2.0 Analysis 2.1 Introduction There was no evidence found to indicate that the aircraft was not airworthy or that the pilot was experiencing any difficulty controlling it. The recorded radar data at the Toronto ACC clearly indicate that the pilot was able to accurately navigate to, and determine when he arrived in, the area of his intended destination. The data shows the aircraft in a controlled descent and the ground speed decreasing as the pilot slowed the aircraft a short distance south of the Killarney airport, his intended destination. The following analysis, therefore, concentrates on the probable flight profile after the aircraft descended below radar coverage in the Killarney airport area. 2.2 Descent Profile The aircraft main (encoding) altimeter baroscale was correctly set (29.91) to the current Sudbury altimeter setting. Radar data shows the aircraft at about 3,000 feet asl, 5 nm south of the Killarney airport, at the time the pilot cancelled IFR. He likely had visual contact with the ground or water at the time he cancelled IFR and commenced flying VFR. As he descended towards the airport, he probably was unable to maintain VFR flight because of the low cloud, fog, and drizzle conditions as reported by persons in the Killarney area at the time of the accident. It could not be determined what altitude the pilot descended to below radar coverage. The accident site location and the aircraft heading at the time the aircraft struck the mountain support the conclusion that the pilot did not encounter suitable weather conditions to carry out a landing at Killarney and elected to proceed to Sudbury, his filed alternate airport. It is likely he was using Loran C for navigation and was able to determine from the Loran C when he had passed over the Killarney airport, even if he did not have visual reference with the ground. He then likely selected the waypoint for Sudbury on the Loran C, turned the aircraft to the appropriate heading indicated on the Loran C, and began to climb on course towards Sudbury. Analysis of the airspeed indicators, the vertical speed indicator, and the fuel flow indicator readings support the conclusion that the aircraft was climbing when it collided with the mountain. The indicated airspeed (115 knots 10 knots) was within the manufacturer's best rate-of-climb or cruise-climb speed for the aircraft. The vertical speed indicator (100 feet up) was indicating a shallow climb. The fuel flow indication (20 to 25 US GPH) was more than the fuel flow indications at maximum cruise power settings, suggesting that engine power was set above maximum cruise power, likely at a climb power setting. 2.3 Controlled Flight into Terrain Witnesses on the ground reported low cloud with fog and drizzle in the accident area and reported hearing an aircraft engine sound, but none observed any aircraft. They also reported that the mountain tops were in cloud. The wings-level attitude of the aircraft at impact and analysis of the aircraft instruments suggest that this was a controlled flight into terrain, likely while the aircraft was flying in cloud in a shallow climb. 2.4 Survival Aspects The aircraft was not reported missing until 21 hours after the accident. It was not equipped with an ELT. After the pilot cancelled IFR with no further communication with ATS, the controller assumed the aircraft had landed at Killarney. There was no evidence that the pilot contacted the Killarney airport unicom frequency after cancelling IFR, and, as a result, no one at Killarney was expecting the aircraft to arrive at the airport. Friends expecting the pilot at Killarney were unable to determine that the aircraft had in fact left Windsor en route to Killarney until the morning after the accident, and it was their enquiries that initiated the search for the aircraft through officials at a company owned by the pilot. 2.5 Terrain Clearance Altitude The aircraft struck the mountain while the pilot was flying in cloud below a safe terrain clearance altitude. It could not be explained why the pilot was operating the aircraft in cloud more than 1,000 feet below the safe IFR altitude for the Killarney area. It is possible that, when he cancelled IFR, he had visual contact with the ground or water and continued descent towards the airport, but that he entered cloud while flying below a safe IFR altitude in the vicinity of, but prior to gaining visual reference with, the airport. Once past the airport, it appears that he set course for Sudbury, which resulted in the aircraft heading towards higher terrain. It is not known where, or from what altitude, the pilot began to climb en route to Sudbury. It could not be determined why the aircraft appeared to be in a shallow climb while heading towards higher terrain when it collided with the mountain. It appears that the pilot was climbing the aircraft in a cruise climb configuration when a best-rate or best-angle configuration would have resulted in the aircraft gaining altitude in a shorter distance travelled over the ground. It is also possible that, because of cockpit workload, he was inattentive to altitude and did not maintain a good rate of climb in order to gain altitude as rapidly as possible, or that he was not aware he was flying towards higher terrain. 3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings The Killarney airport, located in uncontrolled (class G) airspace, does not have an IFR approach. The pilot cancelled his IFR flight plan just short of his destination without further communication. The weather conditions at the Killarney airport likely did not allow the pilot to maintain VFR flight in order to carry out a landing. The pilot likely diverted to his alternate airport. The pilot was operating the aircraft in cloud below the surrounding terrain elevation. The aircraft was intact and under control in a shallow climb when it struck the mountain. The aircraft ELT had been removed for recertification and was not re-installed in the aircraft, nor was it required by regulation. The aircraft was not reported missing until 21 hours after the accident. The aircraft weight and centre of gravity were within limits. The pilot was certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations. Based on the autopsy, toxicology, and medical records, there was no evidence to indicate that the pilot's performance was degraded by physiological factors. 3.2 Causes The pilot was operating the aircraft in instrument meteorological conditions and uncontrolled airspace while below a safe terrain clearance altitude, and the aircraft struck a mountain. The Board has no aviation safety recommendations to issue at this time.4.0 Safety Action The Board has no aviation safety recommendations to issue at this time.