The JADEFOREST grounded while negotiating a 90 degree turn to starboard to pass between two islands, with an extensive shoal area to the north of the channel marked by a buoy. The slow rate of turn initiated by the pilot and the fact that full sea speed had been executed resulted in the vessel advancing further and decreasing the distance to the shallow water before any remedial action could be taken. As is the usual practice, the pilot had the con of the vessel from the moment the vessel left the berth. The master and the OOW, although present in the wheel-house and monitoring the vessel's progress, did not interfere with, or otherwise override the pilot's orders. The sequence of manoeuvres ordered by the pilot accumulated and resulted in the grounding. By ordering full sea speed shortly after leaving the berth, when the vessel was still in confined waters and before a sharp bend in the channel, the pilot exhausted one possible remedy that could have been used to increase the rate of turn or to stop the Jade FOREST. A large vessel usually approaches a bend at slow speed, moves the rudder over and increases the RPM of the propeller if it is necessary to increase the rate of turn. Such a sequence of manoeuvres gives the vessel a good turning moment without a significant increase in speed. Conversely, if the rate of turn is still insufficient, it is possible to stop the vessel in a shorter distance. The JADEFOREST was negotiating the turn at a speed of approximately 11 knots. Although she did not reach her normal sea speed of 14 knots, it was at that moment her maximum possible speed. The first order, for five degrees starboard rudder, intended to start the turn, did not yield the expected result. The rudder deflection was too small to turn a vessel of this size at an appreciable rate within a short distance. It must also be noted that a vessel with a right-handed propeller has a natural tendency to turn to port when the rudder is at the 0 (zero) position because of the side effect of the turning propeller. To compensate for this side effect, the rudder's real amidship position is offset to approximately two to three degrees to starboard. Thus, the practical effect of the order for five degrees starboard rudder on the JADEFOREST was decreased by the offset, making it even less significant. While the pilot was waiting for the long period of 20 seconds to hear the gyro clicking, the JADEFOREST covered a distance of approximately 120 metres ahead. When the pilot ordered 10 degrees starboard rudder, the distance to buoy P2 was only five cables. Several more seconds elapsed before the pilot increased to 20 degrees starboard rudder and thence to hard-to-starboard. Additionally, it took approximately 10 seconds before the rudder moved to the hard-over position. From the turning circle data established during sea trials, it is known that the advance of the JADEFOREST is approximately 3.2 cables from the time the rudder is in the full hard-over position. The vessel's length is about 1.2 cables. These two figures indicate that, to successfully negotiate a 90-degree turn, the JADEFOREST needs a minimum distance ahead of 4.4 cables from the wheel-house if the rudder is already in the hard-over position. Therefore, the remaining five cables from the radar scanner to buoy P2 was barely sufficient to accomplish the 90 degree turn, even if the hard-to-starboard order had been given at that time. All three navigators in the wheel-house were monitoring the vessel's progress and were aware of the distance to the shoal. The fact that the pilot ordered the rudder deflection in steps and the master did not increase it at any stage of the turn indicates that the bridge team did not evaluate the situation by comparing the vessel's manoeuvring characteristic data with the remaining distance ahead. Similarly, although there had been no discussion of variations from the courses laid down on the chart by the OOW, the bridge team did not question the vessel's courses as ordered by the pilot in Northumberland Channel which did not follow the courses plotted by the OOW.Analysis The JADEFOREST grounded while negotiating a 90 degree turn to starboard to pass between two islands, with an extensive shoal area to the north of the channel marked by a buoy. The slow rate of turn initiated by the pilot and the fact that full sea speed had been executed resulted in the vessel advancing further and decreasing the distance to the shallow water before any remedial action could be taken. As is the usual practice, the pilot had the con of the vessel from the moment the vessel left the berth. The master and the OOW, although present in the wheel-house and monitoring the vessel's progress, did not interfere with, or otherwise override the pilot's orders. The sequence of manoeuvres ordered by the pilot accumulated and resulted in the grounding. By ordering full sea speed shortly after leaving the berth, when the vessel was still in confined waters and before a sharp bend in the channel, the pilot exhausted one possible remedy that could have been used to increase the rate of turn or to stop the Jade FOREST. A large vessel usually approaches a bend at slow speed, moves the rudder over and increases the RPM of the propeller if it is necessary to increase the rate of turn. Such a sequence of manoeuvres gives the vessel a good turning moment without a significant increase in speed. Conversely, if the rate of turn is still insufficient, it is possible to stop the vessel in a shorter