Summary The Israel Aircraft Industries Astra SPX, serial number 087, registration C-FRJZ, was on a night visual approach to a private aerodrome at Fox Harbour, Nova Scotia. When on short final, the aircraft struck the tops of trees. The crew had initiated an overshoot just before hitting the trees, and the aircraft was able to climb away successfully. The flight diverted to Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, approximately 30nautical miles from Fox Harbour, and carried out an uneventful landing. The aircraft sustained substantial damage; the passengers and the crew were not injured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The aircraft was relatively new, and records indicated that it had been maintained in accordance with regulations. There were no pre-occurrence deficiencies identified. The aircraft had a flight management system capable of providing accurate point-to-point navigation and providing vertical guidance in certain circumstances. However, the crew was not trained or sufficiently familiar with the vertical guidance capability to have confidence in its use for approaches. Fox Harbour is a privately owned, uncertified, single-runway aerodrome and was unregistered at the time of the accident. The runway (33/15) is paved, 4885 feet long, 75feet wide, and equipped with runway edge lights. The runway elevation is approximately 50feet above sea level. The approach end of Runway33 had been cleared to a tree line approximately 1150feet from the threshold. The average treetop height along the approach path about 60feet. No approach lighting or visual approach slope indicating system (VASIS) was installed. The captain, who was also the operations manager, was flying the aircraft from the left seat. The co-pilot, who was also the chief pilot, was in the right seat and was responsible for the pilot-not-flying duties. The captain had flown into Fox Harbour twice before, but never at night. The co-pilot had landed there about ten times, but only once before at night. The co-pilot's other night flight was in a Learjet, using Runway15. The departure and en route portions of the flight to Fox Harbour were unremarkable until preparation for the descent. The owner had made it clear to this crew, and to other crews on previous occasions, that he expected arrivals and approaches to be flown in minimum time. The operating crew and other employees confirmed this pressure, and aircrew therefore planned and conducted their operations accordingly. In preparation for the arrival and the approach to Fox Harbour, the crew inserted a series of waypoints in the flight management system to guide them for a straight-in approach and landing on Runway 33. The weather for the arrival was good and consistent with the official forecasts and reports. The night was clear and starlit. The 90% illuminated moon was 24 above the horizon and almost directly behind the crew on approach to Runway 33. No restrictions to visibility were present. The aerodrome is on a peninsula along the Northumberland Strait shore in a sparsely settled area of relatively featureless terrain. Only the runway lights were clearly visible to the crew. These conditions are conducive to a black-hole illusion. Transport Canada's Instrument Flight Procedures manual discusses this phenomenon as follows: During night visual approaches to runways in dark, featureless areas the lack of ambient clues to orientation interferes with depth perception. Under these conditions, pilots often overestimate their altitude and, while concentrating on maintaining a constant visual angle of approach, [will fly along a descending] arc which results in premature contact with the ground. The article The Black Hole Approach: Don't Get Sucked In! by Linda D. Pendleton in the online aviation periodical AVWEB states: When an approach is flown to an airport located on a coast in sparsely settled terrain on a night when the air is extremely clear and there is excellent visibility, the phenomenon of black-hole illusion is more pronounced.1 Black-hole illusion has been determined to be a factor in at least two accidents investigated by the TSB (TSB Reports A90H0002 and A96O0034). The crew was not aware of the black-hole illusion. Figure1. Hand-drawn diagram of Fox Harbour aerodrome The company standard operating procedures (SOPs) require that prior to each approach and landing, the flight crew shall be briefed on the critical aspects of the procedure. The company had not developed a formal arrival procedure into Fox Harbour, and an approach briefing was not conducted. It is probable that the good weather and the absence of a formal approach procedure for Fox Harbour contributed to this omission. Air traffic control radar data provided good information about the aircraft descent track, altitudes, and approach speeds. In general, the descent was flown at high speed on a track following the navigation waypoints programmed in the flight management system by the crew. Speed brakes were required to slow the aircraft during the descent. Example speeds show that the aircraft was at 340 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) at 10000feet, 310KIAS at 5000feet, and 250KIAS at 1000feet. At 1000feet, the aircraft was levelled and decelerated to configure for approach and landing. About this time, there was a slight quartering tailwind component, estimated to be about six knots. Because the speed was high throughout the descent, flaps and landing gear selections were delayed and, consequently, not fully extended until about threemiles from the runway. At this time, the co-pilot went heads down to ensure that all checklist items were complete and to confirm that the aircraft was properly configured to land. When he next looked up, he observed that the aircraft was low in relationship to the runway and advised the captain, who corrected by levelling the aircraft. The aircraft altitude was recorded on radar to be between 200 and 300feet above sea level while