Summary The Air France cargo Boeing 747-200 was parked at gate 111 at Montreal International (Mirabel) Airport, Quebec, and was being prepared for a flight to Charles de Gaulle Airport, France. The ramp operations, conducted by Air Canada employees, were almost completed when the co-pilot requested taxi clearance from the apron controller. Taxi clearance was issued and the captain started to taxi the aircraft. A ground handler and a ground power unit (GPU) vehicle were still situated under the aircraft. After the aircraft had taxied about 85 feet, its right wing main landing gear struck the GPU vehicle and pushed it approximately three feet before the captain stopped the aircraft. There were no injuries; however, the aircraft sustained minor damage to two main wheel tires and to a wheel-well door. The incident occurred in daylight conditions. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The aircraft was being prepared for flight by two ground handlers and one aircraft maintenance engineer, all Air Canada employees. One ground handler, the signalman, was located forward of the right wing at approximately the three o'clock position relative to the co-pilot. Both Air France and Air Canada ground operating procedures state that the signalman must take up a position forward of the aircraft, within view of the flight crew. However, the open ramp concept at Mirabel does not allow the signalman to operate safely forward of the aircraft because of other vehicle traffic and the possibility of jet blast from other aircraft. The aircraft maintenance engineer was situated just slightly forward of the signalman and was observing the engine start-up sequence. The other ground handler, who was in charge of communications, was situated under the nose of the aircraft and had his headset connected to the intercom system during the engine start-up sequence. He told the pilots that the aircraft was clear before the commencement of the engine start-up sequence. The ground power unit (GPU) vehicle was situated on the right forward side of the aircraft. The ground handling procedures of both companies state that the GPU vehicle should be driven clear of the aircraft as soon as it is disconnected and no longer in use. However, according to local practice, the GPU vehicle is kept close to the aircraft so that the ground handler can use it to transport the wheel chocks and himself away from the aircraft. The policies of the air carrier (Air France) and of the company handling ground operations (Air Canada) specify that the ground handler in charge of communications with the crew shall not disconnect the intercom communication cord before all staff and equipment are outside the security perimeter (designated as 25 feet around the aircraft). The ground handler disconnected his intercom and gave the all clear to the pilots; however, he had difficulty securing the intercom trap door. The flight crew was not aware of this difficulty. The aircraft maintenance engineer drove his vehicle to the nose of the aircraft in order to assist his colleague. The members of the flight crew did not see the aircraft engineer drive his vehicle toward the aircraft because they were busy with cockpit duties. They believed that the ground handler in charge of communications and the signalman were one and the same person. To the crew members, it was, therefore, impossible that someone could still be positioned under the aircraft. They also believed that all vehicles were clear from under the aircraft as required by the operational procedures of both the air carrier and the company handling ground operations. When the co-pilot requested taxi clearance, the controller's response was: Air France 6443, circulez autour de la btisse par la droite pour la sortie Qubec. Translated, this means, Air France 6443, taxi around the building to the right for the Qubec exit. The flight crew mentioned that, from the way it was pronounced, they had understood the word btisse as Bt. 6. All three crew members looked at their airport area charts and searched for the building or area designated as Bt. 6. After searching the charts, they realized that the apron controller meant btisse, which means building in French. The accepted radio phraseology used to designate the building in question is the word cluster or lot; both may be used in French. From the apron control tower, the controller is unable to see the whole aircraft parked at gate 111. The cluster building blocks his view of the area surrounding the aircraft and makes it impossible for him to confirm that the aircraft is clear of all obstacles before he issues the taxi clearance. Even if the position of the aircraft had allowed the controller a better view of the area surrounding the aircraft, the controller is not responsible for confirming that that part of the apron is clear.The responsibility for ensuring that the aircraft is clear of all obstacles before advancing lies with the flight crew. The co-pilot recalls seeing that the signalman had only his closed right hand positioned against his right shoulder. According to the co-pilot, the signal was distorted because the signalman seemed to be talking on the walkie-talkie. The co-pilot interpreted this signal as a somewhat lax signal to proceed. The hand signal to proceed consists of holding the right arm straight out to the side, at shoulder height, and holding the left arm across the chest with the left hand pointing to the right, indicating the direction of travel. The signalman mentioned that he kept his hands in the stop signal position during the engine start-up sequence and that he did not make eye contact with the co-pilot. The hand signal used to indicate stop consists of holding both arms above the head to form an X pattern. The signalman was wearing the same uniform as his colleagues. Only his orange fluorescent gloves differentiated him from the others. These gloves were somewhat dirty and faded, and were not as conspicuous as when they were new. The signalman mentioned that, after the aircraft started to advance, he continued to hold the stop hand signal, moving forward as the aircraft moved forward. He indicated that the co-pilot did not look in his direction. When the aircraft maintenance engineer and the ground handler under the aircraft heard the engines spool up, they rapidly went to their respective vehicles. The aircraft maintenance engineer drove his vehicle away from the aircraft; however, the ground handler's GPU vehicle stalled. The ground handler rapidly exited his vehicle and ran to the left side of the aircraft. At that moment, the captain noticed someone on the left side, by the No. 1 engine, and immediately brought the aircraft to a complete stop. The co-pilot's request for taxi clearance was made 41 seconds after the captain told the intercom ground handler to disconnect and to revert to hand signals. The aircraft started to move approximately 20 seconds after taxi clearance was given, and the aircraft advanced for approximately 33 seconds before coming to a stop. An internal audit of the company handling ground operations for Air France at the Mirabel airport was scheduled for the following month. There was no record of any audits taking place before the occurrence. It is the responsibility of the group supervisors to monitor the ground operations and ensure that they conform to handling company procedures and safe operations.