Summary While bound from Churchill, Manitoba, towards Arviat, Nunavut, with 15 823 kg of general cargo and a crew of four, the Avataq encountered gale-force winds. When the vessel was approximately 10 nautical miles south of Arviat, the crew reported that the vessel was taking on water and that the bilge pumps were not working. The vessel subsequently foundered, and all four crew members perished. Ce rapport est galement disponible en franais. This report is also available in Inuktitut. [PDF, size 2261 KB]. Other Factual Information Description of the Vessel The Avataq was a small fishing vessel of open construction, with forward accommodation and wheelhouse (Figure 1). Two flush, non-watertight hatches were inset into the afterwelldeck. The hull was constructed of moulded glass-reinforced plastic (GRP) and stiffened by 19-mm plywood bulkheads spaced 82 cm apart. Some of these bulkheads had been removed to accommodate cargo below decks. Deck beams consisted of 10-cm-by-10-cm spruce overlaid with a 2.5-cm plywood deck. The afterdeck was drained by two threaded 7.6-cm scuppers on each side. An aluminum skiff was carried secured to the foredeck. The vessel was equipped with one electric yacht-type bilge pump capable of pumping 1500 litres per hour, one handpump, and one Yamaha gasoline-driven portable pump of unknown capacity. No bilge alarm was fitted. Navigation and communications equipment included a radar, global positioning system, citizens' band (CB) radio, and a portable medium-frequency (MF), 503-kHz bush radio. Description of the Voyage On 21 August 2000, the Avataq arrived in the Port of Churchill, Manitoba, to discharge a small amount of cargo and to load for a return voyage to Arviat and Rankin Inlet, Nunavut. The vessel departed Churchill at 0500 central daylight time(2) on August 24 and proceeded on a course northwards following the 94th meridian. At approximately 2330, as the vessel came into radio range of Arviat, the captain initiated a series of radio calls, on CB radio Channel 14, advising a relative that the crew were on deck re-securing cargo that had come loose and that they expected to arrive in Arviat at 0200 the next morning. Another radio call at 0030 indicated that the vessel was in a position 10 nautical miles south of Arviat, that the bilge pumps were not working properly, and that the vessel was taking on water. A final radio transmission was heard from the vessel at 0130 advising that the Avataq was taking water over the bow and stern and was sinking. Despite attempts by the shore station to contact the vessel, no further transmissions were heard. Search-and-Rescue Operations Several residents of Arviat overheard the radio conversation between the vessel and shore. When communications could not be re-established with the Avataq, a group of residents proceeded south along the coastline on all-terrain vehicles in an attempt to locate the vessel. At 0255, the searchers called the head of the local Emergency Measures Organization (EMO) in Arviat and informed him that the Avataq was missing and might have sunk. After evaluating the situation, Arviat EMO called Nunavut Emergency Services (NES) in Iqaluit, Nunavut, at 0257 to apprise them of the situation, followed by a second call at 0319. Arviat EMO then proceeded to find an aircraft to conduct a search. At 0340, NES Iqaluit called the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) in Iqaluit to ascertain if any other vessels were available in the area. Meanwhile, local residents of Arviat were preparing to search in small vessels but were prevented from departing by adverse weather conditions. At 0510, Arviat EMO received a call from and provided an update to NES Iqaluit, who in turn notified the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) in Trenton, Ontario, at 0519 that the Avataq might have sunk. A Cessna Caravan was located in Rankin Inlet and took off at 0600 with four spotters on board. This aircraft arrived on scene at 0640 at the vessel's last known position and started searching. RCC Trenton retasked a search-and-rescue (SAR) Hercules aircraft (which was on another mission in Franklin Strait) to the area of the sinking. The Hercules arrived on scene at 0810 and dropped a Canadian Search and Rescue Planning (CANSARP)(3) drift buoy. Fuel and crew change requirements allowed the aircraft to remain on scene for only 35 minutes. The aircraft then departed for Churchill. At the time of the occurrence, the motor tanker Mokami had nearly completed discharging cargo in Arviat. However, due to the vessel's lightly ballasted condition and weather conditions outside the harbour, the Mokami could not safely depart to participate in the search. A second commercial vessel, the Nalinee Naree, which had departed Churchill at about the same time as the occurrence, was contacted at 1214 and tasked to participate in the search. Between the time of the initial response and the time the SAR