Summary On the morning of 1 March 1999, the herring seiner Westisle was experiencing rough seas off the west coast of Vancouver Island. Seawater shipped on deck, down flooded past an improperly secured aluminum fish-loading deck scuttle cover leading to the forward starboard cargo tank, causing a starboard list. Down flooding into the compartment increased when the cover became dislodged. When the unsecured deck cargo shifted suddenly to starboard, the vessel was reportedly heeled to an angle of about 70. By ballasting and moving weights, the crew was able to return the vessel to a near upright position. Damage to the vessel was limited to seawater contamination of the main engine fuel injectors and fuel system. No injuries or pollution resulted from this occurrence. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of the Vessel The Westisleis a conventional, steel-hulled, West Coast herring seiner. Below decks forward are crew quarters followed by a machinery space with the main engine on the centerline and main fuel tanks to port and starboard. Each fuel tank is fitted with a float-type air vent located on the weather deck adjacent to the bulwark. A centerline tunnel extends aft from the machinery space between the longitudinal bulkheads of port and starboard cargo fish tanks (cargo tanks) to a watertight door leading to the lazaret. On the weather deck forward, a short foredeck is followed by an enclosed superstructure comprising the wheelhouse and crew accommodations. On the port side of the superstructure's aft and transverse bulkhead is a watertight door leading to the main working deck. A pursing winch is fitted on the centerline near midships. The hatch coamings of the four cargo tanks are divided into port and starboard compartments (see Appendix A). Fish-loading deck scuttles are fitted into and flush with the deck plating between the hatch coamings and bulwarks to port and starboard in way of the after end of the forward cargo tanks. Directly abaft the hatch coamings is a raised, athwartships-mounted net drum followed by a short after deck and transom stern fitted with a horizontal net roller. An inflatable liferaft and cradle is fitted to port atop the superstructure. History of the Voyage At approximately 1000 Pacific standard time on 28 February 1999, the Westisledeparted Campbell River, B.C. with a crew of seven.1 The vessel was bound for the herring fishing grounds of Barkley Sound on the west coast of Vancouver Island. By 0900 on 1 March 1999, winds were from the southeast and seas had risen to an estimated average height of five metres. Seawater was being shipped and retained on deck in increasing quantities and the vessel was developing a noticeable list to starboard. Shortly before 1000 it was discovered that the starboard forward deck scuttle cover to the cargo tank was missing and that the tank was nearly filled with seawater. At approximately 1000 there was a sudden and appreciable increase in the vessel's starboard list when the unsecured deck cargo, consisting of a herring seine net and diesel-powered workboat, shifted to the starboard side of the deck. The vessel was some two miles south of Cape Beale. With the vessel reportedly listed approximately 70 to starboard, the skipper transmitted a Mayday call via VHF channel16. All way was taken off the vessel and the controls to the main engine set to neutral. While preparations were being made to abandon the vessel, the engineer descended into the machinery space where he used circulation pumps to flood the port forward cargo tank with seawater which reduced the vessel's starboard list. Meanwhile, a deck-hand ascended to the port side of the boat deck where he successfully deployed the vessel's eight-person inflatable liferaft. Other crew members engaged the main deck winch and repositioned the stern of the workboat to the port side of the centreline. The cumulative effect of the above returned the vessel to a near upright position. Soon after these emergency tasks had been completed, the main engine failed. It was later determined that fuel had become contaminated with seawater that had entered the starboard side fuel tank through the air vent. Meanwhile at 1005, in response to the Mayday broadcast, the Rescue Coordination Centre in Victoria tasked a Canadian Coast Guard vessel to assist. Being without power and unable to manoeuvre, the Westislewas taken in tow. The tow was later transferred to Western Brave, a responding fishing vessel which assisted the Westisleto a shipyard in Port Alberni, B.C., for inspection and repairs. The damage to the vessel was limited to seawater contamination of the main engine fuel injectors and fuel system. No injuries or pollution resulted from this occurrence. Certification, Training, and Personnel History The Westislewas issued a Ship Inspection Certificate (SIC 29) by Transport Canada, Marine Safety on 16 June 1998. It is valid until 15 June 2002. The skipper held a Transport Canada certificate to command a fishing vessel of this size and type. This was the skipper's first assignment on board the Westislebut he has extensive experience operating fishing vessels of similar tonnage. Although not required by regulation, the engineer held a valid Third-Class Engineer certificate at the time