Summary Whilst bound for an area off Parsboro, Minas Basin, Nova Scotia, to lay 160 metal lobster traps at the start of the fall lobster season, the fishing vessel JOSEPH SISTERS encountered adverse weather and shipped a series of three waves. The heavily laden vessel capsized, throwing the unsecured lobster traps into the water. Four crew members who were sitting on top of the traps were also thrown into the water. After the vessel partially righted in a flooded condition, the owner/operator escaped from the wheelhouse. Soon after, the vessel sank stern first. Four of the five persons were rescued. One crew member is missing and presumed drowned. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of Vessel The JOSEPH SISTERS was of open construction, and the hull had been sheathed with glass-reinforced plastic. The wheelhouse was in the forward part of the vessel, and an open deck work area (the well deck) was aft. As a registered commercial fishing vessel over 15 gross tons (GT), the JOSEPH SISTERS was inspected pursuant to the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations. The Ship Inspection Certificate (SIC 29) issued by Transport Canada (TC) on 21 November 1995 was valid until 20 November 1999. The certificate listed the number of crew as three, including the owner/operator, and limited the extent of permissible voyages to 20 nautical miles off shore except between May 1 and October 31, during which time the limit is extended to 60 nautical miles. The life-saving equipment included: a four-person inflatable liferaft (secured on top of the wheelhouse), three lifejackets (stowed in the cuddy), and one lifebuoy. On board the vessel was a crew of five. During the lobster-harvesting season, it was the normal practice for the operator to have a crew of two. The metal traps weighed 79 kilograms (kg) and were heavier than wooden traps. Wooden traps may differ in size and design but often weigh in excess of 40 kg. Manoeuvring metal traps over the side was more easily accomplished by two persons. The plan for that day was that two crew members would work on each side of the well deck. Three of four crew members were wearing full-length personal flotation devices (PFDs) at the time of the occurrence. History of the Voyage On 13 October 1999, 160 lobster traps were loaded onto the vessel and stowed on its well deck in five tiers. Each lobster trap, including ballast, weighed about 79 kg (175 pounds [lbs]). The total weight of the 160 traps was approximately 12 700 kg (28 000 lbs). The well deck scupper plugs were secured because the deck was below the waterline. The lobster traps were not secured to the vessel, although the uppermost tier__approximately two metres (m) above the deck__was reportedly secured to the tier below it. The number of traps loaded on this occasion was reported to have been the same number of traps loaded in the previous two years. Prior to departing Delhaven, Nova Scotia, the operator listened to a local radio station for weather information. He did not listen to the sea state forecast issued by Environment Canada at 1700[2] for that evening and for October 14, which stated: Fundy, seas one metre or less building to 1 to 2 metres this evening and to 3 to 4 metres overnight. The sea state forecast also advised, users are cautioned that heights may differ significantly in coastal waters and depths of less than 50 metres. The 2000 marine synopsis update issued by Environment Canada on October 13 stated: Marine interests are advised that storm warnings are in effect for Fundy Grand Manan. However, the operator believed that there was no risk in setting his traps because there was little or no wind either at his residence high on a hill or at the wharf. On October 14, the opening day of the fall lobster harvest season, at about 0230, the JOSEPH SISTERS left the wharf at Delhaven to proceed to an area in Minas Basin to lay lobster traps. At the time of departure, the operator reported that the wind was calm. After 25 minutes of sailing, the wind and sea were building up. At approximately 0315 a series of three waves struck the starboard side of the vessel. The first wave shipped water onto the well deck. At that point, the operator shouted to the crew to jettison the traps into the water to try to lighten the vessel. The second wave shipped water, and the vessel developed a starboard list. Only four to six traps were jettisoned before the third wave struck and the vessel capsized to starboard, throwing the four crew members into the sea. The vessel partially righted in a flooded condition allowing the operator to escape from the wheelhouse. None of the lobster traps remained on board after the vessel capsized. Heavily trimmed by the stern, the vessel began to sink. The vessel submerged to the top of the wheelhouse with 1.5m of its bow