2.0 Analysis 2.1 Introduction The conduct of a seagoing vessel in any condition of visibility is governed by the rules of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. It is every vessel's responsibility to apply these rules. A proper look-out must be kept, and a safe speed maintained, at all times, particulary in restricted visibility. Whenever a vessel is in or near an area of restricted visibility, she is required to make a sound signal at prescribed intervals. The signal indicates to another mariner the type of vessel sounding the signal and her status in the water. 2.2 Look-out Visibility was between zero and one-half mile. Although both the master and the OOW of the FEDERAL OSLO were each monitoring a radar, neither detected the presence of the SHELLEY DAWN II. As the watch AB was sounding tanks, there was no dedicated visual look-out posted who would have been better able to see the fishing vessel's bright working lights sooner than the master and OOW who were mainly preoccupied with their respective radars. Although both the FEDERAL OSLO radars were reported to be operating satisfactorily and the SHELLEY DAWN II was fitted with a passive radar reflector and had on board six marker buoys also fitted with radar reflectors, the SHELLEY DAWN II was not seen by radar by the FEDERAL OSLO. The radar target of the SHELLEY DAWN II was detected by the fishing vessel STEPHEN ROBERT at a distance of 0.75 mile. Given the difference in height of the radar antennas of the FEDERAL OSLO and the fishing vessel, the problems of sea and rain clutter experienced by the fishing vessel must have been equal to or worse than those reported by the FEDERAL OSLO. In addition, the movement of the fishing vessel in the sea would have been considerably greater than that of the cargo vessel. The SHELLEY DAWN II was lying to her gear in a south-west/north-east direction. As the vessels scraped each other's port side, the SHELLEY DAWN II must have been lying to her gear on the course line of the FEDERAL OSLO. It is possible that the radar echo of the SHELLEY DAWN II was obscured for a time under the heading marker of the radars of the FEDERAL OSLO. The FEDERAL OSLO was steering a north-easterly course with a force 7 south-westerly gale blowing from astern. In the circumstances, the vessel would probably have been yawing considerably. The radar target of the SHELLEY DAWNII would have been difficult to detect but it would not have been obscured permanently by the heading marker. Since the STEPHEN ROBERT detected the SHELLEY DAWN II by radar and the FEDERAL OSLO did not, the strength of the SHELLEY DAWN II radar echo was not a factor. However, for whatever reasons, the radar echo of the SHELLEY DAWN II was not detected by the radar watch being kept by the FEDERAL OSLO. As all four crew members of the SHELLEY DAWN II were engaged in handling fishing gear, the wheel-house was unattended. At the time of the collision, no visual or radar look-out was being kept. 2.3 Speed The FEDERAL OSLO was proceeding at a speed of about 13.5 kn immediately before the collision. The visibility was between zero and one-half mile and the FEDERAL OSLO was aware of the presence of fishing vessels in her immediate vicinity. The speed of the vessel was such that she could not have been stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. The vessel did not need to proceed at full ahead to maintain her schedule. 2.4 Sound Signals Both the master and the OOW of the FEDERAL OSLO stated that the vessel was sounding a fog signal and that the signal was being generated automatically. They did not agree on the composition of the signal. When the signal was tested, the automatic mode produced the standard sound signal for a power-driven vessel under way, a prolonged blast of approximately six seconds every two minutes. Presumably, given that the ship's whistle was activated, this was the signal being generated before the collision. There is some doubt that the signal was being sounded by the FEDERAL OSLO as none was heard before the collision by the SHELLEY DAWN II. The Canadian fishing vessel STEPHEN ROBERT also passed close to the FEDERAL OSLO after the collision but did not hear a sound signal. 2.5 The Use of Automatic Steering Automatic steering is normally employed in good visibility and where it is not likely that alterations of course will be required quickly. Manual steering enables more rapid alterations of course. It takes some seconds to change over from the automatic to the manual mode and it requires that a helmsman be available to take over the vessel's steering. Despite the restricted visibility and the knowledge that there were fishing vessels in the immediate area, manual steering was not employed and the command to alter course was ineffective. 2.6 Bridge Resource Management Both the master and the OOW were monitoring the vessel's radars; however, neither sighted the SHELLEY DAWN II by this means. As the SHELLEY DAWN II was known to be presenting a good radar image to another vessel, it is difficult to understand why the SHELLEY DAWN II was not seen on the radar screens of the FEDERAL OSLO. As there was no visual watch being kept because the watch AB had been assigned other tasks, the resources available to maintain an effective watch were not used to advantage. For economic reasons, the vessel's crew had been reduced to four. When fishing gear was being recovered, all hands were required for this task. There was no one to maintain a look-out during the time the gear was being recovered. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings During a period of reduced visibility: The personnel available to establish a bridge resource management regime were not used to maximum advantage. No dedicated look-out was posted. The speed of the vessel was not reduced while in the known presence of fishing vessels in the area. It is uncertain if a fog signal was being sounded. The vessel was in the automatic steering mode. The time required to engage manual steering to carry a major alteration of course rendered the alteration ineffective. The watch able seaman (AB) was not on the bridge. The wheel-house was left unmanned while recovering fishing gear. Neither radar was in the operating mode. There was no dedicated look-out. No fog signal was being sounded. 