2.0 Analysis 2.1 Speed of the Integrated Tug-Barge Unit During the transit up the Fraser River, the ITB ran over a number of gill nets and was involved in near-collision situations with other fishing vessels. Between Sandheads at 0745 and the position of the collision off Steveston Island at 0817, the ITB travelled a distance of 5.07nautical miles, giving an average speed of 9.54kn; this despite the fact that the vessel proceeded at reduced speed for some seven minutes (between 0803 and 0810) having reached a low speed of 2.5 kn. While the position and time are inexact, the ITB's average speed outside of the speed reduction period would still be considered unsafe in the prevailing circumstances. Given the heavy concentration of fishing vessels in the vicinity, some of which were within the confines of the channel, prudence dictates that the vessel's reduction in speed should have been maintained. Instead, the vessel's speed was increased to near-full throttle off buoy S14 while approaching concentrations of fishing vessels; the ITB struck the ROXANA GLEN with great impact and could not be stopped in the available distance. Hence, the speed at which the ITB was proceeding before the collision was unsafe. 2.2 Look-out As the video equipment on the ITB does not provide a field of vision ahead, it does not lessen the need to post a look-out forward. The ITB was transiting an area of dense traffic and, despite the limited forward visibility, it proceeded at a considerable speed without posting a look-out forward, contrary to the dictates of good seamanship. Following the collision, a look-out was posted forward. Although the master was aware of the presence of fishing vessels in the area, the vessel's speed was not reduced in sufficient time to avert a collision. Thus, the information available to the master was not used to advantage in making a full and proper assessment of the situation. Hence, the ARCTIC TAGLU did not maintain an efficient and proper look-out. As the lone operator of the ROXANA GLEN was attending to his nets from the afterdeck, he was not monitoring the radar or the VHFR/T (there was no VHF relay speaker on the work deck), nor was he maintaining a proper look-out. The operator was preoccupied with fishing operations; he did not hear the warning signals sounded by the ARCTIC TAGLU and he was not aware of the approaching ITB. Although the bridges of small fishing vessels are often left unattended during fishing operations (due to their small complement), there is no regulatory requirement for VHFR/T relay speakers to be fitted on the work deck. Recognizing the need for such a speaker, some fishing vessel owners/operators have had one installed on their work deck to ensure that they receive important safety messages. 2.3 Maritime Mobile Frequencies--Designation for Fishing Vessel Communication Channel 78A is recommended for inter-ship communication (between commercial and fishing vessels) when commercial ships are transiting an open fishing ground (in the inside passage waters of B.C.), but this information is not contained in RAMN publications. The absence of frequency information in the RAMN publications limits commercial vessels, especially foreign-flag vessels, to using channel 16 as the only means of establishing (verbal) communication with fishing vessels. However, monitoring of channel 16 is given a low priority by fishing vessel operators. The absence of this information in the RAMN is not considered to have contributed to this occurrence. 2.4 Non-enforcement of Regulations Obstruction of the Navigable Channel by Fishermen The DFO, TCMarine Safety, and the Fraser River Harbour Commission require that the navigable channel not be obstructed by fishing activities. The Fraser Harbour Master's office has a limited number of small vessels; however, they were not used to keep the channel clear. The RCMP patrol vessel LINDSAY was not involved in patrol duties on the day of the occurrence, nor had it received any request for assistance from the Fishery Officers. While the RCMP Richmond Division attended to the ARCTIC TAGLU, the marine division of RCMP was not made aware of the occurrence; the current policy does not require the former to notify the latter. This would suggest that there may be a lack of coordination between the different divisions in the RCMP. While section 24 of the Fisheries Act requires that fishing activity not impede safe navigation of vessels, section 26 permits one-third of the width of the navigable channel to be used for fishing activity. The COLREGS and the FRHC by-laws complement each other, but the Fisheries Act appears to be at variance. The COLREGS permit special rules to be made by appropriate harbour authorities.(8) As the DFO fisheries officers monitor fishing activity, they are best positioned to enforce the requirements of the Fisheries Act and could seek assistance from the RCMP, if deemed necessary. In this instance, the fisheries officers did not enforce the requirement, nor was assistance sought from RCMP Marine Services. Because fisheries on the Fraser River are an important part of the B.C. economy, it would appear that some latitude is applied to participants who conduct themselves in a seaman-like manner. This is reflected in the FRHC by-laws, in that they provide for signals to cause fishing vessels to move to allow other vessels to pass. In any event, the fact that obstruction of the channel has been tolerated for years makes enforcement difficult. Difficulties are experienced in enforcing section 24 of the Fisheries Act. Because the process of summary conviction is very cumbersome and the criminal justice system views these convictions as regulatory offences, the likelihood of convictions is slim. Hence, the Contraventions Act passed by Parliament in 1992 and amended on 29May 1996, was designed to make these types of offences easier to address. However, to avail themselves of the ease of enforcement afforded by the Contraventions Act, departments have to ensure that the provisions of their legislation are designated as a contravention by regulations