Because fish stocks in the coastal waters of British Columbia are dwindling, fishermen are going further offshore to deep-sea fishing grounds. The good catches obtained have made this practice a growing trend. Consequently, there are more fishermen who, like the owner of the TWIN J., have converted and modified their vessels to make longer trips and fish for new species. The amendments to the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations planned in 1994, which would have required stability booklets for all fishing vessels over 15 m, have not yet been implemented. The existing regulations do not prevent owners from converting their vessels according to their own requirements. Such modifications are often not brought to the attention of the authorities, nor subjected to inspection or approval, even though they are required to be reported to TCMS. Depending on the owner's knowledge and thoroughness, the conversion could include fishing gear modification and the installation of a long-range communication device. To make the longer trips feasible, the conversion would also include a modern (global positioning) navigational system and an increase of the vessel's fuel-carrying capacity. When the owner bought the TWIN J. in 1996, he was planning to use it for long-range fishing trips. He assessed the vessel according to his commercial plans; however, the examination did not include the vessel's stability characteristics. Had he examined the vessel's stability booklet he would have found the restriction on the use of two aft tanks. He would also have found that on departure, with her holds empty and the original approved fuel and fresh water tanks full, the vessel barely met TC minimum stability criteria. In view of his intention to install additional oil fuel tanks above the main deck, it would have been prudent to have had the converted vessel's stability characteristics reviewed by a competent person. Such lack of knowledge of basic ship's stability may be explained by an insufficient and outdated training. When he obtained his certificate 25 years ago, the skipper did not have to undergo any formal training nor was he required to demonstrate any knowledge of ship's stability. The Marine Safety surveyor did not inquire about the vessel's stability data when issuing the Safety Inspection Certificate two months before the occurrence, nor was he required to do so, because the vessel was not going to fish for herring or capelin. The surveyor was adhering to Canadian regulations, made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act. The four extra fuel tanks added on deck were above the vessel's centre of gravity. This positioning further decreased the already limited transverse stability. On departure from Newport, Oregon, all oil fuel tanks were full, including the two aft tanks and the four additional tanks on deck. The vessel then barely complied with TC initial stability requirements, but all her righting lever and dynamic stability characteristics were markedly below the accepted minimum criteria. The consumption of fuel from underdeck tanks, while the tanks on deck were kept full, further reduced the stability. Consequently, at the time of the capsizing the transverse stability of the TWIN J. would have been even worse than it had been upon departure. The liferafts were not fitted with hydrostatic release mechanisms nor were such devices required by the regulations. It appears that the one that inflated was the non-approved, single-bottom raft stowed on the starboard side in a flat rectangular container. It is most likely that the bungy cord used to lash it to the deck was weak and that it parted when the vessel rolled over. The port side raft, mandatory and approved by the TCMS rules, was inadvertently lost when the crew attempted to launch it manually. Most probably, it wedged itself between the vessel's rigging and, in spite of its positive buoyancy, remained under water with the vessel. The raft that inflated was not the mandatory one. Because the owner had requested that the survival pack be placed in the raft, the survivors had at least two TPAs, some food, water and other equipment; but the flashlight and the repair kit were unusable. The raft's bottom was leaking but the occupants could not patch the hole as the glue in the kit could not be applied to a wet surface and the conical plugs and clamping devices normally contained in a Class A pack were not used. In order to maintain a lookout and remove the excess water with a bailer, the occupants had to partly open the entrance closure. This allowed an ingress of cooler air into the raft. Normally, a liferaft capable of accommodating six or fewer persons should have one ventilation opening. The efficient and timely search and rescue (SAR) operation by both the Canadian and the United States units was initiated immediately after the first EPIRB signal was relayed by a satellite. The operation allowed the rescuers to locate the drifting raft and to rescue the survivors before hypothermia or the other perils of the ocean overpowered them. SAR response was rapid and professional. This, coupled with the fact that there was an extra raft carried on board the vessel and two thermal suits were available, increased the chance of survival. The vessel and its equipment fully complied with the Canadian regulations which allow a fishing vessel such as the TWIN J. to be manned by non-certificated personnel and to sail approximately 3,000 miles from the Canadian coastline. Current inspection regulations did not require that the vessel's stability be verified prior to this voyage. Further, Canadian regulations do not prohibit this size of vessel from having liferafts lashed to the deck despite the fact