Analysis Choice of Anchorage The main criteria for choosing a vessel's anchorage, whether as a shelter or a place to await the order to proceed, include the number and proximity of other vessels; the weather conditions and forecast; and the currents and tidal ranges. Certain physical aspects of the site are also taken into account, including water depth, obstacles around the perimeter, the anchor holding ground, proximity to shipping lanes, and room to manoeuvre. The choice should also consider factors related to the hydrodynamic behaviour of the vessel, such as ratio of draught to water depth and shape of the bow. In shallow water, the hydrodynamic behaviour of a vessel at anchor is similar to that of a vessel underway: the ship acts like an obstacle, forcing the moving water to go around it, thus creating areas of high and low pressure around the hull. The resultant forces and the mass of the ship itself have a direct effect on the strength of the anchor's hold on the sea bed. Table 1 shows the forces acting on an oil tanker with a deadweight of 50802tonnes in a tidal current of 5knots and a 50-knot wind.4 Note that the lower the keel clearance, the greater the forces acting on the ship. A parallel can be drawn between the example in Table1 and this occurrence: between December1 and6, the water depth in the Saint-Jean anchorage varied between 20.5and 25.1m. The draught of the YongKang was 13.5m, so the ratio of water depth to draught ranged from 1.5to1.9. Even though there are no data describing the shape of the YongKang hull to compare to those of the oil tanker in Table1, it has been established that winds and currents applied considerable force on the YongKang in the Saint-Jean anchorage. The Saint-Jean anchorage is considered a good one, but it is marginally suitable for large vessels with a deep draught. The shallow water means they have low keel clearance and currents around their hulls create forces greater than those in deep water. In addition, these vessels have little room to manoeuvre and the shallow water further restricts their ability to move. For this reason, the St-Jean anchorage is used primarily as a short-term anchorage. With seven shackles of anchor chain, the YongKang had a maximum swinging room of roughly four cable lengths in diameter, which is less than the programmed safe area on the radar. It is important to note, however, that because of the position of the anchor and the length of chain in the water, the YongKang could come within one cable length of the Saint-Michel range, so that the stern of the vessel was in line with the green buoys of the Traverse du Nord. On the south side, the stern of the vessel could come within one cable length of the 15m isobath. Given the vessel's large size, deep draught, low keel clearance, the strength of the currents, the increasing winds, and the limited room to manoeuvre, the YongKang was not anchored in a suitable or safe anchorage. Manoeuvre to Avoid Grounding When the alarm sounded at approximately 0715 on 06December2003, the vessel was dragging its anchor. The master immediately used the main engine and tried to gain control of the situation, but this was a complex manoeuvre due to the length of time required to weigh seven shackles of chain. In one hour, the currents and the winds, which had picked up, had caused the ship to drift about 7.8cables to the southeast. On the bridge, the third officer and the helmsman were assisting the master. The third officer recorded the engine orders in the log-book and plotted the position on the chart. The master's attention was divided between the control of the vessel and anchor manoeuvres. Furthermore, his workload was compounded because he had to communicate with the MCTS, the harbour master's office, and the ship's agent in a language that was foreign to him. A master's primary task at such a critical time is to ensure the con of the vessel. However, the master of the YongKang had to divide his attention between controlling his ship and communicating his case for assistance over the radio. This discussion may have prevented him from focussing his full attention on the con of his vessel. Under the prevailing circumstances and conditions, the bridge personnel were unable to prevent the vessel from grounding before the pilot arrived. The tidal currents and winds drove the vessel onto the south shore of the St.LawrenceRiver. Criteria for Assigning Anchorage No one in authority attempted to prevent the YongKang from dropping anchor in the Saint-Jean anchorage. Seafarers tend to consider it as part of the port of Qubec, even though it is not. With the exception of a few port authorities, no Canadian government agency controls the use of anchorages. At the time of the occurrence, the port of Qubec had no official criteria for assigning anchorages. Except when action is needed to protect the environment, MCTS marine regulators do not have a mandate to direct marine traffic. As a result, they cannot assign a ship to a specific anchorage or prevent it from using one. The information on anchorages in the Sailing Directions deals with their physical characteristics. It provides no analysis to identify risks or restrict access. It is up to the master to use the information in the Sailing Directions to decide whether or not an anchorage is suitable. The master of a foreign vessel who may have limited local knowledge can, however, be guided by the pilot or the ship' agent. Other than the prevailing weather forecast and the initial expected wait time, the