Summary On the morning of 14September2000 shortly after departing her berth at Swartz Bay, B.C., the passenger/vehicle ferry SpiritofVancouverIsland increased to a customary speed and attempted to overtake the pleasure craft StarRuby in the 460m long narrow section of the buoyed channel of Colburne Passage. Neither vessel took effective collision-avoidance measures. A collision resulted. The pleasure craft sustained considerable damage and sank. The two persons aboard the StarRuby were recovered and transported to a hospital, where they subsequently succumbed to their injuries. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessels Description of the Vessels The SpiritofVancouverIsland is a conventionally configured twin-screw ro-ro vehicle/passenger ferry with a service speed of 21knots. She is fitted with twin controllable-pitch propellers, twin Becker rudders, two bow thrusters and a bulbous bow. The two propeller shafts, each driving a controllable-pitch propeller, are controlled individually by single-lever controls. The levers are graduated in 10 speed settings both ahead and astern. The StarRuby is a pleasure craft of fibreglass construction. Its Vee hull includes hard chines, permitting the vessel to plane at speeds greater than 15knots. The maximum speed attainable by the vessel is approximately 25knots. History of the Voyages StarRuby On 14 September 2000, the StarRuby was on the third day of a recreational cruise through Canadian waters from the vessel's home port of PortAngeles, WA. The route taken by the StarRuby took her north through Iroquois Passage into Colburne Passage, past the British Columbia Ferry Corporation (BCFC) Terminal at Swartz Bay, Vancouver Island, toward Satellite Channel. After having spent two nights in Victoria, B.C., the operator and his guest were travelling that day to Thetis Island for the weekend. The StarRuby was travelling independently of other pleasure craft in the vicinity. It entered Colburne Passage from Iroquois Passage in the company of several other pleasure craft in line astern. The engines were set in a position which gave her an estimated speed through the water of 9knots. The vessel was being conned from the lower control station. Within Colburne Passage, the vessels altered to port toward the buoyed channel which separates Piers Island from Vancouver Island. Reportedly, the StarRuby continued past the multiple berths of the BCFC ferry terminal toward Gosse Passage, before resuming its position an estimated 100m astern of the pleasure craft ahead (seeFigure1). SpiritofVancouverIsland The ferry SpiritofVancouverIsland was secured at Swartz Bay ferry terminal berth No1 since her arrival at 10352 that morning. The vessel was secured port-side-to at her berth, parallel to the shore, with her stern to the loading ramp on a heading of 321True (T). Since her arrival, the ferry had discharged and re-loaded vehicles and passengers and was preparing for its scheduled 1100 departure. At 1104, the SpiritofVancouverIsland received final clearance to sail from BCFC administration ashore. At the time of departure, the ferry's bridge team comprised the master assisted by the second officer and quartermaster. As the ferry left her berth, the third officer arrived on the bridge. Before departure, the second officer made a visual check of Colburne Passage, advising the master of the presence of pleasure craft in the area, indicating to him visually the three vessels of greatest concern. The master both observed and acknowledged this information. These vessels were off the ferry's starboard beam, heading in the same direction as that to be travelled by the SpiritofVancouverIsland. At departure, one vessel, later identified to be the StarRuby, was observed on an approximate bearing of 010T, some 45 on the starboard bow, at an estimated range of 4-5cables (740 - 925m). Figure1. Area of the occurrence Within the enclosed bridge of the ferry, the master, located at the port bridge-wing console, manoeuvred his vessel away from the berth. A signal of one prolonged blast of the ship's whistle was sounded to indicate the vessel's departure. Once clear, steering was transferred to the central steering position, and the quartermaster was ordered to steer 325True Gyro (TG). The second officer, in addition to monitoring the vessel's progress, recorded the time of departure as 1105 in the bridge log and reported the vessel's departure to Victoria Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) on VHF channel11. Victoria MCTS logs captured the time of the VHF departure call as 1106:45. Once clear of the berth, the master of the SpiritofVancouverIsland moved to the central console and increased the throttle setting to position No6 ahead. In an attempt to warn the adjacent pleasure craft, the master sounded seven blasts on the ship's whistle. Following departure, the engine-room data log recorded a maximum pitch reading of 71.1% at 1107:36. From the central console, the master utilized parallel index lines pre-set in the memory of the radar as a visual aid to guiding his vessel through the buoyed channel 6cables (1100m) distant from the terminal. The channel is both the narrowest and shallowest portion of the passage along the routing toward Tsawwassen and only 460m in length. The pre-determined optimum course for this transit is 300T to maintain a distance of 2cables (370m) from the Vancouver Island shore. Three pleasure craft on the ferry's starboard bow were making toward this same channel. In allowance for the pleasure craft ahead and to starboard of the ferry, the master initiated his course alteration to port in advance of the usual way-point, instructing the quartermaster to steer 303TG. To indicate this manoeuvre