2.0 Analysis 2.1 Introduction This analysis will concentrate on communications, and the bridge resource management on the vessels involved in the accident. Also considered will be the failure to sound the prescribed signals to avert collision and the course alterations made while the vessels were at close quarters. Special attention will also be given to the danger of commercial vessels heading for the Victoria pilot station meeting, and at times crossing, fishing vessels using Baynes Channel in a traffic separation scheme. 2.2 Radio Communications Neither vessel could overhear any of the other's transmissions with respect to the conduct of the vessel or their intentions; their working channels were different, with the PACIFIC CHALLENGER monitoring a channel used by local fishing vessels and the OAKBY monitoring the VTS channel. Both the OAKBY and the PACIFIC CHALLENGER were, however, monitoring channel 16 and each vessel could have used that channel to initiate a call to the other vessel. 2.3 Sound Signals Both vessels initiated alterations of course before the collision. A best reconstruction of events, based on testimony and the trace from the course recorder of the OAKBY, indicates that the OAKBY began an alteration to starboard when the vessels were about one and a half miles apart and the PACIFIC CHALLENGER altered to port when the vessels had closed to less than half a mile. Both vessels initiated the course alteration without warning the other vessel by R/T, sound signals, or light signals. Signals by the vessels would have indicated the manoeuvre that each was initiating and, thus, could have prevented them from turning in the same direction. A sound signal, consisting of five short blasts to indicate danger, was made by the OAKBY after the PACIFIC CHALLENGER was seen to alter course ahead of her. 2.4 Speed of the Vessels The OAKBY maintained her service speed of about 14 knots until she slackened to a manoeuvring speed of about 13 knots a few minutes before the accident. That speed was not appropriate for the traffic conditions in the area she was entering. The vessel had been informed that a fleet of about 50 fishing vessels was proceeding toward Baynes Channel. The vessels were in sight, and the situation called for a great deal more caution. Both vessels were moving on reciprocal routes at a combined speed of over 20 knots. Although additional starboard helm was applied by the OAKBY when the PACIFIC CHALLENGER was seen to alter course across her track, this could not prevent the collision. 2.5 Watch Despite the good visibility, the bridge watch on the PACIFIC CHALLENGER only detected the presence of the OAKBY ahead when that vessel was half a mile distant. The approaching bulk carrier was in sight as soon as she rounded Discovery Island, ie. more than 15 minutes before the twovessels crossed. The attention of the bridge watch on the fishing vessel was mainly focused on the other fishing vessels that were close to and moving in the same direction. By the time the OAKBY was again noticed, collision was inevitable. The course alteration by the OAKBY south of Trial Islands toward the Victoria pilot station should have been anticipated by the bridge watch on the fishing vessels. It is the normal course alteration required at that point for all vessels governed by the rules of navigation within the traffic separation scheme. The bridge watch on the OAKBY had been informed by R/T that a fishing fleet was in the area. Many vessels were in sight and the bulk carrier had crossed some of them already. The course alteration by the fishing vessels also should have been anticipated by the navigating personnel on the bulk carrier. The pilots employed in these waters are aware that the fishing fleet regularly passes through Baynes Channel when returning to Vancouver after a day's fishing. 2.6 Traffic Separation Scheme Because the landward boundary of the westbound traffic lane is close inshore at Trial Islands and the Sailing Directions recommend caution with respect to using the passage north of these islands, the inshore traffic zone is significantly restricted for traffic not using the traffic separation scheme between the Juan de Fuca Strait and Haro Strait. Vessels bound from Race Rocks to Baynes Channel and not using an inshore traffic zone must cross the traffic separation scheme at two points. However, in crossing the lanes at right angles, as required by the Colregs, it can be estimated that, for a vessel such as the PACIFIC CHALLENGER, only two and a half to three miles, or some 20 minutes, is added to the inbound passage. Vessels following a direct course line, as the PACIFIC CHALLENGER did on this occasion, make an alteration of course off Trial Islands, in the same vicinity as outbound vessels using the traffic separation scheme alter course to head for the pilot station. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings A fleet of about 50 fishing vessels was proceeding inbound to Vancouver from the Juan de Fuca Strait. The fishing fleet did not participate in the Vancouver vessel traffic routing system. In this area of the Juan de Fuca Strait, the route used by the fishing vessels took them through the traffic separation scheme against the general direction of traffic flow for a distance of over two miles. Both vessels were monitoring channel 16 of the very high frequency radiotelephone (VHF R/T), but they were using different working frequencies for transmissions regarding the conduct and intentions of the vessel. The OAKBY was proceeding toward the Victoria pilot station. The bulk carrier maintained her service speed until she slackened to manoeuvring speed some six minutes before the collision. Prior to the collision, the two vessels were closing on reciprocal courses at a combined speed in excess of 20 knots. Neither vessel attempted to communicate with the other in any way, even when it became clear that a close-quarters situation was developing. Both vessels altered course prior to the collision and their headings were changing in the same direction as a close-quarters situation developed. Neither vessel gave sound signals or other signals to indicate her intention to alter course. The attention of the person who had the conduct of the PACIFIC CHALLENGER was diverted from the OAKBY as he manoeuvred his vessel within the fishing fleet. The collision occurred at an approximate angle of impact of 70 degrees, the port bow of the PACIFIC CHALLENGER striking the port bow of the OAKBY. The ACIFIC CHALLENGER sustained considerable damage and one crew member was injured. Due to the lack of sea room, there is no inshore traffic zone south of Trial Islands. 3.2 Causes The OAKBY, which was aware of the presence of a fishing fleet in the area, was making excessive speed in the circumstances. The watch on the PACIFIC CHALLENGER was ineffective; speed was not reduced and no action was taken to avert a close-quarters situation. Neither vessel took corrective action in sufficient time to prevent the collision, and neither made any attempt to notify the other of her intentions by radio, sound signals or visual signals. A contributing factor in the collision was that the PACIFIC CHALLENGER was proceeding against the general direction of traffic flow in the traffic separation scheme. 4.0 Safety Action 4.1 Action Taken 4.1.1 Advisory Notice to Commercial Ships and Fishing Vessels In June 1995, representatives of the Canadian Coast Guard, the Fisheries Council of British Columbia, the British Columbia Coast Pilots and the shipping industry met to discuss safety issues concerning commercial ships and fishing vessels on the West Coast. As a result, the 1995 Advisory Notice to Commercial Ships and Fishing Vessels Using the Inside Passage Waters of British Columbia During the Commercial Fishing Season was distributed to the industry and was also published in several industry publications including the Westcoast Fisherman, the Westcoast Mariner, and the union newspaper, The Fisherman. Fishing vessel operators are advised, inter alia, to monitor the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) channel while in transit and to comply with the safety measures required by Rule 10 of the Collision Regulations when crossing or transiting a traffic separation scheme. Commercial ships are also advised, inter alia, to monitor channel78A of the very high frequency radiotelephone (VHFR/T) in addition to the VST channel while transiting an open fishing ground.