Summary The Mallard was inbound for Lock No. 1, Welland Canal and was landing at slow speed on the northernmost section of the tie-up wall. The vessel was still making headway when she came bodily alongside the wall. When the vessel's stern became subject to bank suction and was drawn towards the wall, the bow swung to port across the channel. A few minutes earlier, the CanadianEnterprise had departed Lock No. 1 outbound and was keeping to the east of the centre line of the channel. As the bow of the Mallard swung across the channel towards the CanadianEnterprise, measures to avoid collision were taken by both vessels but the port bow of the Mallard struck the port side of the CanadianEnterprise. No one was injured but both vessels were damaged. There was no pollution. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information On both vessels, the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces are located aft. The Occurrence At approximately 0830[2], with a Canadian pilot on board, the Mallard had weighed anchor and departed her Lake Ontario anchorage. She was well underway and inbound for Port Weller piers at 0830 . At 0835 the CanadianEnterprise departed outbound from Lock No. 1 of the Welland Canal. At 0841 there was a brief Very High Frequency (VHF) radio communication between the vessels in which the vessels' positions were given. The Mallard, now in the canal zone, was abeam of the Canadian Coast Guard station and the CanadianEnterprise was halfway out of Lock No. 1. The CanadianEnterprise was steering towards the southern knuckle of wharf No.1. This course would take the CanadianEnterprise toward the starboard side of the approach channel and give the up-bound Mallard adequate sea room. At 0848, in a VHF radio call, the Mallard informed the CanadianEnterprise that she was a ship's length (about 150m) from the northernmost part of the approach wall at Lock No. 1. The meeting of the two vessels in this area is described by the Seaway and Pilotage as a passing entry. The inbound vessel slides along the approach wall with her bow angled approximately 10 to 15 degrees towards the wall, preventing stern suction by keeping the stern off the approach wall. At the time of passing, this angle must be significantly reduced because of the narrow canal section . The outbound vessel passes close by at slow speed to lessen hydrodynamic interaction between the vessels. At approximately 0851, the bridge team of the Mallard observed that the vessel came up against the approach wall while going ahead at a slow speed. The engine was turning dead slow astern to cant the bow to starboard. The engine was then stopped, but the vessel came up bodily against the wall. At this time the Global Positioning System (GPS) indicated a headway of 3.0 to 3.5 knots. Steerage way can be maintained down to a speed of 3.5 knots. Reportedly, in an attempt to bring the bow back to the wall, the pilot put the engine controls to Dead Slow Ahead, to Half Ahead and to Full Ahead in quick succession for periods of 10 to 15 seconds, with the rudder hard-to-starboard. The pilot realized that the engine movements ahead, with the rudder hard-to-starboard, were not successful in regaining steering and he put the engine Full Astern. At this point the vessels were about 220m apart. At 0854 the pilot of the Mallard pilot broadcast by VHF radio that the vessel's stern 'was sucking the wall'. According to observers on board the CanadianEnterprise, the Mallard appeared to have considerable headway when she landed on the approach wall. The bow of the Mallard was seen to come fairly quickly off the wall after the initial landing and start to swing across the canal. Based upon the observations of the bridge team of the CanadianEnterprise, the lock personnel and information retrieved after the occurrence from the Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) component of the vessel's Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), the vessel was to the east of the centre line of the canal at this time. In this area, the canal is about 88m wide. The master of the CanadianEnterprise responded to the VHF call made by pilot of the Mallard and asked if the pilot could stop his vessel. The pilot informed him that he could not. The engine controls of the CanadianEnterprise were ordered to full speed astern, the general alarm was sounded and a warning broadcast by the vessel's public address system for personnel to clear (leave) the vessel's port side. At 0855, with her stern against the western approach wall, the bow of the Mallard struck the CanadianEnterprise in way of hatch No. 2 . The bow flare of the Mallard rode over the sheer strake of the CanadianEnterprise, shearing off vents, sounding pipes, stanchions and a panama fairlead which was dragged aft and forced the accommodation ladder away from its mountings. The Mallard suffered less damage . Just forward of the collision bulkhead, one metre below the forecastle deck, her bow plating sustained a horizontal cut about 3m long by 15cm wide. In addition, shell plating was indented for 3m forward and 2m aft of the cut. The collision occurred approximately abeam of the Limit of Approach sign No.3 (L/A 3) at an angle of about 20 degrees. The estimated speed