Although the company was required to comply with Regulation 11(c) of the SOLAS Convention, it did not report the leaks either to the classification society, which is responsible for issuing the relevant certificate, or to the authorities of the country in which the vessel was calling, ie. Transport Canada. In the abovementioned instances, the repairs performed under the supervision of the company did not produce the anticipated results. As the vessel had been in service for some 20 years and most bulk carriers which sink are more than 15 years old, it was incumbent upon the company to be more vigilant with regard to the maintenance of this vessel and to report to the classification society any deficiency which could affect the vessel's seaworthiness. In two instances, it was determined that corrosion had contributed to the degradation of the hull, particularly to the deterioration of the welds in the shell plating. In adopting the International Safety Management Code on 04November 1993, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) encouraged companies to implement a safety management system at all levels of the company, both on-board ship and on shore. As the Code does not go into effect for bulk carriers until 1998, the IMO can only promote it at this time. Sound safety management ensures that a vessel is maintained in compliance with regulatory requirements. Contrary to the spirit of the Code, the company, on its own initiative, assessed the risks and significance of the leaks on the DORADO. As it was considered that the damages did not compromise the vessel's seaworthiness, the occurrences were not recorded in the ship's official documents. Inspections revealed that the damages were substantial enough to warrant the DORADO being dry-docked in 1994 to undergo major repairs. The vessel held a number of inspection certificates which, while valid on their face, did not accurately reflect the vessel's compromised seaworthiness. The validity of the certificates is based on an agreement between the company and the classification society that issues the certificates. If either party does not fulfil its commitments, the inspection certificates are worthless and verification of these certificates under Port State Control is futile. If Canadian authorities had not been informed of the leaks on board the DORADO, the loss of seaworthiness in these occurrences would have gone unnoticed.Analysis Although the company was required to comply with Regulation 11(c) of the SOLAS Convention, it did not report the leaks either to the classification society, which is responsible for issuing the relevant certificate, or to the authorities of the country in which the vessel was calling, ie. Transport Canada. In the abovementioned instances, the repairs performed under the supervision of the company did not produce the anticipated results. As the vessel had been in service for some 20 years and most bulk carriers which sink are more than 15 years old, it was incumbent upon the company to be more vigilant with regard to the maintenance of this vessel and to report to the classification society any deficiency which could affect the vessel's seaworthiness. In two instances, it was determined that corrosion had contributed to the degradation of the hull, particularly to the deterioration of the welds in the shell plating. In adopting the International Safety Management Code on 04November 1993, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) encouraged companies to implement a safety management system at all levels of the company, both on-board ship and on shore. As the Code does not go into effect for bulk carriers until 1998, the IMO can only promote it at this time. Sound safety management ensures that a vessel is maintained in compliance with regulatory requirements. Contrary to the spirit of the Code, the company, on its own initiative, assessed the risks and significance of the leaks on the DORADO. As it was considered that the damages did not compromise the vessel's seaworthiness, the occurrences were not recorded in the ship's official documents. Inspections revealed that the damages were substantial enough to warrant the DORADO being dry-docked in 1994 to undergo major repairs. The vessel held a number of inspection certificates which, while valid on their face, did not accurately reflect the vessel's compromised seaworthiness. The validity of the certificates is based on an agreement between the company and the classification society that issues the certificates. If either party does not fulfil its commitments, the inspection certificates are worthless and verification of these certificates under Port State Control is futile. If Canadian authorities had not been informed of the leaks on board the DORADO, the loss of seaworthiness in these occurrences would have gone unnoticed. The company considered that the leaks discovered by the crew did not compromise the vessel's seaworthiness. As the classification society was not informed that the vessel had sustained damages, it did not supervise the repairs. The repairs performed under the supervision of the company did not produce the anticipated results. The damages and repairs were not recorded in the ship's official documents. The leaks compromised the vessel's seaworthiness. When the vessel entered Canadian waters on 27September 1995, no deficiency was reported. In the two occurrences in Canada, it was determined that welds in the shell plating were corroded. The vessel's construction certificate did not accurately reflect the vessel's compromised seaworthiness. The company had not implemented a safety management system. The authorities and classification societies cannot promote a safety management system without company participation.Findings The company considered that the leaks discovered by the crew did not compromise the vessel's seaworthiness. As the classification society was not informed that the vessel had sustained damages, it did not supervise the repairs. The repairs performed under the supervision of the company did not produce the anticipated results. The damages and repairs were not recorded in the ship's official documents. The leaks compromised the vessel's seaworthiness. When the vessel entered Canadian waters on 27September 1995, no deficiency was reported. In the two occurrences in Canada, it was determined that welds in the shell plating were corroded. The vessel's construction certificate did not accurately reflect the vessel's compromised seaworthiness. The company had not implemented a safety management system. The authorities and classification societies cannot promote a safety management system without company participation. Leaks compromised the vessel's seaworthiness. Welding failure due to corrosion caused the leaks in the vessel's double-bottom tanks.Causes and Contributing Factors Leaks compromised the vessel's seaworthiness. Welding failure due to corrosion caused the leaks in the vessel's double-bottom tanks.