Summary The amateur-built VariViggen aircraft departed Bangor Airport, Maine, United States, on 17September2006, at 1711 Atlantic daylight time, on a non-stop, visual flight rules (VFR) flight to Goose Bay, Labrador. The aircraft wreckage was located on 22September2006 in a heavily wooded area about nine nautical miles east of Plaster Rock, New Brunswick. The pilot had been fatally injured in the crash, and the aircraft was destroyed. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information N106VV, a VariViggen two-seat (tandem arrangement), wood and fibreglass aircraft, was registered 06 December1993 as an amateur-built aircraft in the experimental category. The original owner was also the aircraft's builder and was certified to maintain the aircraft. It was powered by a Lycoming O-360-A1A 180HP piston engine, serial number L-18063-36A. From the time it was built and registered in 1993until it was sold in the summer of2006, the original owner operated N106VV from Lawrence Municipal Airport (KLWM) in Lawrence, Massachusetts, United States. The aircraft total flight time was about 140hours. The fuel system on the VariViggen consists of three tanks, a seven-gallon tank installed in each outboard wing leading edge and an aft fuselage-mounted, 25-gallon main tank. Fuel is transferred from the wing tanks via two transfer pumps, to a T-fitting, and a single fuel line then feeds the fuel into the main tank. The engine receives fuel from the main tank only. Maintenance records for the aircraft show that the wing tanks were serviced on 11September2006. During this servicing, the wing tanks were filled with fuel, a leak check was carried out, and the wing tanks were then drained. The accident pilot was appropriately licensed and held a valid pilot's medical. He had about 3000hours of flight time and had experience ferrying a variety of aircraft across the Atlantic Ocean. He had recently purchased N106VV and intended to fly it back to Germany, his home country. From 14to 16September2006, he flew familiarization flights at KLWMand prepared the aircraft for the ferry flight. A 33-gallon ferry fuel tank was installed and secured in the rear seat of the aircraft. Fuel from this tank was fed via a fuel line and transfer pump to the existing fuel T-fitting and from there into the main tank. On 16 September 2006, the aircraft was fully fuelled. The ferry tank was filled first, and the remainder of the fuel was then added to the main tank and two wing tanks. On September17, at 1110 Atlantic daylight time,1 the aircraft departed KLWM under visual flight rules (VFR) and proceeded directly to Bangor Airport (KBGR), arriving at 1243. At KBGR, the aircraft was refuelled with 18.3USgallons. Fuel was added to the ferry tank and the main tank but not to the wing tanks, as these were still full. The pilot filed a VFR flight plan for a non-stop flight to Goose Bay, Labrador (CYYR), and the aircraft departed KBGRat 1711. The pilot did not contact Bangor flight service station after take-off to activate the VFR flight plan to Goose Bay. The last air traffic control (ATC) communication with N106VV was near Millinocket, Maine, when the pilot was advised by Boston Area Control Center (ACC) that he was approaching the edge of Boston's radar coverage, and to contact Moncton Area Control Centre (ACC) in another 20miles. He switched to the Moncton frequency (134.25); however, he did not establish communications with MonctonACC. Data from an on-board, portable global positioning system (GPS) receiver indicates that the aircraft continued en route at about 2500feet above sea level (asl) at an average groundspeed of 115knots. Near Plaster Rock, New Brunswick, flying at 2500feet asl placed the aircraft at approximately 1600feet above ground level(agl). The flight remained uneventful and the aircraft performance was unchanged until just abeam Plaster Rock. A digital camera was found at the wreckage site, and images were recovered from the camera for analysis. Near Plaster Rock, four minutes before the accident, the pilot took a series of photographs. Images of the instrument panel captured the aircraft's GPS position and aircraft operating parameters. The images show the aircraft operating normally and in good weather. There were about 18gallons of fuel in the main tank, and fuel was not being transferred from the wing tanks. The engine was operating at a cruise setting of 2500rpm. The final image, taken three minutes before impact, was a self-portrait in which the pilot appears to be unperturbed. GPS data also showed that, at 1829:16, two minutes before impact, the aircraft slowed and began an uninterrupted descent. The rate of descent increased to about 800feet per minute. The last GPS track point, captured at 1831:20, was for a position just short of the crash site. Two hunters found the aircraft wreckage on the evening of September22, 8.5nm east of Plaster Rock. The pilot was wearing the four-point harness; however, the accident was not survivable, and the pilot was fatally injured during the crash. Wreckage Examination The aircraft descended into the