The impact and aircraft wreckage analysis showed that there were no pre-impact failures or malfunctions that could have caused the deviation from the localizer and glidepath for the ILS approach to Runway23. Although there were reports of gusty winds and mechanical turbulence, there were no weather phenomena observed that would have prevented the aircraft from safely completing an instrument approach, or if this was not possible because of low visibility, a missed approach. Therefore, the analysis will focus on the operational aspects of the occurrence. The crew members were permitted by regulation to conduct the approach in reported visibilities that were below the minimum advisory values published. The pilots were also not required by regulation to have procedures and training to operate as a crew. Furthermore, the PFdid not use the AFCS, without which he was denied a valuable command reference for the approach and use of the autopilot. Consequently, his workload would have been unnecessarily high and control of the aircraft more challenging in the conditions of night, low visibility, and mechanical turbulence. The aircraft was serviceable and under the control of the PF. The aircraft struck the trees/ground almost abeam the DH position, at a distance of 650feet from the extended centreline of the runway/localizer and on a track 50off the final approach track. To arrive at that position, the approach would have been unstable as the maximum deflection of the track bar would have been well beyond the half-scale deflections of azimuth and glideslope for a stabilized ILS approach. This indicates that the crew lost situational awareness between the time the aircraft was last seen on radar in stable descent at 1500feetagl and prior to it reaching the DHposition, in that the aircraft was flown into the terrain. Rather than conduct a missed approach when the approach became unstable and the aircraft was still well above ground level, the PFcontinued in an attempt to land beyond the point where a missed approach could be executed. It is probable that neither the PFnor the PNF was aware that the aircraft was well off the required heading and track for completion of the approach and that the aircraft was well below the DHwithout the runway environment being visible ahead of the aircraft. Certainly, the indications in the cockpit would have been that the aircraft was not on a stable approach. When the approach lights were sighted, their relative position to the aircraft (two o'clock) was another indication that the approach should have been abandoned. Even though the pilot-in-command realized that the aircraft was not in a position to land and had called for an overshoot, the loss of situational awareness did not permit a timely response by thePF. Just before the approach of C-FTNS, a regional airline crew flying a Beech1900 had attempted the same ILS approach and had not been able to land safely because the aircraft became misaligned with the runway during the landing transition after visual references had been acquired. The crew, appropriately, executed a missed approach. The crew members were more experienced, with better training, multi-crew SOPs, and in an aircraft with more advanced navigational equipment. However, they were unable to safely complete the approach, suggesting that conditions were somewhat difficult. Had the crew of C-FTNS been aware of the Beech1900 missed approach, they may have been more predisposed to abandoning their approach. Hand-flying an aircraft to maintain a stabilized approach in darkness, cloud, and turbulence is a demanding task for most pilots. However, the task is made easier by following the flight director system or by using an autopilot and flying a coupled approach, monitored by aPNF. Similarly, adequate training and experience in the use of the autopilot and flight director allows pilots to better visualize the approach and maintain their situational awareness and increases their confidence in the equipment. CARs permit pilots to conduct instrument approaches in visibility less than the advisory visibility published in the CAP, increasing the risk of an ineffective transition to visual flight, misinterpretation of visual references, or the loss of visual references after transitioning to visual flight. A number of occurrences investigated by the TSB have found that inadequate visual references during the final stages of an approach contributed to an accident.Analysis The impact and aircraft wreckage analysis showed that there were no pre-impact failures or malfunctions that could have caused the deviation from the localizer and glidepath for the ILS approach to Runway23. Although there were reports of gusty winds and mechanical turbulence, there were no weather phenomena observed that would have prevented the aircraft from safely completing an instrument approach, or if this was not possible because of low visibility, a missed approach. Therefore, the analysis will focus on the operational aspects of the occurrence. The crew members were permitted by regulation to conduct the approach in reported visibilities that were below the minimum advisory values published. The pilots were also not required by regulation to have procedures and training to operate as a crew. Furthermore, the PFdid not use the AFCS, without which he was denied a valuable command reference for the approach and use of the autopilot. Consequently, his