exposed above the water. The operator called out to his crew in the darkness, and upon receiving an answer, he thought that the four crew members were together in the water. The operator climbed onto the top of the wheelhouse and eventually worked his way to the vessel's aerials. Another fishing vessel, the DENNIS TROY II, bound for a nearby area to lay lobster traps, had departed Delhaven a few minutes after the JOSEPH SISTERS. It was following the same general course as the JOSEPH SISTERS but was a long distance astern of it. By chance, the DENNIS TROY II struck the sinking vessel and stopped to investigate. Using its floodlight, it found the operator clinging to the aerials of the JOSEPH SISTERS and rescued him and three other crew members who were holding on to the lobster traps' floating marker buoys. The fourth crew member was not located. He was not wearing any type of PFD and was not a good swimmer. The JOSEPH SISTERS sank in about 90 feet of water approximately seven nautical miles northeast of Delhaven. The crew did not have time to launch the liferaft manually, and it did not deploy automatically when the vessel sank. The liferaft is presumed to have remained secured to the sunken vessel. The survivors indicated that they were in the nine-degree Celsius (C) water for approximately 20 to 25 minutes. They were not suffering from hypothermia and did not require medical treatment when rescued. According to the Canadian Red Cross Cold Water Survival Chart (Appendix B), a person wearing a standard lifejacket and light clothing in water of 8 to 10C could expect to survive for two to three hours before succumbing to hypothermia. Other Searches Despite an extensive sea, land, air, and underwater search, the fourth crew member was not found and is presumed drowned. Despite an attempt by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police dive team to locate the sunken vessel, it was not found. Certification, Training, and Experience Canadian regulations in force at the time of the occurrence did not require operators or crews of small fishing vessels of less than 70 GT to hold a marine certificate of competency or to undergo marine safety-related training. Effective 31 July 1999, the Crewing Regulations were amended to reduce the tonnage limit from 70 to 60 GT. However, smaller vessels such as the JOSEPH SISTERS remain unaffected by this change. The operator had owned JOSEPH SISTERS for approximately four years and had been engaged in the fishing industry for about 15 years. The operator did not have and was not required to have a certificate of competency to operate his vessel. He had no formal marine training, had not attended any marine safety courses, and was not obliged to have undertaken any such training. Two of the four crew members on board worked regularly and had been employed by the operator for several years. The missing member of the crew and the other member were casual workers employed only on the days the lobster traps were laid. None of the persons on board had ever received marine safety-related training. The operator had not instructed his crew in the use of any of the life-saving equipment, nor was it his habit to do so. Previous Investigations Following the sinking of the fishing vessel STRAITS PRIDE II in 1990, the TSB expressed its concern that the lack of knowledge and skills regarding life-saving equipment and survival techniques on fishing vessels reduces fishers' chances of survival in emergency situations.[3] Following the investigation, TC consulted with the fishing industry to reduce to 15 GT the tonnage for fishing vessels required to have a certificated master. It was also envisaged that certificated masters of fishing vessels would receive marine emergency duties (MED) training, but crews, in general, would not be required to acquire survival skills. The Crewing Regulations were amended to require a certificated master but only on a fishing vessel if it is greater than 60 GT. At present, there is no requirement for an uncertificated master to have received MED training. During its investigation of other occurrences involving fishing vessels, the TSB has observed that many crews on fishing vessels do not fully appreciate that some of their day-to-day operating procedures may be creating unsafe conditions. The TSB recommended that there should be a national safety promotion program for operators and crews of small fishing vessels to increase their awareness of the effects of unsafe operating practices on vessel stability. Further, the TSB recommended that there be a study to identify the extent of unsafe loading and operating practices on small fishing vessels, with a view to developing guidelines for the safe operation of these vessels. Work was started to address these recommendations; however, it was not completed.[4]