Summary On 04 January 2006, after the Skalva discharged a partial consignment of cargo at Gasp, Quebec, work began on welding anchor rings for securing the remaining cargo of bundled construction lumber. During the welding process, smoke was seen rising from between the wood bundles. A dry chemical extinguisher and water were applied, but to no avail. The hatches were then closed and carbon dioxide (CO2) was released into the hold. The temperature in the hold initially increased, but then a decreasing trend was recorded. Eight days later, with the hold at ambient temperature, the hatches were opened and the fire was found extinguished. Approximately 50bundles of lumber were damaged by the fire, of which 15were completely destroyed. There were no injuries. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. Other Factual Information Particulars of the Vessel Description of the Vessel The Skalva is a small general cargo vessel with machinery spaces and accommodations located aft. The single cargo hold is serviced by two hatches and two ship's cranes. Photo1. The Skalva in the port of Gasp History of the Voyage On 30 November 2005, the general cargo vessel Skalva loaded lead ingots at London, United Kingdom. At various ports in the Baltic region, bundles of kiln-dried softwood construction lumber were loaded on top of the ingots. On 16December2005, the Skalva departed Frederika, Denmark, bound for Gasp, Quebec, with a load of wind-generator blades and a blade mold on top of the wood bundles. On 03 January 2006, after unloading the blades and mold in the Port of Gasp, the crew began re-stowing some of the wood bundles that had shifted during the ocean crossing. In order to more securely stow them, it was decided to install strapping from one side of the hold to the other. A local marine contractor was hired to grind anchor rings from their previous position and weld them further aft on the inside of the hatch coamings. This work was to be done under the supervision of the chief officer of the Skalva. The welder placed an aluminum plate measuring 60cm by 40cm on the wood bundle beneath the welding area to protect the cargo (see Photo2). Mineral wool batt insulation was used to fill void space between the bundles, and two fire hoses and a dry-chemical fire extinguisher were positioned nearby. At approximately 1100 eastern standard time3 on 04January2006, grinding and welding of the anchor rings began on the vessel's starboard side. Once finished, the welder began work on the port side. Fire-protection measures were similar to those on the starboard side, except that no aluminum plate was used to protect the cargo. At approximately 1330, when the welding was completed, the mineral wool batt was removed and smoke was observed coming from between the cargo hold side and the first row of wood bundles, just forward of where the welding had taken place. The master was immediately informed. Photo2. Hatch coaming and aluminum plate on top of a wood bundle adjacent to the welding area Fire in the Hold The nearby dry-chemical extinguisher was immediately discharged into the void space between the wood bundle and the ship's side. Buckets of water were also used before the first fire hose was pressurized. Once pressurized, the nozzle was aimed down toward the presumed seat of the fire, but smoke continued to rise in between the wood bundles. At 1350, a second fire hose was used to direct water down through other void spaces between the wood bundles. At 1450, still unable to extinguish the fire, the master decided to close the hatches. The master then contacted the vessel owner and, following discussions, it was mutually agreed to release the vessel's fixed CO2 fire-smothering system into the hold. At 1505, 152 bottles of CO2, each weighing 45kg, were released into the hold. Shipboard Welding Procedures The vessel had hot work procedures as part of its safety management system put in place under the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (International Safety Management Code or ISM Code). The procedures were generic, but included the following: tests should be carried out to ensure that combustible gases and vapours do not exceed 0.3mg/l, and once welding work is complete, the site must be inspected and kept under observation for six hours. The details for these procedures can be found in AppendixC, as translated from the original Russian and Lithuanian. Alert and Warning System The vessel's agent was apprised of the situation on board the Skalva about the time the CO2 was released into the hold. At approximately 1600, he informed the inspector at the local Transport Canada (TC) Marine Safety Service Centre of the fire. Because the master had not yet informed the local Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) centre at Rivire-au-Renard, at 1627, the agent apprised the MCTS centre and then informed the Port of Gasp harbour master. The harbour master arrived on scene soon after and conferred with the vessel's agent. At 1631, the marine occurrence was logged by the MCTS officer and, at 1645, the details were faxed to the Alert and Warning System (AWS) officer at the MCTS centre in Qubec. Between 1737 and 1756, the AWS officer faxed the details of the fire to various interested stakeholders.4 At about 1800, the AWS officer called the ship's agent to inquire if the local fire department at Gasp had been alerted. The agent replied in the negative, indicating that everything was under control. At approximately 1900, the AWS officer relayed this information to the TC Harbour Operations standby officer.5 The standby officer took no further action at that time. Emergency Preparedness and Response The Port of Gasp has procedures in place in case of emergencies. Originally drafted in 2000and completely revised in 2004,they define the roles and