that this may lessen the chance that they will float free if the vessel sinks.Analysis Because fish stocks in the coastal waters of British Columbia are dwindling, fishermen are going further offshore to deep-sea fishing grounds. The good catches obtained have made this practice a growing trend. Consequently, there are more fishermen who, like the owner of the TWIN J., have converted and modified their vessels to make longer trips and fish for new species. The amendments to the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations planned in 1994, which would have required stability booklets for all fishing vessels over 15 m, have not yet been implemented. The existing regulations do not prevent owners from converting their vessels according to their own requirements. Such modifications are often not brought to the attention of the authorities, nor subjected to inspection or approval, even though they are required to be reported to TCMS. Depending on the owner's knowledge and thoroughness, the conversion could include fishing gear modification and the installation of a long-range communication device. To make the longer trips feasible, the conversion would also include a modern (global positioning) navigational system and an increase of the vessel's fuel-carrying capacity. When the owner bought the TWIN J. in 1996, he was planning to use it for long-range fishing trips. He assessed the vessel according to his commercial plans; however, the examination did not include the vessel's stability characteristics. Had he examined the vessel's stability booklet he would have found the restriction on the use of two aft tanks. He would also have found that on departure, with her holds empty and the original approved fuel and fresh water tanks full, the vessel barely met TC minimum stability criteria. In view of his intention to install additional oil fuel tanks above the main deck, it would have been prudent to have had the converted vessel's stability characteristics reviewed by a competent person. Such lack of knowledge of basic ship's stability may be explained by an insufficient and outdated training. When he obtained his certificate 25 years ago, the skipper did not have to undergo any formal training nor was he required to demonstrate any knowledge of ship's stability. The Marine Safety surveyor did not inquire about the vessel's stability data when issuing the Safety Inspection Certificate two months before the occurrence, nor was he required to do so, because the vessel was not going to fish for herring or capelin. The surveyor was adhering to Canadian regulations, made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act. The four extra fuel tanks added on deck were above the vessel's centre of gravity. This positioning further decreased the already limited transverse stability. On departure from Newport, Oregon, all oil fuel tanks were full, including the two aft tanks and the four additional tanks on deck. The vessel then barely complied with TC initial stability requirements, but all her righting lever and dynamic stability characteristics were markedly below the accepted minimum criteria. The consumption of fuel from underdeck tanks, while the tanks on deck were kept full, further reduced the stability. Consequently, at the time of the capsizing the transverse stability of the TWIN J. would have been even worse than it had been upon departure. The liferafts were not fitted with hydrostatic release mechanisms nor were such devices required by the regulations. It appears that the one that inflated was the non-approved, single-bottom raft stowed on the starboard side in a flat rectangular container. It is most likely that the bungy cord used to lash it to the deck was weak and that it parted when the vessel rolled over. The port side raft, mandatory and approved by the TCMS rules, was inadvertently lost when the crew attempted to launch it manually. Most probably, it wedged itself between the vessel's rigging and, in spite of its positive buoyancy, remained under water with the vessel. The raft that inflated was not the mandatory one. Because the owner had requested that the survival pack be placed in the raft, the survivors had at least two TPAs, some food, water and other equipment; but the flashlight and the repair kit were unusable. The raft's bottom was leaking but the occupants could not patch the hole as the glue in the kit could not be applied to a wet surface and the conical plugs and clamping devices normally contained in a Class A pack were not used. In order to maintain a lookout and remove the excess water with a bailer, the occupants had to partly open the entrance closure. This allowed an ingress of cooler air into the raft. Normally, a liferaft capable of accommodating six or fewer persons should have one ventilation opening. The efficient and timely search and rescue (SAR) operation by both the Canadian and the United States units was initiated immediately after the first EPIRB signal was relayed by a satellite. The operation allowed the rescuers to locate the drifting raft and to rescue the survivors before hypothermia or the other perils of the ocean overpowered them. SAR response was rapid and professional. This, coupled with the fact that there was an extra raft carried on board the vessel and two thermal suits were available, increased the chance of survival. The vessel and its equipment fully complied with the Canadian regulations which allow a fishing vessel such as the TWIN J. to be manned by non-certificated personnel and to sail approximately 3,000 miles from the Canadian coastline. Current inspection regulations did not require that the vessel's stability be verified prior to this voyage. Further, Canadian regulations do