Analysis Transverse Stability Consideration of the reported distribution of the deck cargo and the barge's virtually upright condition observed on departure, shows that the heeling effect due to the pulpwood protruding over the port side of the cargo box was counter-balanced by some asymmetric loading to starboard within the cargo box boundaries. Removal of a significant asymmetric load from the starboard side without a concurrent compensatory reduction on the port side would cause the barge to heel to port. Without careful co-ordination of the rates of cargo discharge during unloading operations, the occurrence of transitory athwartships weight imbalances would cause the barge to heel and/or roll. Calculations show that a static imbalance of some 240 tons from the starboard side would cause a permanent heel to port of some 11.5 degrees. However, were a significant imbalance to suddenly occur, the dynamic effect would cause the barge to roll to markedly greater angles than static calculations show. The momentum of such rolling could cause the then broken stow of the fore-and-aft-oriented deck cargo to shift to port--greatly augmenting the roll angle and causing a large quantity of the unsecured pulpwood on the port side to suddenly self-discharge. The sudden discharge of deck cargo from the port side would result in a marked weight imbalance to starboard, and the subsequent compensatory roll to that side would cause the athwartships-oriented and unsecured pulpwood on the outboard starboard side of the deck cargo to discharge onto the wharf. No stability, cargo deadweight scale, or deck loading details were provided for the guidance of the barge/tug operators. Barge technical specifications provided for the information and guidance of the operators were inadequate and misleading. The pulpwood deck cargo, loaded to a height of some 10 m, was unsecured. The absence of retaining stanchions and securing wires, in conjunction with the athwartships orientation of the outboard sides of the pulpwood, made the deck cargo highly vulnerable to shifting at relatively small heel or roll angles. The loaded barge was upright on departure, with positive initial transverse stability and an adequate range of stability--provided that the deck cargo remained in its (unsecured) stowed position. The deck cargo unloading sequence was inadequately planned, co-ordinated and monitored.Findings No stability, cargo deadweight scale, or deck loading details were provided for the guidance of the barge/tug operators. Barge technical specifications provided for the information and guidance of the operators were inadequate and misleading. The pulpwood deck cargo, loaded to a height of some 10 m, was unsecured. The absence of retaining stanchions and securing wires, in conjunction with the athwartships orientation of the outboard sides of the pulpwood, made the deck cargo highly vulnerable to shifting at relatively small heel or roll angles. The loaded barge was upright on departure, with positive initial transverse stability and an adequate range of stability--provided that the deck cargo remained in its (unsecured) stowed position. The deck cargo unloading sequence was inadequately planned, co-ordinated and monitored. Although the barge had positive initial transverse stability prior to departure from Anticosti Island, during its passage across the Gulf of St. Lawrence and on arrival at Carleton, an imbalance of weights in the timber deck cargo caused by the discharge operation initiated the sequence of events which led to the violent self-discharge of some of the cargo from both the port and starboard sides of the stow. Contributing factors were that the stowage of the unsecured deck cargo made it vulnerable to shifting at relatively small angles of roll or heel, the unloading sequence was inadequately planned, co-ordinated and monitored, and the barge technical specifications provided for the information and guidance of the operators were inadequate and misleading.Causes and Contributing Factors Although the barge had positive initial transverse stability prior to departure from Anticosti Island, during its passage across the Gulf of St. Lawrence and on arrival at Carleton, an imbalance of weights in the timber deck cargo caused by the discharge operation initiated the sequence of events which led to the violent self-discharge of some of the cargo from both the port and starboard sides of the stow. Contributing factors were that the stowage of the unsecured deck cargo made it vulnerable to shifting at relatively small angles of roll or heel, the unloading sequence was inadequately planned, co-ordinated and monitored, and the barge technical specifications provided for the information and guidance of the operators were inadequate and misleading.