A NOTAM is normally issued prior to removing equipment from service. This NOTAM was delayed because of an error in format and was not issued until after the loss of communication occurred. Because of the delay in issuing the NOTAM, relevant information about the scheduled removal of the frequency was not entered into the controllers' OIDS. When the frequency was removed from service, the warning systems worked correctly. The technical operations coordinator was immediately aware that the frequency had failed and acted directly to have it returned to service; this was accomplished in about 61seconds. In this occurrence, when communications were lost, the controller was at a critical point in the vectoring procedure. Because the controller had not provided alternate instructions, he had to rely on the aircrew to recognize that a communication failure had occurred. There was no stated requirement that the controller provide alternate instructions, as the Operations Bulletin requiring this procedure had expired. WJA25 was not immediately aware that a communication failure had occurred. However, based on their previous experience flying into Victoria, the crew anticipated a quick turn to final. When the clearance to turn was not received, and as their aircraft approached the localizer, they were preparing to contact the controller and, if necessary, turn to establish their aircraft on the localizer. The crew's prior experience flying into the airport, and their knowledge of the local terrain provided a level of safety not present under other circumstances. Without such prior knowledge, warning about high terrain to the south of the localizer would have been dependent on the GPWS.Analysis A NOTAM is normally issued prior to removing equipment from service. This NOTAM was delayed because of an error in format and was not issued until after the loss of communication occurred. Because of the delay in issuing the NOTAM, relevant information about the scheduled removal of the frequency was not entered into the controllers' OIDS. When the frequency was removed from service, the warning systems worked correctly. The technical operations coordinator was immediately aware that the frequency had failed and acted directly to have it returned to service; this was accomplished in about 61seconds. In this occurrence, when communications were lost, the controller was at a critical point in the vectoring procedure. Because the controller had not provided alternate instructions, he had to rely on the aircrew to recognize that a communication failure had occurred. There was no stated requirement that the controller provide alternate instructions, as the Operations Bulletin requiring this procedure had expired. WJA25 was not immediately aware that a communication failure had occurred. However, based on their previous experience flying into Victoria, the crew anticipated a quick turn to final. When the clearance to turn was not received, and as their aircraft approached the localizer, they were preparing to contact the controller and, if necessary, turn to establish their aircraft on the localizer. The crew's prior experience flying into the airport, and their knowledge of the local terrain provided a level of safety not present under other circumstances. Without such prior knowledge, warning about high terrain to the south of the localizer would have been dependent on the GPWS. The controller descended the aircraft to the lower MVA before providing clearance for the ILS approach, and did not provide any alternate instructions regarding high ground south of the localizer. An active communication frequency was prematurely removed from service following a misunderstanding of a voice communication between technical staff, resulting in a loss of communications between the controller and WJA25. A previous Operations Bulletin(01-151), requiring controllers to instruct aircraft not to proceed south of the final approach course when on vectors for an ILS to Victoria's Runway 09, had lapsed four days prior to the occurrence.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The controller descended the aircraft to the lower MVA before providing clearance for the ILS approach, and did not provide any alternate instructions regarding high ground south of the localizer. An active communication frequency was prematurely removed from service following a misunderstanding of a voice communication between technical staff, resulting in a loss of communications between the controller and WJA25. A previous Operations Bulletin(01-151), requiring controllers to instruct aircraft not to proceed south of the final approach course when on vectors for an ILS to Victoria's Runway 09, had lapsed four days prior to the occurrence. Use of the shortgate procedure into Victoria, as observed in this occurrence, was not in accordance with direction provided in Nav Canada's MANOPS.Other Findings Use of the shortgate procedure into Victoria, as observed in this occurrence, was not in accordance with direction provided in Nav Canada's MANOPS. Following this occurrence, the Vancouver ACC reviewed the NOTAM process and identified a number of changes that were required in the activation protocol. These changes were initiated within the ACC. The Vancouver ACC reviewed existing procedures and phraseology used when coordinating the removal of operational equipment for maintenance purposes. This review resulted in amendments to the procedures and a formalization of the terminology used to confirm the release of the equipment. Nav Canada has initiated a program to establish a back-up, tuneable PAL for use in the event of communications failure. The plan is to provide additional radio equipment which can be instantly accessed from control positions in the Vancouver ACC. As an interim measure, Vancouver ACC issued an Operations Bulletin(02-036), requiring that alternate instructions be issued to aircraft when a controller vectors an aircraft toward higher terrain. Nav Canada subsequently revised the Victoria Terminal Operations Letter(00-1) to integrate new procedures that are to be used when vectoring an aircraft toward high ground, or when using a short gate rather than the published arrival into Victoria. On 18 April 2002, additional spot heights were added to the Victoria approach charts to aid in pilot terrain awareness. Effective 03October2002, the ILS approach chart for RW09 will depict a warning for mountainous terrain in the NW and SW quadrants.Safety Action Following this occurrence, the Vancouver ACC reviewed the NOTAM process and identified a number of changes that were required in the activation protocol. These changes were initiated within the ACC. The Vancouver ACC reviewed existing procedures and phraseology used when coordinating the removal of operational equipment for maintenance purposes. This review resulted in amendments to the procedures and a formalization of the terminology used to confirm the release of the equipment. Nav Canada has initiated a program to establish a back-up, tuneable PAL for use in the event of communications failure. The plan is to provide additional radio equipment which can be instantly accessed from control positions in the Vancouver ACC. As an interim measure, Vancouver ACC issued an Operations Bulletin(02-036), requiring that alternate instructions be issued to aircraft when a controller vectors an aircraft toward higher terrain. Nav Canada subsequently revised the Victoria Terminal Operations Letter(00-1) to integrate new procedures that are to be used when vectoring an aircraft toward high ground, or when using a short gate rather than the published arrival into Victoria. On 18 April 2002, additional spot heights were added to the Victoria approach charts to aid in pilot terrain awareness. Effective 03October2002, the ILS approach chart for RW09 will depict a warning for mountainous terrain in the NW and SW quadrants.