The steady rate of climb after autopilot engagement indicates that the crew had inadvertently selected VS mode instead of IAS mode. This selection error was not detected, in part because there was no requirement in the SOPs for the crew to announce and confirm the IAS mode selection on the AFCS. The indicated airspeed then fluctuated near the value the crew intended, perhaps bolstering the crew's belief that the aircraft was operating in the intended IAS mode, and leading them to become complacent about monitoring the airspeed. Also contributing to the monitoring error was the co-pilot's preoccupation with paperwork during the climb. Because the crew had inadvertently selected an inappropriate AFCS mode and did not detect this error or adequately monitor the airspeed, the airspeed eventually decreased during the climb to the point of stall. The stall occurred at about 14000feet. The aircraft was in cloud, the temperature was below freezing, and the pneumatic de-icing boots were not activated. Therefore, ice accumulation on critical flight surfaces was possible. The stall occurred at an airspeed higher than expected for a clean wing with very little pre-stall warning from the stick shaker. It is likely that ice had accumulated on the aircraft's critical surfaces before the stall. In large transport category aircraft, it would be unsafe to purposely enter a fully developed stall. Therefore, current regulations only require that flight crews receive limited training in stall recognition and recovery, with recovery being initiated at the first indication of a stall. Such training does not allow pilots to become familiar with symptoms of a fully developed stall or allow for practise in recovering from a full aerodynamic stall. In this instance, because of ice contamination, the stall happened at a higher-than-usual airspeed, and the symptoms of the stall were not those that the pilot had been trained to expect. As a result, the captain did not recognize that the aircraft had stalled and, instead, interpreted the unusual movement of the aircraft as being due to turbulence. He therefore continued to try to lift the nose of the aircraft, deepening the stall and lengthening the period of time that the aircraft was out of his control. This led to excessive altitude loss before the aircraft was recovered.Analysis The steady rate of climb after autopilot engagement indicates that the crew had inadvertently selected VS mode instead of IAS mode. This selection error was not detected, in part because there was no requirement in the SOPs for the crew to announce and confirm the IAS mode selection on the AFCS. The indicated airspeed then fluctuated near the value the crew intended, perhaps bolstering the crew's belief that the aircraft was operating in the intended IAS mode, and leading them to become complacent about monitoring the airspeed. Also contributing to the monitoring error was the co-pilot's preoccupation with paperwork during the climb. Because the crew had inadvertently selected an inappropriate AFCS mode and did not detect this error or adequately monitor the airspeed, the airspeed eventually decreased during the climb to the point of stall. The stall occurred at about 14000feet. The aircraft was in cloud, the temperature was below freezing, and the pneumatic de-icing boots were not activated. Therefore, ice accumulation on critical flight surfaces was possible. The stall occurred at an airspeed higher than expected for a clean wing with very little pre-stall warning from the stick shaker. It is likely that ice had accumulated on the aircraft's critical surfaces before the stall. In large transport category aircraft, it would be unsafe to purposely enter a fully developed stall. Therefore, current regulations only require that flight crews receive limited training in stall recognition and recovery, with recovery being initiated at the first indication of a stall. Such training does not allow pilots to become familiar with symptoms of a fully developed stall or allow for practise in recovering from a full aerodynamic stall. In this instance, because of ice contamination, the stall happened at a higher-than-usual airspeed, and the symptoms of the stall were not those that the pilot had been trained to expect. As a result, the captain did not recognize that the aircraft had stalled and, instead, interpreted the unusual movement of the aircraft as being due to turbulence. He therefore continued to try to lift the nose of the aircraft, deepening the stall and lengthening the period of time that the aircraft was out of his control. This led to excessive altitude loss before the aircraft was recovered. During the climb, the captain inadvertently selected vertical speed (VS)mode on the automatic flight control system (AFCS) instead of the intended IAS mode, and neither flight crew detected the selection error. The operator's standard operating procedures (SOPs) did not have a prescribed method for ensuring the correct selection of AFCS climb modes. The flight crew did not activate the pneumatic de-ice equipment while climbing in icing conditions. The flight crew did not detect the decreased airspeed until the aircraft was near the stall. The aircraft stalled at a higher-than-normal airspeed, with little advance warning, most likely due to accumulated ice on critical surfaces. The captain, believing that they had encountered severe turbulence, did not recognize that the aircraft had stalled, and did not apply the standard stall recovery technique.