Synopsis On 27April 1996, the STPHANEPII, carrying lobster traps on deck and with three persons on board, departed the harbour of Gascons, Quebec, bound for the fishing grounds. Shortly after departure, the vessel encountered rough seas. The vessel was struck by a large wave and capsized suddenly. The two crew members lost their lives, but the third occupant, who was on the trip as a guest, escaped unharmed. The Board determined that the small fishing vessel STPHANEPII capsized shortly after leaving the harbour of Gascons because of the adverse effect that the load of lobster traps stacked and secured on deck had on the stability of the vessel. The small margin of static and dynamic stability was lost when the vessel listed after being struck by a wave larger than the rest. 1.0 Factual Information 1.1 Particulars of the Vessel 1.1.1 Description of the Vessel The STPHANEPII is a small closed-construction fishing vessel built of glass-reinforced plastic, intended to be used for fishing for groundfish, except cod. Based on the dimensions given on the small vessel licence, the vessel's gross tonnage is estimated at seven tons. The vessel has a wheel-house and crew accommodation forward, an engine compartment a third of the way back, and a fish hold and an after peak behind. 1.2 History of the Voyage In this area, lobster fishing was scheduled to open on 28April 1996. On the 27, the fishermen were therefore busy setting their traps in order to haul their first catches the next day. The weather was cloudy, and the wind was from the south-east at about three knots, but weather had been bad over the preceding days and the sea was still rough. The skipper/owner of the STPHANEPII loaded his vessel with lobster traps and waited for the weather conditions to improve before going to set his traps in the vicinity of Shigawake in Chaleur Bay, Quebec. He asked some experienced fishermen about his chances of making the trip safely, and they pointed out to him that his deck load was perhaps stacked a little high for the sea conditions. After he had watched other vessels leave the harbour without any problem, however, the skipper/owner of the STPHANEPII cast off at about 1330[3], with a fisherman's helper and a guest on board. When the vessel was about 350m from the berth, she was struck by a large wave and capsized immediately. The STPHANEPII remained afloat, upside down, in approximate position 4810.91'N, 06451.45'W; the depth there is about 36m. The guest was standing in the doorway of the wheel-house when the vessel capsized. Although the wheel-house was under water, he took off his boots, and after watching which way they went, he reasoned that the surface must be in the opposite direction and began swimming in that direction. He surfaced not far from the vessel and managed to climb onto the upturned hull after numerous attempts. The skipper of the VIKING5, which was leaving the harbour behind the STPHANEPII, witnessed the accident and immediately called the Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) Centre at Rivire-au-Renard, Quebec, while heading for the scene, and he rescued the survivor. However, there was no sign of the other two occupants of the capsized vessel. Assistance was requested from other vessels and the survivor was taken to Gascons. An attempt was then made to tow the wreck to port in case one of the victims was trapped inside. The body of the skipper was recovered on 29April 1996 by divers of the Sret du Qubec (SQ) emergency unit. The other crew member is still missing and he is presumed drowned. 1.3 Injuries to Persons 1.4 Damage During the towing operation, the wheel-house of the STPHANEPII was torn off, the navigation equipment was lost, and the propulsion system was damaged by sea water. 1.5 Certification 1.5.1 Vessel A small vessel licence had been issued to the STPHANEPII by the Department of Transport in April 1994. Because she was under 15 gross registered tons, the vessel did not need to be registered and was not required to have an inspection certificate. 1.5.2 Personnel The skipper/owner did not hold a certificate, nor is any certificate required under the regulations. No one on board had any formal knowledge of vessel stability. 1.6 Personnel History The skipper/owner had bought the vessel directly from the builder two years earlier and had been using her for commercial fishing ever since. He had approximately eight years' experience. The fisherman's helper had about three years' experience. 1.7 Weather Information 1.7.1 Weather Forecasts The marine forecasts issued by the Maritimes Weather Centre of Environment Canada at 1130 Atlantic daylight time(ADT) on Saturday, 27April 1996, predicted the following weather for Chaleur Bay: Gale warning ended. Winds from the south between 20 and 25 knots decreasing to south 15 to 20 Sunday morning. Showers and fog patches ending overnight, poor visibility in showers and fog. Turning cooler Sunday. 1.7.2 Weather Encountered According to witnesses, at the time of the accident, the wind was calm and the waves were about0.6m high. 1.8 Navigation Equipment Reportedly, the STPHANEPII was equipped with a magnetic compass, a very high frequency (VHF) radiotelephone, a CB radio and a sonar fish finder. There may also have been a global positioning system (GPS) on board. 1.9 Radio Communications There was no radio communication between the STPHANEPII and any radio station. The MCTS Centre at Rivire-au-Renard received an initial call from the VIKING5 at 1338 indicating that the VIKING5 was going to the aid of a capsized fishing vessel at Gascons. 1.10 Life-saving Equipment Pursuant to the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations, a vessel such as the STPHANEPII must carry the following life-saving equipment: one approved lifejacket for each person on board; and one approved lifebuoy fitted with 27m of line. After the accident, the following equipment was found inside the wreck: two approved lifejackets still wrapped in plastic bags; and b) one approved 610mm lifebuoy. Other life-saving gear may have been lost during towing. 