The information provided by the master and the sequence of events are consistent with the transfer of control from console No. 2 to console No. 1 not having been completed. The RADs responded to the clutch-throttle position of the joysticks but did not follow the rotation. However, this condition could not be duplicated after the accident. Witness statements did not corroborate the master's testimony that he disengaged the RADs before striking the marina dock. He maintained that the vessel was carried by the momentum she had gained while the RADs were clutched in for approximately six seconds during unberthing. However, it was observed during the investigation that more than 30 seconds of continuous athwartship thrust was required to swing the MAYNEQUEEN from the wing-wall to the outbound course. Additional thrust would be required to swing the vessel through the further 40 to contact the marina. In the existing conditions, it is considered that the vessel would not have struck the marina dock if the master had declutched the RADs after six seconds. The master rotated the RADs to their departure settings on the arrival control console and then engaged them only after transferring control to the departure console. On the arrival console, the master had set the joystick controlling the outbound-end drives to a 90 angle before transferring the control to the departure console. When the master applied thrust at the departure console, the ferry commenced moving laterally off the dock and gained momentum. When he attempted to change the direction by using the joystick, the master realized that he did not have control of the directional component of the drives. If, on the other hand, the transfer of control from the arrival console to the departure console had been made with the controls in a fore-and-aft position, the loss of the directional component of the drives would have become apparent as soon as the joystick was positioned at the 90 angle and before athwartship thrust was applied. Because of the sequence and manner in which the controls were transferred, the master did not become aware immediately of the loss of the directional component of the drives. The master had limited experience of the MAYNEQUEEN and was transferred from another vessel without any time being allotted for refamiliarization. The vessel's quick departure from the scene after the accident without an in-depth assessment of the situation was contrary to the practices of good seamanship. Following bottom contact, the master was engaged in an emergency situation which involved critical vessel manoeuvring, conducting damage assessment of the vessel as well as personally carrying out visual assessment of the damaged pleasure craft, and had travelled a distance of some 500 m to the Entrance Light; all in a matter of some six minutes. Hence, the master's inspection of the damaged pleasure craft can, at best, be described as cursory, and his assessment of the situation was, in part, influenced by the fact that he had never seen people on these boats at that time of the day. A precise in-depth assessment of the situation was essential to ensure that the pleasure craft involved were not in need of assistance prior to the vessel departing the accident site. The vessel reported the accident to the Horseshoe Bay terminal but was not held there for further inspection. The only person, apart from the master, with authority to take the vessel out of service was the VP who was briefed by the terminal employee. He wrongly assumed that the ferry had only experienced a hard landing at the terminal in Snug Cove, a fairly common occurrence and one that would not justify stopping the vessel and suspending traffic between Bowen Island and the mainland.Analysis The information provided by the master and the sequence of events are consistent with the transfer of control from console No. 2 to console No. 1 not having been completed. The RADs responded to the clutch-throttle position of the joysticks but did not follow the rotation. However, this condition could not be duplicated after the accident. Witness statements did not corroborate the master's testimony that he disengaged the RADs before striking the marina dock. He maintained that the vessel was carried by the momentum she had gained while the RADs were clutched in for approximately six seconds during unberthing. However, it was observed during the investigation that more than 30 seconds of continuous athwartship thrust was required to swing the MAYNEQUEEN from the wing-wall to the outbound course. Additional thrust would be required to swing the vessel through the further 40 to contact the marina. In the existing conditions, it is considered that the vessel would not have struck the marina dock if the master had declutched the RADs after six seconds. The master rotated the RADs to their departure settings on the arrival control console and then engaged them only after transferring control to the departure console. On the arrival console, the master had set the joystick controlling the outbound-end drives to a 90 angle before transferring the control to the departure console. When the master applied thrust at the departure console, the ferry commenced moving laterally off the dock and gained momentum. When he attempted to change the direction by using the joystick, the master realized that he did not have control of the directional component of the drives. If, on the other hand, the transfer of control from the arrival console to the departure console had been made with the controls in a fore-and-aft position, the loss of the directional component of the drives would have become apparent as soon as the joystick was positioned at the 90 angle and before athwartship thrust was applied. Because of the sequence and manner in which the controls were transferred, the master did not become aware immediately of the loss of the directional component of the drives. The master had limited experience of the MAYNEQUEEN and was transferred from another vessel without any time being allotted for refamiliarization. The vessel's quick departure from the scene after the accident without an in-depth assessment of the situation was contrary to the practices of good seamanship. Following bottom contact, the master was engaged in an emergency situation which involved critical