Analysis Lack of Marine Training and Established Work Procedures and Practices in the Industry Although the logging industry on the B.C. coast has a significant marine component in its work practices, there are few industry-wide guidelines for safe marine operations. Despite action by the Forest Industrial Relations Members Companies, the International Woodworkers of Canada and the W.C.B. of B.C. to further safety, it would appear that there are still areas of marine operations for which no standard procedures or guidelines have been established. Such was the case with respect to anchor dragging operations. Further, an aerial survey had been conducted to determine a good location for helicopter operations, but there was no guideline in place for the marine-related segment of the operations in determining the most appropriate site for the drop zone and the holding pen. Use of Field Sheets versus CHS Charts The large-scale Canadian Hydrographic Service (CHS) chart of the area (No. 3729) which was on board is primarily intended for navigational purposes with information on sea-bed and water depths appropriately spaced for clarity, and consequently, some details close to the coastline may be missing. However, the nature of the work being carried out required more detailed information on the soundings and sea-bed for the area. This information is contained on field sheets used in the preparation of the charts and is available upon request from the CHS for a nominal sum. No such request had been made. Further, if deemed necessary, detailed surveys can also be ordered from the CHS with cost to be born by the organization requesting the information. Use of Suicide Bight The suicide bight, which is a locking bight, is often used in the West Coast towing industry. The knot is secured such that the tow-line has to be slackened for the bight to be released or, alternatively, it will slide off when the tug is heeled over 90 degrees. In this instance, the suicide bight was not used. Operational Factors Operational factors involved in the sinking of the WOLCO VI included: The chart in use indicates a steep shelf in the vicinity of the drop zone and holding pen. The echo-sounder had been non-operational for a period of time and this had been brought to the attention of the company at safety meetings, but no repair had been effected. Consequently, the operator was unable to determine the depth of water in which the tug was operating; a key piece of information, essential for the safe operation of the tug in the vicinity of the steeply shelving sea-bed. Although the borrowing of anchors is common practice in the industry, neither the weight of the anchor nor the length of its cable is conspicuously posted at the float end. As in this instance, the lack of such information jeopardizes the safety of tug operations with potentially serious consequences. While the operator was aware of the dimensions of the anchor, he knew neither its weight nor the length of its cable. As it turned out, when immersed in water, the anchor weighed more than 6 tonnes, well in excess of the tug's handling capability. Also, the length of the anchor cable was less than half the required length. Hence, the heavy granite anchor, as it was being dragged over the steeply shelving sea-bed into deeper waters, caused the tug to settle deeper by the stern, heel heavily to port, and the afterdeck to become submerged. Downflooding from the open doors ensued and continued until the tug lost all reserve buoyancy and sank stern first. Operator's Attempt to Escape In the absence of eyewitness information, it was not possible to determine precisely why the operator was unable to exit the wheel-house. However, it is known that the tug heeled heavily to port and sank rapidly. The rotation of the body underwater, the loss of gravitational reference and the darkness associated with the wheel-house being underwater possibly resulted in the operator becoming disoriented, thus hampering his escape from the sunken vessel. As the vessel commenced sinking stern first, any attempt by the operator to exit the wheel-house would have been thwarted by the strong inrush of water from the after sliding door, and any attempt to open the starboard door would have been hindered by the heavy port list and external water pressure. Thus, the operator may have had no other choice but to seek an air pocket, which generally can be found in the forecastle space, and this provides a possible explanation for the position in which the operator's body was found. Alternatively, the possibility that the force of the water rushing in from the stern may have swept the operator upward through the narrow doorway and into the forecastle cannot be ruled out. few industry-wide guidelines for safe marine operations; neither regulatory nor industry requirements to have duly qualified personnel to operate marine craft, and limited industry-proposed training programs in place. few industry-wide guidelines for safe marine operations; neither regulatory nor industry requirements to have duly qualified personnel to operate marine craft, and limited industry-proposed training programs in place. Although the borrowing of anchors is common practice in the industry, neither the weight of the anchor nor the length of its cable is conspicuously posted at the float end. The crew members had received no training nor were they provided with instructions/guidelines by the company for the safe operation of the tug. The echo-sounder had been defective for a period of time and this had been brought to the attention of the company at safety meetings, but no repair had been effected. The large-scale CHS chart of the area was used instead of the more relevant field sheets while operating in the vicinity of the steeply shelving sea-bed. The small tug with limited horsepower was used to haul a heavy granite anchor, which was well in excess of the vessel's handling capability, without adequate safeguards in place. Because of the defective echo-sounder, the operator was unable to determine the depth of water while operating in the vicinity of the steeply shelving sea-bed. The operator knew neither the weight of the anchor, which was in excess of the tug's handling capability, nor the length of the anchor cable, which was less than half the required length. Because of the short length of the tow-line and of the anchor cable, the anchor exerted a vertical downward force on the tug when she entered deeper waters. The excessive weight of the anchor and the short length of the anchor cable caused the tug to settle deeper by the stern, and the afterdeck to become submerged. Downflooding from the open doors ensued and continued until the tug lost all reserve buoyancy and sank stern first. The tug was not fitted with a quick-release mechanism to disengage the tow nor was an axe readily available to cut the