Summary A Pacific Professional Flight Centre Ltd. Piper PA-44-180 Seminole aircraft (registration C-FHDP, serial number 44-8095022) was on an instrument flight rules flight plan conducting training in the Abbotsford area. The aircraft was cleared for a non-directional beacon (NDB) approach to Runway 07 at Abbotsford International Airport with circling for Runway 01. At the same time, a Canadian Flight Centre Inc. Piper PA-44-180 Seminole aircraft (registration C-FCFZ, serial number 44-7995098) en route from Langley, British Columbia, was transiting the Abbotsford control zone under visual flight rules, southeastbound, at 2500 feet above sea level (asl). On completion of the circling procedure, C-FHDP commenced the published missed approach procedure, which called for a climb to 1200feetasl on a track of 068degrees magnetic, followed by a right climbing turn to a heading of 202degrees magnetic to 3000feet asl, and then a right turn to the XXNDB. As C-FHDP was climbing through 2100feetasl and was 1.3nautical miles from C-FCFZ, the terminal controller in Victoria, British Columbia, noticed C-FCFZ on radar and saw the impending conflict. He instructed the pilot of C-FHDP to stop the climb at 2000feetasl and issued traffic information. The pilot of C-FHDP reacted quickly by beginning a descent to 2000feet. The two aircraft passed with about 0.75nautical miles lateral and 500feet vertical spacing, and safety was not assured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the occurrence. At 1432:22 Pacific daylight time,1 C-FHDP, with two pilots on board, made initial contact with Victoria terminal. At 1435:08, the Victoria terminal controller cleared C-FHDP direct to the WC non-directional beacon (NDB) and for a straight-in instrument landing system (ILS) or NDB approach to Runway07 at Abbotsford. C-FHDP read back the clearance correctly and requested clearance for circling to Runway 01. The controller advised C-FHDP to request circling clearance from Abbotsford tower. At 1439:40, the terminal controller instructed C-FHDP to contact Abbotsford tower. The crew did so, advising that they were on a straight-in approach for Runway07. The Abbotsford tower controller provided the current altimeter setting of 30.05and requested that the pilot report when the aircraft was by the XXNDB. C-FHDP acknowledged and requested the circling low approach and overshoot of Runway01. At 1443:27, the tower controller issued circling clearance for Runway 01. At 1445:25, C-FHDP commenced the circling procedure to the south of Runway07. At 1446:20, the pilot of C-FCFZ called Abbotsford tower, advising that he was six nautical miles (nm) northwest at 2000feet above sea level (asl), climbing to 2500feetasl. The tower controller cleared C-FCFZ through the control zone southeastbound, and radar-identified the aircraft at 1446:40. At this time, C-FCFZ was 5.8nm from Abbotsford Airport. At 1446:43, the terminal controller asked the tower controller on the hotline if C-FHDP was still circling. The tower controller replied in the affirmative and advised that C-FHDP would be in the missed approach at 1448. At the time, C-FHDP was turning final for Runway01, 1.5nm from the threshold. At 1447:01, the tower controller cleared C-FHDP for a low approach to Runway01. At 1448:00, C-FCFZ advised the tower that they would switch to terminal and request a higher altitude. The controller instructed C-FCFZ to contact Victoria terminal on 132.7 MHz. Section 391.5 of the NAV CANADA Air Traffic Control Manual of Operations (ATC MANOPS) requires controllers to "inform aircraft if radar service is terminated." C-FCFZ was not so informed when changed over to Victoria terminal. The tower controller did not advise the terminal controller of his intention to transfer communication of C-FCFZ to the Victoria terminal frequency. Section138.1 of the ATC MANOPS advises controllers to "Maintain close coordination at all times between positions of operation within ATC units and between these positions and other ATC units...." An unwritten practice existed between Abbotsford tower and Victoria terminal to discourage prior coordination of visual flight rules (VFR) traffic requesting air traffic control (ATC) services from Victoria terminal in order to reduce frequency congestion and workload. At 1448:10, the tower controller instructed C-FHDP to contact Victoria terminal on 132.7MHz. At this time, the two aircraft were 3.2nm apart. The missed