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors During the climb, the captain inadvertently selected vertical speed (VS)mode on the automatic flight control system (AFCS) instead of the intended IAS mode, and neither flight crew detected the selection error. The operator's standard operating procedures (SOPs) did not have a prescribed method for ensuring the correct selection of AFCS climb modes. The flight crew did not activate the pneumatic de-ice equipment while climbing in icing conditions. The flight crew did not detect the decreased airspeed until the aircraft was near the stall. The aircraft stalled at a higher-than-normal airspeed, with little advance warning, most likely due to accumulated ice on critical surfaces. The captain, believing that they had encountered severe turbulence, did not recognize that the aircraft had stalled, and did not apply the standard stall recovery technique. Typically, flight crews receive only limited training in stall recognition and recovery, where recovery is initiated at the first indication of a stall. Such training does not allow pilots to become familiar with natural stall symptoms, such as buffet, or allow for practise in recovering from a full aerodynamic stall. A significant proportion of Dash 8 pilots may hold outdated beliefs on the use of pneumatic de-icing equipment.Findings as to Risk Typically, flight crews receive only limited training in stall recognition and recovery, where recovery is initiated at the first indication of a stall. Such training does not allow pilots to become familiar with natural stall symptoms, such as buffet, or allow for practise in recovering from a full aerodynamic stall. A significant proportion of Dash 8 pilots may hold outdated beliefs on the use of pneumatic de-icing equipment. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) issued Safety Advisory A050019-1 on 22July2005 on the subject of inadvertent selection of inappropriate automatic flight control system (AFCS) modes of operation. The letter suggested that Transport Canada (TC)ensure that operators have incorporated measures into their procedures to ensure the correct selection and monitoring of AFCS climb modes. On 04October2005, TCresponded, advising that a copy of the advisory had been passed on to all TC regions, and that the Department would take the necessary action, as required. Since the occurrence, the operator has revised its standard operating procedures (SOPs) to contain a challenge and response action whenever AFCS modes are engaged in the climb. The TSB issued Safety Advisory A50018-1 on 22July2005 on the subject of timely selection of pneumatic de-icing equipment. The advisory suggested that TC consider additional action to ensure that pilots are conforming to published de-icing procedures and to dispel old beliefs about the proper use of pneumatic de-icing equipment. On 04October2005, TCresponded, advising of additional efforts to move this information into the published guidance material in the near future. As well, TC is drafting an article for publication in an upcoming issue of the Aviation Safety Letter. This article will inform pilots of the need to conform to published de-icing procedures and attempt to dispel old beliefs about the use of pneumatic de-icing equipment. Since the occurrence, the operator has directed its trainers to re-emphasize procedures for activation of pneumatic boots as described in its SOPs and the aircraft flight manual. To reduce the likelihood of monitoring errors, the operator has directed all crews to not conduct paperwork during critical phases of flight. These duties are to be performed during level flight only while en route. As a result of recent stall and upset occurrences in turbojet aeroplanes, TC has reinforced the need for appropriate training for the prevention of an aeroplane stall and for stall recovery. TCreleased Commercial and Business Aviation Advisory Circular (CBAAC) No.0247 entitled "Training and Checking Practices for Stall Recovery" on 24August2005.5Safety Action Taken The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) issued Safety Advisory A050019-1 on 22July2005 on the subject of inadvertent selection of inappropriate automatic flight control system (AFCS) modes of operation. The letter suggested that Transport Canada (TC)ensure that operators have incorporated measures into their procedures to ensure the correct selection and monitoring of AFCS climb modes. On 04October2005, TCresponded, advising that a copy of the advisory had been passed on to all TC regions, and that the Department would take the necessary action, as required. Since the occurrence, the operator has revised its standard operating procedures (SOPs) to contain a challenge and response action whenever AFCS modes are engaged in the climb. The TSB issued Safety Advisory A50018-1 on 22July2005 on the subject of timely selection of pneumatic de-icing equipment. The advisory suggested that TC consider additional action to ensure that pilots are conforming to published de-icing procedures and to dispel old beliefs about the proper use of pneumatic de-icing equipment. On 04October2005, TCresponded, advising of additional efforts to move this information into the published guidance material in the near future. As well, TC is drafting an article for publication in an upcoming issue of the Aviation Safety Letter. This article will inform pilots of the need to conform to published de-icing procedures and attempt to dispel old beliefs about the use of pneumatic de-icing equipment. Since the occurrence, the operator has directed its trainers to re-emphasize procedures for activation of pneumatic boots as described in its SOPs and the aircraft flight manual. To reduce the likelihood of monitoring errors, the operator has directed all crews to not conduct paperwork during critical phases of flight. These duties are to be performed during level flight only while en route. As a result of recent stall and upset occurrences in turbojet aeroplanes, TC has reinforced the need for appropriate training for the prevention of an aeroplane stall and for stall recovery. TCreleased Commercial and Business Aviation Advisory Circular (CBAAC) No.0247 entitled "Training and Checking Practices for Stall Recovery" on 24August2005.5