Analysis Decision to Sail The North Atlantic winter season is characterized by frequent adverse weather with winter storms occurring as early as mid-November. On a sail training vessel, the experience of the crew members and their ability to perform in adverse weather should be taken into consideration. New or inexperienced crew members and trainees need the first few days of a voyage to become accustomed to being underway and familiar with onboard operations. The PictonCastle departed Lunenburg in early December, with half the crew new to the vessel and some having limited training or relevant experience. The trainees had little or no sea-going experience, and although four officers had previous experience on sail training vessels, it was the first time on board the PictonCastle for three of them. In addition, seasickness would necessarily be a factor in the first few days, with some personnel likely to be incapacitated in the forecast heavy weather. Having delayed the departure for several days due to adverse weather, the senior master and master made a conscious decision to depart Lunenburg based on their interpretation of the marine weather forecasts that: the developing gale in the southeast would have moved to the northeast ahead of the vessel, and favourable sailing conditions would be associated with the approach of a high-pressure system. However, the high-pressure system was forecast to move through the area quickly and be replaced by a developing low-pressure system. As low-pressure systems move from land to sea in the winter, there is a large contrast between the cold dry air associated with the passage of the low/cold front and the warmer moist sea air. This combination frequently results in rapid intensification of the low-pressure system and the winds. In summer, the temperature contrast is not as significant; therefore, the wind intensity is weaker. Although it was reported that long-range forecasts were taken into consideration on a daily basis- so as to determine when conditions would be favourable to sail- the 96-hour wind, wave, and surface pressure forecasts clearly indicated storm conditions for the occurrence time and area. These forecasts were issued at 1200UTC on 04December2006 and were valid until December8. The 96-hour forecasts predicted a low-pressure system over Newfoundland with gale force winds southwest of Nova Scotia. Mariners need to be aware that, when sailing in winter months, weather conditions can change rapidly and can be quite intense. Consequently, when planning voyages, longer-range forecasts should be taken into consideration. The senior master was also aware that further delays, in combination with the onset of winter at sea that would make the voyage more difficult, could potentially jeopardize the voyage to the Caribbean. Crew and trainees had already been selected and payments made for various legs of the voyage. Arrangements were also being made for the use of the vessel in a television production. Given the financial benefit associated with proceeding with the voyage, this increased pressure to sail. Effectiveness of Onboard Communications Several instances of a lack of communications among the crew were evident in this occurrence. Not all of the officers were aware that some crew members were putting in longer hours, helping out where they could. Moreover, crew members and trainees were not informed of all measures taken, including: the procedures established by the 0400-0800 watch to stay along the windward side of the vessel and to remain in pairs while on deck, the decision by the chief engineer to forego checking the port-side overboard discharge because of the weather, and the master's decision to make the port breezeway off limits. On the evening of the occurrence, the deckhand had expressed concerns to the acting 2/Oabout her ability to handle the helm in the existing sea conditions. As a result, the master gave permission for her to go below. However, she was also told by the acting 2/Oto carry out ship checks, a fact of which the master was unaware. Consequently, the master was not expecting to see the deckhand again on deck on the evening of the occurrence. When he later saw her and ordered her below to get rest, it is likely that the deckhand understood the order in the context of getting rest in between ship checks because there was no discussion/order to cease carrying out ship checks. It is also likely that, because she would have reported to the quarterdeck only after the completion of the ship check, she would have been unaware of the order not to enter the port breezeway. A number of TSB investigations have highlighted the fact that accidents are often the product of ineffective, incomplete, untimely, or misunderstood communications.21 This occurrence again highlights the importance of clear, complete, and well-understood communications, be they among bridge team members, between deckhands, or between trainees. Without this, crews will continue to make assumptions that can be a detriment to their safety. Crewing Level and Certification Flag states are responsible for evaluating and approving proposals submitted by vessel operators for establishing the minimum number of required crew. In doing this, flag states are known to refer to IMO ResolutionA.890(21), Principles of Safe Manning. However, there are no standard methods or formulae for doing so. Nevertheless, a flag state must make a critical and objective assessment of