Summary Morningstar Air Express Inc. Flight 8062 (MAL8062), a Boeing 727-200 cargo aircraft (registration C-GMSX, serial number 21673) was on a scheduled cargo flight from Toronto, Ontario, to Halifax, Nova Scotia, with stops at Montral, Quebec, and Moncton, New Brunswick. The aircraft landed on Runway29 at Moncton at about 1222 Atlantic daylight time. After touchdown, the aircraft hydroplaned and departed the runway at the Charlie Taxiway intersection. It crossed the taxiway and came to rest on an abandoned runway threshold a short distance from the taxiway. Damage was limited to tread damage to the four main landing gear tires and destruction of a taxiway light. There were no injuries. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information At 0325 Atlantic daylight time1 on 31August2004, the flight crew (consisting of the captain, first officer, and flight engineer) reported for duty. The flight from Toronto to Montral was uneventful. The aircraft departed Montral for Moncton at 0706; however, because of thunderstorms in the Moncton area, the crew returned to Montral and landed at0954. At 1110, the aircraft again departed Montral for Moncton, with the captain as the pilot flying (PF). Before descent into Moncton, the crew received the Moncton Airport automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information Zulu, which included the following from a special weather observation taken at 1130: surface wind 180magnetic(M) at 11knots; visibility two statute miles (sm) in light rain showers and mist; scattered cloud at 500feet above ground level (agl); overcast cloud at 1400feet agl; temperature 23C, dew point 22C. The active runway was Runway24. At 1154, Moncton Area Control Centre cleared the aircraft to descend. During the descent, the crew received Moncton ATIS information Alpha, which included the following from a special weather observation taken at1150: surface wind 190M at 10knots gusting to 17knots; visibility 4sm in light rain showers and mist. Because Runway29 is serviced by a precision instrument landing system (ILS) approach, the crew members requested an ILS approach to Runway29. They were told to plan for such an approach. Thunderstorm activity was indicated on the on-board weather radar equipment, and the flight was cleared to deviate around the storms. At 1159, the aircraft was handed over to the Moncton Arrival controller. A pilot report (PIREP) from the crew of an aircraft that had just landed at Moncton was passed to C-GMSX. The PIREP indicated that there was continuous light turbulence on the approach and standing water on the runway, and that aircraft braking action was fair to poor. The aircraft was vectored to the ILS localizer final approach course and received clearance for the straight in ILS approach for Runway29. Control of the aircraft was transferred to Moncton tower, and the crew members were informed that airport field maintenance personnel had reported up to inch of standing water on all airport surfaces. The current weather observation indicated light rain; however, heavy rain had been observed for the previous 30minutes. At 1220, the aircraft intercepted the ILS glideslope, and the crew completed the landing checks. The surface wind was 210M at 8knots. The aircraft was cleared to land. Runway29's visual range was 3500feet and decreasing. The surface wind equated to a crosswind from the left at about 8knots. Flight data recorder (FDR) data show that, except for minor localizer and glideslope deviations, the approach was stable with runway environment acquired at 700feetagl. At decision height, the aircraft was on the glideslope, slightly right of the runway centreline. During transition to landing, the aircraft regained the centreline briefly, drifted to the right, then corrected again to the centreline. There was also a modest deviation below the glideslope before touchdown. The aircraft landed approximately 1400feet from the runway threshold at 135knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) on a heading of 284M, four degrees left of the runway heading of 288M. Immediately following touchdown, the speed brakes were manually deployed, the wing flaps were raised from 30 to 25, and the thrust reversers were deployed, all in accordance with the operator's standard operating procedures (SOPs). Three seconds after touchdown, the aircraft began to weathercock to the left. Reverse thrust reached a maximum engine pressure ratio (EPR) of 1.7on the number one and two engines, and an EPR of 2.0on engine number three. The higher EPR on the number three engine had been apparent on previous landings, indicating that the number three thrust lever was likely out of adjustment. However, the mismatch value was approximately twice as much on the incident landing, suggesting that it was used to counter the weathercocking tendency. The initial application of reverse thrust was maintained for four seconds. However, the aircraft continued to drift toward