Summary On 29June2005, at about 1640 Pacific daylight time, while en route from the Queen Charlotte Strait to Gibsons, British Columbia, on the Sunshine Coast, the small fishing vessel MorningSunrise, with 500prawn traps on deck and approximately 4500kg of frozen prawns in boxes in the freezer hold, listed heavily to port and gradually sank in 152m of water. All four crew members on board, wearing immersion suits, abandoned the vessel into a liferaft and were soon picked up by the Canadian Coast Guard cutter CapeCaution. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of the Vessel The MorningSunrise was a small fibreglass-over-wood, carvel-built fishing vessel of closed construction with a rounded bilge. The wheelhouse, crew accommodation, and engine room were located forward of amidships. The sole means of entrance to the wheelhouse was via a Dutch door located in the after bulkhead. Below the main deck, the hull was subdivided by three transverse watertight bulkheads into four compartments: a forward crew accommodation space, the engine room, a fish hold, and the lazarette. The vessel had two fuel tanks, one on either side of the main engine. The potable water tank was located in the lazarette. The insulated and refrigerated fish hold had double hatch covers. It contained refrigeration plates and a stowage area with pen boards to contain the product. The refrigeration compressor was run off the main engine. The wheelhouse was equipped with navigation and communications equipment including two radar sets, two very high frequency (VHF) radios (one with digital selective calling capability), a global positioning system, an autopilot, and a depth sounder. The vessel was equipped with a pair of outrigger booms with roll-reduction paravanes. An aluminum platform, extending approximately 1.67m aft of the extreme end of the weather deck, was used to store prawn traps. An aluminum railing surrounded the perimeter of the platform. A similar aluminum platform extended approximately 2.75m aft, from the top deck of the housework. This was used to store various fishing equipment and a tote that was temporarily used to store prawns before freezing. Photo1.The MorningSunrise during capsizing History of the Voyage The 2005 Prawn by Trap fishery season for coastal British Columbia ran from May1 to June28. The MorningSunrise took part in the fishery throughout the season in Queen Charlotte Strait, during which time it discharged two loads at Port Hardy. On June27, the vessel replenished its fuel and water supplies in Port Hardy and, with a crew of four on board, including the skipper, departed on the morning of June28. The crew members recovered their 500prawn traps and gear in Queen Charlotte Strait and departed for Vancouver. It was intended to unload the traps and gear in Gibsons, en route to the Versacold Dock, Vancouver, to discharge the prawns. The 500traps and gear were stowed on the aluminum platform at the after part of the weather deck. The catch of approximately 4500kg of prawns was in 1kg boxes penned off in the fish hold. The vessel anchored from 2300 Pacific daylight time3 on June28 until 0300 on June29 to transit Race Passage at slack tide. The crew rested during this time. The vessel departed the anchorage at around 0300 on June29 and transited Johnstone Strait, Race Passage, and Discovery Passage without incident. Figure 1 - Sketch of the occurrence area That afternoon, while transiting the Strait of Georgia, the skipper was alone in the wheelhouse and the other three crew members rested in the crew's quarters. The vessel was on a southerly course travelling at approximately 6.5knots. Steering was by autopilot and both paravane stabilizers were deployed. The MorningSunrise was in the vicinity of Savary Island when, within a period of approximately 15seconds, it developed a list estimated to be 40to port. The wind was from the southeast at 22knots, and the vessel was pitching gently in 1m seas and swell. The master woke the crew and instructed them to investigate the cause of the list. They confirmed that there was no water in the hold or the engine room. The lazarette was inaccessible because it was covered with prawn traps. The bilge pump was started, but only a small quantity of water was discharged, indicating that the lazarette was either dry or that the suction strainers were partially clogged. In a move to correct the list, all the ground lines on deck were moved from port to starboard, but this also proved to be ineffective. The master changed over to manual steering and, in an effort to right the vessel, increased engine revolutions and placed the helm hard-a-starboard. The vessel momentarily returned to the upright, then heeled to starboard, assuming a list of approximately 40 to starboard. The master then increased the revolutions further and placed the helm hard-a-port. This resulted in the vessel assuming a heavy port list again, until it eventually rolled over on its beam ends and gradually settled deeper into the water. At 1612, the skipper broadcast a Mayday message on VHF channel16, giving the vessel's LoranC coordinates. He then ordered the crew to don their immersion suits; all crew members then abandoned the vessel into the launched liferaft. The Mayday message was intercepted by Comox Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) and was immediately relayed to Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) Victoria. Vessels responding to the Mayday included the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) inshore rescue boat CG509, the CCG cutter (CCGC) CapeCaution, the CCGC CapeCaution fast rescue craft Westview, and the Canadian fishing vessel NorthernLights. The CCGC CapeCaution arrived on scene within 20minutes. The CG509 later picked up all of the crew and transferred them to the CCGC CapeCaution. There were no injuries; two crew members were landed ashore, and the skipper and the mate remained on board one of the rescue vessels until after the MorningSunrise sank. The MorningSunrise slowly downflooded through engine room vents and other openings at the main deck until it eventually sank by the stern at 1956on June29 in 152m of water. Its position was 4956.89'N, 12455.92'W. Crew Certification and Experience The skipper and crew of the MorningSunrise held no formal marine qualifications, nor were they required to by regulations. The Crewing Regulations made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act do not require masters or crews of small fishing