As there was no wind at the time of the occurrence, the vessel's heading (230T) at anchor indicates that the tidal current was setting north-eastward towards the land north of Admiralty Point. Given the CHS estimate of a current speed of 1 knot, an object dead in the water would be set in a north-easterly direction at a rate of about 31 metres per minute. The anchor was seen to be coming clear of the water at about 0608, and it is clear that the anchor was free from the bottom at least half a minute before that the tug commenced pushing on the vessel's starboard bow at this time and the engine was put to slow ahead. By the time the tug was directed to push on the port bow to stop the vessel swinging further, the vessel had gained little if any headway (about two ship-lengths) in the seven and a half minutes which had elapsed since the vessel's anchor was free of the bottom. However, the vessel had been set about 220 m in a predominately north-easterly direction by the current. The beam distance between the vessel's bow at anchor and the rocky shore of Admiralty Point was about 525 m. The tug pushing on the starboard bow, apart from initiating a port turn, also generated a force which caused the vessel to move bodily to port. To arrest the port swing, the pilot ordered hard-a-starboard rudder. With the vessel's engine turning slow ahead, this manoeuvre created another force which also caused the vessel to move primarily bodily to port. The three forces generated by the current set, the tug pushing and the rudder's lateral effect acted in approximately the same direction. The resultant of these three forces was significant enough to cause the PACIFIC DOLPHIN to move bodily towards the shore and to strike the rocky bottom at Admiralty Point. The PACIFIC DOLPHIN was conned by an experienced pilot who knew the area and was familiar with handling vessels of this size. The master was in the wheel-house. There had been an exchange of information between the members of the bridge team. However, none of the persons participating in the handling of the vessel fully appreciated the extent of her lateral movement until the tug on the vessel's port side reported that she had been pushed aground. The attentiveness of an average person when performing any task varies from being vigilant to relaxed. Some of the main factors determining the individual's attitude are the job itself, the frequency of its recurrence, the person's experience and external influences. Because the pilot may not have appreciated the extent of the vessel's bodily movement eastward, his alertness was probably relaxed. He did not look for nor did he double-check all the sources of information available to him to determine the rate at which the tidal current was setting the vessel towards the shore. The master most probably fully relied on the pilot's local knowledge and experience and did not monitor the pilot's performance or the vessel's movement closely. Given the traditional master/pilot relationship, this reliance is not unusual for the master of a deep-sea ship in a foreign port. The good weather conditions did not appear to demand extra prudence from the master and, given the traditional master/pilot relationship, the pilot's experience and the fact that the vessel was being assisted by two tugs, the manoeuvre did not appear to be unduly difficult. The master's alertness was also at the relaxed end of the scale. The application of Bridge Resource Management (BRM) principles was limited to the initial exchange of information and there was no formal system in place to closely monitor the vessel's progress. The reduced alertness of the people handling the PACIFIC DOLPHIN on 15 February 1998 likely led to the striking. However, the pilot reacted quickly to the grounding of the tug. He realized that the port side of the PACIFIC DOLPHIN was very close to the rocky point and ordered hard-a-port rudder to shift the vessel's stern away from the danger. The manoeuvre did not prevent the vessel from making contact with the bottom. The damage to the shell plating is consistent with the vessel's hull moving along a hard, solid object such as the boulders found in the rocky shore off Admiralty Point.Analysis As there was no wind at the time of the occurrence, the vessel's heading (230T) at anchor indicates that the tidal current was setting north-eastward towards the land north of Admiralty Point. Given the CHS estimate of a current speed of 1 knot, an object dead in the water would be set in a north-easterly direction at a rate of about 31 metres per minute. The anchor was seen to be coming clear of the water at about 0608, and it is clear that the anchor was free from the bottom at least half a minute before that the tug commenced pushing on the vessel's starboard bow at this time and the engine was put to slow ahead. By the time the tug was directed to push on the port bow to stop the vessel swinging further, the vessel had gained little if any headway (about two ship-lengths) in the seven and a half minutes which had elapsed since the vessel's anchor was free of the bottom. However, the vessel had been set about 220 m in a predominately north-easterly direction by the current. The beam distance between the vessel's bow at anchor and the rocky shore of Admiralty Point was about 525 m. The tug pushing on the starboard bow, apart from initiating a port turn, also generated a force which caused the vessel to move bodily to port. To arrest the port swing, the pilot ordered hard-a-starboard rudder. With the vessel's engine turning slow ahead, this manoeuvre created another force which also caused the vessel to move primarily bodily to port. The three forces generated by the current set, the tug pushing and the rudder's lateral effect acted in approximately the same direction. The resultant of these three forces was significant enough to cause the PACIFIC DOLPHIN to move bodily towards the shore and to strike the rocky bottom at Admiralty Point. The PACIFIC DOLPHIN was conned by an experienced pilot who knew the area and was familiar with handling vessels of this size. The master was