Summary The bulk carrier YongKang, en route from Esperance, Australia, anchored off Saint-Jean, le d'Orlans, in the St. Lawrence River on 02December2003, while awaiting a berth to unload in the port of Qubec. At approximately 0715, eastern standard time, on December6, driven by the ebb tide current and strong northeast winds, the YongKang started to drag its anchor and drift slowly toward the south bank of the river, where it grounded at approximately 0815. The YongKang was refloated by the rising tide at around 1230, but it had sustained some damage to its hull in way of the forepeak; ballast tanks1, 2,and3; and the propeller. No pollution or injury was reported. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of Vessel The bulk carrier YongKang was launched in March2001. It has a deadweight of 74500tonnes and an overall length of 225m. It has one main deck and has seven cargo holds with a total capacity of 91717m3. The propulsion machinery, steering apparatus, wheelhouse, lifeboats, and accommodation are located aft. The vessel is fitted with a single centre-line rudder. The YongKang is designed to carry heavy cargo; holds 2,4,and 6can be left empty and hold4 can be filled with liquid ballast. History of the Voyage On 24 October 2003, the YongKang left Australia with 66330tonnes of bulk cargo: 49432tonnes of alumina for the port of Contrecoeur, Quebec and 16898tonnes of nickel concentrate for the port of Qubec. While steaming up the St.Lawrence River toward the pilotage station at Les Escoumins, Quebec, the ship's agent informed the master of the YongKang that berth53 in the port of Qubec was occupied and that the vessel should anchor off Saint-Jean, le d'Orlans, Quebec, for about 24hours. The master was advised of the approximate position where the vessel was to drop anchor (see Figure1) and that the pilot would disembark. At 11432 on 02 December 2003, the vessel dropped anchor off Saint-Jean, Quebec; seven shackles of chain were let out in position 4654.9'N latitude and 07052.1'W longitude (see Figure2,A). The weather forecast for the next few days was relatively good, and as per the agent's arrangement, the captain of the YongKang released the pilot. Before disembarking, the pilot gave the master a copy of the tide tables for the area off Lauzon, Quebec, for the period from December1 to7inclusive. The main engine, windlass and other equipment was kept on emergency standby and bridge watch was established. The position of the vessel was monitored by means of a radar connected to the GPS receiver. This allowed a reference position, the position of the anchor and a safety area around the anchor position to be programmed. An audible alarm would sound if the vessel moved outside the safety area, which was established at 0.25nautical mile(nm) around the anchor position. The echo from the Saint-Jean wharf was used as the reference target. At 2205 on December 3, the pilot of an inbound vessel reported to Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) in Qubec that the YongKang was a hazard to shipping due to its proximity to the upstream end of the Traverse du Nord channel. He also indicated that the vessel had probably dragged its anchor. Concerned about the safety of the navigation, safety of the vessel and given that there was no pilot on board, he suggested that the vessel be moved. A. Initial position of the YongKang anchor B. Position of the YongKang as reported by pilot in transit at about 2205 on03December2003 C. Swinging room around the anchor D. Position of the YongKang grounding on 06December2003 E. Saint-Michel range Believing that the Saint-Jean anchorage was part of the port of Qubec, the MCTS relayed the information to the harbour master's office. The harbour master's representative asked the pilot of the westbound vessel to report to him directly by telephone, then asked the MCTS to confirm the position of the YongKang. Neither the MCTS nor the harbour master's office could confirm the position of the vessel in the Saint-Jean anchorage by means of instruments. There followed a series of telephone calls between the harbour master's representative, the vessel's agent, and the pilot. The agent could not understand why the pilot was complaining about a vessel anchored at that position by another pilot. He also mentioned that the operation could be quite costly. At approximately 2245, assuming that the vessel would be docked within the next 24hours and with no adverse short-term weather forecast, a decision was made not to move the vessel. The decision was made without obtaining information on the reason for the delay with the vessel occupying the berth. December 4 and 5passed without incident. No report or verification of the YongKang's position was made by the MCTS, the harbour master's office, or the pilots. A number of vessels had transited this area. The master of the YongKang enquired regularly on the availability of berth 53. Effective evaluation of the prolonged stay at anchorage was not carried out. At approximately 0715 on 06 December 2003, the radar alarm sounded on the bridge: the vessel was outside the programmed safety area. The master was advised of the situation and, when he arrived on the bridge, realized immediately that the vessel was dragging its anchor. The first officer was dispatched to the forecastle, and the third officer was instructed to report to the bridge. The main engine was started up, and the MCTS was advised of the situation. The master then notified the harbour master's