Because the deck-hand's experience of navigating a vessel and of using the navigational aids fitted was limited, his effectiveness as a watch keeper was greatly reduced. Given that the vessel was sighted 1 - 1 miles offshore from Parkers Cove at 2130, it may be concluded that the vessel was closer to shore than the skipper believed when he set course for Prim Point. The crew did not ensure the overall safety of the vessel because the position and progress of the vessel was not adequately monitored. Had the crew been more cognizant of the effects of the wind and tide upon the vessel, appropriate allowances for set and drift could have been applied to the initial course and the grounding may have been prevented. Analysis of the crew's 72-hour history, in particular their work/rest schedule, revealed that adequate sleep was not obtained by either the skipper or the deck-hand. During the 72 hours prior to the occurrence, a significant sleep debt would have accumulated, resulting in performance degradation. Notwithstanding the deck-hand's lack of training and limited experience of navigation and of the use of the navigational aids fitted, his performance in this occurrence is consistent with the effects of fatigue in that he was unaware of the vessel's position (vigilance decrement) and accordingly did not adjust the course (failure to respond). Despite the deck-hand's perception that he did not fall asleep, it is probable that he succumbed to unplanned, uncontrollable sleep (lapse or micro-event). The skipper's performance in this occurrence is also consistent with the effects of fatigue in that he handed over the watch to the deck-hand without first having adequately determined the deck-hand's knowledge and/or abilities with regard to navigation (flawed logic and judgement, increased propensity for risk taking). TSB records indicate that unqualified crew members with inadequate watchkeeping abilities are, at least in part, contributory in about 45 to 50 per cent of all collision, groundings and striking of fishing vessels in Canada. Although experienced in fishing, many fishermen do not have formal training in navigation, radar skills, bridge procedures, rules of the road, etc; rather they learn through on-the-job exposure. Following another investigation into the collision between the fishing vessels CONNIE SISTERS I and RYAN ATLANTIC in June 1992, (TSB report M92M4031), the Board determined that the collision occurred because neither vessel was effectively navigated by radar and because neither vessel's crew maintained an effective look-out. As a result, the Board recommended that; The Department of Transport ensure that any person required to have the conduct of a commercial fishing vessel possess the basic skills for safe navigation. (M94-10, issued 1994) In August 1997, the Crewing Regulations were amended to require certification and training for masters and first officers on fishing vessels over 85 GRT by July 30, 1998, and over 70 GRT after that date. The certification requirements shall be extended to vessels over 60 GRT by July 30, 1999. (SOR 97-390 Art. 29 (5) c) refers). Also, under new initiatives referred to as the professionalisation of fishermen, the fishing industry itself is planning to take steps towards providing basic skills for safe navigation to persons having the conduct of fishing vessels not required to carry a certificated master.Analysis Because the deck-hand's experience of navigating a vessel and of using the navigational aids fitted was limited, his effectiveness as a watch keeper was greatly reduced. Given that the vessel was sighted 1 - 1 miles offshore from Parkers Cove at 2130, it may be concluded that the vessel was closer to shore than the skipper believed when he set course for Prim Point. The crew did not ensure the overall safety of the vessel because the position and progress of the vessel was not adequately monitored. Had the crew been more cognizant of the effects of the wind and tide upon the vessel, appropriate allowances for set and drift could have been applied to the initial course and the grounding may have been prevented. Analysis of the crew's 72-hour history, in particular their work/rest schedule, revealed that adequate sleep was not obtained by either the skipper or the deck-hand. During the 72 hours prior to the occurrence, a significant sleep debt would have accumulated, resulting in performance degradation. Notwithstanding the deck-hand's lack of training and limited experience of navigation and of the use of the navigational aids fitted, his performance in this occurrence is consistent with the effects of fatigue in that he was unaware of the vessel's position (vigilance decrement) and accordingly did not adjust the course (failure to respond). Despite the deck-hand's perception that he did not fall asleep, it is probable that he succumbed to unplanned, uncontrollable sleep (lapse or micro-event). The skipper's performance in this occurrence is also consistent with the effects of fatigue in that he handed over the watch to the deck-hand without first having adequately determined the deck-hand's knowledge and/or abilities with regard to navigation (flawed logic and judgement, increased propensity for risk taking). TSB records indicate that unqualified crew members with inadequate watchkeeping abilities are, at least in part, contributory in about 45 to 50 per cent of all collision, groundings and striking of fishing vessels in Canada. Although experienced in fishing, many fishermen do not have formal training in navigation, radar skills, bridge procedures, rules of the road, etc; rather they learn through on-the-job exposure. Following another investigation into the collision between the fishing vessels CONNIE SISTERS I and RYAN ATLANTIC in June 1992, (TSB report M92M4031), the Board determined that the collision occurred because neither vessel was effectively navigated by radar and because neither vessel's crew maintained an effective look-out. As a result, the Board recommended that; The Department of Transport ensure that any person required to have the conduct of a commercial fishing vessel possess the basic skills for safe navigation. (M94-10, issued 1994) In August 1997, the Crewing Regulations were amended to require certification and training for masters and first officers on fishing vessels over 85 GRT by July 30, 1998, and over 70 GRT after that date. The certification requirements shall be extended to vessels over 60 GRT by July 30, 1999. (SOR 97-390 Art. 29 (5) c) refers). Also, under new initiatives referred to as the professionalisation of fishermen, the fishing industry itself is planning to take steps towards providing basic skills for safe navigation to persons having the conduct of fishing vessels not required to carry a certificated master. The vessel grounded in Hardy Cove with the bow in a south-westerly direction, parallel to the coast line. The vessel was much closer to shore than the skipper realized when he set his course for Prim Point. The influence of the wind and tide would have been to set the vessel towards the western shore of Nova Scotia. The influence of the wind and tide on the vessel's course was not fully comprehended by the watch keeper. The watch keeper's lack of training and familiarity with the use of radar and other navigation aids reduced his effectiveness. The design of the vessel and the fact that the work-deck lighting remained on reduced the watch keeper's ability to observe shore lights, which could have warned him of the vessel's proximity to shore. The crew's performance was consistent with the effects of fatigue. The crew's performance was consistent with the effects of fatigue.Findings The vessel grounded in Hardy Cove with the bow in a south-westerly direction, parallel to the coast line. The vessel was much closer to shore than the skipper realized when he set his course for Prim Point. The influence of the wind and tide would have been to set the vessel towards the western shore of Nova Scotia. The influence of the wind and tide on the vessel's course was not fully comprehended by the watch keeper. The watch keeper's lack of training and familiarity with the use of radar and other navigation aids reduced his effectiveness. The design of the vessel and the fact that the work-deck lighting remained on reduced the watch keeper's ability to observe shore lights, which could have warned him of the vessel's proximity to shore. The crew's performance was consistent with the effects of fatigue. The crew's performance was consistent with the effects of fatigue. The Board determined that the MONAPEARL grounded due to the lack of technical marine knowledge of the person assigned the watch keeping duties, and as a result of the crew not being fully aware of the effects of wind and tide. Fatigue, exacerbated by the work/rest schedule maintained by the crew throughout the trip, had a negative effect on the crew's performance.Causes and Contributing Factors The Board determined that the MONAPEARL grounded due to the lack of technical marine knowledge of the person assigned the watch keeping duties, and as a result of the crew not being fully aware of the effects of wind and tide. Fatigue, exacerbated by the work/rest schedule maintained by the crew throughout the trip, had a negative effect on the crew's performance.