Synopsis While upbound in the St. Lawrence River, the laden bulk carrier FEDERAL MACKENZIE grounded on the south side of the Verchres-Contrecoeur Channel, Quebec. There was no apparent damage to the vessel and there were no injuries. The Board determined that the FEDERAL MACKENZIE grounded because of a loss of propulsion which, in turn, resulted in a loss of steering. The loss of propulsion was caused by the fuel control lever becoming displaced due to the vibration of the vessel while transiting a shallow channel. 1.0 Factual Information 1.1 Particulars of the Vessel 1.1.1 Description of the Vessel The FEDERAL MACKENZIE is a conventional-type bulk carrier with her cargo area forward and the bridge, accommodation, and engine-room aft. 1.1.2 Engine Controls (See Photographs - Appendix A) The main engine can be controlled from three different positions, namely: the emergency stand at the main engine; the remote control in the wheel-house; and the remote control in the engine-room. Regardless of the fact that the main engine may be remotely controlled from the bridge or the engine-room, the control at the emergency stand can override the remote stations. There are two levers at the emergency stand. Lever A controls the gear and is marked Start, Ahead, Stop and Astern. Lever B controls fuel flow into the engine and is graduated 0 to 10. Below the 0 position is marked Remote Control at which position the lever is placed for such operation. Lever B has a button control on its end which is used for operating a locking device. However, evidence indicated that the ratchet lock had worn down and had lost its effectiveness. There is a warning light in the engine control-room to show that the engine is being controlled from the emergency stand. There is no such light on the bridge, where warning lights indicate Engine-room Control or Wheel-house Control only. The wheel-house indicator light Wheel-house Control remains lit if the emergency stand lever B is moved out of the remote control position. A number of alarms are activated if the engine stalls. The controllable-pitch propeller revolves in a pivoting Kort nozzle which acts as a rudder. 1.2 History of the Voyage After an uneventful Atlantic crossing, the FEDERAL MACKENZIE arrived at the Les Escoumins pilot station at 19403 on 13 July 1993. The vessel continued her voyage up the St. Lawrence River, bound for Toledo, Ohio, USA, under the conduct of a Canadian pilot. The engines were on bridge control. At 2107, 14 July, the vessel was proceeding up the Verchres-Contrecoeur Channel (see Appendix B for sketch of the area) at a speed of 10 knots over the ground. Evidence indicates that there was considerable vibration attributed at the time to shallow water beneath the keel. During the transit of the channel, the main engine failed. The engine-room employees were unable to restart the engines in time to avoid the grounding. When propulsion was lost, the vessel veered to port. Despite corrective helm action, the swing accelerated. At 2122, the vessel moved out of the navigable channel and grounded on the south side, approximately one cable east of buoy M79 in position 4548'18N, 7319'19W. Soon after the vessel grounded, lever B (fuel control) of the emergency stand was found in the 0 position. No one in the engine-room had moved the lever. After the lever was replaced in the remote control position, the main engine was restarted but attempts to refloat the vessel were unsuccessful until 0830, 19 July 1993, at which time she resumed her voyage to Toledo. 1.3 Composition of the Bridge Watch At the time of the occurrence, the bridge watch consisted of a pilot, an officer of the watch (OOW), and a helmsman. 1.3.1 Composition of the Engine-room Watch At the time of the occurrence, the engine-room watch consisted of an engineer of the watch (EOW), an electrician, and an oiler. 1.4 Injuries to Persons 1.5 Damage 1.5.1 Damage to the Vessel There was no apparent damage to the vessel. 1.5.2 Environmental Damage 1.6 Certification 1.6.1 Vessel The vessel was certificated, manned, and equipped in accordance with existing regulations. 1.6.2 Personnel The master, the OOW, and the pilot held qualifications appropriate for the class of vessel on which they were serving and for the voyage being undertaken. The engineers held qualifications appropriate for the rating of the machinery on board. 1.7 Personnel History 1.7.1 Master The master had served in this capacity for 18 years and had been master of the FEDERAL MACKENZIE since 24 March 1993. 1.7.2 Officer of the Watch The OOW had five years' experience as a deck officer. He joined the FEDERAL MACKENZIE on 28 March 1993. Working a routine sea-watch system, he was quite rested when reporting for duty at 2000. 1.7.3 Helmsman The helmsman had three years' experience as a deck-hand and had acted as a helmsman throughout that period. He had been aboard the FEDERAL MACKENZIE since 26 March 1993. 1.7.4 Pilot The pilot had conducted vessels in his designated area for 18 years. His schedule was such that an adequate rest period was provided between each assignment. 1.7.5 Chief Engineer The chief engineer had served in this capacity aboard the FEDERAL MACKENZIE for 10 months, having had previous experience on similar vessels. 1.8 Environmental Information 1.8.1 Weather At the time of the occurrence, the weather conditions observed were good with south-westerly winds of 10 knots and good visibility. These conditions resembled the forecast issued earlier by Environment Canada. 1.8.2 Tidal and Current Information The tidal influence at Contrecoeur is not significant. Between Lanoraie and Sorel, Quebec, the river current has an average rate of 1.8 knots to 2.0 knots. 1.9 Navigation Equipment 1.9.1 Vessel The navigation equipment was found to be in good working condition. It was not a contributory factor to this occurrence. 1.9.2 Shore The shipping channel has a minimum width of 244 m and a least depth of 10.7 m. All navigation aids in the area were reported to be in position and operating normally at the time of the occurrence.