responsibilities of various parties. Accordingly, the harbour master is responsible for, among other duties, informing TC Harbour Operations of the emergency and then coordinating the emergency response within the port area. The procedures also list various emergency scenarios, one of which is a fire on board a vessel. In such an event, 911emergency services are to be called. The procedures, however, do not clearly state who is responsible for carrying out this task - mentioning a generic observer, as opposed to a specific individual (for example, the harbour master). In this case, 911emergency services were not called. The city of Gasp also has its own emergency procedures, but these do not include specific hazard analysis. Furthermore, the city's procedures do not contain accompanying standard response procedures for identified risks such as an emergency at the port.6 During the night and morning of 04and 05January2006, temperatures were monitored on board the Skalva, and rose to approximately 64C. At 0830 on 05January2006, the agent called the Gasp fire chief, not as an emergency call but rather to inform him of the situation. The fire chief immediately came to the port and, following discussions with both the harbour master and the TCinspector, the decision was made to bring in a fire crew and restrict access to the wharf. By 1200, the fire brigade had set up a command centre near the vessel. Temperatures in the vessel's hold continued to be monitored through 06January2006, with the hottest point on the port side recording generally between 20C and 27C. The ambient exterior temperature at this time was near 0C. On 07January2006, a decreasing trend in the temperature was evident with temperature recordings attaining near-ambient values by 2100 that day. The assembled team of firefighters, port authorities, and the vessel's crew began to consider the possibility of opening the hatches within the next 24to 36hours. The owner's representative arrived in Gasp late on 07January2006 and advised against this action. Based on his experience with previous cargo hold fires, he suggested that more time be given to ensure that the fire was completely out, and that additional CO2 be made available for use in the event that the fire was re-kindled after opening the hatches. By 11 January 2006, a truck carrying CO2 was alongside and connected to the vessel's fixed smothering system. Cargo hold temperatures had returned to ambient for the past four days. After consulting with the emergency response team, including the harbour master, the TCinspector, the TCHarbour Operations standby officer, and the Gasp fire chief, the master, under advice from the owner's representative, decided that the hatches would be opened the next day. On 12January2006, the hatches were opened and the fire was found extinguished. Hot Work Permit, Fire Risk Assessment, and Risk-Reduction Measures As in many ports, before hot work can begin, a hot work permit must first be obtained from port authorities. The hot work permit for the Port of Gasp is a pro-forma document stipulating that all work must be performed in strict compliance with all current fire codes, standards, and safe practices including, but not limited, to the Public Harbours Regulations; the Government Wharves Regulations; the Canada Labour Code; CAN/CSA W117.2-M87, Safety in Welding, Cutting, and Applied Processes; the Boiler, Pressure Vessel, and Compressed Gas Regulations; the Occupational Health and Safety Act; the Canada Confined Spaces Regulations; the Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System Regulation; and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. The Port of Gasp harbour master had signed such a permit for the Skalva, as had the foreman of the company hired to carry out the welding. The hot work permit allowed welding to be undertaken on 04January2006 from 1000to 1700. The Safety in Welding, Cutting, and Applied Processes standard lists fire-prevention and protection measures that must be taken. These include: using appropriate guarding to confine heat, spills, and slag so as to protect adjacent immovable fire hazards; adequately protecting all void spaces and floor openings to prevent sparks or hot slag from igniting combustible materials in adjacent areas; and maintaining a dedicated fire watch when cutting or welding is done near flammable material. The welder did not have a working knowledge of the Safety in Welding, Cutting, and Applied Processes standard. A fire hose and dry-chemical fire extinguisher were placed nearby before the start of welding work, but there is no indication that a detailed risk assessment was undertaken before cutting and welding was started - either by the ship's crew, the harbour master, the marine contractor foreman, or the welder. No dedicated fire watch was maintained. Arrival of a Tanker Loaded with Gasoline and Diesel Products During the cooling-off period of 04to 11January2006, with cargo hatches closed following the CO2 discharge into the hold, the tanker IrvingCanada arrived at the port to discharge a cargo of gasoline and diesel products. On 06January2006, the tanker IrvingCanada requested to tie up to the north side of the public wharf, 35m from the Skalva on the south side, but the request was refused by TCHarbour Operations in consultation with TCMarine Safety. Figure1. The cargo ship Skalva and the tanker Irving Canada at the Gasp wharf As the temperature in the Skalva's cargo hold declined and approached ambient levels, a reassessment was done. On 09January2006, after having received a written opinion from TC Marine Safety that the risks were acceptable as long as certain conditions were respected, TCHarbour Operations allowed the tanker Irving Canada to dock on the other side of the wharf and discharge a cargo of gasoline and diesel.7