The removal of semi-permanent ballast when the extension at the transom was incorporated into the hull would have had the effect of raising the vessel's centre of gravity. This would have been offset to some extent when the vessel was in the light operating departure condition by the fuel which would normally be carried at such times in all the tanks. However, on this occasion, the vessel was low on fuel. Other factors contributed to raising the vessel's centre of gravity, and thus reducing her initial transverse stability, at the time of the capsize. The roll-reduction gear, which would normally be deployed when the vessel was operating, remained in the stowed, upright position. Also the timber for the pen boards which the vessel required when fishing herring or capelin had been removed from the fish hold and was stowed on deck. The MISSCATHARBOUR was carrying about 180 L of hydraulic oil and about 180 L of water in tanks on top of the wheelhouse. While there was nothing unique to this passage with respect to the contents or distribution in the tanks, they represent weights carried high in the vessel and on the occasion of the capsize compensating weights lower in the hull had been removed. Reportedly, the capsize took place rapidly. As the vessel heeled under the influence of the centrifugal forces generated when the helm was hard over and as the deck became immersed, the open lazarette cover and the unsecured fish hold hatch would permit unrestricted down-flooding which would have accelerated and caused a loss of transverse stability and caused the vessel to capsize. That the capsize occurred immediately after the automatic steering device was engaged and the helm went hard to port would suggest that the vessel had marginal initial stability and would likely have capsized if the helm had been put hard over when being steered manually. In June 1992, following the collision between the FV CONNIE SISTERS and the FV RYAN ATLANTIC, (Report No. M92M4031) the Board identified safety deficiencies regarding training and certification requirements. At present there is no regulatory requirement in Canada that personnel operating small fishing vessels of less than 85GRT demonstrate competency in navigation, seamanship, vessel stability and survival skills for certification purposes. This category of vessel constitutes over 90 per cent of the fishing fleet registered in Canada. Although experienced in the harvesting of fish, many fishers have not received formal training in navigation, radar skills, rules and regulations for collision avoidance, etc., for the most part they acquire these skills through on-the-job experience. In 1994 (Recommendation M94-10) the Board recommended that: The Department of Transport ensure that any person required to have the conduct of a commercial fishing vessel possesses the basic skills for safe navigation. It is understood that as of July 1999, Transport Canada plans to require certification for personnel operating fishing vessels of 60 gross tons and over, and, eventually to extend this requirement to even smaller fishing vessels. In the interim, however, TC will not require that a significant number of fishers on smaller vessels such as the MISSCATHARBOUR demonstrate basic navigational skills and knowledge.Analysis The removal of semi-permanent ballast when the extension at the transom was incorporated into the hull would have had the effect of raising the vessel's centre of gravity. This would have been offset to some extent when the vessel was in the light operating departure condition by the fuel which would normally be carried at such times in all the tanks. However, on this occasion, the vessel was low on fuel. Other factors contributed to raising the vessel's centre of gravity, and thus reducing her initial transverse stability, at the time of the capsize. The roll-reduction gear, which would normally be deployed when the vessel was operating, remained in the stowed, upright position. Also the timber for the pen boards which the vessel required when fishing herring or capelin had been removed from the fish hold and was stowed on deck. The MISSCATHARBOUR was carrying about 180 L of hydraulic oil and about 180 L of water in tanks on top of the wheelhouse. While there was nothing unique to this passage with respect to the contents or distribution in the tanks, they represent weights carried high in the vessel and on the occasion of the capsize compensating weights lower in the hull had been removed. Reportedly, the capsize took place rapidly. As the vessel heeled under the influence of the centrifugal forces generated when the helm was hard over and as the deck became immersed, the open lazarette cover and the unsecured fish hold hatch would permit unrestricted down-flooding which would have accelerated and caused a loss of transverse stability and caused the vessel to capsize. That the capsize occurred immediately after the automatic steering device was engaged and the helm went hard to port would suggest that the vessel had marginal initial stability and would likely have capsized if the helm had been put hard over when being steered manually. In June 1992, following the collision between the FV CONNIE SISTERS and the FV RYAN ATLANTIC, (Report No. M92M4031) the Board identified safety deficiencies regarding training and certification requirements. At present there is no regulatory requirement in Canada that personnel operating small fishing vessels of less than 85GRT demonstrate competency in navigation, seamanship, vessel stability and survival skills for certification purposes. This category of vessel constitutes over 90 per cent of the fishing fleet registered in Canada. Although experienced in the harvesting of fish, many fishers have not received formal training in navigation, radar skills, rules and regulations for collision avoidance, etc., for the most part they acquire these skills through on-the-job experience. In 1994 (Recommendation M94-10) the Board recommended that: The Department of Transport ensure that any person required to have the conduct of a commercial fishing vessel possesses the basic skills for safe navigation. It is understood that as of July 1999, Transport Canada plans to require certification for personnel operating fishing vessels of 60 gross tons and over, and, eventually to extend this requirement to even smaller fishing vessels. In the interim, however, TC will not require that a significant number of fishers on smaller vessels such as the MISSCATHARBOUR demonstrate basic navigational skills and knowledge. Low fuel, roll-reduction gear stowed in the vertical position, pen boards on deck and removal of ballast contributed to the raising of the vessel's centre of gravity. The vessel's marginal initial transverse stability could not withstand the heeling effect of the centrifugal forces created by the application of full rudder. Open and unsecured hatches to below-deck compartments permitted downflooding. Life-jackets were not being worn though those on board included non-swimmers and children. Despite modifications to the EPIRB carriage requirements in 1996, vessels of the size and type as the MISSCATHARBOUR are still not required to carry an EPIRB. For small fishing vessels of less than 85GRT, The Department of Transport has no regulatory requirement that personnel operating these vessels demonstrate competency in navigation, seamanship, vessel stability and survival skills etc. Smaller fishing vessels, such as the MISSCATHARBOUR, constitute over 90 per cent of the registered Canadian fishing fleet. Smaller fishing vessels, such as the MISSCATHARBOUR, constitute over 90 per cent of the registered Canadian fishing fleet.Findings Low fuel, roll-reduction gear stowed in the vertical position, pen boards on deck and removal of ballast contributed to the raising of the vessel's centre of gravity. The vessel's marginal initial transverse stability could not withstand the heeling effect of the centrifugal forces created by the application of full rudder. Open and unsecured hatches to below-deck compartments permitted downflooding. Life-jackets were not being worn though those on board included non-swimmers and children. Despite modifications to the EPIRB carriage requirements in 1996, vessels of the size and type as the MISSCATHARBOUR are still not required to carry an EPIRB. For small fishing vessels of less than 85GRT, The Department of Transport has no regulatory requirement that personnel operating these vessels demonstrate competency in navigation, seamanship, vessel stability and survival skills etc. Smaller fishing vessels, such as the MISSCATHARBOUR, constitute over 90 per cent of the registered Canadian fishing fleet. Smaller fishing vessels, such as the MISSCATHARBOUR, constitute over 90 per cent of the registered Canadian fishing fleet. The distribution of weights on the MISSCATHARBOUR at the time of the occurrence had the effect of raising the centre of gravity of the vessel to the extent that the upsetting forces created when the helm was hard over, overcame her initial transverse stability, consequently the vessel heeled very quickly, to the extent, that she down-flooded and capsized.Causes and Contributing Factors The distribution of weights on the MISSCATHARBOUR at the time of the occurrence had the effect of raising the centre of gravity of the vessel to the extent that the upsetting forces created when the helm was hard over, overcame her initial transverse stability, consequently the vessel heeled very quickly, to the extent, that she down-flooded and capsized.