The master of the MAGDELANSEA heard the WOODSIDEI broadcast by VHF R/T as she was leaving the Dartmouth Ferry Terminal, and he assumed that the pilot had also heard it, but he had not. This may have been due to the fact that the pilot was preoccupied with navigating, steering, and making collision avoidance arrangements with another vessel by VHF. Because there was no pre-established regime to ensure that all the members of the bridge team were kept informed, communication between the pilot, the master and the OOW broke down in this regard. The available bridge resources were not optimized. The pilot of the MAGDELANSEA maintained that the WOODSIDEI should have altered course to port to pass astern of the MAGDELANSEA, and he considered that the ferry had created a dangerous close-quarters situation by crossing ahead of his vessel. However, as the vessels were approaching each other, the MAGDELANSEA had the WOODSIDEI on her starboard bow. The MAGDELANSEA was the give-way vessel and was required by the COLREGS to keep out of the way. The pilot stated that, as the vessels closed, he altered the course of the MAGDELANSEA 10 to 15 degrees to starboard to give the WOODSIDEI a wider berth. On the VTS videotape, the course of the MAGDELANSEA, while approaching the ferry track, varies between 314 and 318. The VTS video recording of the vessel's automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) vector does not indicate that course was altered to starboard. However, because the vectors displayed on ARPA radar are derived from historical data, a course alteration made by a target vessel may not be displayed immediately after course is altered. Because performance standards for ARPA radars require that a tracked target present, in a period of not more than one minute (from the alteration), an indication of the target's motion trend, it is not considered likely that an alteration of 10 to 15 degrees would have gone undetected and unrecorded by VTS radar. The difference in headings between 314 and 318 recorded by VTS radar is most likely due to a 2 yaw on either side of the course steered. A yaw of this magnitude is not unusual for a vessel proceeding at slow speed and being steered automatically. Knowing the ferry schedule, the pilot must have been aware that a ferry was scheduled to depart the Dartmouth Ferry Terminal for Halifax at 1000, but he would not necessarily have known of the substitution of one ferry for another. The presence of a ferry in the area was to be expected at the time of the incident. The close-quarters situation developed about three to four minutes after the ferry's departure from the terminal. The incident could have been avoided if the WOODSIDEI had contacted the MAGDELANSEA by VHF immediately after she had cleared the Dartmouth Ferry Terminal. Then there would have been ample time to establish an order of crossing. The ferry did not do so. Both the master and the OOW of the WOODSIDEI were aware of the approaching MAGDELANSEA because both vessels were in full sight of each other immediately after the ferry cleared the terminal. The OOW was of the opinion that the MAGDELANSEA had increased speed by approximately three knots in the minutes before the WOODSIDEI crossed ahead of her. There is no evidence to support this opinion. The VTS videotape indicates a reduction in speed by the MAGDELANSEA from 5.5 to 4.6 knots, and the master and pilot of the MAGDELANSEA also confirmed that the speed of the vessel had not been increased. Apart from the slight reduction in speed of the MAGDELANSEA detected on the VTS ARPA video playback, no detected alteration of course or change of speed was made by either vessel. Both vessels are very manoeuvrable; however, although the bow thruster on the MAGDELAN SEA was ready for use, its effectiveness at five knots would have been minimal.Analysis The master of the MAGDELANSEA heard the WOODSIDEI broadcast by VHF R/T as she was leaving the Dartmouth Ferry Terminal, and he assumed that the pilot had also heard it, but he had not. This may have been due to the fact that the pilot was preoccupied with navigating, steering, and making collision avoidance arrangements with another vessel by VHF. Because there was no pre-established regime to ensure that all the members of the bridge team were kept informed, communication between the pilot, the master and the OOW broke down in this regard. The available bridge resources were not optimized. The pilot of the MAGDELANSEA maintained that the WOODSIDEI should have altered course to port to pass astern of the MAGDELANSEA, and he considered that the ferry had created a dangerous close-quarters situation by crossing ahead of his vessel. However, as the vessels were approaching each other, the MAGDELANSEA had the WOODSIDEI on her starboard bow. The MAGDELANSEA was the give-way vessel and was required by the COLREGS to keep out of the way. The pilot stated that, as the vessels closed, he altered the course of the MAGDELANSEA 10 to 15 degrees to starboard to give the WOODSIDEI a wider berth. On the VTS videotape, the course of the MAGDELANSEA, while approaching the ferry track, varies between 314 and 318. The VTS video recording of the vessel's automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) vector does not indicate that course was altered to starboard. However, because the vectors displayed on ARPA radar are derived from historical data, a course alteration made by a target vessel may not be displayed immediately after course is altered. Because performance standards for ARPA radars require that a tracked target present, in a period of not more than one minute (from the alteration), an indication of the target's motion trend, it is not considered likely that an alteration of 10 to 15 degrees would have gone undetected and unrecorded by VTS radar. The difference in headings between 314 and 318 recorded by VTS radar is most likely due to a 2 yaw on either side of the course steered. A yaw of this magnitude is not unusual for a vessel proceeding at slow speed and being steered automatically. Knowing the ferry schedule, the pilot must have been aware that a ferry was scheduled to depart the Dartmouth Ferry Terminal for Halifax at 1000, but he would not necessarily have known of the substitution of one ferry for another. The presence of a ferry in the area was to be expected at the time of the incident. The close-quarters situation developed