parties did not take the aggregate circumstances and conditions into account. In addition, they could not refer to any anchorage assignment criteria based on risk analysis. As a result, they made decisions based on incomplete information, which placed the YongKang at risk. Some ports in the St.Lawrence have established criteria for assigning anchorages to vessels. For example in the port of Montreal a person is designated to assign anchorages. Some risk-based criteria established include, among others, traffic, vessel draught, type and dimensions, duration of stay, notices from harbour master. However, similar risk-based approach is not taken to identify and establish criteria for other anchorages within the river. Assignment of Pilot to Anchorage Despite the fact that the YongKang was expected to be at anchor for only a short while, it was decided that the pilotage services were no longer required. However, the ship remained at anchor for five days. The master, who did not know the area, relied on the pilot and ship's agent and did not oppose the decision to release the pilot. The safety implications of a master's decision are based on the accuracy and completeness of information supplied by the ship's agent and the pilot. The ship's agent can advise the master in such circumstances, but the decision to keep a pilot on board in an anchorage is the master's responsibility. In other words, the master alone must assess the safety of a situation, while taking the economic pressures of his work into account. In compulsory pilotage areas, a vessel underway like the YongKang is required to have a licensed pilot or a person who holds a pilotage certificate on board. When the vessel is docked or in an anchorage, the services of a pilot are not mandatory. In anchorage areas that are exposed to the effects of winds and tides, caution must be exercised and additional safeguards instituted to mitigate the risks of a vessel dragging anchor and thus adversely affecting the safety of a navigable channel, the safety of the vessel and creating a threat to the environment. Retaining pilotage services is one way of mitigating these risks. Pilots with the knowledge and experience to keep a vessel safe and protect the environment can reduce the workload of bridge personnel as well as the navigational risks. They can also establish communications more easily between the vessel and the MCTS, tugboats, the port authorities, and other vessels. According to the LPA, an assessment of the requirement to provide pilotage services on board a vessel at anchor on the St. Lawrence River has never been done. Response Plan and Emergency Resources Despite the urgent calls for assistance by the master of the YongKang, no government or private agency took action under a pre-established response plan. Because no pollution was reported, Transport Canada (TC) and the Environmental Response Division only monitored the situation. The MCTS answered the call from the YongKang and relayed the information to the appropriate authorities at TC and DFO under the procedures in place for this type of occurrence. The Regional Operations Centre positioned the CCGS MarthaL.Black, in case of an environmental emergency or marine rescue, but released it about two hours before the YongKang was refloated. Even though the master had informed the authorities of a developing emergency situation at about 0715, the OcanCharlie, with the docking pilot on board, did not leave until 0845. The OcanDelta, sent to provide additional assistance, turned back because of mechanical trouble. No other tug or SAR unit was dispatched to replace it. The key to success in an emergency response is to take action in a timely and orderly fashion. The parties involved must know the primary risks and dangers as well as the economic and environmental input. Only then is it possible to establish a response plan, make preventive administrative decisions, and determine the resources needed to support the actions in the plan. In its report on the Alcor,5 the Board recommended that The Department of Transport, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and Canadian pilotage authorities, in consultation with marine interests, develop, implement, and exercise contingency plans to ensure that risks associated with navigation-related emergencies are adequately addressed (M03-03, issued January2004). This occurrence demonstrates that no effective measures have been initiated to mitigate risks, pending development of such a final formalized plan. Although several government agencies were involved in the response, they did not coordinate their actions. Without a response plan, they were unable to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the actions taken. A predefined risk matrix controlled by proper authorities provides a framework against which navigation risk can be assessed in Canadian waters. Except for search and rescue and oil spill operations, other marine emergencies can occur without an appropriate response. While risks associated with uncoordinated SAR or environmental emergency response are not tolerated, the risks associated with developing navigation-related emergencies are tolerated. Considering the large size and deep draught of the vessel, the low keel clearance, the strength of the currents and winds and its limited room for manoeuvre, the YongKang was not anchored safely in an appropriate anchorage. The vessel could not be prevented from grounding in the strong wind and tidal conditions, and timely local assistance from a pilot and a tug was not available.