Summary The pilot of the Piper Seneca 1, C-GRFE, serial number 347350249, departed Calgary, Alberta, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight to Grande Prairie, Alberta, at 0755 mountain standard time (MST)(1). The pilot had rented the aircraft for a private flight to transport four passengers to Grande Prairie for the weekend. The flight to Grande Prairie was carried out at 8 000 feet above sea level (asl) and a clearance for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 29 was issued and acknowledged by the pilot as the aircraft neared destination. The weather at the time was 200-foot ceiling with a reported visibility of of a statute mile (sm) in fog. While on approach, the aircraft descended, struck a lamp standard adjacent to a highway, entered a steep left turn, and struck the ground. The aircraft cartwheeled onto its nose and came to rest upright, facing in the opposite direction. The five occupants were fatally injured. The accident occurred at 1033. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The pilot commenced flying training in 1995 attaining his private pilot licence (PPL) in December of that year. He then continued his training and obtained a commercial pilot licence, and by 30 November 1997, had obtained endorsements for multi-engine rating, instrument rating, and class-four instructor rating. He had accumulated a total of 428 hours on single and 60 hours on multi-engine aircraft. The pilot's logbook indicates that the multi-engine flying was all done on the Piper Seneca aircraft. During his training for the commercial licence and the instrument rating, the pilot logged 46 hours of under-the-hood instrument time and 2.3 hours of actual instrument time. At the time of the accident, the pilot's medical had not been renewed to maintain the commercial pilot licence. Private pilot privileges of the commercial pilot licence extend six months beyond the expiry date on the licence in this case. He had not flown an approach in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) before the occurrence flight. Arrangements for the rental of the aircraft had been made by the pilot earlier in the week. The Seneca was to be fuelled and ready for an early departure on the morning of 14 March. At 0534 the pilot called the flight service station (FSS) at Springbank, Alberta for a weather briefing and to file an IFR flight plan. The FSS specialist provided a general synopsis, the current weather for Calgary, Red Deer, Whitecourt and Grande Prairie, pilot reports of icing, as well as forecast icing in cloud and the winds. Calgary was reporting a ceiling of 700 feet overcast with visibility of 8 to 10 sm. Red Deer was 2 500 feet overcast with a visibility of 15 sm in snow. Whitecourt was 1 400 feet scattered, 2 000 feet overcast with a visibility of 4 sm in light snow, and Grande Prairie had a special report at 0523 with 400 feet overcast and 2 sm in fog. Grande Prairie was expected to improve later in the afternoon. The terminal forecast for Grande Prairie did not show the deteriorating conditions until amendments were issued. The pilot did not receive the terminal forecast. The ceiling and visibility did start to lower at 0523, and continued to decrease until 1320 when conditions began to improve. The pilot called to revise his departure time at about 0705, but he did not ask for or receive the updated weather. The report at 0600 was wind calm, sm visibility in mist, vertical visibility 200 feet, temperature minus 7 degrees Celsius, and dew point minus 9 degrees Celsius. At 0700 the visibility had decreased to sm in freezing fog, and the vertical visibility was 100 feet. At 0748 the pilot called for his IFR clearance followed by taxi instructions and then take-off clearance from Calgary. The flight departed at 0755. Communications with air traffic controllers on the en route portion of the flight appeared to be normal except for some radio transmissions that had to be repeated. The clearance for the approach to Grande Prairie was acknowledged by the pilot and he confirmed that he had the automatic terminal information system (ATIS) report for Grande Prairie. When asked what his intentions were in the event of a missed approach, the pilot indicated that he would climb to 4 300 feet asl and return to the QU beacon, the procedure as described in the Canada Air Pilot approach sheet for Grande Prairie. Inbound to the airport, when asked by the FSS specialist if he had ATIS, the pilot replied that he had information D. At the time, the weather portion of ATIS information D stated: Grande Prairie Airport information D weather at 1700, wind calm, visibility fog, vertical visibility 200 feet, temperature minus 6, dew point minus 8, altimeter 29.98 The pilot reported by the beacon on the glide path to Grande Prairie FSS, and the next transmission was a MAYDAY call followed, five seconds later, by an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) transmission. At 0828 and 0905, two other aircraft had flown the ILS approach to runway 29, but had to carry out missed approaches and fly to their selected alternate airports. The crew reported that they had entered cloud at about 900 feet above ground level (agl), and that they did not see the ground from the decision height of 200 feet agl. This information was not relayed to the occurrence pilot. A pilot flying an ILS approach in instrument conditions refers to aircraft instruments to maintain the aircraft on the centre line of the runway, and on the glide path to the height where a decision must be made to continue the approach or conduct a missed approach procedure. The ILS equipment picks up radio signals from ground based localizer and glide path transmitters. These signals are depicted on the cockpit instrument by vertical and horizontal needles, and if the pilot flies the aircraft to keep the needles centred, the aircraft will descend on a three-degree glide slope on the runway centre line. Radar data show that from the Grande Prairie beacon, the outer marker for the ILS approach to runway 29 located three nm from the runway, the pilot was not accurately tracking the localizer for the duration of the inbound flight. Turns to the left and right during the descent show that the localizer needle would not be centred. The rate of descent appeared to be normal for the speed of the aircraft. Examination of the wreckage trail and the aircraft showed that the left side of the left engine struck a lamp standard at a height of about 18 feet agl. The lamp standard was located on the south side of a divided, double-lane highway, about 1 200 feet from the end of the runway and 1 400 feet left of the runway extended centre line. The aircraft entered a steep left turn, and the left wing struck the ground in about a 90-degree roll attitude. The aircraft then cartwheeled onto the nose and came to rest heading in the opposite direction of travel. The nose section was crushed to the instrument panel, the aft fuselage had buckled behind the cabin bulkhead, and the empennage had displaced upwards and forward at impact. The fuel tanks had ruptured and were crushed. The undercarriage and flaps appeared to be in the retracted position. Damage to the fuselage and the deceleration forces of the impact made this a non-survivable accident. The Piper Seneca was operated by All West Air Services Ltd. as a training platform for multi-engine and instrument training, and for charter flights. Records indicate that the aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures. The was no evidence of deferred deficiencies relevant to the circumstances of the occurrence in the maintenance logbooks. The aircraft weight and centre of gravity were within the normal range. The aircraft was not equipped or certified for flight into known icing conditions. All West Air Services Ltd. has a set of guidelines and regulations for the flight training program. Section 2, which deals with weather limitations, states that for flights on an instrument flight plan, dual or solo, the pilot in command must be IFR rated and: Take-off 1 sm or greater for day and 2 sm or more for night Cruise - no flights are to be operated into known and forecasted icing conditions APP and landing - as per VFR Alternate weather - as per VFR Prior to departure from Calgary, the chief flying instructor asked the pilot about the Grande Prairie weather, and the pilot's reply indicated that the weather was acceptable. There was no other reported discussion about the flight. The guidelines and regulations could not be found in the pilot's personal flying material.