The wind conditions for the landing were within the capabilities of the aircraft. For an airline flight crew, the landing conditions were not abnormal. The first officer, who was significantly less experienced on this aircraft type than the captain, was the pilot flying. He had limited experience with crosswind landings in the CRJ series aircraft, and the gusty wind was sufficient to add complexity to the landing. When the captain engaged in non-operational activity during the final part of the approach, it left the first officer with nearly all of the decision making and control of the aircraft. The captain did not notice that the first officer left the autopilot engaged to well below the stipulated minimum altitude. In leaving the autopilot engaged, the first officer reduced the normal amount of time to get a hands-on feel for the aircraft as it approached the runway. As a result, the first officer was not able to align the aircraft's heading with the runway or eliminate the excessive sideslip during the flare. The first officer was also very late reducing the thrust levers to idle, again with no intervention by the captain. The thrust levers were not completely reduced for the initial touchdown. This not only eliminated the bounce protection normally provided by the GLD system, but also made the aircraft lighter on its wheels and more susceptible to bouncing. Neither the aircraft operating manual nor the training that both pilots had received mentioned the importance of conducting a balked or rejected landing when the aircraft bounces. This information was incorporated after the accident. Thus, when the aircraft bounced, given the low energy state, the first officer likely attempted to salvage the landing rather than execute the balked landing procedure. In the attempt to salvage the landing, the thrust levers were retarded all the way to idle. This was the final parameter for the GLD system to initiate spoiler activation. Had either pilot advanced the thrust levers, the GLD logic would have resulted in the spoilers retracting. The anomalies found in the shock struts, including the condition of the hydraulic fluid, indicate that the struts were processed through the overhaul facility in 2002 without being adequately serviced. The quality control in place at the time did not detect this irregularity and these non airworthy shock struts were installed on the aircraft. Subsequent maintenance on the landing gear did not involve inspection of the pressurized sections of the shock struts, so the struts remained in a non airworthy condition. Although the aircraft had completed a number of successful landings with these shock struts installed and there were no reported adverse bounce tendencies, the shock struts would not be absorbing the normal amount of energy on touchdown and would have contributed to the bounce on this landing. The following TSB laboratory reports were completed: LP 047/2007 - Flight Data Recorder (FDR)/Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) Analysis LP 085/2007 - Hydraulic Fluid Analysis LP 058/2007 - Main Landing Gear Bracket Failure These reports are available from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada upon request.Analysis The wind conditions for the landing were within the capabilities of the aircraft. For an airline flight crew, the landing conditions were not abnormal. The first officer, who was significantly less experienced on this aircraft type than the captain, was the pilot flying. He had limited experience with crosswind landings in the CRJ series aircraft, and the gusty wind was sufficient to add complexity to the landing. When the captain engaged in non-operational activity during the final part of the approach, it left the first officer with nearly all of the decision making and control of the aircraft. The captain did not notice that the first officer left the autopilot engaged to well below the stipulated minimum altitude. In leaving the autopilot engaged, the first officer reduced the normal amount of time to get a hands-on feel for the aircraft as it approached the runway. As a result, the first officer was not able to align the aircraft's heading with the runway or eliminate the excessive sideslip during the flare. The first officer was also very late reducing the thrust levers to idle, again with no intervention by the captain. The thrust levers were not completely reduced for the initial touchdown. This not only eliminated the bounce protection normally provided by the GLD system, but also made the aircraft lighter on its wheels and more susceptible to bouncing. Neither the aircraft operating manual nor the training that both pilots had received mentioned the importance of conducting a balked or rejected landing when the aircraft bounces. This information was incorporated after the accident. Thus, when the aircraft bounced, given the low energy state, the first officer likely attempted to salvage the landing rather than execute the balked landing procedure. In the attempt to salvage the landing, the thrust levers were retarded all the way to idle. This was the final parameter for the GLD system to initiate spoiler activation. Had either pilot advanced the thrust levers, the GLD logic would have resulted in the spoilers retracting. The anomalies found in the shock struts, including the condition of the