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors Considering the large size and deep draught of the vessel, the low keel clearance, the strength of the currents and winds and its limited room for manoeuvre, the YongKang was not anchored safely in an appropriate anchorage. The vessel could not be prevented from grounding in the strong wind and tidal conditions, and timely local assistance from a pilot and a tug was not available. A risk-based approach is not used to identify anchorages that pose unique risks, permitting vessels to be assigned anchorages that may not be suitable. While risks associated with uncoordinated search and rescue (SAR) or environmental emergency response are not tolerated, the risks associated with developing navigation-related emergencies are tolerated.Findings as to Risk A risk-based approach is not used to identify anchorages that pose unique risks, permitting vessels to be assigned anchorages that may not be suitable. While risks associated with uncoordinated search and rescue (SAR) or environmental emergency response are not tolerated, the risks associated with developing navigation-related emergencies are tolerated. Neither the Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) in Qubec nor the port of Qubec has the equipment to remotely confirm the position of vessels within the waters under its jurisdiction. When it was reported that the YongKang had dragged its anchor on 03December2003, the vessel had not reached the limit of its programmed safety area on the ship's radar.Other Findings Neither the Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) in Qubec nor the port of Qubec has the equipment to remotely confirm the position of vessels within the waters under its jurisdiction. When it was reported that the YongKang had dragged its anchor on 03December2003, the vessel had not reached the limit of its programmed safety area on the ship's radar. Safety Action Action Taken At a meeting on 10May2004, representatives of the Laurentian Pilotage Authority (LPA), the Corporation des pilotes du Bas Saint-Laurent, the Qubec port authority, the Marine Safety Directorate of Transport Canada, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) acknowledged that a vessel can drag its anchor in certain tide and wind conditions. The following propositions have been agreed and added to the Operations Manual of the MCTS centre in Qubec, Quebec: MCTS will ask that all anchored vessels give their position by latitude and longitude when they are in an area that is not covered by the control centre radar or when the Automated Identification System (AIS) is not available or functional. Upon receiving information that a ship is dragging its anchor, the control centre will call the vessel to check the situation and will compare the ship's position with the position given when the ship was anchored. If a ship's position is outside the original swinging room and the ship is dragging its anchor, the control centre will call the LPA dispatch centre and, if necessary, the port authority concerned. The control centre and the LPA will decide if a pilot should be dispatched to the vessel for repositioning or if any other action is required, e.g. sending a tug. Since July 2004, all pilot dispatch offices under the supervision of the LPA have been centralized in Montreal under the same address as the LPA head office. The proximity of the dispatch office gives the LPA the capability to have a good and quick picture of the maritime situation on the St.Lawrence river and to rapidly detect any problems. In2006, LPA will acquire the INNAV system, and will be able to have vessel positions displayed on a chart giving them the capability to get a real time picture of the traffic on the river. The Board acknowledges the actions taken by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans which jointly collaborated with representatives of the LPA, the Corporation des pilotes du Bas Saint-Laurent, the Qubec port authority and Transport Canada. However, the Board is concerned that navigational risks, as evidenced in this occurrence and in the grounding and constructive total loss of the bulk carrier Alcor, may still persist until a comprehensive assessment of such risks is undertaken and corresponding emergency response measures are put in place. Such measures may involve assessing the adequacy of safe anchorage areas as well as assessing the need for vessels at anchorages to have pilots aboard. The Board will therefore continue to monitor these types of occurrences with a view to determining the need for any further safety action.Safety Concern The Board acknowledges the actions taken by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans which jointly collaborated with representatives of the LPA, the Corporation des pilotes du Bas Saint-Laurent, the Qubec port authority and Transport Canada. However, the Board is concerned that navigational risks, as evidenced in this occurrence and in the grounding and constructive total loss of the bulk carrier Alcor, may still persist until a comprehensive assessment of such risks is undertaken and corresponding emergency response measures are put in place. Such measures may involve assessing the adequacy of safe anchorage areas as well as assessing the need for vessels at anchorages to have pilots aboard. The Board will therefore continue to monitor these types of occurrences with a view to determining the need for any further safety action.