tracking inbound to the airport. A short distance before the tree line (Figure 1) the aircraft began descending again. The co-pilot saw trees between the aircraft and the runway and called for an overshoot. The captain had begun the overshoot on the co-pilot's call; however, the action was not taken in time to avoid striking the trees. There were no SOP calls relating to altitude during the approach. About 50 feet above ground level and 1300 feet from the threshold of Runway33, the aircraft struck the trees and descended 10feet into the treetops, then climbed away. Damage to the aircraft comprised wing leading-edge dents, minor fuselage perforations, leading- and trailing-edge flap dents and perforations, nose and landing-gear door damage, and foreign object damage to both engines. Tree debris was entangled in the landing gear; some of this debris fell from the aircraft during the overshoot. Debris that entered the engines subsequently resulted in an odour of burning wood and some smoke in the cabin. Once the aircraft began climbing on the overshoot, the crew raised the landing gear and the trailing-edge flaps. Both systems functioned normally. The initial decision to raise the landing gear and the flaps was reexamined during the overshoot climb, resulting in the leading-edge flaps being left extended. The crew contacted air traffic control on the overshoot, declared an emergency, and requested clearance to Charlottetown. Charlottetown was chosen because it was nearby and clearly visible from Fox Harbour, had landing aids, and had airport emergency response services. The aircraft continued to Charlottetown for a straight-in approach and an uneventful landing and shutdown. Because of the flight time for the diversion to Charlottetown, the cockpit voice recorder only captured the last seven minutes of the approach information into Fox Harbour. A flight data recorder was not on board, nor was one required by regulation. Jetport Inc. is a privately held charter company based in Hamilton, Ontario. At the time of the accident, the company was operating one Israel Aircraft Industries AstraSPX, one Learjet31, and two Cessna Caravan aircraft. The company was approved to conduct Astra operations under Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) sections604 and 704. The accident flight was being operated as a private flight for the owner of Jetport under section604; however, three of the passengers were from a separate company travelling in support of another business project belonging to the owner at Fox Harbour. Because these passengers were not under contract to the operator, Transport Canada policy would have deemed the flight to be commercial and, consequently, required it to be operated under CARs section 704. The significant difference between CAR604 and CAR704 operations is that the runway length required for CAR704 operations is greater. The runway length at Fox Harbour was sufficient for the flight to have been operated under CAR704. Summary The Israel Aircraft Industries Astra SPX, serial number 087, registration C-FRJZ, was on a night visual approach to a private aerodrome at Fox Harbour, Nova Scotia. When on short final, the aircraft struck the tops of trees. The crew had initiated an overshoot just before hitting the trees, and the aircraft was able to climb away successfully. The flight diverted to Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, approximately 30nautical miles from Fox Harbour, and carried out an uneventful landing. The aircraft sustained substantial damage; the passengers and the crew were not injured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information The aircraft was relatively new, and records indicated that it had been maintained in accordance with regulations. There were no pre-occurrence deficiencies identified. The aircraft had a flight management system capable of providing accurate point-to-point navigation and providing vertical guidance in certain circumstances. However, the crew was not trained or sufficiently familiar with the vertical guidance capability to have confidence in its use for approaches. Fox Harbour is a privately owned, uncertified, single-runway aerodrome and was unregistered at the time of the accident. The runway (33/15) is paved, 4885 feet long, 75feet wide, and equipped with runway edge lights. The runway elevation is approximately 50feet above sea level. The approach end of Runway33 had been cleared to a tree line approximately 1150feet from the threshold. The average treetop height along the approach path about 60feet. No approach lighting or visual approach slope indicating system (VASIS) was installed. The captain, who was also the operations manager, was flying the aircraft from the left seat. The co-pilot, who was also the chief pilot, was in the right seat and was responsible for the pilot-not-flying duties. The captain had flown into Fox Harbour twice before, but never at night. The co-pilot had landed there about ten times, but only once before at night. The co-pilot's other night flight was in a Learjet, using Runway15. The departure and en route portions of the flight to Fox Harbour were unremarkable until preparation for the descent. The owner had made it clear to this crew, and to other crews on previous occasions, that he expected arrivals and approaches to be flown in minimum time. The operating crew and other employees confirmed this pressure, and aircrew therefore planned and conducted their operations accordingly. In preparation for the arrival and the approach to Fox Harbour, the crew inserted a series of waypoints in the flight management system to guide them for a straight-in approach and landing on Runway 33. The weather for the arrival was good and consistent with the official forecasts and reports. The night was clear and starlit. The 90% illuminated moon was 24 above the horizon and almost directly behind the crew on approach to Runway 33. No restrictions to visibility were present. The