Summary On the evening of 23 August 1998, the Sunrise V departed Lewiston, New York, bound for Port Dalhousie, Ontario, with no passenger on board. Due to adverse weather conditions over western Lake Ontario, the master chose to avoid deep water waves by skirting the shoreline with the vessel at shallow draught in the foil-borne, high-speed mode. The Sunrise V was disabled when she made contact with a submerged object off Four Mile Point, Ontario. The resulting damage to the propulsion system and rudder caused no pollution and no one was injured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The Sunrise V is a Soviet-type Voskhod-2 passenger hydrofoil, designed for operation on navigable rivers and fresh water basins in temperate climate countries. The hull and superstructure are of welded aluminium-magnesium alloy construction, mounted on fixed, stainless steel, surface-piercing foils forward and aft. The hull below the enclosed passenger deck is subdivided into eight watertight compartments, designed to allow the vessel to remain afloat in calm water following damage to the machinery space or to any other single watertight compartment. The bridge is located forward and the machinery space aft. Propulsion power is provided by one high-speed marine diesel engine driving a single, highly skewed propeller through a V drive reduction gear. (See Appendix A.) In June 1998, the Sunrise V was introduced into service for fast transit of passengers across Lake Ontario between Toronto and the Niagara region. Certified to carry a maximum of 66 passengers, the ferry is permitted to operate at foil-borne speeds (of up to 60 km/h), in wave conditions not exceeding 1.3 m in height. The vessel's schedule varies from day to day. Weekday trips of about one hour's duration between Toronto and Port Dalhousie and Niagara-on-the-Lake provide commuter service from 0700 to 2200 eastern daylight time (EDT).2 On weekends, the vessel usually transits between Toronto and Lewiston, New York, from 0900 to 0130 the next morning. On 23 August 1998 at 1620, the Sunrise V departed Toronto with 66 passengers on board, on a regularly scheduled voyage of about 37 miles to Lewiston, New York. At approximately ten miles out and travelling at foil-borne speed, the vessel encountered wave heights that exceeded her safe operating limits. The speed was then reduced to settle the vessel into the displacement mode until she reached the sheltered waters of the Niagara River. The hydrofoil arrived in Lewiston at 1815 and discharged her passengers. Due to the adverse weather, the return trip to Toronto was cancelled. The master decided to depart Lewiston that evening and deliver the vessel to Port Dalhousie, where she would be ready for a scheduled departure at 0700 the next morning. In order to avoid the high waves further out on the lake, the master set a course close to the shoreline. At 1856, the vessel departed Lewiston and proceeded at foil-borne speed down the Niagara River, rounded Mississauga Light and turned to port to skirt the shoreline of the lake in a westerly direction towards Port Dalhousie. The master was alone on the bridge. At 1915, the Sunrise V was passing Four Mile Point on a reported course of 282True, when the vessel shuddered then veered to starboard. The engineer reported to the master that a vibration and screeching noises were coming from the reduction gear and shaft. The main engine was declutched and the vessel settled into displacement mode for an emergency stop. The master reported that his position after coming to a stop was 43 16' N, 079 07' W. The anchor was dropped but did not hold. The vessel drifted in a north-easterly direction towards a line of yellow spar buoys demarcating a Department of National Defence firing range danger area that the vessel had crossed earlier. Several residents ashore saw and heard the hydrofoil touch bottom close to Four Mile Point and they watched the vessel continue for approximately 100m before turning away from shore and coming to a stop. One resident immediately alerted the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) Search and Rescue (SAR) station at Port Weller, Ontario. Unable to make radio contact with anyone on board the Sunrise V, Port Weller SAR dispatched the rescue vessel CGR 100 which arrived on scene at 1937. At that time, the Sunrise V was approximately 460 m off Four Mile Point in position 43 15.75' N, 079 07.85' W. The water depth was approximately 3.2 m. After ascertaining that there was no passenger on board, that no one was injured and that the vessel was not taking on water, the CGR 100 stood by to await the arrival of an assisting vessel owned by the same company. The conventional ferry Lake Runner arrived on scene at 2114 and took the disabled hydrofoil in tow to Port Weller. It was determined later that the Sunrise V had sustained damage to the rudder, shaft, propeller, skeg, reduction gear and coupling. The master of the vessel regularly monitored Environment Canada weather broadcasts