vessels with a gross tonnage of less than 60to hold any marine certificate of competency. Masters and crews are, however, required to be trained in marine emergency duties (MED) at a recognized institution before 01April2007. At the time of the occurrence, none of the crew members had completed their training. All of the crew members were experienced fishers. The skipper had served on the MorningSunrise since it was purchased by the present owner in1999. He had been in command of fishing vessels belonging to the same owner for some 15years. Vessel Certification and Surveys As a vessel under 24.4m in length and under 15in gross tonnage, the MorningSunrise was not required to be periodically inspected by Transport Canada (TC). Significant modifications had been made to the vessel, but no tests were conducted to determine the vessel's new stability, nor were they required. The vessel had been involved in the Prawn by Trap fishery since being purchased and modified by its present owner in1999. The vessel had occasionally been chartered by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) for scientific work. Records show two hull-measurement surveys, as required by DFO, before the granting of fishing licences to the MorningSunrise. The first one was carried out on 29January1991 and it put the length overall at 12.858m. The second survey was done on 15April1999 and placed the length at 12.65m after the bow was cropped by 0.203m to meet DFO's licence transfer requirements and length restrictions. Limitations/Restrictions in the Prawn and Shrimp Trap Fishery Before 1990, there were no limitations/restrictions on procuring a licence to fish for prawn and shrimp by trap. In 1990, as a fishery management conservation measure, vessel length and licence limitations were introduced. Licences are attached to vessel lengths, and the transfer of licences is permitted only if the replacement vessel does not exceed the overall length of the vessel being replaced. In 1995, the Prawn Sectoral Committee, concerned with the number of traps in use, requested that DFO establish limits on how many traps could be fished. In 1995, following the DFO adoption of a reallocated trap limits (RTL) policy, vessel owners were able to increase the original Prawn by Trap single fishing licence by transferring licence rights and additional traps from another vessel. Within the fleet of approximately 250licenced prawn fishing vessels, about 35received RTL stacked licences, allowing them to carry 500traps, as opposed to the single-licence limit of 300traps. Photo 2 - Shell of trap beforecordage is added Also in 1995, in order to deter fishers from jury-rigging their prawn traps to maximize their catch, DFO set upper limits for trap volume and mesh size. Since these limits did not take into consideration trap weights, licence holders opted to make the traps more robust by progressively increasing the trap weights from 2kg to 5kg. This enabled the traps to withstand the weight of the catch, and the licence holders to better their catch size. In 2001, to control the practice of fishers hauling in their traps two to three times a day in order to maximize their catch, another management measure was introduced: commercial trap hauling was restricted to once per day between 0700and1900. Cordage and Accessory Gear Associated with Prawn by Trap Fishery Traps are set in groups of 50as shown in Figure2. They are hooked onto a 9mm ground line. The ends of the lines are buoyed to mark them on the surface and have boom chains, weighing approximately 34kg each, to hold the traps close to the seabed. The traps are suspended from the ground line by 6mm rope bridles. Five hundred traps would normally require 50coils of 9mm rope, with each coil having approximately 550m of rope, each weighing about 20.4kg. When recovered after some days in the water, the cordage and traps are wet, adding to the weight of the gear. Modifications to the Vessel Figure 2 -Traps are set close to the seabed The MorningSunrise was bought by the present owner on 15April1999. The owner already possessed a Stacked Prawn Licence, which was attached to a vessel with a length of 12.65m. The MorningSunrise was 12.86m in length. In order to meet DFO's vessel replacement rules,4 which stipulate that the replacement vessel may not exceed the overall length of the vessel being replaced, the vessel's bow was cropped 0.203m to accommodate a licence transfer. Photo 4 - Example of platform deck extension to accomodate extra traps The Stacked Licence policy permits vessel owners to carry 500prawn traps on board. To facilitate this, an aluminum platform deck extension weighing about 181kg was added to the after end of the MorningSunrise. This extension was not included in the vessel's length overall. Around the same time, a similar aluminum platform, extending approximately 2.75m aft from the top deck of the housework, was constructed. This added a further weight of about 227kg to the vessel. The 408kg weight of the added structures was above the vessel's centre of gravity. These modifications were carried out by a local welding shop without consulting a naval architect orTC. Factors Leading to the Capsizing The condition of the vessel with respect to its deadweight, trim, tanks, free surface, and the effect of alterations could not be determined. An accurate assessment of the vessel's intact transverse stability could not be established. At the time of the occurrence, the traps were stowed in stacks of20, to a height of 1.8m on the after deck, extending from the after end of the fish hold and onto the platform extension. The modifications to the vessel, along with the carriage of 500traps and associated fishing gear to engage in the Prawn Trap fishery, added some 4423kg of weight above the vessel's centre of gravity and further reduced the vessel's inherent low freeboard. The vessel's stability was compromised, and this was reflected in the behaviour of the vessel heeling from one side to the other5 with the application of bold helm and propeller thrust. The lower freeboard, along with the heeling, permitted water to be shipped and retained on deck, causing a detrimental free surface effect. The action of the wind and waves on the vessel, together with the torque created when the throttle was put to full ahead with bold helm, assisted the capsizing moment. Eventually, the vessel sank when it lost reserve buoyancy as a result of downflooding through the engine room vent and other openings at the main deck level.