Synopsis On 07 June 1994, as the fishing vessel RALI II was returning from the fishing grounds, a fire broke out in the engine-room. The flames were quickly suppressed by the gas smothering system. However, the resulting electrical power failure caused the vessel to begin to make sternway, which could not be stopped, thereby complicating any attempt at abandonment. There were no injuries as a result of this occurrence, but the engine-room sustained considerable damage. The Board determined that the fire broke out when a component of the main fuel filters of the main engine failed and the engine-room personnel undertook to clean the filters. This component failure, combined with an improper work method, caused diesel fuel to splash on to the unprotected exhaust pipes. During the fire, the main engine emergency stop remote control and that of the propeller shaft clutch mechanism failed to work. 1.0 Factual Information 1.1 Particulars of the Vessel RALI II Official Number - 368328 Port of Registry - Cap-aux-Meules, Quebec Flag - Canadian Type - Stern trawler Gross Tons - 488.81 Length - 37 m Draught - F2: 3.05 m A: 4.27 m Built - 1976,Verreault Navigation Inc. Les Mchins, Quebec Propulsion - One eight-cylinder Polar-Nohab diesel engine, controllable-pitch propeller Owners - Madelipche Inc. Cap-aux-Meules, Quebec Complement - 9 1.1.1 Description of the Vessel The RALI II is a trawler used for groundfishing. She is the sister ship of the NADINE which sank in December 1990 causing the death of eight persons. As in the NADINE occurrence, the RALI II had begun making sternway at the time of possible abandonment. Units of measurement in this report conform to International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards or, where there is no such standard, are expressed in the International System (SI) of units. See Glossary for all abbreviations and acronyms. All times are EDT (Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) minus four hours) unless otherwise stated. 1.2 History of the Voyage At approximately 0030 eastern daylight time (EDT)3 on 07 June 1994, the RALI II left the Misaine Bank fishing grounds east of Cape Breton Island to return to her home port at Cap-aux- Meules in the les-de-la-Madeleine. At or about 0140, a fire broke out in the engine-room when the vessel was in position 4550'N, 05807'W. The engine-room was immediately evacuated, the propeller pitch was set at zero, the engine speed was reduced to slow, the engine-room openings were closed, and the CO2 gas smothering system was activated. At the same time, a distress call (MAYDAY) was radioed to the Coast Guard Radio Station (CGRS) at Sydney, Nova Scotia. CGRS Stephenville, Newfoundland, replied immediately. Meanwhile, the crew prepared for possible abandonment. An electrical power failure followed the activation of the gas smothering system. Shortly thereafter, the vessel began gradually to make sternway, dragging in her wake first one liferaft that had already been launched and then a second one that the crew had tried to launch under unfavourable conditions. The rafts were damaged, and the survival equipment they contained was lost. The controls of the main engine were set at the lowest revolutions per minute (RPM). All attempts to disengage the propeller shaft or to stop the engine with the emergency stop button were unsuccessful. The remote controls to shut off the four diesel fuel tanks were activated, but the valve of the day tank did not close. The RALI II continued making sternway for approximately one and a half hours. There were no injuries as a result of the fire, but the engine-room was damaged. Three other vessels belonging to the same company were in the vicinity, the closest was only three or four miles away and the farthest, approximately two hours distant. They came to lend assistance. At 0500, the FATIMA took the damaged vessel in tow back to her home port, which they reached without incident at 1030, 08 June 1994. 1.3 Damage to the Vessel The damage, caused mainly by the smoke and heat given off by the fire, was confined to the engine-room. The electrical wires running overhead in the engine-room over the source of the fire were severely damaged. 1.4 Certificates 1.4.1 Vessel's Certificates The vessel had the certificates required under existing regulations. 1.4.2 Crew's Certificates The master and the officer of the watch both held certificates appropriate to their positions and to the class of the vessel and to the type of voyage. The chief engineer did not have the minimum service required to obtain a certificate of competency as chief engineer of a motor- driven fishing vessel. However, at the owners' request, an exemption had been granted to the vessel by the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG). 1.4.3 Marine Emergency Duties (MED) Training The certificated members of the crew had taken the MED courses required to obtain their certificates. Three other crew members had also received such training. 1.5 Personnel History 1.5.1 Master The master held a fishing vessel master certificate in accordance with Canadian regulations. He had held the position of master on board the RALI II since November 1984. He had engaged in fishing since 1951. 1.5.2 Officers The first mate held a fishing master certificate. He had been working on the RALI II for eight years. The chief engineer had been working on the RALI II for five years, three of them as an engineer. This was his first trip as chief engineer. He had engaged in fishing for some ten years. 1.6 Weather Conditions Recorded by the Vessel At the time of the fire, the weather was clear with good visibility. The wind was from the south at less than 15 knots, the waves were approximately one metre high, and the air temperature was 5 Celsius. 1.7 Radio Communications 1.7.1 Inter-Ship At least five vessels responded to the distress call issued by the RALI II and relayed by the CGRS. 1.7.2Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) or Coast Guard Radio Station (CGRS) CGRS Stephenville answered the first distress call issued by the damaged vessel. The VTS Centre in Port-aux-Basques, Newfoundland, also responded. 