While en route from the fishing grounds to St. John's with a catch of about 45 000 kg of redfish stored in 15 pens, the ATLANTIC PRIZE heeled to starboard when the port paravane was lost. The resultant list progressively increased with each roll in the adverse weather conditions, causing the redfish to shift until the vessel down-flooded and, eventually, sank. Stability may be defined as the tendency of a vessel to return to its original position after being displaced therefrom.[6] Though adequate stability is essential to fishing vessel safety, a vessel must also be sea-kindly and comfortable in a sea-way if injuries to crew members are to be avoided. Though not required by regulation, the ATLANTIC PRIZE was fitted with roll-dampening paravanes to increase crew comfort by reducing the vessel's motion in a sea-way. Development of roll-dampening paravanes has been on an individual and generally empirical basis, with few records and little formal study to determine the precise interaction of the induced righting moments and the vessel's inherent transverse stability. The use of paravanes is not without risk. The safe functioning of the submerged delta-shape fish (as they are called by fishermen) is largely dependent on the towing speed and their complementary operation to port and starboard, such that the righting moment caused by the downward force generated on one side is synchronized with the upward roll of the vessel on that same side. If the port and starboard synchronization is disturbed or lost, an athwartship moment can be applied to the vessel when she is rolling towards the paravane generating the most downward force, and the vessel's roll may actually be increased on that side. The synchronous and complementary operation would be eliminated if a paravane were lost or if the boom and/or the rigging on one side were to fail. Similarly, the operation would be significantly disturbed if one paravane surfaced or became fouled with floating kelp, abandoned nets, submerged debris or obstructions on the seabed. It is known that the ATLANTIC PRIZE lost the port paravane before the vessel capsized. When the paravane was lost, the progressive heel to starboard would have increased with the downward thrust of the starboard paravane. However, as the vessel rolled further to starboard, her return to the upright was slowed, and successive wind and wave action on the port side and the weight of accumulated water on the starboard side deck caused the heel to increase, causing the catch to shift, further increasing the list to starboard. The arrangement of the fish hold was such that the fish was loaded to the top of the pens, which did not extend all the way to the deckhead. This arrangement permitted the top of the cargo to shift transversely, and the resultant transverse shift of weight in heavy seas had a detrimental effect on the vessel's transverse stability. This situation would have been further exacerbated when water down-flooded into the fish hold. Mounting the pen-boards to a level above the catch would have prevented the catch from shifting when the combination of wind/wave and paravane failure suddenly heeled the vessel. The list caused by the shifting of the catch would not normally have caused the vessel to sink. However, the vessel's arrangement was such that there were several locations through which down-flooding could occur. Because of the short time between the vessel taking a list and the sinking (approximately 17 minutes), rapid down-flooding must have occurred. The galley window on the accommodation after bulkhead was offset to starboard as was an engine-room intake vent. Water was seen to be flooding through this window into accommodation and also through the vent into the engine-room. The hinge along the centre of the main hatch was not watertight and would have admitted some water. Once the vessel took a permanent list due to the shifted redfish, it rapidly down-flooded through the engine-room air intake vent, open galley window and, to a lesser extent, the main fish hold hatch, until it sank. The donning of immersion suits during emergency drills conducted several times a year can reduce the time required to find and don the equipment in a real emergency. The survival suits on board the ATLANTIC PRIZE were stored in the wheel-house area, which ensured that they were easily accessible. Survival suits are difficult to don in calm conditions and, even though the vessel sank quickly in rough conditions, the crew had time to don survival suits and launch a liferaft. Only the master had Marine Emergency Duties (MED) training; however, he had conducted numerous drills during the preceding years during which the crew had donned their suits and entered the water. Because of these practice drills, when the ATLANTIC PRIZE began to heel over, the crew quickly donned their suits and, once in the water, they had confidence in the suits' ability to keep them afloat and warm. As a result, there was no panic and the crew were able to remain calm until rescued. Although the practice of conducting regular survival suit drills was a major factor in the crew's survival, the suits themselves suffered some wear and tear as a result. At the time of abandonment, some crew members of the ATLANTIC PRIZE had trouble with zippers and inflator tubes. The owner of the vessel was aware of the deterioration and had ordered new suits, but they had not been delivered to the vessel at the time of the occurrence. The water temperature for the area of the occurrence would normally be 8 to 10C. However, at the time of abandonment, a northerly meander in the Gulf Stream had raised the water temperature to 14C. This relatively warm mass of water increased the crew's chance of survival and their ability to remain