Summary At 2243 eastern daylight time on 19July2005, in fine weather and darkness, the upbound vessel JoSpirit and the downbound vessel Orla collided near Mile16 of the South Shore Canal in the St. Lawrence Seaway. The collision occurred near mid-channel at a combined speed of approximately 6knots. Both vessels sustained damage forward, but neither injuries nor pollution resulted. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessels Description of the Vessels Orla The Orla is a conventional geared bulk carrier of recent construction with the engine room and accommodation aft. JoSpirit The JoSpirit is a tanker with the engine room and accommodation aft. Vessel movements, either ahead or astern, are controlled from the wheelhouse using a controllable-pitch control unit. The controllable-pitch control was slightly offset such that, when the control lever was set at zero pitch, the vessel would make headway estimated at between 1and 3knots. The vessel was also equipped with a bow thruster. History of the Voyage At approximately 1955 eastern daylight time2 on 19July2005, a pilot boarded the JoSpirit at Saint-Lambert, Quebec, in the first lock of the St. Lawrence Seaway to conduct the vessel up the South Shore Canal. Visibility was reported as very good with a light breeze. After the vessel departed Cte-Sainte-Catherine lock at 2143, the second lock of the Seaway, the master left the bridge. The pilot, the officer of the watch (OOW), and the helmsman continued the navigation upbound (heading southwest). At 2220, the pilot of the downbound (heading northeast) vessel Orla reported passing Saint-Nicolas Island. The Seaway Beauharnois traffic control officer informed him that the JoSpirit was upbound under the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) bridge. At 2237, the pilots of the two vessels spoke on the very high frequency (VHF) traffic control channel. The communication was of a personal nature and not related to the meeting situation that was to occur. At this time, the JoSpirit was rounding the final upbound bend in the South Shore Canal, about 1 nm above the CPR bridge. The Orla was proceeding on the mid-channel course of 068.5true(T) at the western entrance to the South Shore Canal. Shortly after rounding the final upbound bend in the South Shore Canal, it appeared to the pilot of the JoSpirit that the Orla was slightly crowding the north side of the channel on which he was conducting the tanker. Accordingly, he decided to give a little more room for the meeting to take place by moving closer to the north bank, but he communicated his intentions to neither the pilot of the Orla nor to the JoSpirit's navigation personnel. When satisfied with the vessel's position in the channel, he asked the helmsman to steer 248gyro(G). The helmsman complied but found that the vessel needed regular inputs of 5to 10starboard helm in order to maintain the heading. The OOW was now standing by the helmsman, verifying his actions. Between 2239 and 2240, more than 10 starboard helm was applied to maintain the heading. By 2241, 20 to 30 starboard helm was necessary to steer 248(G).3 During this time, the pilot glanced at the rudder angle indicator from time to time, but there was no exchange of information among bridge team members. As the JoSpirit made its way along the channel bank, the pilot gradually reduced the propeller pitch to slow the vessel down before the meeting. Since completing the final upbound bend at 7.6knots,4 the vessel was now making 5.7knots. There is conflicting information with respect to the helm orders given at about 2242. The navigation personnel of the JoSpirit maintain that the pilot ordered the helm amidships, whereas the pilot does not recollect this order. The helm was nonetheless put to midships (see AppendixA), and the vessel immediately started to sheer to port. Full starboard helm was then applied, but the vessel's heading continued to swing to port. Starboard bow thrust was reportedly requested by the pilot, but was not applied. The bridge team of the Orla consisted of a pilot, master,OOW, and the helmsman. The engine telegraph was set at "dead slow ahead" and the vessel, thought to be in the centre of the channel, was under the conduct of the pilot who was giving the helmsman courses to steer. Upon seeing the JoSpirit sheer toward the middle of the channel, the pilot ordered the helm put to starboard and then, just before the collision, hard to port was applied to try to minimize the angle of contact. The main engine was then stopped. At about 2243, on a heading of 232 (G), the JoSpirit made contact with the Orla in position latitude 4524'43"N and longitude 07342'21"W, approximately 0.51nm upstream of Mile16 of the South Shore Canal (see Figure1). Figure1.St. Lawrence Seaway: South Shore Canal of Kahnawake, Quebec Vessel Positions Before the Collision Most commercial vessels transiting the St. Lawrence Seaway, including the two vessels involved, are required to have a functional Automatic Information System (AIS).5 Vessel position information was obtained from an external source for both the JoSpirit and the Orla. The JoSpirit was also equipped with an electronic chart system (ECS), and the position information on the ECS confirmed the AIS data for the JoSpirit. The Orla was not fitted with an ECS, but carried two global positioning system (GPS) units. However, these had no electronic interface and were not being used for navigational purposes, and the pilot was navigating using visual cues.6 Figure2 illustrates the relative positions of the vessels, based on the AISdata, just before the JoSpirit took the sheer to port. The data also indicate that, between 2233and 2241, the Orla was making a course over the ground (COG) that would bring the vessel toward the north side of the channel- that