peaceful relations. He applies a Cox regression-model with dyads consisting of pairs of states that formerly constituted a unitary state. That means for example Yugoslavia and Bosnia as a pair; the former being the rump state and the latter being the successor state. He finds that, as one would intuitively assume, non-violent separations (being agreed on) fosters a peaceful post-conflict environment and demotivates future conflict. Norway's separation from Sweden and the separation of Slovakia and the Czech Republic are mentioned as examples of this mechanism. Accordingly, violent separations are significantly more prone to end in more conflict, a mechanism illustrated by Eritrea's conflicts after seceding from Ethiopia. In other

words, a separation in itself is not necessarily inherently doomed to end with more war and further human suffering, it all depends on the nature of the separation process (Tir 2005). Seemingly, the separation must have been accompanied by a certain degree of violence for things to turn bad later. Horowitz (2003) does not seem to share this outlook. He consistently argues that separations cannot be a reasonable answer to ethnic conflict and violence, in fact, he claims it would only make matters worse because it does not, as is often assumed, create homogenous successor states. After the establishment of the new state, violence and conflict as well as the oppression of minorities are not reduced. The last point is because separatist movements often, he claims, aim to subordinate or even expel minorities residing in their territory. Instead of endorsing secession, he suggests accommodation and measures such as federalism and regional autonomy solutions to ensure peaceful coexistence. In order to reduce the incidence of ethnic conflicts, internal political arrangements like devolution can be crafted instead of facilitating so called exit strategies (Horowitz 2003). As mentioned earlier, Chapman and Roeder (2007) sow some doubt about this as their findings do not show support to such alternative institutional arrangements to separation.

Apparently, the scholarly debate has formed significantly contrasting visions of what outcomes is to be expected by state separations. These visions differ drastically, and anything resembling some sort of scholarly consensus seems far away. However, it seems that there is an agreement between most scholars that state separation can or should be a last resort action to conflicts, oppression and political disorder. All this being said, one should not forget the third possible outcome of separations which is a neither positive nor negative impact. For my analysis, thus would also be relevant for repression and human rights. In other words, there are roughly three distinct outcomes: a better human rights situation, a worse human rights situation and a situation with generally no discernible different human rights situations in new states compared to other states. The last outcome adds a new aspect to the debate; the "costs and benefits"-analysis of separations becomes a bit more difficult to assess.

The works mentioned so far mainly focus on issues when war is already commenced or ended, but there are of course pre-conflict factors that can supplement our understanding of why state separations occur. Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) have examined how ethnopolitical configurations and power relations may affect the incidence of separatist conflict. How societies deal with pluralism and share power between ethnic groups may determine the risk of secessions and rebellions. Insights on such matters could help prevent armed conflict if power configurations between minorities and majorities are arranged properly. Summed up, the most important argument is that:

The likelihood of armed confrontation increases as the center of power becomes more ethnically segmented and as greater proportions of a state's population are excluded from power because of their ethnic background. These conflicts are even more likely, and more likely to take secessionist form, in incoherent states where the population is not accustomed to direct rule by the political center (Wimmer et al. 2009: 334).

Thus, not only are post-conflict findings relevant in understanding the topic, but also conditions prior to war outbreak. As for the overall debate, there seems to be a division in the field being sustained by disagreements about what constitutes the different definitions and which cases to include and focusing on different outcomes, not to mention the results generated from this. Disparate views and empirical findings may both hinder and further the debate, but studying new aspects to the topic (such as human rights and repression) and including more cases ought at least to do the latter. Also, my attempt to clarify the definitions by testing for differences between secessions and partitions respectively could provide some new insights that in turn can help build a more thorough conceptual scheme for separations.

Arguments in defense of separation		Arguments against separation		
Separates	Kaufmann (1996;	Only facilitates war	Sambanis (2000),	
belligerents and may	1998), Mearsheimer	recurrence,	Sambanis &	
thus end conflict	& Van Evera (1995)	incentives for	Schulhofer-Wohl	
		interstate war as well	(2009)	
May facilitate	Kaufmann (1996;	Gives cause for other	Sambanis (2000),	
democratization	1998), Chapman &	groups' demands,	Etzioni (1992-1993),	
	Roeder (2007)	encouraging further	Kumar (1997),	
		fragmentation	Horowitz (2003)	
A better alternative	Chapman & Roeder	Residual minority	Horowitz (2003)	
than other	(2007)	discrimination		
institutional				
arrangements				
Abolishes security	Kaufmann (1996;	Results in weak	Etzioni (1992-1993),	
dilemmas	1998), Mearsheimer	institutions	Kumar (1997)	
	& Van Evera (1995)			
If done in a non-	Tir (2005)	Undermines	Etzioni (1992-1993),	
violent way, it may		prospects of	Kumar (1997)	
foster a peaceful		democracy in a state		
post-conflict		if separatists obstruct		
environment		consolidation efforts		

2.5 The human rights literature and repression

There is at least one quite important reason why I find human rights and repression to be relevant for examining states born out separations. The levels of human rights violation and repression found in such states should tell us something about what sort of states and which conditions this mode of state-formation "produce". Just as important, the insights gained here should be accounted for in a normative debate on self-determination. To some extent, the theoretical arguments concerning the human rights effects or outcomes of separations has (to the best of my knowledge) not yet taken these issues considerably into account although the most closely related study, as mentioned before, is Mitchell and McCormick (1988), They analyze, among other things, if there is any significant difference in repression levels between newer and older states. Their study does not find any evidence of this.

I define repression in the same way as other scholars (Ritter 2014; Davenport & Inman 2012; Davenport 2007a) have, namely as coercive action conducted by authorities to restrain and mitigate popular dissent and opposition capacity. For my analysis, such coercive action means violations of human rights such as physical integrity rights as well as restriction of civil liberties. In line with the scholarship, I follow and use the definition of physical integrity rights as being the rights not to be imprisoned for one's political beliefs, not to be tortured, not to be abducted and not to be a victim of extrajudicial killing (Ritter 2014: Cingranelli & Richards 2010, Davenport 2007a). Restrictions on civil liberties are also an aspect of repression worth studying. These liberties concern freedom of assembly, speech, association, belief and freedom of the press (Davenport 2007a; Davenport 2007b).

The social science literature on human rights and repression is a large one. Over decades, the increasing focus on human rights has been made evident by the growing international legal and political activity resulting in agreements, institutions, legal instruments and treaties preoccupied with human rights as well as the extensive non-governmental activity surrounding it. Inspired by this, social scientists have also taken interest in the issue. Research has often focused on what motivates the abuse of human rights and many results point to failing state institutions (or unrestrained ones), economic well-being, war and political conflicts and the incentives to employ political terror and human rights abuse as response to dissent (Poe et.al 1999: Mitchell & McCormick 1988; Hafner-Burton 2014). The impact of democracy is found to be generally positive; fully developed democracies promote and protect these rights and countries lacking reliable democratic representation more frequently

violate them. After all democracy endorses negotiated consent, popular participation and control mechanisms; repression may not sit well with the electorate and repressive authorities can thus be ousted (Davenport 2007a; Hafner-Burton 2014; Young 2009). Despite the seemingly inherent recognition of human dignity in liberal democracies, the very process of democratization itself is not always found to be positive for human rights as leaders can respond to transition efforts and challenges with violence and human rights abuse (Hafner-Burton 2014). The relationship with democracy is therefore somewhat more complex than one would intuitively think:

The finding with regard to democracy, though strong, is overwhelming, suggesting what we already know: the presence of democratic institutions does not guarantee full respect of personal integrity rights and the absence of democracy does not necessarily mean these human rights are destined to be violated (Poe et al. 1999: 309).

This complexity has been demonstrated in other works as well. For instance, transitional or hybrid regimes mixing elements of both democracy and autocracy are sometimes found to be worse than fully autocratic ones (Bueno de Mesquita 2005). This suggests that the effect of democracy is not necessarily a positive linear one. Whilst democracy do matter, findings suggests that it must be improved to the highest levels to advance respect for these rights as opposed to a mere step in the right direction. In other words, there is a threshold effect. Fully democratic states display accountability and therefore recognizes and respects human rights. But getting there takes effort and time. When it comes to improving human rights through state building, the record shows that institutional reforms over time is needed to establish a proper institutional groundwork that captures the necessary components of democracy. But as mentioned, improved protection of human rights requires a long-term effort to facilitate and the results may not be observable at first (Davenport 2007a; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Accordingly, the development of human rights and repression after separation will therefore make an interesting observation. What development does these states show in the time following independence? Does repression go up or down?

It is not surprising that the study of human rights is so often linked to the study of repression. From a rationalist point of view, governments violate these rights in order to repress and keep individuals and organizations in check. The ruling power seeks to deter oppositional activities and challengers by making use of such things as political surveillance, torture, illegal imprisonment and denying free speech and political mobilization etc. Opposition is therefore costly and not beneficial when repressive action and violation is effective (Davenport 2007a; Davenport & Inman 2012). By violating human rights and repressing the population, state authorities hope to retain their power and stay in office. Repression, being a coercive action to constrain opponents, is a response to dissent as well as dissent being a response to repression. Dissent is a product of opposing preferences. As political actors, governments repress as a means of political survival. They assess and evaluate what outcome it could produce. It could of course prove either effective, counterproductive (stimulating more dissent and resistance) or somewhere in between regardless of the authorities' intentions. If repression does not work, the legitimacy of the rulers is under even more pressure. It is reasonable to expect that the ability to successfully repress vary among states. It depends on the constraints each state faces (Ritter 2014). The case of El Salvador from the 1960s to the 1980s can illustrate some of the dynamic mechanisms of repression. In this case, dissent was met by repression from the government, which again turned out to be counterproductive as it only provoked more dissent eventually leading to revolutionary civil war. In the end, repressive measures were not strong enough to cripple the capacity of the opposition and thus failed as a means of securing political survival for the regime (Almeida 2003). This dissent-repression nexus shows how dissent and similar threats are countered by repression from the government (which is a robust finding in the literature dubbed "The Law of Coercive Responsiveness"), although the applied repression may prove to be unsuccessful or of mixed effect (Davenport 2007a).

Research on human rights often focuses on the physical integrity aspect of human rights. These rights are meant to protect the physical integrity of a person. Physical integrity rights are internationally recognized and constitute the rights not to be imprisoned for one's political beliefs, not to be tortured, not to be abducted (disappearances administered by the government) and not to be a victim of extrajudicial killing (Cingranelli & Richards 2010: 410; Poe et al. 1999). These rights are substantially linked to human welfare since it is reduced by violating them and repression. At the same time, failing states often do not possess the sufficient capacity to govern in a stable and peaceful way regardless of their aim to do so or not. They lack the capability to prevent political terror committed by other domestic agents. In other words, they cannot effectively defend their citizens' rights (Hafner-Burton 2014).

As to the level of respect for personal integrity rights, there are considerable differences among the states of the world. Among the determinants influencing this level are variables such as democracy, economic development, population size and conflict (Poe et al. 1999).

Previous studies also point to the importance of internal ethnic divisions and internal conflict (Mitchell & McCormick 1988). As a way of state emergence (and perhaps as a feature as well), separations could possibly have an impact alongside these other determinants that cause variation in the respect for personal integrity rights, not to mention civil liberties.

Restrictions on civil liberties constitute a different type of repression, somewhat like an alternative repressive method or tactic to physical integrity rights violations. As mentioned, these liberties involve the freedom of speech, belief, association and freedom of the press. Such freedoms can for instance be repressed by bans, censorship, imposed limitations, arrests and similar actions. Just like the violations of physical integrity rights, this way of repression aims to obstruct the mobilization, organization and (democratic) participation of political dissidents, but it is more precautionary and latent. It resembles more of an intended policy by the government that, when it is successful, relieves the need for more direct and less concealed repression such as violation of physical integrity rights which again is arguably more measureable. That is not to say that these two types of repressive behavior cannot be carried out simultaneously or that one excludes the other, governments may adopt both tactics for their purposes. Different states may apply these repressive tactics differently; civil liberties restriction alters political behavior by dictating and constraining political opportunities while physical integrity violations such as extrajudicial killing does this more directly by exterminating challenging actors (Davenport 2007a; 2007b). Hopefully, by investigating two types of repression, the analysis may draw a more comprehensive picture of repression levels in separated states by comparing the significance of each tactic.

Repression by type and tactic			
Physical Integrity Rights violation	Civil Liberties violation		
- Direct attempt at measuring repression	- Latent attempt at measuring repression		
-Involves torture, disappearances, political	-Involves bans and limitations on speech, press,		
imprisonment and extrajudicial killings	beliefs and association		
-Inhibits political opposition by threatening	- Inhibits political opposition by restricting their		
the physical integrity and freedom of challengers	physical integrity and freedom of challengers political opportunities and potential for		
and, in extreme cases, eliminating them	mobilization by setting the "rules" for socio-		
	political activity		

Table 2: Two types of repression

As mentioned, the human rights' connection to newly formed states has indeed been examined before at least once that I am aware of. When examining characteristics of countries liable to violate human rights, Mitchell and McCormick (1988) tested the relationship between the "newness" of a state and human rights. The basis for this was the theoretical assumption that regardless of colonial rule, politics may be more unsettled in new countries with relatively recently achieved independence. These states simply have not had the necessary time to unify themselves. They argue that in the attempt to "build" the new nation, human rights violations could become particularly pronounced if ethnic and religious dividing lines overrule the notion of belonging to one unitary state. In other words, such new states have not been in existence long enough to consolidate a more cooperative and united political culture; they lack the authority. Nevertheless, the empirical results of their work did not show any distinct difference in respect for human rights between newer and more established states. These findings are interesting, but this study does not take into account the manner of how states came into existence, it simply compares states that became independent before 1944, referred to as "older nations", with states achieving independence after 1944, which again are referred to as "newer nations" (Mitchell & McCormick 1988). This is a worse measure of "newness". This make revisiting the topic even more important since I may expect other findings by distinguishing between state formations.

2.5.1 State capacity and repression

Another concept linked to human rights violation and repression is state capacity. In line with the scholarship, I define state capacity as a state's relative power to implement its goals and policy of which strength is characterized by adequate revenue generation made possible by good institutions and bureaucratic quality (Hendrix 2010; Young 2009).

Sovereign states have legal supremacy over their respective territories and they are held responsible for their human rights situations. Lacking authority and legitimacy, weak states tend to have (on average) worse human rights records compared to strong ones and poor countries usually repress more than richer countries. This is made evident by the consistent negative relationship with economic indicators such as GNP per capita (Davenport 2007a; Englehart 2009; Hill Jr. & Jones 2014). Thus, the capacities of a state have implications for its ability and role. After all, states can act as the defender and protector of human rights as well as the prime enemy and abuser of human rights. From a normative perspective, it is generally agreed upon that the state should champion and secure good human rights practices.

Arguably, this sense of security for the individual is the most important service a state can offer its population (Englehart 2009). The term state capacity is somewhat contested, but it is mainly intended to indicate and say something about the strength or weakness of a state, often used about both militarily and administratively aspects. Young (2009) draws on the theorizations made by Skocpol (1985) and Levi (1988), pointing to the state's ability to implement its policies, acquire revenue and its relative power in the face of domestic political or social opposition. Thus, states are considered to be weak and have little capacity when they cannot accommodate oppositional and competing groups or resolve political disputes without resorting to repression. Insecure leaders resort to this because the resources needed to accommodate are lacking or absent. Repression is considered to be among the least costly options available to authorities desperately clinging to power. Accordingly, a strong state is a state that possess the *political and economic resources* needed to satisfy its population, hence enjoying stronger bargaining power and legitimacy. Young hypothesizes that:

Where states are strong or where they have bargaining power, job security and face few transaction costs, we should expect them to respect human rights. Where these factors are absent, human rights are more likely to be violated (Young 2009: 287-288).

State capacity as such requires well-functioning institutions and adherence to the government's authority. A strong state is deemed legitimate by its citizens who willingly show compliance to the laws and rules. Such governments are responsive to the public and changing demands and the stable political institutions that maintain this order are embedded in society. If a government steps down, the institutions stay mostly unaltered. Because of these factors, the state may receive support in the shape of voluntary compliance from its citizens. This is a type of authority that differs strongly from repressive power which aims to forcefully impose the government's political will on the population (Knutsen 1999; Young 2009; Fukuyama 2014). These notions of strong and well-functioning capacities are quite interesting when applied to separated states seeing as scholars frequently make judgements about their viability after independence.

Hendrix (2010) discusses state capacity in relation to civil conflict and shares the understanding that accommodation through the redistribution of power and resources, incorporating opposition within the political party system etc. is an aspect of a state's capacity to curb dissent. Being a somewhat abstract concept, state capacity has indeed been defined in various distinctive ways which again makes operationalization challenging. Hendrix

elaborates three theoretical definitions of the term. One emphasizes military capacity, another give priority to bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and the third definition focus on political institutions and their respective coherence and quality. He further assesses the utility of these theoretical notions by examining a series of variables extracted from various datasets frequently used in the literature. These variables are then subjected to a factor analysis. Three substantial dimensions are identified; rational legality, rentier-autocraticness and neopatrimonialism. He concludes that measures concerning the capacity to generate revenue and quality of institutional bureaucracy are best suited to operationalize state capacity. The best corresponding measure is found to be total taxes as a proportion of the gross domestic product, essentially because effective revenue generation is what states need in order to accomplish and pursue any policy goals. This corresponds to the logic proposed earlier, as higher levels of revenue extraction requires the compliance of the citizenry. The citizenry is more likely to supply this if the state's authority is perceived as legitimate. It is worth noting that the measures put forth by Hendrix are examined in the context of rebellions and conflict onset. However, this is a construct validity issue. How properly such a variable fits an empirical model depends on the actual research question and how it matches the theoretical concept needed to propose causal connections (Hendrix 2010; Young 2009). Measures of revenue generation has been found relevant in the previously mentioned literature on human rights and repression and state capacity is considered a robust predictor of human rights as well as having a positive impact on it (Englehart 2009: 164, 168). State capacity in the context of civil war is not that different from the context of human rights and repression as the concept's notions of power and legitimacy are relevant to both. It is therefore included in my model.

2.6 Hypotheses

Drawing on the theoretical aspects and arguments put forth so far, I construct twelve hypotheses which makes out six proposals for two types of repression. Concerning the debate on separation in general, I construct two competing proposals; one assuming a negative relationship and the other assuming a positive relationship. I use these two competing proposals since there is still considerable disagreement about the outcomes of separations in general and because their relation to human rights violations is not yet taken much into consideration. Consequently, I can expect a relationship where the impact on human rights could go both ways; both negative and positive.

Those arguing against separations continuously emphasize the possibility that these phenomena exacerbate and endanger post-conflict human welfare (Sambanis 2000; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2009; Kumar 1997; Etzioni 1992-1993; Horowitz 2003). This logic implies that human rights respect will remain low after separation, suggesting that this fragmentation of the state and upheaval of political order serves as a mechanism which endangers these rights. Because of this mechanism, repression occurs as a result of the new states' failure and inability to consolidate stability and bring about a new political order:

H₁: States formed by separation are worse in terms of physical integrity rights

H₂: States formed by separation are worse in terms of civil liberties

On the other hand, the logic of the pro-separation scholars imply that human rights respect might increase¹⁵ since hostile groups are separated and more inhibited from fighting each other (Kaufmann 1996; 1998; Mearsheimer & Van Evera 1995; Chapman & Roeder 2007). Again, at least in theory and from a self-determination perspective, newly formed states ought to be in a better position to provide security for their own people. The creation of a new state for a designated group entails a mechanism where repression is low because of the new found freedom from hostile or discriminatory rule as well as the interest of having a political order based on legitimacy and accountability:

H₃: States formed by separation are better in terms of physical integrity rights

H₄: States formed by separation are better in terms of civil liberties

There is of course also the possibility of a third outcome where there is no systematic relationship; no significant positive or negative direction is the null hypothesis. This would suggest that separations have little convincing relevance when it comes to explaining human rights respect.

Thus, the results will determine if the human rights aspect of the debate on the effects of separations favors one side or the other (or neither). If the results show a negative relationship, then they consequently show support to the anti-separation camp and *vice versa*.

¹⁵ Again, the pro-separation camp does not explicitly address human rights. However, as they deem separation to be a sustainable solution compared to continued and unresolved conflict, human rights would stand a better chance in a post-separation scenario by their reasoning.

This way, the debate is hopefully enrichened by new insights which could give us a better understanding of the effects of these formations and the consequences of self-determination. Notably, these hypotheses treat secession and partition as one, emphasizing the angle that both constitute the creation of new political units.

I will test more specifically the implications of Kaufmann's (1996; 1998) and Mearsheimer & Van Evera's (1995) argument that ethnic hostilities will discontinue as successor states becomes more homogenously ethnic states after separation. As there is supposedly less ethnic fractionalization after separation, there ought to be weaker incentives for repression as the new state's now dominant ethnic group is no longer threatened by other groups. In other words, less sources of ethnic contention would imply less repression. I will put these theoretical assumptions to the test by investigating how the level of ethnic fractionalization in separated and non-separated states affect repression. These hypotheses are related to H_1 - H_4 , but they expect an interaction effect where the level of ethnic fractionalization in separated states affect levels of repression:

*H*₅: In terms of physical integrity rights, non-separated states are likely to be more repressive than separated states as ethnic fractionalization increases

*H*₆: In terms of civil liberties, non-separated states are likely to be more repressive than separated states as ethnic fractionalization increases

Recalling the discussion on whether partitions and secessions should rather be studied individually than as one, I put forth the seventh and eighth hypothesis. Based on O'Leary's (2007) argument that partitions and secessions are considerably different phenomena, I wish to examine whether there is any systematic difference of impact between separation cases typically categorized as secessions and those typically categorized as partitions. The hypotheses follow O'Leary's reasoning that partition as an instrument to end civil war is often imposed by external powers, and that secessionists often base their cause on regaining their formerly established territorial status. This suggests different mechanisms of impact on human rights. Human rights and repression are not topics in O'Leary's work and consequently he does not make any assumptions on this, but if there is indeed a significant divergence in the respective impacts of partition and secession on human rights, it would

somewhat highlight his argument, possibly providing some critique to the combined approach. I assume it is plausible that succeeding secessionists have a better chance at building legitimacy than a partition solution since the latter is more of an imposed and externally influenced incident. It is possible that after all such a fresh cut is more disruptive than a secession since states that emerge from secessions (regardless of intentions and process) ought to be more territorially and politically adjusted to their citizens. Also, independence-seekers have at least envisaged a supposedly better future. In other words, secessionists should be more interested in being accountable to their citizens, secessionists that are truly fighting for their own people should, following this logic, not be in the business of repressing them. Since the "fresh cut" of a partition appears more arbitrary, a partition cannot to the same degree as a secession be expected to provide the same notion of legitimacy in the new state. This implies a mechanism where secessionists, being the new rulers, should have a better starting point as the new state represents their endeavor which gives comparatively stronger incentives¹⁶ to provide good or at least relatively better human rights respect. I can therefore expect partition-cases to score lower on human rights than secessioncases:

*H*₇: Cases of partition are likely to be worse than cases of secessions in terms of physical integrity rights

H₈: Cases of partition are likely to be worse than cases of secessions in terms of civil liberties

Since there is little research and few theoretical guidelines for these hypotheses to rely on, this proposed relationship between human rights and secessions and partitions in particular can only be built on what is implied by the two phenomena's differences (as laid out by O'Leary). These hypotheses require further specification of the combined partition-secession variable into each separate subgroup. The classification for these two separation subgroups are described and discussed in the methods chapter.

As noted earlier, Tir (2005) explicitly address the effects of whether the breakup was nonviolent, for instance by means of a referendum, agreement and similar processes, or if the

¹⁶ This being said, the well-being of their people may not necessarily be the secessionists' true agenda in every case. Although the goals and nature of separatist groups is a related but somewhat different research topic, this is a notion to bear in mind when analyzing the outcomes of separations.

breakup was violent. I expect states formed in violent contexts such as civil war to be more repressive and have worse human rights respect than those formed peacefully. As implied before, the literature frequently emphasizes the negative and disruptive aftermath of violent conflict and Tir (2005) shows how violent separations produce a post-conflict environment that is violence-prone. And since human rights violations are often connected to conflict (Hafner-Burton 2014), I intend to test whether a violent or non-violent process of state formation by separation affects the post-war human rights respect in these states. This implies a mechanism where non-violent separations ought to establish a more conceivable and stable political order that can consolidate the development of good human rights respect whereas a violent separation most likely leaves behind a frail and war-torn state that cannot effectively secure good human rights as institutions and political order are in disarray. As well, the new rulers (for example an armed rebel group) may not be sufficiently fit to govern and consequently need to repress in order to maintain their fragile position. I will therefore include the following hypotheses testing this relationship:

*H*₉: Violent separations are likely to show worse post-war human rights respect than nonviolent separations in terms of physical integrity rights

H_{10} : Violent separations are likely to show worse post-war human rights respect than nonviolent separations in terms of civil liberties

These hypotheses involve further differentiation among the cases and a specified variable denoting the case's violent or non-violent status. The principles determining the status of each case, and which cases that are included, are discussed in the methods chapter (3.0).

