Summary At 1001 on 26 April 1996, the MAGDELANSEA, inbound in Halifax Harbour under the conduct of a pilot, was approaching the normal route followed by the Halifax/Dartmouth ferries. At approximately 1003, the ferry WOODSIDEI departed the Dartmouth Ferry Terminal, bound for Halifax. The WOODSIDEI crossed ahead of the MAGDELANSEA at about 1006, with approximately 93 metres between the vessels. The pilot of the MAGDELANSEA considered that a dangerous situation had been created by the WOODSIDEI Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais.. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessels On the morning of 26 April, weather conditions in Halifax Harbour were good, with visibility of 8 to 10 miles, a light southerly breeze, and a smooth sea. The MAGDELANSEA was inbound with a licensed pilot on board who had the conduct of the vessel. After the pilot had boarded the vessel, some information was exchanged between himself and the master. The master had no formal card with the vessel's characteristics, but he did advise the pilot of the vessel's extremely good manoeuvring ability. The pilot had previous experience on this type of vessel. The pilot had declined the services of a helmsman and was altering course himself using the automatic steering device, whose control is mounted on the steering-position gyrocompass repeater. In addition to steering the vessel, the pilot was also keeping a look-out and operating the very high frequency radiotelephone (VHF R/T). The master was in the wheel-house, mainly at the main engine controls, and the officer of the watch (OOW) was sometimes in the wheel-house and sometimes below performing other duties. The vessel's two radars were switched on, but they were not being used by the bridge team. One VHF R/T was dedicated to channel 12, the calling and working frequency required to be used in the Halifax Harbour area. This frequency is monitored, recorded and timed continuously by the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). The VTS also monitor by radar vessel movements, which are videotaped and timed. Some of the information in this report was derived from both VTS audio and video recordings. There was no large-scale chart of Halifax Harbour on display in the wheel-house of the MAGDELANSEA. The officers were not monitoring the vessel's progress other than by eye. At approximately 1001, the pilot of the MAGDELANSEA advised another vessel that he was approaching the ferry track and would keep to the Dartmouth side. About nine seconds later, the pilot reported to Halifax Traffic that his vessel was at the ferry track. According to VTS videotapes, the vessel was about 0.55 mile south-east of the ferry track at 1001. The pilot later remembered that, at that time, the course was probably 315(T) and the speed approximately five knots. The course of the vessel, as recorded on videotape, was between 314 and 318. At peak periods, ferry departures between Halifax and Dartmouth are every 15 minutes, commencing on the hour. Because another ferry was out of service, the WOODSIDEI was operating on the Dartmouth/Halifax run and not on her normal Woodside/Halifax run. At approximately 1003, the WOODSIDEI called on VHF channel 12 to say that she was departing Dartmouth. The call from the WOODSIDEI was recorded by VTS and heard by the master of the MAGDELANSEA, but not by her pilot. The OOW did not hear the broadcast but, as he was attending to other duties, he may not have been in the wheel-house at the time. At approximately 1006, the pilot of the MAGDELANSEA called the Ferry Dartmouth Three on VHF. The OOW of the ferry responded by indicating that the ferry's name was WOODSIDE I. According to VTS audio recordings, the pilot of the MAGDELANSEA called the ferry by VHF to let the ferry know that she was going across his vessel's bow and causing a dangerous situation. The OOW of the WOODSIDEI replied: I don't think so, I'm on the right side. This message, conveyed in non-standard vocabulary, was intended to mean that the ferry was on the starboard bow of the MAGDELANSEA. At 1006, the pilot of the MAGDELANSEA broadcast that, as the ferry had passengers on board and was crossing close ahead of his vessel, she should pay close attention to what she was doing. The WOODSIDEI crossed ahead of the MAGDELANSEA at a distance of about 93 m. Although the radars on both vessels were operational, they were not used between 1000 and 1006. No whistle warning signals were sounded by either vessel as they approached each other. The certificates of both vessels were in order, and the qualifications of the officers involved were adequate or in excess of regulatory requirements. The officers of both vessels had years of experience in the positions held, and the pilot holds a Class A licence issued by the Atlantic Pilotage Authority (APA). Neither the master nor the OOW of the MAGDELANSEA had attended a recognized Bridge Resource Management (BRM) course. While there is no regulatory reqirement for pilots to have BRM training, the APA, in conjunction with the Marine Division of the Community College at Port Hawkesbury, prepared a BRM course designed specifically for of pilots. The pilot on board the MAGDELANSEA had not attended such a course. All Metro Transit ferry officers attended a bridge procedure course in 1993. This course, which has not been repeated, was specially adapted to the requirements of the ferry operation and incorporated some aspects of BRM. On the WOODSIDEI, the OOW had the conduct as well as the steering of the vessel during the passage from Dartmouth to Halifax. Both hands are necessary to control the two-directional propulsion units. After departure from the terminal, the master joined the OOW in the wheel-house where he played a passive role. Metro Transit upholds the concept that whoever has the conduct of the vessel steers the vessel, handles the VHF and, in fine weather, also acts as look-out. The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) state, in part: When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel. Every vessel which is directed to keep out of the way of another vessel shall, so far as possible, take early and substantial action to keep well clear. Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed. The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in compliance with these Rules. In 1995, the Board conducted A Safety Study of the Operational Relationship Between Ship Masters/Watchkeeping Officers and Marine Pilots to identify safety deficiencies in communication and teamwork among pilots and ship personnel, and made several recommendations. In view of the chronic absence of effective communications on the bridge, the Board recommended that: The Department of Transport require that, when a pilot commences duty in compulsory pilotage waters, there be a formal exchange of information between the master and the pilot with mandatory briefing elements for planned navigational procedures, local conditions and ship's characteristics. Transport Canada (TC) indicated that, in conjunction with pilotage authorities, it will promote procedures for the formal exchange of information between masters and pilots. TC also intends to promote the inclusion of relevant training during Simulated Electronic Navigation (SEN) and Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training courses. Further, in view of safety deficiencies in the effectiveness of current bridge team management practices in compulsory pilotage areas, the Board recommended that: The Department of Transport require that all pilots demonstrate skills in Bridge Resource Management before the issuance and/or renewal of a pilotage licence; and The Department of Transport, through the International Maritime Organization, actively promote the provision of formal training in Bridge Resource Management to all ship officers and marine pilots and the benefits of such training. TC indicated that it intends to promote the development and the provision of BRM training courses, and plans to phase in such requirements starting with higher-level certificates. It was also indicated that TC and pilotage authorities intend to promote the inclusion of a BRM training course for applicants and holders of pilot licences and pilotage certificates. So far, TC prefers to include such a requirement in the certificates of competency and continued proficiency endorsements.