alert. When rescued 6 hours after the sinking, the crew were chilled but not incapacitated. When the crew abandoned ship, they did not activate the new 406 MHz EPIRB. Nevertheless, it floated free when the vessel sank and immediately began transmitting. The information transmitted to the satellite included the identity of the vessel; however, because the EPIRB was not equipped with a GPS receiver, it could not provide an exact location. This resulted in a 66-minute delay in determining the exact location of the vessel. Even though the vessel's MAYDAY call had been received and acknowledged by St. John's Coast Guard Radio, a GPS-equipped EPIRB would have provided an immediate location and aided the already rapid SAR response.Analysis While en route from the fishing grounds to St. John's with a catch of about 45 000 kg of redfish stored in 15 pens, the ATLANTIC PRIZE heeled to starboard when the port paravane was lost. The resultant list progressively increased with each roll in the adverse weather conditions, causing the redfish to shift until the vessel down-flooded and, eventually, sank. Stability may be defined as the tendency of a vessel to return to its original position after being displaced therefrom.[6] Though adequate stability is essential to fishing vessel safety, a vessel must also be sea-kindly and comfortable in a sea-way if injuries to crew members are to be avoided. Though not required by regulation, the ATLANTIC PRIZE was fitted with roll-dampening paravanes to increase crew comfort by reducing the vessel's motion in a sea-way. Development of roll-dampening paravanes has been on an individual and generally empirical basis, with few records and little formal study to determine the precise interaction of the induced righting moments and the vessel's inherent transverse stability. The use of paravanes is not without risk. The safe functioning of the submerged delta-shape fish (as they are called by fishermen) is largely dependent on the towing speed and their complementary operation to port and starboard, such that the righting moment caused by the downward force generated on one side is synchronized with the upward roll of the vessel on that same side. If the port and starboard synchronization is disturbed or lost, an athwartship moment can be applied to the vessel when she is rolling towards the paravane generating the most downward force, and the vessel's roll may actually be increased on that side. The synchronous and complementary operation would be eliminated if a paravane were lost or if the boom and/or the rigging on one side were to fail. Similarly, the operation would be significantly disturbed if one paravane surfaced or became fouled with floating kelp, abandoned nets, submerged debris or obstructions on the seabed. It is known that the ATLANTIC PRIZE lost the port paravane before the vessel capsized. When the paravane was lost, the progressive heel to starboard would have increased with the downward thrust of the starboard paravane. However, as the vessel rolled further to starboard, her return to the upright was slowed, and successive wind and wave action on the port side and the weight of accumulated water on the starboard side deck caused the heel to increase, causing the catch to shift, further increasing the list to starboard. The arrangement of the fish hold was such that the fish was loaded to the top of the pens, which did not extend all the way to the deckhead. This arrangement permitted the top of the cargo to shift transversely, and the resultant transverse shift of weight in heavy seas had a detrimental effect on the vessel's transverse stability. This situation would have been further exacerbated when water down-flooded into the fish hold. Mounting the pen-boards to a level above the catch would have prevented the catch from shifting when the combination of wind/wave and paravane failure suddenly heeled the vessel. The list caused by the shifting of the catch would not normally have caused the vessel to sink. However, the vessel's arrangement was such that there were several locations through which down-flooding could occur. Because of the short time between the vessel taking a list and the sinking (approximately 17 minutes), rapid down-flooding must have occurred. The galley window on the accommodation after bulkhead was offset to starboard as was an engine-room intake vent. Water was seen to be flooding through this window into accommodation and also through the vent into the engine-room. The hinge along the centre of the main hatch was not watertight and would have admitted some water. Once the vessel took a permanent list due to the shifted redfish, it rapidly down-flooded through the engine-room air intake vent, open galley window and, to a lesser extent, the main fish hold hatch, until it sank. The donning of immersion suits during emergency drills conducted several times a year can reduce the time required to find and don the equipment in a real emergency. The survival suits on board the ATLANTIC PRIZE were stored in the wheel-house area, which ensured that they were easily accessible. Survival suits are difficult to don in calm conditions and, even though the vessel sank quickly in rough conditions, the crew had time to don survival suits and launch a liferaft. Only the master had Marine Emergency Duties (MED) training; however, he had conducted numerous drills during the preceding years during which the crew had donned their suits and entered the water. Because of these practice drills, when the ATLANTIC PRIZE began to heel over, the crew quickly donned their suits and, once in the water, they had confidence in the suits' ability to keep them afloat and warm. As a result, there was no panic and the crew were able to remain calm until