Radar data indicated that, even with the overloading and a CG about three inches beyond the aft limit, the aircraft had at least a moderate climb capability and was capable of controlled flight. There was no apparent mechanical cause for the sudden departure from controlled flight, and flight controls were operable before impact. Both engines were operating at impact and were capable of producing rated power. Positioning of the engine controls at the idle position suggests that the pilot was conscious when he lost control and that he was attempting to recover the aircraft. There was no indication that the aircraft encountered icing during its brief exposure (about 40seconds) to instrument meteorological conditions. It is unlikely that the pilot became disorientated because he lost control below the reported cloud base. It could not be determined why control of the aircraft was lost. However, several scenarios could have led to the sudden climb: the handles of the grocery bags, which were slung over the right control yoke, might have impeded control yoke movement; unsecured cargo might have shifted, worsening the CG condition; or retraction of the flaps might have induced the loss of control. The aft CG likely contributed to the suddenness of the aircraft pitch-up and would have made regaining control of the aircraft difficult or impossible. The heavy weight of the aircraft would also have affected controllability. By failing to obtain the required approvals from regulatory authorities and by operating the aircraft outside of its flight envelope, the pilot appears to have disregarded normal safe operating practices and aviation regulations, thereby putting himself and others at risk. Had TC inspected the aircraft before the transatlantic flight, deficiencies in the approval process and operation of the flight would likely have been detected and corrected. However, no documentation had been submitted to TC, and TC was unaware of the proposed flight. The following TSB Engineering Laboratory Report was completed: LP 20/2001 - Stabilator Trim CableAnalysis Radar data indicated that, even with the overloading and a CG about three inches beyond the aft limit, the aircraft had at least a moderate climb capability and was capable of controlled flight. There was no apparent mechanical cause for the sudden departure from controlled flight, and flight controls were operable before impact. Both engines were operating at impact and were capable of producing rated power. Positioning of the engine controls at the idle position suggests that the pilot was conscious when he lost control and that he was attempting to recover the aircraft. There was no indication that the aircraft encountered icing during its brief exposure (about 40seconds) to instrument meteorological conditions. It is unlikely that the pilot became disorientated because he lost control below the reported cloud base. It could not be determined why control of the aircraft was lost. However, several scenarios could have led to the sudden climb: the handles of the grocery bags, which were slung over the right control yoke, might have impeded control yoke movement; unsecured cargo might have shifted, worsening the CG condition; or retraction of the flaps might have induced the loss of control. The aft CG likely contributed to the suddenness of the aircraft pitch-up and would have made regaining control of the aircraft difficult or impossible. The heavy weight of the aircraft would also have affected controllability. By failing to obtain the required approvals from regulatory authorities and by operating the aircraft outside of its flight envelope, the pilot appears to have disregarded normal safe operating practices and aviation regulations, thereby putting himself and others at risk. Had TC inspected the aircraft before the transatlantic flight, deficiencies in the approval process and operation of the flight would likely have been detected and corrected. However, no documentation had been submitted to TC, and TC was unaware of the proposed flight. The following TSB Engineering Laboratory Report was completed: LP 20/2001 - Stabilator Trim Cable Control of the aircraft was lost for undetermined reasons three minutes after take-off, during the climb.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors Control of the aircraft was lost for undetermined reasons three minutes after take-off, during the climb. The aircraft was more than 11% above its maximum allowable gross take-off weight, and the centre of gravity was three inches beyond the aft limit, increasing the risk of control difficulties. Cargo stowed on top of the ferry tanks was not secured. The pilot showed a disregard for normal safe operating practices and aviation regulations. Transport Canada was not aware of the proposed ferry flight and therefore could not intervene.Findings as to Risk The aircraft was more than 11% above its maximum allowable gross take-off weight, and the centre of gravity was three inches beyond the aft limit, increasing the risk of control difficulties. Cargo stowed on top of the ferry tanks was not secured. The pilot showed a disregard for normal safe operating practices and aviation regulations. Transport Canada was not aware of the proposed ferry flight and therefore could not intervene. The up stabilator trim cable showed signs of fraying; however, it was determined the cable failed at impact. The emergency locator transmitter was damaged on impact and did not transmit. The ferry tank installation was not approved. A maintenance release was not completed after ferry tank system installation. Necessary documents for the ferry flight were not submitted to regulatory authorities.Other Findings The up stabilator trim cable showed signs of fraying; however, it was determined the cable failed at impact. The emergency locator transmitter was damaged on impact and did not transmit. The ferry tank installation was not approved. A maintenance release was not completed after ferry tank system installation. Necessary documents for the ferry flight were not submitted to regulatory authorities. This accident was the first of two fatal air accidents in Atlantic Canada in 2001. The other fatal accident (TSBReportNoA01A0058) involved a Piper PA-31 that crashed shortly after take-off, killing the pilot and two passengers and seriously injuring a third passenger. Both occurrences involved overloading and incorrect stowage of cargo. On 13July2001, TSB released an occurrence bulletin to Transport Canada, giving details of the occurrences and identifying aircraft loading as a safety issue. Since incorrect loading of aircraft can lead to catastrophic results, including loss of life, the Board is concerned that pilots continue to disregard safety by operating aircraft outside the maximum allowable weight and loading limitations. The Board will continue to monitor this safety issue.Safety Action This accident was the first of two fatal air accidents in Atlantic Canada in 2001. The other fatal accident (TSBReportNoA01A0058) involved a Piper PA-31 that crashed shortly after take-off, killing the pilot and two passengers and seriously injuring a third passenger. Both occurrences involved overloading and incorrect stowage of cargo. On 13July2001, TSB released an occurrence bulletin to Transport Canada, giving details of the occurrences and identifying aircraft loading as a safety issue. Since incorrect loading of aircraft can lead to catastrophic results, including loss of life, the Board is concerned that pilots continue to disregard safety by operating aircraft outside the maximum allowable weight and loading limitations. The Board will continue to monitor this safety issue.