Upon reaching the bay Comeau, the vessel was put on a heading of 090 so that she could be moved away from the shoal to the west simply by starting the engine in the ahead mode if the vessel moved too close to the shoal. Although the master had not specifically warned the officer of the watch that a south-westerly current was driving the vessel toward the Battures de Manicouagan, the officer reported that he was aware that there was such a current in the bay. The Sailing Directions published by the Canadian Hydrographic Service indicate that this tidal current moves at an average speed of two knots along the Battures de Manicouagan. Studies have shown that assessment of a situation takes place on three different levels: First, the operator must perceive the elements of the situation. That information can come from various sources, including charts. Second, the operator must assimilate this information, in other words, he must form a coherent picture of the situation in his short-term memory. Finally, the operator must project this information into the future, by going beyond the situation; in the area of safety, this is the ultimate objective. The three levels involve various information-processing steps which may present deficiencies and may result in an incomplete or inaccurate assessment of the situation. Even if the operator succeeds in remedying those deficiencies, his assessment of the immediate situation will simply constitute a snapshot of the situation at a given point in time. When the FIFI left port, she was not expecting to put in at the bay Comeau, and, consequently, she did not have on board a large-scale chart appropriate for navigating along that shoreline. On the chart used while waiting for the pilots, one nautical mile is represented by a distance of about 8mm, it was therefore not possible to effectively visualize the movement of the vessel over short distances. The FIFI was about one nautical mile east of the shoal when the engine was stopped. She ran aground about 33 minutes later. During that time, the officer of the watch did not succeed in fully assessing the situation, and he did not realize that the vessel was about to run aground. Using the ARPA would have increased the chances of effectively assessing the vessel's drift speed.Analysis Upon reaching the bay Comeau, the vessel was put on a heading of 090 so that she could be moved away from the shoal to the west simply by starting the engine in the ahead mode if the vessel moved too close to the shoal. Although the master had not specifically warned the officer of the watch that a south-westerly current was driving the vessel toward the Battures de Manicouagan, the officer reported that he was aware that there was such a current in the bay. The Sailing Directions published by the Canadian Hydrographic Service indicate that this tidal current moves at an average speed of two knots along the Battures de Manicouagan. Studies have shown that assessment of a situation takes place on three different levels: First, the operator must perceive the elements of the situation. That information can come from various sources, including charts. Second, the operator must assimilate this information, in other words, he must form a coherent picture of the situation in his short-term memory. Finally, the operator must project this information into the future, by going beyond the situation; in the area of safety, this is the ultimate objective. The three levels involve various information-processing steps which may present deficiencies and may result in an incomplete or inaccurate assessment of the situation. Even if the operator succeeds in remedying those deficiencies, his assessment of the immediate situation will simply constitute a snapshot of the situation at a given point in time. When the FIFI left port, she was not expecting to put in at the bay Comeau, and, consequently, she did not have on board a large-scale chart appropriate for navigating along that shoreline. On the chart used while waiting for the pilots, one nautical mile is represented by a distance of about 8mm, it was therefore not possible to effectively visualize the movement of the vessel over short distances. The FIFI was about one nautical mile east of the shoal when the engine was stopped. She ran aground about 33 minutes later. During that time, the officer of the watch did not succeed in fully assessing the situation, and he did not realize that the vessel was about to run aground. Using the ARPA would have increased the chances of effectively assessing the vessel's drift speed. The navigating personnel was aware that there was a current in the bay. The small-scale chart used was not appropriate for coastal navigation. The officer of the watch did not succeed in fully assessing the situation. The vessel drifted toward the shoal without the drift speed being correctly assessed. The radar's automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) was not used.Findings The navigating personnel was aware that there was a current in the bay. The small-scale chart used was not appropriate for coastal navigation. The officer of the watch did not succeed in fully assessing the situation. The vessel drifted toward the shoal without the drift speed being correctly assessed. The radar's automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) was not used. The tanker FIFI was driven aground by the current around the Battures de Manicouagan because the drift was not correctly assessed. The small-scale chart used made it difficult to assess the drift, and the radar's automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) was not used.Causes and Contributing Factors The tanker FIFI was driven aground by the current around the Battures de Manicouagan because the drift was not correctly assessed. The small-scale chart used made it difficult to assess the drift, and the radar's automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) was not used.