There can be no doubt about the position of the anchored BUMDONG. The information provided by the crew is fully supported by the data recorded and monitored by MCTS . The vessel was about 1.1 miles east of the eastern limit of the inbound traffic lane. Although the bridge watch of the ORHANEKINCI reported that the vessel passed close to the bow of the BUMDONG and asserted that the vessel's starboard quarter had not contacted the bow of the BUMDONG, there is sufficient information available to indicate that the contact (and minor damage) happened: the shuddering felt aboard the BUMDONG as the ERHAN EKINCI passed over her anchor chain; the MCTS record shows that the radar echoes of both vessels merged at 2013:50. While the merging of targets does not prove contact, it indicates that the vessels were very close to each other; the measured height above the water of the damaged part of the bow of the BUMDONG and the scrape on the starboard quarter of the ORHANEKINCI was nearly identical; the bare steel exposed by the contact was bright. The ORHANEKINCI left dry dock with a newly painted hull 13 days previously and had completed a trans-Pacific voyage without going alongside another vessel or structure. Had the scrape occurred some time before arrival, the metal exposed would have shown some signs of oxydization; it did not. According to the principles of safe navigation the ORHANEKINCI was required to give theBUMDONG a wide berth. It is irrelevant whether the ORHANEKINCI touched theBUMDONG or whether she passed as much as 50m or as little as 25 m ahead of the tanker. It was considered unsafe to manoeuvre the large, deep sea, bulk carrier in such close proximity to the anchored tanker. The shuddering felt on the BUMDONG was most probably due to the hull of the ORHAN EKINCI riding over the other vessel's anchor chain. The downward and shortening force exerted on the anchor chain was, most probably, the cause of the anchored vessel's bow being brought into contact with the starboard quarter of the ORHANEKINCI. Most of the information provided the master and crew of the ORHANEKINCI concerning the vessel's approach to Victoria pilot station was contradicted by the same individuals when interviewed for the second time. The positions of 1928 and 2026, however, can be corroborated by information from other sources. The information supplied at both interviews was, in the main, incompatible with the MCTS record which registered the vessel's position about every five minutes during her approach to the pilot station. The fixes plotted by those on the bridge of the vessel on the ship's chart purported to show that the vessel had approached the pilot station within the designated traffic lane. There is an obvious inconsistency, upon which the master declined comment, between this information and the information that the vessel had passed either 25 or 50m ahead of the BUMDONG because the tanker was anchored about 11 cables (1.1 nautical miles) east of the eastern limit of the traffic lane. Since the collision undoubtedly occurred at this distance from the traffic lane and given that courses steered correspond even partly to those stated to have been steered, the positions on the ship's chart at 1948 and 2002 can not be correct. The MCTS record shows that the ORHANEKINCI left the traffic lane at about 1947. There are also inconsistencies in the vessel's speed over the ground, upon which the master did not comment, between the information supplied by those on watch, the speed as calculated between the positions marked on the ship's chart and the speed as calculated between interpolated positions recorded by MCTS. It can be seen that when the vessel was said by the bridge watch to be reducing speed, the information on the ship's chart shows that speed was increasing. Either the speed as calculated from the chart or the information given during the interviews is incorrect. In fact, as the vessel's speed as determined by MCTS was almost constant throughout, it appears that neither the information on speed given at interview nor the speed calculated between the ship's chart positions is correct. Some statements by the crew of the ORHANEKINCI are corroborated by the observations of the OOW of the BUMDONG and the plot of the MCTS record of coordinates. These allow the most probable track of the ORHANEKINCI to be reconstructed. The ORHANEKINCI left the eastern boundary of the traffic lane at approximately 1947, heading 032(T) towards Constance Bank at a speed of 10 to 11 knots. She kept the BUM DONG on her port side, intending to pass astern (east of) the anchored vessel. In a position approximately two cables (400 m) south of the BUMDONG the ORHAN EKINCI altered her course approximately 30 to port to pass ahead of the BUMDONG. It is probable that distance between the bow of the BUMDONG and the starboard side of ORHANEKINCI was about 25 to 50m as she passed ahead. The surface current set the hull