Summary On the evening of 12 September 2005, off le dOrlans on the Saint Lawrence River, the sailing vessel El Tio was bound for Repentigny, Quebec, under engine power. It followed the green buoys that mark the navigable waterway of the northern channel between Cap Gribane and PointSaintJean, le dOrlans, Quebec. At about 2300, the oil tanker Maria Desgagns and the sailing vessel El Tio were moving towards each other. Having been informed of near-collisions between the sailboat and two other vessels a little earlier in the evening, the Maria Desgagns bridge crew took steps to avoid a collision by trying to communicate with the sailboat and whistling warning signals. Nevertheless, the ships paths crossed upstream from the SaintFranois quay. Despite the steps taken by the two vessels, the El Tio and the Maria Desgagns collided. The oil tanker Maria Desgagns was not damaged. The hull of the sailboat ElTio was, however, dented on the port quarter and its sails collapsed; the captain/owner was not injured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information History of the Voyage On 12 September 2005, at about 1245,2 the sailboat El Tio left the PointeauPic quay, Quebec, and set course for its home port, the Repentigny marina, Quebec. The stopover at PointeauPic was part of the return trip from Baie des Chaleurs. Alone on the vessel and awake since 0200, the captain/owner planned to stop later in the day at the SaintLawrence marina, ledOrlans, Quebec. At about 1730, the captain decided to lower the sails and carry on under engine power. The trip down the SaintLaurent River was without incident. At about 2130, the sailboat was located just off Anse aux Bardeaux, roughly 10 miles downstream from the eastern point of le dOrlans. A few minutes earlier, the dredger Port Mchins, which was dredging in the marked navigable channel off the Cap Brl riverbank, had left the dredging area for a dumping area off Sault-au-Cochon. The dredger first noticed the sailboat El Tio when it was located slightly upstream from Cap Gribane, between buoysK91 and K95. As the two ships approached each another just off Cap Rouge, the PortMchins crew realized that the two ships paths would cross and that there was a risk of collision. The dredger reduced speed to a minimum, whistled a warning signal and switched on a searchlight. Seeing no noticeable change in the situation, the dredger PortMchins tried unsuccessfully to reach the sailboat El Tio by radio on VHFchannels 12 and 16. When the sailboat was about 100m off its bow, the dredger took evasive action, veering to starboard to avoid a collision. A few minutes later, the dredger forwarded an account of the event to the MaritimeCommunications and Traffic Services (MCTS) Centre in Qubec on VHF channel 12. The MCTS Centre relayed the information to three downbound ships that were approaching the area: the large sailboat Sedna IV, the oil tanker MariaDesgagns and the bulk carrier CanadianProgress. A little later in the evening, around 2240, the Sedna IV encountered conditions and circumstances similar to those experienced by the dredger PortMchins. Downstream from Saint-Franois quay, le dOrlans, between buoys K115 and K119, the SednaIVs crew took similar steps to avert a collision. This time, the ship moved to the port side to clear the sailboat ElTio. After avoiding the collision, they reported this second event to the MCTS Centre in Qubec. In addition to the pilot who oversaw operations aboard the Maria Desgagns, the bridge crew also included an apprentice pilot, the captain, the watchkeeping officer and a helmsman. All crew members took careful note of the transmitted reports and messages concerning the sailboat that was moving upstream and navigating dangerously. In response to the request to reduce speed off Saint-Franois quay, the MariaDesgagns reduced power for the first time at about 2245. Consistent with the earlier ships reports, the MariaDesgagns bridge crew noticed that the sailboat ElTio was zigzagging in the channel, adjoining the green buoys. Figure 1. The El Tio and the Maria Desgagns collided at about 2300 in the centre of the channel betweenbuoys K119 and K123, one-half mile south of SaintFranois quay. At that point, the crew did everything possible to ensure that the ships crossed paths safety. TheMaria Desgagns, already in the middle of the channel, moved to the starboard side of the channel to give the El Tiomore room to manoeuvre and reduced speed a second time. TheMaria Desgagns whistled a warning signal and used the spotlight twice to confirm the ElTios position as well as signal its presence to the captain of the ElTio. At one point, they saw a reflection, which they interpreted as a light signal from ElTios cockpit. The MariaDesgagns bridge crew interpreted the signal as confirmation that it had been seen. They continued at reduced speed while still observing the ElTio. When the sailboat El Tio was less than 100m off the starboard bow of the oil tanker MariaDesgagns, the sailboat quickly veered to starboard and crossed the oil tankers path. The two ships collided at about 2300 in the middle of the channel, between buoysK119 and K123, one-half mile south of Saint-Franois quay (see Figure1). Navigation Procedures on the El Tio The cabin of the sailboat ElTio was equipped with several navigation aids. On the chart table, there was an Electronic Chart System (ECS) programmed on a laptop, a global positioning system (GPS) and a very high frequency (VHF)radiotelephone. The sailboats cockpit was equipped with a magnetic compass and a second GPS, located on the rudder column. The sailboat was not equipped with radar. Before leaving Repentigny for Baie des Chaleurs, the captain of the ElTio had used the ECS and GPS to select trip routes. To avoid bothering commercial traffic, he had chosen waypoints (WPs) located along the port buoys.The coordinates of these WPs had then been programmed into the cockpit GPS. On the return trip, the captain did not have a printed navigation chart aboard, nor had the ECS been turned on. He navigated the ship through visual observation with assistance from the cockpit GPS and the VHF radiotelephone, which was tuned to channel 16. Given that the cockpit GPS and the ECS in the cabin were