1.11 Search and Rescue 1.11.1 Mandate of the Marine Rescue Centre The Marine Rescue Centre's mandate is to try to save human lives. Once all available information indicates that there is no more chance of survival, the case is referred to police forces which may decide to use divers to try to recover the bodies of the victims. The Canadian Coast Guard does not perform underwater searches. 1.11.2 Notification At 1343 on 27April 1996, the Marine Rescue Sub-Centre (MRSC) at Qubec, Quebec, received a call from the MCTS Centre at Rivire-au-Renard advising that the fishing vessel VIKING5 had reported that the STPHANEPII had capsized off Gascons. At 1350, MRSC Qubec contacted the SQ at Pabos, Quebec, asking for a patrol car and an ambulance to be dispatched. At 1351, the MRSC notified the Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC) in Halifax, Nova Scotia, giving the details of the accident. The SQ was called back at 1357 to inquire about the possibility of sending divers. When the SQ replied that no divers could be sent, the MCTS Centre issued a call to all stations. No diver had been found by 1451 when the SQ at Pabos advised that fire-fighters from Chandler, Quebec, were on their way. They had twodivers in their ranks, with basic equipment to perform reconnaissance dives. 1.11.3 Deployment of Resources The VIKING5, which was leaving the harbour behind the STPHANEPII, was on the scene within a few minutes. She was quickly joined by the FREDDY and other vessels. The divers of the Chandler fire department were on the scene at about 1540, followed by Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopter R-301 at 1625. The MRSC used two fishing vessels, two Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary (CMRA) vessels and a SAR helicopter to conduct the search. The hovercraft WABANAKI was also dispatched, but had to turn back because of bad weather. 1.12 Vessel Stability 1.12.1 Inclining Experiment When the STPHANEPII was put back in the water to be placed on a trailer and taken to a storage area, the TSB took the opportunity to perform an inclining experiment. Over the next few days, the TSB measured the vessel in order to determine the lines of the hull, the size of the fish hold and compartments, and the position of the tanks, with a view to calculating the hydrostatic characteristics of the vessel. The TSB calculations took into account the fact that the wheel-house and its contents had been torn off. The inclining experiment determined that the lightweight of the STPHANEPII was 5,417kg. The vertical and longitudinal positions of the centre of gravity were 1.183m and 1.812m respectively from the reference axes. 1.12.2 Loading Based on the survivor's observations and on the position of the lashings securing the lobster traps on the deck, a plan of the distribution and position of the traps was drawn up. According to information obtained from Fisheries and Oceans and from the owner's next of kin, and given the number of traps remaining on the wharf, the TSB established that the STPHANEPII was carrying 96 lobster traps, all secured on deck. They were attached together in groups of 8 with 6fathoms of cable between them and at each end, with each group marked by a buoy attached with 12 fathoms of cable. The lobster traps were arranged on deck in 4 rows of 24 traps. The traps were conventionally weighted, but early in the season, weight (a stone) is added until the traps (made of wood) become waterlogged. Thus, the traps had varying weights and centres of gravity. The TSB took sample traps, similar to the ones that were on board the STPHANEPII, and calculated their weight. The traps weighed 36.8kg on average and that weight is considered representative of the weight of the 96 traps loaded on board. The weight of the load, including the traps, the cables and the buoys, was estimated at 3,780kg. 1.12.3 Stability Condition From the inclining experiment, the lightship displacement of the STPHANEPII and the position of the centre of gravity were determined. The stability characteristics of the vessel with her fuel and hydraulic oil tanks full and 96 lobster traps stowed on deck were compared with the minimum stability criteria established by Transport Canada, as set out in STAB.4, StabilityStandards for Fishing Vessels, and the following results were obtained: The vessel's dynamic righting ability at an angle of between 0 and 30 was 14% lower than the normally required value. The vessel's dynamic righting ability at an angle of between 0 and 40 was 36% lower than the normally required value. The vessel's dynamic righting ability at an angle of between 30 and 40 was 66% lower than the normally required value. The righting lever (GZ), producing the vessel's moment of statical stability, was 57% lower than the normally required value at an angle of heel of 30. 1.12.4 Normal Fresh Capelin Operation To determine whether or not the stability characteristics of the STPHANEPII contributed to the occurrence, a comparative analysis was made between a deck load of lobster traps and a load of bulk whole fresh capelin. This analysis was carried out with the fish hold loaded to 90%capacity and the tanks filled to 25% capacity, except for the hydraulic oil tank which remains at the same level at all times. Furthermore, the weight of the net drum, which had been removed and placed on the wharf before the departure of the STPHANEPII, was added. This analysis was conducted to assess the free surface effect. In this condition, which is one of the worst operating conditions, the static and dynamic stability characteristics of the vessel were from 25% to 47% higher than the normally required values as set out in STAB.4.