Summary The bulk carrier ATLANTIC HURON was proceeding eastwardly across Lake Erie at night. The speed was 12 knots and visibility was good. As the vessel neared Pelee Passage light, the course was altered to starboard for a port-to-port passage with an approaching vessel. Further course alterations to starboard were made to provide more sea room. In doing so, the ATLANTIC HURON struck the Canadian Coast Guard vessel GRIFFON, which was at anchor. Both vessels were damaged but there was no pollution. Four people sustained minor injuries on board the GRIFFON. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessels Description of the Vessels ATLANTIC HURON The vessel is a five-hold Great Lakes and coastal self-unloading bulk carrier. The crew accommodation, navigating bridge, and machinery space are located aft. The vessel regularly carries cargo between ports within the Great Lakes and the eastern seaboard of Canada. GRIFFON The vessel is primarily used for ice-breaking and to service navigational aids, including light- station re-supply and maintenance, in the upper St. Lawrence River and in Lake Ontario and Lake Erie. History of the Voyages ATLANTIC HURON Upon completion of cargo operations at 2040 eastern daylight time (EDT),[3] on September 24, the ATLANTIC HURON, fully loaded with 25 250 tonnes of wheat and soya pellets and trimmed by the stern, departed Windsor, Ontario, for Halifax, Nova Scotia. The vessel proceeded downbound in the Detroit River. The master had the con of the vessel. No pilot was on board, nor was any required. At 2315, the vessel cleared East Outer light, which is located at the entrance to the Detroit River, and altered to port to make good a course of 096T to fairway buoy P which marks the western entrance of Pelee Passage. The speed of the vessel was 12 knots (kn) and there was a slight list to starboard associated with the settling of cargo. The master then retired from the bridge and left the conduct of the vessel with one of his officers. At 2350, the third officer and the wheelsman were relieved by the second officer and another wheelsman. At the changeover of the watch, the vessel's position was determined by using the electronic chart system (ECS), which was overlayed with an automated radar plotting aid (ARPA) image. The vessel was on automatic pilot. The officer of the watch (OOW) had been informed by the third officer that the vessel CSL NIAGARA was upbound and had called in while at the calling- in-point (CIP) near Southeast Shoal. On the bridge, two very high frequency (VHF) radiotelephones were tuned to channels 12 and 16. The OOW tracked the CSL NIAGARA on the ECS and determined that it would pass well clear of the ATLANTICHURON. There was no other downbound traffic. At 0015, the master checked the ECS display in his cabin and looked out his forward accommodation window. He saw several lights, including those of the CSL NIAGARA and two other vessels, one just to the south of Pelee Passage light and the other beyond Southeast Shoal light. He also saw a vessel lit up by many lights near Pelee Passage light. He assessed that since there was no vessel traffic congestion south of the light, he would not be needed to assist on the bridge and went to sleep. At 0036, the OOW heard the RESERVE issue a SCURIT call on VHF channel 16 that it was westbound and 30 minutes from Southeast Shoal. At this time, the ATLANTIC HURON was eight nautical miles (M), or approximately 38 minutes, west of fairway buoy P. The OOW set about to determine where the RESERVE would be encountered when a second vessel, the LADY SANDALS,[4] was detected ahead of the RESERVE and near Southeast Shoal light. The OOW tracked the LADY SANDALS using the ECS and determined that it would be encountered near and to the east of fairway buoy P. At 0108, the ATLANTIC HURON was approximately 1.4 M, or seven minutes, west of fairway buoy P. The OOW called the LADY SANDALS on VHF channel 16 and requested they switch to channel 8. They agreed to a port-to-port passage and no other information was exchanged. The OOW then ordered the wheelsman to disengage the autopilot and to hand steer the vessel on a course of 099T. The speed of the ATLANTIC HURON as recorded by the ECS was 12 kn. The LADYSANDALS also made a course alteration to starboard to provide more room for a port- to-port passage. The OOW reportedly noticed on the ECS that the LADY SANDALS maintained its course along the recommended 302T course line, leaving little room for the two vessels to safely pass each other. When the OOW looked out through the bridge front window to see the LADYSANDALS, he saw another vessel (later identified to be the GRIFFON off the starboard bow beyond buoy E9). However, he experienced difficulty in identifying whether the vessel was at anchor or under way. No target was observed on the ECS that would indicate the vessel's presence. At 0110, the OOW ordered a course of 110T. Because the vessel was slow to respond, the OOW ordered 120T. The rudder angle indicators were by now at 20 degrees starboard, but the vessel's heading was only changing slowly. Not satisfied with the rate of turn and concerned about a possible collision with the LADY SANDALS, the OOW ordered the helm hard to starboard to accelerate the rate of change of heading. With the helm hard over, the vessel began to shudder. When the OOW saw that the LADY SANDALS would pass by safely, the helm was ordered to midships. The vessel's heading, however, continued to alter to starboard and towards the GRIFFON, which the OOW now realized was at anchor. The vessel passed close by and north of buoy E9. Aware that a