not linked, the captain was unable to immediately determine his sailboats position without leaving the wheelhouse and consulting the ECS in the cabin. Due to the fact that the captain had failed to re-program the GPS, the graphic image had not changed and was still based on the WPs along the port buoys. Consequently, when the sailboat began moving back upriver, off Anse aux Bardeaux, it travelled in the navigable channel along the port buoys on the side used by ships moving downstream. However, Rule 9, Narrow Channels, of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972) stipulates that ships shall keep as near to the outer limit of the fairway, which lies on their starboard side, as is safe and practicable. It also stipulates that ships of less than 20m in length shall not impede the passage of a ship, which can safely navigate only within the fairway. Perspective on the El Tio The calls from the dredger Port Mchins on the VHF channel were not heard, as they were drowned out by the ElTiosengine noise. The El Tios captain saw the dredger PortMchins approaching, but was unable to determine the distance separating them. At one point, the ElTios captain decided to turn to starboard, thereby crossing the dredgers path. A short time later, off Saint-Franois, the El Tios captain failed to hear calls from the large sailboat Sedna IV on the VHF channel. With his view impeded by background light from coast lights, the ElTios captain failed to see the Sedna IV approaching. A situation similar to that described earlier occurred again, this time involving the large sailing vessel SednaIV and the ElTio. Similarly, the oil tanker Maria Desgagns was only noticed at the last minute and its calls on the VHF channel were not heard. When the oil tankers powerful searchlight was turned on, the ElTios captain was blinded and had difficulty assessing the situation as well as the oil tankers position relative to his sailboat. He did not try to communicate via light signals. Knowing that he was on the port side of the navigable channel, he quickly veered to starboard to pass the oil tanker on the port side. The collision took place a few moments later. Rescue Operation The sailboat remained afloat following the collision. The engine and rudder were still operational, but the captain was distraught and feared that his vessel was taking on water. Seeking assistance, hesent out an emergency message (PAN PAN) on the VHF 16 channel. TheCanadian Coast Guard Ship CapTourmente set out at about 2320 and reached the ElTio at about 0010 on 13 September 2005. The sailboat was taken in tow at that time and brought to theSaintLaurent marina, where it arrived at about0135. Training and Experience The Maria Desgagns The captain and the watchkeeping officer each held a Master Certificate, Intermediate Voyage, which they earned in 2001 and 2005, respectively. The captain had 16years of experience as a navigation officer, while the watchkeeping officer had two years of experience. The pilot obtained his first navigation certificate in 1982 and holds a Pilots License, class B1, which he earned in 1998. The apprentice pilot, who is in his first year of apprenticeship, earned his first navigation certificate in 1997. The El Tio The captain purchased his first sailboat in the early 1990s. He has owned the ElTio since 1996. Although his first sailboat was mostly used to shuttle between Qubec and Montral on the SaintLawrence, the El Tio was used to sail along the eastern seaboard of the UnitedStates, inthe Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean. He holds a Pleasure Craft Operators Card (PCOC), which he received in May 2002 after passing a Canadian Coast Guard certified exam. Pleasure Craft Operator Card The Competency of Operators of Pleasure Craft Regulationsprovides for a risk-mitigation mechanism that requires operators to complete a personal study program and examination before obtaining a PCOC. 3 Transport Canada, however, recommends that operators seeking to obtain a PCOC complete aboating safety course offered by one of its certified providers. The Boating Safety Course Standard is used to certify boating safety courses. It calls upon course providers to prepare candidates so that they are able to display an adequate knowledge of boating laws, codes, and regulations required to practice the sport. The Boating Safety Course Standardis aimed at course providers; it is not designed to develop competency in navigation or the use of navigation instruments. Operators are, however, encouraged to refine their skills in these areas by taking appropriate courses. Global Positioning System (GPS) The two GPS systems aboard the El Tio offered the user several options to help navigate. Toplan trips, users could enter the positions of multiple WPs, enabling them to calculate true courses, the distance between WPs, ground speed and the time needed to reach the next WP. The GPS can calculate up to 28parameters and display them on a liquid crystal screen. To help navigate, this type of GPS offers two graphic displays, known as pages. The compasspage indicates, for example, the route to take from one WP to the next or from any other position to a particular WP. The highway page offers a graphic display of a public waterway with an icon representing the vessel (see Figure2). The GPS indicates the vessels position (icon) relative to the planned route (path). In other words, it indicates whether the operator should maintain or alter course in order to move towards the path to be taken. Figure 2. a) Representation of next WP. b) Display of 4 of the 28 settings calculated by the GPS. c) The black band and the white line represent the path to be taken between WPs. d) The icon representing the vessel. The vessel icon is located in the centre of the path on this display, the route to be taken between the preceding WP and WP 3 (TOUR 3). The sailboat captain was using the highway page to navigate from one WP to another (Figure2). Following the collision, the captain decided to head for the SaintLaurent marina, located about 12miles upstream from his position, rather than for the SaintFranois quay, less than half a mile away. This was because he was disoriented and had no means of confirming his position.