Summary In the late evening of 03May2003, in clear conditions with moderate winds from the north-northwest, the ShineiMaruNo.85 was outbound from Halifax harbour when it ran aground near Portuguese Cove. Two fuel tanks were breached causing the loss of a considerable, but undetermined, amount of marine diesel oil. After the lightering of fuel oil, the vessel was towed off the rocks and escorted to Halifax for repairs. No one was injured. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of the Vessel The ShineiMaruNo.85 is a large fishing vessel of welded steel construction. Built as a longliner with tween deck fish processing facilities, it is currently engaged in the tuna fishing industry. The vessel carries frozen bait and has a refrigerated cargo hold enabling it to fish continuously for periods of up to three or four months before returning to port. Introduction On Japanese fishing vessels such as the ShineiMaruNo.85, the typical deck officer complement is four people: fishing master, captain, mate, and radio officer. The captain, although responsible for the safe navigation of the vessel, is outranked by the fishing master. In effect, the fishing master (who does not necessarily require any navigational background) tells the captain where to sail the vessel. The overall responsibility for the entire operation of the vessel and the harvesting of fish, rests with the fishing master. In the case of the ShineiMaruNo.85, the fishing master was also the acting captain. The Japanese officers on board the ShineiMaruNo.85 had limited understanding of English. Although the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) requires officers in charge of a navigational watch to have a working knowledge of English, the convention does not apply to fishing vessels. History of the Voyage At approximately 22002 on 03May2003, the Halifax harbour pilot boarded the ShineiMaruNo.85 in preparation for the vessel's departure. There was no one on the bridge when the pilot arrived. A smell of alcohol was present, and the sounds of music and singing were coming from nearby on the same deck. The pilot was met by the ship's agent (who was fluent in Japanese and English) and the fishing master/acting captain. The radio officer joined them on the bridge shortly after. Because the officers were not wearing uniforms, their ranks could not be determined by appearance. No introductions were made. The pilot explained port departure procedures to both officers with the ship's agent interpreting. Being familiar with the usual chain of command on Japanese longliners, the pilot assumed that the fishing master/acting captain3 was the fishing master (with no navigational responsibilities) and that the radio officer, who appeared to him to be clear-eyed and alert, was the captain. The ship's agent disembarked, and at 2214, the ShineiMaruNo.85 departed Pier30 in Halifax en route to fishing grounds in international waters. The pilot was at the helm and the acting captain stood by the engine controls on the starboard side of the bridge. The radio officer stood by the very high frequency (VHF) radio also on the starboard side. The pilot changed over the steering control from manual steering to automatic pilot at Pleasant Shoal, about 1.2miles from their point of departure. A difference of five degrees was noticed between the gyro compass heading of the ship and the course selected on the autopilot. The degrees-calibrated dial for course selection on the autopilot was out of alignment by five degrees. Consequently, the pilot had to select a course of 155degrees on the autopilot dial to steer a true course of 160degrees Gyro(G) to a position off Sandwich Point. The vessel proceeded down the harbour, adjusting the courses as required, toward the pilot station. The mate, who was the only person on board with navigation experience, was not on the bridge because he was engaged in other departure-related activities on deck. When the pilot called in his voyage status to Marine Communication and Traffic Services (MCTS) Halifax at check point6, the vessel was at full ahead speed to ensure separation from a ship that was about to depart Halifax. There was no inbound traffic ahead of the ShineiMaruNo.85. The acting captain left the bridge and the pilot then set the autopilot to 170degrees to come to a course of 175degrees towards a position off Lichfield Shoal. After the vessel had passed Lichfield Shoal, buoy (H7), the pilot set the autopilot to 155degrees (160G) and made the officer, who was later identified as the radio officer, aware of this selected course for safe transit in accordance with the traffic separation scheme. At the pilot's request, the radio officer reduced the engine control to dead slow ahead to allow the pilot boat to come alongside. Some time between the vessel's departure from berth and the time the pilot disembarked, the pilot had the radio officer, who he believed was the captain, sign the pilot's source form, which verifies that the pilotage has been carried out. At about 2245, some 1.5miles before the pilot boarding station (inside the compulsory pilotage area), the pilot transferred to the pilot boat. Following the pilot's departure, the acting captain was in his cabin and only the radio officer was on the bridge. A few minutes later, the mate arrived in the wheelhouse for the first time during the voyage, and he called the acting captain to the bridge to discuss arrangements for seamen's watches. Around this time, the engine control was set to full ahead speed. While the three officers were on the bridge, no one was monitoring the vessel's progress. At approximately 2300, the ShineiMaruNo.85 was estimated to have been at or near full ahead speed when it ran hard aground near Portuguese Cove. None of the personnel on the bridge were aware that the vessel was in danger of running aground. The vessel was holed in two fuel tanks allowing oil to leak from the vessel. An oil spill containment boom was placed around the vessel soon after going aground, but a considerable and undetermined amount of oil pollution had been released into the environment. No one was injured. See: AppendixA - Sketch of Occurrence Area AppendixB - Photographs of Grounded Vessel Events Following the Grounding Immediately after the grounding, the acting captain attempted to reverse the vessel off the rocks, but the ShineiMaruNo.85 was stuck fast. The pilot was returning to Halifax in the pilot boat when he overheard a radio communication