Summary Whilst proceeding on a harbour cruise in Halifax harbour under sail and not under power, the vessel grounded on Pleasant Shoal. The weather at that time was fair, winds southeasterly at 15 to 20 knots and visibility was unrestricted. There were 53 passengers and a crew of 16, including the master, on board. The vessel suffered minor hull damage. No one was injured and there was no pollution. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Description of the Vessel Although inspected and certificated by Transport Canada as a motor powered sailing vessel, the vessel is a schooner built to the same classic lines as the BLUENOSE. The hull was constructed of red oak, spruce and pine. She has two inspection certificates, the first of which authorizes her to trade with up to 90 passengers and a crew of 18 on cruises in Halifax harbour, while the second certificate permits her to make coastal voyages without passengers with the same number of crew members. Passengers are carried on deck. Under-deck accommodation is designated for the use of the crew. The Vessel's Management Structure The Bluenose II Preservation Trust Society is appointed by the Province of Nova Scotia to operate and maintain the vessel as an educational and historical ambassador for the Province of Nova Scotia. For practical and administrative purposes the Society is composed of four members. The Society provides the Province, through the Minister of Tourism and Culture, with a copy of its annual Financial Statements with respect to the operation of the vessel and is bound by the terms of an agreement dated 2 April 1998 for a period of seven years. To assist in the day-to-day running of the vessel, the Society employs an operations manager who acts as a liaison between the master and the Society. All hands are screened by the Society prior to being appointed to the vessel. There are written job descriptions/duties for the master/officers and crew; however, at the time of the occurrence, the Society had not issued Standing Orders or Operational Policy/Instructions to the master. History of the Voyage At 1302 on June 9, the BLUENOSE II departed her usual berth in Halifax, the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic wharf, under power, with no sails set and with a crew of sixteen.[2] This size of crew was deemed to be sufficient to safely handle the vessel in a harbour cruise. The normal procedure was to back out from the dock using both engines until the vessel was in a good position to set her sails. Usually, these are the jib, jumbo, foresail and mainsail and are set--supervised by the mate and second mate--under the command of the master. The normal sail-handling duties were carried out with the mate supervising the main sail from his station on the afterdeck and the second mate supervising the forward sails from his station on the foredeck. As commanded by the master, the engineer operates the engines from a control position at the forward end of the after house. The master and the engineer were both equipped with radiotelephones but, due to technical problems in the sets, the master's unit could transmit but not receive; while the unit supplied to the engineer could receive but not transmit. Communication between the master and the engineer was one way and was also reportedly disrupted by background noises and the sound of the passengers talking. Whilst under way, passengers are allowed to mingle with the crew and move freely in and around the conning position. After the vessel had backed out of her berth to a position between the berth and Georges Island, she was manoeuvred head into the southeasterly wind by her engines, and the sails were set. Reportedly, the master requested the engineer to feather the vessel's propellers at this time; however, the engineer misunderstood and, in addition to feathering the propellers, shut down the engines. He then left the engine control position. The master believed that he had gone below to the engine-room. At 1323 the vessel was on a port tack and heading for the Hen and Chickens Buoy (Number HQ2; see sketch of area). The buoy was visible from the conning position and the master was estimating the vessel's position by referencing the buoy and other visual clues. When it became apparent to him that the vessel's course was taking her towards Pleasant Shoal, he ordered that the vessel be brought onto the starboard tack. He considered restarting the engines to assist in bringing the bow across the wind but was reluctant to do so in case the engineer was in the engine compartment in a potentially hazardous position. The vessel had begun tacking when she ran aground on Pleasant Shoal at about 1330. A small ingress of water was reported in the engine compartment. The rate of the ingress was measured and was found to be well within the capabilities of the bilge pump. Passengers were requested to move to the starboard side forward. With the engines going astern, the vessel refloated at 1353. There was no pollution. Subsequent to the grounding, an underwater survey was carried out in Halifax when it was found that approximately 3 m (9' 8) of the shoe was missing. Closer to the turn of the stem, 0.6 m (2') of shoe was also missing. Open seams were found near the keel and on both sides of it. The open seams were approximately 2 mm wide and 50 mm deep, and were 1.5 to 2.5 m long. Repairs to the hull were carried out afloat. There was no pollution. Marine Communications and Traffic Services The Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) Centre monitors very high frequency (VHF) channel 12, which covers the outer area of Halifax harbour. Prior to