crewing proposals for each particular ship, taking into account its operation. Operating a sail training vessel can be a demanding endeavour, one requiring a large number of people for sail handling. Further, it is incumbent upon the vessel operator to ensure a sufficient number of well-trained crew members so as to be able to respond to any emergencies. On this vessel, the physical effort necessary for sail handling and dealing with emergencies required the combined efforts of both trainees and crew members. As a party to the STCW Convention, Cook Islands-registered vessels were generally subject to the provisions of the Convention. However, because this vessel was not subject to the STCW Convention and because there were no specific requirements in place regarding certificates of competency and minimum number of crew for sail training vessels, the level and type of manning was determined in consultation with the Ship Registry's technical advisor. In Canada, there are requirements concerning certification and minimum number of crew, but, like the Cook Islands, none specific to sail training vessels. In the United States, requirements are in place regarding certificates of competency and the minimum number of officers and ratings. For vessels similar to the PictonCastle, they must carry at least one able seaman for each mast and an additional able seaman for each square-rigged mast. In total, 65percent of the unlicensed crew must be able seamen. To qualify for an endorsement as an able seaman, a minimum service of six months and the successful completion of an approved able seaman course, which may be taken in lieu of the United States Coast Guard able seaman endorsement examinations, are required. Also, the three-watch system applies. Had the PictonCastle been subject to these United States requirements, the vessel likely would have required two additional certificated officers for the watch system and three other members of the deck crew to be qualified as able seamen. When the vessel encountered adverse weather conditions, the crew was unable to rely on the trainees for assistance. Consequently, the crewing level became inadequate- with the result that crew members had to rely on each other to perform duties during off-watch periods. Fatigue Two causes of fatigue are inadequate quantity/quality of sleep, and the disruption of circadian rhythms. Before the time of the occurrence, crew members were not getting sufficient rest because they were performing duties during their off-watch periods. When coupled with deteriorating weather and seas, the conditions were conducive to fatigue. In addition, it is questionable to provide alcohol to members of the deck watch, who may have already started to be affected by fatigue, while sailing in adverse conditions. The deckhand had been awake for all but two hours the night before the occurrence and was below deck for only three to four hours on the day of the occurrence. Although it could not be determined how much sleep she had during these periods, it is unlikely that she was able to sleep for the entire period; as a result, she was fatigued and suffering from a reduced level of awareness at the time of the occurrence. The master, officers, and crew members remained on deck to take part in the SAR. By noon on the day following the occurrence, some crew members reported having been awake 25to 30consecutive hours. The need for sleep typically recurs after about 15or 16hours of being awake, even for someone well rested. A person who does not obtain required sleep will develop a sleep debt and will be subject to performance degradation. Performance degradation as a result of fatigue manifests itself in many ways, including falling asleep against one's will (micro-sleeps), failure to respond, slowed reactions (physical reaction and the speed of thought processes), incorrect actions, flawed logic and judgement, increases in false responses, increases in memory errors, vigilance decrement, reduced motivation, laxity, and an increased propensity for risk taking.22 Trainee Safety As a sail training vessel, the PictonCastle regularly carries trainees on board, many of whom may not have any previous experience at sea. Consequently, it may be necessary to assign crew members responsibility for ensuring the safety of trainees during an emergency. To be adequately prepared to respond to trainees during an emergency, crew members require knowledge and skill in this area, as well as a basic understanding of crisis management. Without this, crew members may not be fully prepared to meet the demands of an actual emergency, to the detriment of vessel, crew, and trainee safety. In this instance, only the master had formal training in crowd control and crisis management. Crew members who are assigned responsibility for the safety of trainees in an emergency, but who lack formal training in crowd control and crisis management, may inadvertently compromise the safety of those for whom they are responsible. Emergency Alarm Signals The general emergency, fire, and man-overboard alarms are signalled by shouting and ringing one of the two ship bells- located on the quarterdeck forward of the charthouse and on the forecastle, respectively. The vessel is not fitted with an alarm system to provide immediate, local warning of emergencies to spaces that are used for sleeping and to other work spaces below deck, including the engine room. Although the absence of an alarm system did not