Summary A student pilot flying a PiperPA-28-140 aircraft, C-GNUD, serial number28-7525250, departed Langley Airport, British Columbia, for a local solo training flight in the Glen Valley practice area (CYA126). After take-off, the student departed the Langley control zone and flew northeast to enter the training area at about 2200feet above sea level (asl). The flight, was observed from recorded radar data. Once inside the practice area, the aircraft manoeuvring involved a number of gentle and medium turns in alternating directions, using between 10and 30degrees of bank. About 30minutes after take-off, from an altitude of about 2000feet above ground level, the aircraft completed three level, 360-degree turns to the left, and then abruptly entered a rapid, left-hand descending turn. Air traffic control radar data ceased when the aircraft descended below 1600feet above ground level. Observers on the ground described the aircraft as being in a steep, left, spiral dive, completing approximately three full turns before striking the ground. There was no recovery from the spiral dive, and the aircraft struck the ground at high speed. The aircraft was destroyed by the collision and a post-crash fire, and the pilot was fatally injured. The accident occurred at 1640 Pacific daylight time. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Radio communications between the pilot and Langley tower were routine, and there was no indication of any abnormality related to this flight. There were no reports by other aircraft that were operating in the practice area of any emergency communication on the operating frequency. The reported weather for the time of the accident was as follows: a few clouds at 5000feet above ground level, with a scattered layer at 8000feet; surface wind 090at 3knots; and visibility 25miles. Examination and analysis of the radar data showed that the aircraft entered a steep turn to the left at a speed of approximately 115mph. The entry to the manoeuvre was abrupt, with the initial roll stabilizing at about 40-45of bank. The initial turn transited about 80of heading, with a coincidental altitude drop of about600, feet in about 10seconds. Observers on the ground noted that the aircraft's bank angle of about 45and downward pitch angle of about 20remained constant throughout the manoeuvre. The TSB Engineering Facility completed an analysis of aircraft energy in this manoeuvre and determined that the impact speed would have been between 180-200mph. The PiperPa-28-140 was certificated under Civil Air Regulations (CAR) Part3. Based on that standard, The airplane shall be longitudinally, directionally, and laterally stable. Under the requirements for longitudinal stability, CAR Part3, paragraph3.114 requires that when the aircraft is trimmed to a specific speed, a push is required on the controls to maintain speeds above the specified trim speed. When the control force is released, the certification standard requires that the air speed shall return to within 10percent of the original trimmed speed. Without some form of control input by the pilot, the aircraft's longitudinal stability should have caused the nose to rise as the airspeed increased from about 115-200mph. The upward movement of the nose of the aircraft, even with a 45angle of bank, should have aided in recovering from the dive and should have been visible from the ground. Inspection of the recovered wreckage, concentrating on the aerofoil surfaces, aerofoil attachment points, and the aircraft control components, found no indication of any pre-crash structural or control system failure. Examination of relevant technical documents found that an Airworthiness Directive (AD)69-22-02 , effective 30July1979, addressed a problem related to control wheel cracking in the vicinity of its hub. The AD required either the replacement of the control wheel with an improved metal component or the periodic visual inspection of the older type control wheel to detect cracking near the centre hub of the component. The accident aircraft had the older style control wheels that were receiving the required periodic inspections. Plastic components from the hub portion of the pilot's control column (referred to in AD69-22-02) were not recovered and were likely destroyed by the post-crash fire. Recovered portions of the damaged control wheels were sent to the TSB Engineering Branch for further examination and analysis. The engineering examination concluded that the control wheel fragments from the destroyed aircraft indicated the predominant mode of fracture was that of overstress, undoubtedly due to impact. Minimal fatigue pre-cracks were identified around internal (manufacturing) cavities and were dispersed along the centerline of the assembly. However, based on the laboratory tests, the structural integrity of the wheel was not compromised. A review of the Transport Canada (TC) service difficulty reporting (SDR) database revealed that 13 control wheel failure events (either cracking or breaking) have been reported since the original issue of the AD. Although most of those failures were cracks that were identified during periodic maintenance inspections, at least five of the SDRs referred to control wheel breaks that occurred during aircraft operations; some of these breaks occurred outside the area being inspected as a result of the AD. This issue has been resolved by Transport Canada and is addressed separately in the Safety Action section of this report. The pilot of the accident aircraft held a valid student pilot permit and was undergoing training under the direction and supervision of a Flight Training Unit (FTU), and in compliance with CAR401.19(b). The accident pilot had completed his initial medical examination in2001, and the medical records reveal no pre-existing condition that would have adversely affected the pilot's performance. Because the medical category for a student pilot permit is valid for a five-year period, more recent information related to his medical status at the time of the accident is unavailable. Post-mortem and toxicology examinations that were conducted by the British Columbia Coroner Service found no evidence of pre-existing natural disease. The accident pilot began his training for a private pilot license in May2001. A review of his training records shows that his initial training sequences and upper air work had progressed normally. These sequences included an introduction on steep turns, slow flying, stalls, spins, and spiral dive1 recoveries. He then began learning the required traffic pattern sequences and spent the next month of his training (about 20flight hours) concentrating on those skills. He was issued a student pilot permit on 20July2001 and completed his first solo two days later. Following his first solo trip, he spent an additional 7hours (dual) and 4.6hours (solo) in the traffic pattern. On 9 August 2001, the student completed his first dual training trip to the practice area since the upper air sequences had been introduced in mid-June2001. On that trip the instructor observed that the student was having difficulty performing steep turns. Specifically, he was over-banking (up to 65degrees of bank) and using insufficient back pressure on the control wheel. The result was that the aircraft's nose would drop and the aircraft would enter a spiral dive. Following the identification of these weak sequences, the FTU provided three remedial dual training trips to ensure the upper air exercises were safe before authorizing the student to conduct his first solo flight to the training area. In early October 2001, the student took a three-month break from training and returned in January2002 to complete three flights, logging 1.3hours dual and 0.4hour solo. He did not fly again until March2003. Breaks in training are not uncommon and are normally beyond the control of the involved FTU. Under the guidance of CAR401.19, responsibility falls on the involved FTU to review and re-assess previously acquired skills in order to determine a student's level of ability and subsequent course sequencing following an extended break from training. The student's most recent training, following the year-long break, included a combination of 3.1hours of dual instruction, conducted by two qualified flying instructors, followed by one hour of solo flight in the traffic pattern; the accident occurred on the following flight. FTU records indicate that during one of the dual flights, on 15March2003, the student reviewed steep turns and spiral dive recoveries. In part, that training included left and right steep turns and four spiral dive recoveries, executed by the student under the instructor's supervision. Student performance on both steep turns and spiral-dive recoveries was described in training records as good, and neither of the two qualified instructors who conducted the most recent dual instruction identified any performance weaknesses that would have affected the safety of the subsequent solo flights.