Summary While departing from the Snug Cove ferry terminal and swinging to align with the channel, the ferry MAYNEQUEEN sheered into an adjacent marina, striking a floating dock and several small craft before coming to rest on contacting the shore. The floating dock was heavily damaged, with pilings broken, and one pleasure craft was sunk and several others suffered varying degrees of damage. The ferry sustained minor damage to one of her four propulsion units. No injuries were reported as a result of this occurrence. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of the Vessel The MAYNEQUEEN is a double-ended, open-deck, RoRo coastal ferry designed to carry 75 vehicles and 400 passengers. Originally fitted with two fixed propellers and one rudder at each end, she was modified in the '70s and the propulsion and steerage of the vessel is since effected by four right-angle drives (RADs), one each, port and starboard, at both ends of the hull. The RADs can be controlled either directly from the wheel-house or from the engine control room; when in regular service, the wheel-house control mode is used. The rudders have been welded in the amidships position and act as skegs. Two identical consoles, only one of which may be active at any given time, are located one at each end of the wheel-house. The practice is for the console located toward the current forward end to be active. Included in the controls on each console are the following: a joystick controlling the forward RADs; a joystick controlling the after RADs; a transfer command push-button; console-in-command indicator lights; four thrust direction indicators, one for each RAD; and four pairs of lights indicating coupling in and coupling out for each RAD. Each joystick has freedom of movement in two planes: in the horizontal plane, turning (through 360) to achieve the RADs' required direction of thrust, in the vertical plane, pivoting (through a 90 range) for clutch and throttle control of the RADs. Transfer of control between the consoles is effected by pressing the transfer push-button after all RADs have been declutched. An electric signal initiates the electric-pneumatic system which completes the transfer. The manufacturer's instructions recommend ... to hold the Transfer Command push-button down for at least 10 seconds to ensure that proper signal is generated. The B.C. Ferry Manual of Administration stated that only five seconds are necessary for this purpose. Notices were posted next to the push-buttons on both consoles with the five-second requirement. Two console-in-command indicator lights, approximately 5 cm apart, are installed on each console. These lights indicate which console is active. The lights alternate when the transfer command push-button is depressed, i.e. until a full transfer is effected. The lights identifying which console had the control were identical and did not provide a quick confirmation of the status of the control system to the person conning the vessel. Manning and Watch System The regular vessel on the Horseshoe Bay - Snug Cove service is the QUEEN OF CAPILANO which was undergoing refit at the time of the occurrence. While replacing her, the MAYNE QUEEN was manned on a three-crew system by personnel transferred from the QUEEN OF CAPILANO. Each crew comprised a master and seven crew members, and two crews attended the ferry each day, manning the two work shifts, a morning shift from 0430 till 1330, and an afternoon shift from 1430 till 2230. The crews followed a cycle of five morning shifts, five afternoon shifts and five days off. Scene of the Accident The Snug Cove ferry terminal is located at the head of the narrow inlet of the same name and consists of a loading ramp with a wing-wall on the western side. (See Chartlet at Appendix A.) In the loading position, the ferry lies against the western wall with her foredeck under the ramp. Unlike other V-shaped berthing sites for B.C. ferries, this terminal is not provided with a second wing-wall, i.e. it is open to the east where a small craft marina is situated. The marina facilities consist of several floating wooden docks, extending from the shore and located inside a main floating dock, 95 m long, which is kept in place, parallel to and about 30 m from the ferry track, by four wooden dolphins. Because the axis of the ferry terminal loading ramp is at an angle of approximately 50 to the ferry's outbound course, the ferry must turn to port immediately upon leaving the ramp. In fact, it was observed during the investigation process that, on departure, the vessel was pivoted to port until she was in line with her outbound course while her starboard quarter was still in contact with the wing-wall. History of the Voyage On the morning of 07 November 1995, on her second trip of the morning from Horseshoe Bay, the MAYNEQUEEN secured at Snug Cove at 0628. The passages had been uneventful and, as is the routine while loading at Snug Cove, all four RADs were aligned in the fore-and-aft direction to provide thrust to keep the vessel's No. 2 end, the forward end on arrival, under the ramp. At 0638, after 72 vehicles and 165 passengers were loaded on board, the chief officer reported the deck clear, i.e. all