Summary At about 1500 on 18April2001, the factory freezer trawler Fame suffered a major failure in the factory freezer equipment that resulted in the release of the entire charge of refrigerant into the engine room. The refrigerant quickly displaced the oxygen in the engine room, which caused the total loss of main and auxiliary power. With a 3 to 4 starboard list, the vessel remained without electrical power until the early hours of the next morning. As the winds and seas increased, the list became 8 to 10. Inspection of the fish processing tween-deck showed an accumulation of seawater on the starboard side and the starboard list increased to 28 to 30. The decision was made to abandon ship. On 19April at about 0845, 21crewmembers abandoned the vessel into two liferafts, while the remaining three crewmembers were taken off the vessel by the fast rescue craft from a nearby fishing vessel. The Fame subsequently downflooded and sank stern first. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Description of the Vessel The vessel was built in Norway in1977 as a single-screw stern trawler of all-welded steel construction, equipped for onboard fish processing and freezer storage. The hull was subdivided by four transverse watertight bulkheads, three of which extended from the keel up to main deck level, while the fourth extended up to the shelter deck as a collision bulkhead. A watertight inner bottom, enclosing double-bottom tanks extended for the length of the fish hold, while the hull in way of the main engine room was of single-bottom construction. At various times since the vessel came under Canadian ownership in1986, additions and changes to the outfit and layout of the catch-processing equipment were carried out. At the time of the occurrence, she was equipped for onboard processing and freezer storage of shrimp catches. The shrimp was processed at the after end of main deck (generally referred to as the factory deck) in the tween-deck space below the weather deck. The shrimp-processing machinery space extended forward of midships on the starboard side. The location of the engine room, decks, watertight hatches, oil fuel, water ballast, and freshwater tanks, refrigerated upper and lower holds, shrimp-processing areas, and crew accommodation, etc. were as shown in the Outline General Arrangement (seeFigure1). History of the Voyage The Fame, with a crew of24, departed Argentia, Newfoundland and Labrador, on 13April2001 en route to the fishing grounds in the Labrador Sea, approximately 117nautical miles northeast of BelleIsle, Newfoundland and Labrador (seeAppendixA). The vessel arrived at its destination and commenced fishing for shrimp. At 15001 on 18April2001, a loud bang was heard which was followed by an abrupt shutdown of the main engine and an electrical blackout of the vessel. Figure1. F.V.Fame, outline general arrangement The engineer on watch was on the factory deck at the time of the power failure and electrical blackout and immediately went to the engine room to investigate the cause. Upon entering the engine room, he encountered a thick, fog-like atmosphere and almost immediately became dizzy and disoriented. He left the engine room, returned to the factory deck and collapsed on deck for a short period. He collapsed twice more as he made his way to the chief engineer's cabin. The chief engineer went to the engine room and he too encountered the heavy, fog-like atmosphere. He decided to enter the engine room without a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), but had only descended 3-4steps when he was forced out by the smell of the vapour. He was soon met by the other watchkeeping engineer, who only stuck his head through the opened engine room door before being forced to withdraw. It was at first assumed that there had been an engine room fire and that the halon smothering gas had self-released and extinguished the fire. About an hour later, it was decided to enter the engine room, using SCBA, and an engineer entered the space alone to take a quick look. During his brief trip into the upper engine room, he saw no sign of fire or heat. He did, however, report feeling very cold and that his skin felt like it was burning. A short time later, two engineers wearing SCBA entered the engine room and conducted a more extensive inspection of the upper landing area. When they exited the space, they reported that there was no indication of fire but that they felt very cold and that their skin had a burning sensation. After this visit, the two engineers returned to the engine room to check out the lower levels where they discovered that, while there was no sign of fire, the standby (starboard) liquid refrigerant pump was totally destroyed. As a precautionary measure, they closed all the sea suction valves when in the engine room. The master, now aware that the fog-like atmosphere in the engine room was refrigerant gas and that it would not dissipate quickly, started to negotiate a tow from one of the other vessels fishing in the immediate area. As wind and sea conditions were favourable and the