vessel manoeuvring, conducting damage assessment of the vessel as well as personally carrying out visual assessment of the damaged pleasure craft, and had travelled a distance of some 500 m to the Entrance Light; all in a matter of some six minutes. Hence, the master's inspection of the damaged pleasure craft can, at best, be described as cursory, and his assessment of the situation was, in part, influenced by the fact that he had never seen people on these boats at that time of the day. A precise in-depth assessment of the situation was essential to ensure that the pleasure craft involved were not in need of assistance prior to the vessel departing the accident site. The vessel reported the accident to the Horseshoe Bay terminal but was not held there for further inspection. The only person, apart from the master, with authority to take the vessel out of service was the VP who was briefed by the terminal employee. He wrongly assumed that the ferry had only experienced a hard landing at the terminal in Snug Cove, a fairly common occurrence and one that would not justify stopping the vessel and suspending traffic between Bowen Island and the mainland. Directional control of the vessel's forward propulsion was lost during the unberthing manoeuvre. There apparently had been an incomplete transfer of propulsion/steering control from the arrival console to the departure console. Evidence indicates that the propulsion was not declutched before the marina dock was struck. The master was not given a refamiliarization period before assuming operational command of the vessel. The shift schedules precluded the masters from handing over the command of the vessel in person, and there was no established hand-over procedure in place. The ferry departed the scene of the accident before determining if assistance was required and before ensuring that the vessel was seaworthy. Inadequate communication between the ferry and the terminal resulted in ferry management not stopping the vessel for survey and investigation. VTS was notified one hour after the accident. The control system did not incorporate an alarm to warn the operator of an incomplete transfer of control between the consoles. The lights identifying which console was in command were identical and did not readily indicate the status of the control system to the operator. The instructions in the BCFC operation manual were at variance with the manufacturer's instructions for the transfer of control procedure.Findings Directional control of the vessel's forward propulsion was lost during the unberthing manoeuvre. There apparently had been an incomplete transfer of propulsion/steering control from the arrival console to the departure console. Evidence indicates that the propulsion was not declutched before the marina dock was struck. The master was not given a refamiliarization period before assuming operational command of the vessel. The shift schedules precluded the masters from handing over the command of the vessel in person, and there was no established hand-over procedure in place. The ferry departed the scene of the accident before determining if assistance was required and before ensuring that the vessel was seaworthy. Inadequate communication between the ferry and the terminal resulted in ferry management not stopping the vessel for survey and investigation. VTS was notified one hour after the accident. The control system did not incorporate an alarm to warn the operator of an incomplete transfer of control between the consoles. The lights identifying which console was in command were identical and did not readily indicate the status of the control system to the operator. The instructions in the BCFC operation manual were at variance with the manufacturer's instructions for the transfer of control procedure. The MAYNEQUEEN sheered into the adjacent marina when directional control of the forward propulsion was lost while unberthing from Snug Cove terminal. This was apparently due to an incomplete transfer of propulsion/steering control between the wheel-house consoles. Contributing to the extent of the damage was the fact that the forward propulsion was not stopped when control was lost.Causes and Contributing Factors The MAYNEQUEEN sheered into the adjacent marina when directional control of the forward propulsion was lost while unberthing from Snug Cove terminal. This was apparently due to an incomplete transfer of propulsion/steering control between the wheel-house consoles. Contributing to the extent of the damage was the fact that the forward propulsion was not stopped when control was lost. The control system on the MAYNEQUEEN has undergone a thorough check. Certain aspects of the system have been modified to eliminate the possibility of transferring propulsion without transferring steering. New placards have been affixed next to the transfer command push-buttons indicating the requirement for a 10-second depressing period. The control indicator lights colours have been changed to green and red. Masters have been instructed to test-rotate the RADs before engaging propulsion. The deck department has been refamiliarized with the propulsion controls, the airphone talk-back and the sound-powered phone. The BCFC has reviewed its current policy with respect to the following: communications procedures following an incident, and familiarization/refamiliarization with the vessel for masters and new crew members, with input from the fleet masters.Safety Action Taken The control system on the MAYNEQUEEN has undergone a thorough check. Certain aspects of the system have been modified to eliminate the possibility of transferring propulsion without transferring steering. New placards have been affixed next to the transfer command push-buttons indicating the requirement for a 10-second depressing period. The control indicator lights colours have been changed to green and red. Masters have been instructed to test-rotate the RADs before engaging propulsion. The deck department has been refamiliarized with the propulsion controls, the airphone talk-back and the sound-powered phone. The BCFC has reviewed its current policy with respect to the following: communications procedures following an incident, and familiarization/refamiliarization with the vessel for masters and new crew members, with input from the fleet masters.