Summary A Cessna 172, registration C-GYQB, was returning to Qubec following a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country flight. The pilot contacted the Qubec terminal control unit 28nautical miles west of the Qubec/Jean Lesage International Airport while flying at approximately 3000feet above sea level (asl). Morningstar Air Express Flight7069 (MAL7069), a Cessna208 Caravan, was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from the Qubec Airport to Mirabel, Quebec, at a flight planned altitude of 8000feet. The two aircraft passed within 200feet vertically and 500feet laterally of one another as MAL7069 was climbing through 3000feet asl on departure from the Qubec Airport. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The Cessna172 was flown by a student pilot who was on a first VFR solo cross-country flight. The routing of the flight was Qubec-Saint-Hubert-Trois Rivires-Qubec. The first two legs were uneventful, but the take-off out of Trois-Rivires was delayed due to marginal weather conditions. Prior to take-off out of Trois-Rivires at 1800 eastern daylight time,1 the student pilot did not complete the entire Line-up portion of the checklist, omitting to turn the transponder to the altitude encoding position ALT. The student pilot made initial contact with the Qubec terminal control unit at 1837:42, 28nautical miles (nm) west of the Qubec Airport, while flying at approximately 3000feetasl2 (seeAppendixA). On initial contact with C-GYQB, the Qubec terminal controller called up the flight plan data entry window on the radar situation display (RSiT)3 and typed in the aircraft's abbreviated call sign YQB to obtain a valid transponder code. The Qubec terminal controller then instructed the student pilot to select code4522 on the transponder. Although the student pilot entered the appropriate code, the transponder select switch was left in the standby position. As a result, the selected code was not transmitted to the air traffic services (ATS) radar and only a primary radar position symbol, a small invertedY, was displayed on the controller's RSiT. No data tag information such as transponder code, aircraft call sign, altitude or speed was available. After a flight plan data entry window is called up on the RSiT, the variable system parameter for this feature causes the flight plan entry window to time out after 30seconds and automatically disappear from the display. The reference to C-GYQB was now removed from the Qubec terminal controller's display. To serve as an additional reminder, the controller had also written a flight data strip for C-GYQB and placed it in front of him below the keyboard. He did not follow up with the student pilot to request the aircraft's position, altitude, or intentions, nor did he take further action to radar identify the aircraft. C-GYQB continued flight toward the Qubec Airport without the benefit of a radar advisory service. Morningstar Flight7069 (MAL7069) contacted the Qubec terminal controller at 1840:07 while climbing through 1700feet. At 1841:31, the Qubec terminal controller radar identified the aircraft and instructed MAL7069 to maintain 3000feet. At 1843:48, the Qubec terminal controller instructed MAL7069 to turn to a heading of 240degrees magnetic(M). He did not notice that MAL7069 was now heading directly toward the primary radar position symbol for C-GYQB, also at 3000feet. Other IFR traffic that prevented an unrestricted climb by MAL7069 to the flight planned altitude of 8000feet was an opposite direction arrival to the Qubec Airport descending to 8000feet, and a south-westbound overflight at 6000feet. At 1845:01, the Qubec terminal controller instructed MAL7069 to climb to 5000feet, and within a few seconds, advised MAL7069 of traffic two miles ahead, of an unknown type and altitude. MAL7069 had commenced the climb to 5000feet in accordance with the received clearance, but the pilot did not have time to take other evasive action as a result of the traffic information from ATS. Traffic information was not passed to C-GYQB. Although the student pilot sighted the other aircraft, no information was passed back to ATS and no evasive action was taken. At 1845:27, C-GYQB passed approximately 200feet under and 500feet left of MAL7069. Visual meteorological weather conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. Both aircraft were communicating with the Qubec terminal controller on frequency127.85MHz. The student pilot held a glider pilot licence, which had been obtained the previous summer through the Air Cadets program. The student pilot was selected for private pilot licence training through the Air Cadets program in July2004, and had commenced training at a flight school located at the Qubec Airport. The student pilot had less than 75hours of total flying time. He had completed the same cross-country flight the day before with an instructor. That flight had been uneventful and the student pilot was authorized to conduct the solo cross-country. The pilot of MAL7069 had a total of approximately 3800hours of flying time. He held a valid airline transport pilot licence (ATPL) and aircraft type