The final hypotheses test the theoretical assumptions of state capacity in the context of separated states. State capacity is a complex concept, but the main idea is that states with high levels of state capacity are characterized by good institutions and a bureaucracy capable of considerable tax revenue generation. Operationalized in terms of tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product, it is meant to measure how well-functioning a state is. In relative terms, a strong state wields the authority to effectively generate revenue through taxes. This requires compliance from the state's citizens and fosters a mutual interest where both the state and its citizens can except to gain from each other. States capable of this should not have the need to apply repression. Drawing on these theoretical guidelines, higher levels of state

capacity are assumed to have a positive¹⁷ linear effect on human rights as this mechanism enables the authorities to accommodate socio-political opposition, thereby reducing the "need" for repression, and make better policy options more available. Can separated states benefit from higher levels of state capacity more than non-separated states? Or, in other words, how does this "medicine" against repression work for separated states versus nonseparated states? Seeing as these states have been born out of the desires and political ambitions of self-determination, they ought to enjoy good internal legitimacy; their citizens being more content with a state that represents them in a better way than the former state. This compliance and cohesion should serve as a good basis from which to build a strong state. Perhaps separated states therefore would exhibit a generally stronger effect of state capacity on repression than the other states. This validates the following hypotheses:

H_{11} : Separated states are less repressive than non-separated states in terms of physical integrity rights as state capacity increases

 H_{12} : Separated states are less repressive than non-separated states in terms of civil liberties as state capacity increases

In general, I expect the concept of state capacity to be relevant in the study of new states. Testing this relationship would give an impression of whether the state capacity concept applies to new separated states as well. If the proposed mechanism is true for separated states, it would indicate if they are sufficiently able to develop an effective revenue-generating apparatus that promote respect for human rights. Adding state capacity to the equation should give us an impression of whether separations, on average, manage to build strong states or not compared to other states. This again gives some more empirical input to the debate on selfdetermination.

¹⁷ Of course, one should bear in mind that some states could intentionally use their high levels of state capacity to violate human rights, but on average, it has previously been found that weak states repress more than strong states (Englehart 2009: 177).

3.0 Method and research design

In this chapter, I present and explain the thesis' methodological framework and the research design. I start with a discussion on which cases to use in the analysis before moving on to a short description of the final dataset and the main data sources. I then present my variables while discussing operationalization issues. I also describe some time-series issues and, after that, I present and discuss the ordered logistic regression model.

3.1 Case selection – which and why

As mentioned, scholars on the subject have used somewhat different criteria concerning what cases should be included when analyzing separation and the sub-categories partition and secession. Empirical results are frequently sensitive to adjustments and the number of observations inherently affects the results. Cases are included and omitted based on what the disparate theoretical viewpoints define and regards as a relevant case, not to mention the importance of when the starting year for each case is set. This is altogether not too surprising. For example, Kaufmann (1998) and Sambanis (2000) employ different methods, different cases, different time-span and different classifications. Especially the issue of case selection and classification demands attention.

I use mostly the same cases as both Sambanis (2000) and Kaufmann (1996; 1998) in order to stay connected with the academic literature. The works of these scholars are the primary reference-points for which cases to include, because these cases are chiefly at the core of the literature and the accompanying debate. They have been tried, tested and consequently identified as separations. I do, however, expand this list of cases. As laid out in the theory chapter, I will include both violent and peaceful instances of separation. This means either a violent process (a conflict background) or peaceful process leading to separation. The established cases of peaceful separation builds on a list from Tir (2005). I also add new cases that have occurred after the core publications discussed in the theory and literature chapter (see Appendix 7.1). These inclusions, in addition to peaceful cases, enables more fine-grained analyses from which to infer.

There is, however, some points regarding case-selection that requires further consideration. First, there are colonial cases. Such cases also constitute independence and the birth of new states, undeniably sharing some similarities with cases of secession and partition. These shared similarities further complicate the case classifications and thus require some conceptual elaboration. Kaufmann (1998) does not assess cases of decolonization. He argues that, in general, the inhabitants of colonies were never part of the metropolitan state and the colonists are more viewed as foreigners than as a local ethnic group. This implies a different historical background, a different political configuration and large distances between the center and periphery. Sambanis (2000), being an empirical response to Kaufmann's arguments, also omits colonial cases. As mentioned, I will try to stay in line with the rest of the literature because this makes the results more relevant and comparable. Still, I will use overseas decolonization cases as a control variable. This way, I account more for the variation in all other states that are not classified as separation cases. If these non-separated states are heterogeneous, collapsing them into one variable could obscure differences between these states and separation cases. I use the Colonial History Data Set to designate which states that are overseas decolonization cases (see Appendix 7.3). This delimitation is needed as this data set codes colonial cases a far way back in history (Hensel 2014). I therefore only include cases of decolonization after 1945, beyond what is referred to as the first wave of decolonization (Shipway 2008). Interestingly, this dataset also codes cases on independence type by partition and secession. I will therefore use Hensel's configuration from the Colonial History Data Set as a robustness test to my own analysis.

State name	Year of separation and as	Separation process	Separation type ¹⁹				
	new political unit ¹⁸	new political unit ¹⁸					
Armenia	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Azerbaijan	1991	Violent	Secession				
Bangladesh	1972	Violent	Secession				
Belarus	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Bosnia	1992	Non-violent	Secession				
China	1949	Violent	Partition				
Croatia	1991	Violent	Secession				
Cyprus	1974	Violent	Partition				
East Germany	1949	Violent	Partition				
East Timor	2002	Violent	Secession				
Eritrea	1993	Violent	Secession				
Estonia	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Georgia	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Kazakhstan	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Kosovo	2008	Violent	Secession				
Kyrgyzstan	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Latvia	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Lithuania	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Macedonia	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Moldova	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Montenegro	2006	Non-violent	Secession				
North Korea	1948 (1953) ²⁰	Violent	Partition				
North Vietnam	1954	Violent	Partition				
Slovakia ²¹	1993	Non-violent	Secession				
Slovenia	1991	Violent	Secession				
South Korea	1948 (1953)	Violent	Partition				
South Sudan	2011	Violent	Secession				
South Vietnam	1955	Violent	Partition				
Taiwan	1949	Violent	Partition				
Tajikistan	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Turkmenistan	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Ukraine	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
Uzbekistan	1991	Non-violent	Secession				
West Germany	1949	Violent	Partition				

Table 3: All separations, year as new political unit and whether it was a peaceful or violent separation (alphabetical)

¹⁸ Starting year is the first registered year in the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2015) except for Cyprus and the Koreas (Sambanis 2000), and West and East Germany (Rich 2003).

¹⁹ These cases are all assessed in the broader literature on separations. Source for determining partition is O'Leary (2007). Sources for determining secession are Tir (2005), Suny (2011), Roberts (2007), Weller (2009), LeRiche & Arnold (2013), O'Leary (2007), Sambanis (2000), Plakans (2011), Wilson (2011), Gleditsch & Ward (1999) and Gleditsch et al (2002).

²⁰ The concluding year of the Korean partition when the war ended (Sambanis 2000; Buzo 2002).

²¹ The separation type for Czechoslovakia is a bit difficult to assess. The Czech part was the hegemon of the federation although, admittedly, it is not easy to point out which is the successor state as the federation was dissolved by vote. Nevertheless, both Tir (2005) and O'Leary (2007) characterize the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as a secession or a "double secession". Indeed, Slovakia did enjoy a (quasi-)independent status from Czechoslovakia during World War II and the effort for self-determination was prominent before the break-up as well as in previous times (Kirschbaum 2005; Teich, Kováč & Brown 2011).

Table 3 shows the number and names of cases, the starting year as new political unit (gained independence), whether the state formation was non-violent or violent and type of separation. The cases are named after the successor state, since the new states are the main subjects of analysis. Hence, the case is named East Timor instead of, for instance, Indonesia-East Timor, which denotes the dyad for rump and successor state. As the table shows, I analyze 33 cases of separation in total. Notably, the former Soviet republics make up a good share of these. Sambanis (2000: 459) exclude partition cases such as Vietnam, China-Taiwan and the Koreas (except for in his robustness tests) because his focus is mainly on ethnic separation and not ideological separations. I, on the other hand, must include these cases for a more extensive testing of the partition concept proposed by O'Leary (2007) and because some cases may harbor both ethnic and ideological aspects.

3.2 Brief presentation of main data sources used in my new dataset

For my thesis, I have constructed a dataset that includes data from Polity IV, CIRI, Freedom House, the World Bank Development Indicators, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the ICOW Colonial History Dataset, the Ethnic Power Relations dataset, data on relative political capabilities and data on United Nations peacekeeping mandates. The temporal and spatial domain of which inferences can be drawn comprises all independent states in the period 1972 -2014 that have available and sufficient data. A useful fundament for my dataset is the annual time-series provided by Polity IV. It covers a quite large period, from 1800 to 2014. It is among the most widely used data on regimes and characteristics of democracy and autocracy, covering 167 states (as of 2014), both historical and contemporary ones. The data measures changes in polities and regime characteristics over time. To ensure consistency and reliability, the data is reviewed, updated and revised periodically. As the data covers a long period of time and many countries, it makes a reasonable data fundament in my new dataset for which to add the other mentioned data sources. I use a modified version of the Polity-scale, which I describe later, from this data set (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2015).

3.3 The dependent variable

The CIRI dataset measures human rights violations and covers 202 countries over the period 1981-2011. These data aim to measure the government's actual human rights practices²² in

²² Such aspects are especially important considering that, for example, newly separated state may need to appear considerate of their citizens in order to be deemed legitimate. Thus, their exclaimed practices are not sufficient to judge their respect for human rights. Naturally this goes for other types of states as well.

each country-year and, notably, not their stated policies (what they claim to be doing) or a more extensive measure allowing for non-state actors²³. The measures are based on reports from both the United States Department of State and Amnesty International. This cross-check is meant to mitigate the possibility of bias in the United States Department of State reports on US allies. The physical integrity index, measured on an ordinal level, is meant to say something about the approximate frequency of violations as opposed to a specific and accurate number of violations. This follows a methodological reasoning; the ordinal level is assumed to be more in accordance to the available information on human rights violations where accurate numbers of violations are rare. This way, the ordinal level allows for the measurement errors that the qualitative and standardized assessments used for coding may produce (Cingranelli & Richards 2010: 406; Cingranelli, Richards & Clay 2014).

Freedom House also provide data on human rights. Their data cover the years 1972-2014 and 195 countries. The data focus on civil liberties, political rights and freedom enjoyed by individuals. Both law and real practices influence the ratings given to each country, but that does not mean these aspects are considered the same; their methodology focus on evaluating the actual rights of individuals as they are observed in the real world, acknowledging that these are shaped by governments as well as non-state agents. Scores are affected by conditions and events within each country. Ratings are guided by a series of checklist questions. For their civil liberties scale, these checks concern among other things freedom of expression and belief, rights of association, rule of law and individual rights and autonomy. The Freedom House data has been gathered for quite some time and some changes have been made in order to stay in touch with new developments regarding ideas of human rights and freedom. However, previously collected data is not subjected to revision (Freedom House 2015; Freedom House 2016). Nonetheless, these data are frequently used as time-series (Armstrong II 2011: 653).

Violation of physical integrity rights measured by CIRI and violation of civil liberties measured by Freedom House are both types of repression; each constitute a specific tactic or aspect of repression (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay 2014; Freedom House 2015; Freedom House 2016). Two types of repression need two separate measures of repression although in a

²³ I could have applied the Political Terror Scale as an alternative measure of physical integrity rights instead of CIRI, but these data measure overall conditions which also captures repression outside governmental practice (Wood & Gibney 2010). This thesis focus on the repressive behavior of separated states and what political order the governments of these provide, but that is not to say that overall conditions and human rights violations in general are not important for such a topic.

conceptual and general sense they constitute one dependent variable; comprehensive repression in itself. Therefore, even though I use two dependent variables in a statistical manner, I still study one dependent variable in an overall conceptual manner.

I use the physical integrity index provided by CIRI as one of the two measures meant to capture repression. The index ranges from 0 to 8 where higher cumulative values represent higher levels of repression (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay 2014). There is, however, one quite important thing to bear in mind, especially when interpreting regression results. The data have been criticized for using scales that does not sufficiently differentiate between extensive and low human rights violations. In other words, two countries sharing the exact same score (which puts them in the same "class") may exhibit quite different numbers of actual violations. Thus, one ordinal level represents substantial variation. One given example of criticism is that this equates torturing 51 people with torturing 3001; this range still gets the same score on the scale. There is no doubt that this is a problematic issue, but some delineation is needed when the accuracy of the available information is dubious at times (Cingranelli & Richards 2010: 408). This makes a case for using an ordinal scale, but the most important consequence of this is that one should exercise some caution when comparing results and making statements on levels of repression.

The civil liberties scale constructed by Freedom House provides a different measure of repression compared to CIRI. Originally, the scale (ranging from 1 to 7) assigns a score of 1 to the countries with best human rights conditions and 7 to the ones with the worst conditions and consequently most repressive. I have reversed the scales for the purposes of a more intuitive interpretation of the results. This way, a higher score means better civil liberties and lower scores implies relatively worse conditions for civil liberties. However, there is an inevitable level of subjectivity that comes with the evaluation of such repression which affects the assigning of these values. This is of course one aspect that may attract some criticism. Freedom House openly admits it. But the many experts and advisers and the diverse range of sources that ultimately produce these scores hopefully mitigate the worst problems of subjectivity and bias (Freedom House 2015; Freedom House 2016).

The main measurement differences between these two variables, even though they are both ordinal, lies in their assessment on degrees of repression. As laid out before, CIRI ultimately rely on qualitative information regarding the frequency of physical integrity violations, or in other words, an assessment of the instances of such violations. This involves setting a

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numerical violation threshold which are fitted to an ordinal measurement ranking, although this threshold is rarely applicable in practice since fully reliable estimates are hard to come by. The values are therefore the results of a mixed approach (Cingranelli & Richards 2010: 407). Freedom House, on the other hand, base ordinal scores on a checklist standard that evaluate different aspects of civil liberties and the conditions that regulate them (Freedom House 2015). I only point this out to illustrate how both repression variables handle the potential variation and severity of repression in somewhat different ways, but the important thing is that both measures are able to differentiate between better or worse human rights records. Together, they provide a broad concept of repression as they measure different repression tactics. This is a useful approach since one may assume that different states could apply repressive tactics differently (Davenport 2007a; Davenport 2007b).

	Civil I	Liberties						
Physical Integrity Rights	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total
0	90	50	48	35	26	1	0	250
1	51	72	52	61	31	0	0	267
2	53	77	93	78	45	16	0	362
3	77	79	124	76	57	22	3	438
4	69	85	197	130	100	68	7	656
5	40	84	160	117	164	95	29	689
6	10	69	139	117	131	144	77	687
7	4	45	68	59	102	230	312	820
8	0	15	43	23	50	155	448	734
Total	394	576	924	696	706	731	876	4,903
Correlation				0.61				

Table 4: Two-way cross tabulation of Physical Integrity Rights and Civil Liberties (Country-years 1981-2011)

A look at Table 4 reveals that a lot of the observations are centered around the middle values and the values slightly above. Thus, the distribution shows that the two types of repression often occur with somewhat the same frequency. There are, for example, few extreme observations where there are severe restrictions on civil liberties that also show full respect for physical integrity rights. Although, interestingly, there are indeed some remarkable patterns. Some observations with good, relatively speaking, civil liberties conditions show relatively bad respect for physical integrity rights and vice versa. Using both measures captures a broad concept of repression but they also enable us to uncover any noteworthy discrepancies. Whilst the measures are related, they do not overlap too much and thus constitute separate measures.

3.4 Main independent variables

The main independent variable for the first four hypotheses denotes if a state has been formed by a separation or not. More specifically, this distinction is made by creating a dichotomous variable where observations of such new states are given the value of 1 whereas the remaining states make out the reference category and are therefore given the value 0. The effect of separation must therefore be interpreted as relative to other states that are not cases of overseas decolonization (the latter has its own separate dummy). This simple dummy variable is a good starting point and merely a first step of the analysis. This ought to give a first impression of whether there exists a systematic difference between these types of states or not. Being a dichotomous measure, this first-step of operationalization is also about as far as comparable previous studies have explored the topic (Mitchell & McCormick 1988).


For the subsequent analysis, I construct three individual variables that measure time since independence for separated states, older states²⁴ (independent before 1945) and decolonized states respectively. I also construct one similar variable that encompasses all these three formations and use it as a control variable in the other models. These variables are used to capture the effect that time after becoming independent has on the development of human rights respect. As Mitchell & McCormick (1988) suggests, new states may need some time to develop stability and political order. I expect time since independence to exhibit an exponential decay effect on repression and therefore modify these variables accordingly. As such, the effect is non-linear as time elapses; the temporal distance from independence is influential for a while until it begins to decline. I apply this operationalization because I do not expect time since independence to yield an increasingly stronger effect on repression. The decay function is modelled like this:

$$\beta = exp\left((-1\frac{t}{3})\right)$$

 β is the regression coefficient, the effect of time on repression, and *t* is time since independence measured in years elapsed after separation. I compute every third year as the

²⁴ I call system members that gained independence before 1945 older states or established independent states, the wording is simply used as a parsimonious term to distinguish them from separated states and colony cases and an implication that there might differences among these three types of state formation in terms of repression and other factors.

decay rate or "rate of change", meaning that the effect on repression is halved (the initial value) each time after three years. First at three years, again at six years, nine years and so on. Decay functions like this has been utilized in the conflict literature before in order to model the impact of temporal aspects (Raknerud & Hegre 1997: 393). The following example, showing the United States of America, illustrates the difference between a linear variable that counts each year of independence, accumulation, versus an exponential decay trend.



Graph 2: Two different effects of time, simple linear and exponential decay. Example shows the United States of America

For the fifth and sixth hypothesis, I use an interaction-term consisting of the separationdummy mentioned above and a variable for ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al 2003). The ethnic fractionalization variable is also used as a standard control variable in all my statistical models. I therefore describe and discuss this variable in further detail under the "control variables" section (3.5).

As for the seventh and eighth hypothesis, testing for any differences among separation cases identified as partition and those identified as secession, I construct a dummy-variable

denoting if a separation was a partition or a secession. Recalling the theoretical discussion about classifying cases (O'Leary 2007), this is not necessarily a simple task, and frankly, coding such a variable involves a certain degree of arbitrariness. A proper classification demands that I go over each and every case, but this would result in a very lengthy historiographic assessment. I am therefore more inclined to be guided by the scholars' classification preferences although the secession and partition terms are used interchangeably more than once. My relatively broad set of criteria for coding a separation as a secession are as follows:

- The new state has had a former status as independent state or autonomy

- The new state was formerly subjected to another state than the rump state (for example, ruled by a different colonial power)

One or more of these criteria must be met. As mentioned earlier, these are the most inclusive conditions for coding secessions and they fit my new cases, the peaceful secession cases I have added and the violent cases used in the literature. The partition versus secession-aspect is the most difficult to handle. As laid out before, the classification preferences are at odds with each other. For example, O'Leary (2007: 897) maintain that only four of Sambanis' (2000) cases are indisputably partitions. These are Cyprus, Palestine, India²⁵ and the Azerbaijan case which actually means the de facto separation of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992, not the Sovietbreakup in 1991(Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2012; Suny 2011). Of these, I only have data for Cyprus, India (as well as Pakistan) and Azerbaijan, but not Nagorno-Karabakh. The fragmentations of the communist federations are thus considered to be secessions (O'Leary 2007: 898). Partition-cases are in other words few, so in order to test this relationship, I am more or less restricted to using O'Leary's (2007) cases of partition. As mentioned, this also involves the ideological ones.

Consequently, the variable is made up of 11^{26} states coded as 1 for partitions. The rest, classified as secessions, is coded 0 as the point of reference (see Table 3 for a list of these). Note that this specific distinction between types of state separations are only maintained for

²⁵ Sambanis (2000 :448) code a civil war with partition in India from 1946 to 1948. The partition took place in 1947, leading to the independence of India and Pakistan. The conflict over Kashmir followed. Although a partition did take place, one might argue that this specific case is more a case of decolonization, since this event signaled the departure of the British (Wolpert 2004: 351-353). I therefore only include India and Pakistan when analyzing Sambanis' (2000) specific case setup. Indeed, the ICOW Colonial History Dataset codes this event as a case of decolonization (Hensel 2014).

²⁶ 11 cases in total as I run regressions with and without India and Pakistan as well for comparison.

H₇ and H₈. Secessions and partitions are treated as one, namely separations, for all the other hypotheses.

For H₇ and H₈, I construct a variable that differentiate between peaceful and violent separations (see Table 3 for a list of these). As maintained in the literature, the presence of conflict affects human rights (Hafner-Burton 2014; Poe et al 1999). There are several ways of modelling this effect and the operationalization depends on what really makes a separation peaceful or violent. Coding a case as a violent separation could be based on more than one aspect. For example, a separation can be characterized as violent if there was conflict, such as civil war, prior to the formation of the new state and the separation was forced by a rebel group. But even a peaceful separatist endeavor could be marked by violence in the case of one-sided, primarily government, violence (such as massacres in response to demonstrations). I choose to code violent separations based on the presence of conflict *before* independence. The separation was a violent one if both of these criteria are met:

- There was conflict 10 years prior to and/or up to the very year of independence

- Territorial claims were made by an armed group seeking independence

The second criterion does not apply to partitions²⁷. I base my classifications on information and data from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset which codes any territorial claims/incompatibility, the contested territory, years of conflict and the combatants involved. The lower threshold for coding armed conflict is 25 deaths a year (Gleditsch et al 2002). The ten-year interval might seem arbitrary, but a more or less modest number of years must be set; too many years makes a large gap between independence and conflict, but too few years may exclude any effect of long on-going conflicts. This is an interval that allows for the effect of any latent tensions and intractable hostilities (although they may fade over time) that falls short of the recorded conflict threshold for each year.

Following Hendrix (2010), I use tax revenue as a proportion or percentage of GDP, which is meant to measure an economic and institutional dimension, as the state-capacity variable to test H_9 and H_{10} . There are several data sources to choose from and these data also differ somewhat in operationalization. Revenue indicators like total taxes/ GDP are commonly used

²⁷ Sambanis (2000), of course, codes conflict for Cyprus, the Koreas and the Vietnams. UCDP does the same. Other sources also document and confirm that these partitions were connected to conflict and thus violent separations (Buzo 2002; Anderson 2002;). The backdrop that codes the German partition as violent is of course the Second World War (Rich 2003).

in political science (Hendrix 2010). The World Bank, for instance, can provide such data. Regrettably, the total taxes/GDP (or tax revenue as a percentage of GDP) measure from the World Bank Development Indicators covers only the 1990-2014 period. Data prior to 1990 are missing (The World Bank 2016). Another drawback in basic data such as these is that they cannot distinguish between states' levels of administrative sophistication. Some states may have well developed bureaucracies while others can extract the same amount of taxes in more crude and direct ways. As exemplified by Hendrix; Sweden, Algeria and Lesotho are quite different countries, but they all have average values for total taxes/GDP around 31% (Hendrix 2010: 279).

There is a measure called "relative political extraction" first developed by Kugler and Arbetmann (1997) which is meant to alleviate some of the problems with basic tax measures. This measure is the ratio of actual tax revenue to the predicted tax revenue. The measure captures the influence of several factors on tax collection, such as the proportions of exports and mining, thereby accounting for the composition of the state's economy. This measure is, however not free from certain flaws. Even though it captures the influence of non-tax sources, there are still countries that rely much on non-tax revenue sources, thus having lower incentives to invest in efficient monitoring capacities and tax compliance policy. Another drawback by using this measure is that it does not have observations for separation cases like Kosovo, South Sudan, Montenegro and East Timor (Kugler & Tammen 2012). Evidently, each measure has its pros and cons. That being said, relative political extraction is arguably a more theoretically developed measure and it has indeed been recommended as one of the better measures for state capacity (Hendrix 2010: 279, 283).

Relative political extraction is operationalized thus: states that collect actual taxes close to predicted taxes holds values close to 1, whilst states that collect twice as much as predicted consequently has values around 2. It follows that if relative political extraction exceeds 1, the government can be deemed politically capable and strong as it is able to collect more than what one may expect from the economic conditions the government is in. When relative political extraction is lower than 1, the government may be considered to be weaker and less politically capable as it is unable to collect its expected tax revenue. It follows that when the ratio achieves unity, when actual and predicted tax revenue is about the same, the government displays average performance (Kugler & Tammen 2012; Benson & Kugler 1998).

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3.5 Control variables

The research on repression has identified several control variables that are frequently related to repression. Among these are various measures of democracy, economy, conflict and size of population (Hill Jr. & Jones 2014: 661). In line with the literature, I also include these variables to avoid spurious correlations.

