Summary A Canadian Helicopters Limited Bell212 twin-engine helicopter, registration C-FXDS, serial number 30806, with one pilot and one passenger on board was on its first flight of the day. It was operating under contract with the Socit de la protection des forts contre le feu(SOPFEU). At approximately 0708 hours eastern daylight time, after 1hour 47minutes of flight, the right engine FUEL LOW warning light illuminated. The pilot departed the site of fire 496 for Liberal Camp to refuel. Relying on the global positioning system, the pilot estimated the time of arrival to be 14minutes. Twelve minutes later, the right engine stopped; the pilot elected to abort the flight immediately and land in a sand pit near a logging road. Forty-four seconds later, approximately 300feet above ground level, the second engine stopped. The pilot commenced an autorotation that resulted in a hard landing. The two occupants sustained serious injuries. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information At approximately 0520 hours eastern daylight time,1 the pilot took off with approximately 1400 pounds of fuel toward the spray site. At approximately 0706, after 1hour45minutes of flight, the pilot checked the fuel gauge and elected to refuel the aircraft at the alternate base at Liberal Camp, 26nautical miles (nm) to the northeast. The pilot completed his water-bucket cycle and, being unable to find a suitable location to drop the Bambi bucket, the pilot elected to carry it, despite the fact that this sling load reduced the aircraft's range. To stabilize the bucket in flight, he returned to the refill point to fill the Bambi bucket halfway (approximately1900pounds). He estimated that he could land at Liberal Camp 14minutes later with 100pounds of fuel in reserve. At 0708, when departing the site, the right engine fuel low warning light illuminated, followed a few seconds later by the left engine fuel low warning light. The warning light indicates that approximately 140pounds of fuel remains in the tank. At 0711, the pilot informed the SOPFEU communications operator at Roberval base that he was en route to Liberal Camp to refuel. The pilot decided to reassess the amount of fuel halfway between the fire site and Liberal Camp. At approximately 0715, at the halfway point, the pilot noted that he did not have sufficient fuel to reach his destination and elected to land as soon as possible. He continued onward to his destination, seeking a suitable landing area. At 0720:51, 12minutes after the fuel low warning light illuminated, the right engine stopped. The pilot elected to abort the flight immediately and land in a sand pit beside a logging road. He informed the passenger of his intention and asked the passenger to notify SOPFEU and request fuel from them. Forty-four seconds after the first engine stopped, the second engine stopped when the helicopter was approximately 300feet above ground level. The pilot commenced an autorotation and dropped the Bambi bucket during the descent. One second later, the low rotor horn (Nr) activated and remained on until ground impact 13seconds later. The passenger's attempt at communicating with the firefighting chief was interrupted by the loss of both engines. After striking a flat area, sparsely covered with alder trees, the helicopter bounced 10metres on a heading of 27degrees magnetic and came to rest on its right side on the shore of the Mistassini River. The emergency locator transmitter (ELT) activated on impact. The pilot, who was flying the helicopter from the right seat, was ejected from the aircraft. Though wearing a helmet, the pilot sustained serious lacerations to his head and face. The passenger, who was seated in the left front seat, was trapped in the cockpit. After attempting for one hour to contact C-FXDS by radio, SOPFEU began an aerial search at approximately 0820. The aircraft was found at 0855. At 0700, Roberval weather station, located 77nm to the south of the occurrence site, reported no cloud ceiling, visibility 15miles, temperature 23C and winds from the west at 8knots. The pilot was certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations. His employer considered him a capable pilot who always exhibited a professional attitude. He received his commercial pilot licence in April1991. In November1999, the company provided him with theory and practical training on the Bell212, a medium-weight, twin-engine helicopter. The pilot's licence was endorsed for the Bell212 in December1999. In January2001, he renewed his Pilot Proficiency Check on the Bell212. For this type of endorsement, the company does not provide a practical, on-site training program with an experienced pilot. On-site training is not required by regulation, and the company does not normally provide it to the pilots. Prior to his training on the Bell212, the pilot had some 3000flying hours logged exclusively on lightweight, single-engine helicopters. The contract with SOPFEU came into effect on 10June2001; it was the pilot's first commercial contract with the Bell212. Until then, the pilot had just over 25flying hours on type. The pilot also held an aircraft maintenance engineer licence, which authorized him to sign a maintenance release for the Bell212. In January2001, on a theory examination on the Bell212, the pilot's correct answers to questions on the fuel system indicated that he knew that when the FUEL LOW