The ASL SANDERLING is on regularly scheduled voyages, with each one similar to the last, and is dealt with mainly by the same personnel at her ports of call. Consequently, a certain degree of trust had developed between the ship's crew and the stevedores. Few orders were given because everyone knew what to do. Apparently, complacency had set in, leading to irresponsibility and poor judgement. Traditionally the first mate is directly responsible for the proper loading, stowage and securing of cargo, and is aided by the other mates. It was said that a portable generator set providing additional power to containers had been carried successfully on previous voyages. On this occasion, however, the ship's officers had assumed, wrongly, that the loading gang knew what they were doing, and did not question the ability of the supervisor on the weather deck. Had the mate and ship's electrician carried out proper inspections when the unit was initially loaded (and tested) on board, it is likely that the potential danger of combustion of the wooden floor of the overstowed container would have been recognized. The extra diesel fuel drums, and those of plastic construction, were accepted without scrutiny, although the use of these drums close to a heat source during the voyage contradicted acceptable marine standards and safe working practices. Although the master's standing orders were explicit and read, check all cargo, the weather deck cargo was excluded from this procedure. The master's main reason for this exclusion was that he feared for the safety of the seamen on the exposed weather deck in the winter. This fire occurred in mid-September. More-frequent checks, made during proper watch keeping and fire patrols, may have lead to the identification and early detection of the fire hazard. The master's night orders also state, in part, obeying the Int. Rules. That is taken to mean the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, which state, in part, under Rule 5 Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing. On the night of September 15/16 there was no dedicated lookout posted. Had there been such, the glow from the fire might have been seen earlier. The boundary cooling effect provided by the water from the overflowing ballast tanks was effective but helped the aft flowing burning diesel to accelerate, spread, and cause damage to other containers. However, prompt and correct firefighting measures were instigated and the value of MED training was evident when the third mate initiated the rapid knock-down features of high-expansion foam. Notwithstanding the actions or inactions of the master and crew in this instance, the shipowners could have taken precautions in advance of this or similar voyages to alleviate such risk to life, ship and cargo. The portable generator set was not an integral part of the vessel's machinery or equipment and as such would be excluded from the normal ship inspection, approval and certification procedures required by Transport Canada (TC). Also this portable unit would not have come under the normal survey of a recognized classification society. The generator set was not built to marine standards, but it was used as an auxiliary unit to supplement the ship's main electrical machinery, and it had to be operated and fuelled at sea. When such a change in ship operations was anticipated, it was the responsibility of the shipowners to request regulatory authorization to have an approved, temporary generator installation arranged and operated such as to ensure that an appropriate level of safety was maintained throughout the voyage. The usual procedure is to contact the local or regional Marine Safety office. In this instance, it would appear that the Marine Machinery Regulations (MMR), the Ship Safety Electrical Standards (SSES) and accepted marine practice were contravened. Portable/temporary machinery and electrical equipment fitted on board vessels is to be installed and operated in compliance with the same regulations and standards that govern fixed and permanent installations. Since this occurrence, management has put in place a more formally structured regime in cargo-handling procedures and has arranged for the supply of marine-compatible portable generators.Analysis The ASL SANDERLING is on regularly scheduled voyages, with each one similar to the last, and is dealt with mainly by the same personnel at her ports of call. Consequently, a certain degree of trust had developed between the ship's crew and the stevedores. Few orders were given because everyone knew what to do. Apparently, complacency had set in, leading to irresponsibility and poor judgement. Traditionally the first mate is directly responsible for the proper loading, stowage and securing of cargo, and is aided by the other mates. It was said that a portable generator set providing additional power to containers had been carried successfully on previous voyages. On this occasion, however, the ship's officers had assumed, wrongly, that the loading gang knew what they were doing, and did not question the ability of the supervisor on the weather deck. Had the mate and ship's electrician carried out proper inspections when the unit was initially loaded (and tested) on board, it is likely that the potential danger of combustion of the wooden floor of the overstowed container would have been recognized. The extra diesel fuel drums, and those of plastic construction, were accepted without scrutiny, although the use of these drums close to a heat source during the voyage contradicted acceptable marine standards and safe working practices. Although the master's standing orders were explicit and read, check all cargo, the weather deck cargo was excluded from this procedure. The master's main reason for this exclusion was that he feared for the safety of the seamen on the exposed weather deck in the winter. This fire occurred in mid-September. More-frequent checks, made during proper watch keeping and fire patrols, may have lead to the identification and early detection of the fire hazard. The master's night orders also state, in part, obeying the Int. Rules. That is taken to mean the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, which state, in part, under Rule 5 Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing. On the night of September 15/16 there was no dedicated lookout posted. Had there been such, the glow from the fire might have been seen earlier. The boundary cooling effect provided by the water from the overflowing ballast tanks was effective but helped the aft flowing burning diesel to accelerate, spread, and cause damage to other containers. However, prompt and correct firefighting measures were instigated and the value of MED training was evident when the third mate initiated the rapid knock-down features of high-expansion