Whilst total population and various economic measures are indeed considered to be fairly standard control variables, there is also a more substantial rationale for including them; some modernization scholars theorize that the socio-economic tensions stemming from large and poor populations demands more need for order and control. At the same time, economic wellbeing is often linked to political stability. Additionally, a good economy can help pacify opposition by raising opportunity costs and reducing competition for resource-allocation. But on the other side, fast rates of growth may yet again destabilize a society. There are many proposed links between these factors, but the most important thing will be to control for them (Davenport 2007b: 495; Huntington 1968; Englehart 2009: 170). GDP per capita and the population data are all gathered from the World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank. Economic indicators are in current US dollars (The World Bank 2016). I operationalize these variables in terms of natural logarithms. It has been remarked that human rights data like CIRI may be sensitive to population size as these data are based partly on events of abuse. This means that more populous states have more interaction between people which again gives potential for more abuse-opportunities. Thus the use of natural logarithms to reduce this potential bias (Englehart 2009: 170).

Including a measure of democracy would seem almost mandatory in the study of state repression. Much of the repression literature focus on democracy and democratization and the concept is indeed closely linked to repression (Davenport & Inman 2012). Controlling for this effect is therefore quite important in order to avoid any spurious effects indicating that the dependent variable depends more on democracy levels. The combined Polity-index (polity2) intended to measure democracy and autocracy ranges from -10 to +10 (21 points) where -10 is given to full autocracies and +10 is given to full democracies. Mixed regimes consequently lies around the center. The index is made up of five components; the variables XCONST measuring constraints on chief executive, XRCOMP measuring competitiveness of executive recruitment, XROPEN measuring openness of executive recruitment, PARCOMP measuring competitiveness of political participation and PARREG which measures regulation of

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political participation (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2015). It is argued, however, that the coding of the last two variables (PARCOMP and PARREG) makes it problematic to utilize the Polity-index when researching civil war and related issues (Vreeland 2008). This is because the coding guidance to these variables refers directly to civil war and political violence; when these phenomena occur, the observations are coded as anocracies (middle values). Thus, when there are incidences of political violence, otherwise democratic and autocratic states are placed at the center of the index. Following Vreeland (2008), I utilize a modified Polity-index ranging from -6 to +7 which omits the PARCOMP and PARREG components, thus making the new index free of any obvious references to conflict. It is still intended to be a measure of democracy although, unfortunately, this does indeed leave out the participation and election aspects of the overall democracy measure (Vreeland 2008: 415).

To control for all civil war in all states, I use a binary indicator from the UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset that records the presence or absence of conflict with at least 25 deaths for every country-year between 1946 and 2014 (Pettersson & Wallensteen 2015; Gleditsch et al 2002). This controls for the effects of conflict on repression (Hafner-Burton 2014; Poe et al 1999). This variable should also control for initially peaceful separations that experienced conflict after independence. This is important seeing as some separations might have been peaceful up to the very point of independence, but for some cases the newfound independence quickly deteriorates into a more conflict-prone environment when there is too much political instability. The case of Georgia is illustrative for some of these issues. Even though the very separation from the Soviet Union was peaceful enough, it did not take long before the new state found itself in conflict with the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia (Rayfield 2012). Thus, violence accompanied the immediate aftermath. Scholars of repression (Hafner-Burton 2014; Poe et al 1999) often point to the strong relationship between conflict and repression and I find it plausible that such a "bad start" for a new state would have some impact on human rights. It is therefore desirable to apply this control variable that, at least in theory, captures the effect of all civil war before and after separation. This way, violence beyond the proximal limit set for the separation-process variable (violent or non-violent separations) for H₄ is accounted for. However, it is important to exercise some caution when using this control variable. There is after all a possibility for reciprocal causality if, say, severe repression has actually lead to civil war. It is therefore necessary to test and compare results where this variable is omitted.

Ethnic cleavages and the proposed importance of these constitute a prominent part of the literature on separation. As laid out in the theory chapter, there is a discussion on whether separations create ethnically homogenous states or not and if any hostilities between groups are redeemed by this or if new cleavages arise (Kaufmann 1996; 1998; Sambanis 2000, Horowitz 2003). It would therefore be wise to include a control variable that accounts for a state's ethnic composition in order to control for its impact on repression. There are various measures to choose from. The ethno-linguistic fractionalization measure estimates the probability that two individuals in a population, when selected randomly, belongs to different ethnic groups. It ranges from 0 to 1 and accounts for the number of groups and their relative size. Values closer to 1 indicate more fractionalization. It has been criticized on several aspects, although it is widely used. One such criticism may be that the index is not changed over time; recordings are made only once and at different times for different states. Thus it must be assumed that the ethnic heterogeneity and its impact is the same or relatively unchanged for every year which again raises the issue of endogeneity (Alesina et al 2003). Another critical point is that this measure does not sufficiently link ethnical divides to political matters and interactions with the state. Variables that measure ethno-political configurations are therefore another applicable alternative. One appealing variable is a measure of the politically excluded population relative to total population (Vogt et al 2015; Wimmer, Cederman & Min 2009). Returning to the fractionalization approach, the ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable could indeed be deemed quite relevant if one considers the emphasis on intractable ethnic hostilities asserted by the pro-separation camp of the separation literature, perhaps most prominently maintained by Kaufmann (1996; 1998). Because of this, I include this fractionalization variable in all the models to control for this theoretical assertion and put it under scrutiny. The importance and impact of these notions will therefore be evaluated by the regression output. I also use the size of the politically excluded population relative to total population as a control variable as this measure links ethnicity more directly to political interactions. After all, Horowitz (2003) maintain that successor states will likely engage in discrimination of minorities. The variable is also more theoretically linked to repression; excluding populations is repressive in itself and if some ethnic groups are kept out by others it is likely to stimulate dissent which again could be answered with repressive measures. A larger excluded population ought therefore to exacerbate this mechanism.

The post-conflict reconstruction facilitated by the UN constitute an external intervention in

domestic affairs that, ideally, helps stabilize a turbulent conflict aftermath (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Controlling for UN-involvement is also done in the separation literature (Sambanis 2000) and we know that such operations have been conducted in many of the relevant cases, for example, Cyprus, Kosovo and East Timor to name a few (Sambanis 2000; Weller 2009; Chopra 2002). I therefore include a control variable meant to capture the effect of UNinvolvement on cases of separation. By involvement I mean peacekeeping forces, police, observers and those operations which are referred to as multidimensional missions. The latter are missions tasked with projects like institutional reform and economic reconstruction (Hegre, Hultman & Nygård 2010). I suspect all such involvement to influence human rights and repression because it is applied to conflict zones in order to alleviate tensions and promote sustainable peace. If the variable returns any significant, not to mention positive, results, this may have important implications for how policymakers choose to deal with any future separations. Many quantitative scholars have operationalized this involvement in terms of a dichotomous variable. Whilst a binary indicator is able to distinguish between cases with or without UN-involvement, such a measurement is still at a high level of aggregation. I rely on data on UN-mandates from Hegre, Hultman & Nygård (2011) and use their yearly mandate expenditures measure in operationalizing the effect of UN-involvement. This variable measures the amount of million US dollars spent in each year of each UN-mandate, but I have recalculated the measure into actuals US dollars²⁸. The data contain observations over a long period of time (from 1948 to 2013), but the yearly expenditures are set in current US dollars. I summarize the mandate expenditures if there are more than one UN-mandate in a country. There are occasional gaps of mostly one year for some of the mandate's expenditure data. I conduct a linear interpolation and extrapolation for the gaps wherever it is sensible. However, I treat gaps exceeding 3 years as missing as I do not think it is prudent to utilize further linear interpolation beyond that range. Any larger interval increases the uncertainty about what values one, theoretically speaking, may assume is reasonable to expect. I include a control variable that isolates the cases of overseas decolonization from the separation cases and other independent states. This allows for a more specified reference group for assessing the relationship between repression and new versus established states. I use the ICOW Colonial History Dataset to designate which states are formed by

decolonization (Hensel 2014). A list of these cases can be found in the Appendix (7.3).

²⁸ This enables the measure to be operationalized in natural logarithms and requires imputing 1 USD for missing or 0-values (no UN-dollars spent). I am, however, aware that this is not a perfect solution to the problem of 0-values.

I also include regional dummy-variables that controls for any effects related to what part of the world a state is situated in. This can be any important characteristics that are prominent in some parts of the world, be they for instance religious or ideological and so on. The variables denote whether a specific state lies in Western Europe and North America, Eastern Europe, Latin-America, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa or North Africa and the Middle East. These indicators are gathered from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer, Cederman & Min 2009). An example of my reasoning; many of my separation cases emerged from the former Communist Federations which situates them in Eastern Europe and links them to a specific ideological backdrop that used to be prominent there (Suny 2011; Tir 2005). Ultimately, the regional dummy variables, or dummy-set, are meant to put further "pressure" on the main independent variable and pick up any effect the other control variables do not pick up. I use North-America and Western Europe as reference category.

I include a lagged dependent variable (lagging both physical integrity rights and civil liberties) as a control variable in the models. I refer to this variable as "past levels of repression". It makes sense to include a lagged dependent variable as I expect that the current level of repression is may be influenced by past levels of repression, especially if states have developed a culture of repression which makes it more likely for repression to be used in the future (Young 2009; Wooldridge 2013). Lastly, I utilize a time-trend variable in order to control for any inherent time-trend in the time-series data. I use this to counter problems of spuriousness caused by unobserved correlating processes over time. For example, two variables may appear to be related simply because they exhibit the same trend. Controlling for time-trends captures trending behavior that is otherwise unaccounted for in the model (Wooldridge 2013). Like Englehart (2009), I operationalize the time-trend variable as year dummies, but do not explicitly display them in the tables to save space.

Table 5: List of variables

Dependent variables	Operationalization	Notes
Physical integrity rights	Ordinal scale, 0-8 (no government	1981-2011
	respect – full government respect)	
Civil liberties	Ordinal scale, 1-7 (few or no civil	Scale reversed from original Freedom
	liberties - wide range of civil liberties)	House data, 1974-2014
Main independent variables	Operationalization	Notes
Separation	1= Separated states (both secession	Hypotheses 1-6, 11 and 12
	and partition)	
	0= Residual states	
Years of independence	Continuous, all years since	Hypotheses 1 -4. Exponential decay-
	independence	function. For each state formation and
		one for all
Type of separation	1= Partition	Hypothesis 7 and 8. Only variable to
	0= Secession	differentiate between separations with
		respect to sub-type
Violent or peaceful separation	1= Violent separation	Hypothesis 9 and 10. Violence and
	0= Peaceful separation	conflict 10 years prior and up to year
		of separation
Relative political extraction	Ratio of actual tax collection to	Hypothesis 11 and 12. Measure of
	predicted tax collection.	state capacity. 1960-2011
	<1 Low state capacity	
	>1 High state capacity	
	=1 Average performance	
Control variables	Operationalization	Notes
Total population size	Log of total population.	
GDP per capita	Log of GDP per capita	Constant US dollars
Democracy/Regime-type	-6 to +7	Modification of the original Polity-
		scale following Vreeland (2008)
UN-involvement	Log of yearly expenditure in US	Includes all available UN-mandates.
	dollars.	
Colony	1= Colony	States with colonial status after 1945
-	0= Independent states	
Civil war	1= Conflict in given year	All intrastate and internationalized
	0=No conflict in given year	intrastate war
Ethnic fractionalization	Ratio from 0.00 to 1.00	
Log of excluded population relative to	Ratio from 0.00 to 1.00	Operationalized in natural logarithms
ethno-politically relevant population		•
Regional dummy-variables	1 if country belongs to region, 0 if not	
Time-trend	Year dummy-variables	
Past repression	Lagged dependent variables	For both physical integrity rights and
Past repression		

Variables	Ν	Mean	Standard deviation	Minium	Maximum
Democracy/Regime-type	6,365	1.591	4.876	-6	7
Physical Integrity Rights	4,904	4.917	2.334	0	8
Civil Liberties	7,640	4.256	1.952	1	7
Ln-Total Population	7,649	15.282	2.204	8.972	21.033
Ln-GDP per capita	6,959	7.699	1.616	4.124	12.173
Ln-UN-expenditure	7,861	0.963	4.092	0	21.696
Time since independence (all)	7,854	0.012	0.069	1.05e-31	0.716
Political Exclusion	6,221	0.17	0.24	0	0.98
Ethnic Fractionalization	7,388	0.44	0.26	0	0.93
Relative Political Extraction	6,044	1.014	0.442	0.094	3.752

Table 6: Summary statistics for categorical and continuous variables (values for country-years 1972-2014)

Table 7: Frequency statistics for dichotomous variables (values for country-years 1972-2014)

Variables	Ν	0	1
Separation	7,888	7,085	803
Separation-type	920	624	296
Separation-process	850	452	398
Decolonization	7861	4,182	3,679
Civil war	6,899	5,740	1,159
W. Europe & N. America	5,407	4,579	828
Eastern Europe	5,407	4,696	711
Asia	5,407	4,621	786
N. Africa & M. East	5,407	4,726	681
Latin America	5,407	4,549	858
Sub-Saharan Africa	5,407	3,855	1,552

3.6 Time-series data

I use time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data in my analysis. This is a way of managing data with numerous repeated observations on specific units over time. Political processes are often found to be dynamic; changes take place over time. By employing methods like these, the social scientist may attempt to identify and map the causes of these fluctuations (Pevehouse & Brozek 2008; Beck 2008). As for the number needed of observations over time, it should be sufficient to give good estimates and to perform the necessary averaging operations. The observations should therefore be many enough to make sense and to serve a substantial purpose. It may be difficult to identify some minimum limit, but larger amounts of observations give better estimates as there is more material to support inferences (Beck 2001).

This analysis' unit of observation is the country-year, which means the units have a temporal and spatial domain; values for each country (state) is observed annually. More specifically, these are country-year observation of all states (separation cases as well as others). Thus, all available states are observed and included in the analysis, but the states formed by separation are the main subjects of inquiry. I believe a time-series approach is especially appropriate for studying incidences like separations. Separation happens at a specific time and the developments following them will indicate which states are characterized by good or bad human rights respect, especially after a longer time-span.

There is one particularly important issue that needs to be dealt with in time-series and that is autocorrelation or statistical dependence. This means that the errors of observations are correlated over time, they are not independent of each other. The standard errors in the regression models is thus reported to be smaller than they are and coefficient will not be estimated correctly. This ultimately has implications when evaluating statistical significance. Employing lagged variables (t-1) removes the autocorrelation problem in most time-series. Clustering standard errors to make them robust can also be done (Wooldridge 2013; Kohler & Kreuter 2012). Lagged values in predictors are used for a conceptual reason as well. Some effects may take time to develop and some state behavior may be conditional to previous state behavior (Baltagi 2011: 131).

3.7 Statistical technique

I choose to use ordered logistic regression because, as mentioned, I seek to measure the extent of repression and not the actual number of incidents. The fact that repression and human rights respect are not measured in exact numbers of incidents but rather scored in a general

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and relative sense makes, as pointed out by Cingranelli and Richards (2010) and Davenport (2007b), ordered logit a reasonable approach. The categories denote a certain relative level (or a degree) of repression, although, these scores are occasionally based on some quantity. In other words, the outcome which is to be measured is of an ordinal nature. The ordered logit model is a type of logistic regression design suited to handle a dependent variable with more than two values. It is ordered in the sense that *y* is an ordinal variable with values that represent an ordered category. This means that the variable's values are hierarchical; higher numerical values on *y* imply more than preceding values since the objective is to measure the *extent* of something. For instance, you may have the categories 1= low, 2= average, 3= high. 3 is higher than 2 and 1 and at the same time more meaningful conceptually and relatively speaking than 2 and 1. This is opposed to a multinomial model where values are numeric but not ordered and thus a given number is not necessarily worth more than any other (Lemeshow 2013: 289; Hamilton 2013: 268).

Logistic regression models, especially ordered logit, are indeed frequently used in the literature on human rights and to some extent the partition and secession literature (Englehart 2009; Bueno De Mesquita et al 2005; Young 2009, Sambanis 2000; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2009). By applying a logistic model, I not only follow the general literature but also make my findings somewhat more comparable to the findings of others. I therefore follow Davenport (2007b), Englehart (2009), Young (2009) and Bueno De Mesquita et al (2005), among others, in using an ordered logit model for analyzing human rights and repression. With multiple control variables, the model equation is as follows:

$$logit \le j = \beta_0^j + \beta 1 x 1 + \beta 2 x 2 + \ldots + \beta k x k$$

where logit refers to the log odds, β_0^j is the intercept, *j* being the level of the ordered dependent variable and $\beta 1 \times 1$ and so on are the independent variables²⁹. The equation models the effect of the variables on the log odds for y being in a greater than or equal ordered category. I believe that an ordered logistic approach fits the research design better than, say, ordinary least squares. OLS-regression would indeed give estimates about which direction the level of repression in new states are headed, but since repression, because of measurement and coding practices, after all are more ordinal than continuous it makes more sense to use ordered logit; ordinal categories are more in tune with the precision and accuracy of the data. That being said, repression may be regarded as continuous in a theoretical sense and seeing as

²⁹ This proportional odds equation is illustrated by DeMaris (2003: 305).

the ordinal category scales have 7 and 9 categories, an OLS-design could be useful and could be applied as well. Nonetheless, comparing ordered categories of repression is arguably more fitting since the repression measure orders the levels of repression but does not display the exact magnitude of it (Richards 1999: 656; DeMaris 2004: 303).

There are three well known types of models for ordered logistic regression: the adjacentcategory model, the continuation ratio model and the proportional odds model (Lemeshow 2013). As for the specific type of ordered logit, I use the proportional odds model (also known as the constrained cumulative logit model). There are several reasons for this. To begin with, it is frequently applied in the repression and human rights literature which again makes for comparable results. These results are also somewhat easier to handle than the adjacentcategory and continuation-ratio models. This is especially because the proportional odds provide the opportunity to assess a general direction of outcome. Proportional odds models compare outcomes; more specifically it provides a comparison for outcomes that are less than or equal versus a higher (more) outcome. In other words, the equations estimate the log-odds of being in one of these distinctive outcomes by systematically comparing all of the ordered and cumulative values (of each equation) and describing the odds-relationship between them. The proportional odds model relies on the assumption that the odds indeed are proportional. This means that the predictor effect is the same; the odds are multiplied by a proportionality constant for each increase in a unit. Like other assumptions, this one should also be tested, preferably by the Brant test, the Lipsitz-test and Fagerland-Hosmer-test (Lemeshow 2013: 297, 305; DeMaris 2004: 305).

3.8 Assumptions for ordered logistic regression

As already mentioned, ordinal logistic regression requires the dependent variable to be ordinal and the relationship between these ordinal values are assumed to be one of proportional odds. As described above, this assumption can be tested by the Lipsitz-test, Fagerland-Hosmer-test or the Wald-test. Just like in other regression types, one must also test for multicollinearity. By running a variance inflation factor-test one can assess which predictors are highly correlated in a regression model. Collinearity could blur the distinction of which predictor the estimated effect can be ascribed to. In such instances the best counteraction is, arguably, to craft a well-specified model which excludes highly correlated measures (Wooldridge 2013).

One should also check for influential observations like outliers. If the regression results are

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changed considerably when a case is omitted, this case is influential. That being said, outliers are not bound to be influential, but is rather value combinations on the variables that yields such influence. Whilst it is possible that influential observations may come from measurement errors, it is not unreasonable to expect an extreme case or two. Whether they should be left out or not depends on the research purpose. For ordered logit, outliers can be detected by splitting the ordinal variable into separate binary outcomes and plotting the standardized residuals as recommended by Long and Freese (2006: 200-202).

Arguably, one of the most important assumptions in a regression analysis is that theoretically relevant variables are not omitted from the model. Avoiding endogeneity problems is a difficult matter. This assumption can only be met by properly specified regression models based on a good theoretical and conceptual groundwork that builds on cumulated knowledge of the research subject. In other words, omitted variable bias is bound to occur if the choice of variables is not particularly meaningful and follows weak theoretical reasoning. If an important determinant of Y is left out, there is a danger of spurious correlations. The worst consequence could be invalid scientific results (DeMaris 2004; King, Keohane & Verba 1994). A statistical model can thus be over-specified as well as under-specified and as the connection between repression and separated states is not widely researched, I have focused on including those control variables that the separation literature and the repression have in common and some others. This means some variables more related to conflict and others more related to state-level aspects in general. Hopefully this provides a basis for further model development (Wooldridge 2013; Oneal & Russett 2005; Clarke 2005).

4.0 Analysis

In this chapter, I analyze and discuss my ordered logistic regression models and test my hypotheses. I start with a simple preliminary analysis looking at the mean repression level of the separated states compared with established independent states and decolonized states. After that, I move on to the regression models to conduct the main analysis and test various model specifications. Lastly, I evaluate the support for my hypotheses.

4.1 The level of repression by type of state emergence

A preliminary way to start analyzing the relationship between separated states and repression is to simply inspect the mean values³⁰. This way, one may observe the most basic relationship between repression and different types of states and later compare the regression results with it.

States by formation	Mean physical integrity	Mean Civil Liberties (1-7)
	rights (0-8)	
Separation states	4.9	3.9
Standard deviation	2.2	2.0
Ν	607	815
Already independent states	5.2	4.8
Standard deviation	2.4	1.9
Ν	2197	3276
Decolonized states	4.6	3.8
Standard deviation	2.2	1.8
Ν	2100	3549
Separation by secession	5.0	4.1
Standard deviation	2.1	1.8
Ν	495	623
Separation by partition	3.4	3.6
Standard deviation	2.6	2.1
Ν	190	294

Table 8: Mean values of repression for separated, already independent and decolonized states

³⁰ Mean values are rounded.

Seeing as these are mean values, it is not surprising that most states lie somewhere in the middle. Nonetheless, there are some noteworthy patterns. The already independent states, theoretically the most consolidated states, show higher values than the rest on both measures of repression. They seem to exhibit fairly good human rights respect, especially when compared to the other two categories. Although this may not seem too surprising, it does support the assumptions and arguments of the literature arguing against separations. Interestingly, decolonized states show somewhat lower respect for human rights than the separated states. They appear to be more repressive on both measures. Indeed, there is a consistent pattern for both types of repression along each category of states. If one category shows lower physical integrity respect than another, then this is true of civil liberties as well. The gap between separated states and older independent states is much more prominent in civil liberties restrictions than physical integrity rights. Judging from the literature's theoretical guidelines, this could be, for instance, indicative of the "weaknesses" in separated states ability to facilitate post-independence political order, or more precisely, that the new states lack well-performing institutions or productive authority. This gap could also be interpreted in other ways. Perhaps separated states do not engage in the more typically physical tactic of repression simply because they suffered such repression whilst being subordinated the rump state. As a consequence of this, any repressive measures deemed necessary by the separated state's government must therefore be applied through more sociopolitical means; restricting civil liberties to incapacitate and channel the political opportunities of any opposition.

Thus far, it would seem like separated states end up being generally more repressive than already independent states, but they are positively different from decolonized states. Also, the samples have almost the same standard deviation intervals. Perhaps this difference is because of separated states' interconnectedness, having shared institutions for example, with their rump states for a long time and in that way been more influenced by the metropole than distant overseas colonies could be. However, that is of course mere speculation. In order to get a better idea of the relationship between separated states and repression, I now move on to the ordered logistic regressions.

4.2 Testing Sambanis' cases on repression

For a start, I would like to run Sambanis' (2000) case-configuration on my basic model as it could be interesting to compare the human rights results with his more conflict-oriented empirical investigation. It is a logical starting point to add the outlook of repression to Sambanis' work as it constitutes a thorough examination of several important post-conflict aspects like war-recurrence, democratization and residual violence, with several critical findings of importance that judge the viability of separation. This link in itself warrants such a comparison. In addition, it would make a particularly fitting comparison seeing as he does indeed find evidence of likely war-recurrence and some democratization and we know that conflict and democratization is shown to be associated with repression (Sambanis 2000; Hafner-Burton 2014; Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs & Smith 2005). As Sambanis only investigate violent cases, my case-setup of separations rooted in both violent and non-violent backgrounds, which would be the next analytical step, might add new and more general results. I therefore begin with running a regression model with lagged variables and clustered standard errors where the independent variable denotes whether a state is the product of a separation or not using Sambanis' cases as 1 and other states as 0.

Interestingly, Sambanis' cases indicate that separated states, at least those born out of a violent process, are more repressive than other states, but none of these coefficients are consistently statistically significant through all the models (p>0.05). They are, in fact, not close to the 0.10-level either. We cannot claim any difference between separated states versus other independent states and repression. But the effects in these models are negative, meaning that separated states, ceteris paribus, would indeed be more repressive than other independent states if statistical significance were achieved, yet we observe no change in significance when the regional control variables and the political exclusion variable is added either. The same pattern is evident for both types of repression. Thus far, it is worth noting that these indications, at least, somewhat reflects the mean values on repression presented in Table 8, but at this point we cannot say much about the relationship with repression other than that it seems unrelated. Control variables such as democracy/regime type, GDP per capita and civil war show, as so often in the research on human rights (Mitchell & McCormick 1988; Poe et al. 1999; Hill Jr. & Jones 2014; Hafner-Burton 2014), a strong and consistent influence on repression in general. Whilst the findings for Sambanis' cases are far from decisive, it is indeed interesting that a negative relationship with repression is indicated.