of the ORHANEKINCI towards the BUMDONG until the two vessels made contact. It is not known whether the bridge team was aware that the vessel had left the traffic lane. The deviation from the traffic lane when approaching the Victoria pilot station may have been due to the quality of monitoring of the vessel's position. Alternatively, the deviation may have been deliberate, it having been the intention to pass astern of the BUMDONG. The large alteration of course to port at the last minute was ordered after MCTS asked the ORHANEKINCI what its intentions were. The bold alteration to port to pass close ahead of the anchored vessel was commenced when the BUMDONG was on the port bow of the ORHANEKINCI at a distance of about 400m. This alteration brought the vessel unnecessarily into a close quarters situation with the BUM DONG. There was sufficient water for the vessel to proceed on her course of 035 to the pilot station and pass astern of the BUMDONG, albeit out of the traffic lane. An opportunity to lessen the risk of collision was missed when the vessel's starboard midship was passing close ahead of the bow of the BUMDONG. A prudent mariner, understanding the properties of the ship's rudder and propeller interaction, would have put the rudder 'hard-to-starboard' to move the stern away from the danger in such circumstances. That a Bridge Resource Management (BRM) environment was not in place is evident from the sequence of events. During the approach to the pilot station the ORHANEKINCI was allowed to deviate or conned in such a manner that the vessel deviated from the traffic lane. No one in the wheel-house challenged the master when the vessel deviated from the traffic lane or when the decision was made to cross close ahead of the BUMDONG. No one in the wheel-house, including the OOW , actively participated in the navigation of the vessel or brought the possible consequences of the master's actions to his attention. Undoubtedly, the onus to stay within the traffic lane and navigate safely in the vicinity of other vessels was on the bridge team of the ORHANEKINCI, however, the OOW of the BUM DONG could have tried to warn the approaching vessel using radio, visual or sound signals. All these means were available but the OOW did not use any of them. It is possible for one MCTS regulator to monitor all four radar screens; vessels move at relatively low speeds and they usually keep within traffic lanes - especially after an initial contact with MCTS has been made and the vessel's intended course of action is communicated. Because the MCTS regulator is not able to maintain a constant watch on one radar screen, he did not notice that the ORHANEKINCI had deviated from the traffic lane at 1947. Consequently he did not issue a warning to the vessel at this time, some 25 minutes before the occurrence.Analysis There can be no doubt about the position of the anchored BUMDONG. The information provided by the crew is fully supported by the data recorded and monitored by MCTS . The vessel was about 1.1 miles east of the eastern limit of the inbound traffic lane. Although the bridge watch of the ORHANEKINCI reported that the vessel passed close to the bow of the BUMDONG and asserted that the vessel's starboard quarter had not contacted the bow of the BUMDONG, there is sufficient information available to indicate that the contact (and minor damage) happened: the shuddering felt aboard the BUMDONG as the ERHAN EKINCI passed over her anchor chain; the MCTS record shows that the radar echoes of both vessels merged at 2013:50. While the merging of targets does not prove contact, it indicates that the vessels were very close to each other; the measured height above the water of the damaged part of the bow of the BUMDONG and the scrape on the starboard quarter of the ORHANEKINCI was nearly identical; the bare steel exposed by the contact was bright. The ORHANEKINCI left dry dock with a newly painted hull 13 days previously and had completed a trans-Pacific voyage without going alongside another vessel or structure. Had the scrape occurred some time before arrival, the metal exposed would have shown some signs of oxydization; it did not. According to the principles of safe navigation the ORHANEKINCI was required to give theBUMDONG a wide berth. It is irrelevant whether the ORHANEKINCI touched theBUMDONG or whether she passed as much as 50m or as little as 25 m ahead of the tanker. It was considered unsafe to manoeuvre the large, deep sea, bulk carrier in such close proximity to the anchored tanker. The shuddering felt on the BUMDONG was most probably due to the hull of the ORHAN EKINCI riding over the other vessel's anchor chain. The downward and shortening force exerted on the anchor chain was, most probably, the cause of the anchored vessel's bow being brought into contact with the starboard quarter of the ORHANEKINCI. Most of the information provided the master and crew of the ORHANEKINCI