Summary On 29 September 1998, the Venezuelan registered petroleum tanker MORUY was proceeding up the St. Lawrence River bound for Montreal, Quebec, with a cargo of 31,653 metric tonnes of diesel oil. Under the conduct of a pilot, the tanker was in the vicinity of Champlain, Quebec, when the vessel experienced a partial electrical failure affecting the steering system. Despite attempts to regain control and before an anchor could be dropped, the vessel grounded near buoy C-17. The vessel's forepeak was ruptured but there was no pollution and no one was injured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Factual Information On 17 September 1998 the MORUY departed Skikda, Algeria, bound for Montreal, Quebec, with a cargo of 31,653 metric tonnes of diesel oil. Water ballast was carried in the No. 2 wing tanks and in the forepeak. The voyage across the Atlantic was uneventful. At 2200[2] on September 27, while westbound in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the vessel experienced a partial electrical failure affecting the steering system, bridge alarms and navigational equipment. The crew found that rain water had entered the emergency generator room through holes in the corroded deckhead and had leaked into the emergency switchboard, causing circuit failures. The incident was reported to the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) who were also informed that repairs by the tanker's crew would take two to three hours. Vessels in the vicinity were advised accordingly. The leaking deckhead was temporarily repaired by using epoxy to seal the holes. A relay for the emergency generator breaker had to be changed and the emergency switchboard was sprayed with electrical cleaner. Upon completion of the temporary repairs the MORUY proceeded up-river towards Montreal. On September 29 the weather was described as clear, visibility five miles, with an easterly wind at five knots. At 1422, under the conduct of a pilot, the vessel was passing buoy C-15 near Champlain, Quebec, when the officer of the watch (OOW) noticed a fluctuation of the lights on the bridge alarm panel. The helmsman then reported that the vessel was not responding to steering commands. Steering control was immediately switched to the alternate power system, and then changed from wheel mode to non follow-up (nfu). It was reported that, despite these efforts, the vessel still failed to respond to the helm. The master sent the OOW with a handheld radio, to the emergency steering position in the steering gear flat, where he found the second engineer already awaiting orders from the bridge. The No. 2 (port) steering pump, which receives power directly from the main switchboard, was seen to be operating. Both officers assisted in switching the steering from bridge control over to local emergency control. In response to a radioed bridge command, the rudder was put hard-a-starboard, but at 1424 the MORUY had already swung to port out of the channel and had grounded by the bow near buoy C-17 at position 4625' 54 N, 07221' 00 W. The master immediately put into effect the emergency procedure for grounding. A team of crew members proceeded to sound all cargo oil, ballast, and engine-room double-bottom tanks. After ensuring that the vessel's condition was stable and that she was not leaking oil, permission was given by Transport Canada Marine Safety (TCMS) for the transfer of sea water ballast from the forepeak and No. 2 port and starboard wing tanks, in order to make the forward end of the vessel more buoyant. At 1705 the bosun heard the sound of water flowing into the forepeak tank. The ballast transfer was stopped and the forepeak was found to be holed and taking in river water. By 2315 the interior of the emergency switchboard had been thoroughly cleaned, various relays and breakers were replaced, and power was restored to the steering and navigation systems. On October 1 at approximately 1000 the MORUY was refloated with the assistance of tugs and escorted to Trois-Rivires, Quebec, for inspection. There was no pollution as a result of the grounding and no one was injured. TCMS inspected and subsequently detained the vessel in accordance with provisions of the Canada Shipping Act, pending completion of the following items: Cleaning and verification of electrical connections within the emergency switchboard; Provision of complete drawings of the steering gear emergency alarms and indicator lights; The emergency switchboard cable entries made weathertight; The steering gear audible alarm rendered functional; The deckhead of the emergency generator room permanently repaired and satisfactorily water-tested; The bell on the steering gear emergency telephone made functional; Witnessing of the rudder angle indicator functioning properly on emergency power; An underwater inspection conducted to determine the extent of damage to the forepeak; and other items not relevant to the actual grounding. As a result of the grounding, the vessel sustained two cracks in the starboard side bottom plating in way of the forepeak. Other Factual Information The MORUY was classed by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and complied with Venezuelan and international regulations for her intended trade. The vessel operated in accordance with the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and was certificated, crewed and equipped in compliance with existing regulations. The vessel's steering system consisted of two electro-hydraulic pump units serving four rams connected to the tiller head and rapson slide gear. Steering motor-pump unit No. 2 was supplied with electricity directly from the main switchboard in the engine control room. Motor-pump unit No. 1 was powered from the emergency switchboard located in the emergency generator room on the port side of the boat deck. For the operation of steering gear, regulations stipulate that where a ship is equipped with two or more steering gear power units that are capable of simultaneous operation, the ship shall have at least two of those units in operation in areas where navigation demands special caution. [3] Steering control was provided by an electric synchro-system utilizing a rotary transmitter on the bridge and a corresponding receiver in the steering flat. The control system was supplied with two independent sources of power, namely from the main or emergency switchboards. On the bridge, the rudder indicator and the steering station alarms and warning lights received 24-volt D.C. electrical power either from the emergency switchboard or directly from an emergency battery pack. The steering gear arrangement on the MORUY met all international standards for a vessel of her size, type and year of construction.[4] In August 1998 the vessel had been dry-docked in Europe when temporary repairs were carried out to local areas of the corroded deck over the emergency generator/switchboard room. When undergoing a safety drill on September 26, three days prior to the grounding, the vessel's crew had practised emergency procedures for grounding. Prior to the vessel going aground, the engineers on watch had no indication at the control console of any electrical ground faults emanating from the emergency switchboard. Following the grounding, the emergency switchboard was found to be very dirty with evidence of arcing present on several contacts. The switchboard frame and the deck underneath were corroded. After the vessel was repaired and refloated, the repaired deckhead plating of the emergency generator room was ensured weathertight by hose-testing conducted in the presence of a TCMS surveyor.