2.0 Analysis 2.1 Navigation Lights and Collision Avoidance The ARCTIC TAGLU was inbound to the narrow passage of Active Pass with opposing traffic and with Gossip Shoals limiting the extent to which avoiding action could be taken to starboard. The ARCTIC TAGLU was required to keep clear of the unidentified fishing vessel on the tug- barge unit's starboard bow but any alteration to port would have been complicated by the proximity of the TYEE NO. 1. There was inconclusive evidence as to whether or not the sidelights on the BONA VISTA were lit. However, the TYEE NO. 1 had passed the fishing vessel well within the minimum range required for sidelights and was sufficiently concerned to make the fact that the fishing vessel's lights were not visible the subject of a radio call to the VTC. The absence of properly lit sidelights on the BONA VISTA meant that the additional information the lights would have given on that vessel's heading was not available to the OOW on the ARCTIC TAGLU. The tug-barge unit made two small 5 alterations of course, but did not take early, assertive collision avoidance action. Such action, albeit for a limited time, was an available option to give more sea-room to the then unidentified fishing vessel. An early reduction in speed to assess the situation can also enable the navigator to avoid close-quarters situations. It can only be assumed that the operator had the conduct of the BONA VISTA. While he was not certificated, he had considerable experience navigating in these waters and could be expected to be familiar with navigation lights exhibited by different types of vessels. However, the arrangement of navigation lights on the tug-barge unit is one that might not be frequently observed, and it is not known how these lights might have been interpreted. The lights on the ARCTIC TAGLU were typically those of a tug, but it is probable that the BONA VISTA did not appreciate the size of the tug-barge unit. There is also the possibility of misidentification. A tug's two vertically arranged masthead lights have the same appearance as the masthead lights of a power-driven vessel heading directly toward the observer. Being readily visible, the masthead lights are usually the major visual cue to the navigator as to the other vessel's heading. However, had the operator of the BONA VISTA recognized the lights of the ARCTIC TAGLU as being those of a tug engaged in towing (or pushing), he should have expected to also see the lights of the towed (or pushed) vessel. Since both sets of sidelights on the tug-barge unit would have been visible to the BONA VISTA within a range of two miles, a positive identification could have been made, or a radio call to the approaching vessel could have satisfied any doubts. It is not known what avoiding action, if any, was being contemplated by the fishing vessel at the time of the collision; there is no explanation for the fact that the BONA VISTA was observed to cross the bow of the tug-barge unit since, at this stage, the BONA VISTA was required by the COLREGS to maintain her course and speed until clear of the tug-barge unit. 2.2 Radio Communications When the lack of visible sidelights on the unidentified fishing vessel made it difficult to determine the vessel's heading, it might have been possible by means of a blind call on the VHF R/T to have had the BONA VISTA identified, determine her intentions and discuss the passing arrangements. It was known that the fishing vessel was not a participant in the VTS traffic scheme and, therefore, possibly not keeping radio watch on the VTS working channel, channel 11, but no attempt was made to contact her on the international distress and calling frequency, channel 16, or any other frequency. 2.3 Bridge Manning The BONA VISTA would have become visible to the ARCTIC TAGLU as the fishing vessel came open of Burrill Point at about 0228, at which time the vessels were about 4.2 miles apart. It was reported that the BONA VISTA was sighted by the ARCTIC TAGLU at a distance of about three miles. This would have been at about 0232, just over 10 minutes before the collision. There was still sufficient time for the tug-barge unit to take the necessary collision avoidance action; nonetheless, had a dedicated look-out been posted on the bridge as recommended by the CCG Recommended Code of Nautical Procedures and Practices, the fishing vessel might have been seen earlier. The presence of another watchkeeper on the bridge would probably have been more useful on the wheel in the period immediately before the collision when the searchlight was being played over the trailers, and the steering had to be changed over from automatic to manual and the helm put hard over to starboard. Given that the operator was the only person on board known to have any experience in operating a vessel, it was not determined why the BONA VISTA was making the passage of Active Pass at night. While bringing the vessel along the comparatively open waters off the south coast of Vancouver Island, others on board could probably have been used to assist with the steering and in keeping a look-out. However, the operator alone would then have had the responsibility of navigating in the increasingly restricted waters that the vessel transited after passing Victoria, before entering the pass. The decision by the operator to make the passage at such a time was not typical of the picture of the careful, methodical navigator which the investigation otherwise revealed. 