The job of replacing the elevator trim actuator was completed satisfactorily up to the point of rigging the tab. The AME read the elevator trim tab travel limits but misinterpreted those limits to refer to aircraft pitch rather than elevator tab movement. He rigged the tab so that it moved from 5up to 25down, instead of 25up to 5down. This resulted in very limited nose-down trim authority. He either did not read or did not note the warning at the end of the rigging instruction. His misinterpretation of the elevator trim tab travel limits was influenced by the previous incident of the misrigged King Air rudder trim. At the time of that incident, there were numerous informal discussions between the AMEsregarding the wording on the King Air rudder trim control placard, and whether it referred to the position of the rudder tab or the yaw of the aircraft. These discussions, together with the company response of amending the wording on the rudder trim control placard, gave credibility to the argument that the nomenclature referring to the movement of control tabs relates to aircraft response rather than tab deflection. The Aircraft Services Service Bulletin was an attempt to minimize errors by eliminating the recurrence of a specific active failure identified by the incident investigator. The bulletin only addressed the specific circumstances of the King Air rudder trim rigging error, and not the possibility that other aircraft may also be subject to rigging errors. Additional organizational error management strategies aimed at training, the procedures and figures in the maintenance control manual, the use of manuals and procedures during normal work activities including the independent inspection, combined with regular procedure reviews after incidents would help prevent a recurrence of these errors. The maintenance of engine and flying controls have traditionally been treated differently than other maintenance activities due to the consequences of an error when working with these components. AN C010 refers to both the legal requirements of an independent inspection and the philosophy for conducting an independent inspection. It also mentions that it is inadvisable for the AME who completed the maintenance work to be an active participant in the required independent inspection. In this instance, the AME conducting the independent inspection relied on the explanation of the rigging procedure given by the AME who had accomplished the work, thus undermining the intent of the independent inspection. The independent inspection, which is intended to confirm correct assembly, locking, and sense of operation, failed because the second AME did not assess the rigging limits by himself.Analysis The job of replacing the elevator trim actuator was completed satisfactorily up to the point of rigging the tab. The AME read the elevator trim tab travel limits but misinterpreted those limits to refer to aircraft pitch rather than elevator tab movement. He rigged the tab so that it moved from 5up to 25down, instead of 25up to 5down. This resulted in very limited nose-down trim authority. He either did not read or did not note the warning at the end of the rigging instruction. His misinterpretation of the elevator trim tab travel limits was influenced by the previous incident of the misrigged King Air rudder trim. At the time of that incident, there were numerous informal discussions between the AMEsregarding the wording on the King Air rudder trim control placard, and whether it referred to the position of the rudder tab or the yaw of the aircraft. These discussions, together with the company response of amending the wording on the rudder trim control placard, gave credibility to the argument that the nomenclature referring to the movement of control tabs relates to aircraft response rather than tab deflection. The Aircraft Services Service Bulletin was an attempt to minimize errors by eliminating the recurrence of a specific active failure identified by the incident investigator. The bulletin only addressed the specific circumstances of the King Air rudder trim rigging error, and not the possibility that other aircraft may also be subject to rigging errors. Additional organizational error management strategies aimed at training, the procedures and figures in the maintenance control manual, the use of manuals and procedures during normal work activities including the independent inspection, combined with regular procedure reviews after incidents would help prevent a recurrence of these errors. The maintenance of engine and flying controls have traditionally been treated differently than other maintenance activities due to the consequences of an error when working with these components. AN C010 refers to both the legal requirements of an independent inspection and the philosophy for conducting an independent inspection. It also mentions that it is inadvisable for the AME who completed the maintenance work to be an active participant in the required independent inspection. In this instance, the AME conducting the independent inspection relied on the explanation of the rigging procedure given by the AME who had accomplished the work, thus undermining the intent of the independent inspection. The independent inspection, which is intended to confirm correct assembly, locking, and sense of operation, failed because the second AME did not assess the rigging limits by himself. The aircraft maintenance engineer (AME) misinterpreted the elevator trim tab travel limits and misrigged the elevator trim tab such that limited nose-down trim was available. The second AME did not detect the rigging error during the independent inspection because he relied on the first AME's explanation of the rigging procedure.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The aircraft maintenance engineer (AME) misinterpreted the elevator trim tab travel limits and misrigged the elevator trim tab such that limited nose-down trim was available. The second AME did not detect the rigging error during the independent inspection because he relied on the first AME's explanation of the rigging procedure. In an effort to minimize the risk of a misrigged control system, Transport Canada Aircraft Services included the requirements of Airworthiness Notice (AN) C010 in the maintenance control manual.Safety Action Taken In an effort to minimize the risk of a misrigged control system, Transport Canada Aircraft Services included the requirements of Airworthiness Notice (AN) C010 in the maintenance control manual.