Neither the weather conditions nor aircraft serviceability were factors in the occurrence. The analysis will therefore focus on crew actions and company training programs. The crew of JZA8105 had been initially trained on the CRJ200, which included aeroplane performance and limitations training. The crew had experience flying the CRJ200 before completing the CRJ705 conversion training. The Air Canada Jazz CRJ705conversion training was based on the Transport Canada OEBR, which outlined aircraft difference requirements for conversion training between the CL-65 variants. Neither the OEBR nor the Air Canada Jazz CRJ705 conversion training program covered flight characteristics at high-altitude cruise. Also, Air Canada Jazz CRJ705 cockpit reference material did not include information on Vmd limitations. Therefore, the crew of JZA8105 was not aware that, unlike in the CRJ200, long-range cruise speed in the CRJ705could be less than Vmd at altitudes near the aircraft service ceiling. Consequently, the decision to slow the aircraft to 0.70M, which was below the Vmd of 0.75M, while attempting to maintain a constant altitude, was not an appropriate course of action. When the captain was alerted to the airspeed falling below the targeted0.70M, the viable speed - recovery options in order of effectiveness were to begin a descent, and to increase power. When he advanced the power levers, the engine power available at FL400 was only slightly more than that required for cruise, and the aircraft could not accelerate beyond Vmd in level flight. When the airspeed continued to decrease, the captain selected the FCCvertical speed mode. With stick shaker activation imminent, the best course of action would have been to disconnect the autopilot and manually reduce pitch. The second stick shaker event was likely due to the crew introducing a pitch-up with a resultant increase in angle of attack and Gloading. Speed recovery was eventually established by a more aggressive and sustained reduction in pitch attitude. The captain had obtained a limited quantity of fitful sleep the night before the incident flight, despite being afforded adequate time to obtain the required rest. His preoccupation with the FMSafter reducing power, at the expense of the more critical task of monitoring the airspeed, was consistent with a type of performance decrement associated with fatigue. The following TSB Engineering Laboratory report was completed: LP 058/2005 - DFDR Examination. This report is available from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada upon request.Analysis Neither the weather conditions nor aircraft serviceability were factors in the occurrence. The analysis will therefore focus on crew actions and company training programs. The crew of JZA8105 had been initially trained on the CRJ200, which included aeroplane performance and limitations training. The crew had experience flying the CRJ200 before completing the CRJ705 conversion training. The Air Canada Jazz CRJ705conversion training was based on the Transport Canada OEBR, which outlined aircraft difference requirements for conversion training between the CL-65 variants. Neither the OEBR nor the Air Canada Jazz CRJ705 conversion training program covered flight characteristics at high-altitude cruise. Also, Air Canada Jazz CRJ705 cockpit reference material did not include information on Vmd limitations. Therefore, the crew of JZA8105 was not aware that, unlike in the CRJ200, long-range cruise speed in the CRJ705could be less than Vmd at altitudes near the aircraft service ceiling. Consequently, the decision to slow the aircraft to 0.70M, which was below the Vmd of 0.75M, while attempting to maintain a constant altitude, was not an appropriate course of action. When the captain was alerted to the airspeed falling below the targeted0.70M, the viable speed - recovery options in order of effectiveness were to begin a descent, and to increase power. When he advanced the power levers, the engine power available at FL400 was only slightly more than that required for cruise, and the aircraft could not accelerate beyond Vmd in level flight. When the airspeed continued to decrease, the captain selected the FCCvertical speed mode. With stick shaker activation imminent, the best course of action would have been to disconnect the autopilot and manually reduce pitch. The second stick shaker event was likely due to the crew introducing a pitch-up with a resultant increase in angle of attack and Gloading. Speed recovery was eventually established by a more aggressive and sustained reduction in pitch attitude. The captain had obtained a limited quantity of fitful sleep the night before the incident flight, despite being afforded adequate time to obtain the required rest. His preoccupation with the FMSafter reducing power, at the expense of the more critical task of monitoring the airspeed, was consistent with a type of performance decrement associated with fatigue. The following TSB Engineering Laboratory report was completed: LP 058/2005 - DFDR Examination. This report is available from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada upon request. The pilots were not familiar with the relationship between cruise speed and minimum drag speed (Vmd) at high altitudes in the CRJ705. The Air Canada Jazz CRJ705 conversion training, which was based on the Transport Canada evaluation of CL-65 variants in an Operational Evaluation Board Report (OEBR), did not include differences in flight characteristics pertaining to Vmd. The flight crew of JZA8105 were not aware that, under their flight conditions, a low margin of power was available to sustain level flight at cruise altitude at a speed below Vmd. As a result, the crew initiated an airspeed reduction to below Vmd, from which the aircraft was unable to accelerate without loss of altitude. The captain was not well rested before the flight. The effects of fatigue likely resulted in a degradation of his concentration and prolonged diversion of attention from monitoring of airspeed after power reduction. The airspeed was therefore allowed to fall below the targeted value. The company's speed recovery training in the CRJ was limited to 10000feet above sea level (asl), and did not cover the differences in techniques between airspeed recovery at low altitude and at high altitude. Without the benefit of this training, the captain's initial response for airspeed recovery was ineffective, which eventually resulted in stick shaker activation.