At 0140 on 29 March the tide was nearing High Water, flooding the lower drying ground and isolating some portions of the land. The FRC G.R.1 veered off course and struck the rock in spite of the fact that it was operated by qualified personnel and its equipment was in good working order. The injuries to the three persons were lessened by the rising tide, which had flooded the lower ground on the other side of the rock and softened their landing. The mate commanding the boat decided to make sure that the radar was operating properly before departure, yet he subsequently navigated the boat without the same thoroughness. He did not use all available means to ensure that the boat was proceeding safely in the proper direction, and neither of the two crew members verified his orders. The reason for the accident may have been a momentary lapse, an error in making use of the instruments, an obstructed access to the equipment, a lack of team work, or an adverse environmental condition. Probably each of these factors played some role in causing the occurrence. The mate had a good knowledge of the area and probably did not need a chart to navigate the boat. He knew the direction the boat should follow but did not use the compass when giving steering orders. Instead, he relied solely on the radar picture. If he had seen the compass or asked for the compass course he would have realized that the boat was proceeding in the wrong direction. Unlike the compass, the un-stabilized radar picture with a motionless heading marker could not yield any information as to the boat's course with reference to North. The radar was set to a low range, which produced a picture of limited radius and did not yield enough information to navigate the boat safely. The mate could navigate the boat safely between the two islands using radar alone. However the radar, used on a low range, did not allow him to compare the screen with the chart depiction of the area. The echo of the nearest land on the perimeter of the PPI gave the mate the information that he was heading directly toward it. However, he took it as Horsfall Island to be passed to port. Had he switched the radar to a longer range he would have seen that the land ahead was actually Campbell Island to be passed on the starboard side. The wheelsman manoeuvred the boat according to the mate's orders. However, he did not give the mate the feed-back information that was available to him on the boat's course. He remembered that the compass reading was 050 when, after testing the radar, the mate gave him an order to turn to starboard. He turned the boat as he was told and increased the speed. Had the wheelsman passed the compass reading immediately to the mate, the latter would have noticed his own mistake and changed the course accordingly. The speed of the boat was increased by the wheelsman to approximately 30 knots after the radar test was completed. The speed of the boat did not allow the mate time to scan the area with various radar range-scales in order to verify the direction of the boat. In addition, the speed increased the severity with which the boat struck the boat. The environmental conditions hampered the crew in their ability to observe, communicate and compare. The pitch-dark night did not allow them to see even the slightest signs of land. The rain and gusting wind further impeded their vision by cluttering their goggles and forcing them to turn their heads away from the pounding rain drops. The rain also made the spotlight unusable. Contrary to the CCG standing orders, nobody on board the G.R.1 wore a safety helmet. Had helmets been worn, at least some of the injuries could have been less severe. The crews of the GORDON REID and the TANU reacted promptly by dispatching their boats and rendering immediate assistance to the injured persons.Analysis At 0140 on 29 March the tide was nearing High Water, flooding the lower drying ground and isolating some portions of the land. The FRC G.R.1 veered off course and struck the rock in spite of the fact that it was operated by qualified personnel and its equipment was in good working order. The injuries to the three persons were lessened by the rising tide, which had flooded the lower ground on the other side of the rock and softened their landing. The mate commanding the boat decided to make sure that the radar was operating properly before departure, yet he subsequently navigated the boat without the same thoroughness. He did not use all available means to ensure that the boat was proceeding safely in the proper direction, and neither of the two crew members verified his orders. The reason for the accident may have been a momentary lapse, an error in making use of the instruments, an obstructed access to the equipment, a lack of team work, or an adverse environmental condition. Probably each of these factors played some role in causing the occurrence. The mate had a good knowledge of the area and probably did not need a chart to navigate the boat. He knew the direction the boat should follow but did not use the compass when giving steering orders. Instead, he relied solely on the radar picture. If he had seen the compass or asked for the compass course he would have realized that the boat was proceeding in the wrong direction. Unlike