Analysis Loss of Propulsion and Subsequent Grounding While the GreatCentury was assigned an unrestricted service by the American Bureau of Shipping, the vessel was not assigned an ice class or built for navigation in ice; specifically, it was not equipped with a means of recirculating warm cooling water back to the sea chests, or with an internal ballast water recirculation system as recommended in the IMO's Circular504. Consequently, after the grounding, both the upper and lower sea strainers were found blocked by ice, which had reduced the flow of cooling water. Protection devices installed on generators to prevent mechanical failures automatically shut down the diesel engine before overheating, hence the ship's ability to provide electrical power was reduced to a level that was insufficient to operate the main propulsion system. The main engine stopped, thereby leaving the vessel adrift. Since the vessel's anchors were not cleared of ice before the departure, the crew was unable to let them go and, consequently, the vessel drifted northeasterly and grounded. Winter Navigation in Eastern Canada Traffic Zone and St. Lawrence River In order for a vessel to be considered seaworthy, it must be sufficient in its materials, construction, equipment and crew for the trade in which it is employed.8 Vessels without ice class notations, such as the GreatCentury, are suitable for most worldwide trades. However, the extreme environmental ice conditions encountered during the winter in higher latitudes create conditions that have the potential to compromise the safety of the vessel and the crew, and place the environment at risk. During winter 2003, a mass of cold Arctic air remained stationary over the St.Lawrence River, worsening the ice condition on the river. TSB statistics show that, during this period, the number of vessels experiencing sea suction problems was higher than that observed in the previous six years (except for one other year), reflecting the harsh winter conditions on the river at the time of the accident. For vessels operating in Arctic ice conditions, the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System was introduced to mitigate risks posed to vessels and the environment. Notwithstanding the harsh winter conditions present, vessels entering the Gulf of St. Lawrence and St. Lawrence River are not subject to an assessment to determine the vessel's ability to navigate safely in ice. Additionally, during the winter season, with the exception of oil tankers and chemical bulk carriers, vessels entering Canadian waters south of 60N latitude are not assessed for their ability (or lack thereof) to safely navigate in ice-infested waters. The risks associated with operating vessels in certain waters off the East Coast of Canada during the winter and spring months have been recognized by the industry and regulators. The publication Joint Industry-Coast Guard Guidelines for the Control of Oil Tankers and Bulk Chemical Carriers in Ice Control Zones of Eastern Canada specifically addresses the risks, but limits its application to high-risk vessels such as tankers and chemical carriers. While the risk associated with these vessels is higher than that associated with other types of vessels, the hazards posed in each case are essentially the same. Furthermore, although navigation in ice requires specific knowledge and experience, there is no prerequisite for masters of any vessel to have such experience. Given these shortcomings, the mandate of the Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (ECAREG), to safeguard Canadian waters against pollution and damage to the environment, is compromised. Statistics show that vessels proceeding on the St. Lawrence River in winter do experience severe ice conditions. Based on the TSB database, since 1997 an average of 19 vessels per year experience sea suction problems during the winter season on the St. Lawrence River. Moreover, since1999, three vessels have experienced electrical blackouts that resulted in groundings. The GreatCentury is typical of the vessels that have experienced difficulties, in that it was not built for navigation in ice. In fact, the ability of any vessel to proceed in ice is not taken into consideration by the present Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations, nor are vessels required to report if they are ice classed or if they are equipped with an internal recirculation system. The current regulatory regime in the Eastern Canada Traffic Zones and the St. Lawrence River does not adequately address the risks associated with vessels operating in ice-infested waters. International Safety Management Code Compliance The majority of ice-related occurrences reported to the TSB in the Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone involve problems with sea suction blockages and loss of electrical power or propulsion. While ice pilotage expertise is available to all vessels entering Canadian waters, the expertise is limited to nautical aspects; machinery-related aspects are not addressed. While the nautical staff benefit from the advice of the ice advisor or a pilot, the engine room crew do not receive any guidance and are left to operate on their own knowledge and experience. Consequently, engine room crew who are unfamiliar with the precautions to be taken when vessels operate in ice conditions may not fully appreciate the risks and may not be adequately prepared. The International Safety Management (ISM) Code is intended to address risks associated with