vessel had only a slight starboard list (which was reportedly normal for this vessel), there was no sense of urgency and the decision was made to wait until a tow was available. Throughout the evening and night, the two engineers made hourly trips into the engine room to check the bilges for water, but none was detected. On one of these visits, an unsuccessful attempt was made to start one of the auxiliary generators. The factory deck was also monitored by the crew. During this period, no additional water other than that on the factory deck at the time of the blackout was noticed. At approximately 0400 on 19April2001, the wind started to pick up and, by 0500, had reached an estimated 25to 30knots and the sea height had increased to two metres. At 0500, the vessel's starboard list, which had remained at a steady 3 to 4, quickly increased to 8 to 10. Given the windage of the vessel and the sea conditions, this was not considered unusual, but another visit was made to check the engine room bilges. No water was detected there but some was noticed on the starboard side of the factory deck. Between 0500 and 0630, the list increased to an estimated 18 to 20. At 0534, the vessel issued a urgency message, indicating that it had no power, was drifting with a starboard list and had no pumps to discharge the water from the tween-deck space. At 0730, a fishing vessel in the area was requested to take the vessel in tow. As the tow was being connected, two of the engineers went to the engine room to once again check the bilges for water. Finding none, another attempt was made to start an auxiliary generator on an upper level of the engine room. This time, the generator started and electrical power was restored. On leaving the engine room, and with the factory deck now illuminated, the engineers entered the fish processing area and noticed water on the starboard side of the factory deck, which was estimated to be 1.7metres deep. An attempt was made to pump the water out using three starboard side wastewater discharge pumps, but because their starter boxes were under water, this was not possible. A further attempt was made to de-water the factory deck using a spare electric submersible pump, but this effort also failed. Photo2. F.V.Fame pronounced list At approximately 0800, the vessel again lost electrical power and blacked out. The SCBA air supply was also close to running out, and the engineers left the factory deck for the final time, leaving the engine room door open. With the vessel now under tow, the list increased to 28 to 30 and at approximately the same time a rescue aircraft arrived and dropped four portable salvage pumps. As the air drop was being carried out, the situation was considered critical and the decision was made to abandon ship. At 0845, 21crewmembers wearing immersion suits abandoned ship into two liferafts and were picked up by a nearby fishing vessel. The three remaining crewmembers abandoned ship into a fast rescue craft (FRC) from another fishing vessel in the area. At 1250, on 20April2001, the Fame heeled to starboard, downflooded and sank stern first in position 5305'N, 5236'W. Injuries to Persons Damage to Vessel Prior to the loss of propulsion and electrical power, no structural damage or failure affecting the watertight integrity of the vessel was observed. The vessel sank and was subsequently declared a total loss. Damage to Environment When the vessel sank, there was approximately 155000litres of marine diesel oil onboard. The damage to the environment was considered minimal. Vessel Certification The vessel held the class +1A1 Stern Trawler KMC ICE-1C with Det Norske Veritas at the time of the occurrence. It was also subject to regular inspection under the Transport Canada Marine Safety (TCMS) Large Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations (LFVIR). The Fame was certificated and equipped in accordance with the regulations. The vessel was last issued a Safety Inspection Certificate (SIC31) on 26October2000. Personnel Certification The master and officers of the vessel were in possession of valid certificates for their positions and the trade in which they were engaged. Personnel History The master had 29years experience at sea and approximately 4years as commanding officer. He had previously sailed on the vessel in various capacities before joining it as master in February2000. Weather Information The weather conditions at the time of the occurrence were described as light airs with calm seas. At the time of the sinking the weather had deteriorated to winds from the southwest at 25to 30knots with an estimated sea height of two metres. Stability Requirements As a stern trawler exceeding 24.4 metres in registered length and over 150gross registered tonnes (GRT), the Fame was required to comply with the requirements of the LFVIR, including those related to intact stability. Following a major re-fit, the vessel was the subject of an inclining experiment on 09May1994, the results of which were accepted by the (then) Ship Safety Branch of Transport Canada (SSB) and stamped Approved on 