The statements from several witnesses are contradictory. As the communications between the vessel and the tugs were not recorded, it is hard to determine exactly what sequence of events led to the accident. The location of the cranes on the wharf and the minimum distance between them and the face of the wharf indicate that the vessel could hardly have struck the cranes while remaining parallel to the wharf. According to most witnesses, the bow moved away from the wharf as soon as the mooring lines were let go, and the stern remained against the wharf. However, given that the vessel was in lightship condition and the tide was high, the top of the vessel's structure may have hit the cranes because of the flare of the hull aft. The distance travelled by the vessel along the wharf, as reported by witnesses, ranged between 5m and 100m. The minimum distance between the two damaged cranes was 25m. It was not possible to determine with certainty what order the pilot gave to the tugs. The expressions pull me south (tirez-moi au sud), pull me off shore (tirez-moi au large) and that's OK (c'est OK) could have been interpreted differently by the masters of the tugs and thus could have led to confusion during the manoeuvring operations because they were unclear. When the pilot asked the tugs to pull, the ALEXIS SIMARD was parallel to Duncan Wharf astern of the vessel. It seems that the manoeuvre was carried out eastward rather than southward. The pilot could not see the stern tug from his conning position on the bridge. Similarly, the master of the ALEXIS SIMARD could not see the starboard side of the EVELYN while he was pulling her. The towlines were under 30m long, and the breadth of the vessel is 24m. Furthermore, there does not appear to have been any agreement as to the power the tugs were to use to perform the initial manoeuvres. Reportedly, the pilot had explained to the master of the EVELYN the procedure that he intended to use for departure, and the master was in full agreement with it. The plan was to move the vessel away from the wharf and then make her move backward toward the bay. Apparently, the tugs were not informed of this procedure, and the manoeuvre did not produce the anticipated results.Analysis The statements from several witnesses are contradictory. As the communications between the vessel and the tugs were not recorded, it is hard to determine exactly what sequence of events led to the accident. The location of the cranes on the wharf and the minimum distance between them and the face of the wharf indicate that the vessel could hardly have struck the cranes while remaining parallel to the wharf. According to most witnesses, the bow moved away from the wharf as soon as the mooring lines were let go, and the stern remained against the wharf. However, given that the vessel was in lightship condition and the tide was high, the top of the vessel's structure may have hit the cranes because of the flare of the hull aft. The distance travelled by the vessel along the wharf, as reported by witnesses, ranged between 5m and 100m. The minimum distance between the two damaged cranes was 25m. It was not possible to determine with certainty what order the pilot gave to the tugs. The expressions pull me south (tirez-moi au sud), pull me off shore (tirez-moi au large) and that's OK (c'est OK) could have been interpreted differently by the masters of the tugs and thus could have led to confusion during the manoeuvring operations because they were unclear. When the pilot asked the tugs to pull, the ALEXIS SIMARD was parallel to Duncan Wharf astern of the vessel. It seems that the manoeuvre was carried out eastward rather than southward. The pilot could not see the stern tug from his conning position on the bridge. Similarly, the master of the ALEXIS SIMARD could not see the starboard side of the EVELYN while he was pulling her. The towlines were under 30m long, and the breadth of the vessel is 24m. Furthermore, there does not appear to have been any agreement as to the power the tugs were to use to perform the initial manoeuvres. Reportedly, the pilot had explained to the master of the EVELYN the procedure that he intended to use for departure, and the master was in full agreement with it. The plan was to move the vessel away from the wharf and then make her move backward toward the bay. Apparently, the tugs were not informed of this procedure, and the manoeuvre did not produce the anticipated results. There was no agreement as to the power the tugs were to use during the initial manoeuvres. The pilot's intentions as to the manoeuvres to be used for departure were not communicated clearly to the tugs. The terminology used during manoeuvring operations with tugs in port was not standardized and was open to all kinds of interpretations. Each tug manoeuvred according to her master's knowledge and/or assessment of the situation. The EVELYN struck cranes UT-8 and UT-6 because her lightship condition, the high tide and the sharp angle of the vessel to the wharf allowed the top part of her after structure to jut out over the wharf.Findings There was no agreement as to the power the tugs were to use during the initial manoeuvres. The pilot's intentions as to the manoeuvres to be used for departure were not communicated clearly to the tugs. The terminology used during manoeuvring operations with tugs in port was not standardized and was open to all kinds of interpretations. Each tug manoeuvred according to her master's knowledge and/or assessment of the situation. The EVELYN struck cranes UT-8 and UT-6 because her lightship condition, the high tide and the sharp angle of the vessel to the wharf allowed the top part of her after structure to jut out over the wharf. The EVELYN struck cranes UT-8 and UT-6 because all due precautions were not taken to ensure a safe and orderly departure. The manoeuvring orders given to the tugs were not sufficiently clear and precise. They were interpreted by each of the two tug masters according to his knowledge and/or assessment of the situation.Causes and Contributing Factors The EVELYN struck cranes UT-8 and UT-6 because all due precautions were not taken to ensure a safe and orderly departure. The manoeuvring orders given to the tugs were not sufficiently clear and precise. They were interpreted by each of the two tug masters according to his knowledge and/or assessment of the situation. Following this occurrence, the TSB forwarded an information letter to the Laurentian Pilotage Authority (LPA) to inform them of the findings of the investigation relating to communications between the masters of the tugs and the pilot during the departure manoeuvre. In addition, Alcan Electrolysis and Chemical Company Ltd has installed tape recorders on the tugs to record VHF radiotelephone conversations between tug masters and pilots.Safety Action Taken Following this occurrence, the TSB forwarded an information letter to the Laurentian Pilotage Authority (LPA) to inform them of the findings of the investigation relating to communications between the masters of the tugs and the pilot during the departure manoeuvre. In addition, Alcan Electrolysis and Chemical Company Ltd has installed tape recorders on the tugs to record VHF radiotelephone conversations between tug masters and pilots.