Although the forecasts for Muskoka and Peterborough called for low visibility in fog throughout most of the morning, the pilot was influenced by the relatively good weather that he observed both at the airfield and during his drive from home for his first scenic flight. The decision to fly the occurrence flight was based on the weather he observed during the first flight. He did not use all of the weather information available to him since he did not check the automated weather station read-out. Fog could quickly form in the Bancroft area because of the light winds and 100 percent relative humidity. When the pilot encountered deteriorating weather and reversed course to return to Bancroft, he decided to climb to a safe altitude even though this action would place him in solid IMC conditions. He expected to fly quickly through a very localized patch of weather and then regain visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and continue the return flight to Bancroft. He climbed to 2600 feet asl, believing that to be a safe altitude. At no time did the pilot attempt to change to an IFR flight plan. Similarly, he never attempted to climb on top of the cloud layer to regain VMC. Once forced to terminate the VFR sightseeing flight, an early decision to climb on top of the cloud in order to regain VMC would have decreased the pilot's workload and simplified his decision making considerably. Based on available weather reports for the area and the clouds observed by the pilot while holding, VMC conditions were present at a higher altitude (6000 to 8000 feet asl). A climb to this altitude early in the holding pattern would have allowed for clearer, more expedient communications with Toronto Radio, rather than the poor quality reception and the delays experienced while holidng at 3000 to 4000 feet asl. Toronto Radio would have been able to provide the pilot with detailed weather information regarding the fog and low ceilings throughout the entire area and with the assistance required to obtain an IFR clearance. By the time the pilot eventually climbed and contacted Toronto Radio, he was already becoming concerned about his fuel supply. When he realized that the weather in the surrounding area was poor, he decided that he had to make a landing attempt at Bancroft Aerodrome by conducting an IMC cloud-breaking procedure. When he broke out of the clouds, the low ceiling and limited visibility prevented him from conducting a successful visual approach.Analysis Although the forecasts for Muskoka and Peterborough called for low visibility in fog throughout most of the morning, the pilot was influenced by the relatively good weather that he observed both at the airfield and during his drive from home for his first scenic flight. The decision to fly the occurrence flight was based on the weather he observed during the first flight. He did not use all of the weather information available to him since he did not check the automated weather station read-out. Fog could quickly form in the Bancroft area because of the light winds and 100 percent relative humidity. When the pilot encountered deteriorating weather and reversed course to return to Bancroft, he decided to climb to a safe altitude even though this action would place him in solid IMC conditions. He expected to fly quickly through a very localized patch of weather and then regain visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and continue the return flight to Bancroft. He climbed to 2600 feet asl, believing that to be a safe altitude. At no time did the pilot attempt to change to an IFR flight plan. Similarly, he never attempted to climb on top of the cloud layer to regain VMC. Once forced to terminate the VFR sightseeing flight, an early decision to climb on top of the cloud in order to regain VMC would have decreased the pilot's workload and simplified his decision making considerably. Based on available weather reports for the area and the clouds observed by the pilot while holding, VMC conditions were present at a higher altitude (6000 to 8000 feet asl). A climb to this altitude early in the holding pattern would have allowed for clearer, more expedient communications with Toronto Radio, rather than the poor quality reception and the delays experienced while holidng at 3000 to 4000 feet asl. Toronto Radio would have been able to provide the pilot with detailed weather information regarding the fog and low ceilings throughout the entire area and with the assistance required to obtain an IFR clearance. By the time the pilot eventually climbed and contacted Toronto Radio, he was already becoming concerned about his fuel supply. When he realized that the weather in the surrounding area was poor, he decided that he had to make a landing attempt at Bancroft Aerodrome by conducting an IMC cloud-breaking procedure. When he broke out of the clouds, the low ceiling and limited visibility prevented him from conducting a successful visual approach. The pilot was certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations. Maintenance records indicate that the aircraft was certified and maintained for flight in accordance with existing regulations. The only weather information available for the Bancroft Aerodrome was the FA and the AWOS report. The pilot did not check the AWOS report for Bancroft; his decision to fly the occurrence flight was based on the weather he observed during the first flight of the day. Although the pilot held a valid instrument rating, he had very little experience in an IFR environment. The pilot was not prepared for in-flight weather conditions that would force him to fly in IMC and change from a VFR flight plan to an IFR flight plan. The pilot's lack of familiarity in an IFR environment, coupled with his expectation that the low cloud at Bancroft would dissipate as quickly as it had formed, heavily influenced his decision to hold in the vicinity of Bancroft. The pilot flew in IMC in controlled airspace in the vicinity of Bancroft without an IFR clearance and at an altitude below the IFR minimum safe altitude.Findings The pilot was certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations. Maintenance records indicate that the aircraft was certified and maintained for flight in accordance with existing regulations. The only weather information available for the Bancroft Aerodrome was the FA and the AWOS report. The pilot did not check the AWOS report for Bancroft; his decision to fly the occurrence flight was based on the weather he observed during the first flight of the day. Although the pilot held a valid instrument rating, he had very little experience in an IFR environment. The pilot was not prepared for in-flight weather conditions that would force him to fly in IMC and change from a VFR flight plan to an IFR flight plan. The pilot's lack of familiarity in an IFR environment, coupled with his expectation that the low cloud at Bancroft would dissipate as quickly as it had formed, heavily influenced his decision to hold in the vicinity of Bancroft. The pilot flew in IMC in controlled airspace in the vicinity of Bancroft without an IFR clearance and at an altitude below the IFR minimum safe altitude. The pilot crashed on a wooded hillside as a result of his attempt to do a cloud-breaking procedure using a local broadcast radio station for navigation and to descend below safe altitude in IMC conditions to set up for a visual approach. Contributing to the occurrence were the pilot not using all available weather information, his lack of preparation for a rapidly deteriorating weather situation, and his inappropriate decision making.Causes and Contributing Factors The pilot crashed on a wooded hillside as a result of his attempt to do a cloud-breaking procedure using a local broadcast radio station for navigation and to descend below safe altitude in IMC conditions to set up for a visual approach. Contributing to the occurrence were the pilot not using all available weather information, his lack of preparation for a rapidly deteriorating weather situation, and his inappropriate decision making.