2.0 Analysis 2.1 Introduction In the canals of the Seaway, when a vessel is unable to reach a berth, it is virtually impossible to stop without striking one of the sides of the canal. The main engine had to be stopped because of engine problems when the FRONTENAC was in a confined section of the Canal de la Rive Sud and, therefore, the vessel was unable to avoid striking the wall of the canal. 2.2 Main Engine The engine problems were unforeseeable, and the situation was serious enough to warrant an emergency shutdown of the engine. The main cause of the problem was identified and detailed by marine surveyors. Engine maintenance was not an issue in this occurrence, although the source of the problem appears to have been the adjustment of the parts of the No. 3 unit. An information bulletin dated 20 May 1993, issued by a specialized firm that services this type of engine, confirmed the risk of wear of these parts. 2.3 Communication Lack of communication between the bridge team and the engine-room staff delayed the engine shutdown. The engine-room staff were waiting for the bridge team to place the engine telegraph in the finished with engine position, while the bridge team, after setting the propeller pitch to neutral, thought that the engineers would stop the engine on their own. This contributed to further damage. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings The FRONTENAC experienced engine problems while transiting the Canal de la Rive Sud in the St. Lawrence Seaway. Although the anchors and the bow thruster were used to manoeuvre, it was impossible to prevent the vessel from striking the concrete wall bordering the southern edge of the canal at Kahnawake. The vessel suffered minor damage, but the Seaway infrastructure was not damaged. Because of a lack of communication between the bridge team and the engine-room staff, the engine shutdown was delayed. The time that elapsed between the problem first being detected and the engine being stopped apparently contributed to the extent of the damage and furthered the risk of a crankcase explosion. The faulty main engine unit was replaced at Kahnawake with a preassembled unit that, unbeknownst to the personnel, had a machining defect. This machining defect of the piston skirt caused further damage to the engine, thereby increasing the risk of a crankcase explosion. The preassembled spare unit used in the temporary repairs carried out at Kahnawake was not a part from the manufacturer (Sulzer). 3.2 Causes The engine problems resulted from one of the piston stud securing nuts of the No. 3 unit backing off and hammering against the piston rod gland diaphragm plate, which eventually fractured. The Board has no marine safety recommendations to issue at this time.4.0 Safety Action The Board has no marine safety recommendations to issue at this time.