Analysis Verification of Operational Readiness It is good practice for crews to establish a vessel's operational readiness following a long layup. Although not mandatory, and dependant upon the extent of any modifications, this practice allows operators to evaluate performance and stability characteristics and to assess any recent repairs. In this instance, despite the 11-month layup, the lazarette bilge pump was neither repaired nor replaced. It therefore remained non-functional despite the expectation that seawater would likely be entering that compartment when the vessel returned to service. that the tail shaft packing gland was sufficiently tightened; that the seams of the newly-replaced hull planks were watertight; or that the bilge-pumping system was adequate to handle the expected quantity of water ingress into the lazarette through the seams of the timbered stern. Even after the packing gland was discovered to be leaking in the hours immediately following the vessel's departure from the shipyard, no evaluation was carried out. Instead, the gland was re-tightened and 2.5tons of ice was immediately added to the number3 hold, thus prohibiting further access and making it impossible to monitor the effectiveness of the re-tightening procedure under normal operating conditions. Watertightness of a Timbered Stern In this occurrence, the B.C. Safari left the shipyard after an 11-month layup, loaded a total of 14tons of ice into the three fish holds, and proceeded to the fishing grounds the following day while still possessing significant freeboard. It was not until March8, when the vessel also had 22tons of herring and its fish holds had been pressed up with seawater, that the stern became fully submerged. When that occurred, the volume of water likely entering the lazarette through the unsealed seams would have exceeded the capacity of the drains to move all of it forward to the engine room, particularly with the lazarette bilge pump not working. Consequently, free-surface effects would have developed in the lazarette and engine room. Seawater partially retained on the main deck would have resulted in additional free surface. Together, the existence of below-deck and on-deck free surface would have significantly reduced the vessel's positive stability characteristics and its ability to remain upright. Decision to Sail Alone By sailing alone, the master took it upon himself to perform multiple roles. His navigational duties, for instance, required him to remain in the wheelhouse, but left him unable to monitor and confirm the condition of the below-deck compartments. In addition, he was not familiar with how to operate the engine room's hydraulic bilge-pumping system. Although this was not an issue when there was an engineer on board, it became crucial when the vessel was taking on water and there was no effective way to dispel it. Once the master became aware that the water was rising in the engine room and lazarette-an awareness likely delayed by the earlier ad hoc adjustment of the float switch for the lazarette's high-water bilge alarm-he telephoned the vessel's owner requesting pumping instructions. However, by the time they had finished speaking, the B.C. Safari's positive stability characteristics had been so reduced that there was imminent danger of it capsizing. The master had no time to take any safety action other than to make a distress call. During the call, he reported that he intended to abandon the vessel immediately. Failure to Properly Secure Deck Equipment Prior to Departure On March8, relatively calm seas and concerns as to the effect of the dwindling ice supply in the holds made the master eager to begin the voyage to French Creek. In the haste to depart, the hatch covers were not secured. It is likely they became dislodged when the vessel turned sharply to port and then to starboard just prior to capsizing. This would have caused water to flow out of the fish holds, producing increased free-surface effects and negatively affecting vessel stability. In addition, the boom was left raised above the working deck at an estimated angle of 45 and slewed slightly to port. Had the boom been lowered and secured to the centreline of the net drum before leaving Deep Bay, the vessel's centre of gravity would have been lowered, offering improved stability. Instead, the raised boom negatively affected stability at a time when it would have been prudent to keep the centre of gravity as low as possible. Both of these actions-failing to secure hatch covers and leaving the boom unsecured-negatively impact the stability of a vessel. Knowledge of Stability The stability characteristics of fishing vessels are apt to change often and substantially due to the frequency with which nets, traps, or lines are deployed from the vessel into the sea and then hauled back aboard along with various quantities of fish product. On a longer term basis, stability characteristics may change as fishing gear and equipment are added, removed, or relocated in an attempt to maximize catch levels while conforming to government fishing and safety regulations. It is therefore in the best interest of fishing vessel owners and operators to acquire training to understand which factors affect their own vessels' stability and to then take whatever actions are necessary for their vessels to remain safely upright in all conditions likely to be encountered. It has been shown in past occurrences that adequate knowledge of vessel stability and stability related information is critical to the safe operation of fishing vessels. In its investigation into the capsizing of the small fishing vessel Cap Rouge II (TSB report M02W0147), the Board found that limited knowledge of basic principles of trim and stability on the part of those onboard contributed to that occurrence. Similarly, in its investigation into the capsizing of the small fishing vessel Ryan's Commander (TSB report M04N0086), the Board found that not having an adequate knowledge of vessel stability information, on the part of owner and master, had serious adverse consequences when making decisions pertaining to safe operating conditions. The combined effect of the raised boom and the uncontrolled accumulation of water both on and under-deck contributed to a significant loss of positive stability, causing the vessel to quickly capsize and sink. The seams of the timbered stern allowed uncontrolled quantities of seawater to flow into the lazarette and engine room bilges, significantly reducing the vessel's positive stability. The absence of additional crew members compromised the master's ability to take appropriate, timely, and effective action against the water ingress in the under-deck compartments and to abandon ship safely. The vessel sailed with one pump known to be non-functional. Adjusting the position of the float switch for the bilge alarm delayed response time, allowing more water to accumulate in the vessel and thus putting the vessel and crew at greater risk.Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors The combined effect of the raised boom and the uncontrolled accumulation of water both on and under-deck contributed to a significant loss of positive stability, causing the vessel to quickly capsize and sink. The seams of the timbered stern allowed uncontrolled quantities of seawater to flow into the lazarette and engine room bilges, significantly reducing the vessel's positive stability. The absence of additional crew members compromised the master's ability to take appropriate, timely, and effective action against the water ingress in the under-deck compartments and to abandon ship safely. The vessel sailed with one pump known to be non-functional. Adjusting the position of the float switch for the bilge alarm delayed response time, allowing more water to accumulate in the vessel and thus putting the vessel and crew at greater risk. Operators who are unfamiliar with the principles of transverse stability or who cannot apply them to actual on-board conditions place the safety of a fishing vessel and those aboard at risk. The vessel's operational readiness was not fully determined following the extended layup. The master's inability to operate a key piece of on-board equipment-the bilge pump-created a risk to him and the vessel.Findings as to Risk Operators who are unfamiliar with the principles of transverse stability or who cannot apply them to actual on-board conditions place the safety of a fishing vessel and those aboard at risk. The vessel's operational readiness was not fully determined following the extended layup. The master's inability to operate a key piece of on-board equipment-the bilge pump-created a risk to him and the vessel.