Analysis Requirement for Stability Data Currently, there is no requirement for small uninspected fishing vessels, such as the MorningSunrise, to submit trim and stability data to TC for information, review, or approval. The Board has repeatedly expressed the concern that the stability characteristics of most small fishing vessels are not formally assessed and, consequently, that their safe operation is compromised. In November2003, the Board issued two recommendations to TC (M03-05 and M03-06), calling for the assessment/verification of stability for new and existing small inspected fishing vessels. In2005, following the loss of the Ryan'sCommander, and concerned that, in the absence of meaningful action to address past recommendations, fishers continued to be placed at undue risk, the Board issued another recommendation (M05-04) calling on TCto immediately implement recommendations M03-05 and M03-06. (See Safety Action Taken section for subsequent actions.) While these recommendations were made in relation to small inspected fishing vessels (with a gross tonnage of 15to150), the principles also apply to small uninspected fishing vessels (under 15in gross tonnage) given that the risk associated with their operation is similarly high. Owners of commercial vessels are required to report modifications to TC. In addition, when there is a change of ownership of a registered vessel, or when modifications require that the vessel's registration information be changed, then TCis notified by the Registrar of Ships as a matter of course. However, in many cases- such as the MorningSunrise- commercial vessel owners simply make structural modifications without notifying any authority. Frequent changes to the management and operation of the fisheries mean that fishing vessel modifications are an ongoing reality. These modifications, which may adversely affect a vessel's transverse stability, are often carried out without any evaluation by a naval architect or assessment by a TCinspector. In the absence of such an assessment, operational decisions may be based on imprecise or incomplete information- to the detriment of safety. Regulatory Framework and Safety The DFO length restriction, in conjunction with the Stacked Licence policy, encourages the addition of platform extensions. This not only increases the trap stowage area, but it also allows the carriage of 200extra traps, at a greater height above the vessel's centre of gravity, adversely affecting a vessel's transverse stability. Other modifications to comply with DFOlength restrictions include opening end compartments to the sea, which can compromise the watertight integrity of the space; moving away from conventional design concepts and introducing features such as increasing the width and above-water areas to meet operational needs, which may adversely affect the vessel's transverse and dynamic stability. Photo 5 - Examples of vessels' overall length being reduced by opening the end compartment to the sea. This can compromise the watertight integrity of those vessels. These modifications are done to meet the DFO length restrictions. Note: Openings made in the bow section of the vessel on the photo to the left. Drain holes at the bottom of the triangular plate on the photo to the right. TC's regulatory regime is intended to ensure that vessels are safe to operate and are seaworthy for the intended voyage. The regime uses the principle of a self-enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance for small fishing vessels of 15in gross tonnage and under. However, there is no regime in place to ensure that such self-enforcement meets its intended objective. This, together with the DFOregulatory regime working in partial isolation, permits potentially unsafe vessels to operate, to the detriment of small fishing vessel safety. This is not an isolated occurrence. In September 2001, in the occurrence involving the AlexB.1,6 the report focussed on the compromising aspects of the vessel's modifications, the inadequacies of TC'sinspection regime, and the lack of information exchanged between TC and DFO to better highlight and target vessels at risk and the safety culture of fishers. In August2002, the fishing vessel Fritzi-Ann,7 carrying prawn traps under similar circumstances to the MorningSunrise, capsized. The report focussed on the compromising aspects of vessel alterations, incremental prawn trap size/weight increases, and DFO's management policies on vessel safety - and in particular on vessel stability. In response to the safety issues raised in the Fritzi-Ann report, DFO stated that it Swill consult with TCto address their respective mandates and roles in enhancing safety for the small vessel fishing fleet. This would include improved coordination with TCon the development of IFMP (Integrated Fisheries Management Plan) and policies that may affect fishing vessel safety, and the sharing of information pertinent to vessel safety available to DFO. At the time of this occurrence, two years later, these issues continue to compromise the safety of small fishing vessels. In the absence of effective cooperation, the fisheries will continue to be managed in an environment that does not fully address fishing vessel safety concerns, and fishers will continue to be placed at undue risk. Competency of Fishers and Safety There is no requirement for fishers to have competency-based training or certification to operate a vessel of this size and type. The lack of basic seamanship knowledge and the principles of ship stability impairs such a fishing vessel operator's awareness of the consequences of improper weight distribution, to the detriment of vessel safety. the added weights above the vessel's centre of gravity, from modifications and from its loaded condition; the free surface effect of liquids in tanks and water shipped and retained on deck; and the dynamic heeling forces created by wind, waves, and the bold application of helm and throttle. the added weights above the vessel's centre of gravity, from modifications and from its loaded condition; the free surface effect of liquids in tanks and water shipped and retained on deck; and the dynamic heeling forces created by wind, waves, and the bold application of helm and throttle. The inherent low freeboard, along with the heel, permitted water to be shipped and retained on deck, and downflooding ensued through openings at main deck level until all reserve buoyancy was lost and the vessel sank. The operator of the MorningSunrise was not trained in ship stability and was not fully cognizant of the stability characteristics of the vessel.