Summary On the morning of 06 November 2004, the tug Manson, with a crew of two, was on passage between New Westminster, British Columbia, on the Fraser River and Beale Cove, Texada Island, British Columbia. The Manson had two barges in tow: the crane barge McKenzie and the deck barge M.B.D.32. During the transit through the Strait of Georgia, the couplers connecting the M.B.D.32 to the stern of the McKenzie parted. The Manson, with the McKenzie in tow, attempted to recover the M.B.D.32 but experienced steering difficulties during this process. The Manson capsized and sank with the loss of both crew members- a deckhand and the master. Both barges were subsequently recovered; the Manson has not been located. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessels Description of the Vessels Manson The Manson was a small twin-screw tug of conventional design. A single deckhouse enclosed the wheelhouse forward with a galley/mess area at its after end. Aft of the deckhouse were the twin engine exhaust uptakes. Aft of the uptakes, on the centreline, was the towing winch containing 594m of 28.6mm-diameter tow wire, connected via a fish plate to a 75m wire pendant. Two 12m-long, 25.4mm-diameter wire bridles were shackled through a thimble at the end of the pendant. The winch brake was fitted with a manually operated hydraulic brake. Straddling the winch on either side were steel "goal posts" installed to protect the tug when backing against the raked bow of light displacement barges. Below decks, the tug was divided into three watertight compartments: a forecastle forward containing crew berths, the engine space amidships, and the lazarette aft. Access to the engine space and lazarette was through watertight deck hatches outside the wheelhouse. The Manson's main control station, located inside the forward end of the deckhouse, was equipped with steering and engine controls, and navigation equipment, which included two radars, very high frequency (VHF) radios, and an echo sounder. Secondary steering and engine control stations were located by the winch on the main deck, and on the deck above the wheelhouse, at both the forward and after ends. Each control station was fitted with the means to release the tow wire by releasing hydraulic pressure on the winch brake. McKenzie The McKenzie is a dedicated crane barge with a large-capacity, pedestal-mounted crane permanently fixed to its deck. Spuds, used for keeping the barge in position, are fitted near the barge's mid-length. In Photo2, the spuds are seen in the raised position- as they were when the barge was being towed. The crane is situated near the bow, where the towing bridles were attached. M.B.D.32 The barge M.B.D.32 is an open-deck barge used for the carriage of deck cargo. Bulwarks approximately 1.8m high are erected to port and starboard of the main deck. The barge was loaded with construction material and was trimmed significantly by the stern (seePhoto3). History of the Voyage Throughout the day on November5, a two-person crew had operated the Manson on the Fraser River. The crew had secured the tug in New Westminster at the Fraser River Pile Dredge (FRPD) dock on the North Arm of the Fraser River and was relieved by a second two-person crew. The relief crew then connected the tug to the barges McKenzie and M.B.D.32 for the approximately 82-mile passage to Beale Cove on Texada Island. The M.B.D.32 was connected to the stern of the McKenzie with two synthetic-rope couplers, each approximately 7m long, 80mm in diameter, and with a spliced eye at each end. The bow of the McKenzie was connected by wire-rope bridles shackled to the end of the tow wire/pendant of the Manson. The Manson, with the two barges in tow, departed the FRPD at 1700Pacific standard time.2 The 20-mile passage down the Fraser River, to where it enters the Strait of Georgia at Sand Heads light, was uneventful. From Sand Heads, the course is 305True(T) to Sabine Channel at the south end of Texada Island. After passing Sand Heads, the Manson called Victoria Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) at 2050 on VHF channel74, and the tug/tow unit was then tagged on their radar system. Due to the proximity of the Manson and its tow, the separate radar echoes of the tug and barges merged into one echo on the MCTS radar screen. The master then switched the VHF to channel 11, the designated channel for the next leg of the voyage. Shortly after 0218 on November 6, the Victoria MCTS officer observed on radar that the echo representing the Manson and its tow had separated into two distinct echoes. The new echo, later identified to be that of M.B.D.32, was tagged. At 0226, Victoria MCTS reviewed the situation and called the Manson to inquire if it had lost a barge. The Manson responded that it would check into it. The tug and tow were now approaching the Merry Island/Ballenas Island boundary where communications are handed over to MCTS at Comox, British Columbia. Victoria MCTS was unable to establish further contact with the Manson, and at 0227, advised Comox MCTS of the situation. Comox MCTS made several attempts to contact the Manson, and at about 0236, the Manson confirmed that the couplers had parted and that the barge M.B.D.32 was adrift. Radar observations recorded by Victoria MCTS show that, at 0243, the Manson, with the McKenzie in tow, altered course to starboard toward the M.B.D.32. The tug and tow then made good speed (towing speed) toward the M.B.D.32. Figure1.Sketch of the occurrence area The following is a chronological summary of Victoria MCTS radar data and VHF communications with Comox MCTS. At 0333, the N.A.Champion informed Comox MCTS that it had acquired two targets on its radar, 2.5miles away. Earlier, when the targets were 3 miles distant, bright white lights had also been observed in the same vicinity, but these were no longer visible. Comox relayed this information to the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC), which then tasked search and rescue (SAR) resources. At 0348, ComoxMCTS advised the JRCC that the