striking was now imminent, the OOW ordered the helm hard to port. He also sounded the whistle and the general alarm after he located the unlit switches in the darkened wheelhouse with the use of a flashlight. At 0116, the bow of the ATLANTIC HURON struck the port bow of the GRIFFON in position 41 51' 15 N and 8234' 26 W, at an approximate angle of 80. The striking displaced the GRIFFON 1.6 cables[5] south-southeast from its original position. No injuries were reported on board the ATLANTIC HURON. Immediately after the striking, the officers and crew of both vessels took emergency action. The ATLANTIC HURON called the GRIFFON three times on VHF channel 16 before it responded. By 0140, both vessels had reported the striking to Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) in Sarnia. Both vessels remained in the area until each was able to get under way safely. GRIFFON The OOW was alone on the bridge as the quartermaster made his fire rounds. The vessel was at anchor approximately four cables east of Pelee Passage light and had reported its position to MCTS at 1334. Its fore and aft anchor lights were lit, as were the lights of the flight deck, poop deck, main deck and forecastle, and on the bridge deck at each side of the vessel's funnel. Some of the lights on the upper decks were not lit to prevent light reflection on the wheelhouse windows from interfering with the ability to maintain a lookout. Two floodlights were also lit to provide extra lighting on the main deck. Its main engines were on a 30-minute standby. When ATLANTIC HURON and the LADY SANDALS were approximately 5 to 6 M west and east of the GRIFFON, respectively, the time of which was estimated to be about 0050, the OOW began to track the two approaching vessels on the ECS. The OOW determined that the closest point of approach (CPA) of the ATLANTIC HURON was four cables. The CPA was similar to that of other vessels which had passed by previously when the GRIFFON was at anchor. The OOW tracked the LADY SANDALS on the ECS proceeding along the recommended 302otdm;T course line. At 0108, the OOW monitored the VHF call between the ATLANTIC HURON and the LADY SANDALS on channels 16 and 8. After the call, the OOW noticed on the ECS that both vessels altered to starboard. The LADY SANDALS moved north of the recommended 302 course line. The CPA of the ATLANTIC HURON reduced to three cables and the OOW became concerned. When the CPA of the ATLANTIC HURON was two cables, the OOW informed the master of the situation. Under the master's instructions, the port searchlight was turned on to raise the attention of the ATLANTIC HURON. The heading of the approaching vessel continued to change towards the GRIFFON. With a striking now imminent, the OOW attempted to sound the general alarm and to make an announcement on the vessel's public address system but was unsuccessful. He had difficulty locating the switches in the darkness of the bridge and he could not hear from his position on the bridge if a public address announcement was being broadcast. One of the passageway doors leading from the bridge deck to the navigating bridge deck was a fire door, and both doors were closed. After the striking, the general alarm sounded on the vessel and the carbon dioxide (CO2) release siren-type alarm sounded on the bridge. Four persons sustained minor injuries on board the vessel as a result of the striking; these ranged from head trauma to contact injuries suffered by watchkeepers at their work stations. Two of the injured sought medical attention. Weather Weather observations taken on board the GRIFFON and taken by Environment Canada at Southeast Shoal, before and after the occurrence, indicated the following: winds backed from northerly to northwesterly and were 15 to 20 kn; visibility was greater than 10 km; and there was no precipitation. Navigation in Occurrence Area Pelee Passage is the main shipping channel for commercial vessels crossing western Lake Erie (see Figure 1). The fixed light is situated on a pier south of the light buoys at the north end of Middle Ground Shoal and is shown from a circular tower which extends up from a 14-m square helipad. A radar beacon (RACON) is fitted above the light. Near the eastern entrance to Pelee Passage is a voluntary CIP located south of Southeast Shoal light. Vessels which arrive at the CIP may make a report to MCTS in Sarnia on VHF radiotelephone channel 12, but they are not required to do so. There are two printed charts available for Pelee Passage--Canadian Hydrographic Service Chart 2123 and United States National Oceans and Atmospheric Administration Chart 14830. The scales of the charts are the same (1:100,000) and are the largest scale available for that geographic area. Figure 1.Sketch of the occurrence area Reporting to Marine Communications and Traffic Services The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) established MCTS centres to facilitate the safe and efficient movement of marine traffic and to safeguard the environment by providing, inter alia, traffic information, navigational safety information, radar navigational assistance, and space management services. The information is provided to assist masters in the safe conduct of vessels, and there is no intention on the part of the CCG to attempt to navigate or manoeuvre vessels from a shore station.