delay the response of the crew in this occurrence, the presence of effective alarm systems is critical to timely alerting of crew members and trainees in an emergency. Safety Management Effective safety management requires all organizations, large or small, to be cognizant of the risks involved in their operation, to be competent to manage those risks, and to be committed to operating safely. However, there is no regulatory requirement in Canada or the Cook Islands for operators of sail training vessels such as the PictonCastle to have a safety management system. There are particular risks associated with sail training vessel operations such as the requirement to go aloft, the importance of wind and weather to manoeuvrability, and the number of trainees likely to be aboard at any time. The investigation indicated that some of the company's administrative and operating procedures were informal. There was no effective safety management structure/system in that the policies and procedures concerning the operation of the vessel were both informal and undocumented. The procedures contained in the Handbook for Crew were limited to general instructions to the crew and standing orders of the vessel. For example, there were no specific policies or procedures in place for: the planning and conduct of safety drills and equipment deployment; the training, qualifications, or instructions for crew members charged with the responsibility for trainees; ensuring that crew members had the necessary training for performing duties assigned in accordance with the station bill; the planned maintenance and record keeping of onboard equipment and machinery; the use and maintenance of personnel protective equipment, clothing, and devices; and the consumption of alcohol while on watch. An effective safety management system helps ensure that individuals at all levels of an organization have the knowledge and the tools to effectively manage risk, and the necessary information to make sound decisions in any operating condition. This requires that the operators of sail training vessels identify and evaluate existing safety risks so that preventive action can be taken or the risk minimized. Operators must also establish safeguards and safe practices, and put into place the means to continuously gauge performance so as to improve shipboard safety where necessary. Such measures, when effectively implemented, provide multiple safety defences. In the absence of an effective safety management structure, there is the risk that unsafe conditions and practices will remain unidentified and unaddressed. Sail Training Programs A training program, whether it is initial training, familiarization training, or refresher training, should result in the trainee being able to perform the required tasks to a predetermined, measurable, and demonstrable level of competence. To achieve this, a formal training program should consist of: an analysis of the training needs (identification of training needs, specification of training objectives, identification of the training content); development of the content (determining and organizing the learning, determining assessment methods, selection of delivery methods, preparation of learning plans); and implementation and monitoring of the training (conduct of the training, assessment of the trainees, evaluation of the efficacy of the training). A clear understanding of the crew's skill levels and abilities is particularly important in situations where trainees with little or no previous experience may be called upon to assist crew members with emergencies at sea, or where they are hired for uncertificated positions. In this occurrence, some of the crew had gained all of their experience while on board the PictonCastle. Although the PictonCastle advertises a sail training program, it is relatively unstructured. It is based primarily upon on-the-job training, and lacks a structured curriculum or formal performance assessment. Therefore, it may not fully take into account the risks associated with operations in varying conditions and circumstances. Without structured training objectives with measurable evaluation criteria, the ability of trainees to recognize risks and perform safely cannot be accurately assessed. Sailing in Adverse Weather Conditions Although the most prudent action that can be taken is to avoid adverse weather conditions, this may not always be possible. In such cases, it is important that adequate preparations be taken to secure the safety of the vessel and crew. In general, the main deck of a large sailing vessel is considered to present the greatest risk of someone being swept overboard in heavy seas. Accordingly, it is common practice for safety nets to be rigged between shrouds above the bulwarks and safety lines to be run fore and aft. In this occurrence, despite rolling and pitching during hours of darkness and despite water being shipped on deck, the crew did not take adequate measures to prevent someone from being swept overboard in prevailing conditions. Despite an awareness by the crew that the main deck, and in particular the port breezeway, was shipping a significant amount of water, safety nets were not rigged. Safety lines had been rigged inboard on the main deck, but their effectiveness was diminished because safety harnesses were not worn. The absence of fitted fastening points to which safety harnesses could be attached also negated the effectiveness of wearing