2.0 Analysis 2.1 Ingress of Water The source of the water entry that caused the automatic pumps to activate in the lazaret, cockpit, and fish hold is not known. However, considering the short time taken for the large trim by the stern to develop after the longline was retrieved, it is apparent that the size of the opening that allowed the ingress of water was substantial and is consistent with a plank having sprung in the hull, below the waterline, in the vicinity of the lazaret and fish hold. This could have happened while the vessel pounded into the seas after the longline was retrieved. It should be noted that, with the exception of the small penetration on the after fish hold bulkhead for the steering gear cable to pass through, there were no other openings between the fish hold and the lazaret space. The additional weight of shipped water below decks caused the vessel to settle deeper by the stern, thus reducing the freeboard aft. The accumulation of water on deck from shipped seas would have become progressively worse, causing the vessel to settle still deeper, thus covering the freeing ports. Subsequently, the engine-room started taking water by way of the propeller shaft space and by downflooding through the cabin door as the stern became completely submerged. The free- surface effect of the shipped water reduced the vessel's transverse stability, causing the vessel to list to port. After the vessel fell broadside to wind and waves, continuous downflooding into the engine-room and forecastle eventually caused the sinking. 2.2 Life-saving Equipment The life-vest worn by the surviving deck-hand was not a PFD that was approved for the purpose for which it was being used. Regulations require that a properly approved standard lifejacket be carried for each crew member. The lifejacket worn by the victim was an approved PFD. Survival time, however, is dependent on the elements, the physical, physiological, and psychological make-up of the individual, and the individual's training and knowledge of survival techniques. The dinghy was not suitable for use as a liferaft, especially not for three adults in bad sea conditions. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings The crew members of the JU JU continued fishing, although they were aware of the adverse weather forecast. The ingress of water below the waterline was most probably the result of a plank having sprung between the lazaret and the fish hold as a result of the vessel pounding into heavy seas. The dinghy, which capsized, was unsuitable for use as a liferaft. The vessel was not adequately equipped with life-saving appliances. The surviving seaman did not have an approved lifejacket. The crew members had no formal marine training, were self-taught, and had limited experience in the fishing industry. The wind-chill factor of the gale force winds and the cold sea temperature severely limited the survival time of the deceased. 3.2 Causes While heading for shelter at full speed and pounding into the heavy seas, the JU JU most probably sprang a plank below the waterline. The vessel then began flooding into the after spaces, settled quickly by the stern, and subsequently downflooded and sank. Factors that contributed to the loss of life were the inadequacy of the life-saving equipment carried and the crew's inexperience and lack of formal marine and survival training. 4.0 Safety Action 4.1 Action Taken 4.1.1 Survival Training and Equipment Following its investigation into the sinking of the STRAITS PRIDE II on 17 December 1990 (TSB report no. M90N5017), the Board issued several recommendations regarding small fishing vessels. Two recommendations addressed safety deficiencies with respect to crew training and life-saving equipment. The Board recommended that: The Department of Transport ensure that personnel who regularly crew closed- construction fishing vessels receive formal training in life-saving equipment and survival techniques. The Department of Transport expedite its revision of the Small Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations which will require the carriage of anti-exposure worksuits or survival suits by fishermen. A proposed amendment to the Canada Shipping Act (CSA) now being developed would require uncertificated persons to undergo recommended training. In the interim, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) will issue a Ship Safety Bulletin (SSB) with a recommendation to masters respecting such training. To date, the CCG's attempts to make the carriage requirement mandatory have been unsuccessful. However, in the proposed revisions to the Small Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations, anti-exposure worksuits are provided as alternative equipment. In 1993, the CCG produced a video entitled A Matter of Minutes to promote the benefits of a newly designed commercial fisherman anti-exposure worksuit. The CCG also distributed 100 such worksuits to fishermen who are members of the Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary (CMRA) for evaluation. It is hoped that this group of CMRA members will play an important role in shaping the safety attitudes of other fishermen, particularly toward the use of anti-exposure worksuits. The Board will monitor the effectiveness of such initiatives with a view to assessing the need for further safety action on this issue. 4.1.2 Survival Kit Air Dropable (SKAD) Buffalo aircraft from Canadian Forces 442 Squadron provide the primary Search and Rescue (SAR) response on the West Coast. These aircraft carry SKADs when on SAR standby and while training in the region. While Aurora aircraft are capable of delivering SKADs, this equipment is not carried at all times because some mission objectives cannot be fulfilled when SKADs are carried.