According to the report issued by the Qubec Ice Operations Office, the ice conditions south-west of Pointe-des-Monts were: concentration 10/10 of thick first-year ice. Because the vessel was in lightship condition, her manoeuvrability was reduced and her ability to transit the area was seriously compromised. The strong south-westerly winds which began blowing at about 0230 considerably accelerated the bulk carrier's drift toward the shore. The winds were as forecast in the 1537 broadcast; the navigation personnel nonetheless chose to follow a route along the north shore, thereby deliberately reducing the safety margin in the event the vessel became beset in the ice. The vessel was beset in the ice 3.3M from the shore; 5 hours and 30 minutes later, she was only 1.3M from shore. During that period, the bulk carrier requested ice-breaker assistance, but no emergency message was transmitted. If a vessel is in a situation where the need for assistance is urgent, a message to that effect must be sent as soon as possible by the bridge watch officers or the master. That enables the authorities to prioritize requests for assistance. The MARTHA L.BLACK could have stopped taking on fresh water to go lend assistance to the MANYAS1 sooner. However, because of the type of message sent by the bulk carrier, the ice-breaker was not aware of the vessel's precarious situation, and therefore proceeded as usual before leaving Baie-Comeau. It was only once the ice-breaker was at sea that she learned of the emergency situation of the bulk carrier.Analysis According to the report issued by the Qubec Ice Operations Office, the ice conditions south-west of Pointe-des-Monts were: concentration 10/10 of thick first-year ice. Because the vessel was in lightship condition, her manoeuvrability was reduced and her ability to transit the area was seriously compromised. The strong south-westerly winds which began blowing at about 0230 considerably accelerated the bulk carrier's drift toward the shore. The winds were as forecast in the 1537 broadcast; the navigation personnel nonetheless chose to follow a route along the north shore, thereby deliberately reducing the safety margin in the event the vessel became beset in the ice. The vessel was beset in the ice 3.3M from the shore; 5 hours and 30 minutes later, she was only 1.3M from shore. During that period, the bulk carrier requested ice-breaker assistance, but no emergency message was transmitted. If a vessel is in a situation where the need for assistance is urgent, a message to that effect must be sent as soon as possible by the bridge watch officers or the master. That enables the authorities to prioritize requests for assistance. The MARTHA L.BLACK could have stopped taking on fresh water to go lend assistance to the MANYAS1 sooner. However, because of the type of message sent by the bulk carrier, the ice-breaker was not aware of the vessel's precarious situation, and therefore proceeded as usual before leaving Baie-Comeau. It was only once the ice-breaker was at sea that she learned of the emergency situation of the bulk carrier. 1. Because the MANYAS1 was in lightship condition, her ability to transit through the ice south-west of Pointe-des-Monts was seriously compromised. 2. The navigation personnel chose to follow a route along the north shore although strong southerly winds were forecast, thereby reducing the safety margin. 3. The MANYAS1 first asked the MCTS Centre for assistance when she was 3.3M from the shore. 4. No PAN PAN PAN (urgent) message was transmitted to the authorities by the bulk carrier. 5. Strong south-westerly winds accelerated the vessel's drift toward the shore. 6. When the MANYAS1 grounded, the ice-breaker was only one mile away from her.Findings 1. Because the MANYAS1 was in lightship condition, her ability to transit through the ice south-west of Pointe-des-Monts was seriously compromised. 2. The navigation personnel chose to follow a route along the north shore although strong southerly winds were forecast, thereby reducing the safety margin. 3. The MANYAS1 first asked the MCTS Centre for assistance when she was 3.3M from the shore. 4. No PAN PAN PAN (urgent) message was transmitted to the authorities by the bulk carrier. 5. Strong south-westerly winds accelerated the vessel's drift toward the shore. 6. When the MANYAS1 grounded, the ice-breaker was only one mile away from her. The MANYAS1 grounded off Pointe-des-Monts because she became beset in the ice while following a route along the shore and drifted toward the shore because of the strong winds prevailing in the area. The fact that the bulk carrier informed the MCTS of her situation and requested ice-breaker assistance to continue on her passage rather than making an emergency call contributed to the grounding.Causes and Contributing Factors The MANYAS1 grounded off Pointe-des-Monts because she became beset in the ice while following a route along the shore and drifted toward the shore because of the strong winds prevailing in the area. The fact that the bulk carrier informed the MCTS of her situation and requested ice-breaker assistance to continue on her passage rather than making an emergency call contributed to the grounding.