2.0 Analysis 2.1 Introduction This analysis focuses on the cause of overturning and the reasons two of the crew members survived. 2.2 Capsizing Immediately before the capsizing, two of the fishermen were standing on the lee side, resetting a trap. The attempt to manoeuvre alongside the next lobster trap positioned the boat broadside to a large oncoming wave, and the unequal distribution of the weight in the boat aggravated the effect of the roll induced by the wave and caused the boat to capsize. 2.3 Survival Aspects All three men quickly gained the bottom of the capsized boat and were able to hold on. The owner/operator appeared to lose consciousness shortly thereafter and was washed away from the capsized boat. Having assisted the other men on to the capsized hull, he would have been semi-exhausted. The owner/operator quickly disappeared below the surface. As neither his son nor his grandson could swim, and since neither was wearing a lifejacket or PFD, they could do nothing to assist him. There are several reasons the two men survived. They succeeded in their efforts to distribute their weight in such a way that it kept the capsized boat steady and prevented her from righting herself. The reason they did this was that, if the boat had righted herself, she may have sunk from the weight of the water, crew and equipment on board. The men would thus have been left in the water without any form of support. Although the crew members were on the bottom of the capsized boat for about five hours before reaching shore, they were not continuously immersed in the frigid water. The rate of body heat loss was therefore lessened. In addition, their almost continuous movement on the bottom of the overturned boat and the use of the oar helped generate some body heat. At times, both felt they would not survive, but panic attacks were limited by their concern for each other. The fact that one man realized that the drifting boat would eventually take them near shore also helped keep panic at bay. Once ashore on Swain Island, although there was no shelter or material to start a fire, the fishermen obtained what shelter they could in a rock crevice. By huddling together and keeping each other awake, they limited body heat loss and the effects of hypothermia. Had the owner/operator been wearing a lifejacket or PFD, he may have remained afloat long enough to be rescued and may have survived. A lifejacket or PFD can protect the body and assist in the retention of body heat. Further, the colour of these devices would have made all the crew members more visible to rescuers. 3.0 Conclusions The boat capsized when her transverse stability was overcome by the combined effects of the dynamic forces imposed by the breaking sea taken broadside and the unequal distribution of weight on board. None of the three fishermen, who were non- swimmers, was wearing a lifejacket or personal flotation device (PFD), nor was any such device carried on board. The owner/operator, who was swept off the capsized boat, had lost consciousness. The others could do nothing to assist him, and, without a lifejacket or PFD to support him, the owner/operator quickly sank. The positive attitude and the actions of the remaining fishermen contributed to their survival.3.1Findings The boat capsized when her transverse stability was overcome by the combined effects of the dynamic forces imposed by the breaking sea taken broadside and the unequal distribution of weight on board. None of the three fishermen, who were non- swimmers, was wearing a lifejacket or personal flotation device (PFD), nor was any such device carried on board. The owner/operator, who was swept off the capsized boat, had lost consciousness. The others could do nothing to assist him, and, without a lifejacket or PFD to support him, the owner/operator quickly sank. The positive attitude and the actions of the remaining fishermen contributed to their survival. 3.2 Causes The boat capsized when she was struck broadside by a breaking sea, the dynamic forces of which she was unable to withstand because of the unequal distribution of weight on board. 4.1.1 Survival Equipment Following its investigation into the sinking of the STRAITS PRIDE II on 17 December 1990 (TSB report #M90N5017), the Board issued several recommendations regarding small fishing vessels. Pertaining to life-saving equipment, the Board recommended that: The Department of Transport expedite its revision of the Small Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations which will require the carriage of anti-exposure worksuits or survival suits by fishermen. To date, the Canadian Coast Guard's (CCG) attempts to make the carriage requirement mandatory have been unsuccessful. However, the proposed revisions to the Small Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations have been agreed to by the fishing industry and the CCG, and anti-exposure worksuits are provided as alternative equipment. The CCG continues to actively promote the voluntary carriage and wearing of worksuits. In 1993, the CCG produced a video entitled A Matter of Minutes to promote the benefits of a newly designed commercial fisherman anti-exposure worksuit. The CCG also distributed 100 such worksuits to fishermen, who are members of the Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary (CMRA), for evaluation. The Board will monitor the effectiveness of such initiatives with a view to assessing the need for further safety action on this issue. 4.1.2 Open Fishing Boat Safety Study In view of the large number of open boats similar to the accident vessel (e.g. CFV # 083866, TSB Report #M92N5018) and in view of continuing occurrences involving such open fishing boats, the TSB initiated a safety study on the swamping and capsizing of small open fibreglass commercial fishing boats (16 to 23 feet in length). The study's objective is to identify safety deficiencies pertaining to, inter alia, stability, the practices for loading and load distribution, and the carriage of life-saving and communication equipment. Upon completion of the study, the Board will issue appropriate safety recommendations. 4.0 Safety Action