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors the added weights above the vessel's centre of gravity, from modifications and from its loaded condition; the free surface effect of liquids in tanks and water shipped and retained on deck; and the dynamic heeling forces created by wind, waves, and the bold application of helm and throttle. the added weights above the vessel's centre of gravity, from modifications and from its loaded condition; the free surface effect of liquids in tanks and water shipped and retained on deck; and the dynamic heeling forces created by wind, waves, and the bold application of helm and throttle. The inherent low freeboard, along with the heel, permitted water to be shipped and retained on deck, and downflooding ensued through openings at main deck level until all reserve buoyancy was lost and the vessel sank. The operator of the MorningSunrise was not trained in ship stability and was not fully cognizant of the stability characteristics of the vessel. There is no requirement for all small uninspected fishing vessels to have stability data on board to guide operators in the safe operation of their vessels. Trap weights and their effect on a vessel's transverse stability are not considered in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) fisheries management plans, particularly in the granting of stacked licences. The lack of effective coordination between DFO and Transport Canada during the development of regulations, policies, and management plans continues to put small fishing vessel safety at risk. The DFO policy allowing the transfer of licences to a replacement vessel of the same or lesser length encourages vessel modifications that can adversely affect seaworthiness.Findings as to Risk There is no requirement for all small uninspected fishing vessels to have stability data on board to guide operators in the safe operation of their vessels. Trap weights and their effect on a vessel's transverse stability are not considered in the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) fisheries management plans, particularly in the granting of stacked licences. The lack of effective coordination between DFO and Transport Canada during the development of regulations, policies, and management plans continues to put small fishing vessel safety at risk. The DFO policy allowing the transfer of licences to a replacement vessel of the same or lesser length encourages vessel modifications that can adversely affect seaworthiness. On 19January2006, the TSB issued Marine Safety Advisory (MSA) 01-06 to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and Transport Canada (TC) highlighting the issue of stacked licensing, the volumetric specifications for prawn traps, and their impact on small fishing vessel safety. The MSA noted that some 35of the 252vessels on the West Coast were issued stacked licences for the Prawn Trap fishery in2005. Given the number of vessels engaged in prawn fishing, and in particular the number with stacked licences, the MSA suggested that DFOmay wish to review its current volumetric specifications for prawn traps. The advisory added that, in consultation with TC, DFO should also consider means to help ensure that these vessels and their operators are not unwittingly exposed to risks associated with the new, larger and heavier traps and their adverse effects on vessel stability. In response, DFO indicated that it has taken the initiative to increase discussions with TCon these issues. TChas accepted an invitation to attend a prawn fishery management meeting to discuss the issue and possible corrective measures. Similar to arrangements already in place for herring fisheries, DFO will provide TCwith a list of prawn vessels that had stacked licences in 2005or that are using the larger, heavier traps, thus giving TCthe opportunity to undertake vessel inspections on these specific vessels. Should TCidentify stability issues, it would be expected to informDFO, who would then consider adding a licence condition restricting the number of traps a specific vessel may carry at any time.Safety Action Taken On 19January2006, the TSB issued Marine Safety Advisory (MSA) 01-06 to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and Transport Canada (TC) highlighting the issue of stacked licensing, the volumetric specifications for prawn traps, and their impact on small fishing vessel safety. The MSA noted that some 35of the 252vessels on the West Coast were issued stacked licences for the Prawn Trap fishery in2005. Given the number of vessels engaged in prawn fishing, and in particular the number with stacked licences, the MSA suggested that DFOmay wish to review its current volumetric specifications for prawn traps. The advisory added that, in consultation with TC, DFO should also consider means to help ensure that these vessels and their operators are not unwittingly exposed to risks associated with the new, larger and heavier traps and their adverse effects on vessel stability. In response, DFO indicated that it has taken the initiative to increase discussions with TCon these issues. TChas accepted an invitation to attend a prawn fishery management meeting to discuss the issue and possible corrective measures. Similar to arrangements already in place for herring fisheries, DFO will provide TCwith a list of prawn vessels that had stacked licences in 2005or that are using the larger, heavier traps, thus giving TCthe opportunity to undertake vessel inspections on these specific vessels. Should TCidentify stability issues, it would be expected to informDFO, who would then consider adding a licence condition restricting the number of traps a specific vessel may carry at any time. Stability Requirement In advance of the new Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations, TC has established an interim policy for determining, based on a list of risk factors, whether a small inspected fishing vessel requires a stability booklet. A stability booklet is a document that sets out, in standard form, the results of various flotation and stability calculations. It is used to instruct the master and the crew on the safe limits of the vessel under a variety of loading and operating conditions. This interim measure will provide important additional information for the master, and takes effect immediately. TC has issued Ship Safety Bulletin (SSB)04/2006, entitled Safety of Small Fishing Vessels: Information to Owners/Masters about Stability Booklets. The bulletin outlines the process that vessel owners and operators must follow to determine if their vessel requires a stability booklet and how to obtain one. The bulletin will apply to all owners and operators of fishing vessels, new and existing, that are between 15and 150in gross tonnage and less than 24.4m in length. While this does not pertain to vessels with a gross tonnage of less than15, owners and operators are being encouraged to review SSB04/06 and determine whether a stability assessment could help them operate safely. To support the implementation of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, the new Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations are scheduled to come into force in mid-2007. Coordination Between Transport Canada and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans A meeting was held on 15November2005 between the Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security, Transport Canada, and the Assistant Deputy Minister, Fisheries and Aquaculture Management, Department of Fisheries and Oceans,. The objective of this meeting was to discuss increased cooperation between both departments with a view to promoting the safety at sea of fishers. One of the main outcomes of the meeting was the development of a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DFOandTC. The purpose of this MOU is to provide a framework for cooperation between DFOand TCwith regard to promoting the safety at sea of fishers. Among its key points is a commitment by TCand DFOto hold regular head office and regional meetings to discuss various issues related to fishing vessel safety. The MOU also proposes the establishment of a Fishing Vessel Safety Advisory Committee that may include representatives from TC, DFO, and the fishing industry.