Summary In the early morning hours of 24 July 2004, the loaded container vessel Horizon was downbound from Montral, Quebec, in clear weather and under the conduct of a pilot. While off Saint-Anne-de-Sorel, Quebec, the vessel overshot alter course position and grounded along its entire length. Initial attempts to pull the Horizon free were unsuccessful, and a lightering plan was adopted. Eleven days later, after having off-loaded 109containers, the vessel was re-floated and sailed to the port of Sorel. No pollution was observed, and damage to the vessel was minor. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Description of Vessel History of the Voyage In clear weather and with good visibility, the Horizon departed the port of Montral, Quebec, at 00204 on 24July2004. The trip downriver to Sorel was without incident. The three-person bridge team consisted of the officer of the watch (OOW), a helmsman, and a river pilot. The master was also on the bridge but was attending to duties other than navigation. The pilot was seated on the port side of the wheelhouse, the helmsman was standing at the helm station, and the OOW was standing near the engine telegraph to starboard of the helmsman. Passing Sorel, the vessel was settled on the le du Moine leading lights, 082.5True (T). These were observed forward of the bow, with the helmsman steering 084Gyro(G) as per the pilot's advice. The Gyro error was reported to be 1.5high, and the river current was setting about 090T at two knots. With the engine full ahead and the river current nearly astern, the speed over the ground was between 15and15.5knots.5 Figure1. Area in the vicinity of alter-course (A/C) position Soon after the vessel passed buoy S-139 on the starboard side, the helmsman noticed a tendency for the vessel to swing to port. He applied 5and then 10degrees of starboard helm to maintain the ordered course, but the vessel continued the trend to port. The helmsman read aloud the descending ship's heading, zero, eight, three - zero, eight, two - zero, eight, one. At this point, the pilot stood up and ordered hard-a-port. The helm was applied accordingly, and the vessel began to swing in that direction. As the vessel turned to port, it also slowed down and made contact with the muddy channel bottom. At 0317, the vessel grounded on the 056G heading, in position 4603'57N latitude, 07302'13W longitude, approximately one cable to the southeast of the channel limit (see Figure1). The Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) centre at Montral was contacted and made aware of the situation. Damage to the vessel was minor. Salvage The master communicated with the vessel's owners in Greece. The emergency response team (ERT) comprising company experts in Greece was promptly mobilized and arrived on site on 26July2004. Although the depth of water on the port side was greater than on the starboard side, soundings around the vessel indicated that it had lost approximately 1.4m of buoyancy; that is, the draught cut was 7.20m forward, 7.55m amidships, and 8.03m aft. Given the vessel's tonnes per centimetre (TPC) immersion of41, this lost buoyancy works out to approximately 5740tonnes in salt water, or 5589tonnes in fresh water. It was decided to remove 2500tonnes of ballast water from double bottom tanks Nos.3 and4, and to fill the deep tank forward with 320tonnes of ballast. The net loss of buoyancy was now reduced to about 3409tonnes (that is, 5589-2500+320=3409). Both the master and the company's ERT nonetheless expected that the nature of the channel bottom would permit the vessel to be refloated, and two tugs were ordered.6 At 1200 on 24 July 2004, the deballast operation was completed and two tugs, OceanGolf and Duga, were on scene to begin refloating attempts. Efforts proved unsuccessful and another tug, the OceanJupiter, was called. After two more hours without success, a fourth tug, the OceanIntrepid, was summoned, arriving on scene near midnight, but the Horizon still remained immobile. By 26 July 2004, plans to lighter the Horizon were now being considered. On July30, Ocean Group was awarded the salvage contract. The salvor in turn contracted a barge and a self-propelled floating crane in order to discharge 112containers weighing approximately 2400tonnes. Lightering commenced on 01 August 2004, and by August3, some 71containers had been discharged, for a total mass of approximately 1320tonnes. As abundant rainfall on July28, 30,and 31had returned the river level to essentially the same height as on the morning of the grounding, it was decided to refloat the vessel using five tugs. This attempt, too, was unsuccessful, and on August4, another 38containers were discharged, bringing the total to 109removed containers, for a combined weight of 2240tonnes. At 1650, now with the additional help of a sixth tug, the Horizon began moving. By 1700, it was afloat in the channel, with fore and aft draughts of 7.05m and 7.81m, respectively. Personnel Qualifications and Experience The master held a Master Mariner certificate of competency and has been at sea since 1964and in a command position since1979. The OOW held a Watchkeeping Mate certificate issued in2003. He has been at sea since 1998and has about five years' experience performing OOWduties. The pilot was a certified ClassA pilot in 2003and has been a pilot since1998. He commenced his