Analysis Despite the crew's limited experience in the area, no pre-planning of the trip or familiarization with the route had taken place prior to the departure from Windsor. No effective monitoring of the vessel's position, either visually or by radar, took place to correlate the vessel's progress with the chart and critical time was lost searching for the proper chartlet at the alter course position. There was no constructive BRM regime in place in that, although personnel were assigned to monitor the vessel's progress, their effectiveness was not supervised. Occupied with his multi-task responsibilities, the master had not developed the full awareness of the vessel's situation necessary to make the required course alteration decision. The layout of the bridge equipment and instrumentation was such that those assigned to monitor the vessel's progress could not easily use the radar to assist in their task and no one other than the master, as occupant of the port seat, could conveniently use the VHF radiotelephone. The training master's previous critical reaction to the vessel's speed being reduced likely played a part in influencing the master to continue at high speed when there was indecision with respect to the required course alteration. The mate and assisting guest did not monitor the vessel's progress because they incorrectly assumed that the master and training master's previous passage through the area had made them familiar with the route.Findings Despite the crew's limited experience in the area, no pre-planning of the trip or familiarization with the route had taken place prior to the departure from Windsor. No effective monitoring of the vessel's position, either visually or by radar, took place to correlate the vessel's progress with the chart and critical time was lost searching for the proper chartlet at the alter course position. There was no constructive BRM regime in place in that, although personnel were assigned to monitor the vessel's progress, their effectiveness was not supervised. Occupied with his multi-task responsibilities, the master had not developed the full awareness of the vessel's situation necessary to make the required course alteration decision. The layout of the bridge equipment and instrumentation was such that those assigned to monitor the vessel's progress could not easily use the radar to assist in their task and no one other than the master, as occupant of the port seat, could conveniently use the VHF radiotelephone. The training master's previous critical reaction to the vessel's speed being reduced likely played a part in influencing the master to continue at high speed when there was indecision with respect to the required course alteration. The mate and assisting guest did not monitor the vessel's progress because they incorrectly assumed that the master and training master's previous passage through the area had made them familiar with the route. The Katran4 grounded while operating in the foil-borne mode because those in charge of monitoring of the vessel's progress could not determine her position and decide upon the necessary course alteration. Contributing factors in the occurrence were the lack of planning or route familiarization and, that with the master distracted by his multiple responsibilities, there was inadequate bridge resource management and situational awareness.Causes and Contributing Factors The Katran4 grounded while operating in the foil-borne mode because those in charge of monitoring of the vessel's progress could not determine her position and decide upon the necessary course alteration. Contributing factors in the occurrence were the lack of planning or route familiarization and, that with the master distracted by his multiple responsibilities, there was inadequate bridge resource management and situational awareness. After this occurrence, the owners developed training manuals for the operating crews of their hydrofoils. The new owners are developing, with the assistance of local Marine Safety staff, a training program which, using the manuals, will provide proper training for new mates and masters with respect to navigational conduct and requirements of bridge watchkeepers, including Bridge Resource Management, planning, and route familiarization.Safety Action Taken After this occurrence, the owners developed training manuals for the operating crews of their hydrofoils. The new owners are developing, with the assistance of local Marine Safety staff, a training program which, using the manuals, will provide proper training for new mates and masters with respect to navigational conduct and requirements of bridge watchkeepers, including Bridge Resource Management, planning, and route familiarization.