and after the time of the grounding of BLUENOSE II, this channel was heavily burdened with various marine radio traffic, including traffic related to vessel manoeuvres within the harbour. The radio traffic was practically non-stop and mostly did not concern the BLUENOSE II. In addition to the MCTS duty officers' responsibility to monitor and communicate by VHF radio, the same personnel maintain a radar watch. A boundary line on the radar display indicates the shallowing water to the west of the channel and to the east of Pleasant Shoal. To attract the attention of the watch officer, a red light at the radar flashes when a vessel approaches the boundary line. Coinciding with the time at which the BLUENOSE II reached the boundary line, a small, powered pleasure craft was zig-zagging along the line. This action caused the warning light at the duty officer's position to flash intermittently. MCTS monitored the course of BLUENOSE II by radar and at 1327 noted that the vessel was crossing the boundary line, to the west of which vessels should not pass. The officer, who was handling the traffic in the lower section of Halifax harbour, did not call BLUENOSE II to caution her that she was standing into danger. At 1329 radio communication between MCTS and BLUENOSE II confirmed that the vessel was inside Pleasant Shoal. At 1333 MCTS asked the vessel if she was aground and was informed that the vessel was stuck but would be off (the shoal) in a few minutes. MCTS also requested to be informed of the number of persons on board and, about a minute later, received an answer: there were 69 including crew members (i.e. 53 passengers and 16 crew members). Navigational Equipment This equipment, which includes an electronic chart with a repeater in the master's room, a Loran C, a Koden radar display, a GPS navigator, an echo sounder and a NAVTEX, is mainly in the chartroom on the starboard side aft. The only navigational equipment visible or accessible from the conning station are a GPS, an echo sounder repeater and a VHF. At the conning position a chart of Halifax harbour, showing soundings in metres, is on display. Repeaters from some of the navigational equipment are mounted in the companionway and are visible from the conning position on the main deck abaft the steering wheel. The echo sounder repeater in the companionway is calibrated in feet, although other options are available. Although the main unit in the chart room operated properly, the repeater occasionally did not exhibit a reading. An audible depth alarm, which could be preset to sound at a selected depth, had been switched off. It was believed that the echo sounder transducer was positioned 10 feet above the keel but it was later determined that this distance was 3 feet. At the time of the occurrence, 10 feet was added to the reading indicated on the echo sounder repeater, to obtain the depth of water. The vessel is also equipped with two magnetic compasses. A spare radar is unused and stowed in the after alleyway at the access ladder to the chart room and accommodation. Radio Equipment The vessel is well fitted with radio equipment and, at the time of the incident, was correctly monitoring and communicating on VHF channel 12. There is a two-way internal speaker system from and to the conning position and a lookout position forward. The radios supplied to facilitate communications between the master and the engineer did not function as designed. Experience of the Master and Crew The master had recently joined the vessel, having spent 35 years in the fishing industry, 25 of which were as fishing master. He had also owned and sailed his own smaller sailing vessel and had, on his own vessel, been in Halifax harbour 10 to 12 times. He holds a valid certificate as master for a vessel of this size and class. On the afternoon of June 9 he was on his second trip of the day in Halifax harbour. Earlier he had exercised the crew in several shake down cruises out of Lunenburg, before sailing to Halifax for the summer season. Although there were no written management procedures, the mate, with 13 seasons on board the vessel, was familiar with management expectations, shipboard duties and sail handling. The master and mates had not attended a bridge resource management (BRM) course, and the master had not considered adapting such a concept to the BLUENOSE II. Passenger Safety The vessel may carry up to 90 passengers on cruises in Halifax harbour. Before the passengers boarded, they were addressed by a member of the crew in an information session. The information imparted was limited to a description of the vessel. The address did not touch upon safety information relating to emergency procedures nor upon the location or use of life-saving equipment. A head count of passengers embarking is made from the sale of tickets on the dock and by a member of the crew with a counter at the gangway. This number was not automatically communicated to the master, who, prior to leaving the berth, was unaware of the number of passengers on board. When Vessel Traffic Services asked the master for the number of passengers on board, he was able to obtain this figure in about a minute. Once on board, no demonstration was made on the use or location of life-saving equipment, nor was information given relating to emergency procedures. During the cruise, passengers are permitted free access to all areas on deck, including the area around the conning position on the afterdeck from which the vessel was navigated. They are also permitted to mingle with the crew in areas where sail is being worked and are subject to the dangers inherent in this aspect of a working ship.