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Table 9: Using Sambanis' (2000) case-configuration on repression

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR)	PIR	PIR	CL	CL
and Civil Liberties (CL)	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Separation ^(t-1)	-0.162	-0.199	-0.0505	-0.0479
Separation	(0.176)	(0.171)	(0.120)	(0.157)
	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.120)	(0.157)
Decolonization	0.0927	0.00566	-0.0347	-0.129
	(0.121)	(0.163)	(0.111)	(0.144)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.098***	1.009***	4.409***	4.355***
	(0.0437)	(0.0449)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Time since independence	1.121*	0.507	-1.314*	-1.557*
	(0.652)	(0.716)	(0.772)	(0.872)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0793***	0.0727***	0.125***	0.108***
Democrae y/Regime	(0.0122)	(0.0139)	(0.0149)	(0.0162)
	(0.0122)	(0.0139)	(0.014))	(0.0102)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.264***	-0.338***	-0.0274	-0.0559
	(0.0350)	(0.0380)	(0.0252)	(0.0346)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.263***	0.170***	0.205***	0.213***
	(0.0438)	(0.0490)	(0.0385)	(0.0520)
	0.0100			
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0108	-0.00603	0.00228	0.00333
	(0.00679)	(0.00820)	(0.00943)	(0.00881)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.804***	-0.859***	-0.360***	-0.264**
	(0.171)	(0.149)	(0.115)	(0.119)
	(0.171)	(0.14))	(0.115)	(0.11))
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.324	-0.0516	-0.298*	-0.227
	(0.230)	(0.233)	(0.161)	(0.213)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-0.573***		-0.216
		(0.184)		(0.181)
Eastern Europe		-0.941***		-1.056***
Lastern Europe		(0.313)		(0.277)
		(0.313)		(0.277)

Latin America		-1.605*** (0.326) -1.133*** (0.393)				
Sub-Saharan Africa						
Asia		-1.246*** (0.339)		-1.192*** (0.289)		
North Africa and Middle East		-1.333*** (0.333)		-1.520*** (0.273)		
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Constant cut1	-4.397*** (0.745)	-7.857*** (1.034)	5.765*** (0.602)	4.183*** (0.812)		
Constant cut2	-2.880*** (0.728)	-6.366*** (1.026)	(0.602) 10.52*** (0.624)	(0.812) 8.907*** (0.818)		
Constant cut3	-1.444** (0.726)	-4.947*** (1.020)	15.52*** (0.681)	13.76*** (0.864)		
Constant cut4	-0.137 (0.725)	-3.654*** (1.026)	20.20*** (0.747)	18.39*** (0.902)		
Constant cut5	1.494** (0.722)	-2.010* (1.026)	25.06*** (0.822)	23.36*** (0.962)		
Constant cut6	3.057*** (0.728)	-0.446 (1.034)	29.98*** (0.877)	28.68*** (0.993)		
Constant cut7	4.567*** (0.736)	1.111 (1.032)				
Constant cut8	6.624*** (0.756)	3.342*** (1.007)				
N Log pseudolikelihood	3,946 -5619.3315	3,660 -5192.3327	5,503 -2939.394	4,983 -2614.0306		
Pseudo R ²	0.32	0.33	0.72	0.72		

Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.3 H₁, H₂, H₃ and H₄: Separation and repression

My own case-classification of separations (Table 10) does not yield any significant results for both types of repression. The coefficients in Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 are not even remotely statistically significant. Apparently, a parsimonious dummy that also includes non-violent separations does not give a clearer picture of the relationship between repression and separation than only violent cases. That being said, the log odds are consistent with those of the Sambanis configuration in the sense that they are still negative, but the inclusion of my non-violent cases have made the indicated negative effect weaker in terms of physical integrity rights (compare for example; -0.162 in Model 1 and -0.199 in Model 2 with -0.0860 in Model 5 and -0.180 in Model 6). Exponentiation recalculates the log odds to odds-ratios. For example, the coefficient for Model 6, -0.180, thus equals an odds-ratio of 0.83. Being lower than 1, this means decreasing proportional odds of moving from a lower or equal to a higher outcome/category for a separated state compared to a non-separated state.

Apparently, quite like the Sambanis-cases, my cases yield no significant results in both the parsimonious model specification and the extended specification. This is true for both types of repression. Democracy/regime, civil war and log of GDP per capita are, however, significant at the 0.01-level (except for Model 8 at 0.05-level) with higher levels of democracy and GDP per capita being positively associated with higher levels of respect for human rights. As expected and demonstrated in the literature, the presence of civil war affects human rights in the opposite direction (Poe et al. 1999; Hafner-Burton 2014). In other words, when controlling for these central factors and others, separation remains unrelated. The effect of the main independent variable is still insignificant when including the regional dummy variables and political exclusion (Models 6 and 8). The main indicated difference between my cases and Sambanis' is some minor dynamic in repression tactics. Despite statistical insignificance, strictly violent cases like Sambanis' seem, relatively speaking, a bit more likely to affect physical integrity rights, which is not too surprising. Extremities like torture and extrajudicial killings may well follow in the aftermath of violent separations.

Table 10: Using my case-configuration on repression

	PIR	CL	CL
Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
-0.0860	-0 180	-0.151	-0.294
			(0.184)
(0.120)	(0.177)	(0.122)	(0.101)
-0.0255	-0.131	-0.0832	-0.119
(0.135)	(0.157)	(0.104)	(0.127)
			4.354***
(0.0435)	(0.0445)	(0.114)	(0.114)
1.020	0 594	1 1 4 7	-1.325
			(0.904)
(0.009)	(0.092)	(0.784)	(0.904)
0.0765***	0.0710***	0.124***	0.107***
(0.0119)	(0.0139)	(0.0149)	(0.0164)
			-0.0550*
(0.0342)	(0.0383)	(0.0229)	(0.0323)
0 256***	0 174***	0 198***	0.212***
			(0.0535)
(0.0117)	(0.0011)	(0.0272)	(0.0000)
-0.0128*	-0.00737	0.00210	0.00447
(0.00703)	(0.00852)	(0.00925)	(0.00851)
0.000++++			
			-0.277**
(0.173)	(0.150)	(0.115)	(0.117)
-0.228	0.0145	-0.293*	-0.244
			(0.216)
	× /	× /	~ /
	-0.564***		-0.221
	(0.185)		(0.181)
	0 008***		-0.907***
			(0.283)
	$\begin{array}{c} -0.0860\\ (0.128)\\ -0.0255\\ (0.135)\\ 1.102^{***}\\ (0.0435)\\ 1.029\\ (0.669)\\ 0.0765^{***}\\ (0.0119)\\ -0.279^{***}\\ (0.0342)\\ 0.256^{***}\\ (0.0447)\\ -0.0128^{*}\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

Latin America		-1.605*** (0.325)		-1.235*** (0.270)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.055*** (0.392)		-1.004*** (0.315)
Asia		-1.191*** (0.342)		-1.153*** (0.281)
North Africa and Middle East		-1.303*** (0.335)		-1.525*** (0.273)
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-4.668*** (0.773)	-8.098*** (1.057)	5.616*** (0.568)	4.168*** (0.782)
Constant cut2	-3.152*** (0.755)	-6.607*** (1.049)	10.38*** (0.588)	8.900*** (0.791)
Constant cut3	-1.714** (0.746)	-5.187*** (1.040)	15.38*** (0.647)	13.77*** (0.835)
Constant cut4	-0.406 (0.744)	-3.893*** (1.045)	20.06*** (0.716)	18.39*** (0.873)
Constant cut5	1.222* (0.740)	-2.250** (1.045)	24.92*** (0.794)	23.35*** (0.935)
Constant cut6	2.782*** (0.748)	-0.688 (1.054)	29.83*** (0.849)	28.67*** (0.975)
Constant cut7	4.291*** (0.757)	0.868 (1.053)		
Constant cut8	6.348*** (0.778)	3.100*** (1.029)		
N Log pseudolikelihood	3,946 -5621.2102	3,660 -5192.4052	5,503 -2938.7657	4,983 -2612.9598
Pseudo R ²	0.32	0.33	0.72	0.72

Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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
My mixed cases (both violent and non-violent separations), on the other hand, show a bit stronger relation to the other repression tactic, namely civil liberties. This applies when examined in the parsimonious as well as the extended specification. Having included peaceful separations seems to have made the indicated negative effect for civil liberties stronger. While this could be interpreted in more than one way, what seems most certain for this model is that separations in general, *ceteris paribus*, tend to result in states that are more repressive than other states and that this repression is, on average, both latent and direct. Put more precisely, the citizens in separated states could generally have a lower level of physical security than others and could be likely to experience some more limitations to their freedoms of association, speech, belief and political assembly. But, all in all, my cases show strictly the same overall effects as Sambanis'.

As mentioned, my separation cases do not yield any significant results, but it is implied that they are more repressive than other states on both types of repression. A bit stronger effect is indicated for civil liberties restriction than physical integrity rights violations. Political opposition is thus met with more "sophisticated" means that restrict their political power projection against the government. One may speculate that leaders perhaps anticipate that political order is more delicate after separation and thus vulnerable to more direct and physical repression which means that any repressive measures are channeled through institutional workings. But all in all, we cannot say with any more certainty that separated states are more or less repressive than other states, although there are indications³¹.

There are some additional remarks worth making with regard to the control variables. At first glance, it is puzzling that higher levels of yearly expenditure on UN-mandates is negatively associated with physical integrity rights repression in Models 5 and 6. It does indeed seem odd that peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts does not have a positive effect on repression. But there may be a quite logical explanation to this "puzzle". The UN, contrary to what some claim, are most likely to direct their missions and mandates to the countries that are worst off. Put differently, they do not choose conflict-zones where they can expect an uncomplicated operation, but rather they tend to go for the burdensome and demanding cases where the help


³¹ One can always discuss to which degree any effects can be attributed to separation *per se*, that is, the very fact that a state took its current political form because of a separation from another state. But when all factors are held constant, and if the results had been statistically significant, it could be likely that separated states are different because a new political order has been organized.

is needed the most (Fortna 2004: 278, 288). This prioritizing in deployment may be what influences this negative relationship with human rights, and as we can observe in Model 5, this measure is associated with physical integrity rights repression and significant at the 0.10level. Regarding ethnic fractionalization, this measure is found mostly insignificant. In the extended model specifications, I include another and more politically precise measure of relationships between groups, namely the log of excluded population relative to ethnopolitically relevant population, which turns out to perform much better. In Model 6, a larger share excluded population relative to the ethno-politically relevant one is associated with more repression in terms of physical integrity rights (p<0.01). Also, regarding the civil war control variable, it is important to exercise some caution. I could be dealing with reciprocal causality, as severe repression may have caused civil war and not the other way around. However, when I test this relationship in a model where civil war is omitted, there is still a negative effect for separation and still no statistical significance is achieved (see Appendixtable 3). Thus, there is no substantial difference and this control variable does not seem problematic in this case.



Graph 3: Physical Integrity Rights - predictive change from established older states to separated states

Even though no statistically significant relationship is found, we may inspect the predicted change in effects of going from 0 to 1 (from established independent states to separated states) in Graph 3 and 4, where dummy variables are set to 0 and other variables are set to mean values.



Graph 4: Civil Liberties - predictive change from established older states to separated states

These plots illustrate how separated states, compared to the older states, are less likely to belong in the higher categories, but more likely to belong at the lower categories. It should be mentioned that the confidence intervals for separated states are larger at the lowest levels of human rights respect which means that the certainty of these estimations are not as robust, relatively speaking, as those of the older established states.

Judging by the coefficients' significance and the values on Pseudo-R², my models are more suited to explain variation in separated states' civil liberties than their respect for physical integrity rights. Admittedly, there are more civil liberties observations than physical integrity rights observations to draw inferences from. As pointed out earlier, the simplest relationship between state formations and human rights violations (Table 8) indicate that there is a considerably larger discrepancy in mean values for civil liberties than physical integrity

rights. Thus far, I have only investigated a dichotomous operationalization. What effect does time since independence have on repression? Do separated states improve their human rights respect over time, perhaps by better political consolidation and experience as an independent state? I further investigate the hypotheses by employing variables that measure the impact of time since independence, operationalized as an exponential decay-function.

Table 11: Using an exponential decay function for each state formation on repression

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR)	PIR	PIR	CL	CL
and Civil Liberties (CL)	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Time since separation	1.120*	0.460	-1.410	-1.745
	(0.667)	(0.846)	(1.064)	(1.099)
Time since independence	0.107	0.496	-1.887**	-1.823
for established states	(1.568)	(1.517)	(0.888)	(1.250)
	-0.0473	0.0707	-0.549	0.0508
Time since decolonization	(0.286)	(0.365)	(0.524)	(0.724)
	1.102***	1.011***	4.410***	4.356***
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	(0.0434)	(0.0447)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0772***	0.0728***	0.125***	0.108***
	(0.0113)	(0.0139)	(0.0149)	(0.0160)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.276***	-0.346***	-0.0246	-0.0474
	(0.0344)	(0.0378)	(0.0216)	(0.0315)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.261***	0.171***	0.209***	0.207***
	(0.0434)	(0.0505)	(0.0373)	(0.0529)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0131*	-0.00768	0.00211	0.00349
	(0.00726)	(0.00876)	(0.00926)	(0.00871)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.805***	-0.869***	-0.365***	-0.264**
	(0.177)	(0.152)	(0.114)	(0.117)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.211	-0.0115	-0.301**	-0.245
	(0.203)	(0.229)	(0.152)	(0.210)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-0.565***		-0.209
		(0.185)		(0.183)
Eastern Europe		-0.994***		-1.053***

		(0.314)		(0.269)
Latin America		-1.607***		-1.244***
		(0.327)		(0.271)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.147***		-1.113***
		(0.368)		(0.305)
Asia		-1.303***		-1.288***
		(0.329)		(0.271)
North Africa and		-1.339***		-1.566***
Middle East		(0.331)		(0.270)
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-4.562***	-7.951***	5.881***	4.299***
	(0.754)	(1.075)	(0.548)	(0.782)
Constant cut2	-3.047***	-6.459***	10.64***	9.022***
	(0.739)	(1.069)	(0.575)	(0.791)
Constant cut3	-1.608**	-5.039***	15.65***	13.88***
	(0.742)	(1.063)	(0.647)	(0.839)
Constant cut4	-0.301	-3.746***	20.32***	18.51***
	(0.742)	(1.069)	(0.728)	(0.883)
Constant cut5	1.327*	-2.104**	25.18***	23.48***
	(0.737)	(1.069)	(0.802)	(0.944)
Constant cut6	2.887***	-0.543	30.10***	28.80***
	(0.744)	(1.076)	(0.863)	(0.982)
Constant cut7	4.396***	1.013		
	(0.752)	(1.074)		
Constant cut8	6.455***	3.243***		
	(0.772)	(1.049)		
N	3,946	3,660	5,503	4,983
Log pseudolikelihood	-5621.248	-5193.7795	-2939.4235	-2614.2806
Pseudo R ²	0.32	0.33	0.72	0.72

As Table 11 shows, apparently, there is circumstantial evidence that time does heal some wounds, but make others worse. The decay-effects can be a bit tricky to interpret, but some patterns are evident. The most parsimonious model specification (Model 9) shows that separated states, on average and *ceteris paribus*, are likely to experience worse physical integrity rights over time (p<0.1). The positive correlation tells us that higher values of time since separation corresponds with higher values of human rights respect. In an exponential decay-model, the higher values of time are the first values (with closest proximity to the year of independence) which then decays (see Graph 2). This means that, in terms of physical integrity rights, separated states on average show less repression to begin with rather than over time.

However, as before, this effect is not significant once regional control variables and ethnopolitical exclusion are included. Modelling the effect of time by an exponential decay function yields some other interesting findings, but few of them are statistically significant. We find some differing trends by comparing the three state formations and, again, the effect varies by the type of repression. In the extended specification (Model 10), time has had a generally worsening effect on physical integrity rights for all separated states and the older established states, meaning that respect for these rights has generally decreased since the state was born. Nevertheless, the effects are not statistical significant and thus not valid.


Time has had a different impact on civil liberties. The coefficients negative direction implies that low values on the independent variable correlates with higher values on the dependent variable. As the low values are the values furthest away from independence in an exponential decay-model, this means that civil liberties have generally improved over time. In Model 11, this effect is significant for the oldest established states (p<0.05). This is altogether not too surprising. This is a large group where many states are considerably older than both decolonized states and separated states³², which means that, at least on average, they have enjoyed more time to build relatively more robust and accountable states³³. It is worth noting that most decolonized states are older than most of the separated states too, but their effect

³² As Table 3 shows, the youngest of the separated states is only 5 years (South Sudan) at the time of writing and the oldest is 67 years (communist China), which means there is a considerable difference in the time span of all separated states to draw inferences from. This internal variation is important to bear in mind when commenting on separated states in general.

³³ Of course, older states may be weakened over time and experience changes in economical and socio-political standards that can alter the course of repression. Old age does by no means inherently shape a stronger state that shows more respect for its citizens' human rights, but the trend on average, suggest that more years gives time to consolidate political order and develop a less repressive state in terms of civil liberties.

changes from one model to the other. In any case, the seemingly disparate development of civil liberties over time for former colonies (Model 12) in contrast to others makes for an interesting observation. All in all, none of the patterns are significant in the extended model, we cannot say for sure how any of these states have fared over time once more controls are factored in.

Judging from these findings, it is difficult to reveal any reliable and consistent time patterns among these state formations. The main rationale for modelling the time elapsed since separation is of course to uncover whether separated states in general are able to improve their human rights situations regardless of how they were in the immediate time after separation and independence. Again, it is assumed that new states need time to establish themselves or, at least, that this will help build the state as it is arguably too early to pass judgement on a new state's viability right after separation. Perhaps other ways of modelling time would uncover different results. We may, however, illustrate a predicted effect on as shown in Graph 5. With variables set at mean values, these graphs predict the probabilities for physical integrity repression categories for a separated state and an older established state. In the plots, the two examples have the same level of democracy, GDP per capita and such. Time since state formation for both is set to the 90th percentile. As indicated in the analyses thus far, the plots imply that there are better human rights conditions in the older states. Older states are most likely to be in outcome 6 and separated states are most likely to be in outcome 5. However, it is important to bear in mind that this is merely a prediction based on a statistically insignificant regression.



Graph 5: Prediction comparing separated states and older established states at the 90th percentile of exponential decay-time

Despite circumstantial evidence, the results acquired for H_1 - H_4 imply that it is hard to find evidence of a systematic difference as long as no statistical significance is achieved in the same extended model for both dependent variables and all state formations. I simply cannot claim for sure that separated states do have separated themselves from repression or not. This evaluation is also made complex because of a two-pronged dimension of repression. In some ways, there seems to be a trade-off; what kind of repression is worst? Does the circumstantial evidence of gradually improving civil liberties outweigh the possibility of systematically worse physical integrity repression? The findings have some implications for the debate on post-separation viability; this empirical evidence can consequently be taken as confirmation for either stance in the separation debate. All in all, I reject H_1 , H_3 and H_4 . While it may seem most conspicuous judging by the exponential decay-models, the preliminary analysis and the dummy-configuration, I cannot keep H_2 either and thus cannot conclude that separated states are more repressive than other states in terms of civil liberties.

4.4 H₅ and H₆: Ethnic fractionalization and repression

The separation literature suggests that ethnic hostilities can have different impacts. As laid out earlier, the pro-separation literature theorize that such hostilities are abolished after separation (Kaufmann 1996; 1998; Mearsheimer & Van Evera 1995), whilst those in opposition to separation claim that residual minorities would fall prey to discrimination (Horowitz 2003; Sambanis 2000). Thus far, the ethnic fractionalization variable has not been statistically significant at the 0.05-level (except in Model 11), although it suggests that more fractionalization correlates with more repression. Given the scholarly debate on the possibility of post-separation ethnic tensions, I run a regression with an interaction term for separation and ethnic fractionalization to test this relationship further.

This preliminary investigation yields no statistically significant results and thus I can only discuss the coefficient's indications. Except for Model 13, the general pattern is that separated states seems more repressive than non-separated states when interacted with ethnic fractionalization. Otherwise, the effect of ethnic fractionalization on both physical integrity and civil liberties repression is on average stronger (for example -0.374 in Model 14 and - 0.873 in Model 16) for separated states than non-separated states. And, as shown, this indicated effect is negative, leaning towards worse human rights conditions. This, again, is contrary to the hypotheses' expectations and what one would suppose from Kaufmann's (1996; 1998) line of reasoning.

The effect is not statistically valid, but the implications are nonetheless quite interesting. In a way, as separated states seem to be more repressive when ethnic fractionalization increases than non-separated states, it tells us that separation has seemingly not solved inter-ethnic disputes in a comprehensive sense. As such, Sambanis (2000) and Horowitz (2003) could be right when they claim that residual minorities would suffer in a post-separation situation. On the other hand, this could be interpreted as a telling example of the importance of Kaufmann's (1996; 1998) argument that separation must be done properly in order to be a sufficient solution, that is, ethnic groups ought to be properly segregated. That being said, this interaction term does not provide a particularly direct link between levels of repression and inter-ethnic rivalry. As the effects are not statistically significant, it is safer to say that this could just as likely be an example of how separated states generally seems to be worse at accommodating and handling political opposition (perhaps regardless of ethnicity), either

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because of power insecurity or mismanaged institutions.

However, this investigation can be made more specific if I only use violent separations versus non-separated states. After all, it is a better test of Kaufmann's argument seeing as his theory is intended more for violent separations than separations in general. In Table 13, statistical significance at the 0.01-level is indeed obtained for civil liberties repression (Model 20). The comparative effect of violent separation versus non-separated states is apparently conditional on the level of ethnic fractionalization. It may not be particularly surprising that violent separations clearly are more repressive than non-separated states as ethnic fractionalization increases, but that this concerns civil liberties so strongly, but seemingly not physical integrity rights, are interesting. One could assume that, if anything, torture, extrajudicial killings and the like would be more probable in a post-separation environment with a violent backdrop if, for example, previously warring separatist with new-found power decides to target perceived hostile or unwanted ethnic groups that are big enough to pose a threat or challenge. But against the wide variation of states and their respective levels of repression, this does not hold. No significant conditional effect is shown. Rather, as the civil liberties relationship indicates, it could be that a subtler and latent repression would manifest itself if there is still considerable ethnic fractionalization. A violent separation stands in contrast to non-separated states on several levels, but the most important may be that such a new state faces other dilemmas and incentives. The state apparatus must be consolidated anew, amongst other things. As such, civil liberties repression could prove to be a more "rational" choice compared to physical integrity repression which might spark new hostile tensions that could stimulate renewed conflict.

