Synopsis At night, in poor visibility, the FEDERAL OSLO was proceeding at a full speed of 13.5 knots, from Wilmington, Delaware, USA, to Contrecoeur, Quebec, when she collided with the stationary fishing vessel SHELLEY DAWN II. Both vessels sustained minor damage. No one was injured and there was no pollution. The Board determined that the collision between the FEDERAL OSLO and the SHELLEY DAWN II occurred because neither vessel was maintaining a proper look-out and the FEDERAL OSLO had not reduced speed in fog. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. 1.0 Factual Information 1.1 Particulars of the Vessels 1.1.1 Description of the Vessels The FEDERAL OSLO is a general cargo/bulk carrier with accommodation, open-winged bridge and engine-room located aft. The SHELLEY DAWN II is a typical Cape Island fishing vessel with her wheel-house located forward of amidships and an open afterdeck from which the fishing operation is conducted. 1.2 History of the Voyages On the evening of 10 April 1994, the FEDERAL OSLO was steering a north-easterly course by autopilot and was heading for the Cabot Strait. The visibility had deteriorated during the evening hours and it was reported that the vessel was making the appropriate fog signal. The speed of the vessel was maintained at 13.5knots (kn) and the master had the conduct. The only other person on the bridge was the officer of the watch (OOW). Two radar sets were monitored independently by the master and the OOW. All the windows and the port-side door to the wheel-house were closed but the starboard door, on the lee side, was open. Suddenly, in approximate position 4312'N, 6347'W, the master observed a bright, white light close to and almost abeam on the port side of his vessel. He immediately ordered the OOW to disengage the autopilot and to put the helm hard-a-port to take the stern of his vessel away from the fishing vessel which was bumping down his port side. It was about 2122(3). Engine revolutions were reduced to slow ahead and the master rushed to the bridge wing in time to see the unidentified vessel clear the stern of his own ship. The SHELLEY DAWN II had laid her longlining gear during the day of 10April, just east of the La Have Bank (see Appendix A). Immediately before the collision, she was stopped in the water with her engine idling. No sound signal was being made. All four crew members were in the process of hauling back the fishing gear. In the unmanned wheel-house, one of the two radar sets was turned off and the other was on stand-by. None of the crew members were aware of the presence of the FEDERAL OSLO until that vessel was alongside their vessel's port side. 1.3 Injuries to Persons 1.4 Damage A subsequent inspection of the hull of the FEDERAL OSLO revealed scuff marks on the port-side shell plating adjacent to the No. 2 hatch and the amidships draught markings. The scuff marks extended from the waterline to approximately one metre above it. The SHELLEY DAWN II was inspected upon her return to port and the following damage was observed: a deck fracture in the area of the port bow; port and starboard bulwark rail cap fractured at the stem scarf; in the wheel-house, the port-side windows and the horizontal plate through which the engine exhaust pipe passes were leaking; the very high frequency radiotelephone and the cellular telephone antennas were both broken; and approximately 1,800 m of longline fishing gear was lost. 1.5 Certification The FEDERAL OSLO was certificated, manned and equipped in accordance with existing regulations. The SHELLEY DAWN II had a valid inspection certificate (SIC 29), but its validity was contingent upon the log card of each inflatable liferaft carried being endorsed annually by the supplier's accredited service person. This endorsement had not been made since 20 November 1990. 1.5.1 Qualifications of Personnel Both the master and the OOW of the FEDERAL OSLO held qualifications appropriate for the class of vessel on which they were serving and for the voyage being undertaken. Both had completed radar (Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA)) courses. Although the radar certificates issued to the OOW became invalid in 1991, his Certificate of Competency was still valid. The operator of the SHELLEY DAWN II did not possess a Certificate of Competency nor was he required by regulation to be certificated. 1.6 History of Personnel The master had served in this capacity since 1984 and had been appointed to this vessel in March 1994. He had no previous experience in the eastern Canadian waters. The OOW had served in this capacity since 1990 and had been appointed to this vessel in January 1994. The operator had been skipper for 25 years, the last 7 1/2 of which had been on this vessel. He had been fishing in the eastern Canadian waters for 31 years. 1.7 Environmental Information 1.7.1 Weather Forecast from Maritimes Weather Centre The wind was from the south-west at 30 to 35 kn then shifting to the west at 20 to 30 kn at about 2400. Visibility was poor. Light rain was falling and there were occasional moderate showers. Seas were at 2,5 to 3 m. 1.7.2 Weather as Recorded by the FEDERAL OSLO At 2000, the FEDERAL OSLO recorded the weather as Wind south, force 7 (Beaufort scale = 30 kn). A generalized summary for the period 2000 to 2400 read: Zero visibility, heavy rain shower, rough seas and moderate swell. 1.7.3 Weather as Reported by the SHELLEY DAWN II Weather conditions are generally not recorded aboard fishing vessels, but the operator was able to recall that, immediately before the collision, winds were south-westerly at 25 to 30 kn with 2 to 3 m seas, and that visibility was 0.25 to 0.5 mile because of fog and rain. 1.8 Navigation Equipment The vessel is equipped with the following principal navigation aids (those marked with an asterisk (*) were in use at the time of the occurrence): two marine radars (3 cm)*, one of which is an ARPA model equipped with conventional Plan Position Indicator (PPI) displays and daylight viewing visors; autopilot, gyrocompass*, Loran C navigator*, and satellite navigator*; depth-sounder, radio direction finder, magnetic compass* and an appropriate chart for the area; navigation lights* and an automatic electrical whistle*. The vessel was equipped with the following navigational aids: two marine radars (3 cm); depth-sounder*, three LoranC navigators* and a magnetic compass*; and navigation lights* and a hand-operated electrical sound-signalling device. 1.8.1 Serviceability, Procedures and Use of the Navigation Equipment Both radar sets aboard the FEDERAL OSLO were checked by a technician at Contrecoeur, Quebec, and found to be functioning normally. The master of the vessel, who had been monitoring the ARPA set, indicated that sea clutter extended to about two miles but that small targets, believed to be fishing vessels, had been detected. The OOW indicated that, on the other radar set, rain clutter was more of a problem than sea clutter. Regardless of these facts, neither the master nor the OOW detected the echo of the SHELLEY DAWN II on the radar set they were monitoring. 1.8.2 Radar Reflectors The SHELLEY DAWN II was fitted with a 45 cm radar reflector mounted atop her foremast approximately 9 m above the waterline. In addition, on her afterdeck, there were six marker buoys (high flyers) each topped with a 30 cm radar reflector and situated some 3 m above the waterline. The SHELLEY DAWN II had been identified as a radar target by the fishing vessel STEPHEN ROBERT when the two vessels were approximately 0.75 mile apart. 1.9 Bridge Resource Management The crew of the FEDERAL OSLO was made up of three nationalities. English was the working language and there was no report of communications problems. Because of the restricted visibility, the master had been on the bridge and had assumed the conduct of the vessel since 1800. The appointed able seaman (AB) for the first watch (2000-2400) had been delegated to sound the ballast tanks. No relief deck-hand was called to replace him. The OOW had expressed his concern to the master that there was no look-out posted. The master decided that a look-out and the use of manual steering were not necessary at that time. 1.10 Radio Communications Before the collision, neither vessel made a radio security call to advise other vessels in the area of their presence. After the collision, radio communication was established between the vessels and, by this means, the FEDERAL OSLO was able to determine the identity of the vessel with which she had collided. At the request of the SHELLEY DAWN II, a Canadian Coast Guard Radio Station was advised of the accident by the FEDERAL OSLO.