Summary The Cessna Citation550 aircraft, C-GYCJ, serial number5500561, departed Vancouver International Airport, British Columbia, on a medical evacuation flight to the Sandspit Airport in the Queen Charlotte Islands, British Columbia. On board the aircraft were two pilots and a team of two Advanced Life Support Paramedics. When the aircraft arrived at Sandspit, the surface wind was strong, gusty, and across the runway. The crew conducted an instrument approach to Runway30, and just before touchdown the aircraft's nose pitched down; the captain believed that the nosewheel, and then the main gear, collapsed as the aircraft slid on its belly. The crew carried out an evacuation and proceeded to the airport terminal building. When they returned to the aircraft to retrieve their belongings, the crew discovered that the gear was in the up position, as was the landing gear selector. The accident occurred at 2052 Pacific standard time. There were no injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The captain had been employed by Canada Jet Charters Ltd. as a Cessna Citation550 pilot for three years. He was the non-flying pilot for this flight and occupied the right seat. He held a valid airline transport pilot licence endorsed for single and multi-engine land aeroplanes, a C550 type rating, and an instrument rating. His last pilot proficiency check had been conducted on a Citation simulator on 05 September2002. He had accumulated approximately 4550 flying hours on various single and multi-engine aircraft and 1450hours on the Cessna Citation550. He was qualified to operate the aircraft as pilot-in-command (PIC) under instrument flight rules (IFR) and was qualified to occupy the right seat while his first officer acted as the flying pilot, from the left seat. He had been off duty for 24hours before the accident flight. The first officer had been employed by Canada Jet Charters Ltd. as a Cessna Citation 550 pilot for two years. He was the flying pilot for this flight and occupied the left seat. It is normal company practice for the first officer to occupy the left seat when he is the flying pilot, provided the captain is qualified to occupy the right seat. He held a valid airline transport pilot licence endorsed for single- and multi-engine land aeroplanes, a C550 type rating, and an instrument rating. His last pilot proficiency check had been conducted on a Citation simulator on 10January2002. He had accumulated approximately 3300flying hours on various single- and multi-engine aircraft and 850hours on the Cessna Citation550. He had been off duty for 12hours before the accident flight. The two pilots checked in at the Canada Jet Charters facility at Vancouver International Airport at 1830 PST1, where they were met by the two ambulance attendants assigned to the flight. The pilots reviewed weather briefing information and determined that the weather was suitable for the flight in accordance with IFR. The reported weather at Sandspit Airport at 1800 was as follows: wind 170 true at 6knots; visibility 20statute miles; a few clouds at 5200feet above ground level (agl), a few clouds at 7400feet agl, and broken clouds at 21000feet agl; temperature 11C; dew point 10C; altimeter setting 29.03inches of mercury. The forecast weather for Sandspit Airport for the period from 1800 to 2200 was as follows: wind 160true at 10knots gusting to20; prevailing visibility more than 6statute miles; scattered clouds based at 500feet agl, broken clouds based at 2500feet agl; temporarily between 1800 and 2200, visibility two statute miles in light rain showers and mist; broken clouds at 500feet agl, overcast clouds at 1500feet agl. The aircraft departed Vancouver at 1918. The first officer was the flying pilot. The flight was routine until 2021 when the crew obtained the Sandspit weather observation from the automated weather observation system (AWOS). This observation, taken at 2020, reported the wind to be from 220degrees magnetic at 30knots, gusting to 37knots. The crew carried out a briefing for a VOR/DME approach for Runway30 and in view of the strong, gusting crosswind at Sandspit, decided to land with flaps at the approach (15) position, instead of the landing (full) position. Runway30 is asphalt covered, 5120feet long and 150feet wide. They completed the descent checklist and began their descent from flight level (FL) 350 for the approach to Sandspit at 2035. They completed the transition-level checklist through FL180, and the 10000-foot checklist. At 2045, at an altitude of approximately 10000feet, the speed brakes were selected out and remained out for the rest of the flight. During the approach, the crew received numerous radio transmissions from the AWOS and the Terrace, British Columbia, Flight Service Station (FSS) regarding the Sandspit weather. At the appropriate point in the approach, flaps were selected to the approach position. The landing gear warning horn sounded four times before the aircraft passed EBGAM, the final approach fix (FAF), and was silenced by the crew each time. The first officer did not call for the landing gear to be extended, nor did he call for the before-landing checklist to be completed. The captain did not remind the first officer to extend the landing gear and accomplish the before-landing checks. The before-landing checklist in use called for the speed brakes to be as required while the before-landing checklist contained in the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) called for the speed brakes to be retracted prior to 50feet. After passing the FAF, the landing gear warning horn sounded three more times but was again silenced each time. At 2051, at about two nautical miles from the runway threshold, the captain remarked that the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) was not visible. He attempted to turn it on remotely by keying his microphone several times, but when that was unsuccessful, he made a radio transmission to the Terrace FSS to determine if the PAPI was working. The Terrace FSS response was to turn the runway lights up to full intensity, and the captain had to ask for the runway lights to be dimmed. By this time the aircraft was about 14seconds from touch down. After initial contact with the runway, the aircraft bounced several times with diminishing force as it slid down the runway. It then veered to the right side of the runway, breaking five runway lights with its right wing, veered to the left, and came to a stop on a heading of approximately 280degrees magnetic, about 500feet from the end of the runway. The aircraft sustained substantial structural damage. The design of the Cessna Citation550 landing gear warning system is such that if the gear is not down and the flaps are selected to the land position, the warning horn sounds and cannot be silenced. With the flaps at the approach position and the gear not down, the warning horn sounds when a thrust lever is retarded below about 70%N1, but the horn can be silenced. If it is silenced, there will be no further aural warning should the gear not be extended, unless either thrust lever is advanced above the reset position and then retarded. Records show that the aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures. The aircraft was manufactured in1987 and had flown a total of 8143.5hours before the accident flight. A review of the journey, airframe, and engine logbooks showed nothing remarkable. The aircraft was being operated within its weight and centre-of-gravity limits. It was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) which was removed and shipped to the TSB Engineering Branch laboratory for analysis. The aircraft was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system (GPWS), nor was it required to be so equipped under Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs). The GPWS is designed to generate aural and visual warnings if the aircraft enters a flight path toward the ground that would lead to a collision with terrain, or for a landing with an incorrect landing configuration. Had the aircraft been equipped with GPWS, during the approach to Sandspit, the GPWS mode4 would have activated at an altitude, measured by the radio altimeter, of 500feet above the ground, generating warning lights and the aural warning TOO LOW, GEAR.