Table 12: The interaction of separation and ethnic fractionalization on repression

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 13	PIR Model 14	CL Model 15	CL Model 16
	model 15		Widden 15	Middel 10
Sep. x Ethnic fractionalization ^(t-1)	0.697	-0.374	-0.542	-0.873
-	(0.522)	(0.766)	(0.435)	(0.661)
Separation ^(t-1)	-0.307	-0.0577	0.0235	-0.00812
-	(0.228)	(0.338)	(0.206)	(0.295)
Decolonization	-0.00186	-0.131	-0.0980	-0.118
	(0.140)	(0.157)	(0.106)	(0.126)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.100***	1.011***	4.409***	4.356***
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	(0.0434)	(0.0445)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Time since independence	0.870	0.633	-1.054	-1.233
F	(0.645)	(0.706)	(0.793)	(0.921)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0763***	0.0714***	0.124***	0.108***
	(0.0120)	(0.0139)	(0.0150)	(0.0164)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.274***	-0.360***	-0.0367	-0.0628*
	(0.0344)	(0.0394)	(0.0239)	(0.0338)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.260***	0.166***	0.196***	0.197***
	(0.0455)	(0.0561)	(0.0376)	(0.0546)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0127*	-0.00720	0.00245	0.00514
	(0.00707)	(0.00836)	(0.00921)	(0.00843)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.816***	-0.872***	-0.364***	-0.270**
	(0.175)	(0.149)	(0.116)	(0.118)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.286	0.0496	-0.254	-0.165
	(0.239)	(0.248)	(0.171)	(0.230)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-0.567***		-0.226
Foundary entering hologing		(0.185)		(0.181)


N Log pseudolikelihood Pseudo R ²	3,946 -5620.1893 0.32	3,660 -5192.1897 0.33	5,503 -2938.4079 0.72	4,983 -2612.251 0.72
Soustant ento	(0.778)	(1.100)		
Constant cut8	6.419***	2.984***		
onsunt out	(0.758)	(1.125)		
Constant cut7	4.362***	0.751	(0.0+0)	(0.992)
Constant Cuto	(0.749)	(1.125)	(0.848)	(0.992)
Constant cut6	2.852***	-0.803	(0.793) 29.78***	(0.901) 28.46***
	(0.740)	(1.115)	(0.795)	(0.961)
Constant cut5	1.290*	-2.365**	24.86***	23.14***
	(0.742)	(1.115)	(0.718)	(0.900)
Constant cut4	-0.339	-4.008***	20.00***	18.17***
Consum Cuts	(0.744)	(1.106)	(0.650)	(0.865)
Constant cut3	-1.647**	-5.303***	15.33***	13.54***
	(0.754)	(1.117)	(0.592)	(0.826)
Constant cut2	-3.084***	-6.723***	(0.372) 10.32***	(0.810) 8.678***
	(0.771)	(1.121)	(0.572)	(0.816)
Constant cut1	-4.599***	-8.215***	5.557***	3.948***
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		(0.341)		(0.277)
North Africa and Middle East		-1.321***		-1.564***
Marth Africa and Middle Fast		1 201***		1 5 6 1 4 4 4 4
		(0.369)		(0.296)
Asia		-1.233***		-1.236***
		(0.418)		(0.327)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.099***		-1.094***
		(0.339)		(0.281)
Latin America		-1.631***		-1.288***
				(0.283)
Eastern Europe		-0.916*** (0.339)		-0.921 (0.28

Table 12: Interacting congretion and athnia fractionalization using	only violent separations versus all non-separated states on repression
Table 15. Interacting separation and ethnic fractionalization using	only violent separations versus an non-separated states on repression

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 17	PIR Model 18	CL Model 19	CL Model 20
Sep. x Ethnic fractionalization ^(t-1)	1.554	0.0759	-0.848	-1.441***
Sep. x Lunne fractionalization	(1.280)	(1.454)	(0.576)	(0.529)
Separation ^(t-1)	-0.369	0.0743	0.297	0.444*
Separation	(0.286)	(0.410)	(0.217)	(0.230)
Decolonization	0.00599	-0.0916	-0.0555	-0.0770
	(0.127)	(0.158)	(0.0992)	(0.127)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.101***	1.012***	4.412***	4.357***
	(0.0434)	(0.0447)	(0.115)	(0.114)
Time since independence	0.700	0.351	-1.339*	-1.490
	(0.623)	(0.746)	(0.790)	(0.930)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0779***	0.0734***	0.125***	0.109***
	(0.0120)	(0.0139)	(0.0150)	(0.0166)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.276***	-0.353***	-0.0319	-0.0559*
	(0.0336)	(0.0382)	(0.0230)	(0.0330)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.263***	0.170***	0.203***	0.201***
	(0.0449)	(0.0538)	(0.0376)	(0.0525)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0129*	-0.00827	0.00195	0.00419
	(0.00719)	(0.00861)	(0.00903)	(0.00832)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.806***	-0.864***	-0.356***	-0.256**
	(0.174)	(0.150)	(0.115)	(0.118)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.254	0.0345	-0.240	-0.183
	(0.230)	(0.240)	(0.163)	(0.218)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-0.560***		-0.228
		(0.186)		(0.181)

Log pseudolikelihood Pseudo R ²	-5619.8244 0.32	-5193.1331 0.33	-2938.848 0.72	-2613.4478 0.72
1	3,946	3,660	5,503	4,983
	(0.762)	(1.057)		
Constant cut8	6.443***	3.144***		
	(0.741)	(1.082)		
Constant cut7	4.381***	0.911	× ′	
	(0.733)	(1.082)	(0.856)	(0.983)
Constant cut6	2.869***	-0.644	29.94***	28.61***
	(0.724)	(1.071)	(0.801)	(0.950)
Constant cut5	1.307*	-2.204**	25.02***	23.29***
	(0.727)	(1.071)	(0.723)	(0.888)
Constant cut4	-0.320	-3.845***	20.16***	18.31***
	(0.729)	(1.065)	(0.653)	(0.851)
Constant cut3	-1.624**	-5.139***	15.48***	13.68***
	(0.736)	(1.076)	(0.594)	(0.805)
Constant cut2	-3.060***	-6.560***	10.47***	8.827***
	(0.753)	(1.080)	(0.570)	(0.798)
Constant cut1	-4.575***	-8.053***	5.714***	4.098***
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		(0.342)		(0.276)
North Africa and Middle East				
North Africa and Middle Fast		-1.305***		-1.554***
		(0.362)		(0.292)
Asia		-1.267***		-1.295***
		(0.411)		(0.321)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.095***		-1.091***
		(0.333)		(0.277)
Latin America		-1.612***		-1.271***
		(0.521)		(0.279)
		(0.324)		(0.279)

The substantial effect in Model 20 can be illustrated as shown in Graph 6 where we can observe the interaction for different levels of repression.



Graph 6: Predicted probabilities for Civil Liberties outcomes – violent separation versus established independent states interacted with ethnic fractionalization

As the plots display, when other factors are held constant, there are differing marginal trends for civil liberties respect. As ethnic fractionalization is increased, separated states are more likely to be at the lower levels (exemplified by civil liberties at 1 and 3) than the older established states. We also see that states born out of violent separation are less likely to belong at the higher level (exemplified by civil liberties at 5 and 7) than the other states. However, it is worth noting that the probabilities are markedly higher for outcomes 3 and 5.

There are other ways to explore these dynamics. If systematic data were available for successor states before they separated from the rump state, a regression-discontinuity-design could prove to be a good alternative approach. This quasi-experimental technique estimates the causal effect of a treatment or intervention (in this case separation) and can thus analyze conditions before and after the separation (Imbens & Lemieux 2008). Unfortunately, I only

have aggregated rump state data which represents the whole state and cannot therefore account accurately for the conditions in the breakaway region specifically. Until then, as the interaction term is not significant for the physical integrity rights repression, I must reject H_5 . I must also reject H_6 on the basis that the significant finding is contrary to my hypothetical expectations; separated states are worse than non-separated states in terms of civil liberties as ethnic fractionalization increases.

4.5 H₇ and H₈: Separation-type and repression

Again, at the outset, this is a modest investigation at best. While there has been conceptual criticism towards using the terms secession and partition interchangeably, there has not to my knowledge been done any wide empirical research based on the theoretically different implications of these two sub-types of separation. The following regression³⁴ results may therefore be interesting on their own, although far from conclusive. Thus far in the thesis, India and Pakistan have been omitted because they can be argued to be primarily cases of decolonization. Nevertheless, because both states took their shape by partition, I investigate their influence in these hypotheses by running the same models with and without them and look for any comparative distinction.

As one could have expected, the results are a bit varied. There seems to be no systematic difference in repression among the specific types of separation in Table 14; the main independent variable is not found statistically significant at the 0.05-level in any of these models. Previously robust predictors such as log of total population, GDP per capita and democracy/regime-type and civil war are still relevant throughout all the models. More remarkably, civil war, which until now has consistently demonstrated a negative and significant effect on repression, appears to be positively associated with civil liberties repression. This is probably due to the different sample.

The main independent variable effect changes from positive to negative for both civil liberties and physical integrity rights; it is thus indicated that partitions actually have less repression than secessions at first. But the change of direction in the extended model means that the effect is volatile. The positive effects in the parsimonious models is indeed contrary to my hypothetical expectation, building on O'Leary's (2007) evaluation of the partition concept, that the disruptive nature of partitions ought to be more damaging than secessions as the latter

³⁴ Note that these regressions omit the decolonization variable as they only analyze the cases of partitions against the cases of secessions. Naturally, these are not coded as cases of decolonization.

at least follow established homelands, have a stated aim at popular sovereignty and legitimacy and thus have incentives to provide respect for human rights. Then again, the extended model does indeed invalidate this contra-hypothetical implication. Interestingly enough, physical integrity rights seem to be better off in seceded than partitioned states, but this is also not statistically significant. No statistical significance is achieved when including India and Pakistan in the models as well, but the association with both repression types becomes more negative (see Appendix-table 4). Table 14: Separation-type (0= secessions 1= partitions) on repression – without India and Pakistan

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 21	PIR Model 22	CL Model 23	CL Model 24
Separation-type ^(t-1)	0.113	-0.684	0.243	-0.0215
	(0.584)	(0.853)	(0.471)	(0.688)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.008***	0.994***	5.035***	4.959***
	(0.128)	(0.132)	(0.272)	(0.287)
Time since independence	1.643	1.121	-0.0728	0.507
-	(1.761)	(2.050)	(2.082)	(2.482)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0932***	0.0771**	0.251***	0.266***
	(0.0252)	(0.0305)	(0.0616)	(0.0699)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.326***	-0.557***	-0.0465	-0.158
	(0.0751)	(0.161)	(0.0785)	(0.215)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.527***	0.597***	0.479**	0.507**
	(0.184)	(0.194)	(0.192)	(0.235)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0415**	-0.0575***	0.0253	0.0111
	(0.0194)	(0.0211)	(0.0242)	(0.0265)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.129	-0.0350	0.886**	0.875**
	(0.450)	(0.462)	(0.420)	(0.387)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.390**	3.908***	-0.875	-0.256
	(0.679)	(1.342)	(0.605)	(1.257)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-4.154**		-0.503
		(2.095)		(2.072)
Eastern Europe		-1.566*		-0.695
-		(0.923)		(1.201)
Latin America		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity

Sub-Saharan Africa		-2.603* (1.383)		-0.902 (1.857)
Asia		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
North Africa and Middle East		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-4.685**	-8.563**	8.523***	6.491
	(2.162)	(3.392)	(2.302)	(4.452)
Constant cut2	-3.291	-7.151**	14.53***	12.51***
	(2.058)	(3.345)	(2.522)	(4.526)
Constant cut3	-1.794	-5.625*	19.86***	17.85***
	(2.010)	(3.311)	(2.414)	(4.532)
Constant cut4	-0.266	-4.045	26.22***	24.11***
	(1.996)	(3.300)	(2.687)	(4.783)
Constant cut5	1.774	-1.929	31.08***	29.05***
	(1.929)	(3.240)	(3.158)	(5.275)
Constant cut6	3.332*	-0.322	37.57***	35.56***
	(1.920)	(3.264)	(3.137)	(5.414)
Constant cut7	4.895**	1.278		
	(1.953)	(3.274)		
Constant cut8	7.926***	4.189		
	(1.864)	(3.320)		
N	485	455	599	560
Log pseudolikelihood	-644.05529	-608.40709	-248.53386	-239.40605
Pseudo R ²	0.34	0.34	0.78	0.77

As one could have expected, the results are a bit varied. There seems to be no systematic difference in repression among the specific types of separation in Table 14; the main independent variable is not found statistically significant at the 0.05-level in any of these models. Previously robust predictors such as log of total population, GDP per capita and democracy/regime-type and civil war are still relevant throughout all the models. More remarkably, civil war, which until now has consistently demonstrated a negative and significant effect on repression, appears to be positively associated with civil liberties repression. This is probably due to the different sample.

The main independent variable effect changes from positive to negative for both civil liberties and physical integrity rights; it is thus indicated that partitions actually have less repression than secessions at first. But the change of direction in the extended model means that the effect is volatile. The positive effects in the parsimonious models is indeed contrary to my hypothetical expectation, building on O'Leary's (2007) evaluation of the partition concept, that the disruptive nature of partitions ought to be more damaging than secessions as the latter at least follow established homelands, have a stated aim at popular sovereignty and legitimacy and thus have incentives to provide respect for human rights. Then again, the extended model does indeed invalidate this contra-hypothetical implication. Interestingly enough, physical integrity rights appear to be better off in seceded than partitioned states, but this is also not statistically significant. No statistical significance is achieved when including India and Pakistan in the models as well, but the association with both repression types becomes more negative (see Appendix-table 4).

Perhaps there could be found evidence of a systematic relationship if there were more observations to draw inferences from as the sample might suffer from low test-power. But it is also likely that the separation-types' differences in repression are not discernible, and one type is not necessarily better or worse than the other at least when it comes to human rights. Nonetheless, these hypotheses can be investigated further. I run another model where the observations are more balanced since the abovementioned results are biased towards secessions; there are non-violent secessions in the sample but only violent partitions which skews the distribution of cases. This setup yields statistically significant results; civil liberties are significant on the 0.01-level (Model 24). It is a negative relationship meaning that partitions (all violent), in accordance with my theoretical expectation, are more repressive in terms of civil liberties than violent secessions (see Appendix-table 5). The secessions are

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Croatia, Slovenia, Azerbaijan, Eritrea and Bangladesh and the partitions are China, South-Korea and unified Vietnam (the last one having once experienced partition). The partition cases are what Sambanis (2000) calls ideological cases so, although the finding is interesting in itself, the sample is arguably a bit "contaminated". I emphasize this because the partition cases do not involve an ethnic element to the same extent as the secession cases do. This makes strict comparisons dubious, but as mentioned earlier; these are the cases I have when following O'Leary's (2007) guidelines. Either way, the most important aspect is that partition involves a "fresh cut". I may include India and Pakistan (both violent) to further balance this sample in Table 15. Civil liberties repression remains significant at the 0.01-level (Model 28) and physical integrity rights repression is now significant at the 0.05-level (Model 26). This suggests that there may be well-founded reasons to examine secessions and partitions separately, despite their similarities. At the very least, the nature of the detachment ought to be considered in any event where separation could be necessary.

The question of whether separation achieved through partition or through secession ought to have any profound different effect on human rights violations in specific remains largely unanswered, and it is also possible that a better or more fitting theoretical framework is needed to investigate this aspect of separation. However, when India and Pakistan are included and only violent partitions versus violent secessions are analyzed, partitions are found to be more repressive than secessions. As such, it would seem that a separated state, in terms of human rights, is better off when its formation resembles a secession more than a partition. The new state thus reflects the self-determination claims as the territory corresponds more to the demographic and ethnic foundations of which legitimacy and political order is to be built. Unfortunately, these models have a multicollinearity problem. By conducting a stepwise model examination, where more and more collinearity is added to a bi-variate statistical relationship between separation-type and repression, it appears that the regional dummy variables and the log of total population variable are the sources of the problem for both Models 26 and 28 (see Appendix-table 6). It is not possible to maintain the significant statistical relationship without having to deal with multicollinearity, or in other words, when multicollinearity is reduced to tolerable values, the relationship is no longer statistically significant at any level. As the observations are low in this sample (which probably also affects the multicollinearity problem a lot as there is little variation) and multicollinearity is severe, it does not seem prudent to keep H7 and H8.

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Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 25	PIR Model 26	CL Model 27	CL Model 28
Separation-type ^(t-1)	-0.252	-2.202**	0.385	-4.029***
September ()pe	(0.598)	(1.078)	(0.361)	(0.858)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	0.979***	0.940***	5.132***	4.856***
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(0.208)	(0.211)	(0.461)	(0.545)
Time since independence	1.769	1.900	1.613	1.596
	(1.870)	(3.016)	(3.019)	(2.909)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.00926	-0.0396	0.150**	0.214***
	(0.0463)	(0.0547)	(0.0612)	(0.0744)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.531***	-1.346***	-0.146*	-1.787***
	(0.132)	(0.319)	(0.0879)	(0.221)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.447	0.427	0.541**	0.618*
	(0.307)	(0.342)	(0.252)	(0.335)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0493*	-0.0546	-0.0157	-0.103***
	(0.0271)	(0.0494)	(0.0330)	(0.0350)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.682	-0.659	0.247	0.346
	(0.495)	(0.508)	(0.596)	(0.698)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.374	4.762	-1.046	11.65***
	(0.817)	(3.178)	(0.743)	(2.043)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-11.54*		-30.77***
		(6.419)		(3.873)
Eastern Europe		-4.615*		-9.150***
-		(2.552)		(1.365)
Latin America		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity

Table 15: Separation-type on repression – adjusted to only violent cases (with India and Pakistan)

Sub-Saharan Africa		-7.526* (3.906)		-15.18*** (1.875)
Asia		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
North Africa and Middle East		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-9.675***	-26.01***	7.349**	-26.26***
Constant cut2	(3.562) -8.177** (3.343)	(6.181) -24.51*** (6.350)	(2.880) 13.09*** (3.192)	(4.031) -20.17*** (3.988)
Constant cut3	-6.377*	-22.71***	19.36***	-13.37***
Constant cut4	(3.347) -4.915 (3.436)	(6.205) -21.13*** (6.043)	(3.473) 24.63*** (3.743)	(4.376) -8.322* (4.399)
Constant cut5	-2.934	-19.05***	29.85***	-2.708
Constant cut6	(3.328) -1.236 (3.207)	(6.067) -17.29*** (6.073)	(4.016) 37.18*** (4.369)	(5.136) 6.298 (5.629)
Constant cut7	-0.147 (3.308)	-16.06*** (6.061)	(4.502)	(3.627)
Constant cut8	2.481 (3.256)	-14.21** (6.137)		
N Lee needelikelikeed	273	243	355	316
Log pseudolikelihood Pseudo R ²	-350.02237 0.40	-313.68825 0.38	-151.07702 0.77	-131.44311 0.77

4.6 H₉ and H₁₀: Violent and non-violent separations and repression

As Table 16 shows, these initial findings are a bit peculiar; they show that violent separation actually is associated with less repression than non-violent separations. This is indicated for both physical integrity rights and civil liberties, but not found significant. Nonetheless, it is a curious observation. Calculating the odds-ratio for Model 32, which is the exponentiation of the log odds coefficient 0.344, yields the odds-ratio 1.41, which means increasing proportional odds of moving from a lower or equal to a higher outcome/category for violent separations than non-violent separations. Put differently, odds increase by 41 % (OR -1×100).

These findings are very much in contrast to theoretical expectations and related empirical research as the presence of violence and conflict is so strongly associated with more repression (Poe et al. 1999; Hafner-Burton 2014; Tir 2005). Even civil war shows a positive relationship³⁵. Now, there could be several reasons why the results are like these. Perhaps the experiences of conflict have indeed strengthened the need for human rights improvement and thus states formed by violent separation has had incentives to focus on such measures while states formed from non-violent separations have been lacking this. In a way, these results are somewhat in line with Kaufmann's (1996; 1998) argument; violent separations will likely lead to a better post-separation situation if the separation is allowed to be realized. In other words; one might interpret the positive relationship as support for separation as a solution (but it is nonetheless quite puzzling that it is indicated to be better than a non-violent separation). If so, maybe violent separation is not as bad as those opposed to separation would have it. Arguably, some may find this reasoning a bit too speculative, and the effects are after all not significant. It could be likely that the conceptualization of what makes a separation violent could be done differently, either through measuring the intensity of violence or accounting for treaties and so on. The effect could also be sample-specific as there are relatively few cases and observations. Theoretically relevant omitted variables may indeed also play a part, not to mention that some of the regional dummies are omitted because of collinearity problems. I would like to explore this relationship further by running another set of regressions based on an extended concept of violent separation.

³⁵ Omitting the civil war control variable does not change the indicated positive relationship (see Appendix-table 6).

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR)	PIR	PIR	CL	CL
and Civil Liberties (CL)	Model 29	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32
Separation-process ^(t-1)	0.399	0.546	0.267	0.344
	(0.331)	(0.445)	(0.260)	(0.308)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	0.988***	0.992***	4.948***	4.884***
	(0.132)	(0.139)	(0.254)	(0.261)
Time since independence	2.178	2.070	-0.0107	0.799
	(1.917)	(2.037)	(2.005)	(2.691)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0956***	0.0910***	0.262***	0.276***
	(0.0253)	(0.0257)	(0.0653)	(0.0711)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.345***	-0.380**	-0.0467	-0.125
	(0.0672)	(0.151)	(0.0788)	(0.142)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.522***	0.511***	0.495***	0.489**
	(0.176)	(0.174)	(0.185)	(0.227)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0444**	-0.0525**	0.0244	0.0109
	(0.0178)	(0.0234)	(0.0253)	(0.0265)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.295	-0.249	0.774*	0.761*
	(0.483)	(0.524)	(0.413)	(0.413)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.718**	3.358***	-0.697	-0.103
	(0.716)	(1.075)	(0.747)	(0.956)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-2.099 (1.706)		0.0349 (1.921)
Eastern Europe		-0.320 (0.894)		-0.464 (0.777)
Latin America		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity

Table 16: Using separation-process (0= non-violent 1= violent) on repression

Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.698 (1.055)		-0.943 (1.373)
Asia		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
North Africa and Middle East		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-4.998***	-5.276	8.550***	7.275**
Constant cut2	(1.921) -3.588** (1.818)	(3.327) -3.817 (3.316)	(2.376) 14.50*** (2.577)	(3.232) 13.28*** (3.300)
Constant cut3	-2.079 (1.776)	-2.249 (3.220)	(2.377) 19.84*** (2.496)	(3.300) 18.61*** (3.319)
Constant cut4	-0.550 (1.738)	-0.661 (3.145)	26.12*** (2.746)	(3.517) 24.76*** (3.588)
Constant cut5	1.485 (1.649)	1.425 (3.145)	30.95*** (3.215)	29.67*** (4.143)
Constant cut6	3.038* (1.626)	2.999 (3.172)	37.39*** (3.182)	36.18*** (4.296)
Constant cut7	4.623*** (1.671)	4.614 (3.158)		
Constant cut8	7.872*** (1.595)	7.751** (3.155)		
N Log pseudolikelihood Pseudo R ²	467 -619.43854 0.34	437 -585.30526 0.34	578 -245.04152 0.78	539 -235.47906 0.77

Table 17: Separation-process on repression - post-separation conflict included

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 33	PIR Model 34	CL Model 35	CL Model 36
	Widder 55	Widder 54	Widder 55	Widder 50
Separation-process ^(t-1)	-0.112	-0.210	0.293	0.260
	(0.375)	(0.437)	(0.332)	(0.352)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	0.988***	0.985***	4.977***	4.909***
-	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.264)	(0.274)
Time since independence	1.957	1.933	-0.0382	0.801
-	(2.109)	(2.028)	(2.005)	(2.718)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0955***	0.0917***	0.248***	0.260***
	(0.0358)	(0.0355)	(0.0593)	(0.0649)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.379***	-0.542***	-0.0224	-0.117
	(0.104)	(0.171)	(0.0999)	(0.150)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.484**	0.471**	0.535***	0.528**
	(0.204)	(0.225)	(0.169)	(0.207)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0378**	-0.0537***	0.0214	0.00679
	(0.0174)	(0.0198)	(0.0248)	(0.0260)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.225	-0.0608	0.747*	0.782*
	(0.457)	(0.503)	(0.424)	(0.408)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.894	2.750**	-0.562	0.0396
	(0.983)	(1.289)	(0.828)	(1.204)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-2.679		-0.222
		(1.759)		(1.894)
Eastern Europe		-1.030		-0.597
•		(0.827)		(0.729)
Latin America		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity

Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.827 (1.143)		-0.920 (1.397)
Asia		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
North Africa and Middle East		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-6.207**	-9.032**	9.282***	7.591**
	(3.134)	(4.341)	(2.955)	(3.608)
Constant cut2	-4.818	-7.611*	15.26***	13.61***
	(3.049)	(4.327)	(3.273)	(3.794)
Constant cut3	-3.330	-6.080	20.60***	18.92***
	(3.051)	(4.265)	(3.174)	(3.749)
Constant cut4	-1.806	-4.495	26.88***	25.07***
	(3.041)	(4.260)	(3.355)	(3.940)
Constant cut5	0.227	-2.384	31.66***	29.94***
	(2.975)	(4.221)	(3.702)	(4.348)
Constant cut6	1.781	-0.789	38.12***	36.44***
	(2.955)	(4.188)	(3.709)	(4.517)
Constant cut7	3.380	0.838		× /
	(2.927)	(4.134)		
Constant cut8	6.592**	3.909		
	(2.767)	(3.972)		
N	467	437	578	539
Log pseudolikelihood	-620.84132	-586.56332	-244.97733	-235.53214
Pseudo R ²	0.34	0.34	0.78	0.77

The operationalization used for the regressions in Table 16 focus on pre-separation; conflict in a given time (10 years) before the separation makes it a violent separation. And in some cases violence ended some time before the separation was facilitated which could mean that the criteria for case classification have been a bit too "generous". But regardless of this, and as mentioned in the methods chapter, some separations that were initially peaceful experienced conflict and violence not long after separation. When I code these cases as violent, namely Bosnia, Tajikistan, Armenia, Moldova and Georgia, the results are different (Table 17). One of the repression tactics, namely physical integrity violation, now have a negative relationship with violent separation, although none of the models are statistically significant. That this type of repression, compared to civil liberties, is found to have a negative association is not surprising. In times of conflict, application of torture, imprisonment and extrajudicial killings could prove to be quite effective for any government which is thus inclined. It is more easily and quickly applied and a repressive government might find it to be a more beneficial, necessary and fitting response in a chaotic setting. Such abuses are also more easily hidden or blurred by a repressive government which, for instance, can point to the imperatives of war in an attempt to justify their actions. But the extended operationalization does not change the indicated effects on civil liberties. In general, this change in results illustrate the importance of case classification and what criteria are set when operationalizing and conceptualizing conflict. All in all, it looks like, at least for repression, the connection to separation-process is more complex than first anticipated. There seems to be no apparent or obvious relationship between a legacy of violence and prospective repression. All the while, the conflictcharacteristics of violent separations may still matter when predicting repression and it is important to note that even for initially peaceful separations physical integrity rights repression could be aggravated if there is a potential for new conflicts or further fragmentation. This argument is especially relevant for the separation debate, where the prospect of further fragmentation is a source of much debate. But, as none of these findings are statistically significant, I must reject both H₉ and H₁₀.