22August1994. The related Trim and Stability Booklet was also accepted by SSB and stamped Approved on 19January1995. Stability approval for large fishing vessels is based on the submitted data meeting or exceeding minimum criteria detailed in STAB4 of the TCMS publication, Stability, Subdivision and Load Line Standards (TP 7301). Compliance with the minimum criteria of STAB4 ensures that vessels attain what are generally recognised as adequate intact transverse stability characteristics throughout a range of standard loading conditions related to the vessel's intended service. STAB 4 primarily addresses intact transverse stability, which is dependent on the watertight integrity of the hull being maintained, together with the proper closure of openings on or below the weather deck, such as doors, hatches, ventilators, air pipes, overboard discharges, and fish waste/offal chutes, etc. The criteria also ensure adequate margins of reserve buoyancy to withstand and recover from the dynamic effects of severe weather and other detrimental external influences which may be met in normal operation. Current Canadian standards do not address large fishing vessel stability in a damaged or partially flooded condition, nor do the large fishing vessel hull construction requirements call for transverse watertight subdivision to specifically ensure the survival of the vessel in the event of flooding in a fish hold or any other single large compartment below the bulkhead deck. Vessel Loading, Trim Stability The approved Trim and Stability Booklet contained certain restrictions regarding the distribution of oil fuel in the various tanks and the sequence in which fuel was to be consumed. The restrictions also stated that AFTER PEAK OIL FUEL TANKS ARE NOT TO BE USED . The General Notes to the Master section of the booklet repeated the oil fuel distribution and consumption sequence and also stated that In addition, it is required that the vessel upon departure from port shall NOT carry fuel in the aft peak tanks . The port departure loading condition and all other typical operating conditions included in the approved stability booklet were compiled with the aft peak tanks empty. Aft peak tanks fuel oil capacity and free-surface effects characteristics were also included in the booklet. However, no loading conditions were provided for the guidance of the master addressing the detrimental free surface effects on the transverse stability of the vessel in the event of oil fuel being transferred to the aft peak tanks while at sea. The oil fuel tanks, fresh and ballast water tanks sounding records were lost when the vessel sank. Consequently, details of the distribution and quantities of consumable liquids, together with preservation salt and shrimp catch onboard at the time of the sinking, are not available. Subsequent to the sinking, oil fuel and freshwater tanks contents and the cargo deadweight distribution were estimated by the master and chief engineer. The estimated loading data shows the shrimp catch and preservation salt were stowed symmetrically to port and starboard. A summation of the oil fuel and freshwater tanks contents indicates an excess of some 26tonnes to port. This imbalance conflicts with the steady heel of approximately 3 to starboard reportedly maintained by the vessel in calm weather prior to and after the initial loss of electrical power. The reported oil fuel distribution indicates the port and starboard aft peak tanks to be partially full. No2 and No5 starboard side double-bottom tanks and the starboard side forward deep tank are reported to have been empty of oil fuel, while their port side equivalents were partially and/or nearly full. Such a distribution is at variance with the oil fuel consumption sequence indicated in the approved stability booklet. Notwithstanding the above anomalies, a stability review based on the estimated contents of the tanks and cargo loading distribution shows that, prior to the ingress of any flood water, the intact transverse stability characteristics of the vessel met all of the criteria of STAB4. Chlorodifluoromethane - Refrigerant 22 Chlorodifluoromethane is a clear, colourless, non-flammable, non-toxic gas. In concentrations of up to 20percent by volume, it is odourless, but in higher concentrations, is mild and somewhat ethereal. It is commonly used as a refrigerant, a low temperature solvent or an intermediate in the manufacture of fluorocarbon resins. It is shipped and stored as a liquefied gas under its own vapour pressure (850 kpa) and is essentially non-combustible. In a vapour state, it is heavier than air and will displace oxygen. Under conditions of heavy exposure, suitable protective clothing is required and respiratory protection must be worn. The main health hazard associated with releases of this gas is asphyxiation, by the displacement of oxygen. The liquid refrigerant will rapidly boil to a gas at room temperature. The liquefied gas can cause frostbite when in contact with organic tissues. Factory Deck Wastewater Discharge The catching and processing of shrimp is