2.0 Analysis 2.1 General The aircraft was considered to be both mechanically serviceable and suitable for the intended flight. The crew was current on the aircraft, and had flown into the Jasper-Hinton Airport before. Although the runway used by the crew has a slight downslope, it was bare and dry, and of suitable length for the landing. Therefore, the analysis will concentrate on the decision-making factors that contributed to this occurrence, in particular the reasons why the crew opted to carry out a straight-in approach. The confusion between the Jasper townsite and Jasper-Hinton Airport weather reports will also be discussed. 2.2 The Jasper Townsite and Jasper-Hinton Weather Reports The Jasper and the Jasper-Hinton airports are located close to each other and have similar names. When the crew was given the weather by ATC, they were given the Jasper townsite weather and winds. However, since the crew's destination was the Jasper-Hinton Airport, they believed that ATC had abbreviated the name, and that the information was for the Jasper-Hinton Airport. Thus, when advised by ATC that the Jasper wind was calm, the crew relied on weather information for the wrong airport. This confusion between the two airports was seen earlier, when the crew received a pre-flight weather briefing from the Vancouver FSS. They were given the weather for Jasper, which they interpreted as being for the Jasper-Hinton Airport, their destination. With this misinterpreted information in place, they elected to conduct a straight-in approach. 2.3 Pilot Decision Making A straight-in approach for a landing is not recommended at uncontrolled airports where Air-to-Ground Advisory is not available to provide the wind, weather, and runway condition reports required to conduct a safe landing. Where pilots lack any necessary information for landing, they are expected to make a visual inspection by overflying the airport. They should determine the wind and verify that the runway is unobstructed before proceeding for a landing. The crew understood that the winds at Jasper-Hinton were calm, they could see that the runway was clear of other traffic, and they were also monitoring the airport radio and other traffic. The crew, therefore, did not feel that it was necessary to join the circuit and conduct a visual inspection of the field prior to landing. The presence of the surface wind was not known to the crew until they were on short final, when they observed the windsock extended parallel to the ground and varying in direction frequently. The crew had increased the Vref speed by about 10 knots to compensate for subsiding air, turbulence, and airspeed fluctuations experienced on the approach. The touchdown occurred on the first quarter of the runway; however, the higher-than-normal approach speed, combined with a downsloping runway and 14-knot, gusting to 21-knot, tail winds, resulted in an unusually high ground speed at touchdown. Consequently, the crew was unable to stop the aircraft within the available runway distance. The uneven skid patterns indicate that brake anti-skid modulation occurred several times, suggesting that the anti-skid system was functioning normally. The captain, after judging that the aircraft would not stop in the runway distance remaining, believed that he could increase the chance of stopping on the runway by swerving the aircraft down the runway, thereby increasing the distance travelled by the aircraft before the end of the runway. It is unknown whether this procedure increases the likelihood of an aircraft stopping on the runway. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings The flight crew was certified, trained, and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations. The aircraft was certified and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures. There was no evidence found of any airframe failure or system malfunction prior to, or during, the flight. The weight and C of G were within the prescribed limits. The aircraft was not equipped with an ELT as required by ANO Series II, No. 17. The crew carried out a straight-in approach, and did not accurately assess the airport surface winds. The crew were issued the surface wind for Jasper townsite, which they misunderstood to be for the Jasper-Hinton Airport. The crew landed on a downsloping runway with a tail wind of 14 to 21 knots, which exceeded the maximum authorized landing tail wind component. A significant fuel leak occurred due to a punctured left wing fuel tank; however, there was no post-incident fire. A CVR was installed in the aircraft, but had been deactivated by company maintenance. The crew used a higher-than-normal approach speed to compensate for turbulence and subsiding air on final. There is no ERS at this airport, nor was it required. When the crew cancelled their flight plan they did not refile a VFR plan, and were without the benefit of any ATC flight following. The straight-in visual approach to the uncontrolled airport was not as recommended in the AIP Canada procedures. 3.2 Causes The aircraft overran the runway because the crew landed with a 14- to 21-knot tail wind. Contributing to the occurrence were the crew's belief that the calm winds given to them by the Area Control Centre for Jasper townsite were for the Jasper-Hinton Airport, and their decision to continue with the straight-in approach procedure without overflying the airport. The Board has no aviation safety recommendations to issue at this time.4.0 Safety Action The Board has no aviation safety recommendations to issue at this time.