warning light illuminated, 140pounds of fuel remained and, according to the same examination, that the company considered 210pounds as the low fuel level for the Bell212. The flight manual states that approximately 10minutes of flying time at cruise power remains once the light is activated, and describes the procedure for opening the cross-feed valves. It does not state that the aircraft should be landed on a low-fuel indication. The aircraft was in flight for approximately two hours when the first engine stopped; this is consistent with fuel consumption of 700pounds per hour, which is normal for this type of operation. Under the regulations, a helicopter in VFR flight must have sufficient fuel to fly to the destination aerodrome and then to fly for 20minutes at normal cruising speed. The requirements of Canadian Helicopters Limited regarding fuel, published in their operations manual, reiterate the regulations in effect. The company has no specific procedures (none is required) for low-fuel situations or when FUEL LOW warning lights illuminate on an aircraft equipped with them. The pilot took the Transport Canada Pilot Decision-Making course in November1998. Pilot decision-making training introduces pilots to the factors that affect human performance, the decision-making process, and how to counteract human error. The day before the occurrence, the pilot flew for two hours between 0930 and 2000. He went to bed at approximately 2130. He was awake from 2300 to 0100 on work-related duties. The day of the occurrence, he awoke at approximately 0430 to prepare for the day's flights. A breakfast was prepared for him, which he ate in the aircraft. Aircraft records indicate that the aircraft was certified and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures. The helicopter's weight was within limits and its centre of gravity was within the normal range. Because of the extensive damage, calibration of the fuel system could not be verified. However, in February2001, both fuel tank probes and each main tank's fuel low indicator switch were calibrated in accordance with approved procedures. When there is a low fuel level situation, the FUEL LOW warning light illuminates for the engine No1 side or the engine No2 side, indicating that a total of approximately 140pounds of fuel remains. Though not required for the occurrence flight, the aircraft was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) (Fairchild model 93-A100-31) with 32minutes 15seconds of digital recording capacity that loops and continues to record over itself. The CVR was installed in accordance with a Limited Supplementary Type Approval (LSTA), number P-LSH 92-315, approved by Transport Canada. One of the criteria outlined in Subchapter F 525.1457 (d) (2) was that each cockpit voice recorder must be installed so that, within 10minutes after crash impact, there is an automatic means to simultaneously stop the recorder and prevent each erasure feature from functioning. In accordance with the LSTA, a G switch was installed to stop the CVR recording on impacts over 5Gs (acceleration due to gravity). Nonetheless, the CVR continued to operate until the pilot cut the electrical power 9minutes 44seconds after the crash. Examination of the G switch indicated that it was pointing in the direction of flight as specified in the LSTA. Tests carried out showed it activated at 4G impacts. Given that the CVR did not stop recording as stipulated by regulations, its installation was compared with the installation of the ELT, also activated by a G switch, which did set off on impact. It was found that regulatory requirements governing ELT installation on helicopters differ from those governing aeroplanes. When installed in an aeroplane, the ELT must be mounted with its sensitive axis pointing in the direction of flight, while on a helicopter the ELT must be mounted with its sensitive axis pointing approximately 45degrees downward from the normal forward direction of flight. The ELT installation requirements take into account the most likely flight line at impact of both type of aircraft. However, regulatory requirements governing CVR installation make no distinction between installation in helicopters or in aeroplanes. SOPFEU was responsible for operational and administrative supervision of helicopters operating under contract. On each take-off from a main, secondary or pre-positioning base, the pilot is required to report, to either the message centre or land operations, the departure time, the estimated arrival time at the destination, the destination itself and the nature of the work to be carried out. These same procedures apply when the pilot arrives and departs from the site. For safety reasons, the pilot must also report his position every 20minutes during flight. In the event that an aircraft does not report its position during flight, search procedures would be initiated after 30minutes for a search aircraft and after 60minutes for transport aircraft. During the flight, position-reporting procedures were not strictly followed. The estimated time of arrival was not reported until arrival at the fire, the Roberval message centre was not informed that the aircraft had taken off to carry out water bucketing, and no estimated time of arrival at Liberal Camp was provided or requested. Though not required, the low fuel level situation was not reported during the final stage.