[6] Canadian waters in western Lake Erie, which includes Pelee Passage, are within a voluntary reporting area which has radio coverage only and a voluntary CIP near Southeast Shoal for upbound and downbound vessels. Because the CIP is voluntary, not all vessels participate by making a report. In the 1980's, the CCG proposed regulations which would have made the CIP near Southeast Shoal mandatory. Representatives of shipping companies which operated in the Great Lakes objected to the proposal and a voluntary CIP was established. Shipping companies do require their vessels to make a report when at the CIP or to issue a SCURIT call when approaching the CIP. However, all commercial vessels do not necessarily participate in this reporting. The CCG is involved with a number of initiatives to address the implementation of an Automatic Identification System (AIS)[7] for Canada in order to enhance the safety and efficiency of vessel navigation with respect to the East and West coasts and the lower St. Lawrence River. Internationally-adopted AIS carriage requirements stipulate that AIS be fitted on certain ships through a phased implementation program from 1 July 2002 to 1 July 2008.[8] It is anticipated that in 2002, the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation will have an AIS operational within the Seaway system. An AIS transponder will be mandatory on all commercial vessels passing through the Seaway. The location of the occurrence was outside of the seaway boundaries controlled by the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation. Electronic Chart System Used Aboard The ECS data log files retrieved by the TSB from both vessels contain a record of the electronic information from both external sensing devices and screen presentations. In this instance, the data log was updated every 10 seconds and each log entry contained the following information: date, time, vessel latitude, vessel longitude, position source, vessel heading, heading source, vessel course made good, vessel speed made good, number of satellites in use, and number of satellites in view. In addition, log files of the GRIFFON contained information on depth of water, wind direction, and wind speed. From the data log files of both vessels, no major system malfunction was recorded by ECS, and past tracks data were logged without interruption at the set 10-second intervals. ATLANTIC HURON According to the data log files, the vessel entered Pelee Passage at a speed over the ground of 12 kn. At 0110, with the heading at approximately 102T and falling to starboard, a cross track deviation warning was activated.[9] The warning was acknowledged five seconds after it was activated. At 0113, this warning became an alarm and the vessel's heading steadied at about 125T. At 0114, the vessel's heading went to starboard and continued to do so right up to the time of the striking. At 0116, when the vessel struck the GRIFFON, its heading was at about 152T, approximately 30 degrees beyond the recommended course line, and its speed was 11 kn. At 0118, the cross track deviation visual alarm had been acknowledged. GRIFFON The data log files reported a stationary position at approximately 4151' 15 N and 8234' 26 W, and at the time of the striking,[10] the vessel's heading went from about 50T to about 158T in 60 seconds. The momentum of the striking was such that the vessel was displaced 1.6 cables south-southeast of its original position. Damage to the Vessels and the Environment The ATLANTIC HURON sustained damage to the starboard bow, and the shell plating above the spar deck had a fracture approximately 3.6 m long. The GRIFFON sustained damage to the port bow above the ice-belt up to the bulwarks. There was also damage to the forecastle deck, boatswain store, motor generator and buoy winch compartments, and the buoy workshop. There was no report of a release of pollutants. Vessel Certification Both vessels were crewed, equipped, and operated in accordance with existing regulations. Personnel History ATLANTIC HURON The master had been a seafarer for about 26 years, all but two of which were with Canada Steamship Lines Inc. He was issued Master, Inland Waters and Master, Local Voyage certificates in 1984 and 1999, respectively. He had been the master on board the ATLANTIC HURON for the last two and one-half years and rejoined the vessel on 1 September 2000. The OOW had been a seafarer since 1973 and had worked in a number of deck and engine rating positions on a variety of vessels. Most of his seafaring career had been spent on the Great Lakes. In 1989, he was issued a Watchkeeping Mate certificate. His first assignment as a third officer was in 1993 and he continued to work as third or second officer on a number of vessels until 1997, where he has since been a second officer on board the ATLANTIC HURON. He rejoined the vessel on 4 September 2000. The OOW was first introduced to Electronic Chart Precise Integrated Navigation System (ECPINS) in 1992. He had no formal training on the use of ECS but became familiar with its use by self-study and practice. He had taken two bridge resource management training courses which incorporated the use of ECS. The wheelsman, who had been working at sea for about 40 years, joined the vessel as an able seaman and wheelsman in 1997. He rejoined the vessel on 31 July 2000. GRIFFON The master had been employed with the CCG since graduating from the CCG College in 1970 and was issued a CCG Command Certificate in 1973. He had been sailing as master on different vessels since 1985. He was issued a Master Mariner certificate in 1991 and had been sailing as master on the GRIFFON since 1993. The OOW had been employed with the CCG since graduating from the CCG College in 1986. He was issued First Mate, Home Trade and Master, Inland Waters certificates in 1989 and 1995, respectively. He had been working on the GRIFFON as second officer since 1992.