2.0 Analysis 2.1 Conduct of the 6E7221 The pleasure craft was under the conduct of the operator. Although he was an experienced pleasure boat owner, he had not taken any marine navigation courses. Since Canadian pleasure craft owners are not subject to compulsory training, many are unaware of the privileges granted to larger vessels under the Collision Regulations. There was plenty of water in the area where the collision occurred to allow a vessel of the size and type of the 6E7221 to operate, without danger, outside of the narrow main navigation channel and thus avoid a close-quarters situation. The 6E7221 was being operated within the main navigation channel and was not being kept to the starboard side of the channel. Had the 6E7221 carried a second oar, the occupants might have had time to paddle the boat out of the centre of the channel. 2.2 Navigational Watch on the AMELIA DESGAGNES Commercial vessels meet many pleasure craft that are being operated in the main navigation channel, often with complete disregard for the personal safety of the boat's occupants. These types of encounters occur with such frequency that the crews of commercial vessels may become complacent about keeping an effective look-out for pleasure craft. Powerboat pleasure craft are normally much faster and more manoeuvrable than larger commercial vessels are, but they are often operated in an erratic and unpredictable manner that makes it difficult to assess whether risk of collision exists. When the 6E7221 passed ahead of the AMELIA DESGAGNES and was lost to sight, the ship's crew members expected that the boat would eventually reappear to starboard, as had several others that day. No particular measures were taken to track the 6E7221. It was difficult to keep an adequate visual look-out ahead because of the blind sectors caused by the cranes forward of the wheel-house. When the 6E7221 and the occupants who were in the water were passed by the AMELIA DESGAGNES, the master's interpretation of the situation was reflected in his report to Seaway Iroquois, in which he advised of a pleasure craft stopped in the channel and of people swimming. Narrow channels offer very little manoeuvring room for large vessels, and it can be risky for such vessels to slacken speed or stop in strong currents and crosswinds. At a speed through the water of 10 kn, the AMELIA DESGAGNES would have closed the three cables to the disabled 6E7221 in less than two minutes. Had the presence of the 6E7221 been detected immediately, the AMELIA DESGAGNES would have been limited with regard to what action could be taken. 2.3 Pyrotechnic Distress Signals A strict interpretation of the Small Vessel Regulations reveals that pyrotechnic distress signals were not required by the 6E7221. However, as the use of the horn had been lost and no radiotelephone was on board, the occupants of the 6E7221 could have used a pyrotechnic distress signal to indicate the boat's presence had such an appliance been on board. 2.4 Response to the Emergency The AMELIA DESGAGNES did not report the occurrence as an emergency, and time was lost as the Seaway traffic centres attempted to establish the precise position of the occurrence and ascertain whether it had taken place in U.S. or Canadian waters in order to determine which authorities to advise. 2.5 Pleasure Craft Engine Maintenance The operator had only recently taken possession of the 6E7221. He had had no apparent problem starting the engine, and he was giving the boat the first meaningful sea trials under his care. The engine's reliability and maintenance needs were, therefore, still being assessed. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings The 6E7221 suffered an engine breakdown in the main navigation channel, some two to three cables ahead of the AMELIA DESGAGNES. The engine breakdown was subsequently found to be electrical in origin and to have been caused by a malfunctioning alternator. Without propulsion, the 6E7221 drifted toward the centre of the channel. There was only one oar on the 6E7221. It could have been used to move the pleasure craft out of the channel, but it was not. Because of the power failure, the boat's electric horn could not be used to sound a distress signal, and only a visual signal with outstretched arms was given. The pleasure craft was not required to be equipped with pyrotechnic distress signals, and none were aboard. Because of deck cranes, the AMELIA DESGAGNES had a horizontal blind sector of eight degrees and the vertical blind sector between the two sets of cranes extended approximately 190 m beyond the bow. The plight of the 6E7221 was not noticed by the crew of the AMELIA DESGAGNES. Five of the six occupants of the 6E7221 jumped into the water before the AMELIA DESGAGNES struck the boat. To those on the bridge of the AMELIA DESGAGNES, the first indication of a dangerous situation was the sight of the 6E7221 and of the people in the water passing down the sides of the ship. The main propulsion of the AMELIA DESGAGNES was not slowed or stopped. None of the occupants of the 6E7221 was wearing any form of flotation device. The occurrence was reported as a dangerous incident, and precious time was lost in determining jurisdiction. The crew members of the AMELIA DESGAGNES did not deploy any life-saving equipment because they assumed that the persons in the water were pleasure boaters swimming from the 6E7221. 3.2 Causes The AMELIA DESGAGNES and the pleasure craft collided because of an engine malfunction on the pleasure craft. The occupants of the pleasure craft were not able to effectively indicate that they were in distress. Contributing to the collision was the fact that those in charge of the watch on the AMELIA DESGAGNES did not maintain an effective look-out. 4.0 Safety Action 4.1 Safety Concern 4.1.1 Collisions Between Commercial Vessels and Pleasure Craft In the last 10 years, more than 54 collisions have occurred between pleasure craft and large commercial vessels. Of these accidents, 19 were due to inattention or poor look-out, 15 to poor handling or imprudent action, 9 to reduced visibility, 8 to mechanical failures, and 2 to excessive speed. The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) Marine Rescue Centre in Qubec City reported that, since 1987, 12 collisions and 14 near-collisions have been reported in that district. In the narrow waterways of the St. Lawrence River and Seaway, the damage that resulted from such occurrences varied from minor scuffs to total loss of the pleasure craft. In 1987 and 1988, the CCG issued two Ship Safety Bulletins (SSB Nos. 10/87 and 11/88) to warn mariners to avoid close-quarters situations in narrow channels and around harbours. Although the CCG and other non-profit organizations regularly campaign to promote safety, the lack of basic skills and knowledge of seamanship among pleasure craft operators continues to create accident situations. There is no legal requirement to have an operator's licence to operate pleasure craft in Canada. The CCG recently initiated discussions with the Province of Ontario to establish basic proficiency requirements and mandatory educational training for a pleasure craft operator's licence. Although commercial shipping has a responsibility to monitor the movements of smaller craft, large ships do not always have sufficient sea room to manoeuvre within narrow channels or fairways. The Board believes that pleasure craft operators continue to put themselves at risk when, by want of skills, lack of knowledge, or through inattentiveness or imprudence, they impede the passage of large commercial vessels. When a mechanical failure occurs in a restricted channel and the operator of a pleasure craft does not have the necessary means to communicate this situation by radiotelephone or by the use of pyrotechnics to warn oncoming traffic, the risks increase. In view of the frequency and potential severity of collisions between pleasure craft and large commercial vessels, the Board is concerned that current requirements for ensuring the safety of pleasure boaters are inadequate, particularly with respect to the skills and knowledge required of operators, and to the carriage of emergency, distress and communication equipment. The Board commends such initiatives as that being undertaken by the CCG and the Province of Ontario to establish licensing requirements for operators. Additional measures by the CCG, provincial authorities and non-governmental organizations are encouraged to enhance safety awareness by pleasure boaters.