Synopsis The CSL ATLAS departed from Lower Cove, Newfoundland, bound for New York, U.S.A. The master did not engage the services of a pilot for the departure. Shortly after, the vessel grounded 1.1 cables west of Pigeon Head. The CSL ATLAS jettisoned 5,645 tonnes of cargo and was refloated later the same day. The vessel sustained extensive damage to the underside portion of the hull; three compartments were holed. There was neither pollution nor injury as a result of this grounding. The Board determined that the CSL ATLAS grounded because the master sailed at night from a port with which he was unfamiliar, did not employ the recognized departure procedure, did not establish either a bridge resource management regime or a voyage plan for leaving the berth, and did not engage either the pilot or tug available. 1.0 Factual Information 1.1 Particulars of the Vessel CSL ATLAS Official Number - 71599 Port of Registry - Nassau, Bahamas Flag - Bahamian Type - Self-unloading bulk carrier Gross Tons - 41,173 Cargo - 57,289 tonnes of limestone pellets Length 227.40 m Breadth 32.05 m Draught F2: 12.00 m (at departure) A: 12.25 m Built - 1990, Verolme, Brazil Propulsion - One two-stroke, six-cylinder Sulzer diesel engine rated 11,995 kW, driving a single fixed-pitch right- handed propeller - Bow thruster fitted Owners - CSL International Beverly, Massachusetts, U.S.A. 1.1.1 Description of the Vessel The CSL ATLAS has five holds beneath which are double-bottom tanks. The bow thruster compartment and the forward peak tank are forward of the collision bulkhead and extend from the main deck to the bottom of the shell plating. The... 1 Units of measurement in this report conform to International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards or, where there is no such standard, are expressed in the International System (SI) of units. 2 See Glossary for all abbreviations and acronyms. 3 All times are NST (Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) minus 3 hours) unless otherwise stated. ...navigation bridge, crew accommodation and engine-room are all located aft (see photographs - Appendix A). 1.2 History of the Voyage The sequence of events is derived from interviews of the ship's personnel. It does not correlate in all respects with other physical evidence. The CSL ATLAS arrived at Lower Cove, Newfoundland, at 14483, on 16 December 1993. A pilot, employed by the mining company, assisted in berthing the vessel. The master and the pilot decided to berth the vessel port side to the wharf because of the strong northerly winds. Upon completion of loading, the vessel departed from Lower Cove at 0154, 18 December, bound for New York, U.S.A. (see sketch of area - Appendix B). The master, who had not requested the services of a pilot, had the conduct of the vessel. On the bridge with the master were the officer of the watch (OOW) and a helmsman. The chief officer and one cadet were stationed forward, and the second officer and one cadet were stationed aft. Because of the absence of any visual aids, navigation was by radar alone, conducted solely by the master. A system of parallel-indexing was used. The echo-sounder had been turned on and set for digital read-out, with the low-depth underkeel clearance (UKC) alarm set at 3 m. The OOW was responsible for operating the engine and bow thruster controls, as ordered by the master, for entering the engine movements into the bell book, and for monitoring the rudder indicator. After all the moorings had been let go, the deck lights remained lit as the crew secured for sea. A look-out was not posted on the forecastle where visibility was not affected by the lights. Over the next half-hour, various courses were steered and various engine movements, from dead slow ahead to full ahead, were executed. Initially, port helm was applied to bring the stern clear of the dolphins and the bow thruster used to starboard to bring the ship's head around. The master then ordered a course of 105 True (T) as the stern of the vessel became aligned with the eastern dolphin. At 0217, with the vessel moving ahead at an estimated speed of between two and three knots, the bow thruster and the helm were set to swing the vessel hard-to-starboard to alter course to 168(T). Soon after, the engine was ordered to full ahead. At this time, the distance from the nearest land echo was reported to have been two cables. However, at 0221, the vessel struck bottom on the forward starboard side and then heeled to port. The engine was put to full astern and, at 0227, the engine control was transferred to the engine-room and maximum revolutions applied. At 0230, all power aboard the vessel was lost and was not restored until 0255. During this period, the CSL ATLAS was reported to have drifted inshore, coming to rest heading 167(T) in a position 254(T), 1.3 cables from Pig Point, Pigeon Head. Internal soundings established that the vessel was holed in the forepeak tank, the bow thruster compartment and the No. 1 double-bottom tank. When power was restored, pumping of the forepeak and No. 1 double-bottom tanks commenced and remained ongoing. Between 1245 and 1340, unsuccessful attempts were made to refloat the vessel by using her own main engines and with the assistance of the small Canadian tug POINT VIKING. Further unsuccessful attempts were made between 1504 and 1640 with the CCGS J.E. BERNIER also assisting. During the latter efforts, the vessel slewed slightly, coming to rest heading 145(T). At 1530, gale force winds were forecast by Environment Canada for the area in which the CSL ATLAS was stranded. Because the vessel was in a vulnerable position, the master requested permission to jettison a portion of the cargo to lighten and refloat the vessel. Approval was obtained from the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Environment Canada officials and the vessel's owners. Using her own discharging equipment, the vessel commenced jettisoning cargo from the No. 1 hold at 1800. The CSL ATLAS was afloat at 2256 and, under the conduct of a pilot, proceeded to a safe anchorage in St. George's Bay. After receiving a damage report from divers, the vessel was issued an Interim Certificate of Class, allowing her to proceed to her destination and thence to dry-dock for permanent repairs. 