Summary On 20 July 1999, while proceeding from Camden, New Jersey, towards Trois-Rivires, Quebec, the self-unloading bulk carrier NANTICOKE experienced an engine-room fire. The crew briefly fought the fire with portable extinguishers and water prior to the engine-room being evacuated. The fixed halon firefighting system was released and suppressed the fire. Despite damage to the steering power and control system wiring, the vessel proceeded to New York City under its own power for repairs. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information History of the Voyage The NANTICOKE departed Camden, New Jersey, USA, on 19 July 1999 at 1930,[2] loaded with 28,745 tons of petroleum coke and a small amount of trimming ballast. During the 1200-1600 engine-room watch the following day, the watchkeeping engineer cleaned the forward fuel filter on the port generator as part of the preventative maintenance routine. At 1500 the watchkeeping engineer started the generator and tested the filter for leaks. At 1515 the chief engineer entered the engine-room and inspected the generators. Finding all temperatures and pressures normal, he proceeded to the control room. Soon after, the general alarm was sounded for a fire drill, the watchkeeping engineer was then relieved by the chief engineer and proceeded to his fire station. During the fire drill, the chief engineer and mechanical assistant on watch remained in the control room from where the generator flat could not be seen. The fire drill ended at 1600 and the crew prepared for a pollution drill. In the engine control room, the chief engineer noted a high cooling water temperature alarm from port generator cylinder No. 1. The chief engineer left the control room to investigate and discovered that the engine-room was full of smoke and the port generator was on fire. Upon returning to the control room, the chief engineer immediately sounded the general alarm and called the bridge to inform them that there was a fire in the engine-room. He then proceeded to shut down the port generator and isolate its fuel supply. The chief engineer donned a 10-minute escape hood and attempted to locate the mechanical assistant. Failing to find the mechanical assistant (who had already left the engine-room) the chief engineer returned to the control room; however, the control room was not equipped with an emergency exit. As a result the chief engineer, wearing a 10-minute escape hood evacuated the smoke-filled engine-room by following handrails to the engine-room exit door on the main deck. The starboard generator was left running to supply power to the vessel. On the bridge, the master transmitted a security call followed by a Mayday, both of which were received and acknowledged by the United States Coast Guard in New York City. The fire parties were standing down from the drill and were in the process of removing their protective fire suits when the general alarm sounded. Two crew members suited up again and entered the engine-room through the steering flat using Scott air packs. They attempted to fight the fire with CO2 extinguishers but were driven back by the intense heat. Subsequently, a second team, consisting of the head tunnelman and an ordinary seaman, entered the engine-room with a charged fire hose. Setting the nozzle on fog, they managed to extinguish much of the fire before they were ordered out of the engine-room. At 1640 following a head count and ensuring that all of the engine-room vents were closed, the chief engineer discharged the Halon extinguishing system. By 1722 the fire was out and shortly thereafter the gangway doors were opened to ventilate the engine-room while a fire party stood by to guard against a re-ignition. Attempts were made to get the vessel underway to New York City. However, due to damaged steering gear power and control electrical cables, no steering was available. The fire cut off power to the engine-room ventilation fans. The engine-room staff jury-rigged a temporary power supply to one steering motor and, using local control, managed to regain steering. As a consequence of the damaged ventilation fan wiring, the vessel proceeded on one engine, at reduced speed to New York City, arriving at 1500 on July 21. At the time of the occurrence, the wind was from the northeast at 13 knots and seas were 1.5 to 2 m. Visibility was 8 nautical miles. Generator Maintenance Work The work performed on the port generator just prior to the fire was a 125-hour preventative maintenance routine. Included in this procedure was the requirement to disassemble and clean the secondary fuel filter, which had been in use during the past 125 hours of operation. In the case of the port generator, this was the forward filter. The filter was cleaned without incident, and a new cover-sealing O-ring installed. However, the watchkeeping engineer encountered difficulty in obtaining a fuel-tight seal between the cover and cover bolt. As no new spare copper washer gaskets were available on board, the existing copper washer was annealed and re-used. Damage to the Engine-Room Fire damage to the port generator was primarily to the upper front end in the area of cylinder heads Nos. 1, 2 and 3, secondary fuel filters, and accessories/wiring mounted on the front end of the engine. Electrical cables running in athwartships trays directly above the forward end of the port generator were extensively damaged, resulting in a loss of power to steering control, steering pumps, some ventilation fans, and engine-room lighting. The fire damaged paintwork on the overhead directly over the port generator and on the port shell plating outboard adjacent to the port generator. The upper engine-room was extensively covered in soot. Examination of the Port Generator The port generator was examined by the TSB on the evening of July 21. The generator secondary fuel filters are located on the inboard forward end adjacent to valve cover No. 1. The generator secondary fuel filter selector cock was found in the forward filter position indicating that the forward fuel filter was in use at the time of the fire. Both the forward and aft filter bowls were extensively charred externally. The save-all under the fuel filters was full to within 3 cm of its upper edge with diesel oil. There was an indication that fuel had run down the starboard side of the engine under the filters. Outboard of cylinder No. 1 are the exhaust collector pipes which lead to the turbocharger mounted on the forward end of the engine. No lagging or shielding was present on the exhaust pipes where they connected to the turbocharger. An indicator cock protruded from each cylinder head just forward and outboard of the valve covers. A vertical, V-shaped soot pattern was present on the port generator exhaust uptake as well as a horizontal soot pattern on valve covers 1, 2 and 3, both originating in the vicinity of the exhaust manifold/turbocharger inlet area. Aft surfaces of the valve covers had been shadowed from the fire even though their top surfaces were burned and sooted. An area of clean burn damage was present on the cable tray directly above the fuel filters. Aft Fuel Filter Inspection of the aft filter revealed that the cover-retaining bolt was loose and that the cover could be moved vertically by 3 mm. The copper washer gasket used to seal the bolt/cover joint was stuck to the cover. Upon removing the aft filter cover, it was noted that the rubber O-ring, which seals the cover, had deformed plastic and had partially melted on the side facing the engine. Internally, the centre spindle rubber seal was partially distorted by heat, and the filter basket was discoloured, indicating it had been exposed to high temperature. The aft filter cover had a recess in its top surface into which the copper washer gasket fitted, a feature not noted on the forward filter cover. Forward Fuel Filter Inspection of the forward filter revealed that the cover was in place, with the centre retaining-bolt finger tight. The cover seal O-ring was melted for a distance of 3 cm on the side facing the engine, but was otherwise intact. Internally, the centre spindle rubber seal and filter basket were intact and showed no sign of heat damage. The filter bowl was two-thirds full of diesel fuel. File marks were present on the cover/bolt sealing surface and, unlike the aft filter, the cover/bolt surface was flat, with no recess. Inspection of the centre and starboard generator engine secondary fuel filters revealed that the top covers were coated with diesel oil that appeared to have wept from the top cover bolt copper washer gasket.