trees on a northeasterly heading, and the wreckage trail was about 200feet long. The aircraft wings tore away during the final portion of the impact sequence. The fuselage then struck the ground in a nose-low attitude, flipped over, and came to rest inverted. The propeller showed no indication that it was turning at impact. The wing fuel transfer switch was found in the ON position. The engine was removed and transported to the TSB wreckage examination facility in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. No mechanical faults were found with the engine; however, the fuel system at the engine was contaminated with water. Approximately one ounce of fluid was drained from the gascolator2 bowl. The fluid was about 90percent water and 10percent fuel. When the carburetor drain plug was removed, approximately one ounce of water drained out of the bowl and no fuel was observed. Water was also found in the engine-driven fuel pump. The amount and concentration of water was sufficient to have stopped the engine. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular20-105B, SectionC (1), Fuel Contamination: Water contamination continues to be a major cause of fuel related accidents... In an aircraft, condensation can happen inside a less than full fuel tank. When a temperature difference occurs between the walls of the fuel tank and the air in the tank, water droplets will form on the inside top part of the fuel tank walls and drain down into the fuel. The effects of condensation can be reduced by keeping the fuel tanks full while the aircraft is parked. Normally, fuel tank drains are installed on each tank. Water is heavier than aviation gasoline and settles below the fuel to the bottom of the tank. By draining a small amount of liquid from each tank into a clear fuel sample cup, a pilot can visually inspect the fuel for water contamination before flight. This fuel can then be tested with water-finding paste, or another type of chemical detector. Fuel should be considered unfit for use in aircraft if a visual examination shows more than a trace of sediment, globules of water, cloudiness, or a positive reaction to chemical water-testing methods. There was no fuel sampling or chemical testing equipment found at the accident site. N106VV did not have wing-tank fuel inspection drains. The VariViggen fuel system design calls for only one fuel drain, located at the gascolator on the engine firewall. Homebuilt experimental aircraft are fabricated and assembled by their owners for educational and recreational purposes. The designs of these aircraft do not have to meet the same FAA standards that apply to certificated aircraft. In 2005, after an accident involving an amateur-built Kolb, model Mark III (National Transportation Safety Board NYC05LA017), the FAA issued a Special Aviation Maintenance Alert. The alert recommended the inspection of all Kolb or other experimental amateur-built aircraft without fuel tank drains installed for contamination and water. Owners were further encouraged to consider installing fuel pickup inlet screens and proper low-point fuel sump drains in the fuel tanks, if not installed. Pilots were advised to be mindful of what goes into their fuel tanks, how long it has been there, and under what circumstances. Search and Rescue Notification The VFR flight plan had been filed, but was not activated upon departure from KBGR. The aircraft was between control agencies when the accident occurred. Canadian air traffic controllers were not aware that N106VV had crossed into Canadian airspace, and N106VVwas not expected at CYYR. Because the flight plan had not been activated, the Halifax Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) search and rescue (SAR) did not receive a notification of an overdue aircraft when N106VVdid not arrive at CYYR. It was not until the evening of 19 September 2006 that a concerned acquaintance of the pilot contacted Canadian authorities, indicating that the pilot had not made contact since departing KBGR. Shortly thereafter, the JRCC initiated a communications search, declared N106VVmissing, and on September20, began air and ground searches for the aircraft. The aircraft wreckage was found by two hunters on the evening of September22. From January 2005 to July 2006, 201VFR aircraft arrived in Canada from the United States without an active flight plan and without the afforded SAR notification. Of these, 66had filed a flight plan that had not been activated upon departure. The others apparently conducted trans-border flights without filing a flight plan. Of those 66that filed without activating, about equal numbers were Canadian and foreign-registered aircraft. During the search for N106VV, aircraft repeatedly overflew the accident site without detecting the aircraft's emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal. When the aircraft wreckage was located, rescuers turned the fuselage upright to gain access to the pilot. A weak signal was then detected by overflying SAR aircraft. The ELT was in the armed position, but the antenna had been torn away during the crash.