workload would have been unnecessarily high and control of the aircraft more challenging in the conditions of night, low visibility, and mechanical turbulence. The aircraft was serviceable and under the control of the PF. The aircraft struck the trees/ground almost abeam the DH position, at a distance of 650feet from the extended centreline of the runway/localizer and on a track 50off the final approach track. To arrive at that position, the approach would have been unstable as the maximum deflection of the track bar would have been well beyond the half-scale deflections of azimuth and glideslope for a stabilized ILS approach. This indicates that the crew lost situational awareness between the time the aircraft was last seen on radar in stable descent at 1500feetagl and prior to it reaching the DHposition, in that the aircraft was flown into the terrain. Rather than conduct a missed approach when the approach became unstable and the aircraft was still well above ground level, the PFcontinued in an attempt to land beyond the point where a missed approach could be executed. It is probable that neither the PFnor the PNF was aware that the aircraft was well off the required heading and track for completion of the approach and that the aircraft was well below the DHwithout the runway environment being visible ahead of the aircraft. Certainly, the indications in the cockpit would have been that the aircraft was not on a stable approach. When the approach lights were sighted, their relative position to the aircraft (two o'clock) was another indication that the approach should have been abandoned. Even though the pilot-in-command realized that the aircraft was not in a position to land and had called for an overshoot, the loss of situational awareness did not permit a timely response by thePF. Just before the approach of C-FTNS, a regional airline crew flying a Beech1900 had attempted the same ILS approach and had not been able to land safely because the aircraft became misaligned with the runway during the landing transition after visual references had been acquired. The crew, appropriately, executed a missed approach. The crew members were more experienced, with better training, multi-crew SOPs, and in an aircraft with more advanced navigational equipment. However, they were unable to safely complete the approach, suggesting that conditions were somewhat difficult. Had the crew of C-FTNS been aware of the Beech1900 missed approach, they may have been more predisposed to abandoning their approach. Hand-flying an aircraft to maintain a stabilized approach in darkness, cloud, and turbulence is a demanding task for most pilots. However, the task is made easier by following the flight director system or by using an autopilot and flying a coupled approach, monitored by aPNF. Similarly, adequate training and experience in the use of the autopilot and flight director allows pilots to better visualize the approach and maintain their situational awareness and increases their confidence in the equipment. CARs permit pilots to conduct instrument approaches in visibility less than the advisory visibility published in the CAP, increasing the risk of an ineffective transition to visual flight, misinterpretation of visual references, or the loss of visual references after transitioning to visual flight. A number of occurrences investigated by the TSB have found that inadequate visual references during the final stages of an approach contributed to an accident. Rather than conduct a missed approach when the approach became unstabilized, the crew continued in an attempt to land beyond the point where a missed approach could be executed, and the aircraft struck the terrain. The crew members most likely experienced a loss of situational awareness during the latter stages of the approach and, consequently, were unable to fly the aircraft on the required track and descent profile for a safe transition to landing. The crew members were permitted by regulation to conduct the approach in reported visibilities that were below the minimum advisory values published for the instrument landing system approach when they did not have procedures or training to operate as a crew in these conditions.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors Rather than conduct a missed approach when the approach became unstabilized, the crew continued in an attempt to land beyond the point where a missed approach could be executed, and the aircraft struck the terrain. The crew members most likely experienced a loss of situational awareness during the latter stages of the approach and, consequently, were unable to fly the aircraft on the required track and descent profile for a safe transition to landing. The crew members were permitted by regulation to conduct the approach in reported visibilities that were below the minimum advisory values published for the instrument landing system approach when they did not have procedures or training to operate as a crew in these conditions. The crew of C-FTNS did not have the benefit of up-to-date, in-flight weather conditions or knowledge that the Beech 1900 had just carried out a missed approach on which to base their approach decisions.Finding as to Risk The crew of C-FTNS did not have the benefit of up-to-date, in-flight weather conditions or knowledge that the Beech 1900 had just carried out a missed approach on which to base their approach decisions.