A flash fire is defined by the NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, 1995 edition, as a fire that spreads rapidly through a diffuse fuel, such as dust, gas, or the vapours of an ignitible liquid, without the production of damaging pressure. When the port tunnelman lit his lighter in a pocket of methane, it initiated the flash fire. Sufficient methane was being given off from the open gates of the centre conveyor to allow the flame front to propagate into the starboard tunnel. The very minor heat damage to the clear plastic light cover coupled with the lack of sustained burning of combustible material in the area suggests that the heat generated during the flash fire was localized and of short duration. Once the methane had been consumed, the fire was extinguished. There was insufficient energy available to ignite the coal dust present in the vicinity of the No. 8 gate below the No. 5 hold or in the transfer area aft of that point. Based on the tests conducted and eyewitness accounts of the conditions in the tunnel prior to the flash fire, a reasonable conclusion is that the amount of coal dust present in the area of the No. 8 gate on the port side under the No. 5 hold did not, in itself, present an explosion hazard. Methane readings were taken at the forward and aft open access-hatchways to all of the holds during transit of the Welland Canal. No detectable methane was found in the Nos. 1, 2, and 4 holds, which held Southern High Volatile grade coal. Readings of approximately 15 per cent Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) were noted at the Nos. 3 and 5 holds, which held Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal. No detectable methane was found in the tunnel atmosphere before unloading commenced, and no measurable concentrations of methane were detected during the unloading of the Southern High Volatile grade coal. Testing indicated the presence of transient pockets of methane gas of sufficient concentrations to be an explosion hazard at the open gates during the unloading of the Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal. The gas pockets were detected randomly at all of the open gates of the Nos. 3 and 5 holds at one time or another during unloading. Low levels of methane were also detected in the loop belt casing at various times.Analysis A flash fire is defined by the NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, 1995 edition, as a fire that spreads rapidly through a diffuse fuel, such as dust, gas, or the vapours of an ignitible liquid, without the production of damaging pressure. When the port tunnelman lit his lighter in a pocket of methane, it initiated the flash fire. Sufficient methane was being given off from the open gates of the centre conveyor to allow the flame front to propagate into the starboard tunnel. The very minor heat damage to the clear plastic light cover coupled with the lack of sustained burning of combustible material in the area suggests that the heat generated during the flash fire was localized and of short duration. Once the methane had been consumed, the fire was extinguished. There was insufficient energy available to ignite the coal dust present in the vicinity of the No. 8 gate below the No. 5 hold or in the transfer area aft of that point. Based on the tests conducted and eyewitness accounts of the conditions in the tunnel prior to the flash fire, a reasonable conclusion is that the amount of coal dust present in the area of the No. 8 gate on the port side under the No. 5 hold did not, in itself, present an explosion hazard. Methane readings were taken at the forward and aft open access-hatchways to all of the holds during transit of the Welland Canal. No detectable methane was found in the Nos. 1, 2, and 4 holds, which held Southern High Volatile grade coal. Readings of approximately 15 per cent Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) were noted at the Nos. 3 and 5 holds, which held Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal. No detectable methane was found in the tunnel atmosphere before unloading commenced, and no measurable concentrations of methane were detected during the unloading of the Southern High Volatile grade coal. Testing indicated the presence of transient pockets of methane gas of sufficient concentrations to be an explosion hazard at the open gates during the unloading of the Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal. The gas pockets were detected randomly at all of the open gates of the Nos. 3 and 5 holds at one time or another during unloading. Low levels of methane were also detected in the loop belt casing at various times. No Cargo Declaration describing the characteristics and recommended safe handling procedures for the Pocahontas No. 3 Seam and Southern High Volatile coals loaded on 06 August 1995 were offered to or requested by the master. The IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes regarding the safety requirements and other precautions to be followed during loading, carriage and discharge of coal cargoes was not followed. Company Safety Guidelines, in place at the time of the explosion, prohibiting smoking in the tunnels of self- unloading vessels, were not followed. The flash fire resulted from the ignition of a pocket or pockets of methane gas when the port tunnelman attempted to light a cigarette. Personal protective equipment provided a measure of protection for the tunnelmen against the effects of the flash fire. The crew believed that the Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal did not give off methane and was thus not dangerous to handle. Tests conducted during the unloading of a subsequent cargo of Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal showed that methane was present in the air space above the coal at average concentrations of 15 per cent of the Lower Explosive Level (LEL). Tests conducted during the unloading of a subsequent cargo of Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal showed that methane exceeding 100 per cent of the LEL was present in the tunnels, in transient pockets. The crew were well-trained and reportedly responded quickly and efficiently to the emergency. There is no material safety data sheet available for coals.Findings No Cargo Declaration describing the characteristics and recommended safe handling procedures for the Pocahontas No. 3 Seam and Southern High Volatile coals loaded on 06 August 1995 were offered to or requested by the master. The IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes regarding the safety requirements and other precautions to be followed during loading, carriage and discharge of coal cargoes was not followed. Company Safety Guidelines, in place at the time of the explosion, prohibiting smoking in the tunnels of self- unloading vessels, were not followed. The flash fire resulted from the ignition of a pocket or pockets of methane gas when the port tunnelman attempted to light a cigarette. Personal protective equipment provided a measure of protection for the tunnelmen against the effects of the flash fire. The crew believed that the Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal did not give off methane and was thus not dangerous to handle. Tests conducted during the unloading of a subsequent cargo of Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal showed that methane was present in the air space above the coal at average concentrations of 15 per cent of the Lower Explosive Level (LEL). Tests conducted during the unloading of a subsequent cargo of Pocahontas No. 3 Seam coal showed that methane exceeding 100 per cent of the LEL was present in the tunnels, in transient pockets. The crew were well-trained and reportedly responded quickly and efficiently to the emergency. There is no material safety data sheet available for coals. The flash fire in the tunnel of the H.M.GRIFFITH resulted from the ignition of a pocket or pockets of methane gas when the port tunnelman attempted to light a cigarette. Contributing to the occurrence was the belief that this type of coal did not give off methane and was thus safe to handle. The fact that no safety notices prohibiting smoking were posted in the tunnels, that the ship's crew did not comply with Company Safety Guidelines, and the disregard by the ship's officers, shore terminal operators and company personnel of the Notice to Shipmasters Loading Coal (TP 10944) and of the IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes also contributed to the occurrence.Causes and Contributing Factors The flash fire in the tunnel of the H.M.GRIFFITH resulted from the ignition of a pocket or pockets of methane gas when the port tunnelman attempted to light a cigarette. Contributing to the occurrence was the belief that this type of coal did not give off methane and was thus safe to handle. The fact that no safety notices prohibiting smoking were posted in the tunnels, that the ship's crew did not comply with Company Safety Guidelines, and the disregard by the ship's officers, shore terminal operators and company personnel of the Notice to Shipmasters Loading Coal (TP 10944) and of the IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes also contributed to the occurrence. Following this occurrence, TSB Marine Safety Advisory No. 1/96 was forwarded to TC Marine Safety concerning the lack of knowledge of crews of the hazards of handling coal cargoes. In response, TC issued Ship Safety Bulletin No. 04/96 on the potentially hazardous properties and characteristics of coal cargoes on ships. The Bulletin also reminds ship personnel of basic fire prevention procedures to be followed, and urges them to follow the recommendations contained in the IMO Code of Safe Practice for Bulk Cargoes (BC Code) and in the Notice to Shipmasters Loading Coal (TP 10944). TC further indicated that TP 10944 will be amended: to require that cargo and adjacent spaces on Canadian ships loading in ports outside of Canadian waters be monitored for the presence of methane gas; and to incorporate the recently amended coal entry in the BC Code, and that it will be widely circulated when completed.Safety Action Taken Following this occurrence, TSB Marine Safety Advisory No. 1/96 was forwarded to TC Marine Safety concerning the lack of knowledge of crews of the hazards of handling coal cargoes. In response, TC issued Ship Safety Bulletin No. 04/96 on the potentially hazardous properties and characteristics of coal cargoes on ships. The Bulletin also reminds ship personnel of basic fire prevention procedures to be followed, and urges them to follow the recommendations contained in the IMO Code of Safe Practice for Bulk Cargoes (BC Code) and in the Notice to Shipmasters Loading Coal (TP 10944). TC further indicated that TP 10944 will be amended: to require that cargo and adjacent spaces on Canadian ships loading in ports outside of Canadian waters be monitored for the presence of methane gas; and to incorporate the recently amended coal entry in the BC Code, and that it will be widely circulated when completed.