Synopsis The MOONGLOW, on passage from Tofino, B.C. to Victoria, B.C., departed the anchorage at Port San Juan, B.C. at 1500, 11September 1994. The THOMSON departed Nanoose, B.C. on the morning of 11September and disembarked her Canadian Navy Coastal Pilot off Victoria at 1805. The vessel was steaming on the surface in the Juan de Fuca Strait outbound for San Diego, California, U.S.A. At 2119, in Canadian waters off Sheringham Point, the THOMSON and the MOONGLOW collided in dense fog. The MOONGLOW, holed on the starboard side aft, sank quickly. The operator was rescued from the water by the crew of the submarine and treated for mild hypothermia. The submarine sustained some light damage to the starboard bow. Factual Information Home Base Talcahuano Naval Base - Licensing Port - Campbell River, B.C. Type 209Class (Type1300) submarine Classic ketch Draught Forward: 5.50m (Aft): 1.98m Built 1984, Howaldtswerke,Germany 1939, San Pedro, Propulsion Diesel electric, (Auxiliary) One, four-cylinder 4MTU 12V-493-AZ80 diesels; Mercedes Benz diesel, Piller alternators: Siemens driving a single fixed-pitch electric motor, 5000SHP; one shaft propeller, 36BHP Owners Chilean Navy, Valparaiso, Chile Jory Lord Description of the Vessels The MOONGLOW was an auxiliary Bermuda-rigged sailing ketch. The vessel was carvel-built with Honduras mahogany on bent oak ribs; she had a full keel of white oak with lead ballast bolted on. The main and mizzen masts and the booms were of spruce, and she was fitted with 16ft (4.87m) aluminium spinnaker and trade-wind poles at the main mast (see photographs). The vessel had undergone a private survey on 04July 1993, at which time it was remarked that the hull, caulking and fastenings were in fair to good condition. A radar reflector was fitted on the mizzen mast. The MOONGLOW was equipped with the following navigational aids: one radar, with remote-control capabilities and on-screen read-out, mounted on a beam at the entrance to the cabin. It was both visible and operable from the cockpit steering position; one magnetic steering compass, one hand-held bearing compass and an autopilot; one LoranC, with digital read-out, showing courses to steer between waypoints, also visible from the steering position; very high frequency (VHF) and single side band (SSB) radiotelephones; a video sounder; a Stowe electric log; and both fixed and portable sound-signalling apparatus. The vessel was reportedly equipped with the necessary charts and publications for the voyage. The submarine THOMSON, built for the Chilean Navy, was launched in August 1983, commissioned in September 1984, and refitted in 1990. She has a single-skinned hull of steel construction (see photographs). The vessel was navigating on the surface and the following stations were manned: the conning tower bridge station; the main navigation control station; the steering station; and the engine control station. Communication between stations is by an intercom (P/A) system, with sound-powered telephones and portable radiotelephones for backup. At the steering station, located aft of the main navigation control station, there are two steering positions side by side; one for surface navigation and the other for the dived condition. The helmsman is seated in front of a console on which are: an aircraft-type joystick steering control; a gyrorepeater; a log speed indicator; an engine revolutions and helm indicator; and a graduated knob to set engine revolutions. Engine speed orders are relayed to the helmsman in terms of revolutions ahead or astern, and these orders are executed by the helmsman turning the graduated knob to the required setting. The knob is within easy reach on the console in front of him. Surface speed is 11knots, and the diesel-electric mode of propulsion allows for instantaneous full-ahead to full-astern engine movements. Distance travelled when a crash stop is executed at a speed of eight knots is reported to be 275m. The THOMSON is equipped with the following navigational equipment: a number of radar sets of which three were in operation at the time of the collision. One set was for the use of the officer of the watch (OOW) and a second was being used for navigation. One of the weapon systems radars was employed for target-searching and plotting; a Global Positioning System (GPS); an Inertial Navigational System; a Satellite Navigational System; VHF radiotelephones, both fixed and hand-held; an echo-sounder; and sensing devices particular to the vessel's purpose. The conning tower bridge is equipped with a gyrorepeater and fog horn control. The bridge team is supplied with binoculars when on lookout duty. Events According to the Owner/Operator of the MOONGLOW The MOONGLOW was on passage from Tofino to Victoria and had anchored at Port San Juan in the early morning of 11September to await improved weather and to allow her operator to rest. The vessel departed Port San Juan at 1500(1). The auxiliary engine was shut down after clearing the anchorage. At 1600, in approximate position 4830.3'N, 12430.8'W, the vessel set course to 