Summary The Piper PA-28-161, registrationC-GBQY, serial number288216119, took off from Gasp, Quebec, at 1630 eastern standard time (EST) on a flight to Qubec, Quebec making a night flight in accordance with visual flight rules. At 1635 EST, the pilot notified the Qubec flight service station that he was 5nautical miles west of Gasp Airport and confirmed that he was going to the en route frequency. That was the last message received from the aircraft. The plane was reported missing after its flight plan expired. Almost 11 months later, on 08 December 2002, an airliner flying high over the area of L'Ascension-de-Patapdia, NewBrunswick, picked up a signal from an emergency locator transmitter (ELT). The search and rescue team dispatched to the site identified the missing aircraft. The two occupants were fatally injured; the aircraft was destroyed. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information According to the maintenance records, the aircraft was certified and maintained in accordance with existing regulations. It was equipped for instrument flight (IFR). Although the aircraft had dual controls, only the occupant in the left seat was acting as pilot-in-command while the occupant in the right seat was a passenger. Both occupants of the aircraft were taking lessons at Air Tuteurs lte, a flight training school certified by Transport Canada, to obtain their commercial pilot licences. Both held private pilot licences. They were also qualified for night flying. Their flight experience was similar: each had accumulated about 95hours, with 10hours of instrument experience with an instructor on board. Neither was qualified for IFR flight. They had obtained their night endorsements on 23November2001. The pilot and the passenger (for the return flight) had 12hours and 19.2hours of night flying, respectively. To meet the flight experience requirements for a commercial pilot licence, they had to complete a cross-country flight of 300nautical miles (nm) with two stops en route. The purpose of the exercise was to reach the destination by using topographical maps and by identifying landmarks on the ground. The pilots decided to do a round-trip flight together between Saint-Hubert and Gasp, Quebec. They intended to fly to Gasp on Saturday 19January2002 and return the next day. They had agreed that they would take turns as pilot, one piloting on the flight from Saint-Hubert and the other on the flight from Gasp. The day before departure, on the afternoon of 18January, the weather specialist at the Qubec flight service station (FSS) told the pilots that weather conditions would be good for the VFR flight planned the next day between Saint-Hubert and Gasp. He also warned them about a low coming in from the southern United States that could result in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) on the day after, 20January. On 19 January at 0739 eastern standard time (EST),1 the pilot for the Saint-Hubert to Gasp segment received an oral weather briefing from the Qubec FSS for the areas east and west of Montral. Poor conditions for visual flight were moving from west to east. VFR conditions were still forecast to Gasp for that day and IMC conditions for the return flight the following day. After the briefing, the pilot informed the FSS specialist that he would make the return trip on the same day. He then filed a VFR flight plan from Saint-Hubert to Gasp. After the pilots submitted the flight plan and relevant weather reports for the trip to Air Tuteurs lte, the school authorized the pilots to make the flight, instructing them to wait in Gasp if conditions became unsuitable for VFR flight. Before the flight, the pilots rented a Garmin295 portable global positioning system (GPS) from the school. The aircraft took off at noon, and after stopping at Qubec and Mont-Joli, Quebec landed in Gasp at 1727. The flight was without incident, and no malfunctions were reported by the pilots. They spent the night in Gasp. On 20 January at 1025, the pilot for the return flight contacted the Sept-les FSS for a weather briefing. The FSS specialist informed him that conditions were marginal and that VFR flight was not recommended. The pilot indicated that the sky was blue over Gasp, and filed a VFR flight plan to Saint-Hubert. The flight-planned altitude was 4500feet above sea level (asl). A stop was planned at Rivire-du-Loup, Quebec, then at Qubec, weather permitting. Thirty minutes later, the pilot obtained the usual pre-take-off information from the Qubec FSS. After being warned once again that weather conditions were poor west of Gasp, the pilot confirmed that he wanted to take off, stating that he intended to return to Gasp if there were any problems and planned to fly above the cloud layer if necessary. Before take off, the Qubec FSS specialist tried in vain to discourage the pilot from flying. The aircraft took off at 1110. Fourteen minutes later, the FSS relayed a message to the pilot from Air Tuteurs lte that he should not risk flying in the prevailing conditions and should head to VFR conditions. After stating that he was in VFR conditions, the pilot returned to Gasp where he landed at 1141. Back on the ground, the pilot called the Qubec FSS twice, once at 1150 and once at 1348, for the weather. In both weather briefings, the specialists advised against VFR flight because of a cloud ceiling of less than 1000feet and a visibility of statute mile in snow showers. Possible improvement was anticipated after 1800. The pilot then mentioned that he wanted to take off after sunset. Around 1500, in a personal telephone conversation, the pilot indicated that he would stay in Gasp because of the bad weather. At 1533, rather than calling the Qubec FSS again, the pilot preferred to get the weather from the Montral FSS. The forecast conditions were variable until 0100, changing to alternating VFR and marginal VFR and, at times, IFR conditions in snow showers. A slight improvement was expected early the next morning. Reduced visibility in snow showers and low ceilings were forecast for the late morning. Half an hour later, the pilot filed a