Analysis One-Person Bridge Operations The composition of the watch on the bridge is crucial to safe navigation and environmental protection, and must be appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. When a vessel is approaching a major course alteration, good seamanship calls for the first officer to remain in the upper wheelhouse to assist the master. However, when the master arrived on the bridge, he took over the conduct of the vessel and sent the officer of the watch down to carry out nonnavigation-related duties at a critical time in the vessel's transit. During this accident, the master, alone on the bridge, was navigating a push-tow in confined waters when it struck and knocked down the fixed light. Investigations into other marine accidents involving collisions and groundings of tug and barge operations have revealed that a cause or contributing factor has been the failure to maintain an adequate navigational watch. For example, the investigation into the collision between the pleasure craft Sunboy and the barge Texada B.C. being towed by the Jose Narvaez (TSB report M99W0133) indicated that, as a result of navigational practices on the tug, especially that of leaving the tug's wheelhouse unattended, the tug's crew was unaware of the pleasure craft at a critical time during the passage. The accident resulted in four fatalities and a fifth person, who was presumed drowned. In 2002, when the tug Progress pushing the barge Pitts Carillon struck a fixed light (TSB report M02C0011), the first officer, while operating in restricted waters at night, was required to steer and navigate the vessel. To carry out navigation duties while steering, he had to briefly leave the helm unattended to perform another function. The combined tasks of steering while navigating made maintaining awareness of the vessel's position extremely difficult; as a result, the push-tow struck and knocked down the fixed light. The practice on board this vessel, and on other company vessels, was that at least one certificated person be on the bridge. Over time, the master had safely completed many voyages in these waters while alone on the bridge, so he did not consider it necessary to assign an additional person to the bridge watch. As a result, when he became preoccupied with trying to reproduce a previously reported problem with the radar display, he did not notice the dangerous situation that was developing. With no one else on the bridge to assist in navigation, bridge resource management was not possible, and an opportunity to bring the rapidly developing situation to the attention of the master was lost, leading to a single-point failure. Electronic Navigation The use of off-the-shelf LCD monitors for ECS displays may result in a residual glow from the backlighting that, even in night setting, may interfere with night navigation. In this occurrence, despite using the ECS night viewing function and setting the monitor brilliance at minimum, the master felt that the ECS display was too bright and turned off the display monitor. This action resulted in the loss of real-time position monitoring on an electronic navigation chart, thereby removing a defence barrier for the master. Cellular Telephones and Very High Frequency Communications It is beneficial to have vessels maintain a continuous listening watch on a common radiotelephone channel when operating in confined waters so that crews can become aware of situations developing in their vicinity and can take early, appropriate action. This occurrence was reported to a marine traffic regulator (Sarnia Traffic) indirectly by cellular telephone rather than by VHF radio from the occurrence vessel. Within minutes of the striking, the master of the Karen Andrie informed company officials and the United States Coast Guard of the occurrence, but did not inform Sarnia Traffic until some 25 minutes later. Additionally, the Karen Andrie did not inform the nearest approaching tug Kurt R. Luedtke and barge immediately after the striking to warn them that Bar Point Pier Light D33 was now out of commission. In this instance, the master of the Kurt R. Luedtke was vigilant, and the unit was navigated with caution. However, delays in notifying the MCTS and the use of an inappropriate communication method precluded timely broadcast of critical safety information to traffic in the vicinity and could have placed other vessels at undue risk. Conduct of Watchkeeping Bar Point Pier Light D33 is radar conspicuous and would have painted a good return echo on the radar screen while the tug and barge were traversing the short distance between Detroit River Light and Bar Point Pier Light D33. Standard radar watchkeeping requires some minimal level of attention to the discrimination of targets: it is necessary to have a look around on different scales. However, the unit was operating in good visibility in the vicinity of good fixed and floating navigation aids. Despite this, the master elected to duplicate the radar problem on the -mile range at a critical time when the vessel was headed for the D33 light. As such, the progress of the unit was not monitored despite the availability of good visual cues, and a proper lookout was not maintained. Company's Approach to Safety In this instance, the company had a standard operating procedure for navigation. However, guidance was not provided for prioritizing communications in emergencies. Additionally, it did not have a policy regarding formal ECS training for navigating officers. Damage Assessment After the crew's initial damage survey, the tow was moved into deeper water to proceed to Toledo. Without a comprehensive survey of the damaged barge by qualified inspectors or class surveyors, the condition of the weakened hull and the possibility of the barge sinking and blocking the navigable channel was not fully evaluated. At a critical juncture when the vessel was approaching a course alteration, the master was preoccupied with recreating a radar range scale problem and was unaware of the vessel's position. As a result, the barge A-397 struck and knocked down Bar Point Pier Light D33. As the vessel was operating with a one-person bridge watch, consistent with American domestic regulations, bridge resource management was not possible, and the opportunity to bring the rapidly developing situation to the attention of the master was lost, leading to a single-point failure.