to vessel traffic in the vicinity, he sounded two short blasts on the ferry's whistle. This course would keep the SpiritofVancouverIsland the proven safe distance off the shallow water hazard on the ferry's port side. In an attempt to understand the intentions of the pleasure craft ahead, a second signal of seven short and rapid blasts was sounded on the ferry's whistle. In response to these sound signals, MissChief, the lead pleasure craft that had already entered the buoyed channel, altered its course to the south to stand off the Green Beacon (LL248.1) which marks the southwest side of the channel. The pleasure craft KanaOII, astern of the MissChief and approaching buoy U18 (LL 248), initiated a round turn to starboard to clear the channel for the ferry. The StarRuby was observed to maintain her course and speed, proceeding into the buoyed channel. The SpiritofVancouverIsland accelerated through the water, increasing to a speed greater than that of the StarRuby. With the two vessels on a slightly converging course, the distance between them closed. The master of the ferry observed that the StarRuby began to drift to port and a third seven-blast signal was given. When the two vessels were both within the buoyed channel, an estimated 40m between them, the StarRuby was observed to make an abrupt course alteration to port from her position fine on the ferry's starboard bow, crossing into the path of the SpiritofVancouverIsland and disappearing from the bridge line-of-sight. The master was seated at the central console port chair; the second officer was viewing from the starboard side of the bridge. At 1110, the third officer moved to the central console and selected the engine 'Emergency Manoeuvre' control to bypass the engines computerized control program. The engine controls were then moved to the full astern position by the master and the ship's whistle sounded. The two vessels collided. The SpiritofVancouverIsland bridge log records the time of collision as1111, 14September2000. (Communication logs of VHF channel16 at Victoria MCTS record the first call, reporting the collision, being received at 1110:30 from a pleasure craft. The ferry's engine room data recorder logs the time of maximum astern pitch as being1110:49). The Collision The collision occurred some 6.2cables (1148m) from the Swartz Bay Terminal, within a triangle of water bounded by red buoys U16, U18 and Colburne Passage FeG South Beacon, in position 4841'53 N, 12325'23W. The bow of the SpiritofVancouverIsland came in contact with the port side of the StarRuby, rolling the pleasure craft to starboard through an arc of approximately 100. As the ferry continued forward through the water, the hull of the StarRuby, between the port chine and keel, came into contact with the flared hull plating on the ferry's starboard side until the flow of water between the two vessels pushed the StarRuby clear of the SpiritofVancouverIsland and the pleasure craft returned to the upright position in a swamped condition. Rescue Operation Immediately after the collision, the SpiritofVancouverIsland sounded three prolonged blasts on the whistle and a similar signal on the General Alarm bells, directing the crew to rescue boat stations. Victoria MCTS received a call on VHF channel16 from the pleasure craft MissChief at 1112:25, indicating that the vessel was alongside the StarRuby. At 1114:25, the SpiritofVancouverIsland reported to MCTS on VHF channel16 that her first rescue boat was away. The Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) Victoria was contacted by MCTS at 1116 and additional resources were tasked. The SpiritofVancouverIsland volunteered only minimal communication to MCTS after the collision. This led to an initial confusion at both MCTS and RCC in their attempt to determine the location of the collision as well as the vessels involved. Meanwhile, the heavily damaged StarRuby remained upright, the superstructure awash, with the stern completely submerged. By 1122, the operator of the pleasure craft was able to extricate himself through a window on the port side of the cabin of that vessel. He was not wearing eyeglasses and appeared disoriented. He communicated to the rescuers that his hearing was impaired and that he was not travelling alone. However, it was not clear to those on scene exactly how many persons remained aboard before the operator was transferred to shore for medical attention. The Canadian Coast Guard Cutter (CCGC) Skua, stationed at Ganges, Saltspring Island, was tasked to the scene by RCC and designated On-Scene Co-ordinator (OSC). The Skua, together with the station's Rigid Hull Inflatable, got underway without delay and advised RCC at 1121:03. Concerned that the StarRuby might sink, the rescue boat from the SpiritofVancouverIsland towed the pleasure craft into adjacent shallow water, while rescuers continued in their attempts to locate additional persons. At 1147, RCC was informed that a second person had been recovered from the StarRuby. This person was immediately put into the care of emergency health services (EHS) personnel on scene and transferred to shore for medical attention. The CCGC Skua arrived on scene at 1152. Although two persons were recovered from the StarRuby, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) divers made an underwater search while the Coast Guard conducted a sweep search in order to confirm that all persons aboard had been accounted for. No additional person was located. Injuries to Persons The operator of the StarRuby sustained injuries when, as a result of the collision, he came into contact with rigid objects within the cabin of his vessel. Shortly after he was able to free himself from the pleasure craft, he suffered