The jog stick was examined by TSB investigators and an independent firm hired by the tugowner. It was conclusively established that, at some time in the past, the steering controller (jog) had been forced past the limiting screw on the port side. Thereafter it became easier to go past the limit position without meeting the resistance of the port side limiting screw. When this happened, as on 11 May 1995, the jog would not return to the neutral position on its own and would remain jammed in the port-engaged position. The crew on board the tug were not aware of this fault as they had not used the aft-deck steering jog during the few days prior to the occurrence. Although the master's certificate of competency had been obtained twenty nine years ago, existing regulations do not require updates to his training. The deckhand had no formal training at all. Training, in addition to reinforcing knowledge and skill, reinforce safe working practices. Because navigation in restricted waters like the Fraser River is a challenging task, shipping companies usually invest in training, particularly where some time has elapsed since the acquisition of a certificate of competency. The International Chamber of Shipping in their Bridge Procedures Guide recommend the use of standard bridge check lists. The testing of the steering gear and controls is one of the most important checks prior to sailing. It is likely that, had there been shipboard regime or a company policy or instruction to ensure that controls and steering were tested before sailing, the previously undetected fault in the steering controller would have been discovered.Analysis The jog stick was examined by TSB investigators and an independent firm hired by the tugowner. It was conclusively established that, at some time in the past, the steering controller (jog) had been forced past the limiting screw on the port side. Thereafter it became easier to go past the limit position without meeting the resistance of the port side limiting screw. When this happened, as on 11 May 1995, the jog would not return to the neutral position on its own and would remain jammed in the port-engaged position. The crew on board the tug were not aware of this fault as they had not used the aft-deck steering jog during the few days prior to the occurrence. Although the master's certificate of competency had been obtained twenty nine years ago, existing regulations do not require updates to his training. The deckhand had no formal training at all. Training, in addition to reinforcing knowledge and skill, reinforce safe working practices. Because navigation in restricted waters like the Fraser River is a challenging task, shipping companies usually invest in training, particularly where some time has elapsed since the acquisition of a certificate of competency. The International Chamber of Shipping in their Bridge Procedures Guide recommend the use of standard bridge check lists. The testing of the steering gear and controls is one of the most important checks prior to sailing. It is likely that, had there been shipboard regime or a company policy or instruction to ensure that controls and steering were tested before sailing, the previously undetected fault in the steering controller would have been discovered. The incident occurred in partial darkness. The master of the tug was taking a break and was resting in the galley section of the deckhouse at the time of the occurrence. The deckhand left the jog stick by which he was steering immediately prior to the occurrence. The tug veered sharply as the jog stick had jammed in the hard to port position. It was positively established that the limiting screw on the aft jog stick for the steering had worn out rendering the jog stick defective and liable to jamming in the port-alteration position. The defect in the aft electrical controller had been present for some time prior to the accident. Any jog stick located on the tug overrides the steering wheel in the wheel-house. The tug and barge struck the docks and other facilities at Celtic Shipyards and also other vessels berthed there before the tugmaster could regain control of the tug. The tug SEACAPXII and barge SEASPAN619 were not damaged as a result of the occurrence, however the dock structure and other vessels were damaged to different extents.Findings The incident occurred in partial darkness. The master of the tug was taking a break and was resting in the galley section of the deckhouse at the time of the occurrence. The deckhand left the jog stick by which he was steering immediately prior to the occurrence. The tug veered sharply as the jog stick had jammed in the hard to port position. It was positively established that the limiting screw on the aft jog stick for the steering had worn out rendering the jog stick defective and liable to jamming in the port-alteration position. The defect in the aft electrical controller had been present for some time prior to the accident. Any jog stick located on the tug overrides the steering wheel in the wheel-house. The tug and barge struck the docks and other facilities at Celtic Shipyards and also other vessels berthed there before the tugmaster could regain control of the tug. The tug SEACAPXII and barge SEASPAN619 were not damaged as a result of the occurrence, however the dock structure and other vessels were damaged to different extents. The SEACAPXII with SEASPAN619 in tow struck various vessels and shore facilities in the Fraser River because the jog stick for the steering on the tug jammed due to an undetected defect. The steering control was left unattended for a brief period and the consequent delay in recognizing the problem and rectifying it contributed to the occurrence.Causes and Contributory Factors The SEACAPXII with SEASPAN619 in tow struck various vessels and shore facilities in the Fraser River because the jog stick for the steering on the tug jammed due to an undetected defect. The steering control was left unattended for a brief period and the consequent delay in recognizing the problem and rectifying it contributed to the occurrence.