The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea with Canadian Modifications require that all available means, including the use of radar and taking visual bearings of approaching targets, be used to assess the risk of collision and that any action taken to avoid collision must, if the circumstances of the case admit, be positive, made in ample time, and with due regard to the observance of good seamanship. The rules also require that when two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision, each shall alter course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of the other. There is conflicting information with respect to the last minute action of the Westisle. While the Westisle maintains the helm remained on hard-to-port until collision, the CoastalDestinations reported observing the Westisle make a broad alteration to starboard. Damage to the upper deck structure of the port quarter of the Westisle is consistent with her altering course to starboard just before the collision. The Westisle was thus crossing ahead of the IBNo1 when she was struck on the port quarter by the barge's ramp. In any event, small reciprocal actions taken by each vessel resulted in the close-quarters situation. Neither vessel made a substantial course alteration nor did they stop their engines in good time to avert a collision. The non-standard collision avoidance action taken by each vessel without communicating their intent to each other culminated in the collision. The collision avoidance action taken by both vessels suggests that neither vessel was aware of the intentions of the other. Despite this, neither vessel sounded the appropriate sound signal prescribed under the Collision Regulations. Instead, the CoastalDestinations sounded a continuous long blast on the whistle which is reserved for a vessel in distress. At that time, the vessel's head was swinging to port. This would suggest that the need to take collision avoidance measures that are consistent with the Collision Regulations was not fully appreciated by the crew of either vessel. The master of the CoastalDestinations reported two close-quarters situations with unknown fishing vessels on the same night during this voyage. This fact may indicate that the lights displayed by the tug/barge combination cause confusion to the watchkeepers of other vessels. However, there is insufficient information to show that the lights exhibited by the tug/barge were the only cause of the close-quarters situations. At a Vessel Traffic Meeting held in June1993, local fishermen identified the issue of lights and poor visibility of barges and various tows as a long-standing problem on the West Coast. In 1993, the fishing vessel BonaVista collided with the tug/barge combination ArcticTaglu / Link100 (TSB report No M93W1050). Since none of the six persons aboard the BonaVista survived the collision, it could not be determined if the navigation lights exhibited by the ArcticTaglu (a similar arrangement to that of the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1) were a factor or confused the fishing vessel's operator. In May 1994, the TSB forwarded a Marine Safety Advisory to the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) (now TCMS) concerning the importance of the navigation lights displayed by vessels such as the ArcticTaglu and Link100 within the Canadian marine towing industry. In response, the CCG stated that it had carried out an assessment of navigation light requirements for the ArcticTaglu and Link100 in 1988 before the vessels first entered into service. At that time, the CCG had decided that the vessels were not rigidly connected to form a composite unit and evaluated them as a tug-pushing-barge operation. The combination was not lit as a single ship or unit. In July 1994, the Coroner's Inquest into the ArcticTaglu / BonaVista accident found the tug/barge combination fell within the description of a composite unit and recommended, inter alia, that the CCG review the various tug boat-barge configurations so that they are licensed in a manner under which they will be required to have navigation lights that will demonstrate their size and the direction in which they are travelling. In November 1995, in view of the continuing risk of collisions of tug-barge operations in high-traffic areas, the Board recommended that: The Department of Transport ensure that the navigation light requirements for tug-and-barge operations facilitate vessel detection and collision avoidance under all operating conditions, regardless of the tug-barge configuration. (M95 -13, issued November 1995) In response, TC indicated that international requirements for the lighting arrangements for composite units not rigidly connected have been long established, and that these arrangements are well understood by properly trained professional mariners. However, TC indicated that it would conduct a review of the navigation light arrangements for these vessel combinations operating in Canadian waters. The navigation lights of a tug-and-barge composite unit were discussed at a committee meeting held at the May 1996 Canadian Marine Advisory Council (CMAC). The committee did not find that an amendment to the current requirement was needed. TCMS has indicated that no further review is planned. In August 1996, the passenger vessel Statendam nearly collided with the tug/barge combination BelleisleSound / Radium622 in Discovery Passage, B.C. The tug/barge was exhibiting navigation lights arranged similarly to those displayed by