mission was reduced on August 30 at 0935, a total of four SAR helicopters, three Hercules SAR aircraft, one private aircraft, two commercial vessels, and numerous private small vessels participated in the search. The body of a crew member was located and recovered by a Royal Air Force Chinook helicopter at 1908 on August 25, and the body of the captain was located and recovered by a local vessel at 1705 on August 26. Both victims, who were wearing full-length personal flotation device (PFD) coveralls, were found in the vessel's debris field. The local coroner determined that both victims died of hypothermia. The vessel sank in estimated position latitude 6055' N, longitude 09359' W. Lifesaving Equipment The Avataq was equipped with a four-person Beaufort liferaft secured by a pelican hook to a cradle on top of the wheelhouse. A hydrostatic release and deep chocks were not fitted for the liferaft, nor were they required to be fitted. Liferafts are required to be serviced annually at an approved facility; this liferaft was last serviced in 1995. Numerous overflights of the debris field failed to locate the liferaft or its canister; however, an aluminum fishing skiff carried on the foredeck was seen floating. The Avataq was not equipped with an emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB), nor was the vessel required to be so equipped. At the time of the occurrence, six Mustang PFD coveralls (models 185 and 195) were stored at the back of the wheelhouse. The suits worn by the recovered victims were in serviceable condition but were not equipped with marker lights or sound-signalling devices (whistles). A hanger was found in the back of the suit worn by the master, and the suit worn by the crew member was not fully zipped up. The estimated survival time of victims wearing model 185 or 195 Mustang PFD coveralls in 8C water is five hours.(4) Environmental Conditions When the Avataq departed Churchill at 0500 on August 24, the Environment Canada marine weather forecast predicted winds from the west, veering to the northwest later in the day with a predicted windspeed of 15 knots increasing to 30 knots overnight. A gale warning for the Churchill and Arviat marine regions was broadcast on VHF and MF radio by Environment Canada at 1503 local time. Actual wind reports taken from the Arviat airport show that, during the evening of August 24, winds were 10 to 15 knots from the southwest veering westward at 2200.(5) Between 2300 and 2400, windspeed increased from 12 knots to 23 knots. At 0130, when the Avataq foundered, winds had further veered to the west-northwest and were 26 knots, gusting to 33 knots. The water temperature in the area of the occurrence was between 8C and 10C. Crew Certification The master and the crew of the Avataq held no formal marine qualifications. For the local voyages upon which the Avataq was engaged, the master would have been expected to hold a certificate as Master, Ship of Not More Than 350 Gross Tons, or Tug, Local Voyage. This certificate is intended to ensure that the master is knowledgeable in meteorology, ship management, and general seamanship. A further prerequisite to the certificate is the successful completion of courses in simulated electronic navigation (SEN II), marine emergency duties (MED C and D) and the provision of a Restricted Radio Operator Certificate with Maritime Qualification. In 1990, CCG Ship Safety, now Transport Canada Marine Safety (TCMS),(6) recognized the problem of conveying safety and certification requirements to Inuit vessel owners, some of whom are not fluent in English or French. Although TCMS does not have surveyors who are fluent in Inuktitut, the Small Fishing Vessel: Safety Manual (TP10038) is printed in Inuktitut and has reportedly received wide distribution over the past six or seven years as part of the CCG's Boat Safety Program. Vessel Certification and History The Avataq was built in 1979 at Barrington Passage, Nova Scotia, and registered as the Judith Rose III. Construction was not supervised by CCG Ship Safety nor was the vessel built to approved plans. In 1989, the vessel was sold to owners in Iqaluit, where it underwent inspection by CCG Ship Safety. After repairs and modifications, it was certificated as a small fishing vessel. Notwithstanding the requirements of the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations, no plans were submitted to CCG Ship Safety for approval. The initial inspection certificate of the Avataq restricted it to voyages within 20 miles from shore. Due to the remote operating area, a second restriction required that a voyage plan be deposited with the vessel's home base before sailing and that the vessel report its position by radio twice daily. In 1995, the vessel was sold to new owners in Rankin Inlet, Nunavut, where it underwent a second periodic inspection by CCG Ship Safety. After this inspection, the Avataq was still limited to voyages within 20 miles