Summary On 3 June 1999 the bulk carrier HopeI, loaded with 19,016tons of wheat and under the conduct of a pilot, was proceeding downbound in the St. Lawrence Seaway. In the vicinity of Canada Island, the vessel experienced a loss of electrical power. The vessel left the channel and grounded in front of the government wharf at Morrisburg, Ontario. There were no injuries or pollution as a result of the grounding. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information History of the Voyage On 31 March 1999 the HopeI departed Surabaya, Indonesia, with a full cargo of structural steel products. The vessel arrived at Montreal on May 10 where she discharged part of her cargo and underwent inspection by the St. Lawrence Seaway and Lloyd's Registry before proceeding into the Great Lakes. Cargo was discharged at Windsor, Chicago and Milwaukee before theHopeI arrived in Thunder Bay, Ontario, to load 19,016tons of wheat. After departing Thunder Bay on May30, the HopeI had a routine passage downbound through the Great Lakes and St.Lawrence Seaway, stopping at Port Colborne, Ontario, to load 10tonnes of diesel fuel. The vessel was to proceed to Montreal for bunkering and then to Port Cartier where the vessel was to be loaded to full draught. At 1145 eastern daylight time on June 3, the vessel arrived at Iroquois Lock in the St. Lawrence Seaway.2 After locking through, speed was gradually increased until full ahead was ordered as the vessel passed Canada Island at 1230. At 1234, as the course was being altered to port, the vessel experienced a blackout, following which the emergency generator started automatically. The master immediately sent the second officer to have the bosun and chief officer drop the anchors. Two anchors were dropped at 1238; however, by this time the vessel was sheering to port out of the channel. At 1240, the vessel grounded at position 4453.53'N, 07510.74'W in front of the government wharf at Morrisburg. The master immediately ordered the sounding of all tanks, which revealed that the No1 port lower hopper ballast tank and the forepeak tank were taking on water. Subsequent inspection by divers confirmed that the vessel was damaged on the port side between frames 224 and 230, 2m above the bottom in the lower hopper tank, and at frame 237, 3m above the bottom in the forepeak tank. The vessel was refloated on June5. The vessel was lightered of 410tons of cargo to bring the ship to Seaway draft. She was cleared on June7 to proceed to Montreal for repairs and thence to Qubec, Quebec, for dry-docking. Figure1.Sketch of the occurrence area Weather Winds were from the northwest at 10to 15knots. The weather was clear with visibility greater than five miles. Certification The HopeI was properly certified in accordance with international regulations, was classed with Lloyd's Registry of Shipping, and certified for unmanned engine-room (UMS) operation. In accordance with the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, the vessel had been issued a Safety Management Certificate by Bureau Veritas on 20March1997. The officers and crew were properly certified in accordance with international regulations. The chief engineer had 15years' experience in the capacity of chief engineer. A normal work/vacation rotation for the chief engineer would have been four months on the vessel, followed by three months' vacation; however, at the time of the occurrence, he had been on board six and a half months. He was due to be relieved in Montreal on June5, and a relief chief engineer was already on board. Generators The vessel was equipped with three Allen generator sets, each rated at 493kW, with an average fuel consumption of two tonnes of fuel per day. It is reported that no problems were experienced with the vessel's generators during the preceding voyage. As part of the vessel's UMS classification, a standby generator was required to be capable of starting automatically in the event of an anomaly with the generator in service. At the time of the occurrence, the No2 generator was selected as the standby unit. However, because the No2 generator shared a common fuel supply with generators No1 and No3, it did not start when the vessel blacked out. A 12.5kW Lister emergency generator was available to supply power to the vessel's emergency lights; however, because the vessel was built prior to 1984, there was no statutory requirement that the emergency generator be capable of powering the steering gear in the event of a blackout. The emergency generator started automatically following the blackout. Fuel In order to load maximum cargo, the vessel had not taken a full load of marine diesel oil when she stopped at Port Colborne on the downbound passage. Instead, the vessel took only 10tonnes and continued on her voyage with a total of 32tonnes of diesel fuel on board. The intention of the chief engineer was to fully bunker the vessel in Montreal. The vessel's fuel records indicate that two days before the occurrence the generator service tank contained 10tonnes of fuel oil. Approximately 12hours before the occurrence, as the vessel was crossing Lake Ontario, the second engineer, who was standing the 0000 - 0400 watch, became aware of a low level alarm from the generator service tank. He informed the chief engineer and third engineer, whose duty it was to transfer fuel. The chief engineer did not believe that the level could be that low, and soundings were taken at 1000 which indicated a sounding of 0.19m in the generator service tank. The low fuel level alarm was still on at this time. Following the blackout, the second engineer, upon finding air in the fuel systems of generators Nos1and3, immediately opened the valve to supply the system from the main engine diesel oil service tank, which reportedly contained 11tonnes of fuel. Diesel oil flowed by gravity from the main engine service tank to the generator service tank and, approximately 20minutes later, the low level alarm light for the generator service tank extinguished. Once fuel was supplied from the main engine diesel oil service tank, the generators were started and normal power was re-established to the vessel. Subsequently, no other source of air entry into the generator fuel system could be found. Generator Service Tank Fuel Piping and Alarm The engine-room staff were unaware that the generator fuel suction pipe arrangement in the service tank was such that the pipe extended straight into the tank on a horizontal plane, 220mm from the bottom of the tank. Because of this arrangement, the last 1.8tonnes of fuel in the tank was unusable. The float for the low level alarm was located 40mm above the fuel suction pipe. Figure2.Arrangement of the Generator Diesel Oil Service Tank Besides the low level alarm, there was no provision in the engine-room for determining the level of fuel in the generator service tank. Instead, a crew member had to leave the engine-room and sound the tank from a location on the main deck forward of the accommodation. Log Book Records Soundings were taken two and a half hours before the occurrence and recorded in the engine-room log book showing 1.3tonnes in the tank. Subsequent to the occurrence, it was discovered that the quantity of fuel in the generator service tank, as recorded in the engine-room log book, had been altered. Analysis of the log book by the TSB Engineering Laboratory indicates that the alterations had increased the amount of fuel in the tank, as recorded at 1000, by 3tonnes, to read 4.3tonnes.