concerning the vessel's approach to Victoria pilot station was contradicted by the same individuals when interviewed for the second time. The positions of 1928 and 2026, however, can be corroborated by information from other sources. The information supplied at both interviews was, in the main, incompatible with the MCTS record which registered the vessel's position about every five minutes during her approach to the pilot station. The fixes plotted by those on the bridge of the vessel on the ship's chart purported to show that the vessel had approached the pilot station within the designated traffic lane. There is an obvious inconsistency, upon which the master declined comment, between this information and the information that the vessel had passed either 25 or 50m ahead of the BUMDONG because the tanker was anchored about 11 cables (1.1 nautical miles) east of the eastern limit of the traffic lane. Since the collision undoubtedly occurred at this distance from the traffic lane and given that courses steered correspond even partly to those stated to have been steered, the positions on the ship's chart at 1948 and 2002 can not be correct. The MCTS record shows that the ORHANEKINCI left the traffic lane at about 1947. There are also inconsistencies in the vessel's speed over the ground, upon which the master did not comment, between the information supplied by those on watch, the speed as calculated between the positions marked on the ship's chart and the speed as calculated between interpolated positions recorded by MCTS. It can be seen that when the vessel was said by the bridge watch to be reducing speed, the information on the ship's chart shows that speed was increasing. Either the speed as calculated from the chart or the information given during the interviews is incorrect. In fact, as the vessel's speed as determined by MCTS was almost constant throughout, it appears that neither the information on speed given at interview nor the speed calculated between the ship's chart positions is correct. Some statements by the crew of the ORHANEKINCI are corroborated by the observations of the OOW of the BUMDONG and the plot of the MCTS record of coordinates. These allow the most probable track of the ORHANEKINCI to be reconstructed. The ORHANEKINCI left the eastern boundary of the traffic lane at approximately 1947, heading 032(T) towards Constance Bank at a speed of 10 to 11 knots. She kept the BUM DONG on her port side, intending to pass astern (east of) the anchored vessel. In a position approximately two cables (400 m) south of the BUMDONG the ORHAN EKINCI altered her course approximately 30 to port to pass ahead of the BUMDONG. It is probable that distance between the bow of the BUMDONG and the starboard side of ORHANEKINCI was about 25 to 50m as she passed ahead. The surface current set the hull of the ORHANEKINCI towards the BUMDONG until the two vessels made contact. It is not known whether the bridge team was aware that the vessel had left the traffic lane. The deviation from the traffic lane when approaching the Victoria pilot station may have been due to the quality of monitoring of the vessel's position. Alternatively, the deviation may have been deliberate, it having been the intention to pass astern of the BUMDONG. The large alteration of course to port at the last minute was ordered after MCTS asked the ORHANEKINCI what its intentions were. The bold alteration to port to pass close ahead of the anchored vessel was commenced when the BUMDONG was on the port bow of the ORHANEKINCI at a distance of about 400m. This alteration brought the vessel unnecessarily into a close quarters situation with the BUM DONG. There was sufficient water for the vessel to proceed on her course of 035 to the pilot station and pass astern of the BUMDONG, albeit out of the traffic lane. An opportunity to lessen the risk of collision was missed when the vessel's starboard midship was passing close ahead of the bow of the BUMDONG. A prudent mariner, understanding the properties of the ship's rudder and propeller interaction, would have put the rudder 'hard-to-starboard' to move the stern away from the danger in such circumstances. That a Bridge Resource Management (BRM) environment was not in place is evident from the sequence of events. During the approach to the pilot station the ORHANEKINCI was allowed to deviate or conned in such a manner that the vessel deviated from the traffic lane. No one in the wheel-house challenged the master when the vessel deviated from the traffic lane or when the decision was made to cross close ahead of the BUMDONG. No one in the wheel-house, including the OOW , actively participated in the navigation of the vessel or brought the possible consequences of the master's actions to his attention. Undoubtedly, the onus to stay within the traffic lane and navigate safely in the vicinity of other vessels was on the bridge team of the ORHANEKINCI, however, the