Analysis Marine Communications and Traffic Services At the MCTS centre, the officer responsible for monitoring marine traffic in the outer section of Halifax harbour was, immediately prior to the grounding of BLUENOSE II, involved in numerous radio conversations and reports with other vessels. Because a small pleasure craft manoeuvring in the immediate vicinity of the boundary line caused the warning light to flash on and off intermittently, the officer possibly paid less attention to the light than he might otherwise have, and a warning to the BLUENOSE II that she was standing into danger was not issued. Communications Aboard the Vessel The radios, which were designed to facilitate communication between the master and engineer, were not functioning as designed. Since the radio of the master could transmit but not receive and that of the engineer could receive but not transmit, no means existed for the master to know that the engineer had understood his order to feather the propellers. The engineer understood the order to mean feather the propellers and shut down the engines and executed the order as he had understood it. As he did not have the means to confirm that the action he took was correct, the engines were shut down. As the result, the engines were not available to assist the vessel's head through the wind when the time came to go about onto the starboard tack. The heavy radio traffic concerning vessel movements in the lower section of Halifax harbour, which was received on board through three radios, and monitored aboard the vessel, was a source of constant background noise. Most of this traffic did not concern the BLUENOSE II and distracted the master's concentration from the navigation of his vessel. Navigational Equipment The location of the navigational equipment in the chart room was not optimal. As a result, positional information displayed on the radar, electronic chart, and GPS, which could have indicated that the vessel was standing into danger on Pleasant Shoal, was not visible from the conning position and not available to the master. The positioning of these aids to navigation was apparently due to the wish to preserve the on-deck appearance of the BLUENOSE II as an old schooner. It appears that the echo sounder repeater readout was intermittent and known to be so. The value of the readout was also compromised by the fact that the master and officers believed that instrument's transducer was 10 feet above the keel when it was, in fact, 3 feet above the keel. As a result of a miscalculation, the master believed that the water was 7 feet deeper than it was. In addition, the echo sounder indicated depths in feet and the Halifax harbour chart indicated them in metres. Knowledge of BRM Traditional duties of the officers and crew of the BLUENOSE II required that the officers be stationed away from the vessel's conning position area to supervise sail handling. The reasons were two-fold: to ensure that the master's orders were expedited; and to oversee the passengers who had free access to all parts of the deck. No BRM regime was in place on the BLUENOSE II. Neither the master nor the mates were familiar with the concept of BRM or had attended a BRM course. Since each officer was employed in his traditional role in the working of the ship, the master did not maximize the use of his officers to assist him in the navigation of the vessel. The mate, who had been on the vessel for 13 seasons and was experienced in sailing in Halifax harbour, was at his station on the afterdeck, and was not available to assist the master by relaying accurate electronic navigational information available in the chart room. Although the master had reportedly been into Halifax harbour on his own sailing vessel and was familiar with the area, he had not prepared a voyage plan or identified range marks or transit bearings to assist him in the navigation of the much larger BLUENOSE II. He was confident he could fix a position by sighting landmarks. The master assumed complete responsibility for the navigation of his ship and, given the background noise of the radios and passenger conversations, it is likely that he became distracted and lost situational awareness at this time. Although he was aware that Buoy H19 was about four points on his port bow and this indicated that the vessel was heading towards Pleasant Shoal, it did not give him cause for alarm. The chain of command from the owners to the master, via the Society, is tenuous, as there are no Standing Orders from the owner to the master. The master was confident in his ability to visually navigate and had not prepared a voyage plan or identified range marks or transit bearings that would assist him with the navigation. The master reserved the responsibility for the navigation of the vessel and communications to himself, choosing not to delegate some of these tasks to his officers. Neither the master nor the mates were familiar with the concept of BRM. None had attended a BRM course, and the master had not considered adopting such a concept. The master did not maximize the use of his officers to assist him in the navigation of the vessel, particularly the first mate who had been on the vessel for 13 seasons and had experience sailing in Halifax harbour. Most of the aids to navigation, radar, electronic chart and GPS were placed in the chart room such that they were not