The crew had the knowledge and experience to manage and complete the flight safely. The pilot-in-command had taught these same fundamentals as a flight instructor. During the planning of the flight, the acting chief pilot helped the pilot-in-command enter the data in the flight planning software without referring to the aeronautical charts. Although the acting chief pilot mentioned several times that the data for refuelling at Rouyn, La Grande and Kuujjuaq should be entered, the pilot-in-command apparently did not make the association between the exercise on the computer, assimilating the information, and using that information in the overall management of the flight; the aircraft was not refuelled at Rouyn. On departing Dorval, he still had not checked the actual distances that he had to travel. As a result, he was unaware that he was not in compliance with the regulatory minimum fuel requirement when he departed Dorval. Good management also includes complying with aviation regulations and determining what services are available at various airports. Also, flying in northern Quebec demands more careful planning because the airports are far apart and 100LL fuel is not available at all airports. If the pilot-in-command had followed the flight plan, the aircraft would have had ample fuel to complete all segments of the route safely and in compliance with regulations. The co-pilot, who was not present for the flight planning, leafed through the flight plan documents briefly before departure, but he was preoccupied with secondary duties not related to the management of the flight. He took off from Dorval without really understanding the details of the trip and subsequently did not look at the flight itinerary. The pilot-in-command was on his first flight for the company as pilot-in-command and his first flight as pilot-in-command with a co-pilot. This was the co-pilot's fourth flight for the company, his first flight with this pilot-in-command, and his first flight in northern Quebec. The company did not consider it necessary to assign the pilot-in-command to fly with a co-pilot who had more experience flying in northern Quebec. The crew had not received training on the SOPs that detailed their individual duties. During the flight, the crew did not use the checklist or the other flight plan documents. If the crew had used them, they would have seen that fuel-related items appear 12 times on the checklist. Further, after each flight segment the crew should have noted and recorded the fuel status on the flight plan documents. All flight plan documents are tools that standardize practices and serve as aides-mmoire. The crew demonstrated casual work habits. The crew should have been more cautious, considering that the pilot-in-command believed the fuel gauges were not working properly. When the engines misfired shortly after the missed approach at La Grande, the pilot-in-command realized that the aircraft was going to runout of fuel. He then attempted to land at La Grande 3, but crashed in the woods.Analysis The crew had the knowledge and experience to manage and complete the flight safely. The pilot-in-command had taught these same fundamentals as a flight instructor. During the planning of the flight, the acting chief pilot helped the pilot-in-command enter the data in the flight planning software without referring to the aeronautical charts. Although the acting chief pilot mentioned several times that the data for refuelling at Rouyn, La Grande and Kuujjuaq should be entered, the pilot-in-command apparently did not make the association between the exercise on the computer, assimilating the information, and using that information in the overall management of the flight; the aircraft was not refuelled at Rouyn. On departing Dorval, he still had not checked the actual distances that he had to travel. As a result, he was unaware that he was not in compliance with the regulatory minimum fuel requirement when he departed Dorval. Good management also includes complying with aviation regulations and determining what services are available at various airports. Also, flying in northern Quebec demands more careful planning because the airports are far apart and 100LL fuel is not available at all airports. If the pilot-in-command had followed the flight plan, the aircraft would have had ample fuel to complete all segments of the route safely and in compliance with regulations. The co-pilot, who was not present for the flight planning, leafed through the flight plan documents briefly before departure, but he was preoccupied with secondary duties not related to the management of the flight. He took off from Dorval without really understanding the details of the trip and subsequently did not look at the flight itinerary. The pilot-in-command was on his first flight for the company as pilot-in-command and his first flight as pilot-in-command with a co-pilot. This was the co-pilot's fourth flight for the company, his first flight with this pilot-in-command, and his first flight in northern Quebec. The company did not consider it necessary to assign the pilot-in-command to fly with a co-pilot who had more experience flying in northern Quebec. The crew had not received training on the SOPs that detailed their individual duties. During the flight, the crew did not use the checklist or the other flight plan documents. If the crew had used them, they would have seen that fuel-related items appear 12 times on the checklist. Further, after each flight segment the crew should have noted and recorded the fuel status on the flight plan documents. All flight plan documents are tools that standardize practices and serve as aides-mmoire. The crew demonstrated casual work habits. The crew should have been more cautious, considering that the pilot-in-command believed the fuel gauges were not working properly. When the engines misfired shortly after the missed approach at La Grande, the pilot-in-command realized that the aircraft was going to runout of fuel. He then attempted to land at La Grande 3, but crashed in the woods. The pilot-in-command was on his first flight for the company as pilot-in-command and his first flight as pilot-in-command with a co-pilot. The co-pilot was on his fourth flight for the company, his first flight with this pilot-in-command, and his first flight in northern Quebec. Flight planning was done on computer software without checking aeronautical charts. The aircraft was not refuelled at Rouyn as the pilot-in-command had planned. During the flight the crew did not refer to the flight plan documents, which clearly indicated refuelling at Rouyn. The crew did not calculate fuel consumption en route. The crew realized they would run out of fuel shortly after the missed approach at La Grande, when the engines misfired. The pilot-in-command did not believe that the fuel gauges indicated the actual fuel level.Findings The pilot-in-command was on his first flight for the company as pilot-in-command and his first flight as pilot-in-command with a co-pilot. The co-pilot was on his fourth flight for the company, his first flight with this pilot-in-command, and his first flight in northern Quebec. Flight planning was done on computer software without checking aeronautical charts. The aircraft was not refuelled at Rouyn as the pilot-in-command had planned. During the flight the crew did not refer to the flight plan documents, which clearly indicated refuelling at Rouyn. The crew did not calculate fuel consumption en route. The crew realized they would run out of fuel shortly after the missed approach at La Grande, when the engines misfired. The pilot-in-command did not believe that the fuel gauges indicated the actual fuel level. The crew did not refuel at Rouyn as planned, and did not have sufficient fuel to complete the segment. Contributing to the accident were the following: the crew did not fully understand the flight plan documents and did not calculate fuel consumption en route.Causes and Contributing Factors The crew did not refuel at Rouyn as planned, and did not have sufficient fuel to complete the segment. Contributing to the accident were the following: the crew did not fully understand the flight plan documents and did not calculate fuel consumption en route. Prior to the accident, the company had decided to appoint a pilot as aviation safety officer, which it subsequently did. One of the company pilots took the company aviation safety officer course offered by Transport Canada, although under existing regulations this program is not mandatory for this type of operation. The company places less emphasis on the co-pilot's secondary duties; it places greater emphasis on flight management.Safety Action Prior to the accident, the company had decided to appoint a pilot as aviation safety officer, which it subsequently did. One of the company pilots took the company aviation safety officer course offered by Transport Canada, although under existing regulations this program is not mandatory for this type of operation. The company places less emphasis on the co-pilot's secondary duties; it places greater emphasis on flight management.