All indications suggest that, shortly before take-off, the pilot-in-command selected the ignition and engine start switches instead of the auto-ignition switches. Although the two sets of switches have distinct operating mechanisms, the differences were not sufficient to prevent the error. This type of error is common for routine tasks where the object to be activated is located close to another. The line-up checklist does not require a load indicator reading when the auto-ignition switches are selected, which would confirm that the generators are on line. Starting with serial number B224, the generator warning lights on the King Air100 illuminate when they are off line due to switches left in the ignition and engine start position. However, this modification was not offered to operators of earlier King Air models. Even though the ignition and engine start switches are equipped with a return spring in the position used to turn the engine without ignition, this option was not used for the start position. Therefore, the switches remain in the start position if they are inadvertently placed in this position, until they are returned manually. Emergency procedures are formulated to provide crews with practical solutions to abnormal situations. In order for crew members to be able to follow an emergency procedure, they must recognize the situation, identify the appropriate solution and apply it. Without any clear indication that the generators were off line, the crew did not identify that the source of all of the failures was the lack of electric power, for which a procedure exists. A specific check of the white auto-ignition warning lights that remained illuminated would have led the crew to the ignition and engine start switches. However, since these white warning lights are primarily used to indicate that the system is on, they do not suggest that there is an anomaly that needs to be addressed on a priority basis. This would explain why the crew did not complete the applicable checklist and instead focused on other developing anomalies. The logic of recycling the landing gear following the illumination of the in-transit warning light does not take into account the possibility of an electrical failure. The final item indicating that the flight planning must be amended gives the impression that there are no other procedures available to rectify the situation and does not refer the flight crew to the "landing gear will not retract" checklist. If the crew would have completed this checklist, the electrical power could have been cut to the landing gear motor, and the energy saved would have kept the radios and flight instruments operational for several minutes. The GPS would have remained operational, and several options would then have been available. Because fuel endurance was sufficient, the flight could have been diverted to a location where conditions were more favourable for VFR flight. The series of anomalies overlapping immediately after take-off focused the crew's attention and compelled the crew to continuously reassess the new failures: the landing gear remained in transit when the lever was placed in the up position; the auto-ignition warning lights remained on; some flight instruments failed; radio communication instruments failed; radio navigation instruments failed; and the GPS failed. The crew did not identify the source of the problems as being an electrical failure. In IFRconditions, the crew encountered flight instrument and navigation system failures that are not provided for in the regulations applicable to the loss of two-way communications. Not knowing the source of the problem and apprehending new failures, the crew decided to initiate a descent to regain visual contact with the ground. The decision to descend to 2200feet was based on the fact that the crew members were familiar with the area and that the radar vectors received before the communication failure provided them with an approximate position. In addition, they had just left the Montral/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport where they were able to keep visual contact with the ground until reaching an altitude of 2000feet. Gathering and analyzing information related to operational experiences is essential to efficiently manage safety. Incidents that seem minor provide an opportunity to understand when and where errors could occur and help in formulating corrective action to eliminate them. Once in place, the SMSwill motivate operators to analyze this type of incident. The lack of disclosure of this information allowed the same situation to recur under more difficult conditions. Without a formal process to analyze operational experiences, it is likely that the same errors will recur.Analysis All indications suggest that, shortly before take-off, the pilot-in-command selected the ignition and engine start switches instead of the auto-ignition switches. Although the two sets of switches have distinct operating mechanisms, the differences were not sufficient to prevent the error. This type of error is common for routine tasks where the object to be activated is located close to another. The line-up checklist does not require a load indicator reading when the auto-ignition switches are selected, which would confirm that the generators are on line. Starting with serial number B224, the generator warning lights on the King Air100 illuminate when they are off line due to switches left in the ignition and engine start position. However, this modification was not offered to operators of earlier King Air models. Even though the ignition and engine start switches are equipped with a return spring in the position used to turn the engine without ignition, this option was not used for the start position. Therefore, the switches remain in the start position if they are inadvertently placed in this position, until they are returned manually. Emergency procedures are formulated to provide crews with practical solutions to abnormal situations. In order for crew members to be able to follow an emergency procedure, they must recognize the situation, identify the appropriate solution and apply it. Without any clear indication that the generators were off line, the crew did not identify that the source of all of the failures was the lack of electric power, for which a procedure exists. A specific check of the white auto-ignition warning lights that remained illuminated would have led the crew to the ignition and engine start switches. However, since these white warning lights are primarily used to indicate that the system is on, they do not suggest that there is an anomaly that needs to be addressed on a priority basis. This would explain why the crew did not complete the applicable checklist and instead focused on other developing anomalies. The logic of recycling the landing gear following the illumination of the in-transit warning light does not take