Summary While returning from the fishing grounds, the Kella-Lee encountered heavy seas off Cape Scott, British Columbia. It heeled to starboard, progressively down-flooded and sank shortly after 2352 on 25October2001. Its three crew members and the owner/operator abandoned the vessel for a liferaft. A search and rescue operation rescued two crew members and recovered the bodies of the third crew member and the owner/operator, both of whom had succumbed to hypothermia and drowned. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of the Vessel The Kella-Lee was built as a small fishing vessel of closed construction, with an all-welded double chine steel hull and an aluminium-alloy deck-house. The wheelhouse, crew accommodation and engine-room space were located forward of midships, while an insulated fish hold, a small freezer compartment and the lazarette were located aft. The fish hold was divided into nine sections by portable pen-boards. It had a fibreglass weather-tight hatch cover, which had two small access hatch covers set into it. All covers could be battened down, however the two smaller covers were not secured. Below the main deck the hull was sub-divided by three transverse watertight bulkheads into the following compartments: forward crew accommodation space; engine-room; fish hold, and lazarette space (seeAppendixA). The deck-house was accessed through the starboard side wheelhouse weather-tight door and through a dutch door fitted at the after end of the superstructure. The dutch door gave direct access to the starboard side of the after working area of the main deck (see AppendixA and AppendixC). Access to the engine-room was by way of two flush-fitting, lift-out hatches, fitted into the wheelhouse and galley decks. Oil fuel tanks were located at the port and starboard sides of the engine-room and the lazarette space. The potable water tank was located under the forward crew compartment. The wheelhouse was equipped with navigation and communications gear which included two radar sets and video plotter; two very high frequency (VHF) radios; global positioning system (GPS); auto pilot and depth sounders. The radar sets were interfaced with an electronic chart display system. Rigging and Fishing Gear The Kella-Lee, originally rigged for salmon trolling, had been modified with additional gear over the years. At the time of the occurrence, it was rigged to fish for halibut with a hydraulically- driven drum winch located on the main deck abaft the fish hold hatch. The vessel was rigged with a steel mainmast and cargo boom, fitted with hydraulic lifting and vanging winches. The mainmast had a crosstree and rigging for the vertical stowage and deployment of a pair of steel outrigger booms equipped with roll reducing paravanes (seeAppendixA). The vessel was also equipped with a riding sail, some five square metres in area, which was occasionally rigged from the after side of the main mast when required. Main engine mounted power take-offs serviced the vessel's electrical and hydraulic service systems and the steering gear hydraulic system, located in the lazarette. An auxiliary diesel engine, for emergency use, was capable of driving the electrical generator and hydraulic pump for supplying electrical and hydraulic power for the ship's lighting, refrigeration, fishing gear and bilge pumping services. History of the Voyage The Kella-Lee arrived at Port Hardy, British Columbia, on 22October2001 to off-load 9980kg (22000lb) of halibut. The boat was cleaned-up and prepared for its next trip. The auxiliary diesel engine was inoperative, and on the morning of 23October2001, the owner/operator tried, unsuccessfully, to repair it. After loading seven tons of crushed ice into the fish hold and with the fuel/hydraulic tanks fully replenished, the Kella-Lee departed in the afternoon for the fishing grounds, located some 50miles southeast of Cape St. James, in Queen Charlotte Sound, British Columbia. On the evening of 23October2001, the Pacific Weather Centre forecast southwesterly winds at 20knots, shifting to westerly 25knots, with three- to four-metre seas for Queen Charlotte Sound. At 04002 the following morning, the weather outlook was for winds rising to gale force southeast, then shifting to strong gale force southwesterly. A further update at 1030 gave the outlook as winds rising to storm force southeasterly. It was reported that the owner/operator had closely monitored the weather forecasts since departing Port Hardy. The vessel had an uneventful passage en route to the fishing grounds. Fishing for halibut commenced on the morning of 24October2001, in seasonably poor weather conditions, fishing continuously until the following afternoon. At approximately 1400 on 25October2001, the Kella-Lee, with a catch of about 1800kg (4000lb) of fish departed the fishing grounds, for Port Hardy. The main cargo boom was lowered and secured and the riding sail and paravanes deployed. The weather had deteriorated progressively with southeasterly winds of 35to 40knots, rough seas and heavy swells. The vessel was on a course of about 110True(T) and making a speed of approximately four knots for Queen Charlotte Strait. It was variously reported that during the passage the Kella-Lee experienced problems with the steering gear, and that the owner/operator inspected the gear in the lazarette space