1.8 Emergency Equipment 1.8.1 Life-saving Equipment All the life-saving equipment readied for possible abandonment of the vessel worked properly, except that one of the liferafts inflated upside down. Both liferafts were damaged after launching when the vessel began to make sternway and dragged them in her wake. 1.8.2 Fire-fighting Equipment The fire was suppressed quickly by the gas smothering system. No other fire-fighting equipment was used. 1.9 Search and Rescue Three fishing vessels belonging to the same company were in the vicinity. They immediately went to the aid of the RALI II. The crew did not have to abandon ship. 1.10 Response of the Crew The method used by the engine-room personnel to clean the filters was not consistent with the manufacturer's directions or sound work practices. No attempt was made to stop the main engine before the vessel began to make sternway, although this vessel, fitted with a controllable-pitch propeller, was known to make sternway following a power failure. The liferafts were deployed without orders from the master. 1.11 Fuel Filters A drop in the pressure of the fuel supply to the main engine led the engine-room personnel to try to change the main filters. They turned off the three-way valve to isolate one of the two filters (duplex type) and began to unscrew the cover without first lowering the internal pressure using the drain plug. As the diesel fuel was escaping with no drop in pressure, they tried to retighten the cover. As they were doing this, the centre post of the filter broke. The cover lifted off and diesel fuel sprayed on to the exhaust pipes of the main engine and caught fire. Inspection of the failed component revealed that it had been welded previously. No one remembered when this repair had been made. Inspection of the main filters revealed that the overflow valve on the unit that the engine-room personnel was trying to open was damaged and not operational. The ball held on its seat by a spring which prevents diesel fuel from flowing back toward the filter was missing. The seat was so worn that the ball slipped through (see Appendix A). The day tank is located above the level of the main filters. 1.12 Intensity of the Fire The fire was fed by the main pipe bringing diesel fuel to the main engine. Within a few seconds of the fire breaking out, the intensity of the flames and the heat that they gave off were so great that the personnel was forced to evacuate the engine-room in a mad rush. 1.13 Controllable-pitch Propeller (see Appendix C) Following the electrical power failure, the RALI II gradually began to make sternway. Unlike a fixed-pitch propeller, a controllable-pitch (directional) propeller has a separate hub and blades that can turn to the required angle relative to the axis of rotation. Changing the angle of the blade changes the pitch so as to shift from full ahead to full astern without changing the direction of rotation of the engine and propeller. At the base of each blade, there is a flange inserted into the propeller boss. The blade swivels around the centre of the flange on the boss. The pitch is changed by an axial motion of a control rod that passes through the hole in the hollow propeller shaft. The front end of this rod is connected to a piston inside the servocontrol cylinder, and the back end, to the pitch changing mechanism inside the hub of the propeller. This mechanism, consisting of a crosshead connected by a sliding shoe with integral crankpins to the base of each blade, converts the axial motion of the rod into a rotary motion of the propeller blades. To adjust the pitch forward or aft, hydraulic pressure is applied to one side or other of the piston by means of a distributing valve and the sealing ring on the shaft (commonly called an oil distribution box). The surface area of the blade is not symmetrical around the axis of rotation, and the hydrodynamic forces exerted on the blade mean that hydraulic pressure must be maintained for the blade to retain a positive pitch for shifting to full ahead. When all hydraulic pressure is lost, the hydrodynamic forces exerted on the blade force the blade to turn to a different angle in order to achieve a position of equilibrium. The propeller of the RALI II is designed such that, when all hydraulic pressure is lost, the blades gradually turn to an angle equivalent to full astern. This known blade design was dictated by the intended use of the vessel rather than by the mere need to move ahead or astern in the event of loss of hydraulic pressure. Apart from possible damage to the piping of the external hydraulic system resulting in loss ofpressure, the gradual passage to the aft pitch may be caused by a normal oil leak through the seal of the distribution box. The hydraulic pressure of the propeller pitch system on the RALI II is maintained by electric pumps powered by the generators. 1.14 Remote Shut-off Controls After evacuating the engine-room, the crew tried unsuccessfully to cut off the diesel fuel supply to the main engine by activating the remote shut-off valves on the fuel tanks. There are four separate fuel tanks: three of the valves worked properly, but the fourth one which was on the day tank, the tank supplying the main engine, did not work. This tank was found to be empty after the fire. These valves, manufactured by Young Cunningham Limited (see Appendices A and B), are fitted on several Canadian vessels, including passenger vessels. According to the manufacturer, the problem discovered on the RALI II has never been reported since this type of valve has been manufactured. Tests conducted after the vessel returned to port showed that two valves out of four could not be operated remotely if they were left in the full open position, but that they operated properly if they were closed half a turn after being opened all the way. It was also found that the collar that limits the opening of the valve had come loose. 1.15 Emergency Stop System Shortly after the generator stopped, the vessel began to make sternway even though the propeller pitch control was set to neutral (0). Attempts were then made to stop the main engine using the emergency stop push- button, but to no avail. This control system is electric/pneumatic. The electricity comes from emergency batteries (24 volts). The batteries were in good condition, but the electrical wire to the engine control, running overhead in the engine-room, was found to have been severely damaged by the fire. The system operated properly in tests conducted during the repairs and after the wire had been replaced. 1.16Propeller Shaft Clutch System The crew also attempted unsuccessfully to disengage the propeller shaft. This control system is also electric/pneumatic, but it operates on the 110-volt circuit. If the electrical power supply is cut off, the clutch remains in its original position. As attempts to disengage the propeller shaft were made after the power failure occurred, the system, needless to say, was inoperative.