Summary An Air Canada Airbus A319 (serial number0695, registration C-FYKW), operating as ACA183, was on a scheduled flight from Toronto, Ontario, to Kelowna, British Columbia. Before departure from Toronto, the crew was informed by the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that, because of extensive forest fires in the area, only the non-directional [radio] beacon (NDB) Bapproach would be available at Kelowna. When the flight was in the vicinity of the Enderby VOR (very high-frequency omni-directional beacon), the crew was advised by the Vancouver Area Control Centre (ACC) that the NDBB approach was no longer available. The only approach available to the Kelowna Airport was a visual approach. The crew commenced a descent into Kelowna and advised the Vancouver ACC controller that they had the Kelowna Airport in sight. The controller cleared ACA183 to the Kelowna Airport for a visual approach - Runway15 was active - and handed off the aircraft to the Kelowna tower. ACA183 continued inbound to Kelowna on a track that passed over the town of Vernon. The crew configured the aircraft for landing, with the landing gear down and flaps at position2. When the captain saw the Vernon airport Runway23, he turned to a heading of 242Magnetic, selected the flaps at position3, and commenced a visual approach to Runway23 at the Vernon Airport. After 40seconds, when the aircraft was approximately 1.3nautical miles from the threshold and 730feet above ground level (agl), the crew executed a go-around. Shortly after the go-around was initiated, ACA183 received a TCAS (traffic alert and collision avoidance system) traffic advisory generated by a Cessna152 aircraft in the Vernon circuit. ACA183 levelled off at 6000feet above sea level (asl), and the Kelowna tower controller then issued directions to the Kelowna Airport. The crew subsequently carried out a visual approach to Runway15 at Kelowna and landed without further incident. Other Factual Information Knowledge of a serious forest fire south of the Kelowna Airport prompted Air Canada Flight Dispatch, at the request of the crew, to make three telephone calls to Kelowna tower - two before ACA183 departed from Toronto, and one while ACA183 was en route - enquiring if the airport was open. At no time did the dispatcher(s) ask about the availability of instrument approaches, nor did Kelowna tower personnel volunteer any additional information. Air Canada Flight Dispatch was not aware of the reason the instrument landing system/distance measuring equipment (ILS/DME)1 approach was not authorized, nor was it aware of the possibility that the NDB B approach might be cancelled for the same reason. When the Vancouver ACC controller advised the crew that no instrument approach was available, he gave no reason, and the crew did not ask for a reason. The controller did not comment on the serviceability of the approach navaids. There are two instrument approaches at Kelowna, namely the NDBB and the ILS/DME1, both for Runway15. Instrument approaches were not authorized, because, in each case, the associated missed approach procedure infringed on the designated, fire-suppression zone, the boundary of which was located just to the south of the airport. The approach navaids were fully serviceable. ACA183 commenced descent from flight level (FL)350 on a northwesterly heading when it was 57.4nautical miles from the Kelowna Airport1 on airway J569, which runs northwest to Enderby VOR then southwest to Kelowna. During the descent out of FL200, the crew was asked to expedite through 13000feet asl. On three occasions during the descent, the crew advised the Vancouver ACC controller that they had the field in sight. On 15September2003, a Transport Canada King Air aircraft, with Transportation Safety Board investigators on board, followed the flight path and profile flown by ACA183 into Kelowna. It was determined that at no point on that profile was it possible to see the Kelowna Airport. During the go-around from Vernon Airport, when the King Air aircraft was over Lake Okanagan at 6000feetasl, the Kelowna Airport became visible. The Air Canada Route Manual contains a visual transition procedure for Kelowna Runway33 but not for Runway15, the active runway at the time of the incident. The crew improvised a visual approach using the engine-out procedure chart for Runway33. The Air Canada Route Manual does not depict the Vernon Airport and its aerodrome traffic frequency (ATF) on any Kelowna chart. Air Canada has a visual approach policy in its Flight Operations Manual that gives general guidelines for the conduct of visual approaches. It also has aircraft-specific visual approach procedures in the Aircraft Operating Manual for each aircraft type as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). For the A319/A320/A321 aircraft, the SOPs state that visual approaches are planned to be referenced on a nominal 3glide slope, but there is no guidance