Summary The SunnyBlossom was on Lac Saint-Franois bound for Cornwall, Ontario, in daylight and in reduced visibility. A pilot, accompanied by an apprentice pilot, had the conduct of the vessel. Following a course alteration off Pointe Dupuis, the vessel ran aground upstream of buoyD36 on the north side of the channel at 0730. The grounding caused some delays to vessel traffic in the area. The vessel was refloated the following day with the assistance of a tug. The grounding did not cause damage to the vessel or pollution. No one was injured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of the Vessel The SunnyBlossom is an ocean-going chemical tanker of 19995deadweight tonnes, with its bridge, accommodation, and machinery located aft of its cargo tanks. Chemical cargo, such as sodium hydroxide (causticsoda), is usually carried in five centre tanks. The empty side tanks, together with the continuous double bottom, provide double hull environmental protection. The vessel is fitted with a single rudder and the main engine drives a fixed-pitch, right-handed propeller. The ratio of rudder area to underwater lateral profile of the vessel when fully loaded is in the order of1:65, which is within established norms for this type and size of vessel. The vessel is equipped with a Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. ram-type, electro-hydraulic steering gear. After the occurrence, while the vessel lay at anchor, rudder movement was found to be 34 to port and to starboard. The time taken by pump No.1 to complete full rudder movement (34, 0, 34) was 28seconds, and the same sequence by pump No.2 took 26seconds. With both steering pumps in operation, full rudder movement was timed at 26seconds, which is within the regulatory time frame. When the helm at the steering station on the bridge was midships, the bridge helm indicator showed a helm angle of 1 to starboard and the steering compartment indicator showed a helm angle of slightly more than 1 to starboard. History of the Voyage Having sailed from Plaquemine, Louisiana, with a reduced cargo deadweight of 14413tonnes of sodium hydroxide (causticsoda) solution, the SunnyBlossom departed Montral, Quebec, on 17May2000 at 2029 eastern daylight time (EDT)2 for discharge of cargo at Cornwall, Ontario. The vessel was carrying 72per cent of its maximum cargo deadweight at a reduced draught of 7.88m for Seaway navigation, and had a small trim by the stern. After an uneventful voyage from Montral to Upper Beauharnois Lock No.4, a change of pilot took place for the second part of the transit in the St. Lawrence Seaway. An apprentice pilot accompanied the pilot. The master/pilot exchange included an overview of the pilot card and a discussion concerning the vessel's draught. On leaving Beauharnois Lock No.4 at about 0440, the SunnyBlossom was moving ahead at about 6to 7knots (kn) when the apprentice pilot ordered two, zero, eight. The helmsman applied helm, but it was deemed insufficient and helm orders were given by the apprentice pilot to increase the rate of turn and eventually bring the vessel on course. When the apprentice pilot commented on the sluggishness of the vessel, the officer of the watch (OOW) informed him that both steering pumps were on. Neither the pilot nor the apprentice pilot observed the pump selector switch on the steering console; they relied on the information given by the navigating personnel. At 0448, the speed of the vessel was increased from half ahead (7kn)3 to full manoeuvring speed (11.2kn). The apprentice pilot continued to give helm orders to the helmsman and engine orders to the OOW. Visibility in the area was estimated to be approximately 3nautical miles (nm). At the Valleyfield bridge, rain reduced the visibility to 2nm. At 0610, the speed of the vessel was increased to full sea speed (14kn). At about 0627, on the Pointe aux Foins downstream range, the pilot took over the conduct of the vessel. Thereafter, the apprentice pilot assisted the pilot with updates of radar information. The rain intensified and reduced visibility to approximately 1.5nm. Downstream of buoy D17, at about 0650,4 the pilot ordered portten to alter course in a single turn from the Pointe Beaudette ranges at 242True (T) to le Chrtien ranges at 209T. As the heading neared 209Gyro(G),5 the pilot ordered the helmsman to steer 209G, but the vessel continued to swing to 205G. The helmsman applied helm to steady the vessel, but it swung to 223G. The pilot gave the helmsman a succession of orders to steady the vessel's heading on 210G (seeAppendixB, Sketch2). After the vessel had steadied on 210G upstream of buoyD17 on the le Chrtien range, the pilot and the OOW discussed the helmsman's performance. Reportedly, it was the second time the helmsman had experienced difficulty in steadying the heading. The OOW ordered the third officer to replace the helmsman. When the third officer walked to the steering station, the helmsman on duty informed the chief officer (OOW) that he thought he was fit to steer. He was permitted to continue steering the vessel. The next course alteration onto the Pointe Dupuis range was uneventful. Fog and rain further reduced visibility. Winds were light. At 0710, downstream of buoyD26, the