4.7 H₁₁ and H₁₂: State-capacity of separated states and repression

To begin with, it might be wise to examine the main independent variable supposed to measure state capacity, relative political extraction (RPE). For the physical integrity rights distribution (1981-2011), the mean value indicates that states on average actually have a state capacity-ratio equal to the predicted value. For the civil liberties distribution (1972-2014),

states have on average slightly better state capacity than predicted as the value is >1.00. The states with most state capacity show well over 3 times bigger values than predicted. Those with the least state capacity display about 1/10 of the predicted value.

Variable	Ν	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
RPE (1981-2011)	4,874	1.00	0.42	0.10	3.63
RPE (1972-2014)	6,044	1.01	0.44	0.09	3.75


Table 18: Description of the state-capacity variable; Relative Political Extraction

As observed in Table 19; for separations, higher levels of state capacity appear related to more repression. Whilst physical integrity rights exhibit a negative relationship, it is not found significant on the 0.05-level, albeit on the 0.1-level (Model 38). Civil liberties, on the other hand, is statistically significant at the 0.01-level (Model 40) and appears strongly and negatively related to repression. Put precisely, the effect of higher state capacity on repression is on average stronger, in a negative sense, for separated states than for non-separated states. It would therefore seem like the concept of state capacity does not work as well in separated states as it does in non-separated states. So what could be the reasons for this deviation from my hypothetical expectations?

First of all, it is not, theoretically and generally speaking, unthinkable that a state is able to extract revenue efficiently and still be negatively linked to repression. After all, a government with good resources may purposefully use these to inhibit political opposition and dissent, as acknowledged by Englehart (2009: 177). Better extraction ability by itself does not necessarily reflect any specific political values. As such, it becomes a matter of intentions and a revenue base is indeed what is needed for a government to pursue its desired policy. The desired policy being for instance increased repression if the government feels insecure, thus following a simple logic of political survival. Also, what is basically shown here is that higher state capacity is not the good "medicine" to stimulate less repression in separated states as much as it is for non-separated states. Second, despite well-functioning institutions in terms of revenue and the like, separated states may lack the legal framework suited to strengthen and accommodate civil liberties. In other words, the human rights that constitute civil liberties can easily be infringed if they are not sufficiently sanctioned by law. The quality of extractive capabilities could be independent of such matters. They may occupy a middle ground; fair enough civil liberties and fair enough state capacity. Comparatively speaking, state capacity does not predict physical integrity repression as well as it predicts civil liberties. One could

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argue that perhaps this is because physical integrity repression is less costly than civil liberties repression as a means of curtailing the opposition.



Graph 7: Predicted probabilities for Civil Liberties outcomes – separation versus established independent states interacted with relative political extraction

Graph 7 shows how separated states are more likely, when other factors are held constant, to exhibit worse civil liberties respect. As state capacity increases, separated states are more likely to be found at the lower outcomes like 1 and 3 than the older established states. We also see how they are less likely to belong at the higher outcomes like 5 and 7 than the other states.

As the Relative Political Extraction-measure attempts to model the economy of the state and does not solely focus on only tax-revenue generation, other measures should be applied if only to compare effects and further scrutinize the relationship between separation and repression. Even though RPE is a total taxes/GDP-measure meant to improve more basic tax-operationalization, the operationalization of state-capacity, being a broad and much discussed concept, can be done otherwise in future research on separations. Nonetheless, I must reject

 H_{11} and H_{12} as I cannot point to any statistical significance at the 0.05-level for physical integrity rights and since separated states are found to be more repressive than non-separated states in terms of civil liberties as state capacity increases.

Table 19: State capacity as relative political extraction (RPE) on repression

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 37	PIR Model 38	CL Model 39	CL Model 40
and Civil Liberties (CL)	Model 37	Model 38	Model 39	Model 40
Separation x RPE ^(t-1)	-0.290	-0.436*	-0.695*	-1.055***
	(0.223)	(0.244)	(0.375)	(0.374)
Separation ^(t-1)	0.232	0.286	0.557	0.646
	(0.293)	(0.306)	(0.413)	(0.435)
RPE ^(t-1)	0.145	0.139	0.0751	0.136
	(0.111)	(0.126)	(0.0941)	(0.107)
Decolonization	-0.0791	-0.135	-0.134	-0.109
	(0.141)	(0.165)	(0.112)	(0.138)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.094***	1.002***	4.348***	4.273***
-	(0.0442)	(0.0449)	(0.121)	(0.119)
Time since independence	1.291**	0.928	-0.673	-0.716
	(0.611)	(0.597)	(0.782)	(0.921)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0743***	0.0663***	0.123***	0.101***
2 emotion j, regime	(0.0123)	(0.0150)	(0.0158)	(0.0170)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.278***	-0.359***	-0.0411	-0.0755**
	(0.0355)	(0.0392)	(0.0268)	(0.0371)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.270***	0.175***	0.197***	0.210***
	(0.0463)	(0.0547)	(0.0400)	(0.0600)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0117*	-0.00484	-0.00629	-0.00213
	(0.00685)	(0.00820)	(0.00964)	(0.00885)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.798***	-0.850***	-0.312***	-0.208*
	(0.178)	(0.149)	(0.118)	(0.122)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.101	0.0981	-0.296*	-0.0847
	(0.240)	(0.245)	(0.170)	(0.240)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-0.581***		-0.355*
		(0.198)		(0.185)
Eastern Europe		-0.905***		-0.874***

North Africa and Middle East		-1.426*** (0.341)		-1.819*** (0.286)
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-4.401***	-8.083***	5.311***	3.485***
	(0.804)	(1.110)	(0.633)	(0.875)
Constant cut2	-2.884***	-6.590***	10.11***	8.310***
	(0.788)	(1.102)	(0.647)	(0.879)
Constant cut3	-1.450*	-5.175***	15.16***	13.23***
	(0.776)	(1.092)	(0.716)	(0.917)
Constant cut4	-0.158	-3.896***	19.76***	17.80***
	(0.775)	(1.099)	(0.781)	(0.952)
Constant cut5	1.473*	-2.248**	24.55***	22.71***
	(0.768)	(1.097)	(0.865)	(1.018)
Constant cut6	3.043***	-0.673	29.44***	28.02***
	(0.776)	(1.106)	(0.918)	(1.065)
Constant cut7	4.555*** (0.784)	0.889 (1.102)		
Constant cut8	6.620*** (0.805)	3.125*** (1.075)		
N	3,834	3,555	5,029	4,567
Log pseudolikelihood	-5448.7588	-5024.5706	-2720.6649	-2416.2225
Pseudo R ²	-5448.7588 0.32	0.33	0.71	-2410.2223

Throughout this thesis, civil liberties repression has shown the most consistent pattern. What is it about civil liberties restrictions, this latent type of repression, that seems so much more prevalent in the separated states? Based on the theoretical assumptions, there are several explanations that seem plausible. First, perhaps the new governments seek to repress civil liberties because post-separation political conditions are too fragile and it appears a necessary calculation to implement some obstructions to political challengers who may come to jeopardize the current political order. Perhaps this way of handling any aspiring opposition is not perceived to be as risky as more physical confrontation like violating personal integrity rights³⁶. Restricting the right to assembly, for instance, is arguably more safe than conducting extrajudicial killings in a tender post-separation environment as long as it remains an option. Harsher repressive measures would surely also attract international attention that could sow doubts about the legitimacy of the new state and the separatist movements cause. As implied earlier, the repression tactic of choice may indeed vary from government to government (Davenport 2007b). As noted in the theory chapter, self-determination must be judged as just in order to receive the embrace of the international community. If a new state wants to find its place in this company, it should strive to be both a *de facto* and *de jure* state, acquiring both control and legitimacy, constituting a state both in an empirical and judicial sense. And this perspective mirrors the problems the leaders of a new state can face; keeping it together and working as well as keeping it legitimate. From a normative viewpoint, repression impacts both aspects in a negative way. Summed up, despite some other findings, my analysis does not show sufficient support for any of the 12 hypotheses.

4.8 Robustness checks

In order to evaluate my models further, I run a robustness test analysis using an alternative case-configuration. I then assess the various ordered logit assumptions such as variance inflation factor, outliers and proportional odds tests.

4.8.1 Hensel robustness-test

As mentioned earlier, I conduct a basic robustness-test, where it is applicable, for my findings based on Hensel's (2014) case-configuration. This robustness-test is restricted to the main relationship for each hypothesis, that is, it is not as inquiring as the analysis of my own cases.

³⁶ The perceived necessary action in the face of opposition, it should be noted, will of course also depend on the circumstances.

Nevertheless, using this slightly alternative configuration reveals much the same results as my own (see Appendix 7.4). But, Hensel's cases return more statistically significant results than mine. Most notably, separation interacting with ethnic fractionalization now has a significant relationship with civil liberties repression in the outline model. Also, for Hensel's cases, violent separation is significantly associated with less physical integrity rights repression than non-violent separation (p<0.01). Lastly, separation interacted with state capacity is now also negatively significant with physical integrity repression as well as civil liberties repression. All in all, my results are mostly robust in the sense that they exhibit largely the same patterns as Hensel's configuration.

4.8.2 Assessing the model assumptions: goodness-of-fit and proportional odds

To investigate whether ordered logit is the appropriate method, I need to test the assumptions of ordinal logistic regression. I conduct tests on the models with the most important findings. See Appendix for the full test reports (7.5 to 7.7). I begin by testing the proportional odds assumption. It is important to know if there really is a constancy of effects; that the odds-relationship between each category be described as the same. As mentioned earlier, it can be evaluated by several tests of which I use three. I use the tests that the Stata statistics software are able to conduct on my models³⁷. This involves the Brant-test, an approximate likelihood-ratio test³⁸ and the Lipsitz-test. The Lipsitz-test are utilized by a yet unreleased Stata-script written by Morten W. Fagerland and David W. Hosmer (submitted manuscript, obtained through personal contact with M. W Fagerland)³⁹.

Below is an example of the Brant-test conducted on Model 6, the significant test statistic indicates that the proportional odds assumption has likely been violated. Consequently, log of excluded population, for example, does not violate the proportional odds assumption, which implies that this variable has a predicted effect on repression that fits with the assumption that there is the same proportionality constant between each category of repression.

³⁷ Unfortunately, there are some models where Stata cannot compute all the tests. Because of this, I try to utilize several tests where applicable for the proportional odds assumption. Those reported here and in the Appendix are naturally the ones that Stata can produce results for.

³⁸ I use omodel by Wolfe and Gould (1998).

³⁹ morten.fagerland@medisin.uio.no

Brant-test	Chi-square	P>chi-square	DF
All	445.36	0.000	315
Separation	14.77	0.039	7
Decolonization	10.91	0.143	7
Past levels of repression	16.01	0.025	7
Time since independence	10.21	0.177	7
Democracy/Regime-type	17.62	0.014	7
Log of total population	12.44	0.087	7
Log of GDP per capita	33.22	0.000	7
Log of UN-expenditure	17.38	0.015	7
Civil war	9.85	0.197	7
Ethnic fractionalization	7.15	0.413	7
Log of excluded population	6.42	0.492	7
Eastern Europe	7.85	0.346	7
Latin America	5.99	0.540	7
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.31	0.231	7
Asia	5.70	0.575	7
North Africa and Middle East	5.48	0.601	7

Table 20: Brant-test for proportional odds assumption on Model 6 - Time trend control omitted

Using the same model in the approximate likelihood-ratio test and the Lipsitz-test yields the same conclusion.

Table 21: Approximate LR-test for Model 6

Approximate likelihood-ratio test	Model 6
Chi-square	264.04
Degrees of freedom	119
Prob > chi-square	0.0000

Lipsitz-test	Model 6
Number of groups	10
Statistics	41.623
Degrees of freedom	9
P-value	0.0000

Table 22: Lipsitz-test for Model 6

Unfortunately, the implications are clear; an ordered logit model does not fit the data well enough and alternative models should be considered, but such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some alternative models can be suggested however. Lemeshow (2013: 309) suggest fitting a multinomial model as the easiest solution. It is also possible to fit binary logistic models for each outcome category or to fit a partial proportional odds model, but this is a bit more demanding.

4.8.3 Variance-Inflation-Factor (VIF)


I check the variance-inflation-factor to examine if the models suffer from multi-collinearity. The rule of thumb is that a VIF-value that is >10 could be problematic. I test the extended models for H₁-H₄, the extended models 34 and 36 for H₉-H₁₀ and the models with statistically significant findings; Model 20 (H₆), Models 26 and 28 (H₇-H₈) and Model 40 (H₁₂). The closest any of my single variables for H₁-H₄ comes to approximating the critical rule of thumb is the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy which take the values 9.56, 9.72, 8.21 and 8.28. Whilst the values are a bit high to my liking, they do not exceed 10. Model 20 shows 10.37 for Sub-Saharan Africa, which is problematic. Removing this variable makes the effect statistically insignificant. Model 26 and 28 clearly suffers from multicollinearity as some of the variables actually exceed 30 and the main independent variable's value is 11.36 and 12.08. Models 34 and 38 are good, although the Eastern Europe-dummy approaches a VIF of 10. Model 40 looks good with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, which seems to be a usual suspect, but removing it does not change the regression results in any meaningful way; the statistical significance prevails. Below is an example of a VIF-test for Model 6.

Variables – Model 6	Variance Inflation Factor
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.56
Asia	4.15
Log of GDP per capita	4.08
Eastern Europe	3.64
Latin America	3.24
N. Africa and M. East	2.90
Decolonization	2.78
Past levels of repression	2.69
Separation	2.10
Democracy/Regime	2.10
Ethnic fractionalization	1.91
Log of total population	1.72
Civil war	1.62
Log of excl. population	1.39
Time since independence	1.37
Log of UN-expenditure	1.15
Mean VIF	2.50

Table 23: Variance Inflation Factor for Model 6 - Time trend omitted

4.8.4 Influential observation diagnostics

There are no tests created specifically for conducting influential observation diagnostics for ordered logit, but one possible solution is to create separate binary models for each of the ordinal outcomes then predict and plot their standardized Pearson residuals after running logit regressions. Two dependent variables with a total of 16 outcomes and several different models to test means that there will be a lot of residual-plots to inspect, and there is not necessarily any good rule for when and why a particular observation should be excluded or not. Therefore, I conduct influential observation diagnostics for the largest sample, used in H_1-H_6 and $H_{11}-H_{12}$, where both separated and non-separated states are included.



Graph 8: Example of outliers – Physical Integrity Rights = 0

Graph 8 shows an example of two evident, relatively speaking, outliers at the lowest level of physical integrity rights. These are Congo-Brazzaville in 1993 and Mauritania in 1990. Apart from these, the scatterplot looks fine. See Appendix-graphs 1 and 2 for the rest of the plots. The general trend shows that African and Latin-American countries make up most of the considerably outlying observations on the residual plots

In general, I am not inclined to remove observations and thus interfere with the effects. There are several reasons for this. Since many states over many years are observed, some deviation from the general predictions are likely to occur. Removing observations are risky and it demands a well-founded set of reasons for doing this. I find it hard to come up with a specific reason why a given outlying observation ought to be removed; one should allow for the occurrence of incidental outliers and thus acknowledge the theoretical possibility that some countries may exhibit somewhat contradictory values. A variety of combinations of the independent variables may produce an outlying predicted residual and I cannot always have the sufficient in-depth knowledge to determine why a specific country-year is an outlier.

Countries originating from different state formations are at the core of my analysis, and thus it would be very problematic if I were to remove some country-years that "shock" the general estimations; this could be taken as adjusting the data (the observed reality) in order to make the cases easier to handle and thus distort the effects and the bigger picture by excluding "unwanted" actual conditions. This being said, to serve as an example and for the sake of comparison for those interested, I have included a table where outliers are omitted in the Appendix (see Appendix-table 23). The outliers appear to have virtually no substantial influence when omitted, which means that they do not pose a problem for the analysis as such.

5.0 Conclusion

This thesis has explored the relationship between repression and separated states. Its main purpose has been to find any evidence of a systematic difference between repression in separated states versus other types of states. I have also tried to account for aspects of separation like time since separation, ethnic fractionalization, separation-type, separationprocess and state capacity. The rationale and justification for this topic has relied on the fact that separatists often base their self-determination cause on the prospect of a better political future for their own people by creating their own state and separating from the state they are a part of. As some ethnic groups have suffered at the hands of a state's majority, it poses an interesting question if they could be better off on their own or not. I have used levels of repression as my dependent variable, measured by respect (or disrespect) for human rights such as physical integrity rights and civil liberties. Human rights serve as a concept of human welfare and as a normative standard for whether separated states have managed to form accountable and strong states that serves the basic security interests of their citizens or if they have failed at this. This approach is meant to complement an already existing scholarly debate on the viability of separation which thus far have focused on aspects like democracy, warrecurrence, population transfers and residual violence. I have employed a statistical technique and design that has frequently been used in repression research and I have aimed at utilizing variables that are both theoretically relevant and proven to be good predictors. For this research, I have assembled a new dataset of my own and constructed and coded several new specific variables to utilize.

I find that there is no evident systematic difference in repression in general between separated states and older established states. No statistical significance is obtained when modelling the elapsed time since separation either. However, at least, it is indeed indicated that separated states are more repressive in general. I have found that separated states are more repressive in terms of civil liberties if there is increasing ethnic fractionalization. A certain contrast in human rights respect is found between separation-types like secessions and partitions; partitions exhibit more repression than separations when only violent cases are assessed, but these findings suffer from multicollinearity. Violent separations in general seem more prone to prospective physical integrity violation than non-violent separations once a broad definition for violent separation is applied, but no statistically significant findings are made here.

Generally speaking, the link between violent or non-violent separation and repression does not seem to be that conspicuous since it is also indicated that violent separations may be associated with better civil liberties conditions. The impact on repression is conditional to higher levels of state capacity; I find that separated states are significantly more repressive than non-separated states as relative political extraction increases. As such, it does not constitute a factor that have enabled separatist to make a better state than the large variation of other states that make out the category of reference. I must, however, point out that this significant finding fails to meet the proportional odds assumption for ordered logit and the finding should therefore be evaluated with some caution.

There are three topics for future research that I would like to point out as especially important. The discrepancy between the two repression types or tactics is one such matter. I would like to alert attention to the wider implications of my findings. For example, as this thesis has shown, there is obviously more to learn about why one repression type is more prominent than the other under some circumstances. Why do separated states, on average, seem to have more restricted civil liberties than other states? Is there something about that specific set of human rights that makes it more likely to suffer in a separated states or is it a by-product of other conditions made by separation? Generally speaking, a closer analysis of how separation may create an environment that specifically provides imperatives or incentives that favor a certain repression tactic or manifestation above another would be interesting.

The second crucial point I would like to emphasize is the need for research and in-depth analysis on the impact of violent separation processes on post-separation political order and repression. This is especially since I expected the hypotheses about violent and non-violent separation to be the ones that would exhibit the most evident patterns. What impact or importance does these underlying conditions have on the crucial years after separation, or in other words; in what ways do violence and conflict up to the point of separation impose restraints, if any, on the new state's development of human rights conditions? How does a legacy of violence constitute a determinant? After all, in most cases, conflict and violence is over after separation, so any endeavor able to specifically link these precedents to explicit manifestations of repression is welcome. Contrasting this to the experiences of peacefully separated states ought to make an interesting inquiry.

The third point relates to the separation literatures discussion on ethnic group hostilities

before and after separation. Mechanisms of political exclusion and how its interaction with political opposition may cause repression is another such link that I would say are of special importance as this predictor is found to be very robust, especially in comparison with the ethnic fractionalization variable. Dynamics of group exclusion and competing policy struggles could possibly be at the heart of post-separation politics as the new state begins the challenging task of fashioning a new political order. For instance, do the governments of separated states actively engage in political exclusion and disenfranchisement? And, having seized power and established their own state, what characterizes the rule of armed separatist groups? Do they address or show any explicit interest in human rights conditions? Does this differ from the rule of peaceful separatists? There are many interesting aspects like these to explore. Also, research on international support and involvement in the affairs of new states could uncover some compelling perspectives on the shaping of post-separation policy.

What factors further differentiate separated states? As the specific connection between separated states and repression does not seem to be a widely researched topic, there are many other and new ways to explore these dynamics. Different statistical techniques and designs than the one conducted in this thesis is relevant, especially since the proportional odds assumption is violated. As the ordered logit model is most frequently used, a different logistic model could be used in future research. Because the human rights data is categorical, an alternative to ordered logit may be a multinomial logit model or a partial proportional odds model as suggested earlier. Qualitative inquiries like case-studies and QCA are of course relevant. Preferably, there should also be conducted more comparative research on secessions and partitions in particular in order to elaborate and develop a better framework for how these phenomena should be analyzed. This is especially crucial for validity issues and how to identify which cases that belong together for analyzing this somewhat contested concept.

Other variables connection to post-separation are important too. Specific causal links between UN-involvement such as peacekeeping forces, observers and post-conflict reconstruction in separated states and its impact on repression would be an interesting angle. It would also be worthwhile to explore other measures of state-capacity, administratively or militarily, on separated states.

Finally, is separation a good solution considering these findings? It is safest to say that separation's merit as a solution depends on the conditions present, and from a policy

perspective, most would agree that each case should be judged on its merits. That is also why I have explored conditions like separation-type and separation-process, ethnic fractionalization and state capacity. That being said, the evidence found in this analysis do indicate that separated states do not match the civil liberties of the older states and that peaceful separation does not guarantee better future human rights respect. In addition to this, high state capacity is not necessarily a safeguard against repression in this context. As some of these aspects may seem a bit counter-intuitive, it is important to bear this variation in mind when assessing the consequences of separation. In addition to this, the thesis' most important contribution to the literature, generally speaking, is that separation is not necessarily an inherently bad or good solution in terms of repression; a situation which is neither any worse nor better is a quite likely prospect since the findings reveal that systematic and consistent differences are hard to unravel. For the international community and policy implications, this does not exactly make things any easier. The link between self-determination and the subsequent development of human rights remains an issue of debate. But, we know that even though Eritrea and Montenegro both grew out of separation, there are different factors that may have influenced the fact that these countries have quite disparate respect for human rights. Assessing and accounting for such factors is therefore crucial determinants in evaluating separation as a solution. If it ever comes down to it, the insights gained from such scientific endeavors are ultimately reference points that should guide our evaluations when assessing if the breakaway regions of today, be it Catalonia or Abkhazia, would separate themselves, for better or for worse.

6.0 References

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7.0 Appendix

The appendix contains additional models, including alternative specifications as well as a robustness test. It also contains a general qualitative evaluation of the new separation cases (East Timor, Kosovo, Montenegro and South Sudan) and some notes on coding. I have included some case-lists and the test reports on the ordered logit assumptions.

7.1 New cases

I have updated the current list of new states with four breakups from recent history. These are, in chronological order, East Timor, Montenegro, Kosovo and South Sudan. All these cases have not been analyzed by the literature I presented in Chapter 2 and consequently lack any established classification for me to lean on. In order to classify them, I must discuss these cases a bit more in detail. I only do this because they have not been assessed in the literature and theoretical debate presented. Ideally, for a thorough classification, I would have gone through every case in the cumulated literature more in detail but that is a task too large for this thesis' main purposes. I will now justify the inclusion of these new cases by evaluating how they fit the required criteria. I try to make this as parsimonious as possible.

7.1.1 East Timor:

East Timor (Timor-Leste) has a long history of Portuguese colonial rule. In more recent history, the Timorese did indeed enjoy a brief independence in 1975 following Portugal's withdrawal. The prospect of a new future as an independent state was crushed (after only nine days) when Indonesia forcefully annexed the country. East Timor became the subject of almost 25 years of Indonesia's brutal rule. Armed opposition and guerilla warfare was carried out by Fretilin's (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente; the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) military organization Falintil. During these years, tens of thousands of people were killed and displaced and the Indonesian government established militia groups as well in the fight against the Timorese. In a 1999 referendum with 98 % voter turnout, 78.5 % rejected autonomy within Indonesia in favor of an own independent state. This referendum was followed by violence and the execution of many hundred Timorese. The situation got so bad that eventually Australian UN peacekeepers were deployed to the region. It was not until 2002 that formal and final independence was achieved after an UN-administered transition period (Chopra 2002; McCloskey 2000; Ricklefs 2008).

Thus, the road to independence for East Timor was marked by warfare and repression. Classifying this type of independence is, however, a bit difficult. The ICOW Colonial History Dataset classifies the East Timor 2002 case as a decolonization, with Portugal being the colonial ruler (Hensel 2014). This is probably because:

In East Timor, Portugal, the former colonial power for five centuries, was treated as the lawful administering authority throughout the twenty-four years of Indonesia's occupation: only Australia had recognized Jakarta's claim (Chopra 2002: 984).

This raises a tricky question. Did East Timor really separate from Indonesia or Portugal? The East Timor case illustrates some of the most difficult classification issues in trying to differentiate between decolonization and separation and identifying the relevant universe of cases. Although having lasted for only nine days, the period of independence provided an established claim to independence from the perspective of the Timorese. Arguably, it is most prudent to classify East Timor as a case of violent secession, not only because ethnic groups fought each other, but also because Freitlin can be characterized as a separatist group seeking independence. One could also argue that the East Timorese independence endeavor was more directed towards Indonesia than Portugal (Ricklefs 2008). It is a violent case because the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset list this case as a territorial conflict and Freitlin as a conflict actor. The case also meets the condition that conflict took place 5 years prior and/or up to the very year of actual independence (Gleditsch et al 2002).

