A thorough examination of the aircraft's wheel-brake system was completed by the operator following this occurrence and the subsequent occurrence in Montral, and no abnormalities were found. The analysis will deal only with the occurrence at MCIA. The pilots were experienced overall and had flown the aircraft type for a good number of hours: the captain 4300hours and the first officer 900hours. They were more than likely aware that the aircraft was slightly higher and faster over the threshold than desired, the touchdown would be further down the runway than normal, and the runway was wet. With these conditions in mind, it is reasonable to assume that on landing, the crew would do everything possible to ensure that the aircraft stopped on the runway, especially fully applying the wheel brakes. However, the aircraft did not decelerate normally. The AFM unfactored landing distance from 50feet AAE to a full stop on a wet runway for this aircraft and the conditions of the landing was approximately 3900feet. The aircraft was 50feet AAE1675feet passed the runway threshold and used another 2125feet before weight on wheels. Even so, with the derived ground run of 2900feet the aircraft should have been stopped 1300feet before the end of the 8000-foot runway. The AFM factored landing field length of 6500feet provided a safety margin in the event of a problem or long landing. The aircraft was slightly high over the threshold and used 1675feet of the available 8000feet before reaching 50feet AAE. However, 6325feet remained to land and bring the aircraft to a stop. If the aircraft's approach had positioned the aircraft at 50feet above the threshold, with all other factors remaining the same, the aircraft would have used 6625feet to stop. This value still exceeds the maximum value as defined by the AFM; however, the aircraft would have remained on the runway. Conversely, if the braking profile had matched that of previous flights, even with a threshold crossing height of 75feet, the aircraft would have required 6700feet from threshold to full stop. Although this is outside the margin specified in the AFM, it still leaves a margin of approximately 1300feet to have completed the stop on the runway. No fault was found with the brake system, so there may have been two instances of an intermittent fault: electrical, mechanical, or hydraulic. FDR data from the occurrence showed that the brakes were active and there was a low, fluctuating brake pressure, but there was a delay in the rise of brake pressure when compared to other landings. As this aircraft was not equipped to record pedal positions, it could not be determined from the FDR whether, when, or how much the pedals were being depressed. Also, the aircraft was not equipped to record wheel speed, so it is not possible to determine whether the wheels were spinning or stopped. Several operational and human factors contributed to the occurrence. The pilots were aware of the wet runway conditions and the approximate landing distance required; therefore, they should have been aware of the requirement for a normal touchdown point on the 8000-foot runway, typically about 1000feet from the threshold. Similarly, the flight crew would have been aware that a slower flap45 approach would result in a shorter landing distance and reduce the risk of hydroplaning. Nevertheless, they conducted a flap22 approach at a higher speed. The influences that led to this were the turn to intercept the localizer at close range, the need to begin the final descent to land, and the realization that it would be difficult to slow the aircraft enough for the flap45 approach. Based on the FDR data, the PF had some difficulty capturing the localizer and the aircraft was high and fast on the approach. All of these factors led directly to the rushed and unstable approach. Additionally, the crew should have been aware of the need for a firm landing to reduce the risk of hydroplaning. Instead, the landing was long and smooth. On landing, the aircraft most likely entered a state of viscous or dynamic hydroplaning, with the anti-skid system modulating brake pressure to prevent wheel lockup. The aircraft remained in this state until the aircraft speed reached a point where hydroplaning ceased. At this point the anti-system allowed the brakes to come into full effect and effectively slow the aircraft. The amount of time it took the PF to identify the brake problem and relay this information to the PNF was longer than expected for such an event. The PF's low experience on aircraft without thrust reversers, coupled with the wet runway, most likely delayed his recognition of the braking problem as he evaluated the situation and attempted to determine the cause of the lack of deceleration. Similarly, although the PNF may have recognized that the aircraft was not slowing as expected, he did not verbalize his concern to the PF in a timely manner. Someone with access to the cockpit erased the CVR. Although the data was successfully retrieved, the erasure of the CVR is a serious contravention of the regulations and concerns the Board. CVR information is crucial to reconstructing what happened in the cockpit and, consequently, with the aircraft. It is the Board's expectation that the aviation community will assist our investigators by preserving all evidence, including that provided by the CVR. Interference with the CVR obstructs the work of the investigation and may prevent the Board from reporting publicly on causes and safety deficiencies.Analysis A thorough examination of the aircraft's wheel-brake system was completed by the operator following this occurrence and the subsequent occurrence in Montral, and no abnormalities were found. The analysis will deal only with the occurrence at MCIA. The pilots were experienced overall and had flown the aircraft type for a good number of hours: the captain 4300hours and the first officer 900hours. They were more than likely aware that the aircraft was slightly higher and faster over the threshold than desired, the touchdown would be further down the runway than normal, and the runway was wet. With these conditions in mind, it is reasonable to assume that on landing, the crew would do everything possible to ensure that the aircraft stopped on the runway, especially fully applying the wheel brakes. However, the aircraft did not decelerate normally. The AFM unfactored landing distance from 50feet AAE to a full stop on a wet runway for this aircraft and the conditions of the landing was approximately 3900feet. The aircraft was 50feet AAE1675feet passed the runway threshold and used another 2125feet