and sought reports on lake conditions from local shipping. At the time of the occurrence, the wind was from the south-west at 20 to 25 knots, with waves 1 to 2 m high over the lake. In the lee of the shoreline, wave heights were 0.3 to 0.6 m and visibility was clear. A severe thunderstorm watch had been issued by Environment Canada at 1730 for western Lake Ontario. Also, the water level for Lake Ontario was 0.678 m above chart datum (measured at Port Weller). At present, no Canadian regulations exist for the inspection of high-speed vessels. Until regulations can be developed, the Board of Steamship Inspection (BSI) has allowed the use of the Code of Safety for Dynamically Supported Craft (DSC Code),3 and the International Code of Safety for High Speed Craft (HSC Code)4for inspecting high-speed craft. The DSC Code was prepared by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1977 to facilitate research and development of dynamically supported craft in order that they would be accepted internationally. It was predicated on the idea that the traditional method of regulating passenger ships should not be accepted as the only possible way of providing an appropriate level of safety. Over a period of 30 years, new vessel designs had been developed that could not fully comply with existing safety conventions, but they had demonstrated an acceptable level of safety when operating on restricted voyages under approved maintenance and supervision schedules. In 1983, when the first hydrofoil-type vessel was to enter passenger service in Canada, the BSI approved the use of the DSC Code for inspection and regulation of such vessels in Canada. The HSC Code was prepared by IMO in 1994 as an update to the previous DSC Code. The safety philosophy of the Code is based on the management of risk through accommodation arrangement, active safety systems, restricted operation, quality management, and human factors engineering. The application of the Code is subject to several provisions, amongst them that the management of the company operating the craft exercises strict control over its operation and maintenance through a quality management system.5 In 1996, the BSI approved the use of the HSC Code for certification and approval of Canadian high-speed craft, stating: the Board ruled that the IMO Code of Safety for High Speed Craft, modified and amplified by the provisions of Annexes 1 and 2 to this Decision may be applied for the certification and approval of Canadian High Speed Craft. 6 The HSC Code applies to high-speed vessels built or imported into Canada after 01 January 1996. However, it is the contention of Transport Canada Marine Safety (TCMS) that the HSC Code does not apply to vessels operating in the Great Lakes. As a result, the Sunrise V was inspected under the provisions of the older DSC Code and the company was not required to have a quality management system in place. Accordingly, the Sunrise V was approved and certified to carry 66 passengers and 4 crew on voyages across western Lake Ontario, not more than 20nautical miles from a port of refuge. The vessel was restricted from operating in foil-borne mode when wave heights exceeded 1.3 m. Commercial use of hydrofoil craft is new to Canada and few ship's officers have experience in their specialized high-speed operation. However, TCMS now issues HSC endorsements for qualified masters, mates, and engineers. The managing owner of the Sunrise V had previous experience operating hydrofoils in the Mediterranean. He established an in-house training program whereby an officer would train for a minimum of two weeks as mate and a further two weeks as master, receiving TCMS endorsements at each level. Marine Safety surveyors witnessed each candidate in the actual operation of the hydrofoil prior to certification. At the time of the occurrence, six masters and mates had received HSC endorsements. The vessel carries a master, mate, engineer, and purser. Minimum certification for the master is a Master Home Trade 350 tons certificate, and for the engineer a second class motor certificate. If the vessel carries more than 50 passengers, the mate must hold at least a watchkeeping mate's certificate, otherwise no qualifications are required for the mate. At the time of the occurrence, the master and engineer held qualifications appropriate for the class of vessel on which they were serving and for the voyage being undertaken. The mate held no marine qualifications despite the fact that the vessel had just completed a voyage with 66 passengers on board. The purser held no marine qualifications nor was she required to. The master had over 20 years' experience as a ship's officer, mainly on the Great Lakes. He had worked for the owner during the previous year as captain on board the conventional ferry Lake Runner. His first operational experience with hydrofoils began with his training on board the Sunrise V in May 1998, one month prior to the vessel's formal entry intopassenger service. Following this, he sailed