to be covered by the Act. At the time of publication of this report, a number of departments have availed themselves of this enforcement tool, but the DFO has not. A number of small fishing vessels carry VHFR/T equipment, but neither the equipment nor the personnel operating it are certificated. Investigation into occurrences has revealed that personnel operating the equipment were not familiar with it, nor with the mandatory requirements, nor with the proper procedures to operate the equipment. It was determined that in some instances the personnel operating the equipment did not possess a working knowledge of either of Canada's official languages, and consequently could not use the equipment effectively to enhance safety. Communication skills are integral to the safe operation of vessels. In order to decrease the risks that arise from a lack of communication skills, consideration should be given to requiring that all applicants for an RORC possess proficient communication skills to operate in their region of choice. Furthermore, as fishing licences are issued on an annual basis, the system could be used as a vehicle to ensure that fishing vessels fitted with VHF R/T have appropriately qualified personnel to operate the radio station. Despite enforcement efforts by regulatory authorities, it is estimated that some 10percent of small fishing vessels do not have their stations inspected nor are their operators certificated. Some of these vessels operate from smaller ports and remote areas across Canada. In this instance, the unsafe situation went undetected for some four years, to the detriment of vessel and personal safety. Given that the operator, although rescued within minutes of his immersion in the water, was suffering from mild hypothermia, it was fortuitous that help was at hand. 2.5 Attempts at Educating Fishermen Recognizing the need to educate Vietnamese-speaking fishermen in the safe operation of their vessels, the Vietnamese Fishermen's Association publishes a newsletter entitled New Wave in the Vietnamese language. The subjects covered include: rules of the road, safe navigation principles, radio communication procedures, and stability. Nonetheless, the operator of the ROXANA GLEN was not aware of radio procedures and practices. This suggests that the education program may not be reaching its intended audience. 2.5.1 New Initiatives to Educate Fishermen Over the years, the safe operation of fishing vessels has been, and remains, a concern of the Board. A number of recommendations respecting certification (e.g., Marine Emergency Duties (MED) training, safety equipment training, and safety equipment carriage requirements), have been made to TCMS/DFO/ Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC). Provincial labour ministries in conjunction with federal departments including TCMS and DFO are taking new initiatives to professionalize the fishing industry. The initiatives being considered include a record of sea service, an apprenticeship program to train new fishermen and a diploma course in Professional Fishing. 2.6 Safety Meeting Between Marine Interests In June 1995 representatives of the CCG, the Fisheries Council of British Columbia, the BritishColumbia Coast Pilots, and the shipping industry met to discuss safety issues concerning fishing vessels and commercial ships. Subsequently, publicity was given via an advisory notice for fishing vessel operators to monitor the proper channels on VHF radio and to comply with the COLREGS, and for commercial ships to monitor channel 78A while transiting an open fishing ground. Lack of knowledge of English has been a barrier in communications between many of the Vietnamese-speaking fishermen and the remainder of the marine industry. It is also clear that Vietnamese-speaking fishermen are not attending group discussions such as the Fraser Rivers Group and other panels that endeavour to address safety issues. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings The ARCTIC TAGLU/LINK100 was proceeding for the first time to its new terminal on the Fraser River. The ARCTIC TAGLU was proceeding at an unsafe speed given the heavy concentration of fishing vessels in the vicinity. The forward visibility from the ARCTIC TAGLU was partially obscured, and no look-out was posted forward on the barge. The lone operator of the ROXANA GLEN was setting nets in the centre of the navigable channel in the Fraser River. There was no very high frequency (VHF) relay speaker to monitor radio communications from the work deck of the ROXANA GLEN. Neither the warning signals sounded by the ARCTIC TAGLU nor her SCURIT broadcast were heard aboard the ROXANA GLEN. Neither vessel maintained an efficient and proper look-out. The operator of the ROXANA GLEN did not hold a Radiotelephone Operator's Restricted Certificate (RORC) nor did he have working knowledge of English. Communication skills are not a pre-requisite for the issuance of a radio operator's certificate, nor are they a pre-requisite for the issuance of a fishing licence. The operator of the ROXANA GLEN did not avail himself of safety education materials that are published by government agencies and by the Vietnamese Fishermen's Association. The safety of a vessel is not a condition of licence under the Fisheries Act. It is difficult to enforce the provision against obstruction of a navigational channel and this practice by local fishermen has been tolerated for years. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has not availed itself of the ease of enforcement afforded by the Contraventions Act. 3.2 Causes The ARCTIC TAGLU/LINK100 and the ROXANA GLEN were involved in a collision because the integrated tug-barge unit was transiting the Fraser River at an unsafe speed and the ROXANA GLEN was setting nets in the centre of the navigable channel. The fact that neither vessel maintained an efficient and proper look-out contributed to the accident. The Board has no marine safety recommendations to issue at this time.4.0 Safety Action The Board has no marine safety recommendations to issue at this time.