Summary In the early morning hours of 03 May 2003, the Canadian Coast Guard Ship (CCGS) SirWilfredGrenfell was returning to St.John's after conducting engine trials just outside the harbour. At 0054 Newfoundland and Labrador daylight time, the fishing vessel GennyandDoug departed the dock in St.John's Harbour and proceeded outbound en route to the fishing grounds. The two vessels collided 1.4nautical miles northeast of the harbour entrance in thick fog. There was extensive damage to the wheelhouse and hull on the port side of the GennyandDoug, and minor damage to the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell's bow. Following the collision, both vessels returned to port where the GennyandDoug underwent repairs. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessels Description of Vessels The CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell is a Canadian Coast Guard search and rescue vessel of welded steel construction, similar in design to an offshore supply vessel. The vessel is equipped with a bow thruster, stern thruster and four engines driving twin screws, which enable it to maintain a speed of 15knots. The GennyandDoug is a longliner of welded steel construction. The wheelhouse is located about two-thirds of the way aft from the bow. The vessel is fitted with one engine and single screw, and has a maximum speed of about 10knots. History of the Voyage The CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell departed St.John's in the early afternoon hours of 02May2003, to conduct engine trials outside the harbour. The second mate came on watch at midnight2 along with a lookout and a helmsman. The visibility was poor due to fog, and the vessel's fog signal was reportedly sounded in accordance with the Collision Regulations. Around 0030, 03May2003, the officer of the watch (OOW) received a call from the engine room informing him that the trials had been completed and the vessel could head into port. The OOW relayed this information to the master, who came up to the wheelhouse and instructed him to head toward St.John's. The master, aware of the operational environment, then proceeded below deck. In accordance with the Vessel Traffic Services Zones Regulations, the OOW contacted St.John's Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) on the very high frequency (VHF) radio and reported that the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell was abeam Torbay Point (approximately seven miles from the entrance to the harbour at call point2N) at 0055. The master was not on the bridge and the vessel was proceeding at a speed of approximately 15knots. The GennyandDoug contacted St.John's MCTS at 0054, May3, informing them that it was departing Pier 19 in St.John's Harbour, bound for the fishing grounds off Newfoundland. This call was made seconds before the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell's initial call to St.John's MCTS. The master had the conduct of the vessel as it pulled away from the dock, and the conduct was then handed over to the mate. A deckhand was on watch in the wheelhouse acting as lookout. There was conflicting information as to whether the fog signal was sounded. The officers on the bridge were aware from MCTS communications that the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell was inbound. On arrival at the entrance to the harbour, they identified the vessel on their radar at a distance of about 3.5miles. The GennyandDoug checked in with St.John's MCTS at 0108 and reported that its position was abeam Fort Amherst, at the entrance to the harbour. After clearing the entrance to the harbour, the OOW set a course of 049 True. At 0115 the OOW mistakenly called the CCGS SirWilfredTempleman on the radio to arrange a port-to-port passage; the OOW believed that this was the vessel referred to in the MCTS communication. MCTS contacted the GennyandDoug and informed them that the correct name of the vessel was SirWilfredGrenfell, and that the vessel would soon be arriving at the checkpoint, at a radius of two miles from the harbour entrance. The GennyandDoug did not call the SirWilfredGrenfell. Some time after passing Fort Amherst, the captain went below to inform the crew about their watches and returned to the bridge about two minutes later. The GennyandDoug was proceeding at a speed of approximately 6 knots. About two miles from the entrance to the harbour, just after 0116, the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell checked in with St.John's MCTS and switched the radar from a six-mile range to a three-mile range. In acknowledging the call, MCTS advised the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell that the GennyandDoug had passed Fort Amherst at 0109. The OOW acknowledged the message. The OOW manually adjusted the anti-clutter controls in an attempt to alleviate the clutter on the starboard side of the display, but did not see the GennyandDoug on the radar. At 0117, the GennyandDoug contacted the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell on the VHF radio, and the OOWs on the two vessels communicated with each other for the first time. The OOW on the GennyandDoug relayed that he was altering course to starboard in order to give the vessels more room to pass port-to-port, and steadied up on a course of about 090True. The OOW on the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell acknowledged this communication and picked up the GennyandDoug on the radar for the first time, at approximately one-half mile. Realizing the vessels were converging quickly, the OOW on the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell immediately slowed the vessel down and gave the helmsman a starboard helm order. When the vessel did not respond as expected, he queried the helmsman as to whether the helm was to port. Some confusion ensued as to what helm order was requested and the helmsman applied port wheel. Seconds later, the port side lights and masthead light of the GennyandDoug were visible through the fog on the starboard bow. At the same time, the master of the GennyandDoug saw that the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell was coming right for them. There was no time for further collision-avoidance measures by the GennyandDoug. The OOW of the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell put the pitch full astern to avoid a collision. At 0119, the bow of the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell came in contact with the port side of the GennyandDoug in way of the superstructure. The collision occurred at 4734'30"north and 5239'05"west. After the initial impact, secondary contact was made in way of the shell plating further aft, near the waterline on the GennyandDoug. The collision caused extensive damage to the wheelhouse and lesser damage to the shell plating on the port side of the GennyandDoug. The CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell sustained a minimal amount of damage to her bow, comprising small dents and scratches. There was no injury and no pollution. The wind was from the southeast at 5to 10knots and the visibility was less than one-half mile. Following the collision, both vessels took all way off and the crew of the GennyandDoug donned immersion suits, sounded their tanks and checked compartments for any ingress of water. The master of the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell arrived on the bridge after the collision and instructed the crew to sound their tanks and prepare the rescue boat for launching. No ingress of water was detected in either vessel. After confirming with each other that neither vessel was taking on water, and ensuring that St.John's MCTS had been monitoring the events as they occurred via the VHF, both vessels returned to port to further assess damage. Certification and Experience CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell The master of the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell held a Master Mariner's Certificate, which was issued in 1996and endorsed pursuant to the Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1995 (STCW95) in 2001. The second mate held a Watchkeeping Mate's Certificate issued in June2000, and an STCW95, which was endorsed in2002. His experience as a ship's deck officer consisted of approximately 16months sea time over a two-year period on board a cruise ship, and about seven months sea time with the Canadian Coast Guard. Most of his Coast Guard sea time was spent on board the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell. The helmsman held a Bridge Watchman's Certificate issued in 1989and an STCW95 endorsement issued in2002, as required under the Coast Guard's Safety Management System and the Training Standard.3 He had worked for the Coast Guard off and on for about five of the last 10years on different vessels and was an experienced helmsman. He joined the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell three days prior to the collision and his experience at the wheel of this particular vessel consisted of about ten minutes, which he had acquired the previous day. The lookout held a Bridge Watchman's Certificate and an STCW95 endorsement, both of which were issued in July2002. He also held a Watchkeeping Mate's Certificate issued in1987. He had been working at sea intermittently for the past thirty years, and with the Coast Guard since1996. He joined the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell three days prior to the collision. GennyandDoug The master of the GennyandDoug held a Fishing Vessel Master Certificate issued in 1970and a Continued Proficiency endorsement issued in2003. He had been fishing on various vessels for 38years. The mate held a Fishing Master Class 3 Certificate issued in 1993 and a Continued Proficiency endorsement issued in 2003. At the time of the occurrence, he had been mate on the GennyandDoug for 10 years. The lookout held no certification and was not required to do so by regulations. He had served as a deck hand on board fishing vessels for several years, serving the last 12 to 14 years with the same master. Navigational Equipment The navigational equipment in use on the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell included two ARPA4 radars that were interfaced with Global Positioning Systems (GPS), two VHF radios, and an Electronic Chart System (ECS). The starboard radar was an X-band radar, which operates at a wavelength of 3.2cm and offers better detection of small targets and better resolution than the S-band. The starboard radar was used as the primary radar the morning of the occurrence. Reportedly, more clutter was observed on the radar than was expected with the weather conditions at the time. The OOW adjusted the anti-clutter controls, but he was unable to resolve the radar image satisfactorily. A post-occurrence technician's report showed the radar to be in good working order. The port radar was an S-band unit, which operates at a 10cm wavelength and is used primarily for long-range detection of targets offshore; it was located on the port side of the bridge. Upon inspection after the collision, an electronic technician confirmed the ship's reports that the radar would not tune properly. Despite several service calls since the