The pilot was flying to Gimli for two purposes. Although he could have spent the night at one of the en route stops and could still have attended the wedding on August28, an overnight stop would have prevented him from seeing his friend in Gimli, who was leaving the next day. The pilot was aware that weather conditions deteriorated en route from Roblin to Gimli, but attempted the flight in spite of the poor weather. Weather conditions on the night of the accident would have permitted operation at least 500feet agl and clear of cloud with visibility of at least three miles. However, the combination of nighttime darkness, limited surface lighting, low overcast clouds and reduced visibility in drizzle would have made it very difficult for the pilot to maintain visual reference with the surface. The aircraft crashed on a westward heading, indicating the pilot had probably decided to reverse course because of the deteriorating weather conditions. The aircraft struck the surface in a slightly nose-up attitude, indicating the aircraft was still under control at the time of impact. Given the darkness and weather conditions, the pilot would have needed to revert to instrument flight to make the course reversal turn. Although the aircraft was not certified for instrument flight, it was equipped with instruments suitable for emergency use. Instrument flying requires the use of skills, acquired through training and experience, that deteriorate with disuse. The pilot had limited instrument experience, acquired during his pilot private licence training in1998 and the more recent night-rating training. The pilot most likely inadvertently descended while making the course reversal turn and did not detect and arrest the descent in time to prevent impact with the surface. The pilot had filed a flight itinerary with the friend as per regulations. The pilot did not ensure that the friend understood the SAR-notification requirements of the flight itinerary. In this occurrence, emergency response services, including SAR resources, were notified immediately by witnesses to the accident. However, the failure of the pilot to ensure the designated responsible person understood the flight-itinerary, SAR-notification requirements presents a risk that SAR resources might not have been activated in a timely manner.Analysis The pilot was flying to Gimli for two purposes. Although he could have spent the night at one of the en route stops and could still have attended the wedding on August28, an overnight stop would have prevented him from seeing his friend in Gimli, who was leaving the next day. The pilot was aware that weather conditions deteriorated en route from Roblin to Gimli, but attempted the flight in spite of the poor weather. Weather conditions on the night of the accident would have permitted operation at least 500feet agl and clear of cloud with visibility of at least three miles. However, the combination of nighttime darkness, limited surface lighting, low overcast clouds and reduced visibility in drizzle would have made it very difficult for the pilot to maintain visual reference with the surface. The aircraft crashed on a westward heading, indicating the pilot had probably decided to reverse course because of the deteriorating weather conditions. The aircraft struck the surface in a slightly nose-up attitude, indicating the aircraft was still under control at the time of impact. Given the darkness and weather conditions, the pilot would have needed to revert to instrument flight to make the course reversal turn. Although the aircraft was not certified for instrument flight, it was equipped with instruments suitable for emergency use. Instrument flying requires the use of skills, acquired through training and experience, that deteriorate with disuse. The pilot had limited instrument experience, acquired during his pilot private licence training in1998 and the more recent night-rating training. The pilot most likely inadvertently descended while making the course reversal turn and did not detect and arrest the descent in time to prevent impact with the surface. The pilot had filed a flight itinerary with the friend as per regulations. The pilot did not ensure that the friend understood the SAR-notification requirements of the flight itinerary. In this occurrence, emergency response services, including SAR resources, were notified immediately by witnesses to the accident. However, the failure of the pilot to ensure the designated responsible person understood the flight-itinerary, SAR-notification requirements presents a risk that SAR resources might not have been activated in a timely manner. The pilot continued a series of VFR flights at night into an area of limited surface lighting with known adverse weather conditions. The pilot's instrument flying skills were most likely not adequate to safely complete the course reversal turn, resulting in an inadvertent descent that was not detected and corrected in time to prevent impact with the surface.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The pilot continued a series of VFR flights at night into an area of limited surface lighting with known adverse weather conditions. The pilot's instrument flying skills were most likely not adequate to safely complete the course reversal turn, resulting in an inadvertent descent that was not detected and corrected in time to prevent impact with the surface. The pilot did not ensure that the responsible person who received the flight itinerary understood the SAR-notification requirements.Finding as to Risk The pilot did not ensure that the responsible person who received the flight itinerary understood the SAR-notification requirements. On 25 January 2005, the TSB sent a safety advisory to Transport Canada, suggesting that the department may wish to consider action to improve awareness among pilots of the need to ensure that persons responsible for flight itineraries understand their obligations concerning SAR notification. On 14 April 2005, Transport Canada published an article in Issue2/2005 of the Aviation Safety Letter, which is sent to all Canadian licenced pilots. The article summarized the occurrence and emphasized the need for pilots to ensure that persons responsible for the flight itinerary fully understand the SAR-notification requirements. The Olds-Didsbury Flying Association has introduced pilot training sessions, which are conducted every three months. It is mandatory for any pilot renting the club's aircraft to attend these sessions.Safety Action On 25 January 2005, the TSB sent a safety advisory to Transport Canada, suggesting that the department may wish to consider action to improve awareness among pilots of the need to ensure that persons responsible for flight itineraries understand their obligations concerning SAR notification. On 14 April 2005, Transport Canada published an article in Issue2/2005 of the Aviation Safety Letter, which is sent to all Canadian licenced pilots. The article summarized the occurrence and emphasized the need for pilots to ensure that persons responsible for the flight itinerary fully understand the SAR-notification requirements. The Olds-Didsbury Flying Association has introduced pilot training sessions, which are conducted every three months. It is mandatory for any pilot renting the club's aircraft to attend these sessions.