Analysis No formal BRM environment was in place on the bridge of the Algolake, and the responsibilities of those participating in the navigation of the vessel were neither defined nor clear. The interval between position fixes was too large to effectively monitor the vessel's progress along her intended track. The influence of strong westerly winds caused the Algolake to drift east of her intended track, but no allowance was made for this leeway. As the vessel approached a course-alteration point, the master and first mate engaged in a conversation not related to the navigation of the vessel. The master, attempting to operate a defective ECDIS, became distracted by a non-essential task which also affected his night vision. The master did not specifically inform the first mate that he was briefly assuming responsibility for navigation, and this was not mutually understood or agreed upon. After the 0615 vessel position plot, no further position fix was plotted until the vessel ran aground at 0650. The Algolake grounded in shallows, ESE of buoy EN10, having passed the course-alteration point by 2.1 M. Considering that the vessel's ECDIS and depth sounder were inoperative, a less-than- adequate radar watch was kept. The navigation cadet was unfamiliar with the principles of BRM and was not sufficiently trained in the use of radar and other navigational aids to be able to assist effectively.Findings No formal BRM environment was in place on the bridge of the Algolake, and the responsibilities of those participating in the navigation of the vessel were neither defined nor clear. The interval between position fixes was too large to effectively monitor the vessel's progress along her intended track. The influence of strong westerly winds caused the Algolake to drift east of her intended track, but no allowance was made for this leeway. As the vessel approached a course-alteration point, the master and first mate engaged in a conversation not related to the navigation of the vessel. The master, attempting to operate a defective ECDIS, became distracted by a non-essential task which also affected his night vision. The master did not specifically inform the first mate that he was briefly assuming responsibility for navigation, and this was not mutually understood or agreed upon. After the 0615 vessel position plot, no further position fix was plotted until the vessel ran aground at 0650. The Algolake grounded in shallows, ESE of buoy EN10, having passed the course-alteration point by 2.1 M. Considering that the vessel's ECDIS and depth sounder were inoperative, a less-than- adequate radar watch was kept. The navigation cadet was unfamiliar with the principles of BRM and was not sufficiently trained in the use of radar and other navigational aids to be able to assist effectively. The Algolake grounded when the vessel proceeded past a course-alteration point, in darkness and near-gale weather. Contributing to the occurrence were the absence of a bridge resource management environment, undefined or unclear responsibilities of those participating in the navigation of the vessel, and the non-use of all available means to monitor the vessel's progress along its intended track.Causes and Contributing Factors The Algolake grounded when the vessel proceeded past a course-alteration point, in darkness and near-gale weather. Contributing to the occurrence were the absence of a bridge resource management environment, undefined or unclear responsibilities of those participating in the navigation of the vessel, and the non-use of all available means to monitor the vessel's progress along its intended track. As a result of this occurrence, Algoma Central Marine has taken the following actions: both the master and the chief officer were required to attend a refresher BRM course; the ECDIS unit was serviced and repaired; a new depth sounder was installed on board the vessel; instructions were sent to the fleet on the proper use of cadets while on a navigational watch; and a third party was recruited to carry out an independent audit of bridge practices of a number of Algoma ships. These audits will continue in the future.Safety Action Taken As a result of this occurrence, Algoma Central Marine has taken the following actions: both the master and the chief officer were required to attend a refresher BRM course; the ECDIS unit was serviced and repaired; a new depth sounder was installed on board the vessel; instructions were sent to the fleet on the proper use of cadets while on a navigational watch; and a third party was recruited to carry out an independent audit of bridge practices of a number of Algoma ships. These audits will continue in the future.