Summary On the morning of 18 August 1998, the SunriseVI departed Toronto bound for Port Dalhousie, Ontario, with four passengers on board. As the voyage proceeded, the waves increased in height such that the vessel was forced to reduce speed from foil-borne to displacement mode. Soon thereafter, the port front window in the forward passenger compartment was stove in by a wave and lake water entered the passenger compartment. Upon discharging the flood water, the escorted vessel proceeded at dead slow ahead to Port Dalhousie. One passenger was injured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Description of the Vessel The SunriseVI is a passenger hydrofoil with a welded aluminium-magnesium alloy hull and superstructure. The forward and after foils are constructed of stainless steel. The vessel has eight double-bottom tanks below the forward and after passenger compartments. The bridge is located forward and the machinery space aft. Main propulsion power is provided by one high-speed marine diesel engine driving a single highly skewed propeller through a V drive reduction gear. The vessel is equipped with a graduated sounding pole approved by Transport Canada Marine Safety (TCMS) for determining water depth when travelling in the displacement mode, and portable electric bilge pumps. The bow height above the design waterline in displacement mode is approximately 1.65m, and approximately 2.0m from the waterline to the centre of the front window. Although required by the Code of Safety for Dynamically Supported Craft (DSC Code) to be constructed of a material that would not break into dangerous fragments when fractured, the front window broke into several large sharp-edged pieces. Description of the Voyage In June 1998, the SunriseVI was introduced into service for fast transit of passengers across Lake Ontario between Toronto and the Niagara region. Certified to carry a maximum of 66passengers, the ferry is permitted to operate at foil-borne speeds of up to 32knots (kn) in wave conditions not exceeding 1.3m in height. The vessel's schedule varies from day to day. Weekday trips of about one hour's duration between Toronto and Port Dalhousie and Niagara-on-the-Lake provide commuter service from 0700 to 2200 eastern daylight time (EDT).2 On weekends, the vessel usually transits between Toronto and Lewiston, New York, from 0900 to 0130 the next morning. On 18 August 1998, the SunriseVI departed Toronto at 0930 with four passengers on board on an unscheduled promotional voyage to Port Dalhousie. The vessel proceeded across Lake Ontario in foil-borne mode until, in mid-voyage, wave heights of 2 m to 3m were encountered. Speed was reduced to 15kn, and the vessel came off her foils into the displacement mode. At 1015, approximately eight miles north of Port Dalhousie, the vessel encountered a series of large waves which caused the bow to pitch downward. Water broke over the bow and onto the forward windows, shattering the port window into a number of sharp fragments, allowing water to enter the passenger compartment. Under the instructions of the master, passengers and crew donned lifejackets, and one of the passengers (a shore-based company employee) fell and twisted his knee while attempting to plug the broken window with the cover from a lifejacket locker. The master initially attempted to regain foil-borne mode, but the weight of water in the passenger compartment and the high waves prevented the vessel from attaining adequate lift. Instead, the speed was further reduced to 9 kn and the master set a course which allowed the vessel to run before the prevailing waves. A Mayday was broadcast by the master at 1019, and the ferries LakeRunner and Waterways, which were in the immediate area, changed course and headed towards the SunriseVI. The distress call was received by the Canadian Coast Guard station at Port Weller, Ontario. The Rescue Coordination Centre at Trenton was advised and the rescue vessel CGR100 responded. The entrapped flood water in the passenger compartment was approximately 10cm to 15cm deep and had accumulated aft due to the vessel's trim. The chief engineer rigged a portable electric bilge pump (16.8m3/hr capacity) to pump the water from the passenger compartment. The pump was powered from a 24-voltDC outlet located approximately 45cm above the deck, and the discharge hose was led overboard through an open window in the bar area. After losing suction with the pump, the remaining water was drained into a double-bottom space through a manhole which was opened for the purpose. The SunriseVI was escorted to Port Dalhousie by the LakeRunner Waterways I and CGR100. Certification The vessel carried a master, mate, engineer, and purser. Minimum required certification for the master is a master home trade 350 tons certificate, and the engineer requires a second class motor certificate. If the vessel carries more than 50passengers, the mate must hold at least a watchkeeping mate's certificate, otherwise no qualifications are required for the mate. At the time of the occurrence, the master, mate, and engineer held qualifications appropriate for the class of vessel on which they were serving and for the voyage being undertaken. The purser held no marine qualifications nor was she required to. The master had over 20years' experience as a ship's officer, mainly on the Great Lakes. He had worked for the owner during the previous year as captain on board the conventional ferry LakeRunner. His first operational experience with hydrofoils began with his training on board the SunriseV in May 1998, one month before the vessel's formal entry into passenger service. Following this, he sailed for two weeks under the supervision of the managing owner before receiving a Master's High Speed Craft (HSC) endorsement from TCMS. At the time of the occurrence, a syllabus for training and certification of HSC crew had not been developed; however, since that time, TCMS has recognized the need for the development of standards in accordance with the DSC Code. The vessel was issued a certificate (SIC54) as an HSC by TCMS even though she was inspected under the provisions of the DSCCode. Weather At the time of the occurrence, the wind was from the north-east at 25kn to 30kn. As a result, the SunriseVI encountered larger waves as she approached the south side of the lake. Notwithstanding the Environment Canada (EC) marine weather forecast which predicted waves of 1m or less, it is reported that the vessel encountered sustained seas of 2m and several somewhat larger waves approaching 3m in height when the window was stove in. When he came on duty for the trip at 0700, the master had listened to the marine weather forecast which called for 20kn winds from the north occurring later in the morning. The SunriseVI made the scheduled 0700 crossing of Lake Ontario from Port Dalhousie to Toronto without incident, although it was noted that the wind was strong and waves were 1 m high