between the MCTS Halifax and another vessel, reporting that the ShineiMaruNo.85 had run aground. The pilot boat then returned the pilot to the grounded vessel so that he could offer assistance. He was accompanied by another pilot who had just completed a pilotage assignment. When both pilots boarded the grounded vessel at2330, the acting captain reportedly displayed aggressive behaviour towards the pilot who had navigated the ShineiMaruNo.85. One of the pilots advised MCTS Halifax to call the RCMP as he suspected that the acting captain had been drinking alcohol. An RCMP officer arrived on the scene some time later, but a blood-alcohol test was not administered. During the time that both pilots were on the bridge, one of them noticed that the radar screen had been switched to night-time presentation and the steering had been set to manual. The gyrocompass heading was 218degrees. On the following day, 04May, attempts by a local tugboat to tow the ShineiMaruNo.85 off the rocks at high tide failed. On the afternoon of 05May, after the lightering of fuel oil, the vessel was successfully towed off the shore at high tide by two tugboats. The vessel was subsequently escorted to Halifax harbour for damage survey and repair. Bridge Operating Practices and Procedures There was no ship's personnel acting as helmsman nor was a dedicated lookout posted from the time the vessel departed Halifax to the time of the grounding. During the period of time between the pilot disembarking and the mate's initial visit to the wheelhouse, there was no watchkeeping officer on the bridge. The vessel's progress was not monitored by radar nor by visual means, and positions were not plotted on a chart. Weather Information In late evening darkness, the skies were clear with good visibility and winds were from the north-northwest at 15to 20knots. Damage to the Vessel The hull was breached in three places, and the bulbous bow was damaged. A fracture in the bottom plating on the forward end of No.8 tank at midships measured 175mm long by 10mm wide. Approximately 2.4m aft of this area in way of No.8 tank was a fracture 51mm long by 1to 2mm wide. On the port side in way of No.6 tank a fracture 113mm long by 1to 2mm wide was found. The bulbous bow was stove in on the port side- the indentation was 2m long by 700mm wide by 450mmdeep. Officers' Certification and Experience Fishing Master/Acting Captain The fishing master/acting captain held a valid Fourth Grade Maritime Officer's (Engineering) Certificate, issued in Japan and endorsed pursuant to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended in1995. He held no navigation certificates, nor had he received any formal navigational training apart from basic supplementary courses at fisheries school some 30years ago when he received his engineer's certificate. He did not have a working knowledge of English. During three decades of experience on Japanese vessels, he served about 24years as an engineer until1997, when he became a fishing master. In August2002, he assumed the additional role of captain. His previous experiences commanding a vessel while entering or leaving port were during a previous voyage to Halifax in February2003 and on a trip to Cork, Ireland. Chief Mate The mate held a Fifth Grade Maritime Officer (Navigation) certificate issued in Japan. He had been granted an exemption which permitted him to sail on vessels of 200in gross tonnage and above. (The ShineiMaruNo.85 is 379in gross tonnage.) His certificate was also STCW95 endorsed. He did not have a working knowledge of English. He had eight years experience as an officer on Japanese tuna boats and served on the ShineiMaruNo.85 for 17months. Radio Officer The radio officer had 15years experience at sea, the past three and a half years of which were on the ShineiMaruNo.85. He had no other certification or experience in any capacity other than that of radio officer. Halifax Harbour Pilot The pilot held a Master Mariner's certificate issued in1997. He began work in Halifax with the Atlantic Pilotage Authority (APA) in October2000. He holds a ClassA pilotage license issued by theAPA, a regulatory body empowered by the Pilotage Act. Navigation Equipment The radar, gyro compass, autopilot, VHF radio, GPS navigator, echo sounder, and a video plotter/recorder, were all operational during the voyage from Halifax. The type of video plotter on board is used more as a fishing aid rather than a navigational tool. It illustrates the track the vessel has travelled in order to locate the fishing gear and to determine where longlines are set, but the unit cannot display navigation charts. The vessel's officers and the pilot were aware that the degrees-calibrated dial for course selection on the autopilot was offset by five degrees. To steer a chosen course by autopilot, it had to be set five degrees less than the desired gyro compass heading. The autopilot was reported to have worked well. The appropriate charts for transiting Halifax harbour were on board, but they were not used. Marine Communications and Traffic Services Halifax Marine Communications and Traffic Services Halifax monitors vessel traffic by radar and by VHF radio. All voice traffic on VHF radio and telephone is recorded. Vessel movements monitored by radar are usually recorded on videotape, but due to technology upgrades taking place during the time of the occurrence, this was not possible. Upgrades included changing over to digital radar, and operators had expressed concern that, at the time of the occurrence, the radar would lose some targets as the actual vessels approached Chebucto Head. When this happened, the operator had to reacquire the target images. The operator lost the ShineiMaruNo.85 about three times before grounding. Alcohol The acting captain had consumed alcohol before the vessel departed Halifax. After the grounding, the acting captain reportedly had watery eyes, and his breath smelled of alcohol. A blood-alcohol test was not administered. Port State Control Port State Control (PSC) is a ship inspection program established world wide to ensure that foreign vessels entering sovereign waters comply with various international maritime conventions adopted by flag states. An inspection assesses the general seaworthiness of the vessel, the condition of the vessel's equipment, and the validity of the documentation for the vessel and its crew. Currently, fishing vessels are not covered under either the Tokyo or Paris Memorandum of Understanding on PSC.