Summary On 26 February 2003, the GreatCentury was proceeding in fair weather down the St. Lawrence River, en route to Sept-les, Quebec. The vessel's progress was hindered by heavy ice concentration and, in the vicinity of Champlain, the diesel engine generators overheated. The ship's electrical power supply was affected and, therefore, the main propulsion system could not maintain its output and was eventually shut down. Shortly thereafter, the GreatCentury experienced a blackout. An officer was dispatched to the forecastle to let go the anchors, but they were frozen in the hawse pipes. The vessel drifted in the ice flow and grounded outside the channel some 2nautical miles down river off Pointe la Citrouille. During the up-coming tide, the vessel was refloated with tug assistance. There was no injury or pollution as a result of this occurrence. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of the Vessel Photo1. The GreatCentury alongside in Bcancour The Panamax, GreatCentury, is a seven-hold bulk carrier with the crew accommodation arranged at the after end. The vessel was built at the Sumimoto Heavy Industries Ltd., Yokosuka Shipyard, in Japan, under the survey supervision of the American Bureau of Shipping classification society. The vessel was designed for the carriage of bulk cargo and strengthened for the carriage of heavy cargoes. The No.4 hold was designed to be used as a deep ballast compartment. The GreatCentury was not built or classed for navigation in ice and, as such, does not have an ice class notation. However, it was given an unrestricted service designation by the American Bureau of Shipping. Its approximate mean draughts in light and heavy ballast conditions are 5.90m and 7.90m respectively. The vessel is propelled by a slow speed diesel engine, which drives a single right-handed, fixed-pitch propeller. The four solid propeller blades are made of a nickel, aluminum and bronze alloy. All of the vessel's associated fuel, oil and cooling water pumps are driven electrically. History of the Voyage On 14 January 2003, the bulk carrier GreatCentury departed Bunbury, Australia, loaded with 50080tonnes of alumina bound for Bcancour, Quebec. After calling at Durban, South Africa, for bunkers, the vessel resumed its trans-Atlantic voyage bound for Canada. In the mid-Atlantic, the master received a company telex advising him that, at this time of the year in Canada, the vessel would be subjected to navigation in ice-infested waters. This was the vessel's first encounter in ice, and most of the crew members' first introduction to ice navigation. The master held a safety meeting to remind the crew to follow company procedures and to take note of the various handbooks available on the subject, including engine room and bridge and deck procedures manuals. On 15February2003, 48hours prior to entering Canadian waters, the master forwarded to the Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services the standard required information to obtain traffic clearance.3 The GreatCentury met the requirements and two days later entered the Vessel Traffic Services zone. At 0110 on 20 February 2003, an ice advisor embarked the vessel off Port aux Basques, Newfoundland. The ice advisor informed the master of possible problems the crew and vessel may encounter while navigating in ice-infested waters and cold weather. The master told the ice advisor that the crew had been informed accordingly and that he was confident that the vessel could navigate in ice. At about 0915, the freshwater cooling-temperature alarm sounded, warning that the main engine cylinder head outlet temperature was higher than normal. The load on the main engine was reduced but, a few minutes later, two more alarms were heard. The air intake temperature was found to be above operating temperature and the sea water cooling pressure began to fluctuate. The engineers diagnosed the mechanical fault in the three-way valve in way of the cooling line outlet. Once the valve was freed, using an acetylene torch, the engineers positioned it to maximize the flow at the pump suction. Afterward, the cooling water temperature in the circuit was observed to be stable, at approximately 40C. The main engine was then brought back to its operating full speed without further incident. On February21 at 1815, the ice advisor disembarked at LesEscoumins pilot station and two river pilots boarded the vessel. On 22February2003, the GreatCentury berthed at Bcancour, Quebec, and the pilots disembarked. On 24 February 2003, the engine room staff switched from low to high sea suction. Unloading operations were completed at approximately 09304 on 26February2003. As the ballast tanks were being filled (or partially filled) in preparation for departure, including the No.4 cargo hold, the second and fourth engineers carried out routine tests on the machinery. The vessel was downbound in the St. Lawrence River, bound to Sept-les, Quebec. Generators Nos.2 and 3were both put on line and, at about 0910, in order to test the main engine, the main sea water cooling pump was started. However, some three minutes later an alarm sounded. The duty engineer acknowledged the alarm and informed the second engineer that the pressure in the sea water cooling line leading to the generators was low, however, no remedial action was taken nor was the situation closely monitored. At 0932, a second alarm went off; the lube oil temperature in both generators was found to be abnormally high. Shortly thereafter, the sea water pressure and the lube oil temperature returned to normal operating conditions. Two river pilots boarded the vessel at approximately 1000. The bridge called the engine room and gave them a half-hour notice prior to departure. The vessel's departure mean draught was approximately 6.65m. At 1030, following the normal routine, the engine's control was transferred to the bridge; engine room personnel remained on stand-by. Tugs were made fast, fore and aft, at 1045, and around 1100 the vessel commenced the unberthing manoeuvre. The first telegraph order