visible to a person in the conning position. The sounding machine repeater occasionally did not exhibit a reading although a reading was available on the main unit in the chart room. The master and officers believed that the echo sounder transducer was 10 feet above the keel, when in fact it was 3 feet above the keel. As a result of a miscalculation, the master believed that the water was 7 feet deeper than it was. The sounding machine and its repeaters showed depths of water in feet, while the chart of Halifax harbour indicated soundings in metres. The conversion necessary to assimilate echo sounder information caused some confusion. Three radios, the two-way transmitter/receiver from forward and the two-way walkie-talkie with which the master was fitted made the noise level most distracting for the master. The almost non-stop voices broadcasted information which was of little or no relevance to the master. The radios, which were designed to facilitate easy communication between the master and engineer, did not function as designed. As a result, the engines were shut down and were not available to assist the vessel's head through the wind when the time came to go about onto the starboard tack. Passengers were permitted to transit and wait in the area of the afterdeck from which the vessel was being navigated. Their presence and conversation was an additional source of noise and distraction to the master. It is likely that the master lost situational awareness due to multitasking and to being distracted by radio and passenger conversation. Neither before nor after boarding were the passengers instructed in the use or location of the vessel's life-saving equipment. The MCTS duty officer handling radio traffic in the lower reaches of Halifax harbour did not respond immediately to warn the vessel when the target presented by BLUENOSE II was approaching the boundary line and standing into danger. The damage sustained by the vessel in grounding was minor and localized. There was neither injury nor pollution as a result of the grounding.Findings The chain of command from the owners to the master, via the Society, is tenuous, as there are no Standing Orders from the owner to the master. The master was confident in his ability to visually navigate and had not prepared a voyage plan or identified range marks or transit bearings that would assist him with the navigation. The master reserved the responsibility for the navigation of the vessel and communications to himself, choosing not to delegate some of these tasks to his officers. Neither the master nor the mates were familiar with the concept of BRM. None had attended a BRM course, and the master had not considered adopting such a concept. The master did not maximize the use of his officers to assist him in the navigation of the vessel, particularly the first mate who had been on the vessel for 13 seasons and had experience sailing in Halifax harbour. Most of the aids to navigation, radar, electronic chart and GPS were placed in the chart room such that they were not visible to a person in the conning position. The sounding machine repeater occasionally did not exhibit a reading although a reading was available on the main unit in the chart room. The master and officers believed that the echo sounder transducer was 10 feet above the keel, when in fact it was 3 feet above the keel. As a result of a miscalculation, the master believed that the water was 7 feet deeper than it was. The sounding machine and its repeaters showed depths of water in feet, while the chart of Halifax harbour indicated soundings in metres. The conversion necessary to assimilate echo sounder information caused some confusion. Three radios, the two-way transmitter/receiver from forward and the two-way walkie-talkie with which the master was fitted made the noise level most distracting for the master. The almost non-stop voices broadcasted information which was of little or no relevance to the master. The radios, which were designed to facilitate easy communication between the master and engineer, did not function as designed. As a result, the engines were shut down and were not available to assist the vessel's head through the wind when the time came to go about onto the starboard tack. Passengers were permitted to transit and wait in the area of the afterdeck from which the vessel was being navigated. Their presence and conversation was an additional source of noise and distraction to the master. It is likely that the master lost situational awareness due to multitasking and to being distracted by radio and passenger conversation. Neither before nor after boarding were the passengers instructed in the use or location of the vessel's life-saving equipment. The MCTS duty officer handling radio traffic in the lower reaches of Halifax harbour did not respond immediately to warn the vessel when the target presented by BLUENOSE II was approaching the boundary line and standing into danger. The damage sustained by the vessel in grounding was minor and localized. There was neither injury nor pollution as a result of the grounding. The vessel grounded because the master did not avail himself of all of the ship's aids to navigation; did not use the services of all his officers to his fullest advantage; had not prepared a voyage plan nor identified leading marks or transit bearings to assist him in monitoring