Summary The helicopter departed the Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources helicopter base with the pilot and three passengers on board. Approximately two minutes into the flight and at an altitude of 300 feet above the ground (agl), a loud bang was heard, followed immediately by an engine out horn and light. The pilot entered an autorotation and, as he was flying over a forest, extended the glide to reach a road. The main rotor rpm decayed during the extended glide, and the low rotor rpm light and horn were on when the helicopter touched down hard on the road. The helicopter bounced back into the air, moved to the left about six feet, touched down again, and came to rest in an upright attitude. The tail boom was severed by the main rotor blades during the landing. There were no injuries to any of the occupants. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais Other Factual Information A 300-hour inspection of the helicopter was started five days prior to the accident. On the second day of the inspection, the aircraft maintenance engineer (AME) responsible for completion of the inspection was dispatched with two other helicopters on forest fire fighting duties. Another AME was recalled from days off to finish the inspection. The inspection was completed two days prior to the accident, and this was the first flight following the inspection. Access to the engine inlet area through the engine inlet by-pass door is required to inspect some of the items on the 300-hour inspection sheet. To facilitate working in this area, the maintenance personnel use a make-shift inspection aid to prop open the engine by-pass door. This aid was a cardboard tube 9.5 inches long by 2.75 inches in diameter. There was no flagging attached to the tube that would attract attention to it. The tube was observed in position on the first day of the inspection, but after that no one could recall seeing it there. When the replacement AME started work he noted that inspection of the mist eliminator screen, which is in the engine inlet area, and the hinge inspection on the by-pass door had not been carried out, as they were not signed off. The by-pass door has to be removed to complete the hinge inspection, so he removed it, carried out the remainder of the inspection items in the engine inlet area, and reinstalled the by-pass door. The AME then carried out a visual inspection for foreign objects, closed and latched the door, and signed off the applicable inspection items. There was no procedure in place to ensure that all tools were removed and accounted for following the completion of an inspection. During examination of the aircraft after the accident the cardboard tube that was used to prop open the engine by-pass door was found lodged against the compressor inlet. The tube blocked off approximately fifty per cent of the compressor inlet causing the engine to flame out. The accident flight was a non-revenue test flight. According to the operators Maintenance Control Manual there is no requirement for a test flight to be carried out after a 300-hour inspection. However, there is an informal procedure that gives pilots, who are on a self-dispatch system, the authority to carry out test flights after inspections or after the helicopter has been idle for some time to verify that all of its systems are serviceable in the event that it is required for operational duties, or for pilots who are scheduled to fly the helicopter and have not flown it recently. On 20 August 1993, the operator issued a memorandum to all its Air Service staff stating that personnel on test flights will be restricted to essential crew and personnel giving or receiving related training. Up to that time authorized passengers were permitted on maintenance test flights when non-critical components were being checked. The operator does not have any directives specifying a minimum safe altitude for these or any other flights.