Summary In the early morning of 5 April 1999, the Algontario was upbound in the St. Marys River. With the vessel abeam of Johnson Point light, the helm was put hard to port to make a 63 alteration of course into the Middle Neebish Channel. The vessel's turning circle increased and the rate of turn decreased due to squat and bank suction effects. The vessel overshot the turn for the deep channel and grounded in the 6.4m (21ft.) project depth channel between buoys Q20 and Q22. The channel was closed to upbound traffic until the vessel was refloated. Underwater surveys revealed that the hull suffered extensive damage to the bottom plating. The vessel was later dry-docked for temporary repairs. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Description of the Vessel The Algontario is a gearless bulk carrier with the machinery space, crew accommodation, and navigation bridge located aft. The vessel has six holds, with water ballast tanks abreast each hold. Double bottom tanks throughout the length of the cargo holds are subdivided by the centreline girder. The vessel is equipped with main engine bridge controls. The maximum open water speed is 12.5knots. History of the Voyage On 2 April 1999, the Algontario departed the St. Lawrence Cement dock at Clarkson, Ontario, bound for Duluth, Minnesota, with a load of 18,910tonnes(t) of bulk cement. The vessel had 382t of heavy fuel oil and 98t of diesel on board. It was the master's first upbound voyage of the season on the lakes. The voyage was proceeding normally and without incident. All the mechanical, electrical, and navigation systems were operating satisfactorily. On April 5, at 0209 Eastern daylight time, four miles before the Detour Reef Light, the master was called to the bridge to take control of the navigation. The bridge watch was made up of the master, the officer of the watch (OOW), and the helmsman. The master was piloting the vessel visually, and he used the Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS). He opted not to use the echo-sounder while navigating in the river. At 0221 the Algontario passed Detour Reef Light and entered the St. Marys River. At 0345 the deck watch was changed. The new helmsman took the wheel while the vessel was on a course of 308T (Course10). The night was clear and visibility was good; winds were light from the east at 10knots; sunrise was at 0710. As shown on the ECDIS print out, at 0409 the ship's speed over the ground (SOG) was reduced from 10.9to 7.2knots (Position5 on the throttle), as the vessel approached Mud Lake Junction buoy. The gyro was checked on Winter Point and had no error. The vessel's position was reported to the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), known as Soo Control. At about 0435 the Algontario was steering on the Sailor's Encampment Range lights (Course9) in the 8.23m (27ft.) project depth lane of the Neebish Channel. There was no ice or traffic reported in the vicinity of the vessel. At 0434 the vessel passed buoy Q16 with an SOG of 7.5knots. The helmsman steered the vessel using the Sailor's Encampment range lights, 017T, using the left-hand-side range. At 0436 the speed had decreased to 7.4knots at buoy Q18 and to 7.1knots at 0438. At 0439, more than half the ship's length had passed Johnson Point light, which was approximately 60m to port. The ship's heading was 015T, and the SOG was 7.2knots. The master called Soo Control at the winter calling-in point near Johnson Point. The mate noted the position in the log book. The engine speed was then increased to Position6 on the throttle. At 0440, after the master ordered Come to Port when Johnson Point light was abreast of the bridge window, the helmsman immediately put the helm hard to port and the rudder angle indicator followed. The bow started to swing to port, as confirmed by an ECDIS heading of 354T (seeAppendixB,Figure1). The master monitored the rate of turn as the bow started swinging to port. The mate left the port side of the bridge to go to the chart table to mark the vessel's position off Johnson Point. He glanced at the rudder indicator on his way, confirming its hard to port reading. Using the searchlight, the master located buoy Q22 ahead and it appeared to him that the vessel had a rate of turn slower than normal. The engine speed was then increased to Position7. The helmsman also felt that the turn was slower than usual (seeAppendixB,Figures2and3), but this was not brought to the attention of the bridge team. The vessel continued to turn to port but also drifted to starboard into the shallow channel. When the mate felt the vessel shudder, he left the chart table to go to the bridge front window. There was no reported discrepancy between ship time and ECDIS time (seeAppendixB,Figures4,5,and6). At 0443 the vessel grounded on a heading of 310T in the 6.40m (21ft.) project depth section of the Middle Neebish Channel, 50m on the Canadian side of the Canada-United States border, near buoys Q20 and Q22, in the following position: latitude 4615.6'N, longitude 08406.1'W.1 The starboard side of the vessel was hard aground from No5 double bottom tank aft to the rudder skeg. The engine was stopped immediately. The ship came to