engine was reduced from full sea speed to full manoeuvring speed. At 0722, before clearing buoy D31, speed was further reduced to half ahead (7kn). Measuring the distance to the radar target of buoyD31, which was at the limit of visibility, the apprentice pilot found that visibility had decreased to 0.35nm. At 0726, the course steered was altered from 236G to 234G, and the vessel crossed over to the south side of the channel. When the apprentice pilot advised the pilot that the vessel was 0.81nm from Saint-Anicet lower range beacon and 0.36nm from le Lanouette, the pilot ordered the helmsman to apply 10 starboard helm. BuoysD34 and D35were then observed as the vessel rounded between them. As the radar heading marker neared the south side channel target of D37at 0727, the pilot gave helm orders to reduce the vessel's swing and then told the helmsman to steer 247G. BuoyD37 could now be seen on the starboard bow. The pilot confirmed this visual cue by going to the radar and observing the buoy at a distance of 0.31nm. At about 0729, the vessel began to yaw to port and the pilot ordered hard-a-starboard. The heading stopped falling off at 246G and the helm was eased to starboard twenty. When observing buoyD37 ahead, the vessel's response was found to be sluggish and the helm was once again put hard over to starboard. The vessel started to respond and, when the heading reached 250G, the pilot ordered steer two six seven. The third officer informed the apprentice pilot that the next course was 266.5G and that he agreed with the pilot's order. As the vessel cleared buoyD37 on the south side of the channel, the third officer remarked that the vessel was very close to the buoy. The pilot repeated the order course two six seven. By now, the rain had intensified to the extent that visibility was almost nil. The apprentice pilot observed that the heading markers of both radars were approaching 280G and advised the pilot accordingly. The pilot went to the radar, commented on the poor radar performance and immediately ordered the OOW to reduce speed from about 7kn to the dead slow ahead speed of 5kn. The vessel continued to swing to starboard across the channel. There is conflicting information as to what helm orders were given. One account maintains that there was no time to give helm orders, whereas another account maintains that a series of port helm orders was given. At 0730, the chemical tanker grounded upstream of buoyD36, on the north side of the channel, on a heading of 274G. The vessel was aground starboard side to the shoal with a list to port of 2.5 (seeAppendixA,Photo1). At 0735, the grounding of the SunnyBlossom was reported to Seaway Eisenhower. Seaway traffic was interrupted from 1130 until 2300. On 19May2000 (thenextday) at 0911, with the assistance of tugs OceanIntrepid and H-9901, the chemical tanker was refloated. No damage was apparent and apart from an accumulation of clay over the bottom, only minor scratches were reported. The grounding did not affect the integrity of the hull nor the seaworthiness of the vessel. At 1600, the vessel was given clearance by the St.Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation to resume its voyage. Certification of Vessel and Personnel The SunnyBlossom has been calling at Canadian and United States ports on the Atlantic coast and in the Great Lakes for several years. It was certificated and equipped in accordance with existing regulations. The chief officer, 48OOW, was in possession of a Deep Sea Navigator Certificate of Competency, issued by the Republic of Latvia in1997. The third officer, who was also on duty at the time of the occurrence, was in possession of a Third Mate Certificate of Competency, issued by the Republic of the Philippines in1992, and an equivalent certificate issued by the Bahamas in2000. The helmsman on duty at the time of the occurrence held a Rating's Certificate of Competency, issued by the Republic of the Philippines in1996, to perform duties relevant to navigational watchkeeping. The pilot on duty at the time of the occurrence held a Certificate of Competency for a Master of a Home-Trade Steamship of under 350 gross tons, issued in 1962, and a First Mate of an Inland Waters Steamship, issued in1974. He was also in possession of a Great Lakes Pilotage Authority (GLPA) licence for the District of Cornwall, issued in1976. The apprentice pilot held a Certificate of Competency as an Ocean NavigatorI (Master of a Home-Trade Steamship), issued in 1985, and his certificate is endorsed for Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) compliance and continued proficiency (2001). He also held a GLPA licence as an apprentice pilot for the District of Cornwall, issued in 1999. Personnel History The first officer had some 22 years of sea service. In1979, he had begun serving as OOW. The helmsman on duty at the time of the occurrence had been a helmsman since1994. He had joined the vessel on 01May2000, and had previously held a similar position on an ocean-going chemical tanker. The pilot on duty at the time of the occurrence had some 45years of sea service, of which some 24years of sea time were acquired as a licenced pilot. Among his continued proficiency training, he had attended a