Summary The aircraft, a PA-31-350Navajo Chieftain, C-GYYJ, serial number31-7652086, was on a scheduled courier flight from Moncton, NewBrunswick, to Halifax, NovaScotia. After completing an instrument landing system approach to Runway15 at Halifax, the aircraft landed with the landing gear retracted. Neither of the two crew members nor the company passenger was injured. The aircraft sustained damage to its engines, propellers, and fuselage. The accident occurred at night at 2042, Atlantic daylight time. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The accident occurred on the final leg of a regularly scheduled cargo/courier route. The routing was Halifax, NovaScotia, Moncton, NewBrunswick, Miramachi, NewBrunswick, Bathurst, New Brunswick, and Charlo, NewBrunswick, returning that night to Halifax via the reverse route. Departure from Halifax was planned for 0600 Atlantic daylight time.1 The flight crew were certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations. The captain held an airline transport pilot licence with a Group1 instrument rating and had approximately 2800hours total time of which about 1200hours was on a PA-31. The first officer held a commercial pilot licence with a Group1 instrument rating and had approximately 1050hours total time with approximately 600hours on thePA-31. The aircraft was serviceable except that the lighting for the horizontal situation indicator (HSI), which is illuminated only by internal back lighting, had failed. There is only one HSI in the aircraft, and it is located on the lower portion of the captain's instrument panel. The HSI displays vital information necessary for navigation, including instrument landing system (ILS) glideslope information. The operator's Maintenance Control and Policy Manual states that all aircraft defects shall be entered into the aircraft's journey logbook by a member of the flight crew, and that these must be rectified or deferred by a licenced engineer prior to further flight from the home terminal. There was no journey log entry made by the previous flight crew regarding the defective lighting in the HSI. Company maintenance had reportedly attached a written note to the journey log to advise crews of the lighting defect. The lighting had been unserviceable for at least one previous flight. The note could not be located after the accident. The Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR)523.1381, Instrument Lights, describes the design standard for instrument lighting. The standard states that the instrument lights must make each instrument and control easily readable and discernible, and that a cabin dome light is not considered an instrument light. The operating rule for instrument lighting, CAR605.16(1)(I), states that, at night, there must be a means of illumination for all of the instruments used to operate the aircraft. The aircraft departed Halifax at 0551, slightly ahead of schedule, and proceeded uneventfully on the outbound route, arriving in Charlo at 0803. Both crew then went to company accommodations for about eight hours of planned crew rest. There was no indication that either pilot was fatigued prior to departing Charlo. The aircraft departed Charlo on the reverse routing at 1745. There was moderate mechanical turbulence on the return route, and ceilings and visibilities were at or near minimums on all approaches. Approaches were hand-flown by the crew because the aircraft did not have an autopilot. During the ILS approach into Moncton, the first officer, who was flying cross-cockpit, had difficulty seeing the HSI because of darkness. In Moncton a company passenger was brought on board for the flight to Halifax, and the aircraft departed at 2002 with the first officer flying. The wind at Halifax on arrival was from 040 magnetic at 16gusting to 24knots, and the ceiling was 200feet. Although the wind favoured Runway06, the ILS approach to Runway15 provided the best approach minimums, and inbound aircraft were landing on Runway15. The occurrence aircraft was vectored into the traffic flow for a straight-in ILS approach to Runway15. The crew briefed the approach, and it was decided that the first officer would continue flying. In the initial stages of the approach the first officer could not read the darkened glideslope indicator and asked the captain to shine a flashlight, which had been in use since departure from Moncton, on the HSI. On initial interception of the glideslope, and in accordance with company standard operating procedures (SOPs), the captain called glideslopealive when the glideslope indicator moved from full deflection. The captain then diverted the flashlight beam away from the instrument panel to refer to the approach chart. This left the HSI in darkness, and the first officer unable to read the glideslope bar. While the beam from the flashlight was diverted, the glideslope bar passed through one dot above the null position. Company SOPs for an IFR precision approach require that the landing gear be lowered when the glide slope indicator is one dot above the glide slope. This is commonly referred to by crews as the DotAbove call. Flaps15 is selected on interception of the inbound track, and landing lights are selected on as part of the before-landing checklist. Checklist items are normally completed using the challenge and response method. Under this method the pilot flying would call for the check, and the pilot not flying would verbally challenge the pilot flying for the appropriate response. When the flashlight beam was directed back to the HSI, the aircraft was on the glideslope, but the airspeed was high. As the descent continued, the airspeed remained high, and the first officer called for a flap selection of 25 to slow the aircraft. The captain suggested reducing power rather than selecting 25 of flap in case an overshoot was necessary. However, after observing that the engine power was already substantially reduced, the captain selected 25 of flap. At 100 feet above decision height, the captain called the runway lights in sight. Normally the first officer would continue flying the aircraft until landing; however, because water on the windscreen obscured his view of the runway, he passed control to the captain, whose windscreen was fitted with a wiper. The captain assumed control of the aircraft at decision height and continued with the landing. Neither the crew nor the passenger heard the landing gear warning horn sound at any point during the approach to landing. The aircraft touched down smoothly with some engine power on. The gear was in the retracted position, and the aircraft stopped a short distance beyond the intersection of runways15 and24. After the aircraft came to a stop, the crew realized that the landing gear was not extended. The captain checked the gear handle position, noted it was up, then secured the aircraft electrical power, engines, and firewall shut-off. While securing the aircraft, the captain noted that the landing light switch was in the off position. After assessing that there was no immediate danger, the crew re-powered the radio and informed the tower they required assistance. After the occurrence the aircraft landing gear was found to function normally. The landing gear warning horn is activated by switches in the throttle quadrant that make contact when the throttle settings are reduced. The switch adjustment and landing gear warning horn were checked after the accident and operated normally. The HSI interior lights, and the VOR/LOC/Glide slope indicator (Nav2) were defective. On 29May2003, a TSB investigator revisited the accident aircraft and found that two post lights were missing from the instrument panel. The SOPs for the PA-31 did not include a final landing gear check. Only one other aircraft type in the operator's fleet contained a short-final check. Part of the check is to confirm that the gear is down and locked.