harnesses. Alerting Search and Rescue Authorities of an Emergency Any delay in alerting SAR authorities increases the on-scene response time. In this occurrence, the crew members of the PictonCastle were unable to contact either Canadian or United States SARauthorities via the single side band radio. They were able to contact the senior master at his home in Lunenberg using a satellite telephone. In turn, the senior master notified SAR authorities using a regular, land-line telephone. When the vessel later arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, United States, in May2007, the single side band radio, which had been serviced before the vessel's departure to send and receive e-mail and weather information, was replaced. While contact was made with RCC Norfolk and SAR authorities in the United Kingdom using INMARSAT-C, it was not until about 48minutes after the initial call to JRCC Halifax that RCCNorfolk was speaking directly to the vessel. The benefit of direct contact with local authorities is particularly apparent in that it allows an immediate and accurate exchange of information, in addition to the coordination of the search activities. The decision to sail, in order to meet scheduled commitments, did not take into full consideration the available long-range forecasts indicating impending adverse weather- particularly given the limited training of the crew in emergencies and the limited experience of the trainees. The master was unaware that the deckhand had been ordered to carry out hourly ship checks, and it is likely that the deckhand understood the master's order to go below only in the context of getting rest in between ship checks. In the absence of effective and timely coordination of onboard communication, it is likely that the deckhand was unaware of the order not to enter the port breezeway, the area where it is believed she was carrying out a ship check when she was swept overboard. The deckhand was likely affected by fatigue and a loss of alertness at the time of the occurrence. The deckhand was swept overboard when a large wave shipped water along the port side of the vessel. Despite the large amount of water being shipped on deck, safety nets were not rigged above the bulwarks of the main deck and breezeway. Safety lines had been rigged inboard on the main deck, but their effectiveness was diminished because safety harnesses were not worn. The absence of established fastening points to which safety harnesses could be attached also negated the effectiveness of wearing a harness.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The decision to sail, in order to meet scheduled commitments, did not take into full consideration the available long-range forecasts indicating impending adverse weather- particularly given the limited training of the crew in emergencies and the limited experience of the trainees. The master was unaware that the deckhand had been ordered to carry out hourly ship checks, and it is likely that the deckhand understood the master's order to go below only in the context of getting rest in between ship checks. In the absence of effective and timely coordination of onboard communication, it is likely that the deckhand was unaware of the order not to enter the port breezeway, the area where it is believed she was carrying out a ship check when she was swept overboard. The deckhand was likely affected by fatigue and a loss of alertness at the time of the occurrence. The deckhand was swept overboard when a large wave shipped water along the port side of the vessel. Despite the large amount of water being shipped on deck, safety nets were not rigged above the bulwarks of the main deck and breezeway. Safety lines had been rigged inboard on the main deck, but their effectiveness was diminished because safety harnesses were not worn. The absence of established fastening points to which safety harnesses could be attached also negated the effectiveness of wearing a harness. In the absence of an alarm system to provide immediate, local warning to spaces used for sleeping and other work spaces below deck, crew members and trainees may not be alerted in a timely manner to emergencies. In the absence of an effective safety management structure, there is the risk that unsafe conditions and practices will remain unidentified and unaddressed. Crew members assigned the responsibility for the safety of trainees in an emergency, but who lack formal training in crisis management, may compromise safety. The vessel's relatively unstructured training program is based primarily upon on-the-job training, with no structured curriculum or formal performance assessment. Without predetermined learning objectives and measurable evaluation criteria, assessment of a trainee's ability to perform becomes subjective, and may not fully take into account the risks associated with operations in varying conditions and circumstances. Reliance on trainees may result in crew members having to perform additional duties, thus compromising safety.Findings as to Risk In the absence of an alarm system to provide immediate, local warning to spaces used for sleeping and other work spaces below deck, crew members and trainees may not be alerted in a timely manner to emergencies. In the absence of an effective safety management structure, there is the risk that unsafe conditions and practices will remain unidentified and unaddressed. Crew members assigned the responsibility for the safety of