before weight on wheels. Even so, with the derived ground run of 2900feet the aircraft should have been stopped 1300feet before the end of the 8000-foot runway. The AFM factored landing field length of 6500feet provided a safety margin in the event of a problem or long landing. The aircraft was slightly high over the threshold and used 1675feet of the available 8000feet before reaching 50feet AAE. However, 6325feet remained to land and bring the aircraft to a stop. If the aircraft's approach had positioned the aircraft at 50feet above the threshold, with all other factors remaining the same, the aircraft would have used 6625feet to stop. This value still exceeds the maximum value as defined by the AFM; however, the aircraft would have remained on the runway. Conversely, if the braking profile had matched that of previous flights, even with a threshold crossing height of 75feet, the aircraft would have required 6700feet from threshold to full stop. Although this is outside the margin specified in the AFM, it still leaves a margin of approximately 1300feet to have completed the stop on the runway. No fault was found with the brake system, so there may have been two instances of an intermittent fault: electrical, mechanical, or hydraulic. FDR data from the occurrence showed that the brakes were active and there was a low, fluctuating brake pressure, but there was a delay in the rise of brake pressure when compared to other landings. As this aircraft was not equipped to record pedal positions, it could not be determined from the FDR whether, when, or how much the pedals were being depressed. Also, the aircraft was not equipped to record wheel speed, so it is not possible to determine whether the wheels were spinning or stopped. Several operational and human factors contributed to the occurrence. The pilots were aware of the wet runway conditions and the approximate landing distance required; therefore, they should have been aware of the requirement for a normal touchdown point on the 8000-foot runway, typically about 1000feet from the threshold. Similarly, the flight crew would have been aware that a slower flap45 approach would result in a shorter landing distance and reduce the risk of hydroplaning. Nevertheless, they conducted a flap22 approach at a higher speed. The influences that led to this were the turn to intercept the localizer at close range, the need to begin the final descent to land, and the realization that it would be difficult to slow the aircraft enough for the flap45 approach. Based on the FDR data, the PF had some difficulty capturing the localizer and the aircraft was high and fast on the approach. All of these factors led directly to the rushed and unstable approach. Additionally, the crew should have been aware of the need for a firm landing to reduce the risk of hydroplaning. Instead, the landing was long and smooth. On landing, the aircraft most likely entered a state of viscous or dynamic hydroplaning, with the anti-skid system modulating brake pressure to prevent wheel lockup. The aircraft remained in this state until the aircraft speed reached a point where hydroplaning ceased. At this point the anti-system allowed the brakes to come into full effect and effectively slow the aircraft. The amount of time it took the PF to identify the brake problem and relay this information to the PNF was longer than expected for such an event. The PF's low experience on aircraft without thrust reversers, coupled with the wet runway, most likely delayed his recognition of the braking problem as he evaluated the situation and attempted to determine the cause of the lack of deceleration. Similarly, although the PNF may have recognized that the aircraft was not slowing as expected, he did not verbalize his concern to the PF in a timely manner. Someone with access to the cockpit erased the CVR. Although the data was successfully retrieved, the erasure of the CVR is a serious contravention of the regulations and concerns the Board. CVR information is crucial to reconstructing what happened in the cockpit and, consequently, with the aircraft. It is the Board's expectation that the aviation community will assist our investigators by preserving all evidence, including that provided by the CVR. Interference with the CVR obstructs the work of the investigation and may prevent the Board from reporting publicly on causes and safety deficiencies. The approach to Runway25 was high, fast, and not stabilized, resulting in the aircraft touching down almost halfway down the 8000-foot runway. The aircraft landing was smooth; this most likely contributed to the aircraft hydroplaning on touchdown. The anti-skid system most likely prevented the brake pressures from rising to normal values until 16to 19seconds after weight on wheels, resulting in little or no braking action immediately after landing. The flight crew were slow to recognize and react to the lack of normal deceleration. This delayed the transfer of control to the captain and may have contributed to the runway overrun.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The approach to Runway25 was high, fast, and not stabilized, resulting in the aircraft touching down almost halfway down the 8000-foot runway. The aircraft landing was smooth; this most likely contributed to the aircraft hydroplaning on touchdown. The anti-skid system most likely prevented the brake pressures from rising to normal values until 16to 19seconds after weight on wheels, resulting in little or no braking action immediately after landing. The flight crew were slow to recognize and react to the lack of normal deceleration. This delayed the transfer of control to the captain and may have contributed to the runway overrun. It could not be determined if an electrical, mechanical, or hydraulic brake problem existed at the time of the landing. The flight crew did not take appropriate measures to preserve evidence related to the occurrence and, therefore, failed to meet the requirements of the FAR, CAR, and CTAISB regulations. Interference with the CVR obstructs TSB investigations and may prevent the Board from reporting publicly on causes and safety deficiencies.Other Findings It could not be determined if an electrical, mechanical, or hydraulic brake problem existed at the time of the landing. The flight crew did not take appropriate measures to preserve evidence related to the occurrence and, therefore, failed to meet the requirements of the FAR, CAR, and CTAISB regulations. Interference with the CVR obstructs TSB investigations and may prevent the Board from reporting publicly on causes and safety deficiencies.