into account the possibility of an electrical failure. The final item indicating that the flight planning must be amended gives the impression that there are no other procedures available to rectify the situation and does not refer the flight crew to the "landing gear will not retract" checklist. If the crew would have completed this checklist, the electrical power could have been cut to the landing gear motor, and the energy saved would have kept the radios and flight instruments operational for several minutes. The GPS would have remained operational, and several options would then have been available. Because fuel endurance was sufficient, the flight could have been diverted to a location where conditions were more favourable for VFR flight. The series of anomalies overlapping immediately after take-off focused the crew's attention and compelled the crew to continuously reassess the new failures: the landing gear remained in transit when the lever was placed in the up position; the auto-ignition warning lights remained on; some flight instruments failed; radio communication instruments failed; radio navigation instruments failed; and the GPS failed. The crew did not identify the source of the problems as being an electrical failure. In IFRconditions, the crew encountered flight instrument and navigation system failures that are not provided for in the regulations applicable to the loss of two-way communications. Not knowing the source of the problem and apprehending new failures, the crew decided to initiate a descent to regain visual contact with the ground. The decision to descend to 2200feet was based on the fact that the crew members were familiar with the area and that the radar vectors received before the communication failure provided them with an approximate position. In addition, they had just left the Montral/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport where they were able to keep visual contact with the ground until reaching an altitude of 2000feet. Gathering and analyzing information related to operational experiences is essential to efficiently manage safety. Incidents that seem minor provide an opportunity to understand when and where errors could occur and help in formulating corrective action to eliminate them. Once in place, the SMSwill motivate operators to analyze this type of incident. The lack of disclosure of this information allowed the same situation to recur under more difficult conditions. Without a formal process to analyze operational experiences, it is likely that the same errors will recur. Shortly before take-off, the pilot-in-command inadvertently selected the ignition and engine start switches instead of the auto-ignition switches. As a result, all of the aircraft electrical needs were powered by the battery, which was unable to maintain the load needed for the normal use of the electrical system and its related instruments. The line-up checklist does not require a load indicator reading when the auto-ignition switches are selected, which would confirm that the generators are on line. The absence of a clear indication by the warning lights that the generators were off line precluded the crew from the information needed to quickly recognize the anomaly. The crew completed the "abnormal gear indication- in transit" checklist. This checklist gives the impression that no other procedures are available to rectify the situation and does not refer the flight crew to the "landing gear will not retract" checklist. The crew did not complete the "landing gear will not retract" checklist; if it would have done so, the electrical power could have been cut to the landing gear motor. The energy saved would have kept the radios and flight instruments operational for several minutes.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors Shortly before take-off, the pilot-in-command inadvertently selected the ignition and engine start switches instead of the auto-ignition switches. As a result, all of the aircraft electrical needs were powered by the battery, which was unable to maintain the load needed for the normal use of the electrical system and its related instruments. The line-up checklist does not require a load indicator reading when the auto-ignition switches are selected, which would confirm that the generators are on line. The absence of a clear indication by the warning lights that the generators were off line precluded the crew from the information needed to quickly recognize the anomaly. The crew completed the "abnormal gear indication- in transit" checklist. This checklist gives the impression that no other procedures are available to rectify the situation and does not refer the flight crew to the "landing gear will not retract" checklist. The crew did not complete the "landing gear will not retract" checklist; if it would have done so, the electrical power could have been cut to the landing gear motor. The energy saved would have kept the radios and flight instruments operational for several minutes. The crew descended to an altitude below the sector altitude applicable to its position, without knowing its exact position. This situation increased the risk of collision with the terrain or with obstacles.Finding as to Risk The crew descended to an altitude below the sector altitude applicable to its position, without knowing its exact position. This situation increased the risk of collision with the terrain or with obstacles. The absence of a formal process for analyzing operational experiences and the lack of disclosure of information on previous similar accidents or incidents allowed the same situation to recur under more difficult conditions. The crew encountered overlapping failures, and it did not have the time to complete the checklists specific to each failure, which, eventually, would have helped rectify the situation. Instead, the crew decided to descend to regain and maintain visual contact with the ground.Other Findings The absence of a formal process for analyzing operational experiences and the lack of disclosure of information on previous similar accidents or incidents allowed the same situation to recur under more difficult conditions. The crew encountered overlapping failures, and it did not have the time to complete the checklists specific to each failure, which, eventually, would have helped rectify the situation. Instead, the crew decided to descend to regain and maintain visual contact with the ground. Since this incident, during initial and recurrent ground training, Propair Inc. instructors emphasize the risk associated with the starter/generator system and its consequences on some of the company's Beechcraft King Air100.Safety Action Since this incident, during initial and recurrent ground training, Propair Inc. instructors emphasize the risk associated with the starter/generator system and its consequences on some of the company's Beechcraft King Air100.