The elevator trim tabs were not rigged in accordance with the aircraft maintenance manual, resulting in a misrigged condition and a lack of sufficient nose-down trim authority. Maintenance was performed without adherence to the applicable standards of airworthiness as required by Section571.02 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations. The independent control inspection was not carried out in accordance with the standards described in the Canadian Aviation Regulations or Airworthiness Notification, resulting in the misrigged controls being undetected. Incorrect maintenance release statements were entered in the aircraft documents.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The elevator trim tabs were not rigged in accordance with the aircraft maintenance manual, resulting in a misrigged condition and a lack of sufficient nose-down trim authority. Maintenance was performed without adherence to the applicable standards of airworthiness as required by Section571.02 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations. The independent control inspection was not carried out in accordance with the standards described in the Canadian Aviation Regulations or Airworthiness Notification, resulting in the misrigged controls being undetected. Incorrect maintenance release statements were entered in the aircraft documents. As a precautionary measure, Transport Canada issued to Rapid Aircraft Repair Inc. a notice of suspension on 10June2005, conducted a special audit of Rapid Aircraft Repair Inc. on 14June2005, and issued an amended suspension on 21June2005. On 27June2005, Transport Canada rescinded the notice of suspension, subsequent to immediate corrective actions being implemented. On 22 August 2005, Transport Canada received a corrective action plan from Rapid Aircraft Repair Inc., which addressed long-term corrective actions. Following the occurrence and subsequent audit by Transport Canada, Rapid Aircraft Repair Inc. hired a director of quality assurance and designated this person as the person responsible for maintenance (PRM). The company then amended or implemented various processes involving aircraft maintenance, as follows: amended its quality assurance program to ensure closer scrutiny in all aspects of maintenance than was previously possible; implemented a process for regular discussions on process control; implemented the process of a full control-travel check before disassembly; consequently, this process revealed that many aircraft received to work on had controls not rigged within the specified limits; implemented additional training on human factors, improving the reporting of potential problems; and the company is in the process of implementing a Safety Management System (SMS).Safety Action Taken As a precautionary measure, Transport Canada issued to Rapid Aircraft Repair Inc. a notice of suspension on 10June2005, conducted a special audit of Rapid Aircraft Repair Inc. on 14June2005, and issued an amended suspension on 21June2005. On 27June2005, Transport Canada rescinded the notice of suspension, subsequent to immediate corrective actions being implemented. On 22 August 2005, Transport Canada received a corrective action plan from Rapid Aircraft Repair Inc., which addressed long-term corrective actions. Following the occurrence and subsequent audit by Transport Canada, Rapid Aircraft Repair Inc. hired a director of quality assurance and designated this person as the person responsible for maintenance (PRM). The company then amended or implemented various processes involving aircraft maintenance, as follows: amended its quality assurance program to ensure closer scrutiny in all aspects of maintenance than was previously possible; implemented a process for regular discussions on process control; implemented the process of a full control-travel check before disassembly; consequently, this process revealed that many aircraft received to work on had controls not rigged within the specified limits; implemented additional training on human factors, improving the reporting of potential problems; and the company is in the process of implementing a Safety Management System (SMS).