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Culture and identity construction among Palestinian refugees in Jordan



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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the different dimensions of Palestinian identity and the characteristics of social processes related to place. The Palestinian population has faced several waves of mass displacement, especially since 1948 with the creation of the State of Israel. The Israel-Palestine conflict led to the expansion of one of the largest diasporas in the world among Palestinian refugees. My research questions concern issues of cultural practices experienced in host countries such as Jordan, the impact of host societies' context on culture, and whether Palestinian identity is encountered as a resource or constraint in this setting.

The key concepts that I will deal with are culture, identity, place and belonging. I intend to present some insights from social and cultural geography, through processes of inclusion and exclusion, extended to notions of home and homeland. I will look at the impact of discourses and narratives, as well as the political aspects of places related to resistance movements, which underline power relations between host and refugee communities.

The informants' experiences of Palestinian identity constitute data from my fieldwork in refugee camps in North Jordan. Situating my analysis within a theoretical and legal framework against a historical backdrop, which highlights the context of the study area, I will discuss the particular aspects of Palestinian identity construction and its different forms of expression through cultural practices in daily life and the social processes involved. I will then focus on Palestinian identity regarding its role as an asset or constraint in the context of host countries and in camps, especially in relation to the Jordanian legal framework and the impact of humanitarian assistance from the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine.

This thesis invites a discussion around forms of interactions between place and identity in a context of forced displacement, drawing from the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. My study demonstrates the importance of the identity phenomenon for displaced persons and its impacts on inclusion, exclusion or marginalization processes. I will also emphasize repercussions at different levels of analysis, from local to structural and governmental. This stresses important challenges related to complex emergencies in humanitarianism and development studies.

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ACRONYMS

BDS	Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
CBO	Community-Based Organization
IAF	Islamic Action Front
IDF	Israel Defense Force
LNM	Lebanese National Movement
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RAI	Republicans Abroad International
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine

“For it is often the way we look at other people that imprisons them within their own narrowest allegiances. And it is also the way we look at them that may set them free.”

Amin Maalouf, *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong*

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Forced migration in the Middle East has long been a crucial question and a key challenge that has had repercussions on the international community. Waves of migration with different causes at different periods in this region have attracted the attention of academics. However, the political and social constellations of the Middle East are a key factor. Studying cases in conflict areas is especially relevant in human geography and development studies.

Several events in the near past involved Middle East countries but also international actors from Europe and United States. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which led to the Gulf War in 1990-1991, included key actors such as the United States. The War on Iraq by the Bush administration was a consequence of the conflict during 2003-2011. The current Syrian civil war against the Bashar al-Assad regime, which started after the 2011 Arab Spring, shows complex interactions between political institutions and highlights a multitude of migration patterns.

Since the creation of the Israeli State in 1948, the Israel-Palestine conflict led to a long period of unrest in the region. The struggle in this country also has repercussions for neighboring countries in the Middle East, in relation to several political, economic and social dimensions. The Israel-Palestine conflict took place at different stages during history. But the present situation is still challenging and shows real consequences in daily life for the displaced Palestinian people.

The Palestine-Israel conflict has significant impact on host countries and neighboring regions. Jordan is one of the most important host countries in Middle East involved in assistance for refugees, with a population of over 1,5 million registered Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2016). Jordan is situated in the heart of the Middle East, at the border of powerful countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Israel. Diplomatic relations with neighboring countries made Jordan a key actor in the Middle East region. Jordan benefits from a high economic level and strong relations with Western countries (Nasser, 2005, p. 67). The Kingdom plays a major role in economy and political negotiations at an international level. But the circumstances of the

situation pose different challenges and dilemmas for Jordan as a host country concerning political, economic and social dimensions.