trainees in an emergency, but who lack formal training in crisis management, may compromise safety. The vessel's relatively unstructured training program is based primarily upon on-the-job training, with no structured curriculum or formal performance assessment. Without predetermined learning objectives and measurable evaluation criteria, assessment of a trainee's ability to perform becomes subjective, and may not fully take into account the risks associated with operations in varying conditions and circumstances. Reliance on trainees may result in crew members having to perform additional duties, thus compromising safety. Safety Action Action Taken Investigations into this Occurrence Following the occurrence, the Cook Islands Ministry of Transport promptly ordered a preliminary investigation and appointed as investigator the North American and Caribbean region Deputy Registrar for Maritime Cook Islands Ltd., the Cook Islands-based company and corporate administrator of the Cook Islands Ship Registry. The report of the preliminary investigation was completed 19February2007. The Cook Islands Ministry of Transport then convened a Board of Marine Inquiry to review the findings of the preliminary investigation. The Board subsequently issued its final report in2007, a copy of which was provided to the TSBin August2007.23 Under the international Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents,24 Canada, as a substantially interested State, offered to assist the Cook Islands with its inquiry into this occurrence and provided some comments on the final report of the Board of Marine Inquiry. The TSBreviewed the final report and other information available and decided that there was the potential to learn more about the underlying safety deficiencies that led to this occurrence. A better understanding of these deficiencies should lead to a reduction of the risks and advance safety for all sail training programs. Onboard Practices and Procedures After the occurrence, a number of actions were implemented on board the vessel, including the following: A strobe light is to be worn at all times by all crew members and trainees while on deck. The breezeways are to be lit at night. No crew members or trainees are to walk alone on deck. Crew members and trainees are to be monitored to ensure sufficient rest. All hands are to wear a harness at night and in heavy weather. All trainees are to wear a harness when aloft. On 01 February 2007, the Registrar of Ships, Cook Islands, directed the master/owner of the PictonCastle to attend to the following items on or before 15March2007: That there be written safety procedures instructions for all contingency and emergency operations for the vessel such as flooding, man overboard, and heavy weather, and including the wearing of safety harnesses and the ability to clip into safety lines, and the wearing of flotation devices equipped with lights; That formalized training and exercises in emergency procedures be scheduled, conducted, logged, and properly documented, including training for heavy weather, donning of lifejackets and immersion suits, wearing of harnesses, and the operation of rescue boats; That a system be established to conduct and document a variety of surprise drills; That there be a planned maintenance system on board; and That safety equipment lost during the occurrence be replaced. Based on the information provided by the master/owner, the Registrar of Ships was subsequently satisfied with all of the items but one. The Registrar of Ships was not satisfied that a written planned maintenance system was in place, but was satisfied that the vessel was generally well maintained, as was confirmed in an annual survey and inspection conducted in May 2007. Safety Audit An audit of the systems and procedures of the PictonCastle was carried out from 10to 15May2008, on behalf of the Cook Islands. The audit indicated the changes that the operators had made to the vessel and its program as a consequence of the loss of the deckhand. The results of the audit included the following: The training program of the PictonCastle was rewritten and formalized. A new alarm system was installed. The safety management structure was completely overhauled. Additional measures were also implemented, including the following: Static jacklines and netting were fitted along the breezeways. All crew and volunteers are now required to have, as a minimum, basic safety training. A supplement providing new information and updating current information contained in the Handbook for Crew was prepared. A Safety Manual was prepared and addresses a number of areas including shipboard operations, maintenance, emergency procedures, and certification. A pre-prepared Code of Practice Training Manual25 developed for use on board vessels required to comply with the United Kingdom requirements for small commercial vessels is being used to further educate crew and trainees on the purpose and use of lifesaving equipment, the procedures for abandonment, and methods of survival. Canadian Standards for Sail Training Vessels Transport Canada has begun updating its existing Standard Relating to Design, Construction and Operational Safety of Sail Training Vessels, TP13313E. On 05December2007, Transport Canada met with members of the Canadian Sail Training Association to review the draft program for onboard training. A subsequent meeting was held in January2008 to seek their involvement in the development of a