2.4 Rescue Operations In addition to eventually bringing divers to the scene, vessels which arrived to give assistance were outfitted with a selection of equipment which could have been used in the efforts to rescue those who were trapped in the overturned hull of the BONA VISTA. However, reliance was apparently placed on the ability of the divers to recover the trapped people from the hull, and other avenues of assistance were not explored. An effort to set up a supply of air into the capsized hull on a continuing basis was possible with the equipment on hand. This probably would have improved considerably the victims' chances of survival and helped the divers in their efforts, even if beaching the overturned fishing vessel or cutting a hole in the overturned hull were ruled out. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings Non-standard lights were being displayed by the BONA VISTA. The lights shown by the BONA VISTA made it difficult for the ARCTIC TAGLU to determine the heading of the fishing vessel. The uncommon tug-barge unit navigation lights displayed by the ARCTIC TAGLU/LINK 100 were perhaps not readily identified by the BONA VISTA. Neither vessel made any attempt to call the other by radio to clarify the meeting arrangement. Neither vessel reduced speed to allow more time to assess the situation. The ARCTIC TAGLU did not take adequate early collision avoidance action as prescribed in the Collision Regulations. The BONA VISTA did not maintain her course and speed as prescribed by the Collision Regulations. The BONA VISTA, under the sole conduct of her operator, was making a night passage of the difficult pass after a long coastal voyage. The bridge of the ARCTIC TAGLU was manned by only one person. The rescue attempt did not use all available facilities, relying solely on the divers' efforts. 3.2 Causes The ARCTIC TAGLU/LINK 100 and the BONA VISTA collided because neither took appropriate collision avoidance action, and the BONA VISTA inexplicably crossed ahead of the ARCTIC TAGLU/LINK 100. 4.0 Safety Action 4.1 Action Taken 4.1.1 Coroner's Inquest In July 1994, the Coroner's Inquest into this accident made three recommendations. It recommended that the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) review the various tug boat-barge configurations so that they are licensed in a manner under which they will be required to have navigation lights that will demonstrate their size and the direction in which they are travelling. The inquest further recommended that the Department of Transport review vessel manning standards to make certain that the manning of large composite units is adequate for the size of such composite units and for the conditions under which they are operating. It was also recommended to the Vancouver Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) that a system of vessel notification be set up to actively notify vessels which are seen by the VTS to be on a potential collision course. 4.1.2 Training and Certification Unqualified crew members with inadequate watchkeeping abilities have been, at least in part, contributory in 45 to 50 per cent of all collisions, groundings and strikings involving fishing vessels in Canada. There are no regulatory requirements in Canada for personnel to be certificated as having competency in navigation, seamanship, safety, vessel stability, survival skills, etc. to operate small fishing vessels (of less than 100 gross registered tons (GRT)). However, these vessels constitute over 95 per cent of the registered Canadian fishing fleet. In its report on a 1991 occurrence involving the capsizing of the fishing vessel FLYING FISHER, the Board expressed concern that inadequately trained personnel on fishing vessels were contributing to the frequency and the severity of such marine occurrences (TSB report No. M91W1075). Further, following a collision between two fishing vessels in 1994 (TSB report No. M92M4031), the Board recommended that: The Department of Transport ensure that any person required to have the conduct of a commercial fishing vessel possess the basic skills for safe navigation. In response, Transport Canada indicated that the CCG is revising the Certification and Safe Manning Regulations to require certification and training for officers on fishing vessels of 80 GRT and over. It is understood that the CCG also plans to increase the certification requirements for fishing vessels to those of 60 GRT and over, and then eventually for smaller commercial fishing vessels. 