1.1 PALESTINE AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN HISTORY

But what does the term Palestine mean? The term comes from the Arabic *Filastin* and is in fact difficult to define because of its unclear characteristics (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 58). Palestine is not considered a state since this territory belongs officially to Israel, but at the same time its population is not really recognized as Israeli citizens since they do not share the same civil rights as Israelis. Palestine's status has long been controversial among the international community. This is due to the Jewish immigration at different periods of history and the conflict over Palestinian land, then the creation of the Israeli state and positions of the different international actors regarding Israel (Harms & Ferry, 2008). According to the United Nations, Palestine is defined as the territories occupied by the Israeli army, which are the West Bank of the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza strip (UNRWA, 2016). Scholars agree that the term refers to the West Bank of the Israeli State, which includes an Arab and non-Jewish population (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 58). However, the controversial relationship between Palestine and Israel questions the modalities of identity construction of its citizens.

Scholars observed several main phases in the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict. A crucial part of its history lies in the period of the Ottoman Empire, allied with Germany during the First World War. At the end of the War and with the defeat of Germany, Britain took over Palestine and constituted a military administration, the British Mandate, in 1917. This territory later became a part of Transjordan, through an accord between Britain and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 67).

The Second World War marks the episode of the Holocaust, with 6 million Jews executed. European countries showed sympathy for the Jewish cause and helped to the creation of a new country for Jewish refugees (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 81).

The year 1948 marks both the creation of the Israeli state and the first flow of forced displacement of Palestinians, both internally and out of the country. Growing tensions led to the

Six Days War in 1967: Israel invaded and took the control of the West Bank and the Gaza strip (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 110). Some scholars agree that the creation of the Israel state has had an impact on the construction of the Palestinian identity and social processes involved, as we will see later.

Palestinian resistance against Israel became more and more organized, as it did in host countries like Lebanon where the unrest spread during the 1980s. The creation of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLO) in 1964 and its leader Y. Arafat represented a turn towards more violent and terrorist actions. The two occurrences of *Intifada* (from the Arabic "uprising"), first in 1987-1991 and in 2000-2005, represent a significant change in Palestinian resistance (Rigby, 2010, p. 63).

The participation of Norway in the peace process marked a crucial turn, which resulted in the Oslo Accords in September 1993. The main elements of discussion were the possibility for the Palestinian territories to manage self-governance and lead to the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, as well as a progressive withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian territories (Rigby, 2010, p. 59).

The Oslo II Accords were signed in September of 1995. Palestinian territories were divided according to 3 types of zones: A, B and C. At the origin of this decision, the A zone was controlled by the Palestinian authority and independent from Israel. The B zone was partially managed by both Palestinian and Israeli administrations. Israel was in charge of the C zone. But the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Y. Rabin in November 1995, by an Israeli extremist, revealed continuous internal tensions in the country (Rigby, 2010, p. 60). The Oslo process has been heavily criticized for having shown little efficiency in the moment. A two-state solution that was evoked during the peace process seems today to be compromised. The alternative of a one-state solution is still discussed but remains a challenging prospect, given the extreme tensions between the two territories.

1.2 ORGANIZATION OF ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

Along these different steps in history, forced displacement became a reality for many Palestinians. In this context, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine (UNRWA) was created as a temporary organization in order to provide relief aid to Palestinian refugees displaced as a result of the creation of Israel in 1948. Until the 1960s, UNRWA had a policy of "reintegration" in host countries and encouraged permanent resettling of Palestinian displaced. But in 1982, the UNRWA Commissioner-General L. Michelmore proposed to extend the eligibility to the refugee status to the third generation of refugees, as a result of the need for host countries to cut their own assistance budget (Rosen, 2012, p. 3).

The goals of UNRWA question the role of other administrative institutions, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This organization affirms that a displaced person is no longer considered as a refugee once he or she has obtained a citizenship in a host country. However, in Jordan, many Palestinian refugees do have a Jordanian citizenship but are still considered as refugees according to the UNRWA principles. This situation is confusing, and it constitutes a complex legal framework that is challenging to implement in host countries. The status of Palestinian refugees in Jordan shows the ambiguous aspect of having both a citizenship from a host state and a refugee status (Rosen, 2012). This may have consequences for the relation between identity and belonging in regards to host countries.