the right side of the runway and the aircraft heading continued to decrease. The thrust levers were stowed and redeployed twice more in an attempt to regain directional control and counter the drift to the right, but the aircraft remained right of the centreline. During this time, the pilot applied full right rudder and a significant amount of right control wheel input with no significant result. At about 70KIAS, with the aircraft heading about 250M, tire friction began to take effect, and the aircraft departed the left side of the runway. The left main landing gear struck a taxiway light just before Taxiway Charlie. The aircraft continued across a grassy area, entered Taxiway Charlie, and came to rest with all three landing gear on an abandoned runway threshold adjacent to Taxiway Charlie. Moncton tower personnel had observed the incident and notified the airport rescue and fire-fighting (ARFF)unit. ARFF personnel and equipment were at the aircraft in approximately two minutes. Maintenance personnel inspected the aircraft and determined that it could be taxied safely. The aircraft was taxied to the operator's cargo ramp. Further inspection revealed tire damage that was consistent with hydroplaning (reverted rubber). A special weather observation for Moncton Airport was taken shortly after the incident. The surface wind was 200M at seven knots, and heavy thunderstorms and rain were evident. The Boeing 727 aircraft operating manual contains a section titled "Landing on Wet or Slippery Runways" (see AppendixA). In this section, crosswinds and the use of reverse thrust are discussed. The reverse thrust side force and a crosswind can cause the airplane to drift to the downwind side of the runway if the airplane is allowed to weathervane into the wind. As the airplane starts to weathervane into the wind, the reverse thrust side force component adds to the crosswind component and drifts the airplane to the downwind side of the runway. Main gear tire cornering forces available to counteract this drift will be reduced when the anti skid system is operating at maximum braking effectiveness for existing conditions. To correct back to the centreline, reduce reverse thrust to reverse idle and release the brakes. This will minimize the reverse thrust side force component without the requirement to go through a full reverser actuating cycle, and provide the total tire cornering forces for realignment with the runway centreline. Use rudder, aileron and differential braking, as required to prevent overcorrecting past the runway centreline. When established on a track that will regain the runway centreline, reapply steady brakes and reverse thrust as required to stop the airplane. The following is a partial excerpt from the operator's SOPs, discussing the recommended procedures to follow when directional control problems are encountered during a landing on a wet or slippery runway. Immediately release brake pressure. Return to reverse idle. Use rudder, steering and differential braking if required, regain runway centreline. Rolling parallel with the runway and near the centreline, apply reverse thrust and brake pedal pressure to develop maximum braking. Photo1 shows the aircraft moments after the landing. There was significant precipitation and standing water, which would have been conducive to aircraft hydroplaning. The Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) notes that, when hydroplaning occurs, "it is known that a 10-knot, crosswind will drift an aircraft off the side of a 200-foot wide runway in approximately 7seconds under hydroplaning conditions." Aircraft moments after runway excursion Aircraft moments after runway excursion The aircraft flight recorder installation included an FDR and a combined cockpit voice and flight data recorder (CVFDR). The CVFDR was sent to the TSB Engineering Laboratory for analysis, where it was revealed that the audio data was of very poor quality. An intelligibility check had been performed on the audio portion of the CVFDR approximately two months before the occurrence and was determined to be acceptable, but several of the flight data parameters were not being captured. Although not critical in this instance, in a more serious incident, the loss of data could be crucial. The captain had an airline transport pilot licence. The company provided information indicating that the captain had a total flight time of about 6000hours with about 3200hours on type. The first officer had about 3800hours of total flight time with 1119hours on type. As well, the company provided the following information: the captain's flight time in the last 30days was 46.7hours and the first officer's time was 35.1hours; the captain was off duty for 72hours before the occurrence, with 8.5hours of sleep before the first flight. He had been awake 10hours at the time of the occurrence. The first officer's equivalent times were 12hours off duty, 5hours of sleep, and he had been awake for 10hours.