1.3 Injuries to Persons None of the 32 persons on board were injured. 1.4 Damage to the Vessel Extensive damage was sustained by the forward bottom shell plating. In addition to the three holed compartments, the plating was severely rippled from the centre line to the turn of the bilge, and the forefoot was set up extensively. The damage ran in a fore-and-aft line, on either side of the keel, from the stem to the collision bulkhead. 1.4.1 Environmental Damage Approximately 5,645 tonnes of limestone pellets, jettisoned during refloating attempts, were discharged into the water, 60 m inshore of the grounded vessel. 1.5 Certification 1.5.1 Vessel The vessel was certificated, manned and equipped in accordance with existing regulations. 1.5.2 Personnel Both the master and the OOW held qualifications appropriate for the class of vessel on which they were serving and for the voyage being undertaken. 1.6 Personnel History 1.6.1 Master The master had served in this capacity since 1984 and had been master of the CSL ATLAS for one and a half years. This was his first visit to Lower Cove, although he had conned his vessel in and out of various other isolated ports. He had completed a course on the operation of radar with Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) in November 1991. The master preferred to be on board during cargo operations but not necessarily involved in them. The evening before departure, he retired at 1900 and was awakened at 0100, 18 December. At the time of stand-by, he was absolutely rested. 1.6.2 Officer of the Watch The additional second officer had sailed in this capacity for two years and aboard the CSL ATLAS for three months. He had not previously been to Lower Cove. During cargo operations, he was on deck from 0600 to 1200 and from 1800 to 2400. He did not consider himself tired at the time of departure, although he had slept only four hours the previous afternoon. 1.7 Environmental Information 1.7.1 Weather Before and at the time of the occurrence, the sky was partly cloudy and the visibility, where it was not restricted by the deck working lights, was good. It was dark. There was no appreciable wind. 1.7.2 Tidal Current There was no significant current which may have adversely affected the vessel. High water was at 0210. 1.8 Navigation Equipment 1.8.1 Vessel There was a full range of navigation equipment on board, adequate for the safe operation of the vessel. At the time of the occurrence, the relevant instruments in use were: two Sperry 340 marine radars, each equipped with a Plan Position Indicator (PPI) display. One set is equipped with an ARPA; a gyrocompass repeater at the steering position; an echo-sounder equipped with paper trace, digital read-out capabilities and an adjustable minimum-depth alarm; and a course recorder. The ARPA radar was equipped with features which provide sophisticated technology to support navigation safety. The echo-sounder was reported to have been in operation during departure, set for digital read-out. The minimum-depth alarm had been set at 3 m (depth under the keel), but no alarm was heard at any time. A British Admiralty chart of St. George's Bay was on board, but was insufficiently detailed to be of use for entry/departure in the Lower Cove area. Before departure, the ship's agent gave the master Canadian Hydrographic Service survey field sheets Nos. 1000902 and 1000903 which cover the entire Lower Cove area. When the field sheets on board were examined after the occurrence, there were no tracks which would indicate the planned courses out of the cove nor was there evidence of erasures. The position of the grounding had not been plotted. 1.8.2 Shore There are no shore navigational aids (navaids) in the Lower Cove area during the winter season. Between June and November, an isolated danger buoy is located approximately 3.5 cables south of the Lower Cove berth, indicating the presence of a shoal. This buoy was removed on 23 November 1993, as scheduled, and before the onset of ice. The berth itself remains lit at night and, in addition to the five dolphins, there are prominent points of land which would provide good radar echoes to the proficient observer. 1.8.3 Publications The only publication on board with any reference to Lower Cove was the British Admiralty's Newfoundland Pilot. 1.9 Radio Communications The master advised the local agent and the Coast Guard Radio Station (CGRS) at Stephenville of the grounding at 0609 and 0649 respectively, by very high frequency radiotelephone. At no time was a MAYDAY declared or an URGENCY situation broadcast. A request for tug and pilot assistance was made by the master through the local agent following the grounding. 