In addition, UNRWA classifies refugees according to their origins, which induces differences between refugees from the West Bank and those from the Gaza strip. This administrative aspect brings on consequences in the access to assistance in daily life (Rosen, 2012).

This intervention of UNRWA as protection of Palestinian refugees questions the risk to perpetuate the refugee status among vulnerable people and the complexity of identity preservation in host countries. The assistance provided by UNRWA and the possible dependency challenges the feasibility of durable solutions for livelihoods (Rosen, 2012, p. 3).

According to UNRWA, Palestinian refugees number today 5 million (UNRWA, 2016). Such a large number of displaced people poses the question of how individuals perceive their belonging

to a country where they are not welcomed anymore, particularly one that the Israeli Army even has destroyed. This situation challenges how Palestinians perceive their identity in a context of forced displacement outside of their country.

1.3 SHAPING IDENTITY IN A DISPLACEMENT CONTEXT

The context of the Israel-Palestine conflict highlights some fundamental links between social processes, historical background and the production of identity. Cultural practices and identity processes are undoubtedly crucial elements to include in the analysis of social phenomena, particularly in human geography cases.

The "otherness" is a recurrent concept in human geography. Identity appears as result of a relationship between self and others via social interactions. Identity processes depend on interactions between individuals in social groups, with social forces as drivers (Nasser, 2005, p. 140).

The poststructuralist approach may help us to understand the concept. Identity constitutes meaning through social interactions. Poststructuralism involves power relations through processes of inclusion and exclusion that influence the identity construction, both individually and collectively. This theoretical framework valorizes the dichotomy of self-other as well as the impact on the shaping of identity (Nasser, 2005, p. 140).

The concepts of place, identity and belonging emerge from this context. These concepts depend on geographical elements and political situations, which constitute a necessary reflection among scholars in social sciences, especially in the context of the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

We may observe here a multitude of levels of analysis, from local to institutional, which present consequences for the international community. Identity includes as well different types, modalities and levels of analysis: individual, social, ethnic or national. This concept reveals an important complexity in multiple contexts.

A lot of research has been done these last decades about Palestinian identity in itself. Not so much research, however, has studied the interaction between Palestinian identity and social processes in host countries such as Jordan. In my work, I seek to understand the phenomenon of Palestinian refugees who created new identities in Jordan, through underlying and complex transnational processes.

The choice of my master thesis topic came naturally, after a trip to the West Bank in 2015. I am convinced that research on migration patterns in the Middle East is crucial in development studies, particularly in understanding the challenges related to identity among stateless persons. The fieldwork experience is very relevant for future work opportunities with refugees and asylum seekers.

In this thesis, I seek to understand the mechanisms linked to identity preservation and construction. In the special case of Palestinian refugees, I look at how the present political situation affects the construction of identity among this population.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

Human geography and development studies focus on human meaning through modalities of negotiating relations in societies. It is crucial to understand processes associated with forced displacement. Culture, identity and belonging are key concepts in this context.

My contribution through my research will allow for understanding the complex interactions between Palestine and Jordan according to different aspects of culture and identity processes. My reflections are focused on place, identity and belonging in the special context of Palestinian refugees. I would like to explore the different dimensions of culture and identity, how people deal with it in contested places, and consequences on social interactions in societies.

Identity construction constitutes multiple dilemmas between integration in host countries and a hope to return to the homeland. This social phenomenon is characterized by complex

mechanisms among social groups. That is why it is crucial to explore processes involved in construction of identity, and its link to place and belonging.

My research questions are:

- **How do Palestinian refugees experience their cultural practices outside of their country?**
- **How are cultural practices influenced by the place where Palestinian refugees live?**
- **Is Palestinian identity a resource or constraint?**

My first question involves the consequences of forced displacement on cultural practices and identity, in the special case of Palestinian refugees. The second invites to focus on different facets of identity that may be experienced as assets, or as restrictions of identity expression. The last question focuses on the relation between place and identity, with a particular regard for belonging. This challenges how the social, political and economic context of a host country may influence identity processes.