ship operations and establish well-documented vessel-specific procedures and practices.9 Additionally, the crew members designated to the vessel are required to possess skills and knowledge essential for the safe execution of the tasks they are expected to perform in normal operations and during emergencies.10 Given that the GreatCentury was scheduled to ply in.Canadian waters during the winter months, the onus was on the ship's owner and the ship's senior staff to ensure that the infrastructure in place for an internal cooling system was functional. However, in this instance: the Safety Management System (SMS) documentation was not vessel-specific and did not provide the engine crew with effective procedures to operate in ice-infested waters; the vessel was not designed to operate in ice conditions; and the crew was unfamiliar with the precautions that needed to be taken when the vessel was operating in ice conditions. The application of the ISM Code and the provision of adequate policies and procedures provide the ship's complement with necessary information to make sound decisions in any operating condition. Consequently, it is essential that the manuals, procedures and practices be complete and vessel-specific. The crew members on the GreatCentury were experienced seafarers but had not acquired experience on vessels operating in a cold climate or ice-infested waters. Subsequent to entering the ice in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, when the sea water flow to the engine room began to fail, the crew did not recognize that the sea suction strainer was probably becoming blocked with ice. The engineers assumed the three-way valve at the outlet of the machinery cooling system was the cross-over valve referred to on the CL-E09form.11 Given the cooling problems, they concluded that it was defective and by readjusting it, assumed that the recirculation system had been re-activated. A change from low to high sea suction was carried out in Bcancour. This runs contrary to the accepted practice to use the lower suction, which is less likely to be affected by loose ice. This situation continued until the vessel had departed Bcancour, when the crew finally recognized that the sea suctions were becoming blocked with ice. Additionally, the vessel's crew was unaware that the aft peak, double bottom ballast tanks and No.4 cargo hold could be used to supply water for short-term emergency cooling. The crew was inexperienced in ice navigation and, without adequate training and vessel-specific documented procedures/directives in the SMS manual, the crew was unable to recognize and prevent the blockage of the sea suctions, resulting in the loss of propulsion followed by grounding. Ice blocking the main sea suction strainers caused the vessel's generators to overheat and shut down, resulting in a loss of electrical and propulsion power. The crew was unable to let go the anchors, which were frozen in the hawse pipes and, without propulsion power, the vessel drifted with the ice flow and grounded outside the channel. The cooling system in the GreatCentury was not designed for efficient navigation in ice. The crew was inexperienced in ice navigation, and without adequate training and vessel-specific documented procedures/directives in the Safety Management System manual, the crew was unable to readily recognize and prevent the blockage of the sea suctions.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors Ice blocking the main sea suction strainers caused the vessel's generators to overheat and shut down, resulting in a loss of electrical and propulsion power. The crew was unable to let go the anchors, which were frozen in the hawse pipes and, without propulsion power, the vessel drifted with the ice flow and grounded outside the channel. The cooling system in the GreatCentury was not designed for efficient navigation in ice. The crew was inexperienced in ice navigation, and without adequate training and vessel-specific documented procedures/directives in the Safety Management System manual, the crew was unable to readily recognize and prevent the blockage of the sea suctions. The current information required to provide clearance to vessels entering ECAREG waters does not allow the regulator to sufficiently evaluate the risk profile of a vessel. As such, the mandate of the Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (ECAREG), to safeguard Canadian waters against pollution and damage to the environment, is compromised.Finding as to Risk The current information required to provide clearance to vessels entering ECAREG waters does not allow the regulator to sufficiently evaluate the risk profile of a vessel. As such, the mandate of the Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (ECAREG), to safeguard Canadian waters against pollution and damage to the environment, is compromised. Safety Action Action Taken Photo4.Temporary pipe connected to sea strainer returning main engine cooling water directly to sea chest. Transport Canada (TC) TC required the master of the GreatCentury to obtain proper winter clothing for the crew to work outside. The company was also required to install a temporary pipe connection to the sea water cooling outlet and the strainer of the high sea suction inlet. The latter installation allows water to return to the sea chest instead of the suction end of the main engine sea water pump (seePhoto4). Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) As a result of the investigation, DFO reviewed the annual edition of the Notices to Mariners1 to46, and determined that it did not contain a warning to keep sea suction inlets clear in ice-infested waters. A warning concerning this safety issue will be included in the next publication. TSB will monitor the proposed amendment to the publication. Seaworthiness is defined as the sufficiency of a vessel in materials, construction, equipment, crew and outfit for the trade or service in which it is employed.12 For a vessel to safely navigate in ice conditions, the ship's cooling water system must be designed so that a continuous flow of water is supplied to all machinery. Furthermore, given the unique operational demands placed on the vessel, the crew must be trained accordingly. Vessels of 500 gross tonnage or more, vessels engaged in towing or pushing a vessel, and vessels carrying a pollutant or dangerous goods entering Canadian waters must comply with the 24 Hour Notification, as per the Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations. Since July 2004, vessels must report 96 hours before entering Canadian waters, as described in the new Marine Transportation Security Regulations. The present reporting scheme provides general vessel information, but it does not require a vessel to indicate its capability to navigate in ice. As indicated by this investigation and previous occurrences reported, often the first indication of a vessel's lack of suitability for ice navigation occurs when the vessel reports a cooling water problem; more often than not, the vessel has already lost propulsion. It is acknowledged that the Joint Industry-Coast Guard Guidelines for the Control of Oil Tankers and Bulk Chemical Carriers in Ice Control Zones of Eastern Canada addresses certain risks to these types of vessels and recommends the carriage of an ice advisor. However, the guidelines do not apply to the majority of vessels navigating in the zone. Also, the ice advisor is a qualified navigating officer, not necessarily an experienced engineer, familiar with internal machinery cooling systems. Nor is it a requirement that all ships should carry an ice advisor; it is a service provided when a vessel owner requests it. As such, many vessels navigating in the zone without experienced ice navigators and officers remain at risk if the proper precautionary measures are not taken to address such conditions. Although a warning will be placed in the annual edition of Notices to Mariners, to keep sea suctions clear while navigating in ice, a vessel is currently not required to report its ice class (or lack thereof), or the suitability of its on-board cooling-water system for ice navigation, along with the 20items required to be reported to ECAREG (seeAppendixA). As a result, the Board is concerned that some vessels entering Canadian waters during the ice navigation season will continue to pose a risk to life, property and the environment.Safety Concern Seaworthiness is defined as the sufficiency of a vessel in materials, construction, equipment, crew and outfit for the trade or service in which it is employed.12 For a vessel to safely navigate in ice conditions, the ship's cooling water system must be designed so that a continuous flow of water is supplied to all machinery. Furthermore, given the unique operational demands placed on the vessel, the crew must be trained accordingly. Vessels of 500 gross tonnage or more, vessels engaged in towing or pushing a vessel, and vessels carrying a pollutant or dangerous goods entering Canadian waters must comply with the 24 Hour Notification, as per the Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations. Since July 2004, vessels must report 96 hours before entering Canadian waters, as described in the new Marine Transportation Security Regulations. The present reporting scheme provides general vessel information, but it does not require a vessel to indicate its capability to navigate in ice. As indicated by this investigation and previous occurrences reported, often the first indication of a vessel's lack of suitability for ice navigation occurs when the vessel reports a cooling water problem; more often than not, the vessel has already lost propulsion. It is acknowledged that the Joint Industry-Coast Guard Guidelines for the Control of Oil Tankers and Bulk Chemical Carriers in Ice Control Zones of Eastern Canada addresses certain risks to these types of vessels and recommends the carriage of an ice advisor. However, the guidelines do not apply to the majority of vessels navigating in the zone. Also, the ice advisor is a qualified navigating officer, not necessarily an experienced engineer, familiar with internal machinery cooling systems. Nor is it a requirement that all ships should carry an ice advisor; it is a service provided when a vessel owner requests it. As such, many vessels navigating in the zone without experienced ice navigators and officers remain at risk if the proper precautionary measures are not taken to address such conditions. Although a warning will be placed in the annual edition of Notices to Mariners, to keep sea suctions clear while navigating in ice, a vessel is currently not required to report its ice class (or lack thereof), or the suitability of its on-board cooling-water system for ice navigation, along with the 20items required to be reported to ECAREG (seeAppendixA). As a result, the Board is concerned that some vessels entering Canadian waters during the ice navigation season will continue to pose a risk to life, property and the environment.