rescued. Although the practice of conducting regular survival suit drills was a major factor in the crew's survival, the suits themselves suffered some wear and tear as a result. At the time of abandonment, some crew members of the ATLANTIC PRIZE had trouble with zippers and inflator tubes. The owner of the vessel was aware of the deterioration and had ordered new suits, but they had not been delivered to the vessel at the time of the occurrence. The water temperature for the area of the occurrence would normally be 8 to 10C. However, at the time of abandonment, a northerly meander in the Gulf Stream had raised the water temperature to 14C. This relatively warm mass of water increased the crew's chance of survival and their ability to remain alert. When rescued 6 hours after the sinking, the crew were chilled but not incapacitated. When the crew abandoned ship, they did not activate the new 406 MHz EPIRB. Nevertheless, it floated free when the vessel sank and immediately began transmitting. The information transmitted to the satellite included the identity of the vessel; however, because the EPIRB was not equipped with a GPS receiver, it could not provide an exact location. This resulted in a 66-minute delay in determining the exact location of the vessel. Even though the vessel's MAYDAY call had been received and acknowledged by St. John's Coast Guard Radio, a GPS-equipped EPIRB would have provided an immediate location and aided the already rapid SAR response. The Small Fishing Vessel Regulations do not provide requirements for the safe design, installation and operation of paravane stabilizers. Several other serious accidents have occurred involving roll-dampening paravanes on small fishing vessels. The roll-dampening paravanes on the ATLANTIC PRIZE were being used at the time of the occurrence. The port paravane was lost. A combination of wind/wave action on the port side, and the dynamic heeling effect of the remaining paravane on the starboard side, reduced the vessel's righting ability when it rolled to starboard. The penning of the fish hold was such that it allowed fish in the hold to shift over the top of the boards to starboard, further aggravating the vessel's starboard list past deck edge immersion. The cargo hold was down-flooded through an inadequately gasketed fish hatch. The accommodation and engine-room down-flooded through an open galley window and air intake vent respectively.Findings The Small Fishing Vessel Regulations do not provide requirements for the safe design, installation and operation of paravane stabilizers. Several other serious accidents have occurred involving roll-dampening paravanes on small fishing vessels. The roll-dampening paravanes on the ATLANTIC PRIZE were being used at the time of the occurrence. The port paravane was lost. A combination of wind/wave action on the port side, and the dynamic heeling effect of the remaining paravane on the starboard side, reduced the vessel's righting ability when it rolled to starboard. The penning of the fish hold was such that it allowed fish in the hold to shift over the top of the boards to starboard, further aggravating the vessel's starboard list past deck edge immersion. The cargo hold was down-flooded through an inadequately gasketed fish hatch. The accommodation and engine-room down-flooded through an open galley window and air intake vent respectively. The vessel foundered when she took a sudden list to starboard and down-flooded her fish hold, accommodation and engine-room. The foundering was initiated by the loss of the port roll-dampening paravane. Inadequate penning of the catch, a galley window being left open, the positioning of the engine-room vent intake, and the lack of complete watertight integrity of the fish hold hatch cover contributed to the down-flooding which caused the vessel to sink. Contributing to the survival of the crew were the carriage of survival suits, the crew's familiarity and practice with donning the suits, the relatively warm water, the carriage on board of a 406 MHz EPIRB, and the prompt search and rescue response.Causes and Contributing Factors The vessel foundered when she took a sudden list to starboard and down-flooded her fish hold, accommodation and engine-room. The foundering was initiated by the loss of the port roll-dampening paravane. Inadequate penning of the catch, a galley window being left open, the positioning of the engine-room vent intake, and the lack of complete watertight integrity of the fish hold hatch cover contributed to the down-flooding which caused the vessel to sink. Contributing to the survival of the crew were the carriage of survival suits, the crew's familiarity and practice with donning the suits, the relatively warm water, the carriage on board of a 406 MHz EPIRB, and the prompt search and rescue response. Subsequent to this occurrence, TC indicated that it is developing a Ship Safety Bulletin on the use of paravane stabilizers as well as a discussion paper on the same issue. These documents, along with the TC Internal Report on Paravane Roll Stabilization, will be used to communicate to fishermen the safe use of paravane stabilizers. TC further indicated that it is exploring practical approaches to address TSB Recommendation M92-08, including research and development.Safety Action Subsequent to this occurrence, TC indicated that it is developing a Ship Safety Bulletin on the use of paravane stabilizers as well as a discussion paper on the same issue. These documents, along with the TC Internal Report on Paravane Roll Stabilization, will be used to communicate to fishermen the safe use of paravane stabilizers. TC further indicated that it is exploring practical approaches to address TSB Recommendation M92-08, including research and development.