My main objective is to understand elements contributing to the construction of culture and identity among Palestinian refugees. I seek to understand how identity and its different aspects are constructed, particularly in a politically unstable context or where there are conflicts in home countries. Identity is a complex concept that can be defined according to different dimensions: individual, social, ethnic, and national. In this case, the situation of Palestinian refugees is especially relevant to study.

I will look at the different strategies and processes involved in creating or maintaining an identity. I will also discuss how this identity is deployed in relation to different aspects of social, political and economic aspects of daily life.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

I gave previously a brief introduction of the historical context and the challenges involved today in the situation of Palestinian refugees. I presented the main research questions and the objectives of my study.

In Chapter 2, I will first look at the social and political background of the situation, through the British Mandate and the consequences of colonization. I will consider the main phases of migration flows due to the Israel-Palestine conflict and results on the relations with other Middle East countries such as Jordan. I will then discuss the role of humanitarian agencies and the legal framework involved, particularly through UNRWA and UNHCR.

In Chapter 3, I will propose a theoretical framework. I will use some approaches from social and cultural geography that explain the relevancy of cultural practices and identity in human geography. I will seek to define the concepts of cultural practices, identity and diaspora.

The choice of qualitative methodology and methods used during my fieldwork will be presented in Chapter 4. I will discuss the different challenges that I met during my fieldwork and some ethical considerations linked to my research process.

All this will serve as a background for the analysis and provide a theoretical overview of the situation of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. I will then take into consideration the analysis of data and discuss the results. Chapter 5 will be my first analysis chapter. I intend to understand how identity is constructed in the context of Palestinian refugees in host countries. I will try to define Palestinian identity and its expressions in daily life today through cultural practices and livelihoods in refugee camps. I will look at the phenomenon of identity construction through the "Othering" or differentiation from other social groups, as well as the processes involved.

In my second analysis chapter, Chapter 6, I will discuss how the construction of Palestinian identity may be an asset or dilemma and the consequences involved. I will use this as a departure point for the different types of benefits and assistance provided to the different groups of refugees, and their effects on daily life and livelihoods. I will examine the shift in types of

assistance delivered by UNRWA, and the challenges that may have repercussions for Palestinian identity.

My last chapter, Chapter 7, will contain concluding remarks about the main findings from my fieldwork and analysis of data. I will look at how the concepts of place, identity and belonging interact together. I will then focus on identity construction in contested places, such as the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. I will attempt to answer to the research questions more generally and provide an overview of the situation.

I will now discuss the social and political context in a historical perspective of the situation. This chapter and the theoretical framework will constitute the background for my analysis of data.

CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In this chapter, I will look at the origins of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the main phases of migration that have resulted. I will then present political aspects of the study area in Jordan, particularly the British colonization period. I will also discuss the role of humanitarian agencies, the legal framework proposed, and the consequences for the population of Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

2.1 ORIGINS OF THE TERMS

First, the word Palestine (*Filastin* in Arabic) finds its origin in the Greek *Philistia*, which appeared during the 12th century in the occupied territory between modern day Tel Aviv and the Gaza Strip. After the First World War, Palestine referred to the West of the Jordan River and the South of Beirut (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 57).

Before the First World War, there was no delimited country in the Middle East besides the Arabian Peninsula, which included regions such as the Greater Syria, Palestine and Arabia. The Ottoman Empire was allied with Germany during the war. Britain at that time already had colonial interests, particularly in the access to oil, which made the Suez Canal (connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea) a strategic place for business (Harms & Ferry, 2008).

The First World War witnessed a spread of nationalism. In the context of the development of its trade with Europe, the Middle East experienced a beginning of collective thinking that gathered Arabs together and emphasized points in common, such as the Arabic language, Muslim, Druze or Christian religion, and their geographical origin. This led to an Arab identity construction and formed the premises of the Palestinian identity. At the end of the 19th century, a small minority of Jews lived in Palestine, but Jewish immigration became more intense as a result of growing antisemitism in Europe and Russia in the same period. The *First Aliyah* (1882-1903) saw 25 000 Jewish people immigrating into Palestine. During the *Second Aliyah* (1904-14), 30 000 came to

Palestine. They were this time more politically involved in their cause and determined to create a new home for the community (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 61). Palestine was seen as a strategic place, the Holy Land, which bears a strong religious symbolic status. However, Jewish people arriving there had to compete for resources with the original indigenous population, who had already cultivated the land and owned most of it (Harms & Ferry, 2008).