aerodrome is on a peninsula along the Northumberland Strait shore in a sparsely settled area of relatively featureless terrain. Only the runway lights were clearly visible to the crew. These conditions are conducive to a black-hole illusion. Transport Canada's Instrument Flight Procedures manual discusses this phenomenon as follows: During night visual approaches to runways in dark, featureless areas the lack of ambient clues to orientation interferes with depth perception. Under these conditions, pilots often overestimate their altitude and, while concentrating on maintaining a constant visual angle of approach, [will fly along a descending] arc which results in premature contact with the ground. The article The Black Hole Approach: Don't Get Sucked In! by Linda D. Pendleton in the online aviation periodical AVWEB states: When an approach is flown to an airport located on a coast in sparsely settled terrain on a night when the air is extremely clear and there is excellent visibility, the phenomenon of black-hole illusion is more pronounced.1 Black-hole illusion has been determined to be a factor in at least two accidents investigated by the TSB (TSB Reports A90H0002 and A96O0034). The crew was not aware of the black-hole illusion. Figure1. Hand-drawn diagram of Fox Harbour aerodrome The company standard operating procedures (SOPs) require that prior to each approach and landing, the flight crew shall be briefed on the critical aspects of the procedure. The company had not developed a formal arrival procedure into Fox Harbour, and an approach briefing was not conducted. It is probable that the good weather and the absence of a formal approach procedure for Fox Harbour contributed to this omission. Air traffic control radar data provided good information about the aircraft descent track, altitudes, and approach speeds. In general, the descent was flown at high speed on a track following the navigation waypoints programmed in the flight management system by the crew. Speed brakes were required to slow the aircraft during the descent. Example speeds show that the aircraft was at 340 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) at 10000feet, 310KIAS at 5000feet, and 250KIAS at 1000feet. At 1000feet, the aircraft was levelled and decelerated to configure for approach and landing. About this time, there was a slight quartering tailwind component, estimated to be about six knots. Because the speed was high throughout the descent, flaps and landing gear selections were delayed and, consequently, not fully extended until about threemiles from the runway. At this time, the co-pilot went heads down to ensure that all checklist items were complete and to confirm that the aircraft was properly configured to land. When he next looked up, he observed that the aircraft was low in relationship to the runway and advised the captain, who corrected by levelling the aircraft. The aircraft altitude was recorded on radar to be between 200 and 300feet above sea level while tracking inbound to the airport. A short distance before the tree line (Figure 1) the aircraft began descending again. The co-pilot saw trees between the aircraft and the runway and called for an overshoot. The captain had begun the overshoot on the co-pilot's call; however, the action was not taken in time to avoid striking the trees. There were no SOP calls relating to altitude during the approach. About 50 feet above ground level and 1300 feet from the threshold of Runway33, the aircraft struck the trees and descended 10feet into the treetops, then climbed away. Damage to the aircraft comprised wing leading-edge dents, minor fuselage perforations, leading- and trailing-edge flap dents and perforations, nose and landing-gear door damage, and foreign object damage to both engines. Tree debris was entangled in the landing gear; some of this debris fell from the aircraft during the overshoot. Debris that entered the engines subsequently resulted in an odour of burning wood and some smoke in the cabin. Once the aircraft began climbing on the overshoot, the crew raised the landing gear and the trailing-edge flaps. Both systems functioned normally. The initial decision to raise the landing gear and the flaps was reexamined during the overshoot climb, resulting in the leading-edge flaps being left extended. The crew contacted air traffic control on the overshoot, declared an emergency, and requested clearance to Charlottetown. Charlottetown was chosen because it was nearby and clearly visible from Fox Harbour, had landing aids, and had airport emergency response services. The aircraft continued to Charlottetown for a straight-in approach and an uneventful landing and shutdown. Because of the flight time for the diversion to Charlottetown, the cockpit voice recorder only captured the last seven minutes of the approach information into Fox Harbour. A flight data recorder was not on board, nor was one required by regulation. Jetport Inc. is a privately held charter company based in Hamilton, Ontario. At the time of the accident, the company was operating one Israel Aircraft Industries AstraSPX, one Learjet31, and two Cessna Caravan aircraft. The company was approved to conduct Astra operations under Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) sections604 and 704. The accident flight was being operated as a private flight for the owner of Jetport under section604; however, three of the passengers were from a separate company travelling in support of another business project belonging to the owner at Fox Harbour. Because these passengers were not under contract to the operator, Transport Canada policy would have deemed the flight to be commercial and, consequently, required it to be operated under CARs section 704. The significant difference between CAR604 and CAR704 operations is that the runway length required for CAR704 operations is greater. The runway length at Fox Harbour was sufficient for the flight to have been operated under CAR704.