The average speed of KENTATLANTIC, calculated to be approximately 12.49 knots, between C.I.P's 7 and 8, was considered by the tug-skippers to be too fast for the safe manoeuvring of their vessels. ATLANTIC BEECH and ATLANTICTEAK had been ordered by the pilot to go alongside, with the aftermost tug to make fast on the port quarter. KENTATLANTIC passed the area between CAP. 8 and Rodney Terminal, without the tugs being in their respective positions. The pilot, instead of aborting the docking manoeuvre, continued to approach the area east of the berth as though the tugs were in their designated positions. The force of the bow thruster, acting to starboard, was not sufficient to overcome the force of the wind on the starboard bow. Dropping the port anchor did not stop the bow swinging to port, although its use may have reduced the impact and subsequent damage to the vessel and the dock. Between CIP 8 and the berth, the pilot ordered the tugs to exchange positions, that is, the forward tug was to go aft and the after tug was to go forward. These orders were not heard fully, by the bridge team, due to the method of communicating between the pilot and the tugs. The usual method of carrying out this position change, has been for the bow tug to drop back alongside, and for the stern tug to move out and forward to the bow position. On this occasion, the bow tug attempted a 360 degree turn to port. Carrying out this order, in the attempted manner, lost valuable time while the tugs were assuming the new positions. The pilot, knowing the wind conditions and that neither tug was in position, did not abort the berthing manoeuvre in sufficient time to avoid the striking. Off the berth, the strong northerly wind forced the vessel to sheer to port, overcoming the action of the bow thruster to starboard. The port anchor was used in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the striking. Neither of the tug skippers informed the pilot of their reason for not taking up their positions, the reason being that they both considered the speed of KENTATLANTIC to be too fast for safe manoeuvring.Analysis The average speed of KENTATLANTIC, calculated to be approximately 12.49 knots, between C.I.P's 7 and 8, was considered by the tug-skippers to be too fast for the safe manoeuvring of their vessels. ATLANTIC BEECH and ATLANTICTEAK had been ordered by the pilot to go alongside, with the aftermost tug to make fast on the port quarter. KENTATLANTIC passed the area between CAP. 8 and Rodney Terminal, without the tugs being in their respective positions. The pilot, instead of aborting the docking manoeuvre, continued to approach the area east of the berth as though the tugs were in their designated positions. The force of the bow thruster, acting to starboard, was not sufficient to overcome the force of the wind on the starboard bow. Dropping the port anchor did not stop the bow swinging to port, although its use may have reduced the impact and subsequent damage to the vessel and the dock. Between CIP 8 and the berth, the pilot ordered the tugs to exchange positions, that is, the forward tug was to go aft and the after tug was to go forward. These orders were not heard fully, by the bridge team, due to the method of communicating between the pilot and the tugs. The usual method of carrying out this position change, has been for the bow tug to drop back alongside, and for the stern tug to move out and forward to the bow position. On this occasion, the bow tug attempted a 360 degree turn to port. Carrying out this order, in the attempted manner, lost valuable time while the tugs were assuming the new positions. The pilot, knowing the wind conditions and that neither tug was in position, did not abort the berthing manoeuvre in sufficient time to avoid the striking. Off the berth, the strong northerly wind forced the vessel to sheer to port, overcoming the action of the bow thruster to starboard. The port anchor was used in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the striking. Neither of the tug skippers informed the pilot of their reason for not taking up their positions, the reason being that they both considered the speed of KENTATLANTIC to be too fast for safe manoeuvring. The speed of KENTATLANTIC was too fast for a safe manoeuvre as the tugs attempted to come alongside the vessel, where the hard chine represented a further hazard. The pilot did not abort the berthing early enough when the tugs were not in position. Valuable time was lost in repositioning the tugs in the 3 cables before the selected berth was reached. The pilot knew the wind conditions off the berth and the uncertainty of the tide due to freshets. However he did not ensure that the tugs were in position and made fast, or at least in position, in good time. The pilot and tug skippers had worked together successfully in the past. The use of the port anchor before the striking may have reduced the force of the impact and lessened the amount of damage to the vessel and the dock. The striking was not immediately reported nor was the reason given for returning to an anchorage position.Findings The speed of KENTATLANTIC was too fast for a safe manoeuvre as the tugs attempted to come alongside the vessel, where the hard chine represented a further hazard. The pilot did not abort the berthing early enough when the tugs were not in position. Valuable time was lost in repositioning the tugs in the 3 cables before the selected berth was reached. The pilot knew the wind conditions off the berth and the uncertainty of the tide due to freshets. However he did not ensure that the tugs were in position and made fast, or at least in position, in good time. The pilot and tug skippers had worked together successfully in the past. The use of the port anchor before the striking may have reduced the force of the impact and lessened the amount of damage to the vessel and the dock. The striking was not immediately reported nor was the reason given for returning to an anchorage position. The speed of the vessel was considered to be too fast, by both tug skippers while attempting to go alongside. This safety consideration was heightened by the hard chine design of KENT ATLANTIC. The tug masters did not make known to the pilot, their main concern, that the vessel was moving too fast for safe manoeuvring alongside. The pilot, knowing the weather conditions off the berth, did not ensure that the tugs were in position and made fast, or at least in position, in sufficient time to permit a preplanned turning and berthing.Causes and Contributing Factors The speed of the vessel was considered to be too fast, by both tug skippers while attempting to go alongside. This safety consideration was heightened by the hard chine design of KENT ATLANTIC. The tug masters did not make known to the pilot, their main concern, that the vessel was moving too fast for safe manoeuvring alongside. The pilot, knowing the weather conditions off the berth, did not ensure that the tugs were in position and made fast, or at least in position, in sufficient time to permit a preplanned turning and berthing.