7.1.2 Montenegro:

Montenegro has been a part of several political units, including the Ottoman Empire and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Before gaining independence from the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006, the Montenegrins had an established history of independent statehood. Montenegro was recognized as independent by 1860-1880 and was later known as the Kingdom of Montenegro until losing statehood during the first World War. A century later, prominent politicians like prime minister Milo Djukanović pushed for the restoration of independence. The 2006 secession was fulfilled by a referendum with 55.5 % of voters favoring independence and a voter turnout of 86.5 %. International observers approved the way of which the referendum was conducted and the European Union supported the results (Roberts 2007; Gleditsch & Ward 1999). I assert that Montenegro meet the criteria for a peaceful secession; a non-violent separation by an ethnic group with an established territorial claim through former statehood.

7.1.3 Kosovo:

A referendum for secession initiated by Albanians was held shortly after the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991, in many ways signaling the start of further fragmentation in Balkan. The Kosovo crisis and conflict in 1998-1999 involved among others the Kosovo Liberation Army, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Yugoslavia. The authorities in Kosovo declared unilateral independence from Serbia in 2008 and was recognized by some fifty governments a year later. Prior to this, Kosovo had enjoyed an autonomy arrangement administered by the United Nations. Despite the backdrop of violence, the 2008 secession process was unilateral and resolved without conflict (Weller 2009; Glaurdić 2011). The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset code the Kosovo conflict in 1998-1999 as a territorial incompatibility, therefore this case experienced conflict 10 years prior and/or up to the point of independence which was achieved about ten years later, with UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës) seeking separation (Gleditsch et al 2002; Weller 2009). Thus, it is an instance of violent secession.

7.1.4 South Sudan:

After British rule under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the various peoples of the southern parts of Sudan, comprised of many ethnicities, were subjected to Khartoum's exploitive rule. Some argue that the colonizers should rather have left behind two political entities instead of the then new unitary state of Sudan. Religious and cultural differences were among the several issues that put the two regions in opposition. However, South Sudan became independent in 2011, breaking out of Sudan after a long civil war. The referendum itself was peaceful, but the decades of conflicts leading up to it is said to have claimed over two million lives. A rebel insurgency group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was the main force in the fight for independence, but the conflict has been fought for both a national revolution and a separatist cause (LeRiche & Arnold 2013; Natsios 2012; Collins 2008). It is no doubt that this separation was a particularly violent one. The complexity of the South Sudan case makes it difficult to classify. There is no prior claim to statehood, although it is evident from the facts that the southerners never saw northern rule as legitimate. The case does however meet the condition that it was formerly subjected to another state than the rump state. Although there was a shift from revolution to separatism, as elaborated in LeRice & Arnold (2013) and Natsios (2012), the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset code this conflict's incompatibility as governmental because of the rebels initially stated incompatibility (Gleditsch et al 2002). Despite these classification difficulties, I include South

Sudan in my analysis as an example of violent secession.

7.2 A note on coding and arranging political units

Some political units in my analysis need some extra consideration. One prominent example is Yugoslavia. In some datasets, the assigned country codes contain occasional duplicates for Yugoslavia, the succeeding Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the republics constituting these. In the CIRI dataset, for instance, three country names are registered under the same country code. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, and independent Montenegro all share the same POLITY country code, which is 347 (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay 2014)

Should the loose union of Serbia and Montenegro from 2003 to 2006 stand alone as a separate unit? Or should it be treated as a continuation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1992 to 2002? I choose to merge the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the union of Serbia and Montenegro and the remaining Serbian state, treating these as one unit in the CIRI-dataset. This is mainly because this federation succeeded socialist Yugoslavia, thus constituting a continuation. Even though the loose union in 2003 resulted in some institutional changes, Serbia and Montenegro's final union was quite short-lived before the two states took separate paths (Crnobrnja 2005; Roberts 2007). Because of these matters, I code one political unit from 1992-2014. The conceptual scheme found in the separation literature is about comparing the rump and successor state (Kaufmann 1998; Sambanis 2000; Horowitz 2003). In this case, Serbia is always part of the remaining political unit, Serbia did not secede from Yugoslavia, it was rather the dominant political actor (Roberts 2007). The main benefit of this approach⁴⁰ is more parsimonious comparisons.

Unlike the Polity IV dataset, the CIRI-dataset has only one entry for Germany in the recorded period (1981-2011). In other words, unified Germany (1990-) and West-Germany are treated as one, the country code being 260 to correspond with the Polity IV dataset. Polity IV, on the other hand, contains several German entries; Germany, West-Germany, East-Germany and Prussia (the latter is obviously not relevant to my analysis). In order to get the same amount of German political units, I code modern day Germany and West-Germany as one unit, thus

⁴⁰ Likewise, for my research purposes, the Russian Federation is treated as the «same» as the USSR in order to maintain the concept of rump and successor states. This choice is of course not infallible, there could be several reasons to treat the Russian Federation as a *completely* new entity, but then again there would be no reference-category for the successor states.

enabling better country comparability among the various datasets. I do not suspect West Germany to have terribly contrasting human rights respect to unified Germany. This is indeed confirmed by inspecting the CIRI and Freedom House datasets; their respective values do not differ much (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay 2014; Freedom House 2015). It is not an ideal solution, but rather a reasonable and necessary compromise.

7.3 Additional case tables and regressions

Full list of decolonization cases after 1945 used as control variable; from the ICOW Colonial History data (Hensel 2014)⁴¹:

Syria	1946
Jordan	1946
Philippines	1946
India	1947
Bhutan	1947
Pakistan	1947
Myanmar (Burma)	1948
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	1948
Israel	1948
Indonesia	1949
Libya	1951
Laos	1953
Cambodia	1953
Sudan	1956
Ghana	1957
Malaysia	1957
Guinea	1958
Cameroon	1960
Togo	1960
Madagascar (Malagasy Rep.)	1960
Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaire;	
Kinshasa)	1960
Somalia	1960
Congo (Brazzaville)	1960
Niger	1960
Chad	1960
Gabon	1960

⁴¹ East Timor (2002), the Republic of Vietnam (1954) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1954) are coded as decolonization in ICOW Colonial History data (Hensel 2014). East Timor is a new case and not previously discussed in the main literature I have assessed. Because of this I have evaluated it more in-depth and consequently classified it as a violent secession. The two Vietnams are classified as partitions by O'Leary (2007) which means that I must utilize them as such in H_7 - H_8 . These cases are therefore excluded from this list and the decolonization variable.

Sanagal	1960
Senegal	1960 1960
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	1960
Benin (Dahomey) Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	1960
	1960
Cyprus Mali	
	1960
Central African Republic	1960
Nigeria	1960
Mauritania	1960
Sierra Leone	1961
Kuwait	1961
Tanzania (Tanganyika)	1961
Samoa (Western Samoa)	1962
Burundi	1962
Rwanda	1962
Algeria	1962
Trinidad and Tobago	1962
Jamaica	1962
Uganda	1962
Kenya	1963
Zanzibar	1963
Malawi	1964
Malta	1964
Zambia	1964
Gambia	1965
Maldive Islands	1965
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)	1965
Guyana	1966
Botswana	1966
Lesotho	1966
Barbados	1966
Yemen People's Rep. (Aden /	
South)	1967
Nauru	1968
Mauritius	1968
Swaziland	1968
Equatorial Guinea	1968
Tonga	1970
Fiji	1970
Bahrain	1971
Qatar	1971
United Arab Emirates	1971
Bahamas	1973
Grenada	1974
Guinea-Bissau	1974
Mozambique	1975
-	

Comoros	1975
Cape Verde	1975
Sao Tome and Principe	1975
Papua New Guinea	1975
Angola	1975
Suriname	1975
Seychelles	1976
Djibouti	1977
Solomon Islands	1978
Tuvalu	1978
Dominica	1978
St. Lucia	1979
Kiribati	1979
St. Vincent and Grenadines	1979
Vanuatu	1980
Belize	1981
Antigua and Barbuda	1981
St. Kitts and Nevis	1983
Brunei	1984
Marshall Islands	1986
Fed. States of Micronesia	1986
Namibia	1990
Palau	1994

A	Company	4	fan II and II
Appendix-table 1:	Separation	type classification	for H_7 and H_8

State name	Separation type ⁴²
Armenia	Secession
Azerbaijan	Secession
Bangladesh	Secession
Belarus	Secession
Bosnia	Secession
China	Partition (de facto)
Croatia	Secession
Cyprus	Partition
Czech Republic	Secession
Eritrea	Secession
Estonia	Secession
Georgia	Secession
Kosovo	Secession
Kyrgyzstan	Secession
Latvia	Secession
Lithuania	Secession
Macedonia	Secession
Moldova	Secession
North Korea	Partition
North Vietnam	Partition
Slovakia	Secession
Slovenia	Secession
South Korea	Partition
South Sudan	Secession
South Vietnam	Partition
Taiwan	Partition (de facto)
Tajikistan	Secession
Turkmenistan	Secession
Ukraine	Secession
Uzbekistan	Secession
West Germany	Partition

⁴² These cases are all assessed in the broader literature on separations. Source for determining partition is O'Leary (2007). Sources for determining secession are Tir (2005), Suny (2011), Roberts (2007), Weller (2009), LeRiche & Arnold (2013), O'Leary (2007), Sambanis (2000), Plakans (2011), Wilson (2011), Gleditsch & Ward (1999) and Gleditsch et al (2002).

Appendix-table 2: Peaceful cases up to year of separation, then conflict in the following years (Gleditsch et al 2002)

Case	Conflict
1991 Armenia	Nagorno-Karabakh
1991 Georgia	Abkhazia, South Ossetia
1991 Moldova	Dniestr
1991 Tajikistan	Civil war; United Tajik Opposition
1992 Bosnia	Conflict with Croats and Serbs

Appendix-table 3: Separation on repression - civil war omitted

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 1	PIR Model 2	CL Model 3	CL Model 4
Separation ^(t-1)	-0.0355	-0.0922	-0.116	-0.260
separation (*)	-0.0333 (0.128)	-0.0922 (0.187)	(0.128)	(0.189)
	(0.128)	(0.107)	(0.126)	(0.109)
Decolonization	-0.0683	-0.157	-0.103	-0.130
	(0.146)	(0.154)	(0.103)	(0.124)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.167***	1.086***	4.429***	4.361***
	(0.0445)	(0.0434)	(0.115)	(0.113)
ime since independence	0.647	0.226	-1.232	-1.398
	(0.696)	(0.711)	(0.778)	(0.895)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0661***	0.0537***	0.114***	0.0989***
	(0.0128)	(0.0153)	(0.0152)	(0.0159)
og of total population ^(t-1)	-0.283***	-0.360***	-0.0575***	-0.0739**
log of total population	(0.0341)	(0.0402)	(0.0210)	(0.0326)
		(0.0102)	(0.0210)	(0.0520)
og of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.258***	0.187***	0.201***	0.215***
	(0.0450)	(0.0486)	(0.0368)	(0.0535)
og of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0149**	-0.00750	-0.000947	0.00291
og of ON-experiature	(0.00669)	(0.00877)	(0.00908)	(0.00872)
	(0.00009)	(0.00877)	(0.00908)	(0.00872)
thnic fractionalization	-0.221	0.0401	-0.300*	-0.239
	(0.217)	(0.225)	(0.157)	(0.215)
		0 (00***		0.000
log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-0.689***		-0.286
		(0.196)		(0.189)
astern Europe		-0.905***		-0.936***
*		(0.325)		(0.289)
and the second second		1 171444		1 7 17444
atin America		-1.471***		-1.247***
		(0.303)		(0.271)

Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.015*** (0.368)		-1.016*** (0.317)
Asia		-1.161*** (0.322)		-1.185*** (0.280)
North Africa and Middle East		-1.357*** (0.334)		-1.578*** (0.269)
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-4.044*** (0.707)	-7.297*** (1.015)	5.354*** (0.546)	3.929*** (0.793)
Constant cut2	-2.586***	-5.861***	10.13***	8.668***
Constant cut3	(0.692) -1.216* (0.601)	(1.009) -4.509*** (1.007)	(0.573) 15.14*** (0.621)	(0.806) 13.53*** (0.849)
Constant cut4	(0.691) 0.0443	(1.007) -3.261***	(0.631) 19.79***	(0.848) 18.13***
Constant cut5	(0.691) 1.647**	(1.013) -1.643 (1.015)	(0.703) 24.62***	(0.884) 23.08***
Constant cut6	(0.689) 3.207***	(1.015) -0.0781	(0.779) 29.54***	(0.947) 28.39***
Constant cut7	(0.699) 4.728*** (0.707)	(1.026) 1.493 (1.026)	(0.835)	(0.988)
Constant cut8	(0.707) 6.806*** (0.726)	(1.026) 3.745*** (1.003)		
N Log popudalikalihood	3,966	3,660	5,527	4,983
Log pseudolikelihood Pseudo R ²	-5675.2672 0.32	-5227.4046 0.33	-2949.3567 0.72	-2616.0679 0.72

Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Annondiv table /l. Senaration type on	ronroccion with India and Pakistan
Appendix-table 4: Separation-type on	10000000000 = 0000000000000000000000000

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 5	PIR Model 6	CL Model 7	CL Model 8
Separation-type ^(t-1)	-0.458	-1.380	0.0857	-0.341
	(0.542)	(0.881)	(0.366)	(0.468)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	0.997***	0.984***	4.945***	4.906***
	(0.129)	(0.135)	(0.264)	(0.285)
Time since independence	1.895	1.682	-0.288	0.259
	(1.543)	(1.727)	(1.540)	(1.716)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0590*	0.0442	0.224***	0.242***
	(0.0325)	(0.0355)	(0.0541)	(0.0591)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.446***	-0.685***	-0.0860*	-0.257
	(0.0801)	(0.139)	(0.0447)	(0.161)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.558**	0.615**	0.506***	0.529***
	(0.223)	(0.246)	(0.166)	(0.199)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0419**	-0.0580***	0.0222	0.00960
	(0.0167)	(0.0195)	(0.0193)	(0.0204)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.722*	-0.659	0.253	0.290
	(0.408)	(0.425)	(0.334)	(0.325)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.226	2.212	-0.994**	-0.0900
	(0.676)	(1.441)	(0.462)	(1.100)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-3.263*		-1.183
		(1.862)		(2.035)
Eastern Europe		-1.629*		-1.126
		(0.836)		(0.945)
Latin America		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity

Sub-Saharan Africa		-2.417** (1.185)		-1.383 (1.528)
Asia		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
North Africa and Middle East		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-7.270***	-11.47***	7.520***	4.215
	(2.457)	(3.091)	(1.465)	(3.638)
Constant cut2	-5.772**	-9.965***	13.08***	9.852***
	(2.338)	(3.013)	(1.490)	(3.530)
Constant cut3	-4.203*	-8.405***	18.84***	15.70***
	(2.283)	(2.949)	(1.610)	(3.564)
Constant cut4	-2.738	-6.917**	24.57***	21.31***
	(2.296)	(2.948)	(1.758)	(3.726)
Constant cut5	-0.740	-4.872*	29.78***	26.63***
	(2.256)	(2.921)	(2.130)	(4.152)
Constant cut6	0.791	-3.306	36.00***	32.88***
	(2.224)	(2.923)	(2.241)	(4.334)
Constant cut7	2.376	-1.671		
	(2.265)	(2.963)		
Constant cut8	5.484**	1.317		
	(2.182)	(3.003)		
N	545	515	682	643
Log pseudolikelihood	-708.25544	-675.82413	-300.47958	-288.85731
Pseudo R ²	0.38	0.37	0.77	0.76

Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 9	PIR Model 10	CL Model 11	CL Model 12
Separation-type ^(t-1)	0.330	-4.622	0.0668	-9.501***
	(0.602)	(3.483)	(0.436)	(3.462)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	0.965***	0.780***	5.397***	4.980***
	(0.195)	(0.225)	(0.677)	(0.800)
Time since independence	1.255	3.183	1.514	3.183
	(3.340)	(4.588)	(3.575)	(3.108)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.101**	-0.0467	0.114**	0.0130
	(0.0493)	(0.134)	(0.0470)	(0.128)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.330***	-2.364*	-0.295**	-3.757***
208 of total Population	(0.125)	(1.270)	(0.134)	(1.148)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.465*	0.735*	0.395	0.634
	(0.255)	(0.427)	(0.336)	(0.769)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0398	-0.0163	-0.0105	-0.144***
	(0.0262)	(0.0440)	(0.0440)	(0.0449)
Civil war ^(t-1)	0.352	0.234	0.787	1.094
	(0.642)	(0.802)	(0.755)	(0.864)
Ethnic fractionalization	2.531	21.63*	-3.986***	21.11**
	(1.749)	(12.72)	(1.163)	(8.396)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-27.69		-65.33***
		(35.42)		(22.17)
Eastern Europe		-11.92		-20.49***
		(7.752)		(6.907)
Latin America		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity

Appendix-table 5: Separation-type on repression - adjusted to only violent cases (without India and Pakistan)

Sub-Saharan Africa		-21.98 (13.77)		-31.94*** (10.26)
Asia		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
North Africa and Middle East		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-5.089	-43.78	3.997	-65.68***
	(3.530)	(27.03)	(3.868)	(23.10)
Constant cut2	-3.789	-42.43	10.92**	-57.91**
	(3.257)	(27.01)	(4.482)	(23.55)
Constant cut3	-2.016	-40.62	16.83***	-51.46**
	(3.250)	(26.94)	(4.510)	(23.49)
Constant cut4	-0.479	-38.96	23.36***	-44.86*
	(3.323)	(26.86)	(5.105)	(23.59)
Constant cut5	1.589	-36.76	26.89***	-41.05*
	(3.252)	(26.81)	(4.870)	(22.84)
Constant cut6	3.354	-34.64	35.32***	-30.74
	(3.110)	(26.76)	(5.905)	(24.57)
Constant cut7	4.419	-32.92		
	(3.186)	(26.43)		
Constant cut8	6.892**	-30.86		
	(2.981)	(26.47)		
Ν	213	183	272	233
Log pseudolikelihood	-287.456	-239.00684	-100.41463	-83.671999
Pseudo R ²	0.36	0.37	0.80	0.80

Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix -table 6: Multicollinearity removed

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 26	CL Model 28
Separation-type ^(t-1)	0.904	0.327
	(0.719)	(0.644)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.053***	5.031***
	(0.209)	(0.523)
Time since independence	3.157	2.287
	(3.076)	(2.847)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0188	0.171*
	(0.0420)	(0.0883)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	Source of	Source of
	multicollinearity	multicollinearity
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.476	0.628**
	(0.297)	(0.289)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0196	-0.0491*
	(0.0527)	(0.0269)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.727	0.00197
	(0.549)	(0.747)
Ethnic fractionalization	-3.672**	-0.367
	(1.464)	(1.597)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)	9.745***	-0.549
	(3.699)	(3.145)
Eastern Europe	2.510**	0.516
	(1.127)	(0.842)

Sub-Saharan Africa	3.449**	0.185
	(1.359)	(1.130)
Time trend control	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	1.636	10.70***
	(2.239)	(2.054)
Constant cut2	3.200	16.44***
	(2.063)	(2.937)
Constant cut3	5.030**	22.54***
	(2.027)	(3.246)
Constant cut4	6.445***	27.55***
	(2.100)	(3.266)
Constant cut5	8.346***	33.14***
	(2.037)	(3.923)
Constant cut6	9.988***	40.91***
	(2.025)	(5.017)
Constant cut7	11.11***	
	(2.179)	
Constant cut8	12.90***	
	(2.217)	
N	243	316
Log pseudolikelihood	-322.21747	-139.49513
Pseudo R^2	0.36	0.76

Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix-table 7: Separation-process on repression - civil war omitted

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 13	PIR Model 14	CL Model 15	CL Model 16
Separation-process ^(t-1)	0.380	0.498	0.308	0.498*
Separation process	(0.318)	(0.435)	(0.268)	(0.284)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.005***	1.005***	4.936***	4.872***
, i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.254)	(0.262)
Time since independence	2.000	1.928	0.292	0.916
	(2.015)	(2.118)	(2.023)	(2.664)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0949***	0.0901***	0.258***	0.276***
	(0.0249)	(0.0249)	(0.0734)	(0.0769)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.333***	-0.383**	-0.0597	-0.102
	(0.0696)	(0.153)	(0.0818)	(0.146)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.530***	0.518***	0.420**	0.424**
	(0.174)	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.215)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0444**	-0.0536**	0.0300	0.0180
	(0.0178)	(0.0231)	(0.0268)	(0.0272)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.737**	3.446***	-0.872	-0.589
	(0.712)	(1.090)	(0.751)	(0.913)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-2.294		0.874
		(1.734)		(1.911)
Eastern Europe		-0.400		-0.158
-		(0.878)		(0.770)
Latin America		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.727		-0.697
		(1.066)		(1.350)

North Africa and Middle East		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-4.577***	-5.158	8.036***	7.533**
	(1.736)	(3.316)	(2.442)	(3.247)
Constant cut2	-3.180*	-3.709	13.92***	13.49***
	(1.680)	(3.320)	(2.634)	(3.296)
Constant cut3	-1.676	-2.147	19.25***	18.82***
	(1.634)	(3.223)	(2.537)	(3.306)
Constant cut4	-0.145	-0.555	25.55***	24.97***
	(1.606)	(3.149)	(2.803)	(3.584)
Constant cut5	1.887	1.532	30.33***	29.83***
	(1.522)	(3.149)	(3.278)	(4.131)
Constant cut6	3.440**	3.108	36.72***	36.33***
	(1.516)	(3.173)	(3.261)	(4.327)
Constant cut7	5.025***	4.721		
	(1.564)	(3.161)		
Constant cut8	8.271***	7.851**		
	(1.514)	(3.162)		
N	467	437	578	539
Log pseudolikelihood	-619.79554	-585.5262	-246.56985	-236.82082
Pseudo R ²	0.34	0.34	0.78	0.77

Omitted: collinearity

Omitted: collinearity

Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Asia

7.4 Evaluation of the Hensel robustness-test

To test the robustness of my results, I run regressions with the case classification used by the ICOW Colonial History Dataset (Hensel 2014) on repression. I only run this classification on the most basic models. Although Hensel's case classifications differ a bit from mine (as Table 3 and Appendix-table 13 shows), the robustness test shows that the findings and tendencies are quite the same. The effect of the control variables is also quite consistent with the effect in my models. The explained variance, Pseudo R^2 , remain largely similar to mine. Just like my case classification, no statistical significance is achieved for physical integrity rights (Appendix-table 8). But for civil liberties, unlike my own classification, there is a systematic negative relationship in a parsimonious model. Separated states, *ceteris paribus*, repress civil liberties more than other states, but when more variables are added this effect is gone. The likeness of the results indicates that for H₁-H₄, my findings are robust enough to stay unaltered, at least in terms of direction, when using a different case setup.

The fifth and sixth hypothesis shows a statistically significant effect on civil liberties repression. This relationship is negative as is also indicated with my case-configuration. The association with physical integrity rights is the same (Table 12 and Appendix-table 9). Looking at the basic outline model for all secessions and partitions, the robustness test results for the seventh and eighth hypotheses do not entirely indicate the same tendency as my main setup (Table 14 vs. Appendix-table 10). With the Hensel-configuration, partition would look more promising than secession on civil liberties (p<0.01), but we cannot say with any more certainty when it comes to physical integrity rights as long as no statistical significance is found. Apart that from that, the results for H₇-H₈ are relatively robust.

We can test the robustness of the ninth and tenth hypothesis with Hensel's case setup as well. As Table 3 and Appendix-table 13 shows, Hensel has fewer violent cases, but he has also coded Bosnia-Herzegovina as violent, emphasizing the aftermath of separation. Hensel's setup yields much the same results as mine, which is not surprising as the separation-process classifications are pretty much alike. It shows the same positive relationship between violent separation and both repression types, which again is a bit counter-intuitive. However, one thing has changed. In contrast to my setup, the Hensel setup is statistically significant when it comes to physical integrity rights. All in all, my initial findings for H₉ and H₁₀ seem pretty robust.

The results for the ninth and tenth hypothesis is also consistent with my own (Table 19 and

Appendix-table 12). State capacity continues to have a negative effect on both repression types and Hensel's cases achieve statistical significance on both (p<0.01). My cases are only at this level of significance on civil liberties. That being said, the general trend stays the same and my findings are generally robust to this alternative case setup.

