Summary At 1130 eastern daylight time, C-GNRJ, a float-equipped Cessna172P aircraft, serial number17275283, with an instructor and student on board, departed from Lake St.John near Orillia, Ontario. The purpose of the flight was to allow the student to practise take-offs, landings, and simulated engine failures on departure. During the climb following the second takeoff, the instructor simulated an engine failure by pulling the throttle back to idle. The student executed a 180-degree turn as part of a simulated forced approach back to Lake St.John. During this simulated forced approach the aircraft stalled, pitched nose down and crashed into the swampy area along the shore line. The aircraft came to rest in an inverted position with its nose embedded in the swamp. Fishermen on the lake were able to rescue both occupants from the partially-submerged aircraft. Neither the instructor nor the student was wearing a shoulder harness, and both received serious injuries. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The aircraft was manufactured in 1981 and had accumulated 9826flight hours before the accident. It was equipped with Canadian Aircraft Products (CAP) floats, model number67-2000, and was used both as a rental aircraft and for flight instruction. Records indicate that the aircraft was equipped and certified in accordance with existing regulations. There were no known defects before the flight, and the aircraft's weight and centre of gravity were within approved limits. The closest meteorological reporting office was at the Muskoka Airport, approximately 16miles north of Lake St.John. At 1200 eastern daylight time,1 the weather recorded at the Muskoka, Ontario, airport was as follows: broken cloud ceiling at 25000feet above ground level, visibility 12statute miles, temperature 26C, dew point 13C, wind variable 110to 190magnetic at 8knots, and altimeter setting30.24. The meteorological conditions were similar at LakeSt.John. Lake St. John is approximately 3.4kilometres long and 2kilometres wide and is oriented in a north/south direction (seeAppendixA). Orillia Aviation Limited's float plane base is located on a bay on the south-eastern side of the lake. At the south end of the lake, where the occurrence took place, there is approximately 300to 500metres of swampy shoreline extending south to a tree line. The tree line marks the beginning of a forested area, with trees 20to 30feet tall. The instructor pilot held a valid Canadian commercial pilot aeroplane licence and a Class4 instructor rating. The instructor was licenced to fly gliders, and all single-pilot, non-high performance, single- and multi-engine land and sea aeroplanes. The instructor had accumulated 571flight hours in powered aircraft, 150of which were on float-equipped aircraft. The instructor pilot occupied the right seat during the occurrence flight. The student pilot held a valid Canadian student pilot aeroplane permit and was taking abinitio pilot training on float-equipped aircraft. The student had been taking flying lessons since June 2001 and had accumulated 30.5flight hours, of which 19.5were on float-equipped aircraft. The student also had undocumented experience at the controls of a friend's float-equipped Cessna206. The instructor and student had completed two training flights in the week preceding the accident. Circuits and emergencies were the primary focus of these trips. The accident flight was scheduled to allow for further enhancement of these skills and to determine if the student was ready to fly solo. The student completed the aircraft pre-flight safety inspection before the instructor met her at the aircraft. The instructor conducted an informal pre-flight briefing with the student at the dock and in the aircraft as it was taxiing before the first takeoff. This was common practice at the flight school, and there was no time set aside between bookings for pre- and post-flight briefings. It was assumed by both the instructor and the student that this lesson would be a continuation of the previous day's lesson which had encompassed take-offs and landings combined with simulated engine failures. However, all previous simulated engine failures had been introduced at an altitude of at least 1000feet above ground level. In this instance the simulated engine failure was introduced during climb out, and the student was not prepared. Directly ahead of the aircraft, the terrain was forested, and the aircraft altitude was not considered sufficient to turn right and land on an adjacent lake, so the student turned back to land on Lake St.John. As the student completed the turn back toward Lake St. John, control of the aircraft was either transferred to the instructor, or the instructor took control. During or subsequent to the transfer of control, the aircraft stalled and descended into the swamp. At no time during the simulated engine failure scenario did either the student or the instructor apply engine power to abort the simulated forced approach. There is insufficient guidance provided in either the Transport Canada (TC) Flight Instructor Guide, the TC Flight Training Manual, 4thEdition (Revised), or the Cessna172 Pilot Operating Handbook for a pilot to determine the minimum altitude required to safely execute a 180-degree turn following an engine failure after take-off. The TC Flight Training Manual (p.128) states the following: Numerous fatal accidents have resulted from attempting to turn back and land on the runway or aerodrome following an engine failure after take-off. As altitude is at a premium, the tendency is to try to hold the nose of the aircraft up during the turn without consideration for the airspeed and load factor. These actions may induce an abrupt spin entry. Experience and careful consideration of the following factors are essential to making a safe decision to execute a return to the aerodrome: 1)altitude 2)the glide ratio of the aircraft 3)the length of the runway 4)wind strength/ground speed 5)experience of the pilot and 6)pilot currency on type. The Cessna 172 Pilot Operating Handbook (Section3, Engine Failures) states the following: In most cases, the landing should be planned straight ahead with only small changes in direction to avoid obstructions. Altitude and airspeed are seldom sufficient to execute a 180-degree gliding turn to the runway. Although these documents recognize the inherent dangers associated with a 180-degree turn following an engine failure, they do not address the process by which a pilot or a student can determine the minimum safe altitude for an engine-out turn back. TC civil aviation document TP13748E, An Evaluation of Stall/Spin Accidents in Canada 1999, discusses the need for clear and concise information regarding the altitude required before an engine-out 180-degree turn is initiated. TP13748E states in part: Turn Back After Takeoff Several stalls occurred when the pilot decided to turn back to the runway when the engine failed. Typically, guidance on this topic recommends that the pilot land straight ahead unless the aircraft has enough altitude to make the turn back to the runway. This constitutes a fuzzyrule. That is, the rule requires interpretation, but the rule provides little or no guidance in making that interpretation. How much altitude is enough? Is it always the same? What variables may affect the requirement? The pilot is better off not having to consider these questions. Lives would be saved if the guidance required no thought or assessment. If an engine failure after takeoff results in an accident, the pilot is at least eight times more likely to be killed or seriously injured turning back than landing straight ahead. The easiest decisions to make are those which are prescriptive. As soon as the situation is known to exist, the procedure to follow is defined. Engine failure after take off should be such a decision.