in the wheel-house. There had been an exchange of information between the members of the bridge team. However, none of the persons participating in the handling of the vessel fully appreciated the extent of her lateral movement until the tug on the vessel's port side reported that she had been pushed aground. The attentiveness of an average person when performing any task varies from being vigilant to relaxed. Some of the main factors determining the individual's attitude are the job itself, the frequency of its recurrence, the person's experience and external influences. Because the pilot may not have appreciated the extent of the vessel's bodily movement eastward, his alertness was probably relaxed. He did not look for nor did he double-check all the sources of information available to him to determine the rate at which the tidal current was setting the vessel towards the shore. The master most probably fully relied on the pilot's local knowledge and experience and did not monitor the pilot's performance or the vessel's movement closely. Given the traditional master/pilot relationship, this reliance is not unusual for the master of a deep-sea ship in a foreign port. The good weather conditions did not appear to demand extra prudence from the master and, given the traditional master/pilot relationship, the pilot's experience and the fact that the vessel was being assisted by two tugs, the manoeuvre did not appear to be unduly difficult. The master's alertness was also at the relaxed end of the scale. The application of Bridge Resource Management (BRM) principles was limited to the initial exchange of information and there was no formal system in place to closely monitor the vessel's progress. The reduced alertness of the people handling the PACIFIC DOLPHIN on 15 February 1998 likely led to the striking. However, the pilot reacted quickly to the grounding of the tug. He realized that the port side of the PACIFIC DOLPHIN was very close to the rocky point and ordered hard-a-port rudder to shift the vessel's stern away from the danger. The manoeuvre did not prevent the vessel from making contact with the bottom. The damage to the shell plating is consistent with the vessel's hull moving along a hard, solid object such as the boulders found in the rocky shore off Admiralty Point. The manoeuvre began with the PACIFIC DOLPHIN anchored in designated anchorage L which is in close (three cables) proximity to Admiralty Point. After the anchor was aweigh, the vessel was subject to the surface current which was setting at a rate of about 30 metres per minute towards the shore. To swing the bow to port, a tug was pushing on the starboard bow. The engine of the PACIFIC DOLPHIN was turning slow ahead and the vessel's rudder was hard-to-starboard but the vessel gained little headway. The effect of the engine movement, rudder position and low headway was that the vessel moved bodily to port. For about eight and a half minutes, the resultant of the forces on the vessel (current set, the tug pushing and the rudder's lateral effect at low headway) acted in approximately the same direction. The vessel was set bodily towards and struck the rocky shore at Admiralty Point. The vessel's progress was not closely monitored; none of the personnel participating in the handling of the vessel observed the extent or rate of the vessel's lateral movement towards the shore. The vessel's propulsion machinery and steering equipment were in good working order. Neither was a factor in the occurrence. The action by the pilot to avert the striking was too late in the circumstances. All actions following the occurrence were timely and appropriate in the circumstances. The damage sustained by the PACIFIC DOLPHIN is consistent with the hull touching and scraping against the rocky bottom off Admiralty Point.Findings The manoeuvre began with the PACIFIC DOLPHIN anchored in designated anchorage L which is in close (three cables) proximity to Admiralty Point. After the anchor was aweigh, the vessel was subject to the surface current which was setting at a rate of about 30 metres per minute towards the shore. To swing the bow to port, a tug was pushing on the starboard bow. The engine of the PACIFIC DOLPHIN was turning slow ahead and the vessel's rudder was hard-to-starboard but the vessel gained little headway. The effect of the engine movement, rudder position and low headway was that the vessel moved bodily to port. For about eight and a half minutes, the resultant of the forces on the vessel (current set, the tug pushing and the rudder's lateral effect at low headway) acted in approximately the same direction. The vessel was set bodily towards and struck the rocky shore at Admiralty Point. The vessel's progress was not closely monitored; none of the personnel participating in the handling of the vessel observed the extent or rate of the vessel's lateral movement towards the shore. The vessel's propulsion machinery and steering equipment were in good working order. Neither was a factor in the occurrence. The action by the pilot to avert the striking was too late in the circumstances. All actions following the occurrence were timely and appropriate in the circumstances. The damage sustained by the PACIFIC DOLPHIN is consistent with the hull touching and scraping against the rocky bottom off Admiralty Point. The PACIFIC DOLPHIN struck the rocky bottom off Admiralty Point because the vessel's lateral movement towards the shore went unrecognized by the bridge team until the situation was too advanced to correct. Contributing to the striking was the fact that a BRM environment was not fully implemented and the vessel's progress along her intended route was not closely monitored.Causes and Contributing Factors The PACIFIC DOLPHIN struck the rocky bottom off Admiralty Point because the vessel's lateral movement towards the shore went unrecognized by the bridge team until the situation was too advanced to correct. Contributing to the striking was the fact that a BRM environment was not fully implemented and the vessel's progress along her intended route was not closely monitored.