representative, who was in communication with the docking pilot on the telephone. The representative informed the docking pilot that the vessel's agent wanted him on board the YongKang at 1000. On learning that the vessel was dragging its anchor, the representative informed the docking pilot that the master wanted him on board the vessel as soon as possible. The docking pilot replied that he would be on board at 1000and that the master should carry out the manoeuvres necessary to keep the vessel within the anchorage. The MCTS was advised of the intentions of the docking pilot. Communication between the YongKang, the harbour master's office, and the MCTS was difficult: messages were not always received. On several occasions, the master requested the services of a pilot because the vessel was dragging its anchor. He was informed that the pilot would be aboard at 1000and that he should do whatever was necessary to keep the vessel safe in the meantime. At 0810, the master requested a tug, and reiterated that he needed a pilot and that he was finding the vessel difficult to manoeuvre. A pilot on a transiting vessel in the area called the MCTS and confirmed that the YongKang was in a precarious situation. The MCTS decided to dispatch a tug on the basis of this information. The OcanCharlie was dispatched at 0817, but it did not leave until 0845, with the docking pilot aboard. Beginning at 0715, the crew of the YongKang tried to manoeuvre the vessel but it continued to be driven by the wind and current toward the shore; during this period the anchor was weighed. At 0820, the YongKang reported to the MCTS that it had run aground in position 4654.79'N latitude and 07051.1'W longitude on a heading of 202True. The vessel was then six cables north of the bird sanctuary at Anse-Saint-Valier on the south shore. Refloating Operation Soundings were taken around the YongKang. The crew determined that the vessel was aground from the bow to the number2 hold. To lighten the forward part of the vessel, 400 tonnes of ballast was pumped from the forepeak. After learning that the YongKang had run aground, and unsure of the full extent of his duties in this situation, the docking pilot called the Laurentian Pilotage Authority (LPA) for guidance. He was informed to do whatever was necessary to refloat the vessel. When the pilot boarded the YongKang at 1000, he found the anchor in the hawse pipe and the main engine running astern. He assessed the situation and discussed the necessary manoeuvre with the master. They would wait until the next high tide, which was expected around noon. Over the course of the morning, the weather grew worse. The pilot feared that, once afloat, the vessel's stern would be driven quickly upstream by the tide and the northeast wind. Under advice from the pilot, the stern of the vessel was to be made fast to the OcanCharlie, which was still at the site. The sea was rough. Waves were breaking over the OcanCharlie, and ice was forming on its bow. The crew of the YongKang had a great deal of difficulty running a mooring line to the tug: they were not using a heaving line. The idea of towing the vessel was then dropped, and the OcanCharlie was instructed to push on the starboard side of the vessel. In the meantime, a second tug, the OcanDelta, was requested. It left at 1115, but mechanical trouble forced it to turn back at1148. At about 1230, or two hours after the tide had begun to rise, the YongKang was refloated and re-anchored. The pilot remained on board until the vessel docked at 2138 in the port of Qubec. Damage The YongKang sustained damage to its bottom plating in way of the forepeak and ballast tanks1,2, and3. The plating was stove in, and several stiffeners had buckled. There was a fracture in one of the plates in ballast tank1. Three blades of the propeller were deformed and two were fractured. Also, the port bilge keel in way of ballast tank3 had buckled over a length of about1m. Saint-Jean Anchorage The "Saint-Jean anchorage" is not included in the Sailing Directions. It is found southeast of Pointe Saint-Jean, le d'Orlans, where it provides a mud-bottom anchorage 10to 24m deep. Located at the upstream intersection of the Chenal du Sud and the Traverse du Nord, it is marked on the north by buoyK135 and on the south by buoyK131. Its western edge approximates the eastern end of the port of Qubec. To the northeast is the south cardinal buoy DAME, which shows the start of the le Madame Reef. The northwest edge of the anchorage is in proximity to the Saint-Michel range, which runs 033-213 (seeFigure2). The seabed is generally described as appropriate for anchorage. The Atlas of Tidal Currents notes that currents in this area can reach 2.5knots. The medium and high tide ranges are 4.5and 6.6m, respectively. The anchorage offers vessels little protection from northeast to east winds or southwest winds. The area, suitable for vessels with a draught of over 15m, is approximately 2nm long and 0.5nm wide, running along a northeast-southwest axis. Vessels drawing 12.5m and up drop anchor at the Saint-Jean anchorage regularly because those off the Maheu and Lafleur rivers are not deep enough. Pilots usually use the Saint-Jean anchorage to await favourable tides to transit the Traverse du Nord. Availability of Berths in the Port of Qubec The Beauport sector of the port of Qubec includes berths50 to53, which are reserved for handling liquid and solid bulk cargo. The water depths available at berths50, 51,52, and 53are 11.2m, 12.1m, 