not prohibit this size of vessel from having liferafts lashed to the deck despite the fact that this may lessen the chance that they will float free if the vessel sinks. The fishing vessel TWIN J. shipped water on deck from two successive large waves coming over the starboard quarter. The vessel listed to port with its deck awash with retained seawater, and then capsized to starboard when struck by a second wave. The transverse stability of the vessel was markedly reduced by the weight of additional tanks and oil fuel located above the main deck. Contrary to regulatory requirement, the installation of additional oil fuel tanks above the main deck was not brought to the attention of the safety inspector when the latest SIC 29 was issued. The detrimental effects on the vessel's stability and the additional weight of fuel tanks was not reviewed by a competent person during the conversion. Two inflatable rafts were firmly lashed to the upper deck. No hydrostatic release was fitted. The only TC-approved raft was lost when the crew attempted to launch it. No member of the crew wore a lifejacket or personal floatation device when abandoning the vessel. The second raft parted its lashing and self-inflated when the vessel rolled over. The carriage of a second raft as well as its equipment, including the two thermal suits, was not mandatory but had been provided by the owner. In Canada, there is no regulatory requirement for the skipper or the crew of a fishing vessel up to 85 GRT to undergo formal training, including Marine Emergency Duties training. The safety equipment in the non-approved raft did not include smoke signals, nor were they required by regulations. The survivors were unable to effect repairs to the liferaft because the glue provided with the patching kit did not work on a wet surface and they did not use conical plugs or clamping devices normally carried in a Class A pack.Findings The fishing vessel TWIN J. shipped water on deck from two successive large waves coming over the starboard quarter. The vessel listed to port with its deck awash with retained seawater, and then capsized to starboard when struck by a second wave. The transverse stability of the vessel was markedly reduced by the weight of additional tanks and oil fuel located above the main deck. Contrary to regulatory requirement, the installation of additional oil fuel tanks above the main deck was not brought to the attention of the safety inspector when the latest SIC 29 was issued. The detrimental effects on the vessel's stability and the additional weight of fuel tanks was not reviewed by a competent person during the conversion. Two inflatable rafts were firmly lashed to the upper deck. No hydrostatic release was fitted. The only TC-approved raft was lost when the crew attempted to launch it. No member of the crew wore a lifejacket or personal floatation device when abandoning the vessel. The second raft parted its lashing and self-inflated when the vessel rolled over. The carriage of a second raft as well as its equipment, including the two thermal suits, was not mandatory but had been provided by the owner. In Canada, there is no regulatory requirement for the skipper or the crew of a fishing vessel up to 85 GRT to undergo formal training, including Marine Emergency Duties training. The safety equipment in the non-approved raft did not include smoke signals, nor were they required by regulations. The survivors were unable to effect repairs to the liferaft because the glue provided with the patching kit did not work on a wet surface and they did not use conical plugs or clamping devices normally carried in a Class A pack. The TWIN J. capsized because two large and successive waves were shipped and retained on deck. She was unable to recover due to her stability characteristics, which had been adversely affected by the addition of unapproved fuel tanks above the main deck prior to the voyage. Such adverse effect was exacerbated by the fact that the fuel carried on deck was not consumed first. Due to her size and the type of fishing in which she was engaged, the stability characteristics of the TWIN J. were not subject to TC approval. The owner/operator did not have sufficient knowledge of stability to understand the detrimental effect of the modifications made to his vessel. The SAR operation was initiated after a radio signal was received from the vessel's EPIRB. The crew was rescued after they boarded a non-approved, defective liferaft.Causes and Contributing Factors The TWIN J. capsized because two large and successive waves were shipped and retained on deck. She was unable to recover due to her stability characteristics, which had been adversely affected by the addition of unapproved fuel tanks above the main deck prior to the voyage. Such adverse effect was exacerbated by the fact that the fuel carried on deck was not consumed first. Due to her size and the type of fishing in which she was engaged, the stability characteristics of the TWIN J. were not subject to TC approval. The owner/operator did not have sufficient knowledge of stability to understand the detrimental effect of the modifications made to his vessel. The SAR operation was initiated after a radio signal was received from the vessel's EPIRB. The crew was rescued after they boarded a non-approved, defective liferaft. Safety Action Action Taken The safety of small fishing vessels has been a long standing issue in Canada. Due to safety concerns about the level of safety in the fishing industry and, in particular, aboard small fishing vessels, in December 1998 TCMS instituted a Small Fishing Vessel Safety Working Group to review the May 1993 Draft of the Small Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations.