Analysis Weather and Boat-handling Ability Weather forecasts are important aids in planning a safe passage through waters where high waves and strong winds are common. In this instance, the personnel aboard the Marabell8began the first morning of their fishing vacation eager to catch Spring salmon, rumoured to be in the area of Lacy Island. Apparently, neither was aware of pertinent weather information posted near the gangway. When transiting an area of rough water, a vessel's safety is, to a large extent, dependent upon the boat-handling skills of its operator. In this instance, the operator of the Marabell8 had not operated a boat in the area of Langara Island in the five years before the accident and was not an experienced boat handler. Hence, the hazard associated with handling a boat in the weather conditions encountered was not fully recognized by the operator. Most of the boat-renting/chartering public do not have the necessary proficiency to operate a small boat, particularly in adverse weather. The master of the mother vessel Marabellhad warned the guests of navigational hazards in the area and had posted the weather information at the gangway to inform guests who had access to a boat. However, analysis of the weather forecast identifying areas considered safe to visit and those that posed hazards due to weather was not provided to help guests make an informed decision based on risk. Safety Procedures There is no regulatory requirement for the owners of vessels such as the Marabell to monitor the activities of the guests when they are away from the mother ship in small boats. Consequently, when an emergency arises, there is no way of ensuring the provision of prompt assistance either from the authorities or the mother vessel. There is, therefore, a potential for the situation to worsen to the extent that it can seriously jeopardize the safety of the boat and its occupants. The safe operation of an open boat in the exposed waters on the west side of Langara Island demands that additional precautionary measures be instituted to ensure safe passage. Such procedures could include: instituting the buddysystem, where at least two small boats travel together and maintain visual contact with each other for the duration of their passage away from the mother ship; or the monitoring of the small boats by the mother ship, by way of small boats calling the mother ship at scheduled times or the mother ship contacting boats at preset intervals. Canadian Regulatory Requirements Pleasure Craft Operator Certification and Safety The transitional provisions of the Competency of Pleasure Craft Regulations came into force on 01April1999. As a result, in the future, operator licences will be required when operating pleasure craft. The proof of competency requirement does not apply to non-residents, whose stay in Canada does not exceed 45days, who operate a pleasure craft. In light of this fact, the operators of sports fishing companies should ensure that their clients demonstrate their ability to operate boats safely, i.e., basic seamanship, understanding the compass and the chart for the area in which they will be fishing. If a client is not able to demonstrate these abilities, alternative arrangements should be made -- such as the provision of an experienced guide. Accessibility of Life-saving Equipment The issue of the accessibility of emergency equipment aboard open boats that have capsized has been addressed by the Board in response to previous accidents. In the 1992 drowning deaths of two persons aboard a small, open chartered boat, the Board recommended that the Department of Transport initiate research and development into ways of ensuring the accessibility of all emergency equipment, including in a capsizing situation.4 In response to the recommendation, a study entitled Safety Equipment Accessibility on Small Commercial Passenger Vessels - TP13026Ewas completed by MIL Systems on behalf of Transport Canada Marine Safety (TCMS) in March1998. This study did not fully address the safety deficiencies of concern to the TSB. In1999, TCMS undertook a more thorough review of accessibility of life-saving equipment and intended to publish the information by the end of that year. However, to date, the issue remains essentially unaddressed. TCMS now proposes that, as part of Transport Canada's (TC) Canada Shipping Act (CSA) regulatory reform, the issue of accessibility of life-saving equipment be reviewed as part of the Life-Saving Equipment Regulations and Small Vessel Regulations. It is recognized that such a review will take time and, in the interim, the safety of those on board small vessels will continue to be at risk in an emergency situation. Ineffectiveness of Current Requirement for Emergency Signalling Equipment Several means of alerting others of an emergency situation, other than by calling on a marine VHF radio, are available on the market. Long-range emergency signalling equipment (ESE) includes waterproof portable radios and personal locator beacons (PLB). Short-range ESE includes search and rescue transponders (SART) and mini flares. The rapidity of capsizing may preclude transmission of a distress message, prefixed Mayday, as in this instance. Because the vessel carried a VHF set, which was attached to the vessel, the only means of alerting search and rescue (SAR) authorities and seeking assistance was lost when the occupants were suddenly thrown into the water. Similarly, because the distress flares were stowed in the forward locker, they were submerged and were no longer retrievable. Carrying appropriate long-range ESE could have permitted alerting of SAR authorities immediately. Also, carrying alternative short-range ESE would have provided persons in the water with a better means to seek assistance from others in the vicinity. In cold waters, the success of a SAR mission