cars parked, ramp lifted and mooring lines let go. The master, who was at the arrival console, began the departure procedure. After declutching both pairs of RADs, he turned the joystick controlling the drives at the inshore end through 180 for an off-ramp thrust and repositioned the joystick controlling the outbound end drives to a 90 angle for an athwartship thrust, away from the wing-wall. He then went to the departure console, checked the RADs' dials, aligned the joysticks with the dials and pressed the transfer command push-button to take over control from the arrival console. After the console-in-command light came on, the master clutched in the RADs and applied approximately 30 per cent throttle to the forward RADs. This was followed, some five to six seconds later, by the application of approximately 10 per cent throttle to the stern RADs. This manoeuvre was intended to swing the vessel through the required 50 to port and to line her up on the outbound track. As the vessel started coming off the western wing-wall and heading to port, the master commenced turning the joystick controlling the forward RADs to the ahead position, but the RADs' thrust direction indicators did not follow; the forward RADs were still pushing the forward end to port, out of the channel and toward the marina. When he realized that the RADs were not responding to his commands, the master brought both joysticks to the declutch position. Reportedly, the RADs had been clutched in for approximately six seconds. The MAYNEQUEEN continued swinging to port, damaging and displacing the marina outer dock and moored pleasure craft, until the vessel's port forward RAD touched the seabed and the vessel came to rest with her hull in contact with the shore. With the vessel stopped, the master pressed the transfer command push-button for a second time and noted that the RADs' direction indicators now corresponded with the joysticks' alignment. Realizing that he had full control of the vessel, the master ordered a check of the tanks and bilges. He then engaged the RADs, manoeuvred the vessel back into the main channel and proceeded on the passage. No crew was ordered to inspect the damaged pleasure craft but, reportedly, the master made a visual inspection and determined that no assistance was needed prior to leaving the cove. Shortly after leaving Snug Cove, the chief officer made an announcement on the public address system advising passengers that the vessel had experienced a mechanical malfunction and was now proceeding to Horseshoe Bay terminal. At about 0640, the chief officer, as ordered by the master, reported the accident to the BCFC's Horseshoe Bay terminal control tower using the bridge cellular telephone. The tower does not tape conversations; however, the controller on duty recalled that the main particulars of the chief officer's call were that the MAYNEQUEEN had hit the dock at Snug Cove, had one RAD leg damaged and was under way to Horseshoe Bay. Also, the caller requested that the BCFC Assistant Vice-President (VP), Central Area, the highest ranking officer of the BCFC in Horseshoe Bay, be notified. The controller passed this information to his supervisor who, in turn, telephoned the Assistant VP at about 0650, and informed him of the occurrence and indicated that the ferry was on schedule. The MAYNEQUEEN berthed at Horseshoe Bay at 0703. After offloading the traffic, she loaded 21 vehicles and 37 passengers and departed Horseshoe Bay at 0714. At approximately 0725, the Assistant VP arrived at the Horseshoe Bay terminal where he was briefed and updated by terminal personnel. He arranged for a surveyor to board the ferry and, with a relief master already summoned, left for Snug Cove by water taxi. The ferry arrived at Snug Cove at 0735 and remained there for about one hour while the police and BCFC authorities assessed the damage and conducted a preliminary survey of both the vessel and the marina. At 0743, the master reported the occurrence to Vancouver VTS. At 0820, the relieving master assumed command of the vessel, and at 0830 the MAYNE QUEEN departed from Snug Cove. At 0850, the ferry berthed at Horseshoe Bay and was held there until a thorough survey of the vessel and tests of the propulsion control system were completed. Supporting Information On 02 and 03 November 1995, before the accident, the master on another watch had made entries in the wheel-house log and in a notebook referred to as the Malfunction Log to the effect that the RADs did not rotate. These remarks, however, had not been seen by the master who was in command at the time of the accident, nor had he been advised by anyone of such problems. He reported that he did not even know that there was a Malfunction Log aboard the MAYNEQUEEN. Investigation revealed that on this particular route, there is a 45-minute gap between shift changes and, consequently, the masters do not meet at shift changes. No hand-over procedures were established and remarks, if any, for the next master were conveyed on scraps of paper left in the wheel-house. Several passengers who were aboard the ferry during the accident, some of them standing on the open car deck at the forward end, reported that the propeller