cardiac arrest and subsequently died while in the care of EHS personnel while en route to the hospital. His guest was unconscious when rescued. She did not regain consciousness and died three days later. One crew member from the SpiritofVancouverIsland, who was in the ferry's rescue boat, suffered minor lacerations while attempting to gain entry through the cabin windows of the StarRuby. Damage to the Vessels and Environment The SpiritofVancouverIsland sustained abrasions to the starboard corner of the main vehicle deck where it extends beyond the forward doors. An indentation 19mm deep was observed in the 16mm thick hull plating between frames173 and 180below the waterline. The StarRuby sustained major damage. The port side of the hull, forward of the beam and above the waterline, was significantly fractured and torn away, found hanging only from its forward edge. The port aft portion of the superstructure was torn away, leaving a gaping opening into the cabin. Below the waterline, between the port chine and the keel, the hull was gouged and torn open as a result of contact with a scupper pipe extending from the hull of the SpiritofVancouverIsland adjacent to the starboard anchor pocket. There was no discernable pollution. Vessel Personnel Certification and Personnel History The SpiritofVancouverIsland was properly certificated, equipped and crewed in accordance with existing regulations. Additionally, the BCFC and the vessel held certification in accordance with International Safety Management Code (ISM) requirements. The master and the second officer had extensive seagoing experience, with a minimum of six years on ferries operating from the BCFC Swartz Bay Terminal. The StarRuby had passed US Coast Guard Courtesy Examinations in1999 and2000. The operator of the StarRuby was an experienced recreational boater and had taken a US Power Squadron BoatSafe course in May1999. He was elderly and wore glasses fitted with corrective lenses, together with hearing aids to compensate for significant hearing loss in both ears. Weather and Current Information At the time of the occurrence, weather conditions as recorded in the bridge log of the SpiritofVancouverIsland were light airs, rippled seas and haze. The current in Colburne Passage leading up to the time of the occurrence was flowing in a ESE'ly direction at a maximum speed of knot. Radars The SpiritofVancouverIsland is equipped with radars that have Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) capabilities. Due to the limitations of ARPA while the vessel was accelerating and altering course and, as the visibility was good, no ARPA target was acquired. As a result of the collision, the radar aboard the StarRuby was damaged to a degree where it could not be determined whether it was in use at the time of the occurrence. Communications and Marine Traffic Services The collision occurred within Vancouver Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) Control Sector No1. In this sector, traffic is monitored by Victoria MCTS on VHF channel11, the designated frequency for the area. The SpiritofVancouverIsland has multiple VHF radiotelephones on designated frequencies, simultaneously monitoring BCFC VHF radio traffic, VHF channel 16 and MCTS 'Victoria Traffic' on VHF channel11. The vessel communicated in accordance with the applicable MCTS reporting requirements.3 Neither the KanaOII nor MissChief was monitoring 'Victoria Traffic' on VHF channel11 nor were they required to by regulation. As a result, neither vessel heard the ferry make her departure call to 'Victoria Traffic' on VHF channel11. The radio equipment aboard StarRuby was damaged to a degree where it was not possible to determine if it was activated or, if so, what frequency was being monitored. There was no radio communication between the ferry and the pleasure craft prior to the collision. MCTS Radar Coverage MCTS has radar coverage of these waters from antennae located at Mount Newton on Vancouver Island and Mount Parke on Mayne Island. The SpiritofVancouverIsland can be observed on the MCTS radar video recording upon departure from the terminal. However, the area of the occurrence is within a radar shadow area. Therefore, no track was recorded leading to the collision. The StarRuby was equipped with a radar reflector. Being 12miles distant from the MCTS radar antennae, together with the vessel's size and poor radar reflective properties, her track was not recorded by MCTS radar equipment. Nautical Charts Both vessels carried US and Canadian charts and nautical publications. Charts and notebooks recovered from the StarRuby indicate that the operator had planned his passage to Thetis Island in advance but he was not a frequent visitor to the area. There are three Canadian Hydrographic Service charts published which show tracks indicating BCFC ferry routes. However, none of the charts carried aboard the StarRuby (either U.S. or Canadian) included tracks to indicate Swartz Bay as a terminus for ferry routes. The electronic Garmin G chart for the Strait of Georgia that was available to the operator indicates the Washington State ferry route between Anacortes, WA and Sidney, B.C. but not the BCFC ferry routes converging at Swartz Bay. Manoeuvring Characteristics (Speeds and Stopping Distances) Manoeuvring data for the SpiritofVancouverIsland, as determined during her sea trials, indicate that a 'Crash Stop' from an initial speed of 11.9knots would result in a head reach of 431m, with the vessel being stopped in the water, in an elapsed time of 97seconds. This information, while formulated, was not readily available to the bridge team on the ferry. During the vessel's speed trials, no speed comparisons were made with the graduated