sailing vessel training standard. A consultant was hired and additional work is being done to provide the necessary level of details to guide sail training organizations to develop their own manuals and to seek approval from Transport Canada. It is anticipated that a draft standard will be submitted to the next meeting of the Canadian Marine Advisory Council, to be held in the fall of2008. Transport Canada has also begun the process of implementing a policy as an interim measure until requirements for sail training vessels are developed under the Special-purpose Vessel Regulations. Under the policy, a Canadian sail training vessel undertaking sail training activities may choose to comply with the requirements of TP13313E. Alternatively, the vessel may be certified as a passenger vessel, in which case, it must meet all of the applicable provisions of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, and its regulations. Sail training vessels choosing to comply with TP13313E will be limited to structured sail training activities only- operations such as short cruises, sometimes used as fundraising activities, will not be permitted because they are considered passenger operations. Port State Control Inspection On 14 May 2008, Transport Canada carried out a port state control inspection on board the PictonCastle. Various areas of the vessel were inspected and abandonment and fire drills were carried out. No deficiencies were reported. Sail training vessels invariably carry young and inexperienced trainees. The professional officers and crew are often volunteers with a diverse range of experience and qualifications, and they may only be assigned to a ship for a limited period of time. This situation requires structured management procedures based on sound principles in order to maximize safety. Presently, there are at least 10Canadian-registered sailing vessels offering sail training programs. Although it is difficult to estimate the extent to which unsafe conditions and practices may be present on board sail training vessels, five occurrences have been reported to the TSB since1997, including two recently that have prompted Transport Canada to review issues relating to inspection, crewing, certification, and training programs on sail training vessels. The Board acknowledges the initiative by Transport Canada; however, the Board believes that the overall safe operation of sail training vessels could be enhanced through the adoption of comprehensive safety management practices. Effective safety management enables operators to identify the hazards associated with their operation, to assess the risk arising from them, and to identify mitigation strategies to reduce the risks to the lowest possible level. This investigation has demonstrated that, in the absence of enforceable standards or effective, formalized safety management procedures, safety deficiencies can multiply. It does not matter where the ship is registered. For the PictonCastle, regulation was minimal, and there were no flag state standards or guidelines specific to sail training vessels. This is not limited to the Cook Islands. Although sail training vessels registered in Canada benefit from TP13313E, this standard is neither mandatory nor comprehensive, and it does not require an operator to have a safety management system. Most sail training vessels are unique, and it is difficult to apply usable prescriptive rules to them individually, or as a group. Ideally, appropriate regulations would be incorporated into the relevant International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions and become applicable following adoption by flag states. The result would be an effective international regime enforceable by port states (through port state control) and by flag states. In the meantime, some national authorities have adopted guidelines, standards, and regulations for sail training vessels. Individual authorities, however, only have jurisdiction over vessels sailing under their national flag or others operating domestically.26 In the United States, regulations are in place that take into account the particular characteristics and specialized operations of sailing school vessels.27 Additionally, a number of European administrations have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) recognizing certificates for the safe operation of traditional ships in European waters, as well as certificates of competency for crews on traditional ships.28 The MOU, which is based in part on the International Safety Management Code (ISMCode), provides guidance to operators of traditional vessels with a gross tonnage of up to 500and recognizes the difficulty that sail training vessels may have in trying to meet today's requirements. It therefore allows for the implementation of other technologies and operational matters that give an adequate level of safety.29 As noted above, Transport Canada, in cooperation with the Canadian Sail Training Association, is working on an update of TP13313E, with a specific focus on training. Transport Canada is also in the process of adopting an interim measure giving sail training operators the option of complying with either TP13313E or with the regulatory requirements for Canadian passenger vessels. This interim policy would prevail until specific measures are in place under the Special-purpose Vessel Regulations. The Board is concerned that these measures may not result in the adoption of effective