tow-line in an emergency. The suicide bight, which is intended to let the tow-line slide off when the tug is heeled over 90 degrees was not used. The deck-hand, who was wearing a PFD, was rescued, but the operator became trapped and he drowned when the tug sank. The small tug with limited horsepower was used to haul a heavy granite anchor, which was well in excess of the vessel's handling capability, without adequate safeguards in place. Because of the defective echo-sounder, the operator was unable to determine the depth of water while operating in the vicinity of the steeply shelving sea-bed. The operator knew neither the weight of the anchor, which was in excess of the tug's handling capability, nor the length of the anchor cable, which was less than half the required length. Because of the short length of the tow-line and of the anchor cable, the anchor exerted a vertical downward force on the tug when she entered deeper waters. The excessive weight of the anchor and the short length of the anchor cable caused the tug to settle deeper by the stern, and the afterdeck to become submerged. Downflooding from the open doors ensued and continued until the tug lost all reserve buoyancy and sank stern first. The tug was not fitted with a quick-release mechanism to disengage the tow nor was an axe readily available to cut the tow-line in an emergency. The suicide bight, which is intended to let the tow-line slide off when the tug is heeled over 90 degrees was not used. The deck-hand, who was wearing a PFD, was rescued, but the operator became trapped and he drowned when the tug sank.Findings few industry-wide guidelines for safe marine operations; neither regulatory nor industry requirements to have duly qualified personnel to operate marine craft, and limited industry-proposed training programs in place. few industry-wide guidelines for safe marine operations; neither regulatory nor industry requirements to have duly qualified personnel to operate marine craft, and limited industry-proposed training programs in place. Although the borrowing of anchors is common practice in the industry, neither the weight of the anchor nor the length of its cable is conspicuously posted at the float end. The crew members had received no training nor were they provided with instructions/guidelines by the company for the safe operation of the tug. The echo-sounder had been defective for a period of time and this had been brought to the attention of the company at safety meetings, but no repair had been effected. The large-scale CHS chart of the area was used instead of the more relevant field sheets while operating in the vicinity of the steeply shelving sea-bed. The small tug with limited horsepower was used to haul a heavy granite anchor, which was well in excess of the vessel's handling capability, without adequate safeguards in place. Because of the defective echo-sounder, the operator was unable to determine the depth of water while operating in the vicinity of the steeply shelving sea-bed. The operator knew neither the weight of the anchor, which was in excess of the tug's handling capability, nor the length of the anchor cable, which was less than half the required length. Because of the short length of the tow-line and of the anchor cable, the anchor exerted a vertical downward force on the tug when she entered deeper waters. The excessive weight of the anchor and the short length of the anchor cable caused the tug to settle deeper by the stern, and the afterdeck to become submerged. Downflooding from the open doors ensued and continued until the tug lost all reserve buoyancy and sank stern first. The tug was not fitted with a quick-release mechanism to disengage the tow nor was an axe readily available to cut the tow-line in an emergency. The suicide bight, which is intended to let the tow-line slide off when the tug is heeled over 90 degrees was not used. The deck-hand, who was wearing a PFD, was rescued, but the operator became trapped and he drowned when the tug sank. The small tug with limited horsepower was used to haul a heavy granite anchor, which was well in excess of the vessel's handling capability, without adequate safeguards in place. Because of the defective echo-sounder, the operator was unable to determine the depth of water while operating in the vicinity of the steeply shelving sea-bed. The operator knew neither the weight of the anchor, which was in excess of the tug's handling capability, nor the length of the anchor cable, which was less than half the required length. Because of the short length of the tow-line and of the anchor cable, the anchor exerted a vertical downward force on the tug when she entered deeper waters. The excessive weight of the anchor and the short length of the anchor cable caused the tug to settle deeper by the stern, and the afterdeck to become submerged. Downflooding from the open doors ensued and continued until the tug lost all reserve buoyancy and sank stern first. The tug was not fitted with a quick-release mechanism to disengage the tow nor was an axe readily available to cut the tow-line in an emergency. The suicide bight, which is intended to let the tow-line slide off when the tug is heeled over 90 degrees was not used. The deck-hand, who was wearing a PFD, was rescued, but the operator became trapped and he drowned when the tug sank. When the WOLCO VI entered deeper waters at Kwatna Inlet while hauling a heavy granite anchor along the sea-bed, the anchor exerted a vertical downward force on the tug and caused her to settle deeper by the stern, and the afterdeck to become submerged. Downflooding from the open doors ensued and continued until the tug lost all reserve buoyancy and sank stern first. Contributing factors to the occurrence were the lack of crew training, the absence of written work procedures and practices, the non-operational echo-sounder, the absence of a quick-release mechanism to disengage the tow, and the fact that the crew did not know the weight of the anchor, the length of the anchor cable nor the actual depth of water in which the tug was operating.Causes and Contributing Factors When the WOLCO VI entered deeper waters at Kwatna Inlet while hauling a heavy granite anchor along the sea-bed, the anchor exerted a vertical downward force on the tug and caused her to settle deeper by the stern, and the afterdeck to become submerged. Downflooding from the open doors ensued and continued until the tug lost all reserve buoyancy and sank stern first. Contributing factors to the occurrence were the lack of crew training, the absence of written work procedures and practices, the non-operational echo-sounder, the absence of a quick-release mechanism to disengage the tow, and the fact that the crew did not know the weight of the anchor, the length of the anchor cable nor the actual depth of water in which the tug was operating.