Successful completion of a complex task such as manoeuvring a vessel depends on the operator having a complete and accurate understanding of what is going on around him. In order to develop and maintain this understanding, an operator needs first to ensure that the information he has is both reliable and valid. Although the master had available to him a number of sources from which he could have obtained accurate marine weather-related information, he relied solely on the least reliable and valid source, a weather forecast heard over his car radio. This forecast did not accurately indicate the strength of the expected winds or the gust factor. The master's practice of obtaining weather from a local radio station precluded his being fully aware of all the factors affecting the situation. While knowledge of the accurate VHF marine forecast may not have changed the master's decision to depart Borden, it might have influenced him to employ alternative methods of leaving the dock, to order maximum engine power earlier or to remain at the dock until the weather moderated. The practice of relying upon a local land radio station as the source of pre-departure weather information had been successful in the past, which most likely reinforced its continued use. Further, the lack of procedures or standing orders on the use of the VHF and the Navtex and the poor quality of the Navtex presentation may have also reinforced this practice. As evidenced by this occurrence, the practice carried with it the hazard of reduced situational awareness. There was no mention of storm force winds in the forecast heard by the master and he did not exercise his discretion to postpone the departure of the vessel or to employ an alternative method of departure. Although the berth/breakwater is fitted with mooring bollards along most of its length, no use was made of mooring lines to hold the bow of the vessel up to the wind on departure. No endeavour was made to keep the vessel alongside the approach wall or to force the starboard bow on the heavy rubber on the knuckle to allow the wind to act on the starboard quarter and turn the vessel. Due to the comparative closeness of the forward propellers and the bower anchor pockets, there was a reluctance on the part of the master to use an anchor to help to bring the vessel head up into the wind. Further, in the prevailing conditions, it is likely that at least three shackles of chain (82 m) would have been necessary to bring the vessel head-to-wind without dragging the anchor. For the vessel to have remained afloat, such an amount of chain would have to have been deployed when the bow was no more than 75 m from the end of the breakwater. Dropping the anchor at a distance of more than 75 m from the breakwater, given the combined length of ship and chain, could not have prevented the vessel from going aground in approximately the same position as she did. It is unknown why the first transfer of control from the bridge to the after mooring station was not completely successful. Because the control transfer system is electro-mechanical, it is likely that a mechanical relay (or relays) did not function correctly at the moment of change-over. The temporary loss of control of all the available engines was not due to a fault in the propulsion machinery. Although the power generating and distribution system is efficient, rapid and flexible, power supplied by the group of generators on the port side can only be distributed to the propulsion motors on the port side. The same is true for the starboard side generating/distribution system. While the forward/aft power distribution options employed by the master may have compensated in some measure for the non-availability, due to routine maintenance, of No. 3 port prime mover, the fact remains that he had 25% less power available on the port than on the starboard side. This reduction in power, and in the forward thrust on the port side, would have had a significant effect on the master's ability to turn the vessel's head to starboard into the wind. The increase in power to 110% at 0813 would not have altered the port/starboard ratio of available power. It was not unusual to have one prime mover out of service for maintenance and, in normal circumstances, this would not affect the vessel's manoeuverability. On the day of the occurrence, however, maximum power ahead was required from the port propulsion motors to turn the vessel's head to starboard.Analysis Successful completion of a complex task such as manoeuvring a vessel depends on the operator having a complete and accurate understanding of what is going on around him. In order to develop and maintain this understanding, an operator needs first to ensure that the information he has is both reliable and valid. Although the master had available to him a number of sources from which he could have obtained accurate marine weather-related information, he relied solely on the least reliable and valid source, a weather forecast heard over his car radio. This forecast did not accurately indicate the strength of the expected winds or the gust factor. The master's practice of obtaining weather from a local radio station precluded his being fully aware of all the factors affecting the situation. While knowledge of the accurate VHF marine forecast may not have changed the master's decision to depart Borden, it might have influenced him to employ alternative methods of leaving the dock, to order maximum engine power earlier or to remain at the dock until the weather moderated. The practice of relying upon a local land radio station as the source of pre-departure weather information had been successful in the past, which most likely reinforced its continued use. Further, the lack of procedures or standing orders on the use of the VHF and the Navtex and the poor quality of the Navtex presentation may have also reinforced this practice. As evidenced by this occurrence, the practice carried with it the hazard of reduced situational awareness. There was no mention of storm force winds in the forecast heard by the master and he did not exercise his discretion to postpone the departure of the vessel or to employ an alternative method of departure. Although the berth/breakwater is fitted with mooring bollards along most of its length, no use was made of mooring lines to hold the bow of the vessel up to the wind on departure. No endeavour was made to keep the vessel alongside the approach wall or to force the starboard bow on the heavy rubber on the knuckle to allow the wind to act on the starboard quarter and turn the vessel. Due to the comparative closeness of the forward propellers and the bower anchor pockets, there was a reluctance on the part of the master to use an anchor to help to bring the vessel head up into the wind. Further, in the prevailing conditions, it is likely that at least three shackles of chain (82 m) would have been necessary to bring the vessel head-to-wind without dragging the anchor. For the vessel to have remained afloat, such an amount of chain would have to have been deployed when the bow was no more than 75 m from the end of the breakwater. Dropping the anchor at