depends on the prompt notification of SAR authorities and the prompt tasking of SAR resources or, alternatively, in operations such as these (where vessels operate from a mother ship), on communicating distress directly to the mother ship. The lack of appropriate ESE to communicate/signal distress can result in the loss of valuable time and adversely affect the success of a SAR mission. The selection of life-saving equipment appropriate to a particular small vessel operation should take into consideration the following: small vessels operate in a variety of environments; different operations have different life-saving equipment needs; the Canadian climate poses significant hazards to survival and marine safety; and maximizing survival capability involves trade-offs among the various components of a life-saving system. Current Small Vessel Regulationsare prescriptive in nature and the requirement to carry life-saving equipment applies to a broad range of commercial activity. Further, risk varies from operation to operation and some safety equipment is better suited to mitigate risks than others. The regulations call for the carriage of flares stowed in a forward locker. In case of a sudden capsize, as in this instance, the only means of seeking assistance from others in the vicinity was lost. As a result, individuals who find themselves in the water are subjected to unacceptable risk. The prescriptive nature of the regulations, coupled with the delay in the review of the accessibility of the life-saving equipment, will continue to decrease the chances of survival for persons finding themselves in the water. Safety Inspection TC inspected the mother vessel but did not inspect the smaller vessels involved in the operation as the small vessels were considered to be a pleasure craft. TC is aware that the Marabellwas engaged in commercial activity, whereby the guests purchased a fishing package comprised of room and board on board the Marabelland the use of smaller vessels (Marabell8) for sport fishing/recreational activity. There is an expectation on the part of a consumer purchasing such a package that the entire operation meets a minimum level of safety. The occupants of Marabell8were apparently unaware of the forecast weather when they departed for the fishing area. The operator did not have the boat-handling skills to navigate Parry Passage safely in the prevailing wind and wave conditions, nor was he required to meet regulatory proof of competency requirements.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The occupants of Marabell8were apparently unaware of the forecast weather when they departed for the fishing area. The operator did not have the boat-handling skills to navigate Parry Passage safely in the prevailing wind and wave conditions, nor was he required to meet regulatory proof of competency requirements. The guests were not provided information on the areas considered hazardous due to weather, which precluded them from making informed decisions based on risk. The lack of appropriate ESE to communicate/signal distress results in the loss of valuable time, adversely affects the success of a SAR mission and decreases the chances of survival for persons who find themselves in the water. There is no requirement for the mother vessel to monitor the activities of guests when they are assigned to a recreational activity vessel, nor is there a requirement to retain some form of radio contact. Consequently, in an emergency, there is no way of seeking prompt assistance from authorities or the mother vessel. TC inspected the mother vessel but did not inspect the Marabell8.Findings as to Risk The guests were not provided information on the areas considered hazardous due to weather, which precluded them from making informed decisions based on risk. The lack of appropriate ESE to communicate/signal distress results in the loss of valuable time, adversely affects the success of a SAR mission and decreases the chances of survival for persons who find themselves in the water. There is no requirement for the mother vessel to monitor the activities of guests when they are assigned to a recreational activity vessel, nor is there a requirement to retain some form of radio contact. Consequently, in an emergency, there is no way of seeking prompt assistance from authorities or the mother vessel. TC inspected the mother vessel but did not inspect the Marabell8. The owner/operator of the Marabell8provided safety equipment in excess of the regulatory requirement.Other Findings The owner/operator of the Marabell8provided safety equipment in excess of the regulatory requirement. Safety Action Safety Concern Safety Procedures within the Sport Fishing Industry In 1995, the CharlotteExplorer4, which was fishing alone, capsized and its two occupants drowned (TSBReportNoM95W0140). The Board determined that the charter company's procedures to help ensure the safety of its guests were not enforced. These procedures concerned vessels fishing alone, the maintenance of regular radio contact and the provision of security patrols. The safety issues identified with the operation of the Marabell8 are similar to those identified in the CharlotteExplorer4 occurrence, in which case the Board indicated that practices, such as the buddy system and scheduled radio check-ins, would eliminate some of the risks. Safety of Guests in a Commercial Venture The Board believes that, in a commercial venture, the safety of guests who purchase a package comprised of room and board aboard a mother vessel (TCinspected) and the use of a pleasure craft for recreational activity can only be reasonably ensured when all of the components forming the package meet an appropriate minimum level of safety. The Board is concerned that all the facets of such a commercial venture are not inspected as if it were one operation.