Efforts to depart the wharf were complicated because, immediately to shoreward of the easternmost dolphin, the sea floor rises up sharply, parallel to the shore. There is an insufficient water depth for vessels to approach other than from a direction between west and south. In the case of the JAMESNORRIS, because of the self-unloading gear disposition and the dolphin configuration, the vessel could only tie up port side to the berth. The wind at the time of departure was too strong for the available power configuration of the vessel and kept her pinned to the dolphins. If the bow thrust power was insufficient in view of the strong south-east winds, then the use of the starboard anchor, deployed on arrival, may have helped the vessel to leave the berth. However, this action remained at the master's discretion, and the situation may have been aggravated if the anchor had dragged as the vessel departed. Because of the wharf's exposed location, the barometric pressure was monitored, but the person monitoring the barometer did not record that the barometric pressure was decreasing steadily. This may have been due to a faulty instrument or to the frequency of monitoring. As the weather stations at Toronto headlands and Cobourg were decommissioned in April 1995, nearshore severe weather warnings were not available to the bridge watch on VHF channel 16 or on the weather channels. When all attempts to leave had failed and the weather continued to deteriorate, the master made a safe decision in getting the majority of the crew off the vessel, and eventually the skeleton crew as well before daylight finished. The storm weather conditions would have seriously impaired the crew's ability to get off later in darkness with the vessel pounding against the dolphins, and a delay could have resulted in casualties. The sudden deterioration of the weather in the exposed loading location, the vessel's power configuration, the unavailability of accurate weather forecast information from shoreside facilities and the human interpretation of the decreasing barometric pressure information all contributed to the occurrence.Analysis Efforts to depart the wharf were complicated because, immediately to shoreward of the easternmost dolphin, the sea floor rises up sharply, parallel to the shore. There is an insufficient water depth for vessels to approach other than from a direction between west and south. In the case of the JAMESNORRIS, because of the self-unloading gear disposition and the dolphin configuration, the vessel could only tie up port side to the berth. The wind at the time of departure was too strong for the available power configuration of the vessel and kept her pinned to the dolphins. If the bow thrust power was insufficient in view of the strong south-east winds, then the use of the starboard anchor, deployed on arrival, may have helped the vessel to leave the berth. However, this action remained at the master's discretion, and the situation may have been aggravated if the anchor had dragged as the vessel departed. Because of the wharf's exposed location, the barometric pressure was monitored, but the person monitoring the barometer did not record that the barometric pressure was decreasing steadily. This may have been due to a faulty instrument or to the frequency of monitoring. As the weather stations at Toronto headlands and Cobourg were decommissioned in April 1995, nearshore severe weather warnings were not available to the bridge watch on VHF channel 16 or on the weather channels. When all attempts to leave had failed and the weather continued to deteriorate, the master made a safe decision in getting the majority of the crew off the vessel, and eventually the skeleton crew as well before daylight finished. The storm weather conditions would have seriously impaired the crew's ability to get off later in darkness with the vessel pounding against the dolphins, and a delay could have resulted in casualties. The sudden deterioration of the weather in the exposed loading location, the vessel's power configuration, the unavailability of accurate weather forecast information from shoreside facilities and the human interpretation of the decreasing barometric pressure information all contributed to the occurrence. The dolphin arrangement at Colborne exposes vessels to sudden deteriorations of weather. There is no shelter from, or breakwater preventing, incoming heavy seas, especially seas coming from a south-west to south-east direction. Approach and departure methods are limited because the sea bottom profile does not allow vessels of normal Seaway draught to approach or depart the wharf from a direction other than perpendicular to the shoreline. Based on all available weather data, the vessel was near the centre of a deepening depression. The vessel was caught loading alongside when the wind shifted rapidly and increased in strength from the south-east. Human interpretation of the decreasing barometric pressure and the unavailability of accurate weather forecast information from shoreside facilities contributed to the delay in departing the wharf before the onslaught of the bad weather. The master, in conjunction with the chief engineer, under difficult circumstances, made a safe decision in evacuating the crew in two stages, before the pounding became too serious, and additionally in preventing pollution by shutting off the fuel and lubrication oils while the engine-room was still accessible. The JAMESNORRIS main engine was operating with four of its five cylinders at the time of the attempted departure, and thus had less than maximum power. The JAMESNORRIS sank by the stern when the shell plating in way of the engine-room spaces was stove in by the continuous pounding of the vessel against a dolphin. The JAMESNORRIS sank by the stern when the shell plating in way of the engine-room spaces was stove in by the continuous pounding of the vessel against a dolphin.Findings The dolphin arrangement at Colborne exposes vessels to sudden deteriorations of weather. There is no shelter from, or breakwater preventing, incoming heavy seas, especially seas coming from a south-west to south-east direction. Approach and departure methods are limited because the sea bottom profile does not allow vessels of normal Seaway draught to approach or depart the wharf from a direction other than perpendicular to the shoreline. Based on all available weather data, the vessel was near the centre of a deepening depression. The vessel was caught loading alongside when the wind shifted rapidly and increased in strength from the south-east. Human interpretation of the decreasing barometric pressure and the unavailability of accurate weather forecast information from shoreside facilities contributed to the delay in departing the wharf before the onslaught of the bad weather. The master, in conjunction with the chief engineer, under difficult circumstances, made a safe decision in evacuating the crew in two stages, before the pounding became too serious, and additionally in preventing pollution by shutting off the fuel and lubrication oils while the engine-room was still accessible. The JAMESNORRIS main engine was operating with four of its five cylinders at the time of the attempted departure, and thus had less than maximum power. The JAMESNORRIS sank by the stern when the shell plating in way of the engine-room spaces was stove in by the continuous pounding of the vessel against a dolphin. The JAMESNORRIS sank by the stern when the shell plating in way of the engine-room spaces was stove in by the continuous pounding of the vessel against a dolphin. The JAMESNORRIS sank as a result of a combination of factors: the exposed loading location, the vessel's power configuration, the unavailability of accurate weather forecast information and human interpretation of the decreasing barometric pressure which delayed the vessel's departure from the wharf in deteriorating weather.Causes and Contributing Factors The JAMESNORRIS sank as a result of a combination of factors: the exposed loading location, the vessel's power configuration, the unavailability of accurate weather forecast information and human interpretation of the decreasing barometric pressure which delayed the vessel's departure from the wharf in deteriorating weather. Following the occurrence, the shipowners, U.L.S Corporation, met with the masters (assigned and relief) of the JAMESNORRIS to review the accident and to explore means to prevent recurrence. The owners also discussed with the Canadian Hydrographic Service concerning the survey and production of a more detailed chart of Ogden Point. The configuration of the St. Lawrence Cement berth was also reviewed to see if any modifications could be made for safer approach/departure.Safety Action Taken Following the occurrence, the shipowners, U.L.S Corporation, met with the masters (assigned and relief) of the JAMESNORRIS to review the accident and to explore means to prevent recurrence. The owners also discussed with the Canadian Hydrographic Service concerning the survey and production of a more detailed chart of Ogden Point. The configuration of the St. Lawrence Cement berth was also reviewed to see if any modifications could be made for safer approach/departure.