Appendix-table 8: Robustness test using Hensel's (2014) separation cases on repression

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 17	PIR Model 18	CL Model 19	CL Model 20	
Separation ^(t-1)	-0.0653 (0.140)	-0.267 (0.180)	-0.281** (0.142)	-0.358* (0.217)	
Decolonization	0.00290 (0.134)	-0.0801 (0.163)	-0.0640 (0.102)	-0.0918 (0.128)	
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.101*** (0.0436)	1.011*** (0.0446)	4.406*** (0.114)	4.356*** (0.114)	
Time since independence	1.040 (0.714)	0.795 (0.749)	-0.836 (0.815)	-1.128 (0.928)	
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0769*** (0.0121)	0.0700*** (0.0139)	0.125*** (0.0150)	0.106*** (0.0162)	
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.276*** (0.0341)	-0.353*** (0.0374)	-0.0312 (0.0230)	-0.0548* (0.0329)	
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.259*** (0.0450)	0.169*** (0.0501)	0.202*** (0.0377)	0.208*** (0.0542)	
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0131* (0.00722)	-0.00697 (0.00836)	0.00217 (0.00930)	0.00468 (0.00846)	
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.806*** (0.174)	-0.867*** (0.150)	-0.372*** (0.116)	-0.268** (0.118)	
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.235 (0.222)	-0.0137 (0.236)	-0.336** (0.164)	-0.271 (0.219)	
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-0.580*** (0.185)		-0.222 (0.179)	
Eastern Europe		-0.882*** (0.319)		-0.903*** (0.286)	

Latin America		-1.618*** (0.327)		-1.256*** (0.274)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.108***		-1.046***
		(0.390)		(0.319)
Asia		-1.236***		-1.195***
		(0.335)		(0.287)
North Africa and Middle East		-1.340***		-1.559***
		(0.337)		(0.274)
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-4.593***	-8.091***	5.649***	4.139***
	(0.769)	(1.058)	(0.566)	(0.798)
Constant cut2	-3.078***	-6.603***	10.40***	8.860***
	(0.752)	(1.051)	(0.588)	(0.804)
Constant cut3	-1.641**	-5.187***	15.40***	13.71***
	(0.744)	(1.042)	(0.643)	(0.848)
Constant cut4	-0.334	-3.896***	20.08***	18.34***
	(0.742)	(1.047)	(0.715)	(0.886)
Constant cut5	1.294*	-2.253**	24.95***	23.32***
	(0.738)	(1.048)	(0.793)	(0.945)
Constant cut6	2.854***	-0.687	29.88***	28.65***
	(0.747)	(1.057)	(0.848)	(0.983)
Constant cut7	4.364***	0.874	(0.0.10)	(00,00)
	(0.755)	(1.055)		
Constant cut8	6.422***	3.106***		
	(0.776)	(1.030)		
N	3,964	3,660	5,503	4,983
Log pseudolikelihood	-5621.3411	-5192.0026	-2937.6919	-2612.6513
Pseudo R ²	0.32	0.33	0.72	0.72

Appendix-table 9: Hensel's (2014) cases interacted with ethnic fractionalization on repression

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) and Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 21	PIR Model 22	CL Model 23	CL Model 24
Sep. x Ethnic fractionalization ^(t-1)	0.705	-0.364	-0.654**	-1.590***
Sep. x Eunic fractionalization	(0.556)	(0.682)	(0.294)	(0.526)
	(0.350)	(0.082)	(0.294)	(0.320)
Separation ^(t-1)	-0.299	-0.156	-0.0629	0.119
	(0.252)	(0.292)	(0.158)	(0.273)
Decolonization	0.0238	-0.0771	-0.0804	-0.0804
	(0.139)	(0.162)	(0.105)	(0.128)
ast levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.100***	1.011***	4.406***	4.355***
	(0.0435)	(0.0446)	(0.114)	(0.114)
	0.000	0.070	0.750	0.026
Time since independence	0.890	0.860	-0.750	-0.936
	(0.687)	(0.768)	(0.818)	(0.930)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0775***	0.0694***	0.125***	0.106***
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(0.0124)	(0.0140)	(0.0151)	(0.0161)
				· · · · · ·
log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.274***	-0.354***	-0.0352	-0.0615*
	(0.0340)	(0.0376)	(0.0233)	(0.0332)
log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.261***	0.163***	0.202***	0.187***
	(0.0453)	(0.0537)	(0.0375)	(0.0528)
log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0141*	-0.00671	0.00301	0.00634
log of on-expenditure	(0.00739)	(0.00819)	(0.00931)	(0.00836)
	(0.00737)	(0.00017)	(0.00751)	(0.00050)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.807***	-0.868***	-0.374***	-0.269**
	(0.175)	(0.149)	(0.116)	(0.119)
				· · · ·
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.293	0.0226	-0.288*	-0.112
	(0.235)	(0.254)	(0.174)	(0.233)
or of politically avaluated a second stimulation (t-1)		-0.585***		-0.242
log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)				
		(0.187)		(0.180)

Log pseudolikelihood Pseudo R ²	-5620.3192 0.32	-5191.7762 0.33	-2937.1331 0.72	-2609.9043 0.72
N	3,946	3,660	5,503	4,983
	(0.772)	(1.060)		
Constant cut8	6.449***	3.032***		
	(0.751)	(1.088)		
Constant cut7	4.391***	0.799		
	(0.743)	(1.089)	(0.848)	(0.986)
Constant cut6	2.879***	-0.762	29.84***	28.40***
	(0.734)	(1.080)	(0.793)	(0.955)
Constant cut5	1.317*	-2.328**	24.91***	23.05***
	(0.737)	(1.078)	(0.714)	(0.894)
Constant cut4	-0.312	-3.970***	20.04***	18.07***
	(0.739)	(1.071)	(0.643)	(0.856)
Constant cut3	-1.617**	-5.261***	15.36***	13.44***
	(0.748)	(1.080)	(0.588)	(0.815)
Constant cut2	-3.053***	-6.678***	10.36***	8.573***
	(0.764)	(1.086)	(0.566)	(0.809)
Constant cut1	-4.568***	-8.167***	5.601***	3.856***
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
			••	
		(0.347)		(0.283)
North Africa and Middle East		-1.365***		-1.665***
		(0.365)		(0.300)
Asia		-1.281***		-1.379***
		(0.418)		(0.329)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.156***		-1.237***
		(0.340)		(0.288)
Latin America		-1.642***		-1.362***
		(0.320)		(0.284)

Appendix-table 10: Robustness test using Hensels (2014) separation-type cases on repression

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 25	PIR Model 26	CL Model 27	CL Model 28
Separation-type ^(t-1)	0.0607	-0.163	0.898**	0.718
separation-type	(0.415)	(0.476)	(0.435)	(0.487)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.052***	1.040***	4.809***	4.652***
	(0.129)	(0.142)	(0.288)	(0.246)
Fime since independence	2.243	2.202	1.005	-0.784
	(2.067)	(2.765)	(1.575)	(1.997)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.109***	0.101***	0.271***	0.267***
	(0.0248)	(0.0292)	(0.0589)	(0.0690)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.318***	-0.350**	-0.00753	0.00563
	(0.0785)	(0.143)	(0.111)	(0.149)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.532***	0.611***	0.263***	0.389*
G I I I	(0.131)	(0.161)	(0.0988)	(0.214)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0456*	-0.0503**	0.0196	0.0158
	(0.0263)	(0.0236)	(0.0271)	(0.0260)
Civil war ^(t-1)	0.283	0.329	0.852*	0.842*
	(0.430)	(0.490)	(0.498)	(0.439)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.577**	2.930**	-0.763	-0.619
	(0.705)	(1.225)	(0.658)	(1.049)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-2.655*		0.00180
		(1.427)		(1.895)
Eastern Europe		-0.288		0.471
		(0.738)		(0.919)
Latin America		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearit

Sub-Saharan Africa		-0.850 (1.151)		0.464 (1.541)
Asia		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
North Africa and Middle East		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-3.296*	-3.368	8.312***	8.425***
	(1.776)	(2.687)	(2.619)	(3.014)
Constant cut2	-1.904	-1.920	13.38***	13.50***
	(1.660)	(2.677)	(2.553)	(2.760)
Constant cut3	-0.561	-0.531	19.35***	18.93***
	(1.599)	(2.629)	(2.779)	(2.938)
Constant cut4	1.060	1.124	25.25***	24.80***
	(1.539)	(2.557)	(3.063)	(3.236)
Constant cut5	3.167**	3.326	30.09***	29.70***
	(1.448)	(2.497)	(3.518)	(3.654)
Constant cut6	4.765***	4.937*	36.52***	35.90***
	(1.466)	(2.562)	(3.566)	(3.808)
Constant cut7	6.584***	6.692***		× ,
	(1.397)	(2.499)		
Constant cut8	8.889***	9.031***		
	(1.377)	(2.539)		
N	400	370	497	455
Log pseudolikelihood	-547.84087	-504.80853	-230.24438	-216.32525
Pseudo R ²	0.31	0.31	0.74	0.74

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR)	PIR	PIR	CL	CL
Civil Liberties (CL)	Model 29	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32
Separation-process ^(t-1)	0.358	1.435***	0.309	0.533
	(0.260)	(0.490)	(0.299)	(0.431)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.021***	0.989***	4.908***	4.671***
	(0.132)	(0.149)	(0.298)	(0.281)
Time since independence	2.642	2.646	1.314	-1.071
	(1.806)	(2.821)	(1.718)	(2.180)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.110***	0.109***	0.323***	0.346***
	(0.0262)	(0.0335)	(0.0764)	(0.0876)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.350***	-0.200	0.0528	0.132
	(0.0876)	(0.129)	(0.115)	(0.169)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.579***	0.525***	0.377***	0.584***
	(0.125)	(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.221)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0457*	-0.0410*	0.0241	0.0177
	(0.0267)	(0.0241)	(0.0314)	(0.0316)
Civil war ^(t-1)	0.321	0.245	0.824	0.822*
	(0.443)	(0.502)	(0.512)	(0.444)
Ethnic fractionalization	1.558***	2.117*	-1.078	-1.395
	(0.564)	(1.123)	(0.749)	(1.555)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-2.043 (1.497)		0.708 (2.170)
Eastern Europe		1.670** (0.672)		1.296 (0.929)
Latin America		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity

Appendix-table 11: Robustness test using Hensel's (2014) separation-process cases on repression

Sub-Saharan Africa		-0.107 (1.215)		1.470 (1.882)
Asia		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
North Africa and Middle East		Omitted: collinearity		Omitted: collinearity
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-3.311*	0.196	9.834***	11.49***
	(1.773)	(2.531)	(2.744)	(3.196)
Constant cut2	-1.945	1.596	15.10***	16.74***
	(1.660)	(2.529)	(2.712)	(2.916)
Constant cut3	-0.630	2.919	21.39***	22.31***
	(1.647)	(2.530)	(2.957)	(3.147)
Constant cut4	0.977	4.522*	27.59***	28.63***
	(1.581)	(2.456)	(3.292)	(3.489)
Constant cut5	3.055**	6.641***	32.69***	33.84***
	(1.482)	(2.436)	(3.750)	(3.754)
Constant cut6	4.729***	8.314***	39.01***	40.14***
	(1.401)	(2.479)	(3.790)	(3.954)
Constant cut7	6.463***	10.03***		
	(1.382)	(2.454)		
Constant cut8	8.813***	12.64***		
	(1.407)	(2.542)		
N	382	352	475	433
Log pseudolikelihood	-523.84461	-478.28195	-209.94546	-194.92092
Pseudo R ²	0.31	0.32	0.76	0.76

Appendix-table 12: Robustness test using Hensels (2014) cases - state-capacity on repression

Physical Integrity Rights (PIR)	PIR	PIR	CL	CL
Civil Liberties (CL)	Model 33	Model 34	Model 35	Model 36
Separation x RPE ^(t-1)	-0.383**	-0.659***	-0.640*	-1.337***
	(0.188)	(0.245)	(0.360)	(0.314)
Separation ^(t-1)	0.325	0.387	0.302	0.837**
	(0.251)	(0.314)	(0.382)	(0.352)
RPE ^(t-1)	0.152	0.147	0.0637	0.146
	(0.113)	(0.126)	(0.0934)	(0.109)
Decolonization	-0.0502	-0.0752	-0.116	-0.0762
	(0.140)	(0.171)	(0.111)	(0.146)
Past levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.094***	1.001***	4.348***	4.271***
	(0.0443)	(0.0449)	(0.121)	(0.119)
Time since independence	1.357**	1.168*	-0.223	-0.432
	(0.656)	(0.658)	(0.828)	(0.921)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0748***	0.0642***	0.122***	0.101***
	(0.0124)	(0.0150)	(0.0158)	(0.0169)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.274***	-0.354***	-0.0367	-0.0712*
	(0.0355)	(0.0387)	(0.0258)	(0.0374)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.272***	0.172***	0.197***	0.211***
	(0.0464)	(0.0530)	(0.0408)	(0.0618)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0118*	-0.00419	-0.00607	-0.00112
	(0.00698)	(0.00803)	(0.00968)	(0.00882)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.801***	-0.848***	-0.324***	-0.206*
	(0.178)	(0.149)	(0.118)	(0.123)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.105	0.0920	-0.338*	-0.0650
	(0.237)	(0.246)	(0.175)	(0.247)
Log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-0.607*** (0.199)		-0.375** (0.185)
Eastern Europe		-0.859***		-0.863***

Name of separation	Type of separation	Process of separation
Armenia	Secession	Non-violent
Azerbaijan	Secession	Non-violent
Bangladesh	Secession	Violent
Belarus	Secession	Non-violent
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Secession	Violent
Croatia	Secession	Violent
Czech Republic	Partition	Non-violent
East Germany	Partition	Violent
Eritrea	Secession	Violent
Georgia	Secession	Non-violent
Kazakhstan	Secession	Non-violent
Kosovo	Secession	Violent
Kyrgyzstan	Secession	Non-violent
Macedonia	Secession	Non-violent
Moldova	Secession	Non-violent
Montenegro	Secession	Non-violent
North Korea	Partition	Violent
Singapore	Secession	Non-violent
Slovakia	Partition	Non-violent
Slovenia	Secession	Violent
South Korea	Partition	Violent
South Sudan	Secession	Violent
Taiwan	Secession	Violent
Tajikistan	Secession	Non-violent
Turkmenistan	Secession	Non-violent
Ukraine	Secession	Non-violent
Uzbekistan	Secession	Non-violent
West Germany	Partition	Violent

Appendix-table 13: Hensel's (2014) classification

7.5 VIF test statistics

>10= Potential multi-collinearity problems

Time trend control is omitted to save space.

Appendix-table 14: VIF – Model 8

Variables – Model 8	Variance Inflation Factor	
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.72	
Past levels of repression	4.83	
Log of GDP per capita	4.32	
Asia	4.15	
Democracy/Regime	3.87	
Eastern Europe	3.52	
Latin America	3.08	
N. Africa and M. East	3.01	
Decolonization	2.74	
Separation	2.05	
Ethnic fractionalization	1.91	
Log of total population	1.49	
Log of excl. population	1.40	
Time since independence	1.30	
Civil war	1.26	
Log of UN-expenditure	1.13	
Mean VIF	2.53	

Appendix-table 15: VIF – Model 10

Variables – Model 10	Variance Inflation Factor	
Sub-Saharan Africa	8.21	
Log of GDP per capita	4.12	
Asia	3.51	
Latin America	3.26	
Eastern Europe	3.07	
N. Africa and M. East	2.71	
Past levels of repression	2.69	
Democracy/Regime	2.06	
Ethnic fractionalization	1.83	
Log of total population	1.62	
Civil war	1.61	
Log of excl. population	1.39	
Time since separation	1.30	
Log of UN-expenditure	1.15	
Time since independence for est. states	1.05	
Time since decolonization	1.03	
Mean VIF	2.37	

Appendix-table	16:	VIF-	Model	12
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Variables – Model 12	Variance Inflation Factor	
Sub-Saharan Africa	8.28	
Log of GDP per capita	4.36	
Asia	3.54	
Latin America	3.09	
Eastern Europe	2.91	
Democracy/Regime	3.86	
N. Africa and M. East	2.80	
Ethnic fractionalization	1.83	
Log of total population	1.41	
Log of excl. population	1.40	
Time since separation	1.27	
Civil war	1.25	
Log of UN-expenditure	1.13	
Time since independence for est. states	1.04	
Time since decolonization	1.03	
Mean VIF	2.43	

Appendix-table 17: VIF – Model 20

Variables – Model 20	Variance Inflation Factor	
Sub-Saharan Africa	10.37	
Past levels of repression	4.82	
Asia	4.56	
Log of GDP per capita	4.54	
Democracy/Regime	3.90	
Latin America	3.18	
N. Africa and M. East	3.06	
Eastern Europe	3.06	
Separation	2.85	
Decolonization	2.75	
Separation x E. Fractionalization	2.62	
Ethnic fractionalization	1.97	
Log of total population	1.50	
Log of excl. population	1.41	
Civil war	1.25	
Log of UN-expenditure	1.14	
Mean VIF	2.57	

Appendix-table 18: VIF – Model 26

Variables – Model 26	Variance Inflation Factor	
Sub-Saharan Africa	34.44	
Eastern Europe	33.16	
Log of total population	26.63	
Ethnic fractionalization	19.01	
Log of excl. population	11.54	
Separation-type	11.36	
Log of GDP per capita	4.50	
Past levels of repression	3.81	
Democracy/Regime	2.40	
Log of UN-expenditure	1.66	
Time since independence	1.97	
Civil war	1.96	
Mean VIF	5.70	

Appendix-table 19: VIF – Model 28

Variables – Model 28	Variance Inflation Factor	
Eastern Europe	32.91	
Sub-Saharan Africa	29.43	
Log of total population	25.11	
Ethnic fractionalization	20.54	
Log of excl. population	13.13	
Separation-type	12.08	
Past levels of repression	7.89	
Democracy/Regime	5.31	
Log of GDP per capita	5.20	
Log of UN-expenditure	1.73	
Civil war	1.72	
Time since independence	1.62	
Mean VIF	5.50	

Appendix-table 20: VIF – Model 34

Variables – Model 34	Variance Inflation Factor	
Eastern Europe	9.40	
Log of total population	8.21	
Ethnic fractionalization	5.67	
Time since independence	4.04	
Log of GDP per capita	3.62	
Past levels of repression	3.07	
Separation-process	2.35	
Log of excl. population	2.32	
Democracy/Regime	2.09	
Log of UN-expenditure	1.44	
Civil war	1.39	
Mean VIF	5.54	

Appendix-table 21: VIF – Model 36

Variables – Model 36	Variance Inflation Factor	
Eastern Europe	9.37	
Log of total population	7.03	
Past levels of repression	6.57	
Ethnic fractionalization	5.92	
Democracy/Regime	4.87	
Log of GDP per capita	4.61	
Time since independence	3.47	
Log of excl. population	2.34	
Separation-process	2.26	
Civil war	1.38	
Log of UN-expenditure	1.31	
Mean VIF	5.53	

Appendix-table	22:	VIF –	Model 40
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Variables – Model 40	Variance Inflation Factor	
Sub-Saharan Africa	10.37	
Separation	9.39	
Separation x RPE	9.25	
Past levels of repression	5.19	
Log of GDP per capita	4.35	
Asia	4.19	
Democracy/Regime	3.83	
Eastern Europe	3.41	
N. Africa and M. East	3.36	
Latin America	3.07	
Decolonization	2.74	
Ethnic fractionalization	2.01	
Log of total population	1.54	
Log of excl. population	1.46	
Civil war	1.25	
Time since independence	1.25	
Log of UN-expenditure	1.13	
Mean VIF	2.78	


Appendix-table 23: Outliers omitted


Physical Integrity Rights (PIR) Civil Liberties (CL)	PIR Model 37	PIR Model 38	CL Model 39	CL Model 40
Separation-type ^(t-1)	-0.0831	-0.187	-0.144	-0.293
Separation-type //	(0.128)	(0.177)	(0.134)	(0.185)
Decolonization	-0.0268	-0.144	-0.0654	-0.110
	(0.133)	(0.155)	(0.107)	(0.132)
ast levels of repression ^(t-1)	1.129***	1.038***	4.502***	4.462***
	(0.0424)	(0.0434)	(0.112)	(0.110)
Time since independence	1.008	0.577	-1.214	-1.416
	(0.677)	(0.703)	(0.802)	(0.926)
Democracy/Regime ^(t-1)	0.0771***	0.0710***	0.127***	0.111***
	(0.0118)	(0.0137)	(0.0153)	(0.0169)
Log of total population ^(t-1)	-0.279***	-0.360***	-0.0291	-0.0490
	(0.0344)	(0.0383)	(0.0233)	(0.0327)
Log of GDP per capita ^(t-1)	0.255***	0.182***	0.201***	0.219***
	(0.0442)	(0.0511)	(0.0379)	(0.0543)
Log of UN-expenditure ^(t-1)	-0.0121*	-0.00588	0.00256	0.00523
	(0.00722)	(0.00875)	(0.00944)	(0.00876)
Civil war ^(t-1)	-0.841***	-0.908***	-0.388***	-0.297**
	(0.177)	(0.153)	(0.119)	(0.121)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.202	0.0390	-0.313*	-0.277
	(0.224)	(0.232)	(0.165)	(0.224)
log of politically excluded population ^(t-1)		-0.561***		-0.236
		(0.186)		(0.186)
Eastern Europe		-0.881***		-0.875***
		(0.335)		(0.285)


Latin America		-1.587*** (0.323)		-1.223*** (0.276)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-1.012*** (0.391)		-0.955*** (0.321)
Asia		-1.143*** (0.341)		-1.135*** (0.284)
North Africa and Middle East		-1.313*** (0.331)		-1.498*** (0.274)
Time trend control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant cut1	-4.682*** (0.788)	-8.072*** (1.073)	5.729*** (0.563)	4.369*** (0.772)
Constant cut2	-3.129*** (0.770)	-6.543*** (1.063)	10.58*** (0.580)	9.201*** (0.776)
Constant cut3	-1.656** (0.760)	-5.089*** (1.054)	15.69*** (0.633)	14.19*** (0.814)
Constant cut4	-0.321 (0.757)	-3.766*** (1.058)	20.47*** (0.700)	18.93*** (0.847)
Constant cut5	1.341* (0.752)	-2.086** (1.056)	25.44*** (0.777)	24.02*** (0.906)
Constant cut6	2.920*** (0.760)	-0.504 (1.065)	30.44*** (0.830)	29.43*** (0.946)
Constant cut7	4.449*** (0.768)	1.074 (1.064) 3.328***		
Constant cut8	6.527*** (0.789)	(1.040)		
N	3,921	3,635	5,484	4,964
Log pseudolikelihood Pseudo R ²	-5527.3647 0.33	-5099.2496 0.34	-2841.9265 0.72	-2516.7672 0.73

7.6 Evaluation of outliers

As seen in Appendix-table 23 compared with table 10, omitting all the outlying observations made very little substantial impact on the regression results and thus they were not particularly influential. The binary residual plot showing the highest outcomes for physical integrity rights, bottom left and center in Appendix-graph 1, seem to have a few outliers. The same is true of the civil liberties outcomes on the middle (top right and bottom left in Appendix-graph 2). Apart from that, the residual plots seem acceptable apart from a few extremes in Appendix-graph 2. There are relatively many observations and, seeing as these are time-series cross-section data where one observation corresponds to one country-year, these sporadic outliers did not influence the results notably, especially since they are not clustered around the same country or case.







Appendix-graph 2: Outliers for each binary equation of Civil Liberties

7.7 Proportional odds - assumption tests

Brant-test	Chi-square	P>chi-square	DF
All	293.23	0.000	98
Separation	15.60	0.029	7
Democracy/Regime-type	25.17	0.001	7
Log of total population	30.79	0.000	7
Log of GDP per capita	51.30	0.000	7
Log of UN-expenditure	12.12	0.097	7
Civil war	17.52	0.014	7
Decolonization	10.77	0.149	7
Ethnic fractionalization	12.67	0.081	7
Log of excl. pop. relative to ethno-pol. rel. pop	19.03	0.008	7
Eastern Europe	14.83	0.038	7
Latin America	13.45	0.062	7
Sub-Saharan Africa	17.83	0.013	7
Asia	10.49	0.163	7
North Africa and Middle East	9.20	0.238	7

Appendix-table 24: Brant-test for Model 6 (only applicable model for test)

Statistical significance = Proportional odds assumptions is likely violated

Approximate likelihood-ratio test -	Chi-	Degrees of	Prob > chi-
Models:	square	freedom	square
8	437.57	82	0.0000
10	253.01	119	0.0000
12	424.86	82	0.0000
26	205.66	83	0.0000
28	141.37	58	0.0000
34	222.65	86	0.0000
36	210.34	58	0.0000

Appendix-table 25: Approximate likelihood-ratio test for all applicable models

Statistical significance = Proportional odds assumptions is likely violated

Lipsitz-test - models	Number of groups	Statistics	Degrees of freedom	P-value
8	10	106.681	9	0.0000
10	10	41.044	9	0.0000
12	10	117.647	9	0.0000
20	10	117.927	9	0.0000
26	10	13.226	9	0.1526
28	10	27.235	9	0.0130
34	10	23.019	9	0.0062
36	10	17.135	9	0.0466
40	10	97.137	9	0.0000

Appendix-table 26: Lipsitz-test for all applicable models

Statistical significance = Proportional odds assumptions is likely violated