N.A.Champion was 800m from the targets and that its crew could see a strobe light and a steady light. An investigation determined that the strobe light was from the Manson's emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) and that the steady light was from the inflated four-person liferaft. The liferaft was empty. Under instructions from the JRCC, the N.A.Champion set the liferaft adrift so it could serve as a drift indicator for SAR purposes. A total of one air resource and ten marine resources were used in SAR operations. The body of the deckhand was recovered three days after the accident. The cause of death was listed as hypothermia. The body of the master remains missing. The Manson's two four-person liferafts, life rings, and its EPIRB were recovered. One of the liferafts had inflated; the other had not. Post-occurrence inspection and testing of the latter at a service depot revealed that the fibreglass canister was damaged; the painter had parted close to the canister; and the liferaft inflated within its specifications. Despite extensive search using a remotely operated vehicle (ROV), the vessel was not found. Vessel Traffic Services The Manson operated within three sectors of the Vancouver Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) zone. These sectors are monitored by MCTS officers. VTS sectors1 and 2are monitored by Victoria MCTS and sector4 is monitored by ComoxMCTS on the VHF channels shown below: The Manson's passage began in VTS sector2, transferred to VTS sector1 upon entering the Strait of Georgia at Sand Heads, and then to VTS sector4 when the vessels crossed the Merry Island/Ballenas Island line. Victoria MCTS has radar coverage of much of the waters within the two sectors it monitors. A vessel calling Victoria MCTS when exiting the Fraser River at Sand Heads will switch from monitoring VHF channel74 to VHF channel11. Victoria MCTS will then "tag" that radar target to assist in monitoring the traffic in the area. Towing Equipment and Maintenance There was no structured approach to examine, evaluate and make informed decisions on the maintenance and replacement of towing gear. Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon EPIRB owners are required to register each beacon with the Canadian Beacon Registry, which maintains a database. The registry contains information about the beacon, the vessel it is on, and the vessel owners. In September2003, ownership of the Manson changed hands, but the registry was not advised and the database was not updated. The Manson was fitted with a 406MHz EPIRB rigged to deploy automatically in the event of capsizing. Upon receipt of the EPIRB signal on November6, the JRCC accessed the database and made contact with the vessel's previous owner, who then directed the JRCCto the current owner. Damage to the Vessels The Manson sank and was declared a total loss. There was no discernible damage to either of the barges, the M.B.D.32 or the McKenzie, nor was there any indication of either barge having made contact with the Manson. The parted couplers were recovered for examination. The Manson's tow wire, which had been attached to the McKenzie, was recovered intact. It was found to have run off the winch. Damage to the Environment The Manson had approximately 15000litres of diesel fuel on board. A small oil slick was observed in the area for several days afterward. In the relatively open waters of the Strait of Georgia, this oil was soon dispersed. Certification of the Vessels The Manson was last inspected at Vancouver on 26September2001 and was issued a full-term (four years) ship inspection certificate (SIC)22, for home-trade voyages, ClassIII. This certificate permitted a 24-hour operation and stipulated a crew complement of four, including the master, for a two-shift tug with 12-hour operations. The majority of the time, however, the Manson was operated in the Vancouver/Fraser River area as a shift boat, with a two-person crew for an approximate maximum of 12hours. Under this arrangement, the vessel was either berthed after the completion of work or else the crew was relieved by another two-person crew. Both the McKenzie and the M.B.D.32 were uncrewed barges on domestic voyages and were not required to be inspected or certificated by Transport Canada. Personnel Certification and History The master of the Manson was certificated for the class of voyage that was being undertaken. He had many years' experience in the towing industry in British Columbia, including a number of years on board the Manson and similar vessels. The deckhand had served on small tugs for a number of years and had previously worked with the master on other occasions. Both were on their first assignment following five days off duty. Marine Emergency Duties Consequent to changes in the Crewing Regulations, Marine Emergency Duties (MED) training is now mandatory and is being phased in by July2007. In this instance, the master of the Manson held a MED certificate, but the deckhand did not. Weather and Current The weather in the Strait of Georgia was typical for the time of year. The winds had been from the southeast for several days. The Environment Canada forecast included a Small Craft Warning indicating sustained southeast winds between 20and 33knots with visibility reduced, at times, by rain. The Manson experienced southeast winds at 25knots and seas of 1to 1.4m. In this section of the Strait of Georgia, the tidal height is referenced on Point Atkinson. The tidal cycle is mixed, mainly semi-diurnal with two complete tidal oscillations daily, featuring inequalities in both height and time. High water at Point Atkinson was predicted for 2215on November5 with a height of 3.1m, and low water was predicted for 0525 on November6 with a height of 1.9m. The range of this tidal cycle was 1.2m, which is below the 3.2m mean tide range for Point Atkinson. On an ebb tide, the water flows to the southeast. At the time of the occurrence, the tidal water flow was opposing the wind-driven waves, resulting in a shorter wave period and choppy seas.