Analysis Watertight Integrity of Deck Scuttles The cover for the starboard flush-fitting deck scuttle had no visual indicator to determine if the cover in the scuttle's aperture was secured or was merely in place and unsecured. The lack of any positive indication could lead the crew to believe that the deck scuttle cover was well secured and watertight when, in reality, it was neither. The investigation revealed that the cover's locking mechanism had a tendency to jam against the scuttle's under-deck framework. This would cause the unsecured cover to be prone to dislodge in rough seas, thereby compromising the watertight integrity of the vessel's hull. There is no regulatory requirement for the deck scuttle fittings to be type-approved nor were they type-approved. Single-action closing mechanisms with positive indication that the scuttle covers are in the secured position are readily available on the marine market. Although required by regulation, the deck scuttle cover was neither hinged nor secured by a chain to the vessel's structure. Consequently, when the cover became dislodged, it was lost. Thus, the designed means to restore the compartment's watertight integrity was no longer available. Impact of Unsecured Deck Cargo on Vessel Safety Although required by regulation, the deck cargo on board the Westisle was not secured to prevent it from shifting. When the deck scuttle became dislodged, seawater down flooded into the starboard forward cargo tank. The off-centre weight of seawater in the nearly full cargo tank caused the vessel to list to starboard and the unsecured deck cargo to shift to starboard. Increasing the danger of the situation even further was the free surface effect of liquid in all four slack cargo tanks and fuel and fresh water tanks. The vessel's transverse stability was markedly reduced such that the vessel heeled to approximately 70 . Securing the boat and the fish net in an efficient manner would have prevented them from shifting, which, in the event, contributed to the vessel's near-capsizing. Fuel Tank Air Vent Check Valve When the vessel suddenly heeled some 70 to starboard, the ball check valve in the fuel tank's fresh air vent became immersed and seawater entered the tank, contaminated the fuel, and subsequently rendered the main engine inoperable. The float-type air vent is designed to close the aperture under normal rolling conditions at sea and is ineffective when the vessel is heeled to large angles. However, the main engine functioned long enough to supply power necessary to pump water into the port forward cargo tank and to utilize the lifting gear to shift the workboat's stern to the port side of the centerline. Reduction of Transverse Stability The free surface effect of a liquid's movement within a ship raises its virtual centre of gravity and consequently reduces the transverse metacentric height.3 Since metacentric height is a principal indicator of a ship's initial ability to remain upright, the elimination or reduction of free surface is essential in maintaining a vessel's stability. In this instance, the adverse free surface effects progressively increased as the situation developed. The initial free surface effect was created when the four cargo tanks were partially filled with liquid cleaning agent prior to the vessel's departure. When the forward starboard cargo tank's watertight integrity was lost, the amount of water in the compartment progressively increased as seawater down flooded through the unsecured (and subsequently dislodged) deck scuttle cover. This caused the vessel's starboard list to progressively increase. As the list increased, the freeing ports became immersed and a larger amount of seawater was shipped and retained on the deck. The dangerous situation was further compounded when the unsecured deck cargo shifted to starboard and the starboard deck edge remained submerged. The vessel's inherent transverse stability characteristics and remedial action taken by the crew prevented more serious consequences to the occurrence. Life-Saving Equipment, Emergency Drills, and Training The crew was made aware of the storage location of life-saving equipment but no drills were conducted. Furthermore, the crew had not tried on the life jackets or the immersion suits. Not until the crew prepared to abandon the vessel did six of the seven crew members discover that their life jackets and suits were too small. Despite their above-average build, the crew had not tried on the personal life-saving equipment upon joining the vessel or prior to the vessel's departure. Although the standard life jackets are designed to fit all adults, six of the seven crew members were unable to use them because of their build. Two of the crew members managed to don the life jackets, but because they were tight around the neck, they were forced to remove them. Because Marine Emergency Duties training is not a pre-requisite for crew employed