the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1. The pilot of the passenger vessel, an experienced mariner, at first believed that the lights he saw were those of two fishing vessels; however, this was not the major contributing factor to the near-collision. This would suggest that difficulty in clearly identifying the navigation lights displayed by tug/barge units on the West Coast is not limited to the crews of fishing vessels. In August 1997, in an Action IN REM and IN PERSONAM before the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, a family member of those lost on the BonaVista as a result of the collision with the ArcticTaglu / Link100 was awarded damages. The judge found, inter alia, that Had the tug/barge combination been lit as a composite unit, it would have been immediately recognizable by mariners, as a single vessel of large size. It is understood that TC is appealing the ruling. Information received by the TSB and recorded in its database shows that, since 1989, the ArcticTaglu has been involved in two collisions and five near-collisions with other vessels at night. It is not known, however, if the navigation lights exhibited by the vessel were a factor in these occurrences.Analysis The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea with Canadian Modifications require that all available means, including the use of radar and taking visual bearings of approaching targets, be used to assess the risk of collision and that any action taken to avoid collision must, if the circumstances of the case admit, be positive, made in ample time, and with due regard to the observance of good seamanship. The rules also require that when two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision, each shall alter course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of the other. There is conflicting information with respect to the last minute action of the Westisle. While the Westisle maintains the helm remained on hard-to-port until collision, the CoastalDestinations reported observing the Westisle make a broad alteration to starboard. Damage to the upper deck structure of the port quarter of the Westisle is consistent with her altering course to starboard just before the collision. The Westisle was thus crossing ahead of the IBNo1 when she was struck on the port quarter by the barge's ramp. In any event, small reciprocal actions taken by each vessel resulted in the close-quarters situation. Neither vessel made a substantial course alteration nor did they stop their engines in good time to avert a collision. The non-standard collision avoidance action taken by each vessel without communicating their intent to each other culminated in the collision. The collision avoidance action taken by both vessels suggests that neither vessel was aware of the intentions of the other. Despite this, neither vessel sounded the appropriate sound signal prescribed under the Collision Regulations. Instead, the CoastalDestinations sounded a continuous long blast on the whistle which is reserved for a vessel in distress. At that time, the vessel's head was swinging to port. This would suggest that the need to take collision avoidance measures that are consistent with the Collision Regulations was not fully appreciated by the crew of either vessel. The master of the CoastalDestinations reported two close-quarters situations with unknown fishing vessels on the same night during this voyage. This fact may indicate that the lights displayed by the tug/barge combination cause confusion to the watchkeepers of other vessels. However, there is insufficient information to show that the lights exhibited by the tug/barge were the only cause of the close-quarters situations. At a Vessel Traffic Meeting held in June1993, local fishermen identified the issue of lights and poor visibility of barges and various tows as a long-standing problem on the West Coast. In 1993, the fishing vessel BonaVista collided with the tug/barge combination ArcticTaglu / Link100 (TSB report No M93W1050). Since none of the six persons aboard the BonaVista survived the collision, it could not be determined if the navigation lights exhibited by the ArcticTaglu (a similar arrangement to that of the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1) were a factor or confused the fishing vessel's operator. In May 1994, the TSB forwarded a Marine Safety Advisory to the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) (now TCMS) concerning the importance of the navigation lights displayed by vessels such as the ArcticTaglu and Link100 within the Canadian marine towing industry. In response, the CCG stated that it had carried out an assessment of navigation light requirements for the ArcticTaglu and Link100 in 1988 before the vessels first entered into service. At that time, the CCG had decided that the vessels were not rigidly connected to form a composite unit and evaluated them as a tug-pushing-barge operation. The combination was not lit as a single ship or unit. In July 1994, the Coroner's Inquest into the ArcticTaglu / BonaVista accident found the tug/barge combination fell within the description of a composite unit and recommended, inter alia, that the CCG review the various tug boat-barge configurations so that they are licensed in a manner under which they will be required to have navigation lights that will demonstrate their size and the direction in which they are travelling. In November 1995, in view of the continuing risk of collisions of tug-barge operations in high-traffic areas, the Board recommended that: The Department of Transport ensure that the navigation light requirements for tug-and-barge operations facilitate vessel detection and collision avoidance under all operating conditions, regardless of the tug-barge configuration. (M95 -13, issued November 1995) In response, TC indicated that international requirements for the lighting arrangements for composite units not rigidly connected have been long established, and that these arrangements are well understood by properly trained professional mariners. However, TC indicated that it would conduct a review of the navigation light arrangements for these vessel combinations operating in Canadian waters. The navigation lights of a tug-and-barge composite unit were discussed at a committee meeting held at the May 1996 Canadian Marine Advisory Council (CMAC). The committee did not find that an amendment to the current requirement was needed. TCMS has indicated that no further review is planned. In August 1996, the passenger vessel Statendam nearly collided with the tug/barge combination BelleisleSound / Radium622 in Discovery Passage, B.C. The tug/barge was exhibiting navigation lights arranged similarly to those displayed by the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1. The pilot of the passenger vessel, an experienced mariner, at first believed that the lights he saw were those of two fishing vessels; however, this was not the major contributing factor to the near-collision. This would suggest that difficulty in clearly identifying the navigation lights displayed by tug/barge units on the West Coast is not limited to the crews of fishing vessels. In August 1997, in an Action IN REM and IN PERSONAM before the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, a family member of those lost on the BonaVista as a result of the collision with the ArcticTaglu / Link100 was awarded damages. The judge found, inter alia, that Had the tug/barge combination been lit as a composite unit, it would have been immediately recognizable by mariners, as a single vessel of large size. It is understood that TC is appealing the ruling. Information received by the TSB and recorded in its database shows that, since 1989, the ArcticTaglu has been involved in two collisions and five near-collisions with other vessels at night. It is not known, however, if the navigation lights exhibited by the vessel were a factor in these occurrences. The Westisle and the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1 were headed on reciprocal courses and in sight of one another in the Strait of Georgia. The CoastalDestinations initially altered course only ten degrees to starboard. The bridge watch of the Westisle did not recognize the lights on the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1 as those of a tug pushing a barge on a reciprocal course, and they altered course to port. Both vessels deviated from the Collision Regulations without communicating their intentions to the other. As the distance between the two vessels decreased, neither vessel made substantial course alterations nor did they stop their engines in sufficient time to avert collision or to allow them more time to assess the situation. Notwithstanding the Board's recommendation M95-13, it appears that a safety deficiency continues to exist in the regulatory provisions that apply to the installation/display of navigation lights on tug/barge combinations in the B.C. towing industry.Findings The Westisle and the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1 were headed on reciprocal courses and in sight of one another in the Strait of Georgia. The CoastalDestinations initially altered course only ten degrees to starboard. The bridge watch of the Westisle did not recognize the lights on the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1 as those of a tug pushing a barge on a reciprocal course, and they altered course to port. Both vessels deviated from the Collision Regulations without communicating their intentions to the other. As the distance between the two vessels decreased, neither vessel made substantial course alterations nor did they stop their engines in sufficient time to avert collision or to allow them more time to assess the situation. Notwithstanding the Board's recommendation M95-13, it appears that a safety deficiency continues to exist in the regulatory provisions that apply to the installation/display of navigation lights on tug/barge combinations in the B.C. towing industry. The Westisle collided with the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1 because the watchkeepers on the fishing vessel did not recognize the lights exhibited by the tug/barge combination and each vessel took non-standard collision avoidance action without communicating their intentions to the other. The fact that neither vessel made substantial course alterations nor did they stop their engines in sufficient time either to avert collision or to allow them more time to assess the situation contributed to the occurrence.Causes and Contributing Factors The Westisle collided with the CoastalDestinations / IBNo1 because the watchkeepers on the fishing vessel did not recognize the lights exhibited by the tug/barge combination and each vessel took non-standard collision avoidance action without communicating their intentions to the other. The fact that neither vessel made substantial course alterations nor did they stop their engines in sufficient time either to avert collision or to allow them more time to assess the situation contributed to the occurrence.