rest with a three-degree starboard list. The grounding took place where Course 9 and Course 8 intersect in the upbound channel. At 0450 the master advised Soo Control of the situation. He then ordered the mate and helmsman to take soundings in the water ballast tanks (WBT) to assess flooding of the compartments and to monitor water depths and draughts around the vessel. The fuel tanks were also sounded. The depths on the starboard side were observed to be 6.83m forward and 7.62m aft. Depth over the stern was 7.31m on the starboard side and 8.23m on the port side. The tanks showing an ingress of water were WBT No5 starboard, WBT No6 starboard, and the port and starboard engine-room void spaces. There was no change in the soundings or ullage of any of the fuel tanks in the engine room; however, the cofferdams were filled with water. Pollutants were not released. The ship emergency plan was put into effect. Since there was a potential release of fuel and diesel oil in an area that is environmentally sensitive, containment services were contracted to the Eastern Canada Response Organization. An oil boom was deployed around the stern of the vessel. The USCG closed the Middle Neebish Channel pending full appraisal of the environmental situation. Damage to the Vessel A diving inspection revealed that the ship was resting on a mud, gravel, and rock bottom, the stern frame skeg was resting on boulders, and the rudder was clear. The diving inspection and subsequent dry-dock survey indicated that the vessel had sustained extensive bottom shell plating damage. Starboard double bottom water ballast tanks Nos4,5, and6 and the feed water tank and cofferdams in way of the engine room were breached. Salvage Operations The owners's salvage team arrived on the scene at 1730. The USCG inspected the vessel and requested a detailed salvage plan, approved by a naval architect, before the start of salvage operations. The salvage engineer considered that lightering was essential to refloat the vessel. Based upon the plan, it was decided to remove all ballast water from the remaining intact ballast tanks and to transfer bunker C fuel to a barge to lighten the ship. At 0733, on April 7, lightering operations began in the presence of representatives of the USCG, Transport Canada (TC) and Environment Canada. The Algontario floated free at 1830 that evening. Vessel Certification The vessel had been inspected by TC at Hamilton, Ontario, on 30March1999 and met the certification, crewing, and equipment requirements for that class of vessel and its area of operation. Personnel Qualifications, Experience and Fitness The master held a Coastal Navigation 1 (CN 1) certificate issued in Toronto in 1980. He had 11 years of service as a master with Algoma and had started his fifth season on the Algontario. He was qualified to navigate on the Great Lakes and he had made several voyages on the St. Marys River. During the winter months, he was used to a regular night's rest. He considered himself to be well-rested and fit for his duties; this was his first trip of the year. The chief officer had been going to sea since 1967. He held a CN 2 certificate issued in St. Catharines in 1997, and had been working for the company since March1998, and had been serving in this capacity for nearly five years on other vessels. He reported that he was well rested and felt fit for his duties. The helmsman had over 15 years of experience as helmsman and worked mainly on the Great Lakes. He held a Bridge Watchman Certificate. He also reported being well rested and alert for his duties. The second engineer held the appropriate engineer qualifications. He was on watch in the engine-room and did not notice or experience any mechanical problems. Circadian Rhythms and Performance The master's circadian rhythm was somewhat affected by his watch on the bridge after departing Clarkson and while transiting the Welland Canal for 12hours. Also, it took close to 10hours to navigate the Detroit and St. Clair River system at night. Finally, he took the con at the entrance of the St. Marys River shortly after 0200 on April5. In normal conditions, the sleep/wake cycle follows a 24-hour rhythm, with approximately one third of this time spent sleeping. The cycle is not the same for everyone, and the main peak of alertness can occur earlier or later in the day. Although individual rhythms vary, everyone experiences two distinct peaks and troughs. The big trough is at night, with the time of a person's lowest alertness in the hours just before dawn, between 0300 and 0500; the other trough occurs in the mid-afternoon, between 1500 and 1700. During the troughs, it can be particularly difficult to maintain alertness. Preceding these maximum sleepiness periods, people have maximum wakefulness periods or peaks. The grounding occurred between 0300 and 0500, i.e. during what was likely the crew's alertness trough. Neebish Channel The West and Middle Neebish channels are strategically important waterways between Lake Huron and Lake Superior. The original deepening of the St. Marys River was completed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as a result of the Boundary Waters Treatydated 1957. The