Summary On 18 October 2000, the Norwegian bulk carrier Fossnes was steaming up the St. Lawrence River bound for Sarnia, Ontario, in fair weather and under the conduct of a pilot. Shortly before noon, the helmsman advised the officer of the watch that the helm was not responding. The rudder was immobilized to starboard. Full astern was ordered, and both anchors were dropped. The vessel maintained its headway and ran aground shortly thereafter off Cap Martin. That evening, the vessel was refloated with the assistance of a tug. The Fossnes continued on its voyage and docked in the port of Qubec. An inspection of the hull revealed that one of the ballast tanks was holed. The occurrence did not result in pollution. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Description of the Vessel The Fossnes is a bulk carrier designed to carry a variety of cargo. The wheelhouse, the accommodations, and the engine room are aft of the four cargo holds. The holds are served by two gantry cranes that have a capacity of 25tonnes each. On the stern, the vessel carries a fully enclosed, free-fall-launched lifeboat with a capacity of 27persons. The vessel was launched on 25February1995 and was classed with Lloyd's Register of Shipping. Its certificates were issued under Norwegian regulations and the international conventions of the International Maritime Organization, including, among others, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The vessel was operated in accordance with the International Safety Management Code. History of the Voyage On 07 October 2000, the Fossnes left Sagunto, Spain, with a load of 14105tonnes of fertilizer bound for Sarnia, Ontario. On October18, around 0705,2 off the Les Escoumins pilotage station, a pilot boarded the Fossnes to carry out his assignment to Qubec . Both steering gear power units were operating, and the helmsman was steering in follow-up (FU) control mode. While relieving the watch in the engine room around 0800, the chief engineer relieved the first engineer. The master went up to the bridge from time to time to ensure that all was well. Around 1130, he left the wheelhouse for lunch. After a course change off Cap-aux-Oies, the vessel was steaming at an over-the-ground speed of 10knots on a course of 243 by the gyrocompass (G). Navigating by parallel indexing, the pilot set the electronic bearing line at six cables to round Cap Martin. At 1138, a steering gear alarm went off on the bridge. The officer of the watch (OOW) saw that one of the red warning lights for the No1 power unit was lit. He cancelled the audible alarm and switched off the No1 pump. The OOW then telephoned the chief engineer in the engine control room to advise him of the breakdown. The chief engineer called him back and told him to restart the No1 pump. Thereafter, the chief engineer went to the steering gear compartment. The OOW tried to start the pump twice but was unable to do so, and the alarm went off both times. Meanwhile, the chief engineer requested the assistance of the electrician. The electrician joined him a few minutes later and was advised of the breakdown. The chief engineer asked the OOW to restart the No1 pump. When it started, the electrician noted that the motor ammeter indicated very high current. Around 1146, the electrician told the chief engineer to immediately shut down the pump locally. While trying to turn the rotor manually, he noted that the electric motor turned freely. He then examined the No1 starter panel. When he pressed the contactor for the electric motor, he noticed that it offered a high mechanical resistance. Around 1154, the pilot gave the helmsman the order to steer 250G. The helmsman turned the wheel to the right and initiated stabilization manoeuvres to steer steady. At about the same time the electrician, who was still in the steering gear compartment, attempted to manually start the No1 pump by operating the contactor. After a few attempts, sparks began to fly out of the contactor. While the helm was set at approximately 7 to starboard, the helmsman realized that it was no longer responding. An alarm on the steering control stand sounded, and a blue warning light came on, indicating a loss of electrical power in the FU control circuit. The pilot ordered the OOW to carry out an emergency stop. The second officer, who had just arrived on the bridge to stand his watch, set the engine telegraph to stop, then full astern. The third officer then rushed to the forecastle. The master heard the speed change from his cabin, and he hurried to the wheelhouse. After assessing the situation, the master set the engine telegraph to stop, then he gradually increased speed from dead slow astern to full astern at 1158.3 After hearing the engine speed reduction, the chief engineer hurried to the control room, where he noticed that the main engine was set at full astern. He immediately called the wheelhouse and was told that the rudder was not responding and that the vessel was headed for land. Although both anchors were let go, the vessel continued its swing to starboard. At 1201, the vessel grounded in position latitude 4727'48'' North and longitude 07017'54'' West, about two cables southwest of Cap Martin. The ebb current was estimated at 3.5knots, setting at 070true. A light wind was blowing from the east. The pilot advised Marine Communications and Traffic Services in Qubec that the vessel was aground, and the master requested that a tug assist the vessel as soon as possible. With the assistance of the tug OceanDelta, the Fossnes was refloated around 2025 at high tide. It was then escorted by the tug to berth No27 in the port of Qubec. Additional Information The pilot remembers hearing alarms, but he does not remember if he tried to find out the nature of these cautions. The pilot was reportedly advised by the OOW that one of the power units had failed and that the steering gear was operating on one pump. However, the pilot reports having understood that the alarms were not important. No alarms related to power unit No2 were recorded by the alarm data logger. Except for the main breaker on the No1 power unit in the emergency switchboard, no circuit breaker was found in the tripped position. Between approximately 1146 and 1156, the chief engineer and the electrician who were in the steering gear compartment noticed no failure of the No2power unit, and the rudder appeared to respond normally to the helm. After the grounding, a simulation carried out in the presence of Transport Canada inspectors revealed that the steering gear continued to function after the transfer from FU control mode to non-follow-up (NFU) control mode. Damage to the Vessel An underwater inspection revealed that the port bilge strake was buckled and holed in way of frames no121 to125. Also, the port bottom strake adjacent to the bilge strake was indented in way of frames no123 to125. The starboard bilge strake was buckled and fractured in way of frame No110. The damage was repaired in dry dock. Engine Telegraph The main engine is a reversible low-speed diesel engine manufactured by Burmeister Wain, model 4S50MC, developing 5720kW