3.2 Causes The collision between the FEDERAL OSLO and the SHELLEY DAWN II occurred because neither vessel was maintaining a proper look-out and the FEDERAL OSLO had not reduced speed in fog. 4.0 Safety Action 4.1 Action Taken 4.1.1 Small Fishing Vessel Crew Certification In its report on a 1992 collision between the two fishing vessels RYAN ATLANTIC and CONNIE SISTERS I (TSB Report No. M92M4031), the Board expressed its concern that inadequately trained personnel on fishing vessels contribute to the frequency and the severity of such marine occurrences. Consequently, the Board recommended that: The Department of Transport ensure that any person required to have the conduct of a commercial fishing vessel possess the basic skills for safe navigation. (M94-10, issued July 1994) In its response, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) recognized the safety impact of inadequately trained personnel and advised that it is presently revising the Certification and Safe Manning Regulations to require certification and training for officers on fishing vessels 80 gross registered tons (GRT) and over. It is understood that the CCG plans to increase the certification requirements in the areas of navigation safety, radar use, Marine Emergency Duties (MED), and stability. The forthcoming revisions to regulations will be phased over two years to apply to vessels of 60 GRT, and eventually to fishing vessels as low as 15 GRT. The CCG also indicated that, in conjunction with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), it supports a number of national fishermen training centres and a mobile training unit in navigation for small fishing ports in Nova Scotia. 4.2 Action Required 4.2.1 Radar Detection Small fishing vessels are often built of wood or plastic materials and have a low freeboard. Because they do not expose much reflective material to radar transmissions, they are frequently undetected and sometimes run down by larger vessels. The CCG has published a Small Fishing Vessel Safety Manual (TP 10038) that summarizes the performance requirements of radar reflectors contained in the Collision Regulations as follows: Radar reflectors are required for vessels less than 20 metres long, and for all non-metal vessels, and should be located above all superstructure at least 4 metres above the water if possible. The SHELLEY DAWN II met these criteria, but it would have been difficult to detect her by radar in the prevailing weather conditions. In the last 10 years, in the Maritime provinces alone, fishing vessels of various sizes were involved in at least 56 open-sea collisions. Poor appreciation of radar in fog was a contributing factor in 29 of these occurrences. Merchant mariners that transit fishing areas in periods of fog, rain and moderate seas, rely heavily on their radar to detect the presence of other vessels. Applying sea and rain anti-clutter to reduce undesirable returns on radar screens can mask the presence of small radar targets at close range. In order to strengthen radar echoes, fishermen normally use radar reflectors of various sizes. Radar reflectors vary in size, shape and material. The detection of these vessels can, however, become intermittent when the reflector disappears in the trough of a swell or large waves. The Board is concerned that radar reflectors installed on small fishing vessels operating offshore in all types of weather may not always be detectable. Therefore, the Board recommends that: The Department of Transport warn fishermen of the detection limits of radar reflectors on small fishing vessels and promote radar reflectors designed to ensure maximum reflective performance; and The Department of Transport investigate the feasibility of expanding the use of appropriate radar transponders on small fishing vessels. 4.3 Safety Concern 4.3.1 Crew Certification The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recognizes that the most frequent cause of marine collisions involving fishing vessels in the open sea has been the failure to maintain an adequate navigational watch. The practice of leaving the wheel-house to tend to fishing gear has serious potential consequences. The navigating personnel on both the FEDERAL OSLO and the SHELLEY DAWN II did not perform a series of established collision avoidance procedures in reduced visibility such as switching the autopilot off and posting a helmsman for manual steering, sounding fog signals at the prescribed intervals, stationing a dedicated visual look-out, reducing speed, and making radio security calls. Such failures are not isolated. TSB records indicate that, in the last 10 years, in relatively open waters, there were over 147 collisions in Canada between fishing vessels of various sizes. Of these collisions, 94 involved vessels under 50 GRT and 32 involved vessels between 50 and 100 GRT. Fishing vessels were also involved in 11 collisions with large cargo vessels and in 20 other collisions with tugs and barges. Of all reported occurrences in Canada, the most frequently cited causes of collisions were imprudent actions, inattention or poor look-out, lack of appreciation of radar information, lack of fog signals, and lack of radio communication. These causes indicate a disregard for basic seamanship and collision avoidance procedures. Once again, the Board is concerned that many fishermen demonstrate a lack of professional competency in navigation, seamanship, safety, and survival skills to operate fishing vessels of less than 100 GRT. Since these vessels constitute over 95 per cent of the registered Canadian fishing fleet, there is serious potential for damage and loss of lives. The Board recognizes that current CCG revisions to the Certification and Safe Manning Regulations will have an impact on fishing vessel safety but, in the interim, a significant number of fishermen on small vessels will not be required to demonstrate their basic navigational skills and knowledge. However, the Board believes that effective implementation of the revised regulations will lead to a long-term reduction of similar occurrences.