on fishing vessels of this size and type, it is imperative that the skippers conduct emergency drills to ensure that their crew members know the storage location and use of life-saving equipment and are made aware of their duties and responsibilities during an emergency. The design of the deck scuttle cover did not permit a person on deck to visually verify that the cover was properly secured. The deck cover's securing arm had a tendency to jam against the scuttle's under-deck framework without effectively securing the cover. While working in the seaway, the improperly secured flush-fitting deck scuttle cover of the forward starboard cargo tank became dislodged. Thus, the compartment's watertight integrity was lost. The deck scuttle covers were neither hinged nor secured by a chain to the vessel's structure. The vessel developed a starboard list when seawater down flooded through the improperly secured and subsequently dislodged flush-fitting deck scuttle cover. The unsecured deck cargo shifted to starboard and caused the flooded vessel to list about 70. The free surface effect of the liquids in the four nearly full cargo tanks reduced the vessel's transverse stability prior to departure. Pumping ballast into the port forward cargo tank and repositioning the workboat contributed to the vessel's recovery. With the vessel heeled some 70 to starboard, the ball check valve in the fuel tank's fresh air vent became immersed, and seawater entered the tank and contaminated the fuel, rendering the main engine inoperable. Neither the approved standard life jackets nor the immersion suits fit six of the seven crew members because of their above-average build. Although the crew was new to the vessel, emergency drills were not conducted nor were the vessel's life jackets and immersion suits tried on prior to the emergency.Findings The design of the deck scuttle cover did not permit a person on deck to visually verify that the cover was properly secured. The deck cover's securing arm had a tendency to jam against the scuttle's under-deck framework without effectively securing the cover. While working in the seaway, the improperly secured flush-fitting deck scuttle cover of the forward starboard cargo tank became dislodged. Thus, the compartment's watertight integrity was lost. The deck scuttle covers were neither hinged nor secured by a chain to the vessel's structure. The vessel developed a starboard list when seawater down flooded through the improperly secured and subsequently dislodged flush-fitting deck scuttle cover. The unsecured deck cargo shifted to starboard and caused the flooded vessel to list about 70. The free surface effect of the liquids in the four nearly full cargo tanks reduced the vessel's transverse stability prior to departure. Pumping ballast into the port forward cargo tank and repositioning the workboat contributed to the vessel's recovery. With the vessel heeled some 70 to starboard, the ball check valve in the fuel tank's fresh air vent became immersed, and seawater entered the tank and contaminated the fuel, rendering the main engine inoperable. Neither the approved standard life jackets nor the immersion suits fit six of the seven crew members because of their above-average build. Although the crew was new to the vessel, emergency drills were not conducted nor were the vessel's life jackets and immersion suits tried on prior to the emergency. The Westisledeveloped a starboard list when seawater down flooded into the forward starboard cargo tank through its improperly secured and subsequently dislodged flush-deck scuttle cover. The unsecured deck cargo shifted and increased the starboard list to some 70, submerging the weather deck. Factors contributing to the occurrence were: the tendency of the scuttle cover locking mechanism to jam against the under-deck framework, and the practice of not securing the deck cargo.Causes and Contributing Factors The Westisledeveloped a starboard list when seawater down flooded into the forward starboard cargo tank through its improperly secured and subsequently dislodged flush-deck scuttle cover. The unsecured deck cargo shifted and increased the starboard list to some 70, submerging the weather deck. Factors contributing to the occurrence were: the tendency of the scuttle cover locking mechanism to jam against the under-deck framework, and the practice of not securing the deck cargo. Safety Action Action Taken Following the occurrence, the flush-fitting deck scuttle securing mechanism was modified. Transport Canada tested the vessel's starboard fuel tank vent valve and found it in good working order up to but not beyond 20 of incline. Transport Canada issued Ship Safety BulletinN0 13/99 stressing the importance of regular training in emergency procedures. Transport Canada instructed its western region marine inspectors to verify that all fishing vessel fish scuttle covers are permanently secured to the vessel.