Synopsis On 10 December 1994, the ANAX, loaded with 17,717 metric tonnes of wheat from Duluth, USA, was transiting the St. Lawrence River bound for Baie Comeau, Quebec, with two pilots on board. When the vessel was off Beaumont, a power interruption occurred on the emergency electrical system supplying the navigation instruments and the steering position. A few minutes later, the vessel grounded on a rocky bottom on the south side of the channel. The vessel sustained major damage requiring drydocking. No one was injured, and no pollution was reported as a result of this occurrence. Factual Information Port of Registry Nassau, Bahamas Propulsion MAN2SA, five cylinders, 7,606kW, driving a single fixed-pitch propeller At 1215(1) on 10December 1994, after changing pilots at Quebec, Quebec, the ANAX resumed her service speed on leaving the limits of the Port of Quebec bound for Baie Comeau. For more economical fuel consumption, the vessel switched from using diesel oil to heavy oil in the main engine. At about 1310, when the vessel was off Beaumont, a power interruption paralyzed the navigation instruments and the steering position, and the vessel yawed to starboard. The bridge personnel immediately informed the engine-room staff of a steering gear failure by telephone and placed the engine telegraph to full astern. The surprised engine-room staff hesitated before responding to the manoeuvre. The master was urgently called to the bridge and ordered the engineers of the watch by telephone to reverse the main engine immediately. The manoeuvring order was carried out, but the vessel grounded, at about 1312, on the south side of the channel above buoy K147 before the engine was in reverse. The tide had been falling for about 1hour and 30minutes. The ANAX grounded over a third of her length, with the stern remaining in open water. The forepeak, No.1 double-bottom port and starboard tanks and No.3 double-bottom starboard tank were staved in. The vessel had to be lightened by 1,800tons, and the assistance of tugs was required, to be refloated at high tide on 14December 1994. During tests carried out in the presence of inspectors, the opening of the circuit breaker serving the emergency electrical system on the main switchboard produced more or less the same effects as were observed by the personnel on the bridge at the time of the grounding. No other scenario reproduced the same effects, and no part of the system involved was identified as a possible cause of this failure. Post-occurrence inspections were carried out by inspectors of the Ship Safety Branch of the Canadian Coast Guard to determine the technical cause of the grounding and for Port State Control. Some noteworthy deficiencies were found as follows: the emergency generator failed to start automatically due to the presence of frozen water in its fuel line; the emergency generator circuit breaker did not close automatically; the short-circuit fuses in the emergency panel and the main panel for the steering motors were not as shown in the one-line diagram; indications of different function modes in the wheel-house were not evident if not missing; the power failure alarm system for the electric motors did not have a sound signal; the emergency telephone between the wheel-house and the engine-room was out of order; the motor of the starboard lifeboat could not be started; and the lifeboat launching mechanism was too slow.