approach procedure being followed by C-FHDP would take the aircraft through the altitude of C-FCFZ (2500feet asl) while C-FHDP climbed to the missed approach altitude of 3000feetasl. As per the unwritten practice, the tower controller had not made any prior coordination with the terminal controller about C-FCFZ, and did not pass traffic information to either aircraft or provide conflict resolution. Both aircraft were flying in ClassD airspace. Section RAC 2.8.4 of the Aeronautical Information Publication (A.I.P. Canada) defines ClassD airspace as airspace in which "ATC separation is provided only to IFR aircraft. Aircraft will be provided with traffic information. Equipment and workload permitting, conflict resolution will be provided between VFR and IFR aircraft, and upon request between VFR aircraft." At 1448:13, C-FCFZ called Victoria terminal; however, the terminal controller did not hear the call because he was talking on the hotline with the tower at Bellingham, Washington, United States. At 1448:19, just six seconds later, C-FHDP also called Victoria. It is likely that, if the controller heard part of the first call while he was on the hotline, he might then have assumed that it was the same aircraft calling again a short time later. The terminal controller instructed C-FHDP to fly heading201 and climb to 4000feetasl. The terminal controller did not notice C-FCFZ's radar target on his radar display. The radar situation (RSiT) display showed the radar return of C-FCFZ as a digital target with modeC altitude, but with no registration or speed. The Victoria terminal controller works primarily with aircraft targets that have additional data (such as registration and speed) linked from a flight plan. This presents a more compelling visual cue to the controller. He also was controlling aircraft in different parts of the sector; this placed additional demands upon his attention. Section 502.1, A. Note, of the ATC MANOPS states that Section 502.1, Note, of the ATC MANOPS tells controllers that Shortly after instructing C-FHDP to contact Victoria terminal, the Abbotsford tower controller recognized that a conflict between the two aircraft was possible. He called them both in turn on the tower frequency but got no response. He also dialed in the Victoria terminal frequency on his standby radio and listened to the terminal controller to determine whether both aircraft were in communication with Victoria terminal. The Victoria terminal controller was occupied with a series of communications, and a decision was made by the tower controller that activating the hotline would aggravate, not assist, the situation. At 1449:15, C-FCFZ called Victoria terminal a second time, but again got no response. At 1449:18, the Victoria terminal controller noticed C-FCFZ's radar target, recognized there was a conflict, instructed C-FHDP to stop the climb at 2000feetasl, and advised of traffic at one thirty position at one mile, indicating 2500feet. At the time this instruction was received, C-FHDP was 1.3nm from C-FCFZ, climbing through 2100feetasl. C-FHDP reached 2400 feet asl before starting to descend. C-FHDP was at 2000 feet asl when it passed under C-FCFZ. In a subsequent discussion between the Victoria terminal controller and the pilot of C-FHDP, the controller advised that the traffic was VFR and not in communication with him, and the pilot confirmed that Abbotsford tower had not advised him of this traffic. Abbotsford tower is authorized to provide radar service in the Abbotsford control zone. Radar service is defined as a service provided directly by means of radar and it comprises either radar advisory or radar monitoring. Radar advisory is the provision of advice and information based on radar observations, while radar monitoring is the use of radar for the purpose of providing aircraft with information and advice relative to significant deviations from their normal flight path. The document Arrangement between the Vancouver area control centre and the Abbotsford control tower, effective 15July2004, states in SectionD.2.1(b)(iv) "Abbotsford tower shall ensure VFR aircraft are separated from IFR aircraft on instrument approach or missed approach." However, there was an understanding between Victoria terminal and Abbotsford tower that VFR aircraft desiring flight following from Victoria terminal were not to be the subject of coordination with Victoria terminal before a communication transfer.