2.0 Analysis 2.1 Introduction The analysis discusses the events leading up to landing at Halifax, including company operations, crew procedures, the flight path flown and the deviations below the normal flight path, the actions of the captain in landing the aircraft, and aircraft performance. Also discussed are the runway environment, the activity of the crew, and influences upon the actions of the pilots. 2.2 Dispatch of the Flight to Halifax The flight to Halifax did present some challenges to the crew. The runway was slippery, which created difficulties for the landing at Halifax and the planned departure from Halifax to Rome. Company Operations had addressed the concerns expressed by the captain regarding the departure from Halifax at a heavy aircraft weight. Operations had arranged for another pilot to join the crew in case a decision was made to lighten the fuel load, thereby necessitating an intermediate stop which would have extended the crew day. The landing distance required for CDN48, given the runway condition at Halifax, was expected to be less than the runway available. The amount of runway actually used by CDN48 during the landing, less than 6,500 feet, supports the conclusion that the landing distance available was adequate. The weather in Halifax was forecast to be above approach limits for the estimated time of arrival, and the surface winds were not forecast to be a factor. However, icing conditions were forecast in cloud and freezing precipitation. Alternate airports were further than normal from Halifax , but sufficient fuel was on board to allow for a diversion if necessary. Because of the weather conditions, the crew was justified in taking extra care in planning for the flight to Halifax and Rome, but there does not appear to have been an operational reason to cancel their flight. 2.3 Approach Design The airline's procedures for completing non-precision approaches, like the back course procedure to runway 06, call for the use of FMS VNAV for descent guidance. The procedure is intended to place the aircraft below cloud in good position for a visual landing. CAI, like other airlines operating FMS-equipped aircraft, have adjusted their approach procedures to allow the approach to be flown using FMS vertical guidance. The approach for runway 06 was set up by the crew using a beacon crossing altitude of 1,700 feet asl, in accordance with the company's procedures, which produced a virtual glide path angle of about 2.3. The extra 10 feet added to the threshold crossing altitude, by request of the captain, had a negligible effect on the glide path angle. The approach, as programmed in the FMS, created the situation where the approach would become unstabilized at MDA, where the crew would transition to visual flight to make the landing using the 3 PAPI glide path. There was no training provided to the crew indicating that there would be a difference in flight paths when transitioning from VNAV to visual conditions for landing. The calculation of the data required to produce a constant 3 glide path, although possible, would have represented a significant challenge to most flight crew, and was outside of the scope of the airline's procedures or training. Other operators addressed this problem by providing crews with beacon crossing altitudes that produced a glide path angle of 3.0, which reduces the problems in transitioning from the instrument approach to visual landing.