Analysis Underkeel Clearance For course 9, the two upbound lanes of the Neebish Channel have different depths: 8.2 m on the west side and 6.4 m on the east side. The west lane is marked by a set of ranges; the east by day beacons on Sailor's Encampment hill. The sounding survey conducted by the US Army Corps of Engineers indicated normal depths in both the 8.2 m and 6.4 m channels. The width of the deeper upbound lane is 91 m (300 feet); the width of the shallower lane is 61 m (200 feet). Vessels approaching buoy Q16 need to proceed at a reduced speed to minimize shallow water or squat effect. Local pilots report using a speed of seven knots to control the turn at Johnson Point. It was also reported that some lake masters stay close to the middle of course 9 before initiating the next turn. Normal navigation practices were followed on the JEAN PARISIEN. With a pronounced trim by the stern of 3.3 m and a draught of 7.0 m aft, the JEAN PARISIEN was too deep to enter the east side, 6.4 m-deep lane of the Middle Neebish channel. As a result, the ship's bottom shell struck the river bank and the No. 5 starboard tank was set in some 20 cm. Many companies of the US Great Lakes fleet have adopted the practice of adjusting the vessel's trim to increase the underkeel clearance before transiting the Neebish channel. This practice was not common in the Canadian fleet. After loading, or before entering the St. Marys River, the trim of the JEAN PARISIEN was not adjusted, and the passage plan was not modified. The master middled the channel between buoys Q16 and Q17. This took the starboard side of the vessel closer to the shallow side of the channel. Pilotage Practices Canada Steamship Lines operates a fleet of 12 vessels on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterway. Like most domestic vessels, the JEAN PARISIEN was exempted from having to take a pilot. The bridge navigation team was in charge of the navigation and, as a regular practice, the master conned the ship and the OOW monitored the radar and other navigation systems. Company policy required bridge personnel to prepare a detailed port-to-port passage plan. The passage plan available for the St. Marys River did not include provisions to trim the vessel to increase underkeel clearance in the Neebish Channel. While piloting the vessel, the OOW's duties included monitoring the helmsman and estimating the vessel's speed by noting the time of passing certain points along the river. There is no indication that the OOW participated in the adjustment of courses or alerted the master when the vessel drifted toward the east side channel. Although the bridge team was trained in bridge resource management, the OOW did not provide any significant inputs to the master to ensure the effectiveness of the passage plan. The pilotage method used on the JEAN PARISIEN consisted of steering in the middle of the sets of ranges and beacons on Sailor's Encampment and aligning the vessel in the middle of the channel at buoys Q16 and Q17. This practice, combined with vessel's greater-than-anticipated drift to starboard, brought the vessel onto an alignment near the edge of the shallow, 6.4 m channel, which it struck. It appears that the bridge watch did not fully appreciate that the vessel's passage should have been made in the 8.2 m depth lane only. Like most Great Lakes bulk carriers, the JEAN PARISIEN has a large block coefficient (0.86). When the vessel approached the shallow side of the Neebish channel, it is likely that the vessel experienced increased squat. It is possible that bank suction effect also played a role in the incident. The JEAN PARISIEN contacted bottom in the 6.4 m (21 foot) project depth lane of the Middle Neebish Channel because the vessel's 7.0 m draught exceeded the channel depth. The JEAN PARISIEN has a large block coefficient (0.86). When it approached the shallow side of the Neebish channel, it is likely that the vessel experienced increased squat. It is possible that bank suction effect also played a role in the accident. No precautionary measures were taken to deballast or trim the vessel prior to transiting the Neebish Channel. The company required each master to produce a port-to-port passage plan. The bridge team, however, did not adapt its passage plan to take into account the circumstances which required a departure from normal pilotage practices.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The JEAN PARISIEN contacted bottom in the 6.4 m (21 foot) project depth lane of the Middle Neebish Channel because the vessel's 7.0 m draught exceeded the channel depth. The JEAN PARISIEN has a large block coefficient (0.86). When it approached the shallow side of the Neebish channel, it is likely that the vessel experienced increased squat. It is possible that bank suction effect also played a role in the accident. No precautionary measures were taken to deballast or trim the vessel prior to transiting the Neebish Channel. The company required each master to produce a port-to-port passage plan. The bridge team, however, did not adapt its passage plan to take into account the circumstances which required a departure from normal pilotage practices. Safety Action Action Taken On 24 April 1999, the vessel owners issued a safety alert to company masters warning them of the low water level on the St.Marys River. The masters were requested, prior to departing, entering port or transiting a river system, to ballast their vessels to increase underkeel clearance after correcting for squat. The USCG Soo Control issued the following Notice to Mariners: Mariners are advised of incidents of vessels grounding and other shallow water effects along course 8 and 9 in the vicinity of Johnson's Point. Mariners are reminded to consider the effects of shallow water, current, vessel speed, squat, underkeel clearances and related directional stability when transiting Middle Neebish Channel.