of shore; however, the requisite voyage plan and radio position reports were not noted on the new certificate. This final inspection certificate expired in July 1999 and, up to the time of the occurrence, the owner had not requested that the vessel be re-inspected and the certificate renewed. At least 34 small fishing vessels are registered to owners living in Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon Territory. Only two of these vessels are currently inspected by TCMS. The primary activity of these vessels registered as commercial fishing vessels is subsistence fishing or whaling and the carrying of cargo between coastal communities. As early as 1990, a CCG inspector had expressed concern to his regional office over the safety of small fishing vessels operating in the Arctic. Vessel Activity Between 1995 and August 2000, the Avataq made two to four voyages per year between the Port of Churchill and communities on the western shore of Hudson Bay. During the same period, the Quinaluguaq conducted a similar number of voyages. Before departure, a representative of the Port of Churchill would visit the vessel to obtain an outward declaration form and collect port fees. Since approximately 1995, both the Avataq and Quinaluguaq had called routinely at the Port of Churchill to load cargo. The cargo-carrying activity of these vessels was known to officials of the Port of Churchill and to the TCMS port warden. Because the maritime operations at the port are seasonal, TCMS does not maintain a full-time inspection presence. A port warden is hired on contract for the short shipping season, primarily to ensure the safe loading of grain cargos. However, under the Canada Shipping Act, the Minister of Transport may empower a port warden or other competent person to inspect vessels for any defects believed to exist.(7) Vessel Loading and Stability Information provided by cargo consignors and gathered from the examination of salvaged cargo indicates that the vessel was carrying an estimated 15 823 kg of the following cargo: Propane: 3727 kg Building materials: 12 096 kg Cargo consigned to the Avataq was stored by Northern Transportation Ltd. and released when the vessel was prepared to load.(8) The crew loaded and secured the cargo without the aid of stevedores. Once the vessel was loaded and ready for departure, a representative of the port obtained an outward declaration form from the master, indicating the tonnage of cargo on board, from which port dues were calculated before departure. The master declared to the port that there were 10 160 kg of cargo on board. The precise on-board disposition of the cargo cannot be ascertained. In the past, the vessel had been loaded with steel pipe space-frames, wood construction materials, and large propane bottles stowed on deck. Smaller propane bottles were stowed in the hold on either side of the engine room. On departure, the vessel's freeboard is estimated to have been approximately 40 cm. To prevent water ingress onto the afterdeck, the scuppers were plugged with threaded barrel plugs. Because of the low freeboard, it was common practice for the crew to cover the afterdeck with a plastic tarpaulin attached to the gunwale to reduce the amount of water shipped. On one previous voyage, the Avataq nearly capsized after taking a large angle of heel. In that instance, cargo was lost overboard and the vessel righted itself. A small fishing vessel that is not engaged in fishing herring or capelin is not required by regulation to have approved stability information. However, at the time of the occurrence, the vessel was operating as a cargo carrier. Previous Occurrences In a previous occurrence investigated by the TSB, the pleasure craft Qasaoq, with 10 Inuit hunters on board, sank near the mouth of Frobisher Bay, resulting in the loss of 8 persons.(9) The Board found that the vessel was not equipped with adequate lifesaving equipment or with a suitable radio for broadcasting a distress call on the designated distress frequencies. In addition, the Board found safety deficiencies in the handling of distress calls by Iqaluit EMO that unduly delayed the SAR operation. As a result, personnel from the key agencies involved in SAR operations in the North and representatives of local authorities met to review mandates and to discuss procedures relating to SAR operations.(10) It was agreed that the appropriate RCC in Trenton or Halifax must be immediately notified of marine accidents. To avoid misunderstandings and delays, emergency dispatching and communications were to be handled by a dedicated EMO centre, effective 01 April 1996. A series of four boating safety documentaries produced by the CCG for the Inuit was broadcast locally on community television. Furthermore, safety posters and copies of the Small Fishing Vessel: Safety Manual (TP 10038) in Inuktitut, containing a 1-800 information number, were distributed to local fishing communities.