Middle Neebish Channel was cut and dredged by means of explosives. Rock debris was removed and piled on the canal banks. The river bottom remains hard and rocky. Since the construction of a downbound channel on the west side of Neebish Island, the east-side channel is now a one-way channel for upbound vessels. Although several sections of the Neebish channel lie in Canadian waters, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) has never conducted any dredging activities on these sections. The channels of the St. Marys River meet the CCG Canadian Waterways National Manoeuvring Guidelines. The following information is widely available to mariners, through various sources, including US chart number 14883 and the Canadian Sailing Directions Volume2. The United States Coast Pilot for the Great Lakes, Volume 6 describes the Neebish Channel as follows: The dredged channel of the St. Marys River divides to lead around Neebish Island. The upbound channel to the east and north sides of Neebish Island is 17.5miles long. The courses through this stretch are well marked by lighted ranges and buoys. Course9 leads 3.6miles NNE to Johnson Point on the SE side of Neebish Island. The E side of the Channel has a depth of 21feet for a width of 200feet. The W side has a depth of 27feet for at least 300feet. The west side is marked by a 01655' lighted range at the upper end. Course8 leads NW for 1 mile from Johnson Point to Mirre Point. The NE side of the channel has a depth of 21feet for a width of 400feet and the SW side has a depth of 28feet for a least width of 600feet. The deep side of the channel is marked by a 13456' lighted range at the lower end and a 314 lighted range at the upper end. A USCG survey confirmed that buoys Q20 and Q22 were in their normal positions. After the refloating operations, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers conducted a sounding survey to find if there was a hidden danger near Johnson Point. It was found that the deep and shallow draught channels conformed to their respective controlling depths of 8.54m and 6.40m, and that their actual physical depths at the time were approximately 0.03m greater. Navigation and Steering Equipment The Algontario was equipped with the required navigation equipment and also fitted with a modern ECDIS (model Navi-Sailor 2400S). The replay of the ECDIS data provided graphic information that helped in determining the vessel's track before grounding. The vessel is steered from a centreline console with good visibility forward. The single rudder steering system is controlled by two steering pumps. The times for hard over to hard over are 20seconds in hand mode and 22seconds in non-follow up mode. Both steering motors were tested before departure from Clarkson. It was the practice to have both steering motors running before entering a narrow waterway. Following the grounding, United States and Canadian inspectors tested the steering and found it responding normally. There was no indication of steering gear malfunction. Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) VTS have been established in the St. Marys River to prevent collisions and groundings, to protect improvements to the waterway, and to protect the navigable waters from environmental damage. The VTS station regulates the routing and movement of vessels. Participation in St. Marys VTS is mandatory for vessels at least 40m long. There is a 7.8-knot speed limit in effect between Everens Point and Reed Point.2 Johnson Point is a calling-in point only in winter. There were 22upbound vessels with a draught of 6.4 m or more that turned at Johnson Point between April2 and April5. On April2 the bulk carriers JamesR.Baker and CandianEnterprisenegotiated the turn with a 7.5-m (24ft.6in.) draught. The day before the grounding, at 0757, the Algosoopassed through with a draught of 6.6m and, at 2106, the St.Clair reported upbound at Johnson Point with a draught of 6.4m. With an after static draught of 7.8m, the Algontario was the deepest draught vessel to pass Johnson Point in early April1999. Pilotage Waters By international agreement between the United States and Canada, the waters of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River have been divided into designated and undesignated pilotage waters. All waters of the St. Marys River are part of District3. The Western Great Lake Pilots Association provides pilotage service for ocean vessels. The Great Lakes Pilotage Regulations do not require a ship-specific exemption. The ship masters and officers were exempted from pilotage requirements. Water Level Fluctuations and Currents According to the pilot book, the water levels of the Great Lakes are subject to three types of fluctuations: seasonal, long-range, and short-period. In the spring of 1999, long-range and seasonal water fluctuations affected Lake Superior, and water levels were reported to be lower than normal. Since 1900, the difference between the highest and the lowest monthly mean levels below the Sault Ste. Marie locks has been about 1.8m. Changes in level have a direct effect on the available depth in the channel. The depths of water in the dredged channels on the St. Marys River are known as the Federal project depths. