Analysis Construction of Vessels for Operation in Ice In the eastern Canadian waters south of the 60th parallel, there are no restrictions placed on navigation as a result of the annual ice pack. Vessels, many of which are constructed purely for navigation in open water, are provided guidance14 and CCG icebreaker support to assist them in navigating safely through the ice, to their destination. Where sealing vessels are concerned, however, their destination is the ice and the role of CCG icebreakers is to assist fishing vessels to ice-free water and not to assist in the seal hunt. As such, the risk of being exposed to significant ice-induced loads (pressure and impact) is much greater than for other vessels, which are being navigated to avoid the ice as much as possible. For a vessel to be considered seaworthy, it must be sufficient in its materials, construction, equipment, and crew for the trade in which it is employed.15 Where vessels are expected to operate in ice-covered waters, such as during the seal hunt, some strengthening or reinforcing of the ship is necessary, beyond that which is required for open-water operations, in order to maintain seaworthiness. This premise is supported by a review of the number of vessel damage incidents that have been reported by non-ice-strengthened fishing vessels involved in the seal hunt- 227occurrences over 48months of sealing activity since1990. At one time, TC had adopted requirements for the strengthening/adapting of vessels for operation in ice in the Sealing Ships Construction Regulations. However, when these regulations were revoked, the requirements were not otherwise replaced as stipulated in the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement- with the result that fishing vessels are now permitted to operate in ice without specific measures to guard against the risk of damage. Recognizing the need for strengthening of vessels operating in ice-covered waters, TChas included such measures in the latest drafts of the new proposed Small Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations and Construction Standards for Commercial Fishing Vessels. However, until such time as these proposals come into force, fishing vessels will continue to operate in ice-covered waters without taking sufficient measures to mitigate the associated risks, placing fishing vessels and their crews at undue risk. Safety Culture in the Sealing Industry Despite warnings of the developing ice pressure, the JustinM remained in the pack ice in anticipation of the opening of the seal hunt. In addition to the damage sustained by the JustinM when it became trapped, several other vessels were also trapped and sustained damage, albeit to a lesser degree. This risk-taking is common during the seal hunt, where it is also well known that vessels will take advantage of leads created by CCG icebreakers when freeing trapped vessels to navigate into or return themselves to the ice pack. The risk-taking propensity of those participating in the seal hunt is influenced by several factors: The economic benefits are considerable. In many cases, the gross income from seal hunting represents a significant percentage of annual income for an individual. Given the short length of season, the expenses associated with earning this income are also relatively low. The global quota system put in place by DFO to manage the fishery results in an environment of intense competition whereby the first and the fastest reap the greatest rewards. Despite the high risk of damage or loss of their vessel, the risk to life associated with seal hunting is relatively low. Given the close proximity of other vessels and the provision of CCG icebreaker support, the chance of rescue/assistance if required is quite good. In addition, while operating in or near the ice, abandoning the vessel if necessary is a fairly straightforward process of jumping off the vessel and onto the ice. "A safety culture consists of several elements, including compliance with standards and regulations, awareness of risks, and a fair balance between safety and commerce."16 In the sealing industry, individuals appear to recognize and accept the risks; however, the lack of appropriate standards and regulations- in an intensely competitive environment where the benefits are high and the risks appear low- results in fostering a culture of risk rather than a culture of safety. When the JustinM became trapped in an ice field, the hull, which was not adequately strengthened for operations in ice, was crushed by the pressure, allowing ingress of water until it sank.Finding as to Causes and Contributing Factors When the JustinM became trapped in an ice field, the hull, which was not adequately strengthened for operations in ice, was crushed by the pressure, allowing ingress of water until it sank. In the absence of regulatory requirements to protect against damage while operating in ice-covered waters, and in an environment of intense economic pressure, fishers may be induced to take undue risks. Department of Fisheries and Oceans rules for managing the sealing industry induce an intensely competitive atmosphere among those participating in the seal hunt. In an industry where the potential for economic gain is seen to far outweigh the risks to life and vessel, this atmosphere fosters a culture of risk in the sealing industry rather than a culture of safety.Findings as to Risk In the absence of regulatory requirements to protect against damage while operating in ice-covered waters, and in an environment of intense economic pressure, fishers may be induced to take undue risks. Department of Fisheries and Oceans rules for managing the sealing