1.10 Documentation The master's account of the grounding appears in abbreviated form in the deck logbook and the master's report. 1.11 Vessel Stability The vessel had adequate stability at all times. 1.12 Voyage Planning Although a voyage plan for the passage from Lower Cove to New York had been compiled and approved by the master, it excluded any port plan for either origin or destination. Not familiar with the Lower Cove area, the master had sought and received advice from the agent, who was also a master mariner and tugmaster, on the movements of the vessel from the berth to enable her to clear the shoal area to the south. This information was not shared with the navigation officers nor were courses marked on the field sheets, then on board. 1.13 Machinery There was no breakdown or malfunction of the main engine or machinery of the CSL ATLAS before the grounding. 1.14 Electrical System The vessel is equipped with three ship service generators located in the machinery space and one emergency generator located on the boat deck. When water flooded the bow thruster compartment, there was a current surge in excess of 3,000 amps which caused the breakers of the ship service generator to trip. The bow thruster circuit breaker did not trip. A complete black-out resulted. At this stage, the emergency generator should have cut in and restored limited power, but it did not. The electrician went to the emergency generator room and discovered that the manual/automatic start control switch was in the manual mode. No one could explain why this was the case. Once this control was switched to the automatic mode, the emergency generator started and power was restored to the emergency circuits. While the vessel was undergoing repairs, it was discovered that the bow thruster breaker had a trip delay exceeding that of the generator breakers. Apparently, this had been the case since the vessel was built but it had gone undetected until this occurrence. It has since been rectified. 1.15 Description of the Approaches to Lower Cove Lower Cove is exposed to southerly winds. Once a large vessel is inside the cove, there is relatively little room to manoeuvre. The berth lies in a north-east/south-west direction and consists of five dolphins, spaced approximately 52 m apart, extending 282 m from east to west. Vessels usually pass two cables west of Pigeon Head and berth starboard side to. This approach ensures that the masters of fully laden vessels can take the recognized direct departure route to the south-west. It also facilitates a direct departure from the berth in the event of bad weather. The distance from the berth to the north-west corner of Pig Point is 1,220 m, from the berth to a shoal area, 580 m, and the width of the channel between the shoal and Pig Point is 808 m. Fifteen-metre water-depth contours lie 457 m to the south-east and 510 m to the south. Pilotage for the area is non-compulsory but is readily available as is a small tug for assistance in manoeuvring. Because of his unfamiliarity with the Lower Cove area, the master had been previously instructed by the vessel's managers to engage the services of a pilot for both arrival and departure. In addition, the master had been advised that a tug was available. However, the master decided to take the full responsibility of the departure of his vessel. 1.16 Position of Grounding The master maintained that the CSL ATLAS had struck a pinnacle at a distance of two cables (366 m) from Pigeon Head, had heeled to port and then slid off the obstruction. He further maintained that the vessel had then drifted ashore, fetching up 1.3 cables (238 m) from Pigeon Head at 0700. The master made a radiotelephone call to the local agent at 0309 stating that the vessel was aground 1.1 cables (201 m) from Pigeon Head. A confirmed position of the vessel when aground was not recorded by the ship's personnel. However, the pilot, who boarded the vessel to assist after the grounding, determined by radar that the vessel was 1.1 cables (201 m) from Pig Point. She was heading 145(T) and the bow was estimated to be 90 m from the shore. The approximate coordinates were: 1.17 Underwater Inspection An underwater video survey of the vessel showed that she was hard aground across the beam from the bow to the mid-section of the No. 1 double-bottom tank. The forefoot was lifted extensively, the crew in the bow area felt the vessel lift as she made initial contact and heard the sound of tearing metal. The grounding was not felt in the engine-room. 1.18 Confirmation of Water Depth A detailed hydrographic survey of Lower Cove was completed in May 1993. Field sheets were compiled and completed by the Canadian Hydrographic Service (Atlantic) at the Bedford Institute of Oceanography and were published in October 1993. Following the master's report that the vessel had struck an uncharted pinnacle, the CCG Newfoundland Region made a vessel available to make two sounding sweeps of the area off Pigeon Head to confirm the depth of water. At 2034, 24 January 1994, the height of tide was maximum at 0.88 m above chart datum and, with the CCGS J.E. BERNIER in a position two cables west of Pigeon Head, the depth of water was recorded as 24 m. A similar pass was made at low water, which occurred at 0242, 25 January, at which time the depth of water was 0.3 m above chart datum. The depth of water was recorded as 23 m. No trace of the reported pinnacle was found.