rating. The Qubec terminal controller was licensed and qualified for the position. He qualified as a controller in 1992and received his IFR qualification in1994. In1996, he qualified to work the Qubec terminal sector. The date of the incident was the first day of combined operations for the Ottawa and Qubec terminal control units, termed the Capitales sub-unit. A number of minor changes to the operational procedures in the Qubec sector were introduced at the time of the amalgamation. The Qubec terminal controller had been undergoing training in the Ottawa sector earlier in the day, prior to working in the Qubec sector. The Capitales sub-unit consists of three sectors; Qubec terminal, and Ottawa arrival and Ottawa departure. Staffing at the time of the occurrence was in accordance with unit guidelines. There were three controllers, one supervisor and a controller-in-training on duty. The traffic level in the Qubec sector at the time of the incident was moderate with some complexity due to multiple IFR approaches to the two intersecting runways at the Qubec Airport. The Qubec terminal controller was controlling seven aircraft. There was also extensive coordination between the Qubec terminal and the Qubec tower to sequence another aircraft that had previously cancelled IFR. This coordination took a considerable amount of both controllers' time and attention, which affected the Qubec terminal controller's scan of the entire RSiT display. The Qubec terminal airspace is comprised of controlled airspace designated either ClassB,D, or Ein which both VFR and IFR flights are permitted; however, VFR flights require a clearance from air traffic control (ATC) to enter ClassB airspace. To the west of the Qubec Airport (seeAppendixA), ClassD airspace starts at 25nm from 3500feet to 12500feet asl and, within 15nm, extends upward from 1400feet. The responsibility for the airspace within 15nm is divided between the Qubec tower and the Qubec terminal, with the tower having jurisdiction from 3000feet and below. The description of the airspace is contained in the Designated Airspace Handbook (DAH), and depicted in the Canada Flight Supplement (seeAppendixB). Both the pilot of C-GYQB and MAL7069 would have had ready access to the latest version of the latter publication in the flight planning phase of their respective flights. ClassD airspace within the Qubec terminal area requires that an aircraft be equipped with a functioning transponder with modeC altitude encoding. Aircraft operating in VFR between 7and 15nm of the airport and between 1400feet and 3000feet are required to contact the Qubec tower, and aircraft operating in this area at altitudes above 3000feet are to contact the Qubec terminal. At the time of initial contact by C-GYQB with the Qubec terminal, the aircraft was at 3000feet and 28nm west of the Qubec Airport, flying in ClassE airspace. Section601.03 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) states that aircraft shall be equipped with a functioning transponder incorporating an automatic pressure reporting device when operating in airspace designated as transponder airspace. Aeronautical Information Publication (A.I.P.Canada), Section RAC1.9.1, states, Transponders substantially increase the capability of radar to detect aircraft, and the use of automatic pressure altitude reporting equipment (ModeC) enables controllers to quickly determine where potential conflicts could occur. Proper transponder operating procedures and techniques will provide both VFR and IFR aircraft with a higher degree of safety. The See and be Seen concept is applicable for both VFR and IFR traffic. A.I.P. Canada, Section RAC6.2, reminds pilots operating in IFR that they must be aware of the need to provide their own visual separation from VFR aircraft when operating in VMC (visual meteorological conditions) in controlled airspace. A.I.P. Canada, Section RAC2.8.4, and the Air Traffic Control Manual of Operations (ATC MANOPS), Section165, describe ClassD airspace as a controlled airspace with the following conditions: Both IFR and VFR flights are permitted, but VFR flights must establish two-way communication with the appropriate ATS agency prior to entering the airspace. Unlike Class C airspace rules and procedures, aircraft do not need a clearance to enter ClassD airspace. ATS separation is provided only to IFR aircraft. Aircraft will be provided with traffic information. Equipment and workload permitting, conflict resolution will be provided between VFR and IFR aircraft, and upon request between VFR aircraft. A person operating an aircraft in VFR in ClassD airspace shall ensure that the aircraft is equipped with radio communication equipment capable of two-way communication with the appropriate ATS unit. Controllers shall take whatever action they consider necessary to separate the aircraft concerned if they know that a VFR aircraft is at the same altitude and in the same general area as a radar-controlled aircraft. Studies have shown that pilots are more likely to see other traffic in their vicinity if they have received information on the other aircraft, such as relative position and altitude.4