Summary On 24 July 1996 the rail ferry GEORGES ALEXANDRE LEBEL, laden with 2 505 metric tonnes of miscellaneous cargo out of Baie-Comeau, Quebec, was heading to the Port of Matane, Quebec. In the course of approach manoeuvres in restricted visibility in the approaches to the Port of Matane the GEORGES ALEXANDRE LEBEL struck the head of the west pier. Once inside the harbour, the vessel docked without incident. The propeller shaft, propeller, rudder stock and rudder on the starboard side were bent. The occurrence did not result in any injuries or pollution. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel On 24 July 1996, at about 2010[1], the GEORGES ALEXANDRE LEBEL departed Baie-Comeau laden with 22 railcars. The cars were stowed on the main deck, which is covered against bad weather. The vessel crossed the buoy at the mouth of the Manicouagan River at 16 knots and then steered 135G[2]. At about 2145, in fog, the vessel lost visual contact with the ferry CAMILLE MARCOUX, also making for Matane. The wind was blowing out of the east-south-east at about 20 knots with seas of 1.5 metres (m). At about 2155, when the vessel was about four nautical miles (M) from port, the chief mate went down onto the forecastle with the boatswain and two seamen to prepare for docking. The master went up to the bridge and took the conduct of the vessel. The master followed the vessel's progress on the ARPA (automatic radar plotting aid) radar on the starboard side set to the 6 M range in stabilized relative mode. A seaman helmsman was steering using the helm control. The vessel was slightly south-west of the planned trajectory, and the master gave the order to steer 130G. In the approaches to the harbour, the second officer went out onto the starboard wing to keep a lookout. At about 2223, when the vessel was 1.5 M from the harbour entrance, the speed was reduced to approximately 7 knots. At 7.5 cables from the entrance, the course was altered to 150G, and, at 5 cables, the master again reduced the vessel's speed to about 2.5 knots and ordered the helmsman to steer 190G. At 3 cables, the green light of the pier was observed slightly to port of the vessel's centre line. The searchlight on the wheelhouse was turned on. The master noticed that the helmsman was steering 193G and asked him to increase the rudder angle to keep the vessel on a course of 190G. At one cable from the entrance, the chief mate observed the red light of the west pier and informed the master of the nearness of the pier head. The master ordered the helm hard-a-port, but the helmsman did not hear the order, and the master had to repeat it to him. The master ensured that the order was carried out by watching the steering indicator; the vessel then altered course to port. The master then ordered the helm midships, but the helmsman was not familiar with this wheel order, and the master had to put the helm midships himself. The chief mate and the second officer informed the master of the nearness of the head of the west pier. Both main engines were stopped, and, at about 2230, the starboard quarter of the GEORGES ALEXANDRE LEBEL struck the west pier. At about 2300 the vessel docked without incident at its berth. To minimize the frequency and cost of maintenance, Canadian Coast Guard Aids to Navigation Services uses solar power to operate the red light on the west pier. In good visibility (10 M), the nominal range of the lights is respectively 6.1 M (red light on the west pier) and 10.2 M (green light on the east pier). Although the difference in range between these two lights is large in good visibility, in fog (visibility 0.5 M), the effective range of the lights is only 0.93 M (red light) and 1.22 M (green light). The current practice on board the GEORGES ALEXANDRE LEBEL during docking and sailing operations was to assign the second officer to the helm and have the seaman helmsman join the boatswain party down on the forecastle. On this occasion, however, to maintain an effective lookout in restricted visibility and assist the master, a permanent seaman helmsman was ordered to remain at the helm. In this occurrence, the second officer and the seaman helmsman were both replacements. However, the master ordered the seaman helmsman to remain at the helm because he knew the vessel better than the second officer. Although he had been a crew member on board for some years, the seaman helmsman chosen to perform the docking manoeuvres had never steered the vessel during docking, and his vessel steering experience was limited to a few practice sessions during sea crossings. The second officer holds a Master Mariner's certificate and had in the past replaced the chief mate for about ten days. The company did not have any written instructions concerning crew members' assignments and roles during docking and sailing operations. On 31 August 1996, at the request of the Public Works and Government Services Canada Engineering Division, an underwater inspection was performed on the head of the west pier. Tetrapods were found scattered about the sea floor at the entrance to the harbour. It was determined that the tetrapod that jutted highest above the sea floor was submerged approximately 5.7 m under the chart datum. At the time of the occurrence there was a tide of approximately 3.3 m above the chart datum. Further, there were tetrapods missing on the east side of the head, but there is no indication that the rail ferry's striking the west pier head was the cause of this. However, scoring was noted on the side and the turn of the bilge, forward of the counter, at 2 m and 4 m, respectively, under the waterline on the starboard side. Action Taken Following this occurrence, the company issued new departure and arrival procedures taking into account the experience of manoeuvring personnel.