a distance of more than 75 m from the breakwater, given the combined length of ship and chain, could not have prevented the vessel from going aground in approximately the same position as she did. It is unknown why the first transfer of control from the bridge to the after mooring station was not completely successful. Because the control transfer system is electro-mechanical, it is likely that a mechanical relay (or relays) did not function correctly at the moment of change-over. The temporary loss of control of all the available engines was not due to a fault in the propulsion machinery. Although the power generating and distribution system is efficient, rapid and flexible, power supplied by the group of generators on the port side can only be distributed to the propulsion motors on the port side. The same is true for the starboard side generating/distribution system. While the forward/aft power distribution options employed by the master may have compensated in some measure for the non-availability, due to routine maintenance, of No. 3 port prime mover, the fact remains that he had 25% less power available on the port than on the starboard side. This reduction in power, and in the forward thrust on the port side, would have had a significant effect on the master's ability to turn the vessel's head to starboard into the wind. The increase in power to 110% at 0813 would not have altered the port/starboard ratio of available power. It was not unusual to have one prime mover out of service for maintenance and, in normal circumstances, this would not affect the vessel's manoeuverability. On the day of the occurrence, however, maximum power ahead was required from the port propulsion motors to turn the vessel's head to starboard. The Navtex had run out of paper and the presentation of its characters is not easily legible. The radio equipment on board the vessel was not utilised to its potential to obtain marine weather forecasts. The master did not fully use the bridge team (trainee master, first mate, quartermaster) to obtain a marine weather forecast. The weather forecasts obtained from local radio stations were not as accurate as those available from marine weather broadcasts. There was no mention of storm force winds in the forecast heard by the master and the decision to sail was based on this information. Marine Atlantic placed the onus of responsibility on the master as to whether or not to leave the berth. The master's principal experience was of the trade between Borden and Cape Tormentine, where he had successfully completed over 500 crossings in 1996. Problems associated with the switch transferring power to and from the navigating bridge and the after control position caused a waste of time when the vessel was being manoeuvred in the confines of Borden Harbour. Given that the change-over switch had a history of failure, the master could have saved valuable manoeuvring time had he retained the conduct of the vessel from the navigating bridge and assigned the first mate or trainee master to the after docking position as a lookout/spotter. In the circumstances prevailing upon departure, the reduction in available power to the port side propulsion machinery limited the vessel's ability to turn to starboard into the wind. In the unusual circumstances of the vessel not responding to helm and engine movements the maximum available main engine power was not immediately ordered. No use was made of mooring bollards and lines or the end of the berth/breakwater to help turn the vessel head to wind and outwards from the harbour.Findings The Navtex had run out of paper and the presentation of its characters is not easily legible. The radio equipment on board the vessel was not utilised to its potential to obtain marine weather forecasts. The master did not fully use the bridge team (trainee master, first mate, quartermaster) to obtain a marine weather forecast. The weather forecasts obtained from local radio stations were not as accurate as those available from marine weather broadcasts. There was no mention of storm force winds in the forecast heard by the master and the decision to sail was based on this information. Marine Atlantic placed the onus of responsibility on the master as to whether or not to leave the berth. The master's principal experience was of the trade between Borden and Cape Tormentine, where he had successfully completed over 500 crossings in 1996. Problems associated with the switch transferring power to and from the navigating bridge and the after control position caused a waste of time when the vessel was being manoeuvred in the confines of Borden Harbour. Given that the change-over switch had a history of failure, the master could have saved valuable manoeuvring time had he retained the conduct of the vessel from the navigating bridge and assigned the first mate or trainee master to the after docking position as a lookout/spotter. In the circumstances prevailing upon departure, the reduction in available power to the port side propulsion machinery limited the vessel's ability to turn to starboard into the wind. In the unusual circumstances of the vessel not responding to helm and engine movements the maximum available main engine power was not immediately ordered. No use was made of mooring bollards and lines or the end of the berth/breakwater to help turn the vessel head to wind and outwards from the harbour. The master did not acquire the complete marine weather forecast available to him, which could have provided early warning of the gale-force winds encountered upon sailing. In the prevailing conditions upon sailing, the routine maintenance being carried out on No. 3 (port) prime mover reduced the vessel's ability to turn to starboard. Although the master employed the undocking/sailing techniques with which he was familiar, these were not successful. In the unusual conditions existing, the use of alternative techniques was not considered.Causes and Contributing Factors The master did not acquire the complete marine weather forecast available to him, which could have provided early warning of the gale-force winds encountered upon sailing. In the prevailing conditions upon sailing, the routine maintenance being carried out on No. 3 (port) prime mover reduced the vessel's ability to turn to starboard. Although the master employed the undocking/sailing techniques with which he was familiar, these were not successful. In the unusual conditions existing, the use of alternative techniques was not considered. Safety Action Action Taken The service between Borden Harbour, P.E.I., and Cape Tormentine, New Brunswick, ceased operation in the spring of 1997 and the JOHNHAMILTONGRAY was sold and left Canadian waters. With a view to introducing changes to improve safety on their remaining operation, the owners reviewed their policies and procedures, solicited and obtained input from senior company masters with a view to introducing changes to improve safety. Management has indicated that, with respect to the use of VHF radios and Navtex, guidance will be provided in obtaining and recording timely marine weather forecasts and ensuring the Navtex is loaded with paper.