as to how that slope is to be achieved. At 42.7 nautical miles from the Kelowna Airport, ACA183 was in a descent through 12000feetasl, and the crew had commenced a turn to track toward the LW (Kelowna) NDB. At 22.3nautical miles from the Kelowna Airport, at an altitude of 4000feet asl, the crew selected Flap1, followed quickly by Flap2, landing gear down, and the speed brakes selected in. During descent, the first officer was distracted from approach-monitoring duties while trying to talk to company personnel in Kelowna regarding a gate assignment. At 18.6nautical miles from the Kelowna Airport, at an altitude of approximately 2600feet asl, the captain turned toward Runway23 at the Vernon Airport. Flap3 was selected and the rate of descent increased from approximately 800feet per minute (fpm) to approximately 1800fpm. After 40seconds, when ACA183 was 1.3nautical miles from the Vernon Airport, the first officer, aware of the distance to Kelowna Airport, suggested they perform a go-around, which was then carried out by the captain. The go-around was initiated from an altitude of approximately 2000feet asl, 730feet agl. At all times during the approach, the aircraft's navigation system was set up to provide bearing and distance information from the Kelowna Airport, but neither pilot actively or effectively monitored the aircraft flight path and altitude in relation to the distance from the planned landing runway. Once the Vancouver ACC controller cleared the aircraft for a visual approach, the captain focussed his attention outside the aircraft and conducted navigation by visual reference to the ground. He did not reference the information available from his cockpit displays on the distance to the Kelowna Airport and did not compare the aircraft headings with the intended runway heading. Both the Vancouver ACC controller and the Kelowna tower controller believed the crew could see the Kelowna Airport, and both observed on radar the aircraft descend to a low altitude in the vicinity of Vernon. When ACA183 was at 3000feetasl and descending, the Kelowna tower controller queried the ACA183 crew about its altitude. The aircraft continued to descend. The Vernon Airport is an uncontrolled aerodrome with a designated ATF for use within a five-nautical-mile radius and up to 4100feetasl. Aircraft entering this area are expected to broadcast their intentions on 122.8MHz, the local unicom frequency, to ensure that all aircraft operating at the airport are aware of each other. ACA183 made no such broadcast. After landing at Kelowna, the captain contacted an Air Canada supervisory pilot by telephone and recounted the incident. The captain indicated that, while the aircraft had descended to a lower altitude than usual, it had not reached a significantly low altitude. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data was not secured at that time. The CVR operates on a continuous 30-minute loop and when ACA183 continued on its scheduled flights to Victoria and Vancouver, the pertinent section of the CVR tape was overwritten. The flight data recorder (FDR) was removed from the aircraft and its information was recovered for analysis by the TSB Engineering Branch. The captain had been employed by Air Canada for seven years. He held a valid Canadian airline transport pilot licence (ATPL) endorsed for the Airbus A319/320/321 and a group 1 instrument rating. He had accumulated 10500hours of total flying time, including 3520hours on the Airbus A319/320/321 and 1351hours as captain. He held a Kelowna aerodrome qualification, an Air Canada authorization to operate into Kelowna Airport, and had flown into and out of Kelowna the previous week. The first officer had been employed by Air Canada for three years. He held a valid Canadian ATPL endorsed for the Airbus A319/320/321 and a group1 instrument rating. He had accumulated 5890hours of total flying time, including 658hours as first officer on the AirbusA319/320/321. The first officer had not previously operated into Kelowna Airport. At the time of the incident, the following information from the Kelowna automatic terminal information service was in effect: Kelowna Airport information Golf - Weather at 1800 Zulu, wind 190at7; visibility15; few clouds at 6000, few clouds at 25000; temperature20; dew point-0; altimeter 30.02; IFR approach visual, active Runway15. NOTAM: All instrument procedures Runway15 not authorized. IFR departures Runway15 not authorized due [to] forest fire. Forest fire area from Kelowna Airport to 4miles southwest and from Kelowna Airport 19miles south at 8000msl and below; all aircraft remain clear. Prior permission required. Request permission from Kelowna tower on frequency119.6. Inform ATC that you have information Golf. Kelowna tower personnel reported that, while the visibility to the south of the airport was somewhat restricted due to smoke from forest fires, the visibility in the north quadrant was unlimited.