OOW of the BUM DONG could have tried to warn the approaching vessel using radio, visual or sound signals. All these means were available but the OOW did not use any of them. It is possible for one MCTS regulator to monitor all four radar screens; vessels move at relatively low speeds and they usually keep within traffic lanes - especially after an initial contact with MCTS has been made and the vessel's intended course of action is communicated. Because the MCTS regulator is not able to maintain a constant watch on one radar screen, he did not notice that the ORHANEKINCI had deviated from the traffic lane at 1947. Consequently he did not issue a warning to the vessel at this time, some 25 minutes before the occurrence. The ORHANEKINCI deviated from the traffic lane and approached the anchored BUMDONG at Constance Bank. The vessels made physical contact and each sustained some damage. The propulsion and steering on the ORHANEKINCI was in good working order. The surface current was setting the ORHANEKINCIto the east and out of of the traffic lane. The bridge team of the ORHANEKINCI navigated the vessel without due regard to the principles of ordinary seamanship. The master allowed the vessel to approach the BUMDONG and maneuvered dangerously in close proximity of the anchored vessel. The BUMDONG did not try to warn the approaching vessel by any of the available means. The MCTS regulator did not observe the radar target of the ORHANEKINCI exit the area of the traffic lane at 1947 and did not warn the vessel that she had done so until 2012. The MCTS regulator did not observe the radar target of the ORHANEKINCI exit the area of the traffic lane at 1947 and did not warn the vessel that she had done so until 2012.Findings The ORHANEKINCI deviated from the traffic lane and approached the anchored BUMDONG at Constance Bank. The vessels made physical contact and each sustained some damage. The propulsion and steering on the ORHANEKINCI was in good working order. The surface current was setting the ORHANEKINCIto the east and out of of the traffic lane. The bridge team of the ORHANEKINCI navigated the vessel without due regard to the principles of ordinary seamanship. The master allowed the vessel to approach the BUMDONG and maneuvered dangerously in close proximity of the anchored vessel. The BUMDONG did not try to warn the approaching vessel by any of the available means. The MCTS regulator did not observe the radar target of the ORHANEKINCI exit the area of the traffic lane at 1947 and did not warn the vessel that she had done so until 2012. The MCTS regulator did not observe the radar target of the ORHANEKINCI exit the area of the traffic lane at 1947 and did not warn the vessel that she had done so until 2012. The two vessels found themselves in a close quarters situation and made physical contact because the ORHANEKINCI deviated from the traffic separation scheme, approached and maneuvered dangerously in close proximity to the anchored tanker. Contributing factors were the absence of a Bridge Resource Management environment aboard and that the vessel's deviation from the traffic separation scheme was not detected at an early stage by the Vancouver Marine Communications and Traffic Services Centre. Following the incident, the Pacific Region MCTS Regional Procedures Coordination Committee (RPCC) decided to meet to review Standard Operating Procedures. The result of the discussions regarding CVTS operating and hand-off procedures will be brought to the attention ofthe Canada-US Cooperative Vessel Traffic Services Joint Coordinating Group for further action. Also, coordinated action has been discussed between the US and Canadian Coast Guards to establish procedures for mandatory compliance with traffic lanes and separation schemes in Haro Strait and the Pilot Boarding Station.Causes and Contributing Factors The two vessels found themselves in a close quarters situation and made physical contact because the ORHANEKINCI deviated from the traffic separation scheme, approached and maneuvered dangerously in close proximity to the anchored tanker. Contributing factors were the absence of a Bridge Resource Management environment aboard and that the vessel's deviation from the traffic separation scheme was not detected at an early stage by the Vancouver Marine Communications and Traffic Services Centre. Following the incident, the Pacific Region MCTS Regional Procedures Coordination Committee (RPCC) decided to meet to review Standard Operating Procedures. The result of the discussions regarding CVTS operating and hand-off procedures will be brought to the attention ofthe Canada-US Cooperative Vessel Traffic Services Joint Coordinating Group for further action. Also, coordinated action has been discussed between the US and Canadian Coast Guards to establish procedures for mandatory compliance with traffic lanes and separation schemes in Haro Strait and the Pilot Boarding Station.