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers makes periodic bar sweeps through all the dredged reaches of the St. Marys River, and any depths found to be less than the project depths are published in the Local Notice to Mariners. According to the VTS St. Marys River, at 0443 on the morning of the grounding, the lower pool was one inch above datum.3 The lower pool is a gauge level used to represent the general area below the Sault locks. The strength of the current depends largely upon the discharge of the river and the elevation of the water surface at the mouth of the river. At the time of the grounding, the St. Marys River was discharging water at a low water flow rate of 1560m3/sec. The current around Johnson Point (Course9) was estimated to have been approximately 2knots. Bridge Resource Management (BRM) Practices The Board has previously noted that poor communication on the bridge, interrupted procedures, lack of situational awareness, and lack of teamwork continue to be factors in occurrences. Consequently, the Board has emphasized the need for improved teamwork to advance safe navigation. In 1995 the Board released a Safety Study of the Operational Relationship Between Ship Masters/Watchkeeping Officers and Marine Pilots which identified safety deficiencies associated with the lack of teamwork on the bridge, including communication between marine pilots, masters, and watchkeeping officers. In the study, the Board recommended that TC require that the initial training syllabus for all ship officers be modified to include demonstration of skills in BRM (M95-09, issued October1995); and that TC require all ship officers to demonstrate BRM skills before being issued Continued Proficiency certificates (M95-10, issued October1995). In response, TC has developed a BRM Training Standard in collaboration with ship owners, marine schools, pilotage authorities, and officer unions. The finalized document is contained in TP 13117. Canadian and American marine training institutions are already providing BRM training to Canadian officers. Although BRM training is not mandatory in Canada, in 1996 and 1997 the master and the first officer of the Algontario had taken a course in BRM at Marine Safety International in Newport, Rhode Island. Squat and Bank Suction Effects As a vessel moves ahead in a restricted shallow channel, the flow of water under the hull is accelerated and causes a reduction in pressure such that the vessel settles deeper than her static draught. This phenomenon, known as squat, depends upon a ship's speed, the ratio of her static draught to the channel depth, and the relationship of the cross sectional areas of the hull and the channel. The depth of the squat increases with the square of the speed; loaded vessels with limited static under-keel clearance (UKC) may settle, make bottom contact, and incur grounding damage when proceeding at too high a speed. A reduction in speed will lessen the effect of squat. When the speed of the vessel is such that some UKC is retained and bottom contact is not made, the hydrodynamic effect of the squat continues to affect the vessel's trim and have a detrimental effect on her handling characteristics. The detrimental effects include increased wave making - especially at the forward end - which generally causes the vessel to become sluggish and slower to manoeuvre. Bank suction effect is similar to squat, but acts in the horizontal rather than vertical plane. As a vessel moves ahead in the middle of a restricted shallow channel, the flow of water around each side of the hull is more or less symmetrical, and steering control and response are not adversely affected. However, when a vessel's course is parallel to, but off the centre of a narrow restricted channel, the flow of water between the ship and the nearer side of the channel is accelerated, causing a reduction in pressure which draws the vessel toward that side. The magnitude of this suction depends largely upon the vessel's speed, the depth of the water, and how close the vessel is to the side of the channel. When a vessel is influenced by such a suction effect, attempts to turn the bow away from the near side of the channel can exacerbate the situation and cause the stern to swing toward, and make contact with, the channel side. Such a situation is best countered by a reduction in speed. When a vessel is closer to one side of a channel, and a course change becomes necessary to follow the general trend of the channel on that side, the suction effect acting at the stern will retard the initiation of the vessel's response to the rudder and also delay the normal turning effect expected from such a helm order. The delayed steering response caused by bank suction effect, in conjunction with slower manoeuvring characteristics due to squat, can result in a vessel overshooting its intended turning point, not following the intended course, and making contact with or grounding on either side of a channel. Although the water level in the channel was above chart datum, it was lower than normal for this time of the season, and the vessel had less water under the keel than usual.