at 123rpm. It drives a fixed-pitch propeller and is equipped with an AutoChief4, model AC-4, control system manufactured by NorControl. The main engine can be controlled from the bridge or the engine control room. The propeller's AC-4 controller system has an emergency stop feature. Emergency stop is activated when the engine telegraph lever on the bridge is moved directly from an ahead speed greater than 26rpm to the full astern position without momentarily selecting the stop position. A warning light on the console in way of the engine telegraph lights up when the system is activated and goes out when the main engine has started to turn astern. From full ahead, tests have demonstrated that this manoeuvre is carried out in 135s. Sea trials demonstrated that, in an emergency stop, the vessel's headway could be stopped in 4min49s. This information was posted on a bulkhead in the wheelhouse. Steering Gear The steering gear is an electric-hydraulic system with two cylinders and was manufactured in Poland by Hydroster. It has two identical power units and develops 320kNm of torque. Power units no1 and2 were supplied from the emergency and main switchboards, respectively. Each supply line was connected to the switchboard via a dual-protection three-phase circuit breaker made by Klockner Moeller, model NZMS4-63. The settings for overcurrent protection (long delay) and short-circuit protection (short delay) on the No1 power unit breaker were 55A and 550A, respectively. During a steering gear test before departure about two months before the grounding, the No1 power unit had sustained a breakdown. An inspection of the circuit had revealed that the main breaker on the supply line of that power unit was in the tripped position. No1 Power Unit Motor Contactor The starter panels for the two power units that were installed in the steering gear compartment were identical. A rotary selector mounted on the panels' cover was used to select the start-up from the bridge or the steering gear compartment. The starter for the No1 power unit motor has a three-phase contactor, model SLA 85, manufactured by Elester. The starter consisted of a moulded plastic casing containing one fixed contact and one moveable contact. In the centre of the casing was an electrical coil with a series of contacts at either end. When the circuit was de-energized, four compression springs held the moveable contact away from the fixed contact. When the coil was energized, the moveable contact touched the fixed contact to complete the circuit between the supply and the electric motor. After the grounding, it was observed that the contact surfaces of all phases were damaged by arcing burns, but damage was not uniform. Also, the moveable contact slid with difficulty over the fixed contact, preventing a positive contact. An inspection of the main circuit breaker, the electric motor, and the power circuit wiring revealed no malfunction. A resistivity test with a megohmmeter on the supply line to the power unit and on the electric motor revealed resistance of at least 1000megaohms4. Photo1. Moveable contact of Elesher SLA 85 contactor. Pieces of yellowish polymer from one of the spring guides were found scattered around the inside of the contactor casing, and one of the guides was dislodged (Photo1). Polymer can deteriorate after prolonged exposure to chemicals, heat, cold, stress, sunlight, oxygen, moisture, or pollutants in the atmosphere. Any of these factors, either individually or collectively, will alter the chemical composition of the material. Symptoms such as surface fragility, yellowing, cracking, or loss of elasticity and resilience are all signs of chemical deterioration. An inspection of the No2 power unit contactor revealed that one of the spring guides was also broken and showed signs of chemical deterioration. The working life of the two contactors was approximately the same. The contactor for the No2 greaser pump for the main engine also had a dislocated spring guide. Steering Gear Control Photo2. Arrangement of steering control console. Steering Gear Alarm Panels The steering gear has two alarm panels, one on a bridge console and the other in the steering gear compartment. Mounted on each of these panels are warning lights and switches for the two power units. On the bridge panel there are starter switches and a warning light intensity switch. One white and one green warning light indicate the energizing of the power circuit and the power unit, respectively. They are also equipped with a vibration alarm. Central Processing Unit Each power unit has its own central processing unit (CPU), which is connected to the alarm system on the bridge, in the engine room, and in the steering gear compartment. When the circuits supplying the CPUs were de-energized, the warning lights on the alarm panels in the steering gear compartment and on the bridge went out. However, de-energizing of the CPUs did not affect the operation of the steering gear power units. The Steering Gear Electric Diagram, B570-DZ/614-1-1, dated 14 September 1994, indicates that the No1 CPU was supplied from the emergency switchboard via the 220V - 2EL distribution box; the No2 CPU was supplied from the main switchboard via the 220V - 2L distribution box. Contrary to that diagram, the CPUs were energized only through the emergency switchboard. Rudder Indicators Five rudder indicators were on board: four were found on the bridge and one in the steering gear compartment. All five rudder indicators were connected to the same electrical circuit, which was supplied by two different sources. A selector switch was used to select the source of power from either the main or the emergency switchboard. A third position was used for drawing power from the main switchboard; in the event of a power failure, a relay automatically switched the power to the emergency switchboard. At the time of the breakdown, the selector switch was in the third position. Regulations Pertaining to Steering Gear Machinery Installations, Chapter II-1, Regulation29, paragraph 8 of the SOLAS Convention (1992 consolidation edition) reads in part as follows: Any main and auxiliary steering gear control system operable from the navigation bridge shall comply with the following: [8.1] if electric, it shall be served by its own separate circuit supplied from a steering gear power circuit from a point within the steering gear compartment, or directly from switchboard busbars supplying that steering gear power circuit at a point on the switchboard adjacent to the supply to the steering gear power circuit. [8.5] short circuit protection only shall be provided for steering gear control supply circuits. Machinery Installations, Chapter II-1, Regulation30, paragraph 3 of the SOLAS Convention reads in part as follows: Short circuit protection and an overload alarm shall be provided for such circuits and motors. Protection against excess current, including starting current, if provided, shall be for not less than twice the full load current of the motor or circuit so protected, and shall be arranged to permit the passage of the appropriate starting currents.