of the occurrence. The crew had recently joined the vessel. With the exception of the engineer and one deck-hand, none of the other crew members had attended Marine Emergency Duties training nor were they required to do so by regulation. Weather and Current Information The weather experienced by the vessel was similar to the marine weather forecast issued by the Pacific Weather Centre of Environment Canada. The weather forecast issued at 0440 on 28February 1999 for the relevant portion of Vancouver Island's west coast called for southerly winds of 25 to 35knots changing to westerly winds of between 30 and 40knots. In the morning, seas were expected to reach heights of between five and six metres. Stability Requirement The initial Steamship Inspection Certificate (SIC 29) was issued on 10June 1982 pending issuance of an approved Trim and Stability booklet which took place on 3August 1982. No reported modifications have been made to the hull or equipment since that date. The booklet was approved based on an inclining experiment conducted on a sister ship MV VanIsleon 27January 1981with 10 tons of permanent ballast placed at the bottom of the engine-room. The vessel was engaged in commercial herring fishery at the time of the occurrence. The principal stability characteristics contained in the vessel's Trim and Stability booklet met or exceeded the criteria of the Stability, Subdivision, and Load Line Standards STAB 4, as detailed in the Transport Canada Publication TP7301E. Departure Load Condition Prior to departure, the vessel's fuel and fresh water tanks were full. Approximately 46cm of liquid cleaning solution had been added to each of the vessel's two port and two starboard cargo tanks, a practice common to many commercial fishing vessels. The vessel's initial amidship freeboard was 610cm. Cargo Tank Arrangement There are four cargo tanks aboard this vessel: port and starboard forward tanks and port and starboard after tanks. Each of the forward tanks has a 30.10m3 capacity while each of the after tanks has an 18.36 m3 capacity. Port and starboard tank hatch coamings have a uniform height of 91 cm and all four main hatch openings are fitted with watertight aluminum covers. Fish-loading Deck Scuttles To facilitate fish-loading operations, each cargo tank was fitted with 46cmx61cm flush-deck scuttles located on the weather deck between the bulwarks and the mid-point of the cargo tank coamings. Each deck scuttle was provided with an aluminum watertight cover secured by a single, recessed, centre-locking bolt that could be tightened or loosened using a square-headed wrench designed for that purpose. The covers were not hinged or permanently attached by chain to the vessel's structure, although regulation required them to be so attached.2 Cargo Tank Pumping Arrangement Pumping arrangements consisted of the main engine, and, if necessary, an auxiliary engine supplying power to a centrifugal pump of 5cm in diameter with suction valves fitted to each of the four cargo tanks. Valves fitted to each tank permit the flow of seawater in or out of those tanks. Fuel Tank Air Vent Check Valves The fuel tanks were fitted with WINEL model RM1 vent check valves, designed such that the buoyancy of the ball effectively shuts off the aperture to the tank opening and prevents seawater from entering the tank. According to the manufacturer, these valves are not watertight at large angles of heel. Regular maintenance is recommended by the manufacturer to ensure proper functioning of the valve includes checking the seals, screens, and balls. Stowage of Deck Cargo At the time of the occurrence, a 5-ton herring seine net and 2-ton diesel-powered workboat were stowed on the centerline of the weather deck abaft the net drum, directly forward of the transom stern, ready to be deployed at the start of the fishing. Neither item was secured to any fixed point on the vessel's structure. Life Saving Equipment and Safety Drill In accordance with Transport Canada requirements, life-saving equipment on board the vessel included seven standard Department of Transport approved lifejackets and an eight-person inflatable liferaft. The liferaft was stowed in its cradle on the boat deck and was inspected and certified for eight people on 3February 1999. It had been successfully deployed but remained unused when it became unnecessary to abandon the vessel. The vessel also carried seven immersion suits in compliance with the requirements of the Fishing Operations Regulationsmade pursuant to section71 of the B.C. Workers Compensation Act; there is no requirement for the carriage of immersion suits for such vessels in the Canada Shipping Act regulations. Both sets of regulations call for the master to ensure that the crew is aware of the location and use of emergency equipment. The Fishing Operations Regulations require that drills be conducted periodically and when there is a change in crew. In preparation for abandonment, crew members had mustered in the galley where they attempted to don immersion suits and life jackets. Only one of the seven crew members actually wore an immersion suit. The remaining six persons found that the life jackets and the suits were too small. Crew members were 1.7m to 1.9m tall and weighed between 90kg and 118kg.