was given at 1108, and the main engine responded accordingly. Some seven minutes later, the pressure in the generator sea water cooling line started to drop and fluctuate. The departure manoeuvring continued until the vessel was in the channel. At approximately 1145, the tugs were cast off and by 1200 the vessel was proceeding down the St.Lawrence at a speed of approximately 9knots in 6/10slush ice concentration. Notwithstanding the fact that the main engine was operating normally, the generators were experiencing cooling problems. In order to cool down the system, the engine room personnel performed the following: generator No.1 was started and put on line; the sea suction was transferred to the low suction; steam was applied to the high sea suction chest; and the generator cooling pump was replaced by the stand-by pump. Figure1. Sketch of the occurrence area Up until this time, the vessel had continued to use the high sea suction for cooling water. The cooling circuit water pressure, nevertheless, continued to fluctuate and sometimes the flow stopped. The generators were, in succession, brought off line and once cooled, were reconnected in order to maintain the electrical supply. At 1213, a generator alarm sounded; both lube oil and water jacket temperature readings on the three generators were observed to be abnormally high. Four minutes later, the main engine sea water cooling pressure began to fluctuate. Notwithstanding efforts deployed to resolve the cooling problem, the situation continued to worsen and the chief engineer advised the bridge team that a blackout could occur. At 1221, generator No.2 tripped off the main switchboard, as well as the preferential switchboard. About four minutes later, the vessel experienced a short-term blackout, which stopped the propulsion system. Electrical power was regained shortly thereafter, but not sufficiently in time to restart the main engine. Meanwhile, the master ordered a deck officer to the forecastle anchor station. As both anchors were frozen in ice, they could not be released and the vessel commenced drifting with the ice flow. The generators, which had all been brought on line, continued to sustain cooling problems; eventually they shut down. A second blackout occurred and, at 1241, the emergency generator started automatically. With neither propulsion nor the use of anchors, at approximately 1255, the GreatCentury was driven onto the BatturesPerron (reef). The vessel grounded in position 4628.392'N and 07214.862'W, some 1.5nautical miles upriver from Batiscan, Quebec. As the vessel lay athwartships to the ice flow on a 245G heading, the ice, which had accumulated on the starboard side of the vessel, drifted down stream. The open water condition was favourable to restarting a generator. As the sea water suction pressure built up, essential systems were restarted, and, at 1303, the main engine was operational. A sounding of the tanks revealed that the vessel had not sustained an ingress of water. At 1418, with the assistance of two tugs, the GreatCentury was refloated on the rising tide. Shortly thereafter, the vessel was anchored for inspection of its cooling system. A Transport Canada (TC) inspector, who had boarded the vessel prior to the refloating operation, began the inspection by examining both sea suction strainers; they were both found filled with ice. Using the ship's plans, the inspector informed the engine room personnel of the different means available to them to cool the onboard machinery while navigating in ice-infested waters. Hand-drawn diagrams were posted in way of the main and auxiliary cooling pumps starter panel to better inform the personnel (see photos2and3). Thereafter, the vessel returned to the port of Bcancour. An underwater survey of the hull revealed scratch and scuff marks on the paint, and the propeller sustained damage in way of the tips. Environmental Conditions At the time of departure, visibility was clear with northwesterly winds at some 10knots. Ice reconnaissance information available to the pilots and master, valid for the period 16:35Z to 17:45Z, indicated that the ice concentration was approximately6/10 of brash ice between the port of Bcancour and Batiscan. Inspection of the Cooling System The vessel had three sea chests that were vented and each was fitted with a flanged vent valve on top. However, there was no permanent steam or air line connected to them. The two sea chests on the starboard side were used as a sea-water inlet to cool the main engine and generators (seeFigure2). The high sea suction inlet was located on the ship's side, while the low suction was found on the ship's bottom in way of the centre line. Both are fitted with strainers and isolating valves and linked to a common pipe. The third sea chest is located on the port side and is used mainly for the ballast operations. The circuit allowed interconnection between the three suctions. The cooling system of the main engine is separate from the generators. To protect the generators from overheating, built-in protection devices would automatically shut down the engines. The vessel was not designed to re-circulate the cooling sea water for the main engine and generators when navigating in ice-infested waters. However, a connection is available between the aft peak, ballast tanks and No.4 cargo hold and the suction side of the main sea-water cooling system, but it was not considered as a recirculating internal cooling system. It is only usable as long as there is water in the tank from which water is being drawn, or as long as the tank can be refilled. In the vessel's ballasted condition at the time of the occurrence, these tanks contained a total of 24247metric tons of ballast water available for emergency cooling of the main engine and generators. Figure2. Sketch of cooling water arrangement of the GreatCentury The temperature of the main engine sea-water circulating system is controlled by a three-way valve installed on the outlet side of the coolers, enabling part of the water to return to the pump suction. The