4.1.3 Rescue Diving Capability Subsequent to this occurrence, the CCG reviewed its diving policy and embarked on a two-year rescue diving pilot program to determine the effectiveness of rescue diving. CCG rescue divers have now completed their training and the pilot program will be operating out of the CCG Hovercraft Base Sea Island, in Richmond, B.C. 4.1.4 Navigation Lights on Small Fishing Vessels Following the occurrence, the TSB forwarded a Marine Safety Information Letter to the CCG indicating that the non-standard navigation lights and installations found on the BONA VISTA may not be uncommon on small fishing vessels and, as such, there would be potential for other collisions in similar circumstances. 4.2 Action Required 4.2.1 Navigation Lights on Tugs and Barges Navigation lights on vessels not only warn crews of the presence of other vessels but also help the crews determine the course and target angle (the relative bearing of one's own vessel from the target) of vessels under way. By observing the lights displayed by an approaching vessel, mariners can determine which vessel has the responsibility to keep out of the way of the other. In May 1994, the TSB forwarded a Marine Safety Advisory to the CCG concerning the importance of proper displays of navigation lights on such vessels as the ARCTIC TAGLU and LINK 100 within the Canadian marine towing industry. In response, the CCG stated that it had carried out an assessment of navigation light requirements for the ARCTIC TAGLU and LINK 100 in 1988 before the vessels first entered into service. At that time, the CCG had decided that the vessels were not rigidly connected to form a composite unit and evaluated them as a tug-pushing-barge operation. The navigation light requirements were assessed as per Collision Regulations (COLREGS) Rules 24(c) and 24(f)(i) for the tug and the barge respectively. Under these rules, the barge is required to exhibit sidelights at the forward end, and the tug must display two masthead lights in a vertical line, sidelights and a sternlight. However, if the ARCTIC TAGLU and LINK 100 had been considered to be a composite[4] unit, an additional masthead light on the forward end of the barge would have had to be displayed (COLREGS Rule 23). The Board notes that regardless of whether the ARCTIC TAGLU and LINK 100 operate as a composite unit or as a tug-pushing-barge unit, the tug and the barge move in unison in the same direction, have the same aggregate overall length (approximately 130 m in this case), and have essentially the same manoeuvring characteristics. Composite units or power-driven vessels of similar length to that of the tug-pushing-barge unit are required to display two white masthead lights, one on the foremast and the other on the aft mast centre line, with the latter being higher than the former. The arrangement of the fore-and-aft masthead lights enables the crews of other vessels to determine the course of the tug-barge and the corresponding target angle. With only the dual masthead lights displayed on the ARCTIC TAGLU, a change of heading or the exact direction of the tug-barge unit may not be readily discernible. Since 1988, the ARCTIC TAGLU has been involved in at least five near-collisions or close-quarters situations. It was not determined if navigation lights were a factor in these occurrences; however, the Board understands that, at a Vessel Traffic Meeting in June 1993, the concerns of local fishermen identified the issue of lights and poor visibility of barges and various tows as a long-standing problem on the West Coast. On the West Coast, a large towing fleet operates day and night in all visibility conditions resulting in frequent encounters with numerous other vessels. The potential for collision and close-quarter situations is significant. The Board believes that, for an increased level of safety, the requirements for lighting arrangements on combination vessels (tug and barges) should be based on criteria that facilitate vessel detection and collision avoidance rather than on how the vessels are connected. The Board recognizes that the Coroner's Inquest into this accident identified the safety deficiency in the navigation light arrangement on the tug-barge unit and made a recommendation to that effect. However, the Board is not aware of any action being taken. In view of the continuing risk of collisions with tug-barge operations in high-traffic areas, the Board recommends that: The Department of Transport ensure that the navigation light requirements for tug-and-barge operations facilitate vessel detection and collision avoidance under all operating conditions, regardless of the tug-barge configuration.