Although the operator maintained that he had not lost situational awareness, it appeared to other observers that he was unsure of the route through Kenneth Passage to Mackenzie Sound. Given the terrain, the radar return would appear to be good and the information derived from the radar reliable. The slow speed of the tug and the use of the spotlight to pick out the shore would, however, appear to confirm that the operator was unsure of the tow's position in the area. By the time the tug ran aground on the rocks, it was heading on a reciprocal course to its intended track. While the ebb tide was not strong , it was setting through Kenneth Passage in a westerly direction and the tow was heading into the tide. Because of this, the ebb should not have adversely affected the manoeuverability of the tow. Once the tug had commenced its turn to starboard to reportedly keep the barge clear of the shore, the manoeuverability of the tow may have been diminished by the effect of the tide. The more course was altered to starboard, the greater this effect would have become. The operator's confidence in the functioning of the towline quick release mechanism allowed him to control the momentum of the barge. Had the operator not successfully used his abort system, the barge could have quickly capsized the tug. Alternatively, if the tow wire had been suddenly let go, serious damage to the barge could have been caused by its momentum when it ran aground. Considering that the barge carried large quantities of inflammable liquids, the consequences of its uncontrolled grounding at speed could have been disastrous to the persons on board both the barge and the tug. In the past many fatalities have been caused when tugs became girded because they were not equipped with a quick release mechanism for the tow wire, or if equipped it was not used. This occurrence demonstrates that the judicious use of an abort system can avoid or lessen the consequences of girding. Although the tug operator and deckhand were uncertificated, the operator's towing experience succeeded in avoiding serious damage to the barge. If this experience had been supplemented by marine training in emergency situations it could have resulted in a resolution of the difficulties encountered without the tug having to be sacrificed. Both the tug and barge were equipped with anchors which could have been used to give the operator time to assess the situation. Radar/Navigational training would have helped the operator to be more aware of his surroundings as darkness set in. Under the Life Saving Equipment Regulations, in Canadian waters, when non propelled vessels over 15 gross tonnes which carry a crew but not passengers, are towed or pushed, they are considered Class Eleven vessels and must be so equipped. However, because these barges are usually stationary, they are not normally inspected. While presently there is no documented information to show that the practice of not requesting TCMS inspection for a voyage with crew aboard is common in the barge industry on the west coast, this aspect of the TRAILER PRINCESS occurrence would appear not to be an isolated incident. Although the total number of these barges is unknown, many are in use for different purposes; including fish farming, logging operations, recreational fishing or floating homes.Analysis Although the operator maintained that he had not lost situational awareness, it appeared to other observers that he was unsure of the route through Kenneth Passage to Mackenzie Sound. Given the terrain, the radar return would appear to be good and the information derived from the radar reliable. The slow speed of the tug and the use of the spotlight to pick out the shore would, however, appear to confirm that the operator was unsure of the tow's position in the area. By the time the tug ran aground on the rocks, it was heading on a reciprocal course to its intended track. While the ebb tide was not strong , it was setting through Kenneth Passage in a westerly direction and the tow was heading into the tide. Because of this, the ebb should not have adversely affected the manoeuverability of the tow. Once the tug had commenced its turn to starboard to reportedly keep the barge clear of the shore, the manoeuverability of the tow may have been diminished by the effect of the tide. The more course was altered to starboard, the greater this effect would have become. The operator's confidence in the functioning of the towline quick release mechanism allowed him to control the momentum of the barge. Had the operator not successfully used his abort system, the barge could have quickly capsized the tug. Alternatively, if the tow wire had been suddenly let go, serious damage to the barge could have been caused by its momentum when it ran aground. Considering that the barge carried large quantities of inflammable liquids, the consequences of its uncontrolled grounding at speed could have been disastrous to the persons on board both the barge and the tug. In the past many fatalities have been caused when tugs became girded because they were not equipped with a quick release mechanism for the tow wire, or if equipped it was not used. This occurrence demonstrates that the judicious use of an abort system can avoid or lessen the consequences of girding. Although the tug operator and deckhand were uncertificated, the operator's towing experience succeeded in avoiding serious damage to the barge. If this experience had been supplemented by marine training in emergency situations it could have resulted in a resolution of the difficulties encountered without the tug having to be sacrificed. Both the tug and barge were equipped with anchors which could have been used to give the operator time to assess the situation. Radar/Navigational training would have helped the operator to be more aware of his surroundings as darkness set in. Under the Life Saving Equipment Regulations, in Canadian waters, when non propelled vessels over 15 gross tonnes which carry a crew but not passengers, are towed or pushed, they are considered Class Eleven vessels and must be so equipped. However, because these barges are usually stationary, they are not normally inspected. While presently there is no documented information to show that the practice of not requesting TCMS inspection for a voyage with crew aboard is common in the barge industry on the west coast, this aspect of the TRAILER PRINCESS occurrence would appear not to be an isolated incident. Although the total number of these barges is unknown, many are in use for different purposes; including fish farming, logging operations, recreational fishing or floating homes. The tug GULFCOASTER was required to have a certificated master but did not have one. When moving location, the barge was required to be inspected under the Canada Shipping Act but it was not so inspected. The owners did not request Transport Canada Marine Safety to inspect the barge for the voyage. The tug was towing the helicopter logging barge to its new location with at least twelve people on board. The tug's operator probably became disoriented while endeavouring to control the barge through a narrow winding channel in darkness. The tug ran aground in darkness in a non-navigable narrow winding channel which did not lead to its destination. After the tug ran aground, the tug master effectively used the abort procedure to save damage to the barge. The tug master and deckhand safely abandoned the tug and boarded the barge. The tug master and deckhand safely abandoned the tug and boarded the barge.Findings The tug GULFCOASTER was required to have a certificated master but did not have one. When moving location, the barge was required to be inspected under the Canada Shipping Act but it was not so inspected. The owners did not request Transport Canada Marine Safety to inspect the barge for the voyage. The tug was towing the helicopter logging barge to its new location with at least twelve people on board. The tug's operator probably became disoriented while endeavouring to control the barge through a narrow winding channel in darkness. The tug ran aground in darkness in a non-navigable narrow winding channel which did not lead to its destination. After the tug ran aground, the tug master effectively used the abort procedure to save damage to the barge. The tug master and deckhand safely abandoned the tug and boarded the barge. The tug master and deckhand safely abandoned the tug and boarded the barge. The GULFCOASTER towing the TRAILERPRINCESS ran aground when the tug operator probably became disoriented while endeavouring to control the barge through a narrow winding channel in darkness. The lack of certification of the tug's crew and lack of radar/navigational knowledge contributed to the occurrence. Transport Canada Marine Safety has charged the owners of the barge under Section 126 of the Criminal Code for wilful non-compliance with section 109 of the Canada Shipping Act.Causes and Contributing Factors The GULFCOASTER towing the TRAILERPRINCESS ran aground when the tug operator probably became disoriented while endeavouring to control the barge through a narrow winding channel in darkness. The lack of certification of the tug's crew and lack of radar/navigational knowledge contributed to the occurrence. Transport Canada Marine Safety has charged the owners of the barge under Section 126 of the Criminal Code for wilful non-compliance with section 109 of the Canada Shipping Act.