noise, deck vibration and rate of swing continued until the vessel stopped well past the damaged marina dock. During the post-accident surveys at the Horseshoe Bay terminal, a number of tests were conducted to simulate the incomplete transfer of control. These tests included quick transfers; the push-buttons were depressed for as little as a second, well below the period required by either the manufacturer or the owner. None of the tests resulted in the condition, as reported by the master, which led to the accident; control was always transferred flawlessly. In the course of the investigation, it was observed on several occasions that it takes approximately 35 seconds to swing the MAYNEQUEEN from her berthing position to the mid-channel position when departing from the Snug Cove terminal. No light or signal on the console indicates an incomplete transfer of control. There are lights indicating the coupling in and coupling out status of the RADs; however, the master may positively verify the steering only by observing the dials while turning the joysticks. The MAYNEQUEEN had been designated a substitute vessel on the Horseshoe Bay - Snug Cove run since 01 November 1995 while the regular ferry, the QUEEN OF CAPILANO, was undergoing her annual refit. The QUEEN OF CAPILANO is propelled by four RADs fitted with controllable-pitch propellers and controlled by two joysticks. In principle, manoeuvring the QUEEN OF CAPILANO is similar to handling the MAYNEQUEEN; however, they are not sister ships and certain aspects of transferring control and handling the RADs are not identical. Damage Damage to the Ferry It was ascertained during two diving operations, on 07 and 12 November, that the MAYNE QUEEN sustained damage to her shell plating, rudder-skeg and one of her propellers at the end that grounded. The shell plating had abrasion marks, and the rudder-skeg was bent to the side; the damage was consistent with the hull making contact with the steep, rocky shoreline in a sweeping motion. The damage to the propeller indicated that, at the time of bottom contact, the propeller was still clutched in; this finding corroborates observations by engine-room crew and some passengers that there was a rattling noise while the RAD was clutched in and unusual vibration afterward. To the Small Craft Marina The 95 m main floating dock at the marina was severed at its mid-length, with four dolphins broken at seabed level and two dolphins displaced. Some of the other docks sustained a lesser degree of damage. To Other Craft Several small craft tied up to the marina's docks suffered various degrees of damage and one of them sank. Damage to small craft was caused by direct contact with the MAYNEQUEEN and by sections of the docks disturbed by the ferry. No damage to the environment was observed. Certification The ferry had been issued a SIC 17 Certificate by the Ship Safety Branch of the Canadian Coast Guard on 12 May 1995 and it was valid until 11 May 1996. Personnel The master of the MAYNEQUEEN at the time of the occurrence held a Master Foreign-Going Certificate of Competency issued in Canada in 1991. He had accumulated approximately 40 years of sea service on various vessels, of which approximately 21 years (since 1974) were on BCFC ferries. He had served as master on various ferries and runs since 1976. He had served on the Snug Cove run for approximately three years, most of this time on the QUEEN OF CAPILANO. He was on the MAYNEQUEEN for some time in 1994 and for one shift on 01 November 1995, six days before the accident. After that one shift, he was on the scheduled five days off, and he returned to his duties on 07 November; the accident happened during his second run that day. The chief officer, chief engineer and second engineer were all holders of the appropriate grade marine certificates issued in Canada. The chief officer and the two deck-hands were also on their first shift after a five-day break. They were all familiar with the Horseshoe Bay - Snug Cove run and sailed on this vessel only when she was substituting for other ferries. The chief engineer, promoted to this position in 1994, had sailed mainly on other ferries. He sailed on the MAYNEQUEEN for a total of about six months during various periods when this vessel was substituting for a regular ferry undergoing refit. He was on the MAYNE QUEEN from 31 October to 01 November and returned on 05 November after three days off. The MAYNEQUEEN had tied up overnight at the Horseshoe Bay terminal. The engine-room crew had remained on board all night for maintenance purposes while the deck crew and the master arrived at various times between 0430 and 0500. After the first round trip, the engine-room crew changed at Horseshoe Bay. Weather and Tidal Information The vessel reported the weather as rain, with good visibility, light wind and rippled sea surface. The weather and current were not considered to have contributed to the accident. The Canadian Tide and Current Tables, Volume 5, show the following times and heights for Point Atkinson, the nearest reference point, on 07 November 1995: High Water, 0605, 4.4 m Low Water, 1130, 3.0 m The occurrence took place approximately 35 minutes after high water.