but was unable to repair it. The owner/operator and the two most experienced deckhands shared the wheelhouse watches. The owner/operator took over the conduct of the vessel at 2200 on 25October2001. The three deckhands rested in their quarters. Shortly afterwards, the crew awoke to a loud banging noise and found the vessel was rolling and pitching heavily. Two of the deckhands donned immersion suits that were stowed in their cabin and with great difficulty, due to the vessel's movement, made their way to the wheelhouse. Green seas were breaking over the vessel and water was entering the galley area through the open top half of the dutch door. Water was down-flooding into the engine compartment through the non-watertight deck hatches in the galley and wheelhouse. One of the small flush-fitting access hatch covers in the main fish hold hatch had been swept away. The Kella-Lee fell off course and, with the wind and seas on the port side, heeled over quickly to starboard. In this condition, the violent seas and heavy swells continued to toss the vessel about. The owner/operator who was at the helm feared the ingress of water through the starboard wheelhouse door, and tried to turn the vessel's head into the wind, however, the rudder did not respond to the helm and the vessel continued to pitch and roll violently. He dispatched a deckhand to the engine compartment to check the steering gear hydraulic pump and also the condition of the main engine, as heavy smoke was observed to be coming from the stack. The sail remained deployed at this time but due to the weather conditions none of the crew members ventured out on deck to lower it. The deckhand found heavy traces of hydraulic oil on the rungs of the ladder into the engine-room directly below the solenoid valves in the steering gear hydraulic piping system. He also noticed water rising in the bilges and reported this to the wheelhouse. Green seas continually swept over the vessel resulting in more down-flooding through both the unsecured access hatches located on the main fish hold hatch cover and also into the galley area. The third deckhand donned the last and only immersion suit that was stowed in the owner's cabin. The owner/operator then gave the order to abandon the severely listing vessel, now rolling between the vertical and close to her beam ends on the starboard side. The crew was being thrown against the wheelhouse bulkheads during each roll. The main engine spluttered, smoked and almost stalled with each roll. The owner/operator ordered the liferaft to be deployed and sent out a MAYDAY distress call on VHF radiotelephone channel16 at 2352 indicating that they were abandoning ship into a liferaft (seeAppendixB). The position given was as shown on the global positioning system (GPS) as 5101'N 12837'W (13miles north of Cape Scott). The call was received by Prince Rupert Coast Guard Radio, who in turn broadcast a Mayday Relay and immediately notified the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) in Victoria. An extensive air and sea search lasting 17hours ensued. Rescue resources included two Buffalo fixed wing aircraft and a Labrador helicopter from Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Comox, the Canadian Coast Guard ship (CCGS) JohnP.Tully, the fishing vessel Frosty and the South Korean-registered freighter CSXAnchorage. The crew members made their way to the wheelhouse top, bracing themselves against whatever support the vessel could afford. The Kella-Lee was, by now, lying on its starboard side, occasionally rolling to the vertical and then flopping back to starboard. The liferaft, when launched from the stowed position on the starboard side, was immediately swept under the vessel. Some moments later it cleared the underside of the vessel, floated free, and inflated allowing two deckhands and the owner/operator to climb in. The third deckhand did not manage to climb on board and clung onto the outside of the liferaft. The liferaft painter then became entangled with the rigging of the paravane boom. The boom came down on the raft and its occupants with every roll of the vessel. The raft eventually overturned leaving the crew members clinging to it, and attempting to shield themselves from the boom. To avoid the boom, the owner/operator and one deckhand let go of the liferaft and were immediately swept away by the wind and the waves. Later, one of the two deckhands remaining with the liferaft managed to right it and climb on board. The other deckhand also, in trying to protect himself from the boom, eventually let go of the liferaft and was swept away. Subsequently, the vessel sank and the liferaft with the one deckhand on board floated free. The winds at this time were estimated to be 80-90knots from the south, with 8-10metre seas and swells. Two crew members survived. The first survivor was rescued from the water by the CCGS JohnP.Tully at 0725 on 26October2001, some 7hours after the MAYDAY was broadcast, and the second survivor was hoisted from the vessel's liferaft onto a Labrador helicopter at 1712 some 17hours after the distress call. Stability Data Approval As a small fishing vessel of closed construction and not engaged in fishing for herring or capelin, the Kella-Lee was not required to comply with the intact stability requirements of Section29 of Part1 of the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations (SFVIR), nor was it required to meet the criteria of the 'Stability, Subdivision Load Line Standards' STAB4 as detailed in Transport Canada (TC) publication TP7301. At the request of the first owner, the vessel (then named ShannonMist) was the subject of an inclining experiment on 28July1980, and the related Trim and Stability Booklet was duly stamped 'approved' by the Canadian Steamship Inspection (CSI) Branch of the Department of Transport (DOT)3 on 20January1981. The booklet indicated that the vessel was fitted with 8.38tons of permanent ballast, located in the engine-room and fish hold bilges and also noted that stability approval was For Salmon Trolling Only. Compliance with the minimum stability criteria of STAB4 ensures that small fishing vessels maintain an adequate margin of intact transverse stability throughout a range of standard loading conditions related to the vessel's intended service. The criteria are such that the margin of reserve intact transverse stability ensures that a vessel is able to withstand adverse weather conditions and other detrimental influences expected during its service. Reserve intact transverse stability depends on the continued maintenance of the watertight integrity of a vessel's hatch covers and openings. If this watertight integrity is jeopardised, the vessel's stability is negatively affected and it may capsize. Stability History The Kella-Lee, originally rigged for salmon trolling, was modified with additional gear over the years. The vessel was first modified shortly after the ownership changed in1984, when additional gear was installed on the weather deck and wheelhouse top to suit the intended fishing operations of the new (and current) owner. The modifications also included the removal of some of the permanent ballast from the engine-room bilges. The actual quantity of ballast removed was not recorded and the vessel's transverse stability was not formally re-assessed at that time. At different times between1984 and the day of the occurrence, the Kella-Lee was equipped with various types of gear to suit different fisheries. In order to maintain operational versatility and the ability to quickly respond to changing fisheries and fishery quotas, redundant gear was not always removed when the operational requirements of the vessel changed. At the time of the occurrence the vessel was engaged in the halibut fishery. In addition to the hydraulically-powered self-winding net drum and long-lining gear associated with this kind of fishing, the vessel had sundry other gear (related to other fisheries) which was located on the main deck and the wheelhouse top. The cumulative effect of the ballast removal and the on-going fishing equipment modifications raised the vessel's centre of gravity and detrimentally affected its transverse stability. The vessel was not employed in the herring or capelin fisheries, consequently, the submission of revised stability data was not a mandatory, regulatory requirement. However, regardless of the mode of fishing, the vessel's stability and seaworthiness is the responsibility of the owner. The partial removal of ballast was not formally reported to TC, nor were the later additional and modified changes to the weight of the fishing gear called to the attention of the TC ship inspectors at any subsequent routine inspection. Since the Kella-Lee was not required to comply with the intact stability requirements of the SFVIR and the TP 7301, the owner was not required to report the ballast removal to TC. Vessel Stability On departure, the Kella-Lee was loaded with seven tons of crushed ice stowed in the fish hold for catch preservation. Subsequently, approximately 1800kg (4000lb) of fish caught prior to the sinking were packed with the crushed ice in the fish hold. Reportedly, the vessel's fuel tanks were filled to capacity for the intended voyage. The total weight of the fuel and its distribution within the vessel can thus be deduced from its fuel tank capacities data. However, the sequence of fuel consumption from the various tanks is not known and the fuel weight distribution at the time of the sinking cannot be determined. The rate of fuel consumption due to the rough sea conditions encountered during the voyage is unknown. While the fuel weight reduction is compensated to some extent by the additional weight of the fish catch, the cumulative effect of this weight change and the effect of free surface caused by melting ice and water downflooding into the vessel make it difficult to calculate the vessel's vertical centre of gravity with precision. Due to the uncertainty of the vessel's deadweight and trim condition, as a result of the significantly increased weight of additional and redundant fishing gear located above the weather deck and the unknown weight of the ballast removed from the bottom of the engine-room, an accurate estimate of the vessel's intact transverse stability characteristics at the time of the occurrence is not possible. The cumulative effect of the above factors would have significantly reduced the vessel's self righting ability in rough weather. They also rendered the Kella-Lee vulnerable to the detrimental free-surface effects of sea water which was shipped and retained on board, when the rough weather was encountered. Vessel Inspection and Certification The