The first officer was unaware of the vessel's relative position to crib light82. This analysis will focus on those elements that contributed to the first officer's ability to effectively navigate the vessel, including the composition of the watch and the effects of the crew's schedule on performance.Analysis The first officer was unaware of the vessel's relative position to crib light82. This analysis will focus on those elements that contributed to the first officer's ability to effectively navigate the vessel, including the composition of the watch and the effects of the crew's schedule on performance. Watch Composition According to Section38 of the Crewing Regulations, Requirements for Deck Watches,3 and the Code of Nautical Procedures and Practices (TP1018),the composition of the watch shall at all times be adequate and appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions, and shall take into account the need for maintaining a proper lookout. TP1018 also mentions various factors that must be taken into account when deciding the composition of the watch on the bridge: at no time shall the bridge be left unattended; weather conditions, visibility and whether there is daylight or darkness; proximity of navigational hazards which may make it necessary for the officer in charge of the watch to carry out additional navigational duties; use and operational condition of navigational aids such as radar or electronic position-indicating devices and any other equipment affecting the safe navigation of the ship; whether the ship is fitted with automatic steering; any unusual demands on the navigational watch that may arise as a result of special operational circumstances. Given that the vessel was operating in restricted waters, a helmsman should have been assigned to steer the vessel. When the first officer was on navigation duty during the course of the voyage, a deckhand was assigned to assist him on the bridge. Having had no experience in steering a vessel, the deckhand acted as a lookout only. Without a helmsman, the first officer had to contend with the difficulties of night navigation and the multi-tasks of verifying the vessel's position on radar, chart reading, piloting, and hand steering. Given that this was the first officer's first trip on the Seaway in some time, he may have needed to refer to the radar and charts more frequently than another who had more recent experience in the area. Furthermore, as the tug was not designed for push-towing, the steering of the unit would have been more demanding. Consequently, the watch composition should have included a designated qualified helmsman. While the master's watch included a designated qualified helmsman, the first officer's watch did not. Five minutes prior to the occurrence, the lookout was sent below deck, thus depriving the watch of his services. At this juncture, the first officer was required to steer steady on course 220(T) while planning a course alteration off crib light82. The difficulty of the task was compounded by the fact that he was also required to use visual cues both forward and aft, i.e. the leading lights, the Doran Shoal range lights located abaft on the north shore, and crib light82 ahead. In order to use the chart or radar to carry out course adjustments, the first officer was required to leave the helm, quickly find the information he needed and return to steer the vessel. However, his view of crib light82 may have been intermittently obstructed by the work boat and spuds on the barge, as well as by the shore background lighting. The combined tasks of having to steer while navigating the vessel would have made the task of maintaining awareness of the vessel's position extremely difficult. This occurrence demonstrates the need for proper watch composition. Fatigue The first officer had minimal opportunity to obtain quality, restorative sleep in the 24hours prior to the occurrence due to the short duration of rest periods available, interference from other duties during rest periods, and a significant caffeine intake that would have interfered with quality sleep. Given that the crew members were working under similar circumstances, and given their limited opportunity to obtain quality rest in the 24hours preceding the occurrence, they were likely fatigued at the time of the occurrence, which would have adversely affected their performance. Fatigue is known to affect an individual's ability to attend to information, to keep information in memory, and to solve problems. In this occurrence, it is likely that fatigue further increased the difficulty of maintaining an awareness of the vessel's position. This, in conjunction with the factors described above, could have contributed to the first officer being unaware of the relative position of the light to the vessel. Part 1, Section5 of the Code of Nautical Practices and Procedures,Fitness for Duty, further requires that watchkeeping officers and ratings are not impaired by fatigue. The relieving staff should be sufficiently rested and otherwise fit for duty. In this instance, the adopted work-rest schedule for the crew was not conducive to acquiring proper rest, and the crew's performance was likely affected by fatigue at the time of the occurrence. In this respect, the guideline for the Fitness for Duty provision was not adhered to. Fatigued crew members will not only compromise the safe navigation of the vessel, but they will be less capable of adequately responding to shipboard emergencies that may require fire-fighting, launching life-saving equipment, or dealing with medical emergencies. The crew members would also be subject to an increased risk of personal injury. The first officer was unaware of the vessel's position in relation to crib light82. The composition of the watch was such that the first officer was required to steer and navigate the vessel, making it extremely difficult to keep track of the vessel's position. The adopted work-rest schedule for the crew was not conducive to acquiring proper rest, and the crew's performance was likely affected by fatigue at the time of the occurrence.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The first officer was unaware of the vessel's position in relation to crib light82. The composition of the watch was such that the first officer was required to steer and navigate the vessel, making it extremely difficult to keep track of the vessel's position. The adopted work-rest schedule for the crew was not conducive to acquiring proper rest, and the crew's performance was likely affected by fatigue at the time of the occurrence. Crews of small ships such as tugs may be subjected to work-rest schedules that do not conform to Canadian and international regulations.Findings as to Risk Crews of small ships such as tugs may be subjected to work-rest schedules that do not conform to Canadian and international regulations. Safety Action Action Taken On 24 June 2003, Transport Canada, Marine Safety Ontario Region, issued a memorandum to industry entitled, Hours of Work and Rest on board Canadian Vessels. It serves as a reminder of the safety requirements as enforced by the Crewing Regulations(Canada Shipping Act, paragraph562.1(1)(c)) for owners and operators of vessels, to maintain minimum mandatory sleep-rest periods for vessel crews. On 01 August 2003, Seaway NoticeNo.14 announced new requirements for all ships operating in Seaway waters. The intention of the notice was to implement minimum crewing and stern anchor requirements for all ships, including integrated tugs and barges, articulated tugs and barges, and pusher barge units. The requirements are addressed in Section35 of the Seaway Practices and Procedures,which took effect on 01October2003, and state in part: (c) man the wheelhouse of the ship at all times by either the master or certified deck officer and by another qualified crew member; and (d) have sufficient well rested crew members available for mooring operations and other essential duties.