Summary While the NANCYPAULA was en route to Gooseberry Cove to land her catch of approximately 11 tonnes of capelin, she was swamped by two heavy seas. The fishing vessel lost all reserve buoyancy and sank so quickly that the crew had no time to don life jackets or call for assistance before abandoning the vessel. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel The NANCYPAULA was a vessel of Cape Island design with a beam of approximately 4 m amidships. The afterdeck, some 7.6 m in length, was surrounded by an 83 cm-high bulwark fitted with freeing ports. She had a valid Safety Inspection Certificate (SIC 29), with an expiry date of 09 April 1999. The vessel departed Catalina on 01 July 1996 at 0500[1], which coincided with the start of the local permissible time for capelin fishing. In preparation for carrying capelin, pen boards extending from the bottom of the fish hold to within approximately 0.3 m of the deckhead had been fitted to divide the area of the fish hold into nine non-watertight pens, each measuring approximately 1.3 m x 1.3 m. The fuel tanks had been topped up at Catalina and contained approximately 1,325 litres of marine diesel. Approximately 11,340 kg of capelin were caught in an area off Deer Harbour and evenly distributed in the fish hold. The hatch to the fish hold was covered, but was neither weathertight nor secured. When full, the fish hold could accommodate approximately 19,050 kg of capelin. The NANCYPAULA was on a south-westerly course, pitching slightly as she headed into the seas, bound for Gooseberry Cove, where the catch was to be landed. The weather was fine with a south-westerly wind of 25 to 30 knots and seas of approximately two metres. Suddenly, at about 1600, when the NANCYPAULA was abeam of Notion Island Lighthouse and approximately 900 m off, two heavy confused seas on the port beam were encountered in quick succession. Water shipped from these seas filled the afterdeck and caused the vessel to trim by the stern and list heavily to port. The vessel then downloaded through unsecured openings to the fish hold and to other under-deck compartments, and sank. The owner/operator had no time to use the very high frequency (VHF) radiotelephone to request assistance as he and the others on board were up to their thighs in water when they abandoned the vessel in favour of the work boat. The work boat was being towed astern from the starboard quarter. The crew of the NANCYPAULA was picked up from the work boat by another fishing vessel. Once in the work boat, the owner/operator had headed in the direction of another fishing vessel rather than toward the nearby land, which, in that area of Trinity Bay, is sparsely populated. At the time of the sinking, there was a crew of five on board the NANCYPAULA as well as the owner/operator's son who was not taking part in the fishing venture. There was a sufficient number of life jackets for all on board although, in this instance, none was used in the hasty abandonment. The vessel sank in approximately 172 m of water and there was no visible sign of pollution. Prior to the sinking of the NANCYPAULA, investigations into the sinking of the MISS STEPHANIE II (TSB Report No. M94C0016) and of the MARWOOD (TSB Report No. M94W0065) had identified the non-watertightness of fish hold covers as a causal factor in both occurrences. Marine Safety Advisories Nos. 05-94 and 05-96, concerning the need to re-assess the requirements for fish hold hatch covers to ensure the seaworthiness of fishing vessels, were forwarded to the Canadian Coast Guard and to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The potential dangers associated with non-watertight hatches have again been highlighted by the sinking of the NANCYPAULA. Capelin Fishery The dangers of carrying capelin are widely recognized. It is a very slippery fish, and unless stowed in pens, can cause a free surface effect similar to that of water. As a small fishing vessel of greater than 15 gross tons engaged in capelin fishing, the NANCYPAULA was required to submit trim and stability calculations to the Canadian Coast Guard for approval, but this had not been done.