is, a COG less than the channel direction of 068.5(T). Figure2.Reconstruction of relative vessel positions in the canal, as retrieved from AIS data Width of Vessels and the Canal The canal area where the collision took place has a usable navigable width of approximately 70m. The JoSpirit has a moulded breadth of 15.9m, while the Orla is 23m wide. Vessel Certification The JoSpirit and the Orla were crewed, certificated, and equipped in accordance with existing regulations. Personnel Certification The master and officers of the JoSpirit and the Orla held appropriate certificates for the type of vessel and class of voyage. Personnel History JoSpirit The pilot had been employed as such since 1990. Before becoming a pilot, he had sailed as master. The master of the JoSpirit had sailed as master on various vessels since 1983. He had been master on the JoSpirit for four years. The OOW had been sailing as a deck officer since1991, while the helmsman had been sailing since1990. Both the pilot and the master had received training in bridge resource management (BRM). Orla The pilot had been employed as such since1995. Before becoming a pilot, he had sailed as master. The master of the Orla had been sailing since1970, and had sailed as master on various vessels for the past 20years. The OOW had been sailing in his present capacity since004, and the helmsman, since1971. Injuries to Persons There were no reported injuries on either vessel. Damage to the Vessels and Environment JoSpirit The side shell plating of the JoSpirit in way of the forecastle was set in and gashed. Orla Damage to the Orla included a large hole above the waterline in way of the forward paint stores. A minor fire forward caused by sparks was quickly extinguished. Rudder Movement and Rudder Angle Recorder- JoSpirit The JoSpirit is equipped with a Becker rudder. When such a rudder is turned to any given angle up to a maximum of 60, an articulated flap also moves in relation to the plane of the main blade up to an additional 45. The ratio of flap angle to main rudder angle is variable, being greatest at small rudder angles and then diminishing. A 5 main rudder application, for example, will produce almost 12of flap angle, while a 45main rudder application will result in 45 of flap angle. This type of rudder has the effect of increasing the lift coefficient dramatically, and the resulting side force is almost 80percent greater than conventional rudders. Maximum side force of the Becker rudder is achieved at about 34on the main rudder, with a corresponding flap angle of about 43. The JoSpirit is also equipped with aC. Plath rudder angle recorder (see AppendixA). Although the maximum rudder angle achievable is 60 (port or starboard), the rudder angle recorder in the wheelhouse is only capable of recording to a maximum of 45(port and starboard). Any rudder angles used that are greater than 45are also recorded as 45. On the other hand, the rudder angle indicator used by the bridge team to view helm application is graduated to the full extent of rudder movement- that is, 60. Night Navigation in the South Shore Canal Photo4.Lamppost lights extinguished and/or obstructed The South Shore Canal is fitted with variable-intensity lighting that outlines the banks of the canal.7 The system extends from the Jacques Cartier Bridge in the east to the end of the dyke at Kahnawake (Lac Saint-Louis) in the west. Light intensity can be controlled from Cte-Sainte-Catherine and increased during periods of reduced visibility. Night navigation in the canal is essentially carried out using the visual cues taken from the lighting arrangements. Although the north shore light posts were, for the most part, easily visible and clear of any trees or other obstructions, those on the south side were not. Especially above Cte-Sainte-Catherine lock, many lamppost lights were extinguished, and had been for some time, while others were obstructed by trees and bushes. Bank Suction As a vessel moves forward, displaced water produces a cushion effect at the bow, before filling the void behind the stern. Lateral pressures are balanced. When a ship is off the channel centreline, a yawing moment is produced. The elevation of the water between the vessel and the near bank of the channel is less than the other side, and the resultant force tends to move the stern toward the near bank. This effect is known as bank suction; its magnitude is influenced by other factors, including vessel distance from the bank, vessel speed, water depth, draft, and channel profile.8 Collisions in narrow channels due to one vessel taking a sheer as a result of bank suction effect are well documented. In 2002, while outbound in the Houston Ship Channel, the vessel Lindholm took an unrecoverable sheer to port and collided with the inbound StoltAchievement.9 In 2003 at Townsville, Queensland, Australia, a tanker sheered to port across the channel and grounded when starboard rudder, which was being used to counteract the bank suction effect aft, was removed.10 Similarly, the PONedlloydGenoa and the Ebro collided on Germany's Elbe River in 2002when the PONedlloydGenoa sheered irreversibly to port after starboard helm was removed.11 Bridge Resource Management Bridge resource management is the effective management and utilization of all resources, human and technical, available to a bridge team to help ensure the safe operation of a vessel. It focuses on skills such as communication and team building. Weakness in bridge organization and management has been cited as the primary cause of marine casualties worldwide. When the pilot is on board, he/she must participate in and be supported as a temporary bridge team member. Good bridge resource management also involves effective inter-ship communication, especially in narrow channels.12