Summary While the NORTHERNVENTURE was en route from the crab fishing grounds to Roddickton, Newfoundland, on 20 July 1995, a fire broke out in the engine-room. The crew on watch, who discovered the fire, alerted the remaining crew members who were in their bunks. Prompt and effective action was taken and the fire extinguished. The vessel then proceeded on her own power, escorted by another fishing vessel, and arrived at Englee, Newfoundland, without further incident. The vessel sustained minor damage and there was no pollution. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel The NORTHERNVENTURE is a typical Newfoundland longliner with a raised wheel-house and accommodation forward, aft of which are the engine-room, fish hold and lazaret. After departing from the crab fishing grounds, the vessel was on her return passage to Roddickton. At about 0100(1) on 20 July 1995, the two crew members on watch noticed smoke emanating from the engine-room ventilators. The hatch cover to the engine-room was opened and fire was observed to be in progress. The other crew members, who were in their bunks, were alerted and mustered on deck while a distress message was transmitted. Power to the lighting and the navigation systems was supplied by the main-engine-driven generator. Within minutes, the main engine stopped and a brief black-out was experienced. The stand-alone generator, which was in operation supplying power to the searchlights, was then used and the lighting restored. The crew, under instructions from the skipper, prepared the liferaft and the lifeboat, and closed the engine-room ventilators. Two portable dry chemical fire-extinguishers were then discharged into the flames on the port side of the engine-room. The fire continued to smoulder. The skipper entered the engine-room long enough to engage the power take-off to the sea water pump run from the generator engine. Sea water was then used to completely extinguish the fire. After the damage was assessed and it had been determined safe to do so, the generator was used to restart the main engine. The distress was cancelled and two of the three vessels which had been tasked were stood down. The fishing vessel BRENDA AND MICHAEL II arrived on scene and escorted the NORTHERNVENTURE to Englee. Battery and Battery Charging System The vessel was equipped with two banks of four, eight-volt marine heavy-duty batteries. Both banks were in fibreglass trays positioned one above the other on the port side, just aft of the engine-room bulkhead and adjacent to the port fuel tank. The positive cable connecting the battery to the starter motor passed below the lower bank of batteries. Investigation into the occurrence revealed that: Four filler vent caps had been displaced and there was a hole in the corner of the burned lower battery tray. The alternator was defective and had been overcharging the battery. Halon 1211 Fire-extinguishing System There is no regulatory requirement for the fitting of an automatic fire detection and extinguishing system aboard a fishing vessel of this size and type; however, one such unit was fitted aboard the NORTHERNVENTURE. The unit was designed for, and used as, a fixed installation in the enclosed area, the engine-room. The assembly consisted of one extinguishing agent storage cylinder, a charge of Halon 1211, one pressure gauge, one Schrader valve (for filling and pressurization), one valve body, and one sprinkler head enclosed in a wire guard. The sprinkler head in use was temperature-rated for 141C; the lowest temperature rating available was 57C. The system was installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. The cylinder was suspended from the deck-head beam on the centre line in the forward part of the main engine, and some 2 m to the starboard of the banks of batteries. Following the occurrence, the fire-extinguishing system was examined and tested at the TSB(2) laboratory and the conclusions drawn included, among others, the following: The automatic system did not activate because the fire did not generate enough heat over a long enough period of time at the position of the sprinkler head. The temperature rating of the sprinkler head in use was too high for the vessel's engine-room. The depleted condition of the Halon system was attributable to a slow, low-volume leak caused by a cracked and deteriorated valve core plunger seat washer. Lack of servicing and routine inspection most likely permitted the deteriorated condition of the valve core and the ensuing leak to remain undetected while the equipment was in service. TC Marine Policy - Inspection of Non-Mandatory Safety Equipment It is the policy and practice of TC Marine to require all non-mandatory life-saving and fire-fighting equipment installed on board vessels to be in proper working order. The owner has the option of removing non-mandatory equipment that is found to be defective, or of restoring it to proper working order. According to information received from TC Marine, the Halon 1211 fire-extinguishing system was last inspected on 11 May 1993 at which time it was reported to be functioning satisfactorily. However, there is no record on file confirming the inspection nor concerning the acceptance of the equipment for installation on board the NORTHERNVENTURE. Burn Pattern Examination of the burn area indicated that the fire spread upward toward the deck-head and then to starboard from a point in the vicinity of the banks of batteries. Crew Training The skipper and one of the crew members had received Marine Emergency Duties (MED) training as a prerequisite to obtaining a Fishing Master, Class IV, Certificate of Competency.