Analysis BRM Had the master been trained in BRM it is likely that he would have had a better appreciation of the importance of teamwork - with emphasis on communication. When good communication was essential, the master's limited fluency in English made communication with the pilot difficult. The pilot's decision to return to anchorage X was based on the fact that he believed the master had informed him that he had only a half hour to safely anchor the vessel. There was little interaction between the master, the OOW and the pilot as the vessel's transit progressed. The master was busy between the chart table and the port-side radar, and the OOW was wiping wheelhouse windows in between his other duties, leaving the pilot to act on his own. The pilot should have been aware that the OOW was plotting the vessel's position at frequent intervals, and both he and the master could have better assessed their alternatives when first informed of the problem with the engine by the chief engineer at 0140. A close look at the 0139 position as plotted by the OOW would have indicated that immediate action was necessary to allow the vessel to be manoeuvred to anchorage X, approximately 4.5cables in a northeasterly direction. Better communications also would have revealed that the vessel's engine was not about to fail in 30minutes, allowing for a choice of anchorage. Instead, a discussion ensued between the master and the pilot as to the best anchorage while the vessel maintained headway at approximately 6.6knots. A full exchange of information regarding the vessel's manoeuvring characteristics was not made before the vessel departed her berth. At 0149 the master and pilot knew full use could not be made of the main engine. This was some 10minutes and some 1.1miles along her intended track after the problem had been identified. Given the reduced engine power available and the vessel's loaded condition it should have been evident that it was not possible to safely make a round turn to starboard to return to anchorage X, particularly as speed was reduced from half to dead slow ahead at 0149. As indicated on the wheelhouse poster, at a speed of 12knots in shallow water when the helm is placed hard-to-starboard the advance is approximately eight cables and the tactical diameter is approximately one mile, which distances would be greater at reduced speed. After learning that the vessel did not need to go to anchor, the decision at 0152 to come around to port when on a heading of approximately 357T, in order to proceed outbound, together with the helm and engine movements that followed, further indicate that the pilot had lost his awareness of the situation. Throughout the occurrence there were several factors that affected the pilot's appreciation of the situation: the lack of clear communication between the master and the pilot, with respect to the time available before it became necessary to anchor the vessel; the critical passage of time during discussion of the anchorage decision; the inadequate sharing of information regarding the vessel's manoeuvring characteristics, and the knowledge of the vessel's position as plotted by the OOW. Had those on the bridge functioned as a team, the vessel's progress could have been closely monitored throughout and more favourable decisions made with regard to her passage. The CapeAcacia struck a rocky bottom south of West Kinahan Island, immediately inside the 20m contour line, during darkness, in fine weather and clear visibility. The starboard underwater section of the bow was badly damaged. The vessel experienced problems with the No5 cylinder exhaust valve spindle, which required the engine to be run at a reduced speed. The master was not fluent in English, and the pilot misunderstood the master's description of the problems being encountered with the engines as meaning that the vessel would lose propulsion power within 30minutes. Believing that he would lose propulsion power within 30minutes, the pilot consulted with the master regarding a suitable anchorage, and it was agreed to return to anchorage X. The period of 10minutes to make the decision to return to anchorage X placed the vessel in a position from which it was unsafe to make the turn to starboard. The pilot reported he was not aware that the bridge watch was plotting the vessel's position at frequent intervals. Helm and engine movements, while attempting to turn the vessel around to proceed to anchorage X, were inappropriate. The subsequent decision to abort that turn and proceed outbound is questionable. Knowledge of the vessel's position, and deep draught, together with limited manoeuvring capabilities in the fully-loaded condition and reduced power, would have indicated insufficient sea room for the proposed manoeuvres.Findings The CapeAcacia struck a rocky bottom south of West Kinahan Island, immediately inside the 20m contour line, during darkness, in fine weather and clear visibility. The starboard underwater section of the bow was badly damaged. The vessel experienced problems with the No5 cylinder exhaust valve spindle, which required the engine to be run at a reduced speed. The master was not fluent in English, and the pilot misunderstood the master's description of the problems being encountered with the engines as meaning that the vessel would lose propulsion power within 30minutes. Believing that he would lose propulsion power within 30minutes, the pilot consulted with the master regarding a suitable anchorage, and it was agreed to return to anchorage X. The period of 10minutes to make the decision to return to anchorage X placed the vessel in a position from which it was unsafe to make the turn to starboard. The pilot reported he was not aware that the bridge watch was plotting the vessel's position at frequent intervals. Helm and engine movements, while attempting to turn the vessel around to proceed to anchorage X, were inappropriate. The subsequent decision to abort that turn and proceed outbound is questionable. Knowledge of the vessel's position, and deep draught, together with limited manoeuvring capabilities in the fully-loaded condition and reduced power, would have indicated insufficient sea room for the proposed manoeuvres. The Cape Acacia struck bottom south of West Kinahan Island because of a delayed decision on the best course of action after experiencing engine problems. Factors contributing to the occurrence were as follows: poor communication between the master and the pilot, which led to an inadequate appreciation of the existing situation; the inadequate sharing of information among the bridge team; and a poor appreciation of the vessel's manoeuvring characteristics.Causes and Contributing Factors The Cape Acacia struck bottom south of West Kinahan Island because of a delayed decision on the best course of action after experiencing engine problems. Factors contributing to the occurrence were as follows: poor communication between the master and the pilot, which led to an inadequate appreciation of the existing situation; the inadequate sharing of information among the bridge team; and a poor appreciation of the vessel's manoeuvring characteristics. All four Canadian Pilotage Authorities have instituted compulsory Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training for pilots. Transport Canada made amendments to the General Pilotage Regulationsto institute compulsory BRM training for pilots. These amendments came into force on 30March2000 and require that licence and pilotage certificate applicants or holders, beginning on 1January2000, hold a certificate of attendance at a training program in BRM recognized by the Authority as meeting the requirements of PartB of ChapterVIII of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW),as amended from time to time. As a result of this occurrence, the owners of the Cape Acaciadetermined that all of the company's deck officers should attend a recognised BRM training program. This training program was initiated in June1999.Safety Action Taken All four Canadian Pilotage Authorities have instituted compulsory Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training for pilots. Transport Canada made amendments to the General Pilotage Regulationsto institute compulsory BRM training for pilots. These amendments came into force on 30March2000 and require that licence and pilotage certificate applicants or holders, beginning on 1January2000, hold a certificate of attendance at a training program in BRM recognized by the Authority as meeting the requirements of PartB of ChapterVIII of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW),as amended from time to time. As a result of this occurrence, the owners of the Cape Acaciadetermined that all of the company's deck officers should attend a recognised BRM training program. This training program was initiated in June1999.