at seven miles from Toronto. Upon departure from Toronto, the wind speed had not changed; however, over-lake winds on Lake Ontario may be up to 30per cent stronger than land winds during the summer months. It is estimated that, from May through to September during an average year, the maximum wave heights likely to be encountered on Lake Ontario can exceed the hydrofoil's 1.3m operating limit 20 to 25per cent of the time.3 Also, winds which are predominantly from the south-west can reach 10 kn to greater than 20kn with similar frequency. During the summer months, about 60per cent of prevailing waves have crest-to-crest lengths less than the length of the vessel, in which circumstances, the hydrofoil would tend to plane horizontally through small, short waves. However, 30 to 40per cent of the waves could well exceed 20m in length, in which case the vessel would tend to follow the contour of a long wave. Subsequent to the occurrence, the vessel's HSC certificate (SIC54) was endorsed with the condition that: When the winds are over 16mph/ 25kph from a North or Southerly direction for a prolonged period, Master is to check the wave height of the ports at the receiving end i.e.winds Northerly check Port Dalhousie/ Niagara on the Lake entrances. Design of the Vessel The SunriseVI, being a Soviet-type Voskhod-2 passenger hydrofoil, was built to comply with the Russian Rules of River Register for a class O vessel. The various Russian class designations are set to determine the structure of a ship and a range of water areas where the ship is permitted to operate. The areas of operation for the various classes take into account wind and wave climate conditions likely to be encountered during navigation. Class O hydrofoil vessels must be capable of operating in areas having waves with a 1per cent probability of reaching a height of 1.3m, and a recurrence of not more than 4per cent during the period of navigation. Class O operational areas within Russia are specified for numerous portions of rivers, several reservoirs on rivers, and two small lakes. Lake Teletzkoe, one of these lakes, is approximately 50km long and less than 3km wide. Lake Ontario by comparison is approximately 290km long by 50km wide (between Toronto and Port Dalhousie/Niagara Region) with a depth of 110m. The hull below the enclosed passenger deck is subdivided into eight watertight compartments designed to allow the vessel to remain afloat in calm water following damage to the machinery space or to any other single watertight compartment. However, both the DSC Code and the International Code of Safety for High Speed Craft (HSC Code) call for assumed damage to occur anywhere on the periphery or bottom of the hull; i.e., the vessel must be able to remain afloat when the watertight integrity of any two adjacent compartments is breached. In order to have the SunriseVI class of hydrofoil comply with the two-compartment standard of subdivision for Canadian operations, the double-bottom compartments on either side of the V drive space and just forward of the engine-room were filled with plastic bags containing polystyrene beads to reduce permeability. Although required by the DSC Code,4 the vessel was not equipped with a fixed bilge pumping system which, when in use, would prevent the unintentional flow of water from one compartment to another. Instead, two portable electric pumps were carried on board. Pump access to the double-bottom spaces is possible only by opening the manholes to the double-bottom tanks. The speed of the vessel in displacement mode ranges from 0kn 5 to 11kn. When power is increased, the vessel passes through a transition zone as the hull begins to lift from the water and speed increases until she is fully foil-borne at a maximum speed of 32.4kn. The transition zone is a most intricate and important period in ship control as the main engine load sharply increases and the metacentric stability decreases. Within this control-sensitive transition zone, statical stability is reduced as the hull lifts, and simultaneously, the hydrodynamic forces on the foils progressively develop sufficient stability as higher speeds are attained. At slower speeds, the foils become submerged and have a dampening effect on hull motion relative to the behaviour of a similar standard hull having no foils. Most of the pieces from the fractured window were recovered and forwarded to the TSB Engineering Laboratory for analysis. Visual and optical microscope examination indicates that the window failed from an overstress. The failure originated near the top centre of the window and radiated downward and inboard. The remains of the window showed a yellowish discolouration and crazing, which are indicative of deterioration due to exposure to sunlight. 6 In its investigation of a separate occurrence where the Canadian ferries QueenofSaanich and RoyalVancouver collided at the northern entrance to Active Pass, British Columbia, on 06February 1992, the Board found that the operation of HSC is usually more demanding than that of a conventional vessel, and that the crews must possess the knowledge, qualifications and training consistent with the special features of HSC (TSB report NoM92W1012). The Board recommended that: The Department of Transport establish guidelines for the operation of high-speed passenger craft taking into account local operating conditions and the overall navigational infrastructure. At present, no Canadian regulations exist for the inspection of high-speed vessels. Since 1996, the Board of Steamship Inspection (BSI) has allowed the use of the HSC Code7 for the inspection, certification and approval of Canadian HSC. Because passenger vessels being transferred to Canadian registry are deemed to be new ships, the HSC Code may be applied to high-speed vessels built or imported into Canada after 01January 1996. However, TCMS does not apply the HSC Code to non-Solas (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) vessels operating in the Great Lakes. As a result, the SunriseVI was inspected under the provisions of the older DSC Code, and the company was not required to have a quality management system in place. Window Replacement Both forward windows on the SunriseVI have been replaced with Cyrolon ZX polycarbonate panels that were tested by TCMS. Inspection and Certification Procedures As a result of several incidents involving high-speed craft operations and the Class O hydrofoils in particular, TCMS initiated a review of its operations on Lake Ontario. TCMS will no longer certify the Voskhod-2 class of hydrofoil for cross-lake service. Also, following the review of high-speed craft operations, TC issued instructions to HSC operators to ensure that: they exchange information regarding adverse weather; a warning sign is posted regarding the dangers of operating in shallow or hazardous waters; and operations manuals include adequate instructions consistent with a quality management system.