the compass, the un-stabilized radar picture with a motionless heading marker could not yield any information as to the boat's course with reference to North. The radar was set to a low range, which produced a picture of limited radius and did not yield enough information to navigate the boat safely. The mate could navigate the boat safely between the two islands using radar alone. However the radar, used on a low range, did not allow him to compare the screen with the chart depiction of the area. The echo of the nearest land on the perimeter of the PPI gave the mate the information that he was heading directly toward it. However, he took it as Horsfall Island to be passed to port. Had he switched the radar to a longer range he would have seen that the land ahead was actually Campbell Island to be passed on the starboard side. The wheelsman manoeuvred the boat according to the mate's orders. However, he did not give the mate the feed-back information that was available to him on the boat's course. He remembered that the compass reading was 050 when, after testing the radar, the mate gave him an order to turn to starboard. He turned the boat as he was told and increased the speed. Had the wheelsman passed the compass reading immediately to the mate, the latter would have noticed his own mistake and changed the course accordingly. The speed of the boat was increased by the wheelsman to approximately 30 knots after the radar test was completed. The speed of the boat did not allow the mate time to scan the area with various radar range-scales in order to verify the direction of the boat. In addition, the speed increased the severity with which the boat struck the boat. The environmental conditions hampered the crew in their ability to observe, communicate and compare. The pitch-dark night did not allow them to see even the slightest signs of land. The rain and gusting wind further impeded their vision by cluttering their goggles and forcing them to turn their heads away from the pounding rain drops. The rain also made the spotlight unusable. Contrary to the CCG standing orders, nobody on board the G.R.1 wore a safety helmet. Had helmets been worn, at least some of the injuries could have been less severe. The crews of the GORDON REID and the TANU reacted promptly by dispatching their boats and rendering immediate assistance to the injured persons. The propulsion and navigational equipment on the FRC were tested and found in good working order. The mate navigated the boat by radar alone. The radar was set to a low range, which produced a picture of limited radius and did not yield enough information to navigate the boat safely. The mate misinterpreted the radar picture and turned the boat in the wrong direction. The speed of the boat was increased without a full assessment of the path ahead. The speed of the boat was excessive in the circumstances. All three occupants were thrown from the boat and projected over the rock, landing in the water on the other side. Two occupants sustained serious injuries. The boat was seriously damaged and declared a total loss. One compass on board the G.R.1 was located in front of the wheelsman and was not easily visible from the officer-in-charge's seat. Contrary to the standing orders the persons in the FRC did not wear safety helmets. The action by the two SAR vessels after the occurrence was efficient and appropriate in the circumstances.Findings The propulsion and navigational equipment on the FRC were tested and found in good working order. The mate navigated the boat by radar alone. The radar was set to a low range, which produced a picture of limited radius and did not yield enough information to navigate the boat safely. The mate misinterpreted the radar picture and turned the boat in the wrong direction. The speed of the boat was increased without a full assessment of the path ahead. The speed of the boat was excessive in the circumstances. All three occupants were thrown from the boat and projected over the rock, landing in the water on the other side. Two occupants sustained serious injuries. The boat was seriously damaged and declared a total loss. One compass on board the G.R.1 was located in front of the wheelsman and was not easily visible from the officer-in-charge's seat. Contrary to the standing orders the persons in the FRC did not wear safety helmets. The action by the two SAR vessels after the occurrence was efficient and appropriate in the circumstances. The FRC G.R.1 struck the rock because it was navigated in the wrong direction at very high speed. The navigation of the boat by radar alone, set to a short range; the reduced visibility; the obstructed access to the equipment; and a lack of teamwork contributed to this accident. Its occupants were injured as a result of being ejected from the FRC by its sudden deceleration on striking.Causes and Contributing Factors The FRC G.R.1 struck the rock because it was navigated in the wrong direction at very high speed. The navigation of the boat by radar alone, set to a short range; the reduced visibility; the obstructed access to the equipment; and a lack of teamwork contributed to this accident. Its occupants were injured as a result of being ejected from the FRC by its sudden deceleration on striking.