090Compass(C), about 113True(T). The full main and genoa sails were set, the wind was from the west. (See sketch of the area.) The MOONGLOW did not participate in the Seattle Traffic (VTS) Reporting System, nor was she required to. The vessel's VHF was tuned to channel 13, which is Seattle Traffic's secondary frequency used primarily for vessels making passing arrangements. The VHF was also tuned to channel 16, the international calling and distress frequency. At 1900, the vessel was approximately three miles SSW of Jordan River. There was fog in patches, and the visibility was zero to three miles. In accordance with his standard procedure after dark, the operator changed the genoa sail for a trade-wind jib. The smaller trade-wind jib sail does not obstruct other vessels' view of the port and starboard sidelights which were fixed on the main mast stays, about 1.7m above the deck level. Both sidelights and the stern light were switched on. The vessel was being kept about three miles offshore because of reduced visibility in fog. Positions were fixed by radar and the Loran C was also in operation. At about 2130, in a position approximately four miles south of Sheringham Point, the course was altered to 060(C), about 083(T), for a position south of Race Rocks to keep to the north of the outbound traffic lane. The vessel was travelling at an estimated speed of four knots and the main sail had just been reefed. The operator was steering the vessel by hand. The last position had been plotted on the chart about 20 minutes previously. Visibility was between zero and 1/16 of a mile. The wind was north-westerly at 15 to 20knots and a low westerly swell was running. After course was altered at 2130(2), with the radar on the four-mile range, an echo was observed 15 to starboard of the heading marker and close to the centre of the PPI screen. When the range was reduced to one mile, the target was estimated to be about 1/16 of a mile distant. The operator then heard a rush of water and saw what appeared to be the bulbous bow of a freighter, but was, in fact, the bow of the THOMSON. When the bow was at an estimated distance of 6 to 9m, the conning tower and both navigation sidelights of the submarine became visible. The operator instinctively moved to the port side of the cockpit; he did not attempt a collision avoidance manoeuvre in the few seconds before collision. He sent a brief, hurried MAYDAY message by VHF radiotelephone immediately after the collision. All lights, radios and electronics on board the MOONGLOW then went dead. Although it was reported that a MAYDAY position was transmitted, no such position was received by shore stations nor by other traffic in the area. A portable compressed gas fog horn, used in preference to the vessel's electric fog horn, was used to sound the required fog signal at least within five minutes prior to the collision. The bow of the THOMSON struck the MOONGLOW on her starboard side aft about the cockpit at an angle of impact of between 30 to 45 on the bow, and rolled the MOONGLOW to port. The ketch sustained extensive damage and water rushed in. The operator estimated that the collision position was 4818'36N, 12355'00W, some four cables north of the northern limit of the outbound lane. The operator made a brief unsuccessful attempt to launch the inflatable liferaft but he experienced difficulty in operating the quick-release goose-neck clip. As the ingress of water caused the vessel to sink deeper in the water, the operator abandoned the vessel over the stern. Wearing a floater jacket, he swam clear. The MOONGLOW sank bodily in about 180m of water within one minute of the collision. The MAYDAY transmitted by the MOONGLOW was heard by the THOMSON, by Canadian and US Coast Guard radio stations and VTS stations as well as by other traffic transiting the area. The operator clung to a floating propane tank until rescued by the submarine about 20 minutes later. The operator of the MOONGLOW had gained experience on small vessels including tugs and workboats. He has sailed his own yachts in B.C. waters since 1991 and is presently employed, in a relieving capacity, as a seaman with the Canadian Coast Guard. He had purchased the MOONGLOW in 1993. Events According to the Crew of the THOMSON The THOMSON and her crew were paying their first visit to the West Coast of Canada. The submarine entered Canadian waters on 08September 1994, arriving at Nanoose on the east coast of Vancouver Island on 09September. The vessel was then engaged in naval exercises with Canadian and US Navy vessels, in exercise area WG off Nanoose. The submarine departed Nanoose en route for San Diego at 0808, 11September. A Canadian Navy Coastal Pilot was on board. In addition to the ship's complement, two US Navy personnel were on board; a liaison officer and a communications rating. The rating assisted with English language radiotelephone communications. The vessel participated in both the Vancouver and Seattle VTS reporting systems as required throughout. The Canadian Navy Coastal Pilot disembarked off Victoria at 