Simulated Electronic Navigation (SEN II) course in1990, and had completed an Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) course in1999. The apprentice pilot commenced his apprenticeship with the GLPA in1999. Weather Information At the time of the occurrence, visibility was almost nil in heavy rainfall and fog, with southeasterly winds at some 3kn. The air temperature was 15C. Current Information Southwest of calling-in point No.7, the waterway extends in a 234.5T direction, passing south of Pointe Mouille Flats and north of the Saint-Anicet shoal. From buoyD33 to buoyD35, the waterway is approximately 400m wide at an average depth of 13.5m.6 Upstream of buoyD35, the waterway narrows to a 137m-wide channel at an evenly dredged depth of 8.7m. The narrow channel extends in a 266.5T direction through Lancaster Bar. The depth of water as plotted by the Summerstown tide gauge recorder for 18May2000, at around 0730, was 0.42m above chart datum. The current off Island Bank is reported to set to the northeast at approximately 1.5to 2kn. Pilotage and Bridge Management Except for the aids to navigation, such as the ranges and the buoys, there are no prominent landmarks in the Pointe Dupuis area. The upbound course alteration off Pointe Dupuis, from the Saint-Anicet west range onto the Pointe Dupuis range, is a 32turn, which calls for a close port-hand approach to light buoyD37. In way of buoy D33, the vessel is made to gradually cross over onto the south side of the channel. The turn is commenced abeam le Lanouette from a heading of 235T, followed by an intermediate course of 247T, and completed by a final heading of 267T to enter the dredged channel. A bank cushion effect is used to proceed along the port-hand buoys in the dredged channel upstream ofD37. This manoeuvre has been adopted by all pilots transiting upbound because it enables the vessel to compensate for the drift due to the current, which sets northeast. Downbound vessels that must meet in this area pass starboard to starboard. The chief officer, who was the OOW, stood by the engine telegraph on the starboard side of the bridge while the third officer plotted the position of the vessel on the chart with information from one of the radars on the port side. The helmsman performed his duties at the steering station. Both the pilot and his apprentice pilot monitored the progress of the vessel visually from the forward bridge windows in way of the central gyro-compass repeater and/or from either of the port radars. During the trip, the pilot was engaged in tutoring the apprentice pilot and this communication was conducted in French. All navigation orders such as course, helm and engine telegraph orders were given in English, which was the working language of the ship's officers and crew. However, in the vicinity of buoyD35, critical information essential to safely negotiate the turn was not shared with other members of the bridge team. Situational Awareness The maintenance of situational awareness in confined/pilotage waters, particularly in conditions of reduced visibility, is a demanding task for the navigator. The task requires that cues, both visual and from aids to navigation and instruments, be sampled and integrated, and that this information be projected ahead to determine the action to be taken. In good visibility, navigators use visual cues in their immediate and extended surroundings to determine orientation, rate and direction of movement, distance from obstacles on or near the vessel's track, and the avoidance of these obstacles. While the information available with direct vision in good visibility is adequate, the limited information obtainable in restricted visibility is not. In this occurrence, the poor visibility reduced the navigators' ability to resolve the limited visual cues available. Electronic Chart System The vessel was fitted with an electronic chart system (ECS). It had been installed on the chart table console, abaft the steering station, the vessel having a traditional bridge layout with chart table in the after part of the wheelhouse (seeAppendixA,Photo2). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) type-approved ECDIS and the non-approved ECS offer numerous benefits compared to conventional navigation, such as automatic display and updating of own-ship position, and the capability to overlay radar information. Although it is not mandatory to carry an ECDIS or ECS, or to be trained in the use of these systems, the advent of these automated systems is a significant step toward increasing operational efficiency, situational awareness, and safer navigation. The ECS installed on the SunnyBlossom was not calibrated with the on-board global positioning system (GPS) and was, therefore, not available for safe navigation. Both the crew and pilot were aware of this, and it was not used during the course of the voyage. The watch officers had not received training, and did not appear to be proficient in the use of the ECS. They had instituted an informal in-house training routine among themselves. Arrangements had been made to have the system re-calibrated when the vessel arrived at Cornwall. Therefore, the ECS was not being used as a primary source of navigation information.