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors At a critical juncture when the vessel was approaching a course alteration, the master was preoccupied with recreating a radar range scale problem and was unaware of the vessel's position. As a result, the barge A-397 struck and knocked down Bar Point Pier Light D33. As the vessel was operating with a one-person bridge watch, consistent with American domestic regulations, bridge resource management was not possible, and the opportunity to bring the rapidly developing situation to the attention of the master was lost, leading to a single-point failure. Not reporting the occurrence and the damage to the navigation aid to the Marine Communications and Traffic Services in a timely and appropriate manner delayed broadcast and deprived navigators of information critical to the safe operation of the vessel. Given that no comprehensive inspection survey of the barge was carried out, there was some risk to the tow's safety and to other shipping navigating in the vicinity. The use of off-the-shelf LCD monitors for electronic chart system displays may result in a residual glow from the backlighting that, even in night mode, may interfere with night navigation.Findings as to Risk Not reporting the occurrence and the damage to the navigation aid to the Marine Communications and Traffic Services in a timely and appropriate manner delayed broadcast and deprived navigators of information critical to the safe operation of the vessel. Given that no comprehensive inspection survey of the barge was carried out, there was some risk to the tow's safety and to other shipping navigating in the vicinity. The use of off-the-shelf LCD monitors for electronic chart system displays may result in a residual glow from the backlighting that, even in night mode, may interfere with night navigation. The Canadian and American crewing regulations are not in harmony and do not provide the same level of safety for vessels operating in each other's waters.Other Finding The Canadian and American crewing regulations are not in harmony and do not provide the same level of safety for vessels operating in each other's waters. Since the occurrence, the following safety actions have been taken by the owners, Andrie Inc.: Captains and mates are required to attend a United States Coast Guardapproved bridge resource management course for towing vessels. Under a new policy, pilot house electronics are not to be turned off while the vessel is operating. All monitors are now capable of being dimmed or have a filter available to reduce the light produced. Before the incident, the electronic chart system monitors could not be dimmed sufficiently during nighttime operations. The company internal investigative report was shared with its captains in the form of a directive on the lessons learned and then distributed among crew members. Proper procedures were reviewed during vessel safety meetings. The company is reviewing standard operating procedures for watch changes and may implement new guidelines for watch changes in or near confined waters. The radar in the upper wheelhouse has been updated with a new and independent global positioning system that is tied into the ECPINS (electronic chart precise integrated navigation system), eradicating radar unit problems. The company maintains a form that outlines when a vessel is to notify the Environmental and Safety Coordinator and a form with a notification checklist for qualified individuals.Safety Action Taken Since the occurrence, the following safety actions have been taken by the owners, Andrie Inc.: Captains and mates are required to attend a United States Coast Guardapproved bridge resource management course for towing vessels. Under a new policy, pilot house electronics are not to be turned off while the vessel is operating. All monitors are now capable of being dimmed or have a filter available to reduce the light produced. Before the incident, the electronic chart system monitors could not be dimmed sufficiently during nighttime operations. The company internal investigative report was shared with its captains in the form of a directive on the lessons learned and then distributed among crew members. Proper procedures were reviewed during vessel safety meetings. The company is reviewing standard operating procedures for watch changes and may implement new guidelines for watch changes in or near confined waters. The radar in the upper wheelhouse has been updated with a new and independent global positioning system that is tied into the ECPINS (electronic chart precise integrated navigation system), eradicating radar unit problems. The company maintains a form that outlines when a vessel is to notify the Environmental and Safety Coordinator and a form with a notification checklist for qualified individuals.