Summary On the afternoon of 17March2002, while stopped in ice and waiting for a change in the weather, a fire broke out in the bow of the large fishing vessel Katsheshuk. After an unsuccessful attempt at fighting the fire, the decision was made to abandon the vessel. Several days later, the tug AtlanticMaple took the vessel into tow and steamed towards St.John's, Newfoundland and Labrador. The tug and tow encountered adverse weather and were forced to seek refuge in Trinity Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador. When the weather finally moderated, the tow resumed. On the morning of 30March2002, while approximately six nautical miles north-west of Cape St.Francis, Newfoundland and Labrador, the Katsheshuk listed and sank. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of the Vessel The vessel was built in Norway in1987 as a single-screw stern trawler of all-welded steel construction, equipped for on board scallop processing and freezer storage. The navigating bridge and crew accommodation were located forward, the factory was located at midships and the engine room was located aft. In 1988, it was imported to, and registered in, Canada. In1991, the vessel was converted to a shrimp trawler and was engaged in the shrimp fishery on the East coast of Canada. In2001, the ship was purchased by the current owner. The hull was subdivided by seven transverse watertight bulkheads, five of which extended from the keel up to the main deck level, while the sixth extended up to the shelter deck as a collision bulkhead. A seventh watertight bulkhead extended from the main deck up to the tween deck and was used to divide the forward freezer hold from the lower processing area. A watertight inner bottom, enclosing double-bottom tanks extended for the length of the fish hold, while the hull in way of the main engine room was of part double-bottom construction (seeFigure1a). History of the Voyage On 11 March 2002 at 2400,3 the Katsheshuk with a crew of 30sailed from Harbour Grace, Newfoundland and Labrador, bound for the shrimp fishing grounds off eastern Labrador (seeAppendixA). On arrival at the destination, the vessel started fishing, but had to move around from area to area to find the shrimp. On the morning of 17March2002, poor weather conditions prevented the vessel from fishing, so it steamed on a west-south-west course into the ice pack. At 1200, the vessel stopped in the ice to await better conditions. At approximately 1545, two crew members working on deck saw smoke coming from doorG (seeFigure2) in the trawl deck superstructure providing access to the lobby. One crew member immediately went to inform the officer of the watch (OOW) while the other entered the lower accommodation to warn the crew. The OOW, on being informed of the situation, immediately activated the fire alarm, but it failed to sound. He was soon relieved by the master and proceeded to his muster station. The master then made an announcement on the public address (PA) system and activated the general alarm system, which did sound. The master then contacted three vessels by VHF, the NewfoundlandOtter,the ArcticEnduranceand the OceanPride, which were fishing in the area and informed them of the fire on board the Katsheshuk and requested their assistance. As the master felt he was too busy with the emergency on board, he did not inform the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) of the vessel's situation. An initial inspection determined the smoke was emanating from the bow area of the vessel and as a precaution, the sliding watertight doors were remotely closed. While the master monitored the situation from the wheelhouse, in the tween deck accommodation three decks below, preparations were being made to locate and fight the fire. Figure3a. Route of port fire party A fire party was assembled in the after cross-alleyway area of the tween deck accommodation. The fire party consisted of a fire lead wearing only coveralls and a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and others without SCBAs as a hose party. After a short delay to charge the fire main, the fire party proceeded up the port side alleyway and through the open doorA (seeFigure3a) to the laundry room. Leaving the rest of the hose party in the laundry room, the fire lead proceeded into the solarium through doorC, latching it open on the way. The fire lead then opened doorD and entered a small foyer where he was met by a wall of smoke. On opening either doorEorF4, he was met with heat and flame and immediately opened up his hose in a straight stream pattern. He was only able to direct water on the fire for a few seconds before the rest of his fire party (withnoSCBA) called for him to pull back. The fire lead, by now running low on air, dropped the hose in the laundry room and retreated to the cross-alleyway area leaving some doors in the open position. While up forward and unknown to the first fire party, a second fire party was being assembled in the starboard alleyway (seeFigure3b). This team consisted of a fire lead wearing jeans, a short sleeve shirt and a SCBA accompanied by a hose party. As the first fire party was pulling back, the second fire party opened doorB leading to the solarium and the fire lead felt some heat. He introduced water into the solarium for about a minute before deciding to pull back to get a safety line. On the second trip forward, the fire lead made it to doorD and when he opened it, a white flame shot out over his head and hit the deckhead. He opened up his hose at the fire, but was quickly forced back by debris falling from the deckhead. The second fire party then retreated to the after cross-alleyway also leaving some doors in the open position. Figure3b. Route of starboard fire party Forced to give up their plan of fighting the fire internally, the crew started to set up boundary cooling on the exterior of the vessel. To cool the deckhead of the forecastle storage locker, a fire hose was fed through the wheelhouse, onto the foredeck, and then lowered through a rope scuttle (an opening through which mooring ropes are passed) to the forward mooring station. Shortly after charging the line, a hose clamp securing the hose to the hose fitting let go, requiring the line to be shut down to reattach the clamp. A second fire hose was set up on the trawl deck and directed at the transverse bulkhead at the forward end of the trawl deck. Meanwhile, the master contacted other vessels in the area and requested additional fire-fighting equipment. Some hoses and SCBAs were transferred to the Katsheshuk from other vessels, however the hose connections were incompatible and an adapter had to be made for one of the Katsheshuk hydrants. At approximately the same time and roughly 45minutes after the fire was discovered, the master decided to evacuate all non-essential personnel to the other fishing vessels in the area. An attempt was made to raise the vessel's rescue boat (seePhoto2) using the port boat davit, but the crew could not get