The inspection certificate (SIC 16) issued by Transport Canada lists the safety equipment to be carried on the vessel. The equipment includes 3 inflatable life-rafts capable of accommodating a total of 45 persons, 4 life-buoys, and 44 lifejackets. The lifejackets were stowed in an unidentified box in the well deck. There were no placards posted indicating the correct method of wearing and securing a lifejacket. There was also no announcement or demonstration made by any members of the crew regarding the safety equipment when the passengers boarded. The owner and skipper of the vessel had no man-overboard procedure in place. The topic had been discussed between the skipper and the crew but no practice had been carried out. Such a demonstration is not required by Transport Canada, nor is the practical use of inflatable life-rafts or life-buoys. The TSB issued a report, number M95M0092, after MACDONALD'SIII grounded near Charlottetown Harbour in 1995 with 15 passengers on board. The cause was assessed to be the result of the close proximity of the bar in the wheel-house and the proximity of many non-essential persons at the navigation position. It is unknown whether the man who fell overboard had consumed alcohol before boarding the vessel. However it was confirmed that he had consumed three double rum-and-cokes in a 40- to 45-minute-period on board. His behaviour, before falling overboard, was such that the skipper instructed the bartender not to give him any more alcohol. That action had been already implemented by the bartender, who had also observed his unsteady behaviour. The actions of the two would-be rescuers, while commendable, placed a further burden on the skipper who, instead of having a man-overboard situation to deal with, now had three men in the water. The man who had fallen overboard, although he had been sighted in the water for approximately 30 to 60 seconds, was lost to sight.Analysis The inspection certificate (SIC 16) issued by Transport Canada lists the safety equipment to be carried on the vessel. The equipment includes 3 inflatable life-rafts capable of accommodating a total of 45 persons, 4 life-buoys, and 44 lifejackets. The lifejackets were stowed in an unidentified box in the well deck. There were no placards posted indicating the correct method of wearing and securing a lifejacket. There was also no announcement or demonstration made by any members of the crew regarding the safety equipment when the passengers boarded. The owner and skipper of the vessel had no man-overboard procedure in place. The topic had been discussed between the skipper and the crew but no practice had been carried out. Such a demonstration is not required by Transport Canada, nor is the practical use of inflatable life-rafts or life-buoys. The TSB issued a report, number M95M0092, after MACDONALD'SIII grounded near Charlottetown Harbour in 1995 with 15 passengers on board. The cause was assessed to be the result of the close proximity of the bar in the wheel-house and the proximity of many non-essential persons at the navigation position. It is unknown whether the man who fell overboard had consumed alcohol before boarding the vessel. However it was confirmed that he had consumed three double rum-and-cokes in a 40- to 45-minute-period on board. His behaviour, before falling overboard, was such that the skipper instructed the bartender not to give him any more alcohol. That action had been already implemented by the bartender, who had also observed his unsteady behaviour. The actions of the two would-be rescuers, while commendable, placed a further burden on the skipper who, instead of having a man-overboard situation to deal with, now had three men in the water. The man who had fallen overboard, although he had been sighted in the water for approximately 30 to 60 seconds, was lost to sight. The passengers boarded the vessel without any contact with the crew of MACDONALD'SIII. The passengers were not provided with any information regarding the stowage of the inflatable life-rafts, life-buoys, lifejackets or fire-fighting equipment. There were no notices posted regarding the use of safety equipment. There had been no man-overboard practices carried out. The number of non-essential persons in the comparatively confined area of the wheel-house was distracting to the skipper and crew. Prior to his falling overboard, fellow passengers tried unsuccessfully to persuade the man to remain in his seat on the well deck.Findings The passengers boarded the vessel without any contact with the crew of MACDONALD'SIII. The passengers were not provided with any information regarding the stowage of the inflatable life-rafts, life-buoys, lifejackets or fire-fighting equipment. There were no notices posted regarding the use of safety equipment. There had been no man-overboard practices carried out. The number of non-essential persons in the comparatively confined area of the wheel-house was distracting to the skipper and crew. Prior to his falling overboard, fellow passengers tried unsuccessfully to persuade the man to remain in his seat on the well deck. The man who fell overboard did so because he left the security of other areas of the vessel and recklessly danced on the narrow, cluttered area of the afterdeck. The consumption of alcohol may have been a contributory factor in promoting irresponsible behaviour and a disregard for potential dangers.Causes and Contributing Factors The man who fell overboard did so because he left the security of other areas of the vessel and recklessly danced on the narrow, cluttered area of the afterdeck. The consumption of alcohol may have been a contributory factor in promoting irresponsible behaviour and a disregard for potential dangers.