1805, 11September. Because of reduced visibility ahead, low visibility navigation stations was implemented at 1847. Extra watchkeepers were posted: these included an additional lookout in the conning tower bridge and an extra radar operator to monitor one of the vessel's weapon systems radars in use to detect and plot other vessels. All five retractable masts, two periscopes, two radar and a navigation light mast were raised to increase radar detectability. The vessel's speed was reduced to eight knots and the navigation lights were switched on. The fog signal, required by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS), was sounded manually from the conning tower bridge. A total of 18 officers and men were on watch at low visibility navigation stations. In the main navigation control room were the commander, the OOW, a second watch officer, the navigator, the radar man, the magnetic telephone man, the radio man, a sonar man, two periscope men, and a records man. On the conning tower bridge were the bridge watch officer and two lookouts. A helmsman was at the steering station. Three men were on duty in the engine control space. After disembarking the pilot, the THOMSON kept to the outbound traffic lane and rounded Race Rocks at 1909. At 1916, she was steadied on a heading of 279(T). The vessel was kept approximately two cables south of the northern limit of the traffic lane to allow larger and faster outbound traffic to keep to the centre of the lane to overtake her safely. Navigation was by radar and GPS. Between 2006 and 2035 (see sketch of the area), the THOMSON crossed the northern limit of the traffic lane to allow the outbound freighter SEALAND ENTERPRISE to pass at a safe distance in fog. Ten GPS or radar positions obtained during this period indicated that the vessel was never more than two cables north of the limit. At 2035, the course was altered to 260(T) to pass an outbound tug and tow. At 2056, having passed to the south of the tug and tow, the submarine was located near the centre of the traffic lane and course was altered to 282(T) to follow the outbound lane. Between 2053 and 2126, a total of seven positions were plotted on the submarine's navigation chart; three obtained by radar and four by GPS. At this time, winds were west to west-north-westerly at about six knots, the sea was slight and visibility was approximately 100m. At 2126(3), with the vessel in position 4818'00N, 12358'13W by GPS, the conning tower bridge officer reported to the main navigation control room that he had sighted a green light 15 on the port bow. The other vessel was approximately 20m from the bow and showed no mast lights. No fog signal was heard. The MOONGLOW had not been detected by any of the submarine's radar sets, nor had she been seen by either of the periscopes. When the other vessel was sighted, the conning tower bridge officer immediately ordered port full rudder, stop motors and full astern motors. The THOMSON started to swing to port but was unable to clear the MOONGLOW. The starboard bow of the submarine struck the MOONGLOW on the starboard quarter at an angle of impact of approximately 30. The speed of impact is unknown, but it was less than eight knots because the submarine's astern propulsion had engaged prior to the collision. The MOONGLOW was not seen to take avoiding action nor were her sails seen to be set. The MOONGLOW slid down the starboard side of the THOMSON and her stern light was seen to disappear in the fog off the starboard quarter. The submarine commander heard the sighting report. He ordered the crew to man emergency stations and to prepare for an imminent collision by the bow. These orders were relayed over the P/A system. The alarm bells were also sounded. He hurriedly climbed the conning tower ladder but arrived on the bridge just after the collision occurred. The commander ordered the crew to stand by for a man overboard procedure and manoeuvred the vessel around to starboard to retrace her track. He then stopped engines to listen for sounds. About six to eight minutes after the collision, the watch heard the operator of the MOONGLOW shouting. He was sighted, clinging to a propane tank, in the beam of an aldis lamp. He was recovered by a crew member who donned a wetsuit and swam over to him with a line. He was then pulled alongside and helped on board by crew members positioned on the small expanse of fore deck. The operator of the MOONGLOW was treated for mild hypothermia, given dry clothing and served a meal. He was later transferred to a US Coast Guard vessel and then to a Canadian Coast Guard vessel and landed in Sooke, B.C. The commander of the THOMSON is qualified as a submarine commander with both the Chilean and the Royal Navy. He had 25 years' experience in the Chilean Navy, 15 years of which were on submarines. He had been in command of the THOMSON for two years. Both the bridge watch officer and the main control room officer were fully qualified and experienced submarine officers. Vessel Traffic Services, Tracking and Communications The Juan de Fuca Strait