radar was new, this was a frequent recurring problem with this radar. An S-band radar is not generally used as the primary radar close to land, as an X-band radar offers greater resolution and detection of smaller targets. The port radar was unreliable and was not used by the ship's complement as an aid to navigation. The ECS is a navigational device that is integrated with the radar, the GPS and the Gyro compass. The vessel's progress can be monitored on an electronic chart with a radar overlay. This system also provides a recording and playback feature that can be used to recreate a vessel's course and speed with precision (see Figure2). Safety Management System The CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell was certified under the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and, as such, had a safety management system (SMS) in place. The primary objectives of the ISM Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of life, and protection from damage to the environment. The ISM Code is designed to promote safety through the adoption of best practices established by the international rules and regulations, codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the IMO, the flag states and various maritime .industry organizations. Checklists were in place for various procedures and scenarios, such as procedures for pre-arrival into port and operating in restricted visibility. However, as a non-SOLAS5 vessel, the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell was not required to comply with the ISM Code. The Safety Management System on this vessel required the commanding officer6 to promote and implement a bridge resource management (BRM) philosophy. A BRM philosophy emphasizes the importance of teamwork, information exchange and coordination among bridge team members. Speed The speed of the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell prior to the collision, as obtained from the ECS recording, showed that the vessel was proceeding at a sustained speed of 15knots until two minutes prior to the collision. At one minute before the collision, it was proceeding at a speed of 11knots and, at the time of the collision, at about 6knots. The maximum speed of the GennyandDoug was about 12knots. Throughout the trip, it was proceeding at a speed of approximately 6knots. The conduct of a vessel at sea is governed by the Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions. In determining a safe speed, a navigator is required to take into consideration a number of factors, including the following:7 the state of visibility; the traffic density, including concentrations of fishing vessels or any other vessels; the characteristics, efficiency and limitations of the radar equipment, and the possibility that small vessels may not be detected by radar at an adequate range. Emergency manoeuvre tests performed during the sea trials of the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell indicated the vessel could achieve a crash stop (full ahead to full astern) in 53seconds while travelling a distance of 210m. The maximum speed attained during these trials was 15.5knots. Radio Communications Under the Vessel Traffic Services Zones Regulations, participation in the Vessel Traffic Services system is compulsory for larger vessels, which are required to maintain radio watch on the designated VHF frequency. One of the primary functions of the MCTS is to provide participating vessels with traffic and waterway information. This information is typically provided whenever a vessel reports in at a calling-in point. St.John's MCTS monitors VHF radio channel11 for vessels transiting the harbour and approaches. Tape recordings of all communications are kept. Vessels contact the MCTS at various call-in points and are provided with vessel traffic information in the area. Vessels approaching the north call in at 2Noff Torbay Point and then two miles from the entrance to the harbour. The GennyandDoug first contacted MCTS at 0054 to inform them of their imminent departure. This communication was immediately followed by a call from the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell, informing the MCTS that the vessel was on its way back to St.John's. At 0108, the GennyandDoug checked in with St.John's MCTS on the VHF at FortAmherst. The OOW of the GennyandDoug had been monitoring radio communications between MCTS and other traffic, and at 0115 made a call to the CCGS SirWilfredTempleman requesting a port-to-port passage. Recognizing the error in the transmission, MCTS contacted the GennyandDoug immediately and informed the crew that the correct name of the vessel was the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell. The GennyandDoug acknowledged the message. At 0116, the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell called MCTS to report that it was at the two-mile call-in point. The MCTS replied that the GennyandDoug had passed Fort Amherst at 0109, and the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell acknowledged the transmission. Immediately afterwards, at 0117, the GennyandDoug contacted the CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell and informed the crew that it was altering course to the east. The CCGS SirWilfredGrenfell acknowledged this transmission, and the next communication occurred immediately following the collision at 0119. St.John's MCTS does not have the capability to monitor vessel traffic by radar. In spite of the restricted visibility, neither vessel made a navigation safety call prefixed SECURITY on VHF radio channel16, to alert traffic in the area to their presence.