SFVIR made pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act require every small fishing vessel between 15and 150GRT, less than 24.4m in length, to be inspected once every four years by TC. TC records show the Kella-Lee as having had underwater hull and machinery inspections in1984,1989,1993and1997. The vessel was certificated as a Home Trade Class3 vessel and a Steamship Inspection Certificate (S.I.C.29),4 was issued on 18October1984, with an expiry date of 07October1988, on satisfactory completion of that quadrennial inspection. However, there are no records of any subsequent S.I.C.29 having been issued as required under the provisions of the SFVIR. The next quadrennial inspection was due in June2001 but had not been carried out at the time of the occurrence on 25October2001. Personnel Certification and Experience The Owner/Operator held a Canadian Fishing Master Class Four (CFV4) Certificate of Competency issued on 02February2001 and valid until 01February2005. He was issued a Radio Operator Certificate (Maritime Commercial - ROC-MC), by Industry Canada on 06February2001. This Certification included qualification for the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) as set out by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). One of the deckhands, who was on his second fishing trip with this owner, had all relevant Marine Emergency Duties (MED) training. The other two, both experienced fishermen, had worked with the owner/operator for the last five years but did not have any formal MED training. Machinery Malfunction The vessel had experienced problems with the steering system prior to this occurrence. The owner/operator carried out his own repairs and no records are available regarding the nature of the problems. At the time of the occurrence when the vessel was experiencing steering problems, the owner/operator reportedly had gone down into the lazarette to examine the rudder stock and hydraulic steering ram, but was not able to restore steering control. Prior to sailing, the auxiliary engine was not operational and attempts by the owner to fix it were unsuccessful. Consequently the vessel sailed with only the main engine available to provide power for all on-board services. Survival/Distress Equipment TC regulations require a vessel of the size, type and crew complement such as the Kella-Lee, when on a Home Trade Class3 Voyage, to carry one approved lifejacket for each person on board; two approved lifebuoys, one fitted with 27m of line and the other with an approved lifebuoy light, and a liferaft which may be carried in lieu of a lifeboat or skiff. Further, the Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia's Fishing Operations Regulations require the vessel to carry one immersion suit for each crew member. It is not possible to verify the actual equipment carried, however, it was reported that there were no standard lifejackets on board. The vessel was equipped with a six person inflatable liferaft, stowed at the starboard after end of the flying bridge and secured in chocks by senhouse slips, and a fibre-glassed dinghy. During the accident, only three extra-large-sized immersion suits were readily available. Although not required, the vessel was also equipped with one Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB), of the ClassB type, transmitting on 121.5MHz emergency frequency. Such an EPIRB transmits an audible sweep tone but no user identification. The last inspection date as noted on the EPIRB was March1992, with an annual inspection due date of March1993. The battery, which was due to be replaced in December1994, had not been replaced. The EPIRB was recovered with the owner's body. It was not switched on and no signal had been received from it. Weather forecasts At 1600, 24October2001 the Weather Centre of Environment Canada issued a gale warning for Queen Charlotte Sound predicting southeasterly gale force winds of 30to 40knots and three-metre seas for the following afternoon. The outlook was for winds rising to storm force southeast then veering to storm force southwest and easing to strong westerly. At 2118 on 24October2001, the Pacific Weather Centre issued a Storm Warning for Queen Charlotte Sound with predictions for southeasterly storm force winds of 50to 60knots and four-metre swells for the evening of 25October2001. The weather, as experienced at the time of the occurrence, was consistent with the marine weather forecast for the area. These forecasts were reportedly being monitored by the owner/operator, however the Kella-Lee continued fishing until 1400, 25October2001, some 16hours after the storm warning. The CCGS JohnP.Tully reported winds of 45-50knots and gusting to 80knots and seven-metre seas when it arrived on the scene. Search and Rescue Operations Both the Canadian Forces (CF) and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) have search and rescue (SAR) responsibilities under the National Search and Rescue Program. Air and marine rescue operations in British Columbia are controlled by a team consisting of CF and CCG personnel under the authority of the CF commander at the Regional Coordination Centre in Victoria. The primary CF air facility available for SAR in the Victoria region is provided by 442 Transport and Rescue Squadron based at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Comox, British