it to operate. As a result, they used the cargo crane on the starboard side. The crew evacuated using the vessel's own rescue boat by boarding the rescue boat on the forecastle deck and then being lowered to the water. After several lifts, it was decided to deploy the pilot ladder and have the crew climb down the ladder and board the rescue boats from the Katsheshuk as well as those dispatched from the nearby vessels. During the initial evacuation, 24crew members were transferred to the ArcticEndurance and NewfoundlandOtter. As darkness approached, two more crew members were evacuated from the vessel. Over time the vessel started to develop a list, so one crew member donned a fireman's outfit with SCBA and entered the tween deck accommodation to shut off the fire hoses which were believed still to be open in the port and starboard alleyways. The port fire hose was found to be shut-off while the starboard fire hose was found to have burst. The hydrant feeding the starboard fire hose was closed and the crew member retreated from the tween deck accommodation. Eventually, the wheelhouse began to fill with smoke, and the decision was made by the master for the remaining crew members to leave the vessel. All main and auxiliary power was shut down and the four remaining crew members donned immersion suits and prepared to abandon the vessel. A liferaft was thrown over the side and inflated for use as a temporary shelter. While descending the pilot ladder, at least two crew members fell off. One fell onto the ice and suffered a broken foot while the second fell into the water but was quickly recovered. During the final evacuation, these four crew members were transferred to the ArcticEndurance. Approximately 3hours and 45minutes after the onset of the fire, the NewfoundlandOtter made the initial notification of the occurrence to the CCG through the Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) at St. Anthony, Newfoundland and Labrador. Injuries to Persons One crew member suffered a broken foot when he fell off the pilot ladder. A second crew member suffered a lacerated hand when he came in contact with some broken glass while retrieving a fire axe. Salvage The owners of the Katsheshuk hired the tug AtlanticMaple to tow the vessel to port. By the time the tug arrived on the scene, the now derelict vessel had drifted approximately 168nautical miles to the south. On the morning of 26March2002 (seePhoto4), the AtlanticMaple escorted by the CCGS HenryLarsentook the Katsheshuk under tow. The original plan was to tow the vessel directly to St.John'sNewfoundland and Labrador, but due to high winds, the tug and tow were forced to seek shelter in Trinity Bay and later Conception Bay., On the early morning of 30 March 2002, weather conditions were favourable and the AtlanticMaple, with the Katsheshuk in tow, resumed its passage and headed for St.John's. At approximately 0616, the AtlanticMaple noticed the Katsheshuk had taken on a pronounced list and appeared to be settling lower in the water. At 0726, the Katsheshuk sank in position 4754.3'N, 05249.5'W (seeAppendixB). Damage to the Vessel The vessel sank and was subsequently declared a total loss. Damage to the Environment When the vessel sank, the action of the wind and the waves dispersed the oil and its impact on the environment was considered minimal. Vessel Certification The Katsheshuk held the class 1A1 Stern Trawler KMCICE-1A5 with Det Norske Veritas at the time of the occurrence. It was also subject to regular inspection under the Transport Canada Marine Safety Large Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations. The vessel was certificated and equipped in accordance with Canadian regulations and was last issued a Safety Inspection Certificate (SIC31) on 29March2001. Personnel Certification The master and the officers of the vessel were in possession of valid certificates for their positions and the trade in which they were engaged. All of the officers and most of the crew had some level of Marine Emergency Duties training. Personnel History The master had 27years experience at sea and approximately seven years experience as master on various fishing vessels. Weather Information The weather conditions at the time of the occurrence were estimated at winds from the north-northwest at 50knots with a swell of 4m. At the time of the sinking, the winds were from the northwest at 15to 20knots with a sea height of 1.5m. Forward Stores The forward stores was located in the forepeak on the tween deck level. It was surrounded by the hull on two sides, the forepeak tank and chain locker underneath, the forward mooring area overhead and a steel bulkhead aft. It was thermally insulated in way of the hull and was heated by a 5kW6 (440VoltsAC) unit heater suspended from the deckhead. Although there was a sign posted indicating the door was to be closed at sea, this weathertight door as well as an overhead escape hatch from the compartment were generally left open. Various sundries which were stored in the locker included bedding (pillows), toilet paper, paper towels, cardboard, cleaning supplies, various aerosols, Christmas decorations, charcoal briquets, and barbecue lighter fluid. The physical tidiness was characterized as messy. The day before the fire, several crew members were tasked to clean up the storage area. After this work was completed, the physical tidiness was described as better. Forward Mooring Station Door The door H (seeFigure2) leading from the shelter deck lobby to the forward mooring area was normally left open. Boat and Fire Drills Boat and fire drills were carried out on a regular basis. These drills would typically involve the crew mustering at their designated emergency stations and stating their respective duties. It was a usual practice for the crew to try on their immersion suits, as well as check and lubricate the zippers. Familiarization with and donning of the SCBAs was also common. None of the crew, however, could recall having ever witnessed the fire hoses being run out and charged during a fire drill. There was also no indication that fire drills were conducted with mock scenarios to fully familiarize the crew with the equipment and foster better interaction and coordination between team members. Fire Detection System The vessel was equipped with an automatic fire detection system connected to remote sensors fitted through the vessel. In the event of fire the sensor would detect the smoke or heat and send a signal (pre-alarm) to the wheelhouse. The wheelhouse personnel could either acknowledge the signal and investigate its cause, or immediately activate the fire alarm. Typically, if the pre-alarm was not acknowledged within a preset time, the fire detection system would automatically activate the fire alarm. Fire and general alarm systems are generally integrated with the PA system to permit the temporary silencing of the alarm during an announcement.7 On completion of the announcement, the alarm automatically resumes sounding.