Summary In the late evening of 21April2002, while proceeding upbound in the Saint Lawrence Seaway off Broder Island in calm conditions, the barge PittsCarillon, pushed by the tug Progress, struck and knocked over crib light82. As the tug and barge continued to sail over the submerged navigation aid, both vessels were holed and took on water. They were able to proceed to an Iroquois Lock service dock for inspection and repairs. There was no pollution and no one was injured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessels Description of the Tug-Barge Unit The Progress is a conventional harbour tug of steel construction. The navigation bridge is above a tier of superstructure on the fore part of the main deck. There is one conning position in the wheelhouse, which has an open layout with wide windows giving an unobstructed view in all directions from approximately 6m above the waterline. Photo2. Barge PittsCarillonwith deck cargo (work boat) aft The PittsCarillon is a flat-topped steel barge designed to carry deck cargo. It is fitted with two anchoring spuds, which were in the raised position for transiting the Seaway. A 10m long work boat was secured aft on the deck at centre. The spuds and work boat projected approximately 3.5m above the barge's deck (about 5.5m above the waterline). (SeePhoto2.) Description of the Navigation Aid Crib light82 is located approximately 100m southeast of Broder Island. The fixed navigation aid is a white circular tower with a red top 10.1m high above water level, resting on a 3.5m diameter concrete base. The light characteristic is flashing red with a four-second interval and it has a nominal range of 4nautical miles (seePhoto3). History of the Voyage At 2105,2 on 20April2002, the tug Progress, pushing the barge PittsCarillon, departed Montral bound for Hamilton, Ontario. The tug's bow had been made fast to the bow (raked end) of the barge, thereby making the square-ended stern of the barge the leading edge of the tow (seeFigure1). En route, the master observed that the tug-barge unit proceeded at an unusually slow speed of only 4 knots at full ahead power. After exiting the Saint-Lambert lock, the Seaway Beauharnois Traffic Control Station was informed that the unit would be secured in the vicinity of Cte-Sainte-Catherine for crew rest. Under directions from the master, the first officer would conduct the vessel through the South Shore Canal to the next lock and, if necessary, to extend his watch accordingly. Figure1. Push-towing configuration of the tug Progress and barge PittsCarillon when leaving Montral At 0130 on 21April2002, the tug-barge unit tied-up at the Cte-Sainte-Catherine approach wall. The crew rested until about 0500, and at 0530, they undertook to disconnect the tow and reposition the tug to make its bow fast to the stern of the barge (seeFigure2). Upon completion of the tug-barge connecting rigging, concern was expressed that the rig was inadequately secured and that additional spring lines were necessary to safely operate the tow. The master did not deem it necessary to rig additional spring lines. However, when the unit stopped later, during the Seaway transit, extra spring lines were utilized. Figure2. Push-towing configuration after disconnecting and repositioning vessels At approximately 0630, the tug-barge unit got underway with the barge's raked bow heading the tow. The full ahead speed of the unit then increased to 7knots. At this stage, a decision was made to work a rotating shift of three hours of work and three hours of rest, and this decision was conveyed to the first officer. The first officer stood the first watch. The master visited the bridge for brief periods during the first officer's watches. At 1850, the master had taken the tug and tow unit through the Snell Lock and the first officer started his next watch. The master retired to his cabin at2000. At 2200, the master visited the bridge; there was no shipping traffic in the vicinity. At this time it was suggested that the officers would revert to a sixonsixoff schedule at midnight. The first officer, although having expressed that he was exhausted, agreed. At 2225, the watchman went down to the galley to prepare a sandwich for the first officer. As the tug was not equipped with an autopilot (nor was one required by regulations), the first officer had to steer the vessel while performing other navigational duties. At approximately 2230, the captain was in his cabin and the tow was approaching Broder Island when two successive crashing sounds were heard as the tug jolted abruptly to port. The tug-barge unit had knocked down crib light82 and continued to sail over the submerged navigation aid. (SeeAppendixA Sketch of the Occurrence Area.) The occurrence was reported immediately to Seaway Iroquois Traffic Control Station and to the vessel owners. Both the tug and the barge were holed and took on water. However, the crew was able to control the ingress of water using available pumps. The tug-barge unit proceeded upstream to a Seaway service dock at Iroquois Lock for subsequent survey and repairs. Damage to the Tug and Barge Photo4. Collapsed crib light82 under water The Progresswas holed below the waterline in two locations approximately 2m abaft the collision bulkhead. The forward starboard corner of the barge PittsCarillon was indented and water entered through a side shell fracture. Both vessels sustained damage to shell plating and associated framing. Damage to the Navigation Aid Crib light82 was knocked from its concrete base and remained submerged (seePhoto4). Weather Conditions At 2200 on April21, the Environment Canada Marine Weather Broadcast for the greater Morrisburg to Iroquois section of the St.Lawrence River reported calm and clear conditions with good visibility. The river current was 1.5to 2knots. Personnel Certification and Experience The master had acquired command experience on a small passenger ferry in Sorel, Quebec, and on fishing vessels off the Gasp peninsula. The master held a Certificate of Competency for Master, Ship of Not More Than 350 Tons, Gross Tonnage, or Tug, Local Voyage since September 2001, and had been operating a commercial tug for the present owners. The first officer had been at sea for some 30 years and acquired experience as a navigation officer aboard tankers and other types of vessels. He held a Master Intermediate Voyage certificate of competency. He had gained some experience assisting in piloting on the Great Lakes, some four years earlier. In 2001, he was hired by the present owners as a navigation officer to perform a single 30-day ocean-going delivery voyage of a vessel. His assignment as first officer on the tug Progresswas to be over after completing the push-tow of the PittsCarillon .from Montral to Hamilton The watchman on duty with the first officer was a deckhand with no steering experience, and his duties on the bridge were mainly as a lookout and to identify conspicuous navigation marks. The regulations do not require steering experience for a deckhand who is acting as watchman. His usual duties included the handling of mooring lines during (un)docking, locking duties, and securing deck cargo and towlines. Hours of Work and Rest Practices The master and first officer joined the Progress on 07April2002. When on duty, they worked for six hours followed by six hours of rest. They were required to keep cargo and sea watches while making round-trip voyages. During the shift work, the master and the first officer relieved each other as required. In the evening, prior to the occurrence, it was reported that some of the crew members were not getting sufficient rest because they had to perform lock duty, or that they could not sleep in their off-watch period. Crewing Regulations pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act, Division 2, state the following : (a) a period of rest of not less than six consecutive hours in every 24-hour period; and (b) at least 16hours of rest in every 48-hour period. (a) a period of rest of not less than six consecutive hours in every 24-hour period; and (b) at least 16hours of rest in every 48-hour period. In the 24 hours preceding the accident, the longest period of uninterrupted rest for the crew occurred between 0130 and 0500 on 21April2002. Following that rest period, the navigation personnel worked for three hours followed by three hours of rest until approximately 2230, the time of the accident. Additionally, the crew had consumed varying amounts of caffeine beverages to stay awake, and during their off periods, they were unable to obtain sleep. Navigation Practices The master and the first officer shared the navigation of the tug-barge unit. The master would berth-unberth the tug-barge unit, and most crew members would stand watch during lock transits. The master would then retire to his cabin, one flight of stairs below the wheelhouse, while the first officer was in charge of the navigation. During the master's watch, he was assisted by a crew member who was an experienced helmsman. Navigation of the tug, which included pilotage and helmsman duties, was difficult for the first officer, as the Progresswas not equipped with an autopilot and his lookout had no steering experience. Consequently, in order to carry out navigation duties while steering, he had to steady the unit on course, then briefly leave the helm unattended to perform another function, before the tug-barge unit deviated too far from the chosen course. On the night of the striking, the last entry in the logbook during passage was made by the first officer at 2115, when passing calling-in-point No. 11 en route from Eisenhower Lock to Iroquois Lock. No record was found which would assist in reconstructing the track of the tug-barge unit before reaching Broder Island.