VFR flight plan to Qubec with an altitude of 4500feetasl. At 1635, five minutes after taking off, the pilot reported that he was five nautical miles west of Gasp and confirmed that he was going to the en route frequency. That was the last message received from the aircraft. The plane was reported missing soon after its expected arrival time in Qubec expired. The search and rescue operations were difficult and unsuccessful. The aircraft's emergency locator transmitter (ELT) was not transmitting a signal, and the fact that the extensive search area was quite rugged, sparsely populated, and densely wooded further complicated the searchers' efforts. The search was called off 11days later because it was thought unlikely that the occupants had survived. On 12 February, 12days after the search effort ended, American authorities sent radar data to the Canadian Search and Rescue (SAR) service showing part of the flight path at 12-second intervals. Before that date, Canada's Air Force was unaware of the extent of trans-border radar coverage by the United States, so during the search effort the information provided to SAR was limited. Although another official search was not started, SAR carried out several unsuccessful aerial searches over the area of the last radar target. Close to 11months after the aircraft disappeared, its ELT started transmitting. The aircraft was found in a densely wooded area 1nm south of the planned route and 135nm from Gasp at an altitude of 1200feet asl. The plane had crashed into the western slope of the Patapedia River valley, which is very steep and rises to 1500feet asl. The aircraft's initial path through the trees was about 235Magnetic(M). The aircraft penetrated the trees at a left bank angle of about 20, a nose-down angle of 5, and an angle of descent of 20. The aircraft began to break apart upon initial impact with the trees. Because twilight ended at about 1632, the flight took place at night. This was the pilot's first night flight since he had obtained his endorsement. Given the pilot's qualifications and the flight-planned altitude, existing regulations require that in-flight visibility should have been at least 3miles, and the aircraft's distance from the clouds should have been at least 500feet measured vertically and at least 2000feet measured horizontally. Because the pilot did not have an IFR rating, nor a rating for flying over the cloud layer, the aircraft should have been flown under the clouds using visual landmarks on the ground. The aircraft followed a direct path between Gasp and Qubec, staying within about 100feet of an altitude of 5000feet, with a relatively steady ground speed of 95knots. At 1758, at 130nm from Gasp and 170nm from Qubec, the aircraft turned slightly south of its path. One minute later, the aircraft turned its heading even more to the south. It then banked right on a heading to return to the direct path to Qubec. At 1801, the aircraft initiated a banked left turn of about 20. During the turn, the aircraft's altitude went from 5000feet asl to 4600feet asl, and the ground speed increased from 93knots to 159knots in 30seconds. Ten seconds later, the GPS stopped recording the aircraft's track at an altitude of 4739feet and at a heading of 138M. At the same moment, the radar stopped receiving the transponder signals, and the aircraft's echo (secondary and primary) disappeared from the screen. The last recorded position was less than 200metres from the crash site (seeFigure1). Figure1. Radar and GPS data for the last four minutes of flight. An examination of the wreckage, systems, and all components recovered showed no deficiencies that could have hindered control of the aircraft, nor were there any failures or malfunctions before impact. The anemometer needle slap mark on the gauge face indicates that the aircraft struck the ground at 150knots, a speed that was in the caution range (126knots to 160knots). There was no in-flight or post-impact fire. The components of the aircraft's electrical system and the aircraft instruments that were in good enough condition to be examined were analysed. The bulbs from three of the annunciator lights (vacuum system, alternator, and engine oil pressure) were also analysed. The lights illuminate to signal an abnormality or when pressed for a functional check (an electrical wire connecting the bulb to the relevant system is grounded). Although the annunciator lights for the vacuum system and engine oil pressure were on before impact, the investigation determined that the associated systems were functioning normally. The indicator lights probably lit up at the start of the series of impacts during deformation of the fuselage. An analysis of the seat belts showed that the pilot's lap belt was fastened, but his shoulder belt was not. The front passenger's lap belt tore and broke the floor structure on the left and right sides where it was anchored. The belt buckle was found unfastened, and no functional damage or abnormality was detected. The shoulder harness was found unfastened from the seat belt. It could not be determined whether the passenger's seat belt had been fastened. The ELT (Narco Avionics, model ELT10, serial number32772) was found on its mounting plate attached to the tail structure. The switch was in the ARM position so that it could activate automatically in case of a crash. The antenna cable was torn from its housing. A raised part of the housing near the switch and the reset button were broken. The impact forces were sufficiently strong to activate the ELT; however during the aircraft's break-up, the ELT housing was damaged. Debris likely struck the reset button, interrupting transmission of the emergency signal just as the ELT activated. Because the ELT was exposed to the weather, the switch corroded and closed the circuit, causing a distress signal to be transmitted 11months after the accident. According to a study done by researchers at the University of Illinois, pilots with no IFR training can expect to live about 178seconds, or 2seconds short of 3minutes, after losing visual contact with the ground in bad weather.