three-way valve is controlled by a thermo-pneumatic device that is linked to a probe at the outlet end of the air cooler, with a set point of 25C. According to the company's procedures manual, before arrival in the cold climate zone, the internal cooling system was to be tested by the duty engineer using the Ice Navigation Checklist form, No.CL-E09, and an entry is to be made in the bridge and engine room logs. The checklist includes the following items: Engine department is fully conversant with the vessel's internal cooling system Cross-over valve checked: open/closed All engine room valves of the internal cooling system checked: open/closed Bridge is informed that the vessel is operating using the internal cooling system All engine room heaters on Steering gear heaters on Engine room pressurized Internal cooling tanks filled to working level Fuel oil tanks' heaters on Four CL-E09 forms were completed and signed by the second engineer and were dated19, 20, 21/22 and 26February2003. The four documents showed that items Nos.5 and6, concerning the heaters, were not checked and that item No.8, on the 19and 21/22forms concerning the internal cooling tanks, was not checked. None of the forms indicated that a deficiency had been identified. Past Occurrences *Period from November1 to April30. **To date of occurrence, 26February2003. Before 1997, vessels experiencing cooling problems due to a blockage of the sea suction inlet by ice (in Canadian waters) were not systematically compiled in the TSB database. Nevertheless, the database revealed that, prior this date, 22significant occurrences were captured due to this recurring problem. During this period, there was an average of 2170movements per year between the months of December and March. Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone The Canadian waters north of 60N latitude are considered as Arctic ice-covered waters and, as such, the Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations apply in this region. In1996, TCmade an extensive revision to these regulations by introducing the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System, with the aim of reducing the risk of damage to vessels and the environment. The system is based on a calculated Ice Numeral(IN), which is a function of the quantity of hazardous ice present and the vessel's ability to navigate in ice. The INdetermines whether or not a ship may proceed, i.e. if the INis negative, clearance is not given. In contrast, traffic in eastern Canadian waters south of 60N latitude is regulated by the Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (ECAREG). Every ship of 500or more in gross tonnage shall provide, 24hours before entering the ECAREG zone, a report to a Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) Marine Communications and Traffic Services centre.5 The regulations, however, do not assess a vessel's ability to navigate in ice, nor is there a requirement for the vessel to report whether or not it carries an ice classification, including, inter alia, whether there is an available internal recirculation/cooling system for the machinery. Previous Safety Action It is not uncommon for a TC inspector to board a vessel and find that the engine room personnel is unaware of the fact that the ship may not be fitted with an internal re-circulating system and that when fitted with one, the crew may not have the required knowledge to activate the system. As a result of previous occurrences involving the blockage of sea inlets by ice, TC Marine Safety published two Ship Safety Bulletins (SSBs), (08/1989 and 09/1996), to serve as a reminder of some of the problems that may be encountered when operating in winter conditions. Additionally, to raise awareness of the issue, TC's Quebec Region, through a CCG notice, informed ships of the risks associated with ice navigation. The notice was issued before the commencement of 2002-2003 winter season and was to be repeated in subsequent winter navigation seasons. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recognizes that vessels that do not have an ice class notation are prone to sea suction problems and, as such, are more than likely to be involved in an accident. Consequently, IMO issued Circular504, Guidance on Design and Construction of Sea Inlets under Slush Ice Conditions, in1989, which provides guidance on the design and construction of sea suction inlets for vessels that navigate under slush ice conditions (seeFigure3). Figure3. IMO suggested arrangement (port side view, starboard side similar) On 02 March 1991, the BahiadelaHabana, a 10572gross tons general cargo vessel under the Cuban flag, was under way in the St.Lawrence River when the sea-inlet strainers became blocked with ice. While trying to clear the strainers, the engine room began to flood and the vessel blacked out. As a result of this occurrence, the TSB sent a Marine Safety Advisory6 to the vessel's owners, informing them of the problems associated with slush ice blocking sea suctions, as well as a copy of TC SSB08/1989 and IMO Circular504. On 27 December 2000, the CanmarForce, a container ship of 28176gross tons, sailing under the Panamanian flag, was under way in the St.Lawrence River, under the conduct of a pilot, bound for the Port of Montreal. At 1959 local time, near CapLevrard, the vessel experienced a power blackout and subsequently went aground. The vessel was refloated the next day with tug assistance. There was no apparent damage to the vessel or the environment. The vessel was equipped with an internal recirculating system and a steam line connected to the sea chest to reduce the risk of loss of pressure while operating in slush ice conditions, but they were not used. Engine room personnel were unaware that slush ice could block sea inlets and that the vessel was equipped with an internal recirculating system for use in such instances. As a result of this occurrence, the TSB sent a Marine Safety Information7 letter to the vessel's owners, informing them of the problems associated with slush ice blocking sea suctions.