safety management systems on sail training vessels under Canadian jurisdiction. The Board therefore encourages Transport Canada to adopt a proactive approach with the specific objective of an early introduction of a safety management system for sail training vessels. Further, the Board is concerned that foreign sail training vessels calling at Canadian ports in the context of an international voyage do not have the defences afforded by an effective safety management system. The Board therefore encourages Transport Canada to take a proactive position at IMO with the objective of bringing all sail training vessels within the scope of the appropriate international conventions, while recognizing their special character.Safety Concern Sail training vessels invariably carry young and inexperienced trainees. The professional officers and crew are often volunteers with a diverse range of experience and qualifications, and they may only be assigned to a ship for a limited period of time. This situation requires structured management procedures based on sound principles in order to maximize safety. Presently, there are at least 10Canadian-registered sailing vessels offering sail training programs. Although it is difficult to estimate the extent to which unsafe conditions and practices may be present on board sail training vessels, five occurrences have been reported to the TSB since1997, including two recently that have prompted Transport Canada to review issues relating to inspection, crewing, certification, and training programs on sail training vessels. The Board acknowledges the initiative by Transport Canada; however, the Board believes that the overall safe operation of sail training vessels could be enhanced through the adoption of comprehensive safety management practices. Effective safety management enables operators to identify the hazards associated with their operation, to assess the risk arising from them, and to identify mitigation strategies to reduce the risks to the lowest possible level. This investigation has demonstrated that, in the absence of enforceable standards or effective, formalized safety management procedures, safety deficiencies can multiply. It does not matter where the ship is registered. For the PictonCastle, regulation was minimal, and there were no flag state standards or guidelines specific to sail training vessels. This is not limited to the Cook Islands. Although sail training vessels registered in Canada benefit from TP13313E, this standard is neither mandatory nor comprehensive, and it does not require an operator to have a safety management system. Most sail training vessels are unique, and it is difficult to apply usable prescriptive rules to them individually, or as a group. Ideally, appropriate regulations would be incorporated into the relevant International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions and become applicable following adoption by flag states. The result would be an effective international regime enforceable by port states (through port state control) and by flag states. In the meantime, some national authorities have adopted guidelines, standards, and regulations for sail training vessels. Individual authorities, however, only have jurisdiction over vessels sailing under their national flag or others operating domestically.26 In the United States, regulations are in place that take into account the particular characteristics and specialized operations of sailing school vessels.27 Additionally, a number of European administrations have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) recognizing certificates for the safe operation of traditional ships in European waters, as well as certificates of competency for crews on traditional ships.28 The MOU, which is based in part on the International Safety Management Code (ISMCode), provides guidance to operators of traditional vessels with a gross tonnage of up to 500and recognizes the difficulty that sail training vessels may have in trying to meet today's requirements. It therefore allows for the implementation of other technologies and operational matters that give an adequate level of safety.29 As noted above, Transport Canada, in cooperation with the Canadian Sail Training Association, is working on an update of TP13313E, with a specific focus on training. Transport Canada is also in the process of adopting an interim measure giving sail training operators the option of complying with either TP13313E or with the regulatory requirements for Canadian passenger vessels. This interim policy would prevail until specific measures are in place under the Special-purpose Vessel Regulations. The Board is concerned that these measures may not result in the adoption of effective safety management systems on sail training vessels under Canadian jurisdiction. The Board therefore encourages Transport Canada to adopt a proactive approach with the specific objective of an early introduction of a safety management system for sail training vessels. Further, the Board is concerned that foreign sail training vessels calling at Canadian ports in the context of an international voyage do not have the defences afforded by an effective safety management system. The Board therefore encourages Transport Canada to take a proactive position at IMO with the objective of bringing all sail training vessels within the scope of the appropriate international conventions, while recognizing their special character.