of the Mallard was about 3 knots. The Mallard separated briefly from the CanadianEnterprise but her bow again made contact with the accommodation area of the other vessel. This second contact caused extensive indentation and abrasion and buckled shell plates in way of the portholes. The pilot then asked the master of the Mallard to drop the starboard anchor. About half a shackle of cable was let go to help to control, to stop and to prevent the vessel's bow from swinging further to port and pushing the stern of the CanadianEnterprise towards the side of the channel. Except for emergencies, Seaway regulations prohibit anchoring in this area. The master of the Canadian Enterprise employed that vessel's bow thruster to advantage to minimize the damage to both vessels and to keep his vessel in the channel. Reportedly, no one was injured on either vessel. The CanadianEnterprise proceeded to the western approach wall and made fast to assess the damage caused to her by the collision. Repairs were made to the satisfaction of the vessel's classification society. The vessel resumed her voyage to Port Cartier at about 1715 the same day. After a brief inspection, the Mallard was allowed by Seaway Welland to transit the locks to Port Colborne, to effect repairs. Further examination of the Mallard indicated no rudder or propeller damage which could have affected her ability to manoeuvre. The Mallardmarginally passed the steering test with a cycle time of 27 seconds in still water conditions with 2 steering engines on. The Seaway maximum time allowance is 28 seconds . According to the pilots who handled the vessel, at dead slow and slow ahead the vessel's response to the helm was poor. The pilots reported that the Mallard was a difficult and cumbersome vessel to handle and attributed this to her large beam to length ratio, trim by the head, and slow steering response. The pilot who was on board at the time of the occurrence was relieved by a pilot who had 18 years experience in the Welland Canal, but he too experienced difficulty in maintaining the vessel's directional stability. When the Mallard was leaving lock No. 7, the vessel sheered to port but there was room to recover. When approaching lock No. 8, the pilot requested that the flow of water over the weir just below the lock be shut off. To maintain control during the approach to the east wall below lock No. 8, the rudder was hard-to-port and the engines were turning full ahead. There was little margin for error. The Welland Canal engineering branch confirmed that the amount of water flowing over the weir beside Lock No. 1 was normal and that it was unlikely that the flow contributed to the loss of control of the Mallard. The Environment Canada Ontario Climate Centre provided information recorded by the automatic weather monitoring equipment at Port Weller Piers at the time of the occurrence. The wind speed recorded varied between zero and five knots. At the time of her departure from the anchorage, those on board the Mallard recorded the wind as being NE at 10 to 15 knots. The weather was clear and the visibility was good. Passing entries are common in the Welland Canal. Apart from minor occurrences where ships have brushed against each other, no similar occurrence has taken place in this area of the canal. Personnel Information The master of the CanadianEnterprise is the holder of a CN1 certificate. He has served as master with the ULS Corporation for approximately 13 years. The pilot joined the District II pilotage (Welland Canal area) in August of 1996. Previously he had several years experience as master of bulk carriers trading in the Great Lakes and bulk carriers engaged in deep sea trading . The pilot holds a GLPA District 2 Pilotage Licence as well as a Master Mariner's Certificate of Competency. At the time of the occurrence the pilot was suffering from Bell's Palsy which affected a facial nerve and the muscles in the right side of his face controlling eyelid movement. When he was not working, he kept a patch over the eye for protection. When he was working, he wore clear, non-prescription glasses. To alleviate the condition, the pilot had been prescribed medication and an eye lubricant. Three days before the occurrence he finished a course of medication to reduce nerve inflammation. The medication is basically a steroid which is prescribed for a limited period (about three weeks) to reduce side-effects such as an increase in blood pressure. The eye lubricant is an isotonic solution, used to keep the eyeball moist. Its use may cause blurred vision, however medical opinion varies on for how long the blurring continues after use, estimates vary from two to fifteen minutes. Medical opinion stated that once the 'blurring effect' had subsided there would have been no loss in visual depth perception and thus would not have affected the pilot's skills. The pilot stated that his use of another non-prescription topical eye medication did not affect his vision or depth perception. The pilot was observed to lubricate his eyeball at an interval of several minutes to 10 minutes before the occurrence , the interval depending on the estimates of the observers at interview. The pilot was adequately rested before commencing his assignment.