Columbia. The distress call was received by Prince Rupert CGRS at 2352, 25October2001 and soon after JRCC Victoria tasked the CCGS JohnP.Tully at 2356 and the Buffalo aircraft, R452, from CFB Comox at 2358. Other units tasked included the South Korean freighter CSXAnchorage and the Canadian fishing vessel Frosty. The Labrador helicopter, R318, from CFB Comox was tasked at 0007 on October26 but was unable to respond for some time due to bad weather. The CCGS JohnP.Tully, which was on primary SAR standby patrolling Fitzhugh Sound, provided an estimated time of arrival (ETA) at the scene of 7.5hours. The Buffalo aircraft, R452, was on the scene at 0207. Two lights were sighted in the water at 0241, but due to weather conditions the crew was unable to determine if the lights were from a liferaft or from persons in the water. At 0314, R452 which would soon have to refuel, requested that JRCC task a relief Buffalo aircraft. The Buffalo aircraft kept the lights in sight till 0428 and then dropped a datum marker buoy (DMB) prior to departing to refuel at PortHardy. The second Buffalo aircraft, R465, was on the scene at 0651. There was no air coverage between 0428 and 0651. The Labrador helicopter, R318, departed Comox at 0640 with an ETA of 0725 at Port Hardy. It refuelled and was then on scene at1247. The CCGS JohnP.Tully sighted a light close off the bow at 0708. Due to adverse weather and poor visibility, it was not possible to launch the vessel's Fast Rescue Craft (FRC) until 0725, when the first surviving crew member from the Kella-Lee was picked up. The bodies of the owner/operator and a deckhand were recovered in the interim. While the deckhand had donned an immersion suit, the owner/operator wore a floater jacket and pants. The activating switch of the EPIRB found strapped to his right leg was in the off position. The last surviving crew member was hoisted aboard R318 at 1712 on 26October2001. Both survivors wore immersion suits. CF/SAR Aircraft Response and Readiness R452 was tasked at 2358, 25October2001, was airborne at 0123, and arrived on the scene at 0207, 26October2001. At 0314, R452 requested a relief aircraft and at 0428 departed the scene to refuel. Some time was required to dispatch the replacement Buffalo aircraft, R465, and it arrived on the scene at 0651. As per CF Publication209, National Search and Rescue Manual, the CF is mandated to have one Buffalo aircraft and one Labrador helicopter crewed and ready for SAR operations 24/7. Once these are tasked by JRCC, CF readiness for the aircraft is waived until the aircraft returns to the home base. However, should another incident occur which requires the urgent deployment of an additional SAR aircraft, the Commanding Officer of the squadron works on a best effort basis to provide additional crews and craft. General Requirements for Insurance of Fishing Vessels The Kella-Lee was insured at the time of the occurrence. Fishing vessel insurance is not mandatory, and if so desired, it is the owner's responsibility to have his vessel(s) surveyed by a marine surveyor, prior to being accepted for insurance. The owner obtains insurance for his vessel, from an underwriter, via an insurance broker. This process involves the submission to the underwriters, of a 'report of a marine survey', carried out by a marine surveyor. Any deficiencies found during the survey are duly noted. It is usual practice for the owner to agree to rectify any deficiencies identified within a stipulated period of time. However, seldom do underwriters follow up to ensure that these defects are actually corrected. Common defects include substandard life-saving and fire-fighting gear, poor maintenance and poor housekeeping. Other important defects often include insufficiently watertight and improperly secured hatch covers and manhole covers. Underwriters in general do not have requirements specific to fish hold hatch covers and their means of securement, nor do they have criteria specific to continued seaworthiness and safety critical items often go uncorrected. Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia Requirements for Fishing Operations and Immersion Suits. Section24.97(1) of the Fishing Operations Regulations made pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act state that Every fishing vessel must carry, for each crew member, one immersion suit meeting standards acceptable to the Board. The Kella-Lee, with a crew of four, had three immersion suits on board. All three suits were extra large size and were too big for the crew members wearing them. The Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia Occupational Health and Safety Regulations under the heading Fishing Operations list the general requirements, applicable to all owners, masters and crew members of licensed commercial fishing vessels relating to the seaworthiness of the vessel, the maintenance of machinery and equipment, the assigning of emergency duties and the owner's responsibility after major modifications. Location of Liferaft The liferaft was located on top of the wheelhouse, on the starboard after end, thus placing it abreast and inboard of the boom and rigging. During the occurrence, as the liferaft was deployed, the painter became entangled with the boom and its rigging. This prevented the immediate inflation of the raft and its accessibility to the crew.