industry induce an intensely competitive atmosphere among those participating in the seal hunt. In an industry where the potential for economic gain is seen to far outweigh the risks to life and vessel, this atmosphere fosters a culture of risk in the sealing industry rather than a culture of safety. At least 11 vessels were less than a mile from the JustinM, but only four responded to the distress call, and only three arrived to offer assistance.Other Finding At least 11 vessels were less than a mile from the JustinM, but only four responded to the distress call, and only three arrived to offer assistance. Safety Action Action Taken The 2005 season in particular was marked by a series of accidents and incidents in the Gulf zone. As a result, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) changed the seal hunt's controlling conditions. In the Gulf, there are two herds of seals that give birth in March: one south of the Magdalen Islands and a larger community further north, near the Strait of Belle Isle. To ease competition between the regions, DFO ruled that sealers from the southern part of the Gulf (the Magdalen Islands, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia) would hunt the southern herd. Similarly, the northern Gulf herd was to be hunted by sealers from the west coast of Newfoundland and Quebec's lower north shore. Concerning the 2006 quota, which was set at 325000 (total for both zones), DFO decided to: Magdalen Islands:20%; New Brunswick and Nova Scotia:2%; Quebec's lower north shore:8%; and Newfoundland's west coast:70%. Magdalen Islands, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia: 25March2006; Newfoundland's west coast: 05April2006; and Quebec's lower north shore: 07April2006. Magdalen Islands, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia: 25March2006; Newfoundland's west coast: 05April2006; and Quebec's lower north shore: 07April2006. End the seal hunt in the aforementioned regions once their allotted percentage of the quota is reached, and only then grant access to sealers from other regions, according to the specified dates set by DFO. This new method of quota allocation was expected to have two results: improve each sealer's income by raising the quality of pelts;19 and lower the number of sealers in one area, thereby diminishing competition and with it the economic pressures that lead to safety risks. In 2006, the number of marine accidents and incidents related to sealing vessels was significantly diminished in the Gulf zone. However, this good record also needs to be seen in light of the season's less-severe ice conditions- and not only as a result of the new rules put in place for that year's sealing. On 06 November 2006, DFO and Transport Canada (TC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the safety at sea of commercial fishers.20 The stated objectives of this MOU are to cooperate at the national and regional levels to: establish principles that take into account the promotion of a safety culture among fishers; establish a process whereby these principles can be used when developing rules, regulations, policies, and plans; exchange information and consult with the objective of improving the safety of fishers at sea; and develop safety goals and monitor progress. The MOU also outlines the specific processes established for cooperation with regard to fishing vessel safety, the safety implications of fisheries management plans, and the establishment of fishing safety committees. Originally, operators of small commercial vessels were required to complete Marine Emergency Duties (MED) by 01April2007. While most fish harvesters have completed the training, the industry has requested an extension of the enforcement for those remaining. On 27May2007, TCannounced a one-year grace period for fish harvesters and sealers to complete mandatory training in the principles of basic safety at sea. As a result of implementing this grace period, TCwill not take enforcement action if a crew member can show proof of registration in a MED training course before 01April2008. TC continues to work on finalizing the new Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations to determine which regulations most need to be modernized to best protect fishers, vessels, and the marine environment. The Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations are expected to be published in PartI of the Canada Gazette in the summer of2008. Safety Concern Resource Management Regimes for the Sealing Industry The Board recognizes that the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) modified the rules in 2006to lower the number of sealers in one area, thereby lessening the competition among them. The Board also recognizes that DFO has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Transport Canada regarding the safety at sea of fishing vessels. However, the residual risks remain in that the regimes in place for the management of the sealing industry still induce an intense competitive atmosphere among those participating in the seal hunt. The Board is concerned that, without improvements in fishery resource management practices that take full account of the risks associated with the nature of commercial sealing operations, the regime may continue to foster a culture of risk rather than a safety culture. Recognizing the impact that fishery resource management regimes can have on the safety of fishers and fishing vessels, the Board in the past had expressed similar concerns.21 The Board, therefore, will continue to monitor occurrences involving sealing operations with a view to assessing the need for further safety action on this issue.