There were no discrepancies found with the aircraft, airport facilities, or air traffic services. This analysis will focus on those aspects of the flight that were considered causal, contributing, or were identified as presenting a potential safety risk. From the outset of the flight from Toronto, the crew was anticipating a CategoryII approach to Runway23 at Halifax. This anticipation was based on the ACARS reports from the operator's dispatch and the ATIS information at Halifax. It was only during the descent into Halifax that the crew became aware that they would be unable to conduct the approach to Runway23. This change required the crew to re-program the FMS, conduct another approach briefing for Runway14, and also expedite the descent because of the reduced distance to fly to reach Runway14. All of these elements increased the crew workload, and may have contributed to the inadvertent omission of the required monitored approach procedure. The crew did not brief for nor carry out a pilot monitored approach (PMA), which disabled a critical safety defence established by the company to effectively manage low-visibility conditions. The cockpit workload during the transition to visual conditions is shared during a PMA, thus improving the decision making with respect to continuing for a landing. Flying a PMA would also have resulted in the more experienced flight crew member landing the aircraft in the reduced visibility conditions. The co-pilot flown transition became destabilized after the autopilot was disconnected, and this situation became more difficult when the TOGA mode was activated. When the aircraft was being manoeuvred to correct the situation, the aircraft wing contacted the runway. Reverse thrust was not selected until eight seconds after the nose gear was on the runway. These actions were likely a result of limited experience on type and the relatively high-stress, high-workload environment, exacerbated by the dark, low-visibility conditions. The captain had sufficient visual references to assess correctly the aircraft's position and direct corrective action to the first officer. The captain did not take control or command a go-around after the transition became destabilized because he believed that the co-pilot was correcting back toward the centre of the runway and the landing was salvageable. The aircraft settled on both main landing gear at 3550 feet from the threshold of Runway14. The touchdown position, in conjunction with the delay in the application of reverse thrust, led to the aircraft slowing to taxi speed with only approximately 500feet of runway remaining. With even a lightly contaminated runway, the risk of a runway overrun would have been increased. The fact that the CVR continued to operate after the aircraft landed resulted in occurrence information being overwritten, depriving the investigation team of potentially important information relative to the occurrence. This is an ongoing problem with CVR-equipped aircraft, and a solution must be found.Analysis There were no discrepancies found with the aircraft, airport facilities, or air traffic services. This analysis will focus on those aspects of the flight that were considered causal, contributing, or were identified as presenting a potential safety risk. From the outset of the flight from Toronto, the crew was anticipating a CategoryII approach to Runway23 at Halifax. This anticipation was based on the ACARS reports from the operator's dispatch and the ATIS information at Halifax. It was only during the descent into Halifax that the crew became aware that they would be unable to conduct the approach to Runway23. This change required the crew to re-program the FMS, conduct another approach briefing for Runway14, and also expedite the descent because of the reduced distance to fly to reach Runway14. All of these elements increased the crew workload, and may have contributed to the inadvertent omission of the required monitored approach procedure. The crew did not brief for nor carry out a pilot monitored approach (PMA), which disabled a critical safety defence established by the company to effectively manage low-visibility conditions. The cockpit workload during the transition to visual conditions is shared during a PMA, thus improving the decision making with respect to continuing for a landing. Flying a PMA would also have resulted in the more experienced flight crew member landing the aircraft in the reduced visibility conditions. The co-pilot flown transition became destabilized after the autopilot was disconnected, and this situation became more difficult when the TOGA mode was activated. When the aircraft was being manoeuvred to correct the situation, the aircraft wing contacted the runway. Reverse thrust was not selected until eight seconds after the nose gear was on the runway. These actions were likely a result of limited experience on type and the relatively high-stress, high-workload environment, exacerbated by the dark, low-visibility conditions. The captain had sufficient visual references to assess correctly the aircraft's position and direct corrective action to the first officer. The captain did not take control or command a go-around after the transition became destabilized because he believed that the co-pilot was correcting back toward the centre of the runway and the landing was salvageable. The aircraft settled on both main landing gear at 3550 feet from the threshold of Runway14. The touchdown position, in conjunction with the delay in the application of reverse thrust, led to the aircraft slowing to taxi speed with only approximately 500feet of runway remaining. With even a lightly contaminated runway, the risk of a runway overrun would have been increased. The fact that the CVR continued to operate after the aircraft landed