routeing system has been adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It is listed in Notice No.10 of the 1994 Annual Edition of Notices to Mariners. Vessels which are not required to participate in the Seattle Traffic Reporting System are still obliged to comply with the requirements for using traffic lanes as found in Rule 10 of the COLREGS. The assigned VHF reporting frequency for vessels participating in the Seattle Traffic Reporting System for the Juan de Fuca Strait is 5A. The MOONGLOW did not maintain a listening watch on this frequency. VTS Seattle tracked the outbound THOMSON by radar. The vessel participated fully in the Seattle VTS Reporting System prior to the collision. At the time of the collision, the VTS Sector Operator reported that the submarine was tracking near the centre of the outbound traffic lane. The Sector Operator also reported that, at no time during his tracking of the THOMSON, did he observe the vessel outside (to the north) of the outbound traffic lane. Neither before nor after hearing the MAYDAY broadcast by the MOONGLOW did the Sector Operator observe that vessel's radar echo by VTS radar. Due to frequency interference, radiotelephone communications between the THOMSON and Seattle VTS were bad after the collision. It took some minutes for VTS to make contact with the submarine. At first, the THOMSON did not respond when asked if she had been involved in a collision. The submarine indicated that, while she was passing through the area, calls for help had been heard and that she was attempting to rescue a person from the water. In answer to further inquiries from VTS Seattle at about 2140, the submarine denied having been in a collision. At 2215, when the rescue vessel USCG41315 from Neah Bay, Washington, U.S.A., was alongside the submarine, it was communicated to them that the transfer of the operator of the MOONGLOW would not take place until after statements were made. At 2317, the submarine's US Navy liaison officer communicated that, contrary to earlier reports, a collision had occurred. The operator of the MOONGLOW was transferred to the USCG vessel at 0040, 12September. Other Vessels in the Area The Canadian tug SEASPAN CAVALIER responded to the MAYDAY message sent by the MOONGLOW. The tug was towing two loaded lumber scows and, at 2120, was in approximate position 4819.00'N, 12349.3'W, some six miles ENE of the collision position. The tug was eastbound on a course of 103(T) at a speed of 7.3knots, and was keeping to the north of the traffic lane. The SEASPAN CAVALIER would have passed the outbound submarine shortly after 2100. The tug reported that particular attention would have been paid to any vessel north of the traffic lane limit, that VTS Seattle would have informed the tug had this been the case, and that, had there been such a vessel north of the lane, the tug would have detected her by radar for sure. The Canadian yacht ARDENT was steering on Otter Point, B.C., eastbound for Sooke. When responding to the MAYDAY, she reported that her position by GPS was 4822.2'N, 12402.9'W. The vessel reported that, prior to the collision, there was a radar target about four miles ahead of her, on a similar course and proceeding at about the same speed. It was believed that this target was the MOONGLOW. Since the reported track of the ARDENT, when projected ahead, is much further inshore than the collision position reported by either the MOONGLOW or the THOMSON, the echo observed by the ARDENT could not have been that of the MOONGLOW. Action Taken The investigation into this ocurrence did not determine why the MOONGLOW was not detected by either the VTS or the THOMSON radars. However, it is known that small vessels are generally poor radar targets due to their lack of superstructure. It is essential that small vessels of non-metallic construction, such as the MOONGLOW, carry radar reflectors with good reflective characteristics to increase their possibility of detection. As a result of a previous collision between a bulk carrier and a fishing vessel in 1994, the Board recommended that Transport Canada warn fishermen of the detection limits of radar reflectors on small fishing vessels and promote radar reflectors designed to ensure maximum reflective performance. Subsequently, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) issued Ship Safety Bulletin No.11/95, Radar Reflectors on Small Vessels: Construction, Fitting, and Limitations. The Ship Safety Bulletin, issued in June 1995, cautions operators of small vessels, in general, of the detection limitation of radar reflectors and emphasizes the importance of keeping a proper lookout and maintaining an efficient radar watch. Plans that meet design and fitting standards to give maximum echoing area are also made available at regional Ship Safety offices for those operators who wish to build effective radar reflectors. 1. All times are PDT (Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) minus seven hours) unless otherwise stated. 2. See Time of the Collision Section. 3. See Time of the Collision Section.