hydraulic fluid, indicate that the struts were processed through the overhaul facility in 2002 without being adequately serviced. The quality control in place at the time did not detect this irregularity and these non airworthy shock struts were installed on the aircraft. Subsequent maintenance on the landing gear did not involve inspection of the pressurized sections of the shock struts, so the struts remained in a non airworthy condition. Although the aircraft had completed a number of successful landings with these shock struts installed and there were no reported adverse bounce tendencies, the shock struts would not be absorbing the normal amount of energy on touchdown and would have contributed to the bounce on this landing. The following TSB laboratory reports were completed: LP 047/2007 - Flight Data Recorder (FDR)/Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) Analysis LP 085/2007 - Hydraulic Fluid Analysis LP 058/2007 - Main Landing Gear Bracket Failure These reports are available from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada upon request. On final approach, the captain diverted his attention from monitoring the flight, leaving most of the decision making and control of the aircraft to the first officer, who was significantly less experienced on the aircraft type. As a result, the first officer was not fully supervised during the late stages of the approach. The first officer did not adhere to the Air Canada Jazz standard operating procedures (SOPs) in the handling of the autopilot and thrust levers on short final, which left the aircraft highly susceptible to a bounce, and without the bounce protection normally provided by the ground lift dump (GLD) system. Neither the aircraft operating manual nor the training that both pilots had received mentioned the importance of conducting a balked or rejected landing when the aircraft bounces. Given the low-energy state of the aircraft at the time of the bounce, the first officer attempted to salvage the landing. When the thrust levers were reduced to idle after the bounce, the GLD system activated. The resultant sink rate after the GLD system deployed was beyond the certification standard for the landing gear and resulted in the landing gear trunnion fitting failures. There was insufficient quality control at the landing gear overhaul facility, which allowed non-airworthy equipment to enter into service. The condition of the shock struts would have contributed to the bounce.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors On final approach, the captain diverted his attention from monitoring the flight, leaving most of the decision making and control of the aircraft to the first officer, who was significantly less experienced on the aircraft type. As a result, the first officer was not fully supervised during the late stages of the approach. The first officer did not adhere to the Air Canada Jazz standard operating procedures (SOPs) in the handling of the autopilot and thrust levers on short final, which left the aircraft highly susceptible to a bounce, and without the bounce protection normally provided by the ground lift dump (GLD) system. Neither the aircraft operating manual nor the training that both pilots had received mentioned the importance of conducting a balked or rejected landing when the aircraft bounces. Given the low-energy state of the aircraft at the time of the bounce, the first officer attempted to salvage the landing. When the thrust levers were reduced to idle after the bounce, the GLD system activated. The resultant sink rate after the GLD system deployed was beyond the certification standard for the landing gear and resulted in the landing gear trunnion fitting failures. There was insufficient quality control at the landing gear overhaul facility, which allowed non-airworthy equipment to enter into service. The condition of the shock struts would have contributed to the bounce. Several passengers took carry-on items with them as they exited the aircraft, despite being instructed not to do so. The location of the stored megaphone did not allow the flight attendant to have ready access after the passengers started moving to the exit door.Findings as to Risk Several passengers took carry-on items with them as they exited the aircraft, despite being instructed not to do so. The location of the stored megaphone did not allow the flight attendant to have ready access after the passengers started moving to the exit door. On 26 September 2006, Air Canada Jazz sent an e-mail to all of its simulator and line training instructors to raise awareness about the dangers of landing the CRJ series aircraft with residual thrust, reminding them that it could contribute to a bounced landing. This information was officially incorporated into the 01 October 2007 update of its line indoctrination guide, which provides guidance on administering line training.Safety Action Taken On 26 September 2006, Air Canada Jazz sent an e-mail to all of its simulator and line training instructors to raise awareness about the dangers of landing the CRJ series aircraft with residual thrust, reminding them that it could contribute to a bounced landing. This information was officially incorporated into the 01 October 2007 update of its line indoctrination guide, which provides guidance on administering line training.