12.2m, and 14.5m, respectively (seeFigure3).3 A depth of 15.2m is also available at berth52 at a distance of about 90m from the end of berth53. To unload cargo, there are four serviceable gantry cranes available at berths52 and53. The harbour master oversees the assignment of berths at the port of Qubec. Berths52 and53 are managed by a private stevedoring company that determines the order of ships docking there. Although a vessel may at times be granted priority docking privileges, berths are usually available on a "first-come, first-served" basis. When the YongKang arrived on 02 December 2003, berths52 and 53were occupied by the Puffin and the LegionyPolskie, respectively. The plan had been for the YongKang to dock between berths52 and53, because of its deep draught and the limited cargo space on the dock. At 0327 on December3, however, the CanadianNavigator replaced the Puffin. In addition, equipment failures and a shortage of personnel had delayed trans-shipping operations on the CanadianNavigator and the LegionyPolskie. As a result, the YongKang was not given access to the dock until the two vessels had left on December6. Vessel Certification After the occurrence, the classification society, acting under the Chinese authority of the Hong Kong special administrative region, issued a Load-line Certificate and a Conditional Safety Construction Certificate. These certificates required corrective action before 19February2004 and limited the vessel movements to a single voyage from Qubec to a port in China via the Suez Canal. All other certificates required for this type of vessel were valid and appropriate. Personnel Certification The master and officers held valid certificates in accordance with the requirements of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers. Their certificates were appropriate for the type of voyage the vessel was on and its operation. Weather At 0700 on 06 December 2003, the Environment Canada observation station at Saint-Franois, le d'Orlans, logged winds from the northeast-by-east at 41 km/h. The winds shifted to northeast-by-north at about 1000, while their speed rose to 57km/h around noon, then to about 75km/h at the end of the day. The air temperature fell steadily throughout the day. At the time of the occurrence, it was recorded at -6C. Currents and Tides From 02 to 06December2003, the range resulted in mean tide levels. At 0715 on 06December2003, the ebb tide was moving northeast at a rate of approximately 2.5knots, while at 1230, when the vessel was refloated, the incoming tide was flowing southwest at about 2knots. The pilot had given the bridge personnel a document listing the times for the tides, together with some handwritten notes on the changes in current direction caused by the tides. Government Infrastructure The primary objective of Canadian public ports administrations is to ensure the economic efficiency of the port while protecting the environment. With that in mind, some port administrations have adopted criteria for anchorage assignment. The LPA ensures the safe operation of pilotage services and the maintenance of pilot qualifications, and oversees the delivery of pilotage services. In1988, while reorganizing its services, it agreed to combine some of them with those of the Qubec port administration. Under the agreement, the LPA would provide the following services to the harbour master's office: assignment of pilots; assignment of berths and movement of vessels; and administration of all applicable services or services that must be provided by the port. Even though the Saint-Jean anchorage is not part of the port of Qubec area, the harbour master's office was notified of the vessel's precarious situation at about 2205 onDecember3. One operation centre and two divisions of the Marine Programs Directorate of the Canadian Coast Guard, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), were involved in this incident: The Regional Operations Centre, which coordinates search and rescue (SAR) operations, manages ice operations, and coordinates ship and helicopter operations, was advised of the occurrence at 0909 on December6. The centre asked the CCGS MarthaL.Black, which was in the area, to halt its activities and stand by to respond. The vessel was released at 1030. The Environmental Response Division, whose mandate is to protect the environment after marine accidents, was advised of the occurrence on December6 at 1042. There was no pollution and the situation was monitored. The MCTS Division, which provides marine communication and traffic services to the marine community, and ensures the safety of life at sea and the protection of the environment, forwarded requests from the YongKang to the divisions and organizations concerned. The Marine Safety Directorate of Transport Canada (TC), which is tasked with ensuring that vessels involved in marine accidents are still seaworthy, was contacted at 0909 on December6. It confirmed that the vessel was not causing any pollution and monitored the events as they unfolded. Once the vessel was docked, a surveyor ensured that it had been temporarily repaired satisfactorily before giving it clearance to sail. Towing and Pilot Boarding Services Towing and pilot boarding services are provided by the same private company in the port of Qubec. Boarding services are provided by a pilot boat in summer and a tugboat in winter. One tug is always on duty within the harbour, but a second tug within or outside the harbour requires one hour's notice.