resulted in occurrence information being overwritten, depriving the investigation team of potentially important information relative to the occurrence. This is an ongoing problem with CVR-equipped aircraft, and a solution must be found. The crew did not carry out a pilot monitored approach in accordance with company procedures and therefore disabled a critical safety defence established to manage landing safely in the low-visibility conditions. The transition from the approach to the landing phase became destabilized when the co-pilot disconnected the autopilot, resulting in the aircraft wing contacting the runway when the aircraft was being manoeuvred to correct the situation. The co-pilot's inability to keep the aircraft stabilized during the transition to landing and his selection of the take-off/go-around (TOGA) mode were likely the result of his limited experience on type and the stress from the low-visibility and relatively high-workload conditions. The captain did not take control or command a go-around once the transition became destabilized.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The crew did not carry out a pilot monitored approach in accordance with company procedures and therefore disabled a critical safety defence established to manage landing safely in the low-visibility conditions. The transition from the approach to the landing phase became destabilized when the co-pilot disconnected the autopilot, resulting in the aircraft wing contacting the runway when the aircraft was being manoeuvred to correct the situation. The co-pilot's inability to keep the aircraft stabilized during the transition to landing and his selection of the take-off/go-around (TOGA) mode were likely the result of his limited experience on type and the stress from the low-visibility and relatively high-workload conditions. The captain did not take control or command a go-around once the transition became destabilized. The touchdown point, in conjunction with the delay in application of reverse thrust, increased the risk of a runway overrun.Finding as to Risk The touchdown point, in conjunction with the delay in application of reverse thrust, increased the risk of a runway overrun. Significant data were lost to the investigation because the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was not shut down after it was determined that the aircraft wing had struck the ground, depriving the investigation team of possible important information.Other Finding Significant data were lost to the investigation because the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was not shut down after it was determined that the aircraft wing had struck the ground, depriving the investigation team of possible important information. Safety Action Taken WestJet Airlines The flight crew were given simulator training in low-visibility approaches, and completed line checks with a company check pilot. A memorandum was issued to all dispatch personnel advising them that, when passing runway visual range (RVR) information to flight crew, they must also include the applicable runway along with the time and date. The memorandum will be included in the next Flight Dispatch Operations Guide revision. Guidance on the required information will be given during training for dispatch personnel. Revisions to flight crew training procedures have been introduced that place additional emphasis on hazards associated with low-visibility transition to visual references during instrument approaches, and on the requirement to use monitored approach procedures in these conditions. In addition, training will involve discussion of procedures to be carried out in the event of loss of visual reference below decision height (DH), such as missed approach/rejected landing procedures. The approach procedures for CategoryI and II instrument landing system (ILS) approaches are being harmonized to make both procedures as similar as possible. Amendments to the operator's company operations manual have been issued outlining the changes to the approach ban limits. The operator has completed an internal risk assessment and has entered into discussions with NAV CANADA, Transport Canada, and other industry organizations to explore the possibility of conducting auto-landings on CategoryI ILS approaches. Transport Canada Aviation regulations have been amended to prohibit commercial aeroplane operators from beginning an approach when visibility is so poor that a successful approach to a landing is unlikely. The regulations will establish, for all runways where visibility is reported, the minimum visibility for the crew to begin an approach in what is termed an Approach Ban. The amendments will also extend the requirements to runways where conditions are reported by an instrument-rated pilot or qualified person rather than a sensor. In addition, the regulations will help harmonize Canadian regulations with international standards and respond to recommendations from the TSB. These changes came into force 01 December 2006 and affect commercial operators. The most significant changes to the Approach Ban affect commercial operators holding operating certificates under the Subparts702, 703, 704and 705of the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) operating aeroplanes in instrument flight rules (IFR). Minimal changes to the approach ban affect IFR commercial helicopter, and IFR aircraft operations by private operators and general aviation. For more information regarding the new "Approach Ban" regulations, visit the Transport Canada web site. The following table provides an overall summary of the present approach ban minima, and the minima that will apply after the new regulations come into force. Approach ban minima, and the minima that will apply after the new regulations come into force.