engine control settings, nor is there documentation showing what actual speed is achieved at the No6 setting ahead. However, subsequent to the collision, observation on board the vessel determined that the No6 setting gives a speed of approximately 13knots. Also, analysis of MCTS data on the day of the occurrence, and comparative data from previous trips, shows that the SpiritofVancouverIsland was travelling at approximately 12to 14knots at the time of the collision. The track of the StarRuby was not recorded by MCTS radar equipment, hence her speed was not accurately established. Subsequent to the collision, the vessel's differential global positioning system (DGPS) and electronic map system were examined by the manufacturer in the hope of retrieving track data. However, water had found its way into both units and shorted out the internal batteries. This water damage, coupled with the physical damage sustained, caused the loss of the non-volatile memory. During inspection of the StarRuby wreckage, the engine controls were found in the 'astern' position, the power setting was 'atidle', and the rudders in the hard-to-port position. The engine tachometers at the vessel's upper control station were observed to be stuck at maximum rpm for each motor. Bridge Layout SpiritofVancouverIsland Photo3. Bridge layout - Spirit of Vancouver Island The ferry makes use of an integrated bridge design which takes into consideration ergonomic principles. The conning officer sits in the port seat at the central console and has access to, among other instruments, radar, engine controls, and communication equipment. The navigator sits immediately to starboard of the conning officer and uses a radar and VHF radio to advise the conning officer of navigation information (dangers to navigation, traffic, radio communications, etc.). Visibility forward and to each side of the bridge has been optimized through extensive use of glass. To port and starboard of the console are pedestal-mounted gyro compass repeaters, each fitted with a pelorus. The vessel is steered from a helm position, manned by a quartermaster, located at the centreline abaft the console. Helm and propulsion controls are also located on consoles on each enclosed bridge wing, used primarily for docking and undocking. The gyro compass error was nil. StarRuby The StarRuby is fitted with a radar reflector and has both upper and lower control stations. At the time of the accident, the lower control station was in use. The upper control station, located above the main cabin, is situated on the vessel's centreline in an open command bridge. This station, although fitted with a fabric 'bimini' top, was otherwise open. The lower control station is located at the forward end of the enclosed main cabin, with the main console on the starboard side. It was equipped with, among other equipment, an autopilot, two VHF radiotelephones, radar, and a DGPS integrated with electronic maps. From this control station, the view of adjacent waters was significantly restricted by overhead cupboards that had been suspended from the deck head at the forward end of the control station. The cupboards were mounted transversely from the port side to the vessel's centreline. The addition of these cupboards significantly impaired visibility to port. Additionally, the windows of the main cabin, port, starboard, and aft, were fitted with metal venetian blinds. The blinds on the port side of the main cabin were in the lowered and closed position, impairing visibility to port. For an operator at the lower control station seated at the helm, the arc of visibility from dead ahead through 50 on the port bow was essentially clear. However, from 50 to 70 on the port bow, visibility was hampered by overhead cupboards and restricted to a range of approximately 30-40m from the vessel. With the blinds on the port side of the main cabin in the lowered and closed position, nothing abaft 70 on the port bow of the vessel was visible to the operator. A combination of vessel trim and an awning fitted above the after cockpit also further limited visibility astern when the vessel was underway at speed. When the SpiritofVancouverIsland began to move from her berth, she was abaft the port beam of the StarRuby. The enclosed cabin is in close proximity to the vessel's engine compartment. When the vessel is operating at speed, engine noise interferes with the operator's ability to detect sounds originating from outside the cabin. Bridge Resource Management Bridge personnel on the SpiritofVancouverIsland at the time of the occurrence had not received formal instruction in Bridge Resource Management (BRM). However, many BRM principles were being applied on the day of the occurrence. Currently, BRM training is not a regulatory requirement for vessels operating in this trade. The bridge procedures on the SpiritofVancouverIsland are laid out in the ISM documentation of the ship. These procedures are contained in a vessel-specific manual and also in the Senior Master's Standing Orders, both of which are kept in the wheelhouse and were duly signed as being acknowledged by the ship's officers. Traffic Patterns There are now 40vessels in the BCFC fleet, providing year-round service on 25routes serving up to 46destinations. In addition to commercial vessels, the inside coastal waters are traversed extensively by pleasure craft from Canada and the U.S. Many of the routes taken by pleasure craft put them in close proximity to BCFC terminals. In the summer months, the large ferries depart hourly from both Swartz Bay and Tsawwassen between 0700and2200. The Swartz Bay terminal also serves as a terminus for other routes as well with vessels utilizing each of the terminal's five berths.