foam. Notwithstanding the actions or inactions of the master and crew in this instance, the shipowners could have taken precautions in advance of this or similar voyages to alleviate such risk to life, ship and cargo. The portable generator set was not an integral part of the vessel's machinery or equipment and as such would be excluded from the normal ship inspection, approval and certification procedures required by Transport Canada (TC). Also this portable unit would not have come under the normal survey of a recognized classification society. The generator set was not built to marine standards, but it was used as an auxiliary unit to supplement the ship's main electrical machinery, and it had to be operated and fuelled at sea. When such a change in ship operations was anticipated, it was the responsibility of the shipowners to request regulatory authorization to have an approved, temporary generator installation arranged and operated such as to ensure that an appropriate level of safety was maintained throughout the voyage. The usual procedure is to contact the local or regional Marine Safety office. In this instance, it would appear that the Marine Machinery Regulations (MMR), the Ship Safety Electrical Standards (SSES) and accepted marine practice were contravened. Portable/temporary machinery and electrical equipment fitted on board vessels is to be installed and operated in compliance with the same regulations and standards that govern fixed and permanent installations. Since this occurrence, management has put in place a more formally structured regime in cargo-handling procedures and has arranged for the supply of marine-compatible portable generators. There was no pre-planning regime in place to establish a safe loading plan for the weather deck containers and an appropriate portable generator set. The non-marine type portable generator was loaded and secured on the weather deck by stevedores, under a supervisor who was less familiar with loading in this area and unsupervised by the ship's personnel. The generator set was overstowed with an empty 20-foot, wooden-floored container, the bottom of which was approximately 33 cm (13 inches) above the end of the generator's exhaust pipe. Two 35-gallon plastic and three 30-gallon steel drums full of diesel oil were secured to the base of the generator for refuelling it (the heat source) at sea. The generator unit was not inspected or tested by the officer of the watch, or by the ship's electrician, and there was no formal instruction in place to do so. The generator assembly had been running on board under load and unattended for approximately three hours before the fire was discovered. Although the actual load imposed upon the generator by the 17 refrigerated containers is unknown, it was considered to be sufficient to produce exhaust temperatures hot enough to cause rapid pyrolysis and ultimate ignition of the wooden container floor. The presence of two plastic drums of diesel oil contributed to the propagation of the fire as they were in close proximity to the heat source and were eventually consumed in the fire. MED training, as required by regulation and the mandatory standards of the STCW Convention and the STCW Code, was of value to those engaged in extinguishing the fire.Findings There was no pre-planning regime in place to establish a safe loading plan for the weather deck containers and an appropriate portable generator set. The non-marine type portable generator was loaded and secured on the weather deck by stevedores, under a supervisor who was less familiar with loading in this area and unsupervised by the ship's personnel. The generator set was overstowed with an empty 20-foot, wooden-floored container, the bottom of which was approximately 33 cm (13 inches) above the end of the generator's exhaust pipe. Two 35-gallon plastic and three 30-gallon steel drums full of diesel oil were secured to the base of the generator for refuelling it (the heat source) at sea. The generator unit was not inspected or tested by the officer of the watch, or by the ship's electrician, and there was no formal instruction in place to do so. The generator assembly had been running on board under load and unattended for approximately three hours before the fire was discovered. Although the actual load imposed upon the generator by the 17 refrigerated containers is unknown, it was considered to be sufficient to produce exhaust temperatures hot enough to cause rapid pyrolysis and ultimate ignition of the wooden container floor. The presence of two plastic drums of diesel oil contributed to the propagation of the fire as they were in close proximity to the heat source and were eventually consumed in the fire. MED training, as required by regulation and the mandatory standards of the STCW Convention and the STCW Code, was of value to those engaged in extinguishing the fire. The ASL SANDERLING experienced a fire within container cargo on the weather deck forward as a consequence of the dangerously arranged stowage of a non-marine type portable generator such that hot exhaust gases from its engine likely ignited adjacent combustible and highly flammable materials. The complacent attitude of the ship's officers and shore crew; the lack of foresight of the supervisor in deck cargo stowage; and the lack of proper supervision/watchkeeping and fire patrols concerning the special stowage and safe operation of the generator set all contributed to a fire hazard being created and unrecognized by the ship's personnel. Inaction by the shipowners to obtain advanced approval from regulatory authorities--for the safe installation and operation of an appropriate auxiliary generator set--increased the possibility of having a fire on board.Causes and Contributing Factors The ASL SANDERLING experienced a fire within container cargo on the weather deck forward as a consequence of the dangerously arranged stowage of a non-marine type portable generator such that hot exhaust gases from its engine likely ignited adjacent combustible and highly flammable materials. The complacent attitude of the ship's officers and shore crew; the lack of foresight of the supervisor in deck cargo stowage; and the lack of proper supervision/watchkeeping and fire patrols concerning the special stowage and safe operation of the generator set all contributed to a fire hazard being created and unrecognized by the ship's personnel. Inaction by the shipowners to obtain advanced approval from regulatory authorities--for the safe installation and operation of an appropriate auxiliary generator set--increased the possibility of having a fire on board. Safety Action Taken Following this occurrence, the shipowners put in place more formally structured cargo-handling procedures and arranged for the supply of marine-compatible portable generators.