for two weeks under the supervisionof the managing owner before receiving a master's HSC endorsement from TCMS. He had worked an average of 51 hours per week with only occasional days off since the end of April 1998. In order to maintain an adequate amount of sleep when not at home or between voyages, the master sometimes napped in a passenger seat on board or in a chair at the company office. He also made use of a small two-berth cabin on board the Sunrise V where he had slept on the evening prior to the occurrence. He had no training in Bridge Resource Management (BRM). The mate had worked previously as a deck-hand on board the Port Weller pilot boat. His primary occupation was ashore with a local steel company. Due to a strike at his primary place of employment , he had worked full-time during the 1997 sailing season as a deck-hand on board the Lake Runner. During the 1998 season, he was hired on a part-time basis on board the Sunrise V, usually for weekends and holidays. The engineer was an experienced seagoing engineer since 1987. He had been employed with the company during 1997 on board the Lake Runner, and in 1998 he served on board the Sunrise V and her sister hydrofoil the Sunrise VI. He had worked an average of 57 hours per week both on scheduled voyages and on machinery maintenance since the beginning of June, with only occasional days off. The navigation equipment on the Sunrise V was found to be in good working condition. However, the layout of the cockpit is such that the Furuno model 1721 radar and Furuno model GP 30 global positioning system (GPS) cannot be easily seen by a second person sitting in the jump seat behind the operator. The radar was on and set to a scale of two miles when the hydrofoil struck bottom. The master reported that the vessel's position was being determined by a combination of radar / GPS and visual estimation. The Sunrise V carried on board Canadian Loran chart L/C 2077 covering the entire western end of Lake Ontario, but the scale was small and it did not show details of the lake bottom for the area around Four Mile Point. Canadian Hydrographic Service (CHS) chart No2043 would have been more appropriate. At the time of the occurrence, no paper chart was displayed at the conning position nor was a space provided for one to be displayed. Following the collision between the conventional ferry Queen of Saanich and the high-speed ferry Royal Vancouver (TSB Report No M92W1012), it was found that no navigational charts were available to bridge personnel on the high-speed ferry. Subsequently, the operator of the Royal Vancouver prepared nautical charts for the vessel's route, divided into plasticised sections, to facilitate effective and quick reference from the conning position. Contrary to the DSC Code, the vessel was not fitted with a depth-sounder for use when the vessel was in displacement mode, and subsequent to the hydrofoil coming to an emergency stop, the crew used poles over the side to try to ascertain the depth of water. As a consequence of the bridge being uncrewed during this initial stage of the occurrence, attempts by SAR stations to make radio contact with the disabled vessel were unsuccessful. All aids to navigation in the area were reported to be in position and operating normally at the time of the occurrence. The CHS Sailing Directions warns that shoal water near Four Mile Point extends up to 0.3 mile (550 m) offshore. Boaters are cautioned to avoid this danger by keeping farther offshore. Boulders litter the lake bottom in the shoal area and it is reported by CCG SAR Port Weller that numerous pleasure craft go aground or are stranded in this area each year. A Department of National Defence (DND) small arms firing range danger area is located midway between the entrance to the Niagara River and Four Mile Point and extends 2.8 km offshore. It is marked with a series of yellow spar buoys. The occasional use of the firing range is announced by local CCG marine radio broadcasts, and by advertisement in local papers. Because of the dangers presented by the shoal water, boulders and DND firing range area, local mariners usually sail at a safe distance off Four Mile Point. The company operating the Sunrise V did not have a safety management system in place, and formal procedures were limited to two pages of general instructions to the crew. No company procedures were available concerning navigational safety measures required on routes such as between the Niagara River and Port Dalhousie. The company did not provide recommended sailing routes to its masters. Instead, reliance was placed on the master choosing the best route to the vessel's destination. The Sunrise V had passed close to Four Mile Point on at least two previous occasions. At about 1720 on 21 August, the Sunrise V passed through the area of shoal water and boulders near the Point. At approximately 1015 on 23August, the vessel again passed close to Four Mile Point. On both occasions the vessel was heading in an easterly direction.