such that there is always a certain amount of wastewater on the factory deck. Water entrained with the catch, as well as water used in the cookers and general service, are the most common sources. To limit the accumulation of wastewater on the factory deck, the Fame was fitted with five automatic, submersible, electrically driven wastewater discharge pumps. The pumps, two on the port side and the three on the starboard side, were located in drain wells in the deck and equipped with float switches. Two of the starboard side pump discharges were approximately 125mm in diameter, and the third was 75mm in diameter. Each pump discharged through a short discharge pipe fitted with a screw-down non-return valve (SDNR) fitted at the vessel's side. When water reached a predetermined level in the drain well, the pump would automatically start and discharge the water overboard. Once the level of wastewater in the drain well was sufficiently lowered, the pump would stop automatically. This process was repeated, without manual intervention, whenever the factory was in operation. The SDNR valves prevented the backflow of water from the sea into the vessel. In addition to SDNR valves, anti-syphon loops are commonly installed on this type of vessel to prevent the backflow of water in a piping system. In this particular installation, anti-syphon loops were not fitted, nor were they required to be. Along with wastewater on the factory deck, various fish waste and other debris would routinely find its way into the drain wells. This debris, if small enough, would be sucked up by the pump and discharged over the side. However, it was not uncommon for debris to become lodged in the discharge pipes and ship side valves and impair pumping. Whenever this occurred, the affected submersible pump would be isolated and the SDNR valve manually opened up and cleared. Other shell penetrations above the factory deck including wave gate drains, offal, turbot and galley waste discharge chutes, which were reported to have been either secured or were located further forward and higher than the deck wastewater discharge valves. These are, therefore, considered unlikely sources for the entry of water into the hull. Search and Rescue Operations At 1500 on 18 April 2001, the vessel lost all electrical generation capability and suffered a blackout. Despite the fact the blackout left the vessel in a vulnerable position, a decision was made not to contact the CCG. Two hours later, this decision was re-affirmed. The vessel remained blacked out. At around 0400 the following morning, the wind, which had been light all night, began to pick up. Over the next 90minutes, the wind continued to increase and the seas continued to build. At 0534, the master made his first official notification to St.Anthony Coast Guard Radio (VCM), informing them of the loss of power and the vessel's heeled condition and that an urgency message (PANPAN) broadcast was being considered. A few minutes later, at the request of the VCM radio operator, the master of the Fame issued the urgency message (PANPAN) broadcast. A Hercules Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft on the ground in Gander, Newfoundland and Labrador was immediately tasked with delivering four air-droppable, gasoline-powered, portable pumps. The aircraft arrived on scene within two hours and dropped all four pumps. Three of the pumps missed the vessel and the fourth got caught up in the rigging. By this time, the situation had deteriorated to the point where the crew had commenced abandoning ship. Three large fishing vessels, the NewfoundlandOtter, the NorthernEagle and the MerseyVenture were fishing in the vicinity of the Fame and they also rendered assistance. The MerseyVenture put a line on the Fame to tow her head into the wind, but when the decision was made to abandon ship, the line was let go. Twenty-one of the crewmembers abandoned into two liferafts and were quickly recovered by the NewfoundlandOtter. The three remaining crewmembers were taken off the now heavily listing vessel by a FRC from the NorthernEagle. Eventually, these three individuals were transferred to the NewfoundlandOtter, which transported the entire crew to St.Anthony, Newfoundland and Labrador. Immersion Suits When the decision was made to abandon the vessel, the crew originally put on immersion suits. Eleven immersion suits were made by one manufacturer and 13suits by another. During the donning of one of the suits, the teeth of the front zipper separated, rendering the suit unserviceable. There were several spare suits available onboard and one of them was used without further incident. It was subsequently learned that there were two other problems with the immersion suits during the occurrence. Specifically, one crewmember complained his left foot got wet while a second crewmember reported that his suit was equipped with two right mitts. Appendix A - Sketch of the Occurrence Area Appendix B - Glossary 1. All times are Newfoundland standard time (Coordinated Universal Time minus three and one-half hours) unless otherwise noted.