Summary A Raytheon Beechcraft King Air 200 (registration C-FCGL, serial numberBB190) operating as NTA202 (Northern Thunderbird Air), departed Vancouver, British Columbia, at 0824 Pacific daylight time on 28July2005 for a visual flight rules flight to Smithers, British Columbia, with a crew of two on board. The aircraft did not arrive at its destination, and a search was commenced later that same day. The aircraft was found on 30July2005. The crash site was in a narrow canyon at an elevation of about 3900feet above sea level, in an area of steeply rising terrain. Both occupants were fatally injured. A post-crash fire destroyed most of the aircraft. The emergency locator transmitter was destroyed in the fire and no signal was detected. The crash occurred at about 0840Pacific daylight time. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The reported weather at Vancouver International Airport, British Columbia, approximately 54 nautical miles (nm) south of the accident site, at 0900 Pacific daylight time,1 about 20minutes after the accident, was as follows: wind 310T at 7knots; visibility 30statute miles; scattered clouds at 22000feet above ground level (agl); temperature 20C; dew point 17C; altimeter setting 29.95 inches of mercury; remarks: 2oktas cirrus, sea-level pressure 1014.2hectopascals. A pilot report from a helicopter pilot who flew in the area of the accident that same morning indicated that there was a light wind from the northwest and that there were three oktas of altocumulus cloud between 6800and 8000feet above sea level (asl) over the ice cap to the north and northeast of the accident site. The crew, which consisted of a captain and first officer, were alerted for the flight the previous day. The purpose of the flight was to ferry the aircraft empty to Smithers, British Columbia, and thereafter to operate it as a revenue flight. The crew reported to Vancouver International Airport at 0700 and took off at 0824 under visual flight rules (VFR) with 3600pounds of fuel on board. No flight plan was filed but a company flight note was activated. Radar data indicated the aircraft flew north up Howe Sound, British Columbia, at 2000feet asl. The last recorded radar hit, at 0831:23, showed the aircraft in the vicinity of Anvil Island, descending through 1700feet asl. The aircraft was later observed flying low up the Squamish River valley, about 12nm south of the accident site, on a northerly heading. The captain had been employed by Northern Thunderbird Air for three years. He held a valid airline transport pilot licence issued by Transport Canada (TC), endorsed for the Beechcraft King Air200, and a Group1 instrument rating. His last medical was conducted on 01March2005 and the medical certificate was valid for 12months. He had undergone a pilot proficiency check (PPC) on the Beechcraft King Air200, conducted by TC on 27April2005, which was valid for two years. He had accumulated 2700hours of total flying time, including 100hours on the Beechcraft King Air200 as captain. The captain was free of duty the day before the accident. He went to bed at a reasonable hour the night before the flight, and there was nothing in his 24-hour history to suggest that he might have been fatigued. While the captain did have a second job, he did not work at that job the day before the accident. The first officer had been employed by Northern Thunderbird Air for about four months. He held a valid commercial pilot licence issued byTC, endorsed for the Beechcraft King Air200, and a Group1 instrument rating. His last medical was conducted on 21January2005 and the medical certificate was valid for 12months. On 02June2005, he completed a PPCon the Beechcraft King Air200, conducted by TC, which was valid for two years. He had accumulated 1200hours of total flying time, including 80hours as first officer on the King Air200. He was free of duty the day before the accident. He went to bed at a reasonable hour the night before the flight, and there was nothing in his 24-hour history to suggest that he might have been fatigued. Autopsies and full toxicology examinations of the two pilots did not reveal any conditions that could have led to or contributed to the accident. Both pilots had received company training on the status and use of the Northern Thunderbird Air company operations manual (COM) and on the hazards of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). The COM, section4.3.1, Obstacle Clearance Requirements, states the following: Records indicate that the aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures. The aircraft was manufactured in 1976and had flown a total of 21336.1hours as of 26July2005. A review of the airframe, engine, and propeller logbooks showed nothing remarkable. The left engine, serial number PCE80325, had accumulated 3435.2hours since overhaul. The right engine, serial number PCE80384, had accumulated 3169.8hours since overhaul. The wreckage was found in the Shovelnose Creek valley at an elevation of 3900feet asl. The aircraft had clipped the tops of two trees before contacting the 33slope at about a 33pitch angle. Measurements of the angle and direction between the two clipped tree tops indicate that the aircraft was climbing at an angle of about 12or 13when it struck the two trees, and was flying on a track of 038M. The average slope was 11, but it was much steeper at the accident site. Calculations made by the aircraft manufacturer, using the estimated aircraft weight and conditions at the time of the accident, indicate that the aircraft would have been capable of climbing at an angle of 13at full power, and that this was close to its maximum sustainable climb capability. The post-crash fire consumed most of the aircraft except for the tail section. Two small pieces of fibreglass, some white paint chips, and an antenna were found along the flight path. Right aileron parts and the right wing lower skin, including fuel tank access panels, were found in the woods to the right of the right engine, but most of the wreckage debris was confined to an area no larger than the aircraft. The propeller had separated from the left engine and its reduction gearbox was fractured. Both propeller cylinders were intact. Of the four exhaust stacks, only the left engine's left stack showed any damage. Both Pratt & Whitney PT6A-41 engines were recovered from the accident site and shipped to Pratt & Whitney Canada for analysis. The examination found severe fire damage but minimal impact damage to both engines. There were numerous indications of internal circumferential rubbing on both engines, characteristic of impact while operating at high power. Little indication of longitudinal compression damage was found. Both propellers were recovered and removed to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) regional wreckage examination facility where a teardown took place, assisted by a representative of the propeller manufacturer. Witness marks were found on the left propeller at the feather stop. Multiple blade angle witness marks, both higher and lower than normal operating blade angles, were found on the right propeller. Extensive blade damage, consisting of multiple fore and aft bends, deep gouges in the leading edges, and torn tips, was evident on both propellers, characteristic of impact with engine power on. Flying safely in mountainous terrain requires an understanding and awareness of the hazards associated with mountain flight. Some of these hazards are visual illusions, more extreme weather phenomena than are otherwise normally encountered, including turbulence, degraded aircraft performance due to density altitude effects, and a requirement to employ special operating techniques. Nothing could be found to indicate that either pilot had received dedicated mountain flying training or a dedicated pilot decision-making course. Their TC-approved flight training program to obtain their pilot licences may have included some of this training.