distance. The JADEFOREST was negotiating the turn at a speed of approximately 11 knots. Although she did not reach her normal sea speed of 14 knots, it was at that moment her maximum possible speed. The first order, for five degrees starboard rudder, intended to start the turn, did not yield the expected result. The rudder deflection was too small to turn a vessel of this size at an appreciable rate within a short distance. It must also be noted that a vessel with a right-handed propeller has a natural tendency to turn to port when the rudder is at the 0 (zero) position because of the side effect of the turning propeller. To compensate for this side effect, the rudder's real amidship position is offset to approximately two to three degrees to starboard. Thus, the practical effect of the order for five degrees starboard rudder on the JADEFOREST was decreased by the offset, making it even less significant. While the pilot was waiting for the long period of 20 seconds to hear the gyro clicking, the JADEFOREST covered a distance of approximately 120 metres ahead. When the pilot ordered 10 degrees starboard rudder, the distance to buoy P2 was only five cables. Several more seconds elapsed before the pilot increased to 20 degrees starboard rudder and thence to hard-to-starboard. Additionally, it took approximately 10 seconds before the rudder moved to the hard-over position. From the turning circle data established during sea trials, it is known that the advance of the JADEFOREST is approximately 3.2 cables from the time the rudder is in the full hard-over position. The vessel's length is about 1.2 cables. These two figures indicate that, to successfully negotiate a 90-degree turn, the JADEFOREST needs a minimum distance ahead of 4.4 cables from the wheel-house if the rudder is already in the hard-over position. Therefore, the remaining five cables from the radar scanner to buoy P2 was barely sufficient to accomplish the 90 degree turn, even if the hard-to-starboard order had been given at that time. All three navigators in the wheel-house were monitoring the vessel's progress and were aware of the distance to the shoal. The fact that the pilot ordered the rudder deflection in steps and the master did not increase it at any stage of the turn indicates that the bridge team did not evaluate the situation by comparing the vessel's manoeuvring characteristic data with the remaining distance ahead. Similarly, although there had been no discussion of variations from the courses laid down on the chart by the OOW, the bridge team did not question the vessel's courses as ordered by the pilot in Northumberland Channel which did not follow the courses plotted by the OOW. The propulsion machinery and steering equipment of the Jade FOREST were in good working order. No detailed discussion of the voyage plan took place before departure. The pilot requested full sea speed shortly after the vessel left the berth, when the vessel was in confined waters and before a sharp bend in the channel. The JADEFOREST was closing the distance to the shallow water at her maximum possible speed. The initial angle of the rudder, five degrees to starboard, was too small to start the turn at a sufficient rate. Subsequent rudder orders were delayed, so that the helm orders given in steps (10 degrees, 20 degrees and hard-to-starboard) were insufficient in the developing circumstances. The master did not take over the con from the pilot when the rate of turn was too slow. The vessel could not be stopped nor the rate of turn increased after the rudder was moved to the hard-over position prior to the grounding. All actions following the grounding, up to and including the refloating, by the master, crew and port authorities, were timely and appropriate in the circumstances. The JADEFOREST sustained extensive damage to her bottom shell plating.Findings The propulsion machinery and steering equipment of the Jade FOREST were in good working order. No detailed discussion of the voyage plan took place before departure. The pilot requested full sea speed shortly after the vessel left the berth, when the vessel was in confined waters and before a sharp bend in the channel. The JADEFOREST was closing the distance to the shallow water at her maximum possible speed. The initial angle of the rudder, five degrees to starboard, was too small to start the turn at a sufficient rate. Subsequent rudder orders were delayed, so that the helm orders given in steps (10 degrees, 20 degrees and hard-to-starboard) were insufficient in the developing circumstances. The master did not take over the con from the pilot when the rate of turn was too slow. The vessel could not be stopped nor the rate of turn increased after the rudder was moved to the hard-over position prior to the grounding. All actions following the grounding, up to and including the refloating, by the master, crew and port authorities, were timely and appropriate in the circumstances. The JADEFOREST sustained extensive damage to her bottom shell plating. The JADEFOREST grounded because of the full sea speed combined with the insufficient rudder deflection ordered by the pilot when the vessel was approaching a sharp bend in the channel, and of the lack of input by the master or the OOW.Causes and Contributing Factors The JADEFOREST grounded because of the full sea speed combined with the insufficient rudder deflection ordered by the pilot when the vessel was approaching a sharp bend in the channel, and of the lack of input by the master or the OOW.