about three to four minutes after the ferry's departure from the terminal. The incident could have been avoided if the WOODSIDEI had contacted the MAGDELANSEA by VHF immediately after she had cleared the Dartmouth Ferry Terminal. Then there would have been ample time to establish an order of crossing. The ferry did not do so. Both the master and the OOW of the WOODSIDEI were aware of the approaching MAGDELANSEA because both vessels were in full sight of each other immediately after the ferry cleared the terminal. The OOW was of the opinion that the MAGDELANSEA had increased speed by approximately three knots in the minutes before the WOODSIDEI crossed ahead of her. There is no evidence to support this opinion. The VTS videotape indicates a reduction in speed by the MAGDELANSEA from 5.5 to 4.6 knots, and the master and pilot of the MAGDELANSEA also confirmed that the speed of the vessel had not been increased. Apart from the slight reduction in speed of the MAGDELANSEA detected on the VTS ARPA video playback, no detected alteration of course or change of speed was made by either vessel. Both vessels are very manoeuvrable; however, although the bow thruster on the MAGDELAN SEA was ready for use, its effectiveness at five knots would have been minimal. On the MAGDELANSEA, the master heard the departure message broadcast by the WOODSIDEI on VHF R/T, and he assumed that the pilot had heard it also and understood its implication. He did not direct the pilot's attention to the message. The pilot was preoccupied performing multiple tasks to the extent that he did not hear the WOODSIDEI informing VTS of her departure. The available bridge resources were not optimized, especially with regard to communication and the division of tasks. The pilot became aware of the WOODSIDEI approximately two minutes after the ferry had departed the Dartmouth Ferry Terminal and was approaching his vessel in such a way that the MAGDELANSEA was the give-way vessel. The pilot of the MAGDELANSEA believed that a close-quarters situation and a risk of collision existed when the vessels passed each other, but this opinion was not shared by the officers of both vessels. Neither the WOODSIDEI nor the MAGDELANSEA contacted the other in good time to establish a passing or crossing precedence to eliminate any doubt on both vessels. The master of the WOODSIDEI did not discuss the traffic pattern with the OOW, or issue any order regarding the course and/or speed of the vessel, and he did not take charge of the VHF conversation with the MAGDELANSEA. Metro Transit considers that the ferry officer who is steering has the conduct of the vessel and is expected to perform the duties related to this task. The other officer in the wheel-house not only plays a passive role but, in fine weather, does little or nothing to assist the helmsman. Although the ferry officers attended a modified bridge resource management course three years ago, BRM principles on the division of tasks were not being implemented on the WOODSIDEI at the time of the incident. The small-scale chart of Halifax Harbour displayed in the wheel-house of the MAGDELANSEA was not suitable for accurate plotting and monitoring of the vessel's progress.Findings On the MAGDELANSEA, the master heard the departure message broadcast by the WOODSIDEI on VHF R/T, and he assumed that the pilot had heard it also and understood its implication. He did not direct the pilot's attention to the message. The pilot was preoccupied performing multiple tasks to the extent that he did not hear the WOODSIDEI informing VTS of her departure. The available bridge resources were not optimized, especially with regard to communication and the division of tasks. The pilot became aware of the WOODSIDEI approximately two minutes after the ferry had departed the Dartmouth Ferry Terminal and was approaching his vessel in such a way that the MAGDELANSEA was the give-way vessel. The pilot of the MAGDELANSEA believed that a close-quarters situation and a risk of collision existed when the vessels passed each other, but this opinion was not shared by the officers of both vessels. Neither the WOODSIDEI nor the MAGDELANSEA contacted the other in good time to establish a passing or crossing precedence to eliminate any doubt on both vessels. The master of the WOODSIDEI did not discuss the traffic pattern with the OOW, or issue any order regarding the course and/or speed of the vessel, and he did not take charge of the VHF conversation with the MAGDELANSEA. Metro Transit considers that the ferry officer who is steering has the conduct of the vessel and is expected to perform the duties related to this task. The other officer in the wheel-house not only plays a passive role but, in fine weather, does little or nothing to assist the helmsman. Although the ferry officers attended a modified bridge resource management course three years ago, BRM principles on the division of tasks were not being implemented on the WOODSIDEI at the time of the incident. The small-scale chart of Halifax Harbour displayed in the wheel-house of the MAGDELANSEA was not suitable for accurate plotting and monitoring of the vessel's progress. This incident occurred because the pilot of the MAGDELANSEA did not hear the departure broadcast by the WOODSIDEI as he was assuming multiple responsibilities and had not maximized the deployment of officers and crew available to him. The fact that the master of the MAGDELANSEA did not alert the pilot to the VHF R/T departure message from the WOODSIDEI contributed to this occurrence. A further contributing factor was that the WOODSIDEI did not make her intentions clear by calling the MAGDELANSEA on VHF channel 12 after departing the berth, and assumed that any action necessary would be taken by the MAGDELANSEA.Causes and Contributing Factors This incident occurred because the pilot of the MAGDELANSEA did not hear the departure broadcast by the WOODSIDEI as he was assuming multiple responsibilities and had not maximized the deployment of officers and crew available to him. The fact that the master of the MAGDELANSEA did not alert the pilot to the VHF R/T departure message from the WOODSIDEI contributed to this occurrence. A further contributing factor was that the WOODSIDEI did not make her intentions clear by calling the MAGDELANSEA on VHF channel 12 after departing the berth, and assumed that any action necessary would be taken by the MAGDELANSEA.