the progress of the vessel; and was distracted by the proximity of passengers and the background noise of radio communications. All of the above factors may have lead him to lose situational awareness. In addition, the master did not receive a warning from the MCTS officer that his vessel was standing into danger.Causes and Contributing Factors The vessel grounded because the master did not avail himself of all of the ship's aids to navigation; did not use the services of all his officers to his fullest advantage; had not prepared a voyage plan nor identified leading marks or transit bearings to assist him in monitoring the progress of the vessel; and was distracted by the proximity of passengers and the background noise of radio communications. All of the above factors may have lead him to lose situational awareness. In addition, the master did not receive a warning from the MCTS officer that his vessel was standing into danger. Prior to departing a berth with passengers on board, a safety announcement is made and the correct method of donning a life jacket demonstrated. Other safety equipment is explained, such as inflatable life rafts. A tally of the number of passengers is given to the master prior to departure. When the vessel is underway, an officer is now positioned in the chartroom to watch the electronic chart display, radar, etc., and to provide navigational information from these sources to the master at the conning position on deck. The circumstances surrounding this incident, the importance of MCTS duties, the state of equipment, and the responsibilities of MCTS Officers was discussed by the Acting Regional Superintendent, the Officer in Charge, and staff. An annual training program is currently being developed. Courses such as Distress Procedure Refresher training and Radar Navigation Assistance will be used to assist MCTS Officers in the maintenance of their professional skills. MCTS Halifax is operating with equipment which, in some cases, is 18 to 20 years old. A major project is underway to replace all VTS radar equipment with state-of-the-art equipment. This also includes recording equipment for video radar displays which will be used for accurate interpretation of incident information. A project is also underway to replace the outdated audio recording equipment, which will make accurate interpretation of information possible. A project to test the viability of the Automatic Identification System is underway. This project involves MCTS Halifax, the Halifax Port Authority and the Atlantic Pilotage Authority. It is being conducted in anticipation of the future mandatory carriage requirements which will provide additional, timely information to the MCTS Centre and other ships. TCMS has made a recommendation to the Chairman of the Bluenose II Preservation Trust that prior to appointing individuals as masters or persons in charge of a watch, who are not familiar with the vessel, they shall sail on the vessel, or similar vessel of its size and rig, for a sufficient period of time to allow them to gain experience in handling and coping with the constraints, layout, and construction of the vessel.Safety Action Taken Prior to departing a berth with passengers on board, a safety announcement is made and the correct method of donning a life jacket demonstrated. Other safety equipment is explained, such as inflatable life rafts. A tally of the number of passengers is given to the master prior to departure. When the vessel is underway, an officer is now positioned in the chartroom to watch the electronic chart display, radar, etc., and to provide navigational information from these sources to the master at the conning position on deck. The circumstances surrounding this incident, the importance of MCTS duties, the state of equipment, and the responsibilities of MCTS Officers was discussed by the Acting Regional Superintendent, the Officer in Charge, and staff. An annual training program is currently being developed. Courses such as Distress Procedure Refresher training and Radar Navigation Assistance will be used to assist MCTS Officers in the maintenance of their professional skills. MCTS Halifax is operating with equipment which, in some cases, is 18 to 20 years old. A major project is underway to replace all VTS radar equipment with state-of-the-art equipment. This also includes recording equipment for video radar displays which will be used for accurate interpretation of incident information. A project is also underway to replace the outdated audio recording equipment, which will make accurate interpretation of information possible. A project to test the viability of the Automatic Identification System is underway. This project involves MCTS Halifax, the Halifax Port Authority and the Atlantic Pilotage Authority. It is being conducted in anticipation of the future mandatory carriage requirements which will provide additional, timely information to the MCTS Centre and other ships. TCMS has made a recommendation to the Chairman of the Bluenose II Preservation Trust that prior to appointing individuals as masters or persons in charge of a watch, who are not familiar with the vessel, they shall sail on the vessel, or similar vessel of its size and rig, for a sufficient period of time to allow them to gain experience in handling and coping with the constraints, layout, and construction of the vessel.