The aircraft was operating in environmental conditions conducive to snow penetration into the brake assemblies during ground operations at Kenora. The brake assemblies on the left main landing gear froze, preventing the wheels from rotating during the landing roll at Dryden. The first officer's foot position and pressure application on the rudder pedals prevented effective use of differential braking and nosewheel steering to maintain directional control of the aircraft after landing.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The aircraft was operating in environmental conditions conducive to snow penetration into the brake assemblies during ground operations at Kenora. The brake assemblies on the left main landing gear froze, preventing the wheels from rotating during the landing roll at Dryden. The first officer's foot position and pressure application on the rudder pedals prevented effective use of differential braking and nosewheel steering to maintain directional control of the aircraft after landing. Although the practice of pilots placing their feet on the rudder pedals with their heels on the floor reduces the risk of tire damage from an unintentional brake application, the practice creates a risk that pilots will not be able to use the brakes to maintain directional control. The aircraft manufacturer's AFM does not provide emergency or abnormal procedures for frozen brakes. The company SOP provides very limited guidance regarding frozen brakes, and the Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Publication does not provide any guidance material regarding the risks associated with frozen brakes. Brake freeze-up risk management strategies are, for the most part, undocumented and inconsistently applied by the industry. Industry strategies in some cases contradict the strategies recommended by the brake manufacturer. Some vehicle movements on the Dryden aerodrome were not communicated to Winnipeg Radio, creating a risk that an aircraft movement could occur while a vehicle was on the runway. The continued operation of the runway with a disabled aircraft and vehicles within Zone1 of the runway strip increased the risk to aircraft using the runway. The passengers walked across active airport manoeuvring surfaces to the terminal building with no direct control over their movements. The potential exists for misidentifying or delaying the identification of safety deficiencies in future investigations as a result of FDR data inaccuracies or undetected CVR signal attenuation from phase discrepancies.Findings as to Risk Although the practice of pilots placing their feet on the rudder pedals with their heels on the floor reduces the risk of tire damage from an unintentional brake application, the practice creates a risk that pilots will not be able to use the brakes to maintain directional control. The aircraft manufacturer's AFM does not provide emergency or abnormal procedures for frozen brakes. The company SOP provides very limited guidance regarding frozen brakes, and the Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Publication does not provide any guidance material regarding the risks associated with frozen brakes. Brake freeze-up risk management strategies are, for the most part, undocumented and inconsistently applied by the industry. Industry strategies in some cases contradict the strategies recommended by the brake manufacturer. Some vehicle movements on the Dryden aerodrome were not communicated to Winnipeg Radio, creating a risk that an aircraft movement could occur while a vehicle was on the runway. The continued operation of the runway with a disabled aircraft and vehicles within Zone1 of the runway strip increased the risk to aircraft using the runway. The passengers walked across active airport manoeuvring surfaces to the terminal building with no direct control over their movements. The potential exists for misidentifying or delaying the identification of safety deficiencies in future investigations as a result of FDR data inaccuracies or undetected CVR signal attenuation from phase discrepancies. The graded runway strip intended to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft running off the runway fulfilled its purpose for the landing ofBLS342. The crew's action of shutting down both engines before the runway excursion most likely prevented structural failure of the propeller system and possible subsequent damage to the cabin integrity.Other Findings The graded runway strip intended to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft running off the runway fulfilled its purpose for the landing ofBLS342. The crew's action of shutting down both engines before the runway excursion most likely prevented structural failure of the propeller system and possible subsequent damage to the cabin integrity. The operator corrected the wiring of the cockpit audio/microphone jacks and confirmed proper operation of the CVR. The operator reported that no further problems existed with the mixed channel. L3 Communications, the manufacturer of the FA2100CVR, is in the process of revising the Installation and Operation Manual for the CVR Functional and Intelligibility Test procedures, to ensure that operators check the 120-minute channels for proper operation. The Transportation Safety Board sent an Aviation Safety Advisory (615-A040037-1) to Transport Canada suggesting that they may wish to consider action to ensure that pilots understand the risks associated with frozen brakes and are adequately prepared to maintain directional control on landing.Safety Action Taken The operator corrected the wiring of the cockpit audio/microphone jacks and confirmed proper operation of the CVR. The operator reported that no further problems existed with the mixed channel. L3 Communications, the manufacturer of the FA2100CVR, is in the process of revising the Installation and Operation Manual for the CVR Functional and Intelligibility Test procedures, to ensure that operators check the 120-minute channels for proper operation. The Transportation Safety Board sent an Aviation Safety Advisory (615-A040037-1) to Transport Canada suggesting that they may wish to consider action to ensure that pilots understand the risks associated with frozen brakes and are adequately prepared to maintain directional control on landing.