sea career in 1983as anOOW. Pilot's Work/Rest Schedule On 21 July 2004, the pilot had no pilotage assignments. That night, the pilot went to bed about 2100 and was awoken about 0200 the following day; his sleep was reported as good. On July22, he assumed conduct of a vessel from approximately 0325 until 1045. He took naps during the day on both July22 and23. During the evening of July23, at 2300, he was called for the Horizon assignment, and he boarded the vessel at2340. Soon after the grounding, the pilot contacted the pilotage dispatch office and requested a relief pilot. Contractual arrangements between the pilotage corporation and the Laurentian Pilotage Authority (LPA) call for a 12-hour lead time before starting an assignment, and before the arrival of any relief. The pilot remained on board during the morning and afternoon of 24July2004 to help the master carry out tug work for the initial refloating attempts. He was relieved by another pilot at 1510thatday. Fatigue Awareness In 2003 and 2004, pilots contracting their services to the LPA were made aware of fatigue issues affecting performance. Training was given in the form of information sessions based on the Transport Canada (TC) publication TP13960E, Fatigue Management Guide for Canadian Marine Pilots. The pilot did not attend the fatigue awareness training in 2003and2004. However, during the Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training, which he attended four years before the grounding, there was a session on fatigue management. Bridge Layout and Position of Bridge Team Members Before the Grounding The Horizon's bridge layout is typical of the majority of ocean-going cargo vessels. The arrangement can be seen in Figure2, which shows the position of the bridge team members just before the grounding. The four black squares just aft of the instruments and forward of the chart table are structural pillars that extend from deck to deckhead. Bridge Design Ergonomic design standards and guidelines have been established by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)7 and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).8 Since the Horizon was constructed in 1982, its bridge was not influenced by any of these documents. Emergency Response Seven hours after the grounding, at approximately 1000, a TCinspector boarded the vessel to assess the situation. His main concerns were the possible danger to crew, along with the vessel's seaworthiness and the risk of pollution. Satisfied that there was neither risk of pollution nor a danger to the crew, he left the vessel approximately four hours later. The TCinspector returned later that day, near midnight, for further consultations with the crew. He subsequently left after being assured that a salvage plan would be submitted to TC. On 29 July 2004, the salvor submitted a salvage plan toTC. It was accepted on July31. For the days leading up to the refloating, an employee with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans(DFO) was on board to witness the operation as a government representative in case of pollution. A TCinspector was onboard during all the refloating attempts. It is the position of TC that it is the ship's responsibility to respond to an emergency, such as an oil spill or grounding. Federal agencies step in only when safety of life or the environment is being threatened through inadequate response. Accordingly, each time grounding occurs, the procedure is similar: the vessel's crew or pilot informs authorities of the grounding; the vessel specifies whether there has been release of pollutants (if so, the vessel's spill response plan is activated); the crew assesses the extent of damage to the vessel; the vessel attempts to refloat, usually with the help of tugs; if the vessel remains grounded, a salvage plan is submitted; the plan may include a salvor's participation; lightering is carried out if necessary; the vessel is subsequently refloated; and during the operation, TC monitors the execution of the plan and represents the government in case of pollution. DFO also agrees that the ship is responsible to respond in an emergency and will coordinate its resources with other federal agencies as required with respect to search and rescue, direction of marine traffic and pollution response activities. In cases where the polluter is unknown, unable, or unwilling, DFO assumes the lead for pollution response. Other Events and Information Requests Related to the Salvage Operation On 26 July 2004, DFO served the Horizon's operators with a notice stipulating that DFO be informed of corrective action to be taken towards an oil spill threat. The same day, DFO also requested a capacity plan (tank plans, capacities) and the status of the vessel from the master before a refloat attempt. On 28 July 2004, DFO asked the ship's agents for a loading plan and the location of any dangerous cargo. The agents sent the information, adding that TC had also requested the same information at an earlier time. On 29 July 2004, DFO requested that the Horizon's operators submit an environmental protection plan (EPP) before refloating, reiterating this on August2 when no EPP had yet been received. On 03 August 2004, the operators submitted an EPP, which was evaluated and accepted by the Canadian Coast Guard's Environmental Response Division (DFO) and Environment Canada.