2.0 Analysis 2.1 Anchors Because cable ferries operated by the New Brunswick DOT are not fitted with any type of anchor, in the event of a cable parting, there is no method by which the crew can exercise any control over the movement or aspect of the drifting vessel until such time as assistance arrives. The use of an anchor would also assist in preventing the ferry from being swept ashore should a failed cable be jammed in the drive gear as happened on a previous occasion. In such circumstances, the tethered ferry runs a considerable risk of hull damage when contacting the river bank. Although there is little room for additional deck machinery on a vessel such as the F-39, consideration could have been given to providing a rudimentary, emergency-only, anchoring capability with a buoyed anchor, eliminating the need to install a sophisticated anchor-recovery system. 2.2 Passenger Safety The operators are not required to hold any marine certificate of competency or marine safety certification to operate the cable ferries, which are used to transport many vehicles and passengers (including school children) each year. The liferaft and emergency equipment seminar conducted by the Canadian Coast Guard was the only training in the use of lifesaving appliances they had received. Ferry crew who have received the necessary level of marine safety training are more likely to be able to make effective use of the life-saving and fire-fighting equipment fitted on the ferries, and to ensure passenger safety in the event of an emergency. 2.3 Cable Replacement The deterioration of the protective plastic coating and the outer strands of the failed cable in the area of the break suggests that visible signs of the poor condition of the cable had been present for some time before the break occurred. They were not detected at the weekly inspections carried out prior to the failure. The fallibility of the presently scheduled visual inspections suggests that more stringent measures, such as cable life limits and periodic, more thorough, examination of the cable should be instituted. 2.4 Radio Communications Because of the poor condition of the marine VHF radio fitted on the F-39, the ferry operator had to relay messages through another ferry in the system. In a developing emergency, the speed of communication can be crucial in limiting detrimental effects. In an emergency, the training that an operator has received in qualifying for a RORC could be critical in ensuring effective communication and expediting assistance. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings The ferry cable was in contact with the river bed where it was subject to the effects of the river current and tidal action. Repeated dragging of the cable over the bottom resulted in a breakdown of the protective plastic coating and accelerated deterioration of the cable. Erosion of the exposed outer strands continued until the remaining strands of the cable parted under load. The cable in the area of the break was heavily corroded deep into the core prior to the failure. Routine weekly examinations did not detect the extent of the deterioration of the cable. The cable failed after an extraordinarily long service period; however, no life limit for ferry cables had been established. The ferry was in mid-stream when the cable parted, and was out of control, drifting with the river current, wind and tide, until a tug arrived on scene. The ferry was not fitted with an anchor for the crew to deploy to minimize the ferry's drift or prevent a grounding or a collision. The condition of the marine very high frequency (VHF) radio fitted to the ferry caused difficulties in establishing communications with respect to the emergency. The operator did not hold a Radiotelephone Operator's Restricted Certificate (RORC). The ferry crew were not required to hold marine qualifications and had received only introductory training in marine emergency procedures and safety equipment during a training seminar held by the Canadian Coast Guard. There was no system in place for independent safety inspections to be carried out on the cable ferries, their equipment or operators. 3.2 Causes The cable failed because localized wear and corrosion of the exterior strands of the cable had reached such an extent that the remaining strands failed in overstress. 4.0 Safety Action 4.1 Action Taken 4.1.1 Cable Replacement Schedule Following this occurrence, the TSB forwarded a copy of the laboratory analysis report on the damaged cable to the New Brunswick Department of Transportation (DOT). The TSB understands that the DOT has now conducted a study of the life span of ferry cables to determine average operational life in the prevailing conditions, with a view to optimizing a replacement schedule. (Several factors such as winter ice, high currents and high winds affect the life span of a ferry cable.) For the F-39 cable ferry, it was determined that the replacement cycle should be less than 303 days, taking into consideration a replacement before winter. 4.1.2 Fitting Anchors on Ferries The DOT has reportedly established a capital expenditure program to install anchors on its fleet of short run cable ferries, over the next two or three years. 4.1.3 Upgrading Ferry Standards Since the occurrence, the radios on F-39 have been replaced, a Ferry Operations Manual has been developed based on the requirements of the Canada Shipping Act, maximum loading limits established for each ferry, and arrangements have been made to provide Marine Emergency Duties (MED) training for ferry personnel. Other planned improvements include making bulkheads watertight, replacing wood cabins with steel structures, improving bilge pumping systems, and addressing any other areas covered under regulations.