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The pilots were not familiar with the relationship between cruise speed and minimum drag speed (Vmd) at high altitudes in the CRJ705. The Air Canada Jazz CRJ705 conversion training, which was based on the Transport Canada evaluation of CL-65 variants in an Operational Evaluation Board Report (OEBR), did not include differences in flight characteristics pertaining to Vmd. The flight crew of JZA8105 were not aware that, under their flight conditions, a low margin of power was available to sustain level flight at cruise altitude at a speed below Vmd. As a result, the crew initiated an airspeed reduction to below Vmd, from which the aircraft was unable to accelerate without loss of altitude. The captain was not well rested before the flight. The effects of fatigue likely resulted in a degradation of his concentration and prolonged diversion of attention from monitoring of airspeed after power reduction. The airspeed was therefore allowed to fall below the targeted value. The company's speed recovery training in the CRJ was limited to 10000feet above sea level (asl), and did not cover the differences in techniques between airspeed recovery at low altitude and at high altitude. Without the benefit of this training, the captain's initial response for airspeed recovery was ineffective, which eventually resulted in stick shaker activation. A time drift originating in the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) introduced an inaccuracy of 0.16percent where the required standard was 0.125percent. Although the drift did not have an impact on this investigation, the resulting inaccuracy of time synchronization could reduce the value of flight data recorder information as it applies to establishing an accurate sequence of events in other occurrences.Other Finding A time drift originating in the digital flight data recorder (DFDR) introduced an inaccuracy of 0.16percent where the required standard was 0.125percent. Although the drift did not have an impact on this investigation, the resulting inaccuracy of time synchronization could reduce the value of flight data recorder information as it applies to establishing an accurate sequence of events in other occurrences. Following this occurrence, Bombardier Aerospace issued a message to all operators of the CRJ705/900 variants of the CL-65. It emphasized that operators may not be aware that, under certain flight conditions, climb speeds may be below minimum drag speed (Vmd). It was recommended that flight operations should not be conducted below Vmd as defined in the General Speed Section of the Flight Planning Cruise Control Manual for the aircraft type. In addition, Bombardier Aerospace will add Vmd tables to the aircraft Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) to provide flight crews with readily available information on speed limitations. Air Canada Jazz introduced a nine-module "High Altitude and High Speed Training" program for all CRJ705pilots. Company operations on the type were limited to FL350 until all pilots completed the training. Air Canada Jazz also developed a Quick Reference chart for pilot use in plotting Vmd versus aircraft weight, altitude, and air temperature. Amendments were made to the company Aircraft Operations Manual warning crews of the importance of adhering to published climb schedules. It also emphasized that the CRJ705 may not accelerate or maintain cruise altitude if speed is allowed to deteriorate below Vmd. Minimum recommended holding and manoeuvring speeds were charted as a function of altitude. In August 2005, Transport Canada published Commercial and Business Aviation Advisory Circular No.0247. This circular provided guidance and recommendations to operators for stall recovery training and checking, with the goal of ensuring that flight crews recognize early indications of an approach to a stall and apply the appropriate recovery actions to prevent an aeroplane from entering a stall or upset.Safety Action Taken Following this occurrence, Bombardier Aerospace issued a message to all operators of the CRJ705/900 variants of the CL-65. It emphasized that operators may not be aware that, under certain flight conditions, climb speeds may be below minimum drag speed (Vmd). It was recommended that flight operations should not be conducted below Vmd as defined in the General Speed Section of the Flight Planning Cruise Control Manual for the aircraft type. In addition, Bombardier Aerospace will add Vmd tables to the aircraft Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) to provide flight crews with readily available information on speed limitations. Air Canada Jazz introduced a nine-module "High Altitude and High Speed Training" program for all CRJ705pilots. Company operations on the type were limited to FL350 until all pilots completed the training. Air Canada Jazz also developed a Quick Reference chart for pilot use in plotting Vmd versus aircraft weight, altitude, and air temperature. Amendments were made to the company Aircraft Operations Manual warning crews of the importance of adhering to published climb schedules. It also emphasized that the CRJ705 may not accelerate or maintain cruise altitude if speed is allowed to deteriorate below Vmd. Minimum recommended holding and manoeuvring speeds were charted as a function of altitude. In August 2005, Transport Canada published Commercial and Business Aviation Advisory Circular No.0247. This circular provided guidance and recommendations to operators for stall recovery training and checking, with the goal of ensuring that flight crews recognize early indications of an approach to a stall and apply the appropriate recovery actions to prevent an aeroplane from entering a stall or upset.