Figure 1: Map of the research area (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 2007)

Palestinians are considered now as a minority in different areas of Israel. They are often mistaken as with Israeli Arabs or Bedouins. The Israel State makes a distinction between Arabs, Palestinians and Bedouins. Bedouins are an Arab minority in Israel, characterized by the practice

of Islam and the Arabic language. The main group is Negev Bedouins, who come from the desert region of South Israel. Some of them are also peasants from coastal Palestine who became progressively nomadic (Jabukowska, 1992, p. 86).

Bedouins are actually Palestinians but do not recognize themselves as such, as evidenced by the fact that they have not taken part in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Furthermore, Bedouins are allowed to join the Israeli military (Minority Right Group International, 2009). Some of the Bedouins cooperate with Israel, but many of them have experienced violent evictions and confiscations of land in Israel (McDowall, 1998). However, Palestinians have long perceived Bedouins as allies with Israel, which contributed to a fracture between the different Arab minorities in the region (McDowall, 1998).

The Gaza strip and the West Bank are commonly known as Palestine, but the two territories do not have the same relation with Israel. The Hamas political party has the majority in Gaza and does not recognize the state of Israel. Due to this radical choice, Gaza residents have highly restricted rights of movement, and are allowed to travel out of the territory only for medical reasons. Contrarily, the Fatah group in the West Bank established diplomatic relations with Israel and is characterized by more moderate politics in the context of the conflict (Smith & Myre, 2007).

These different minorities and social groups present distinct interests and connections toward Israel and neighboring countries. Due to the diplomatic relations between Jordan and Israel relating to the refugee crisis, this involves consequences for the ethnic minorities who reside in the Kingdom.

2.2 EVENTS LEADING TO THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The Israel-Palestine conflict finds its origins in several main events that led to the creation of the Israeli state (Harms & Ferry, 2008). These events involved not only Israeli and Palestinian actors, but also neighboring countries in the Middle East and Western countries at the origin of colonization. All these actors contributed to the current divisions, which played a role in

Palestinian identity construction. The situation in Jordan and its relations with other Middle East countries are outcomes of this history. I will present in a table the main events during the conflict, before 1948.

Nature of intervention	Date/year	Purpose/goal	Major Actors	Outcome/Status
Hussein-McMahon Correspondence	1915-1916	British-Arab Alliance to end the Ottoman Empire	British High Commissioner Mac Mahon and Arab leader Sharif Hussein of Mecca	Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916
Sykes-Picot Agreement	16 May 1916	Conquest of the Ottoman Empire	British colonel Sir M. Sykes and French diplomat F. Picot	Partitioning of the Empire into British Mandate in Palestine and Iraq, and French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon
Balfour Declaration	2 November 1917	Promotion of Jewish immigration in Palestine	British foreign secretary A.J. Balfour, Zionist Federation of Great Britain	Expansion of Jewish population in Palestine
King-Crane Commission	1919	Organization of Mandate and possible future independence of Arab countries	H. Churchill King and C. R. Crane	Repartition of the Mandate between Great Britain and France
White Paper	23 May 1939	Response to the Arab Revolt from 1936	Great Britain, Jewish community in Palestine	Paper rejected
UN General Assembly, Resolution 106	15 May 1947	End of British Mandate and partition plan	"Neutral" countries: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, Yugoslavia	Creation of the United Nations Special Committee for Palestine (UNSCOP)
UN General Assembly, Resolution 181	29 November 1947	UN Partition plan	UN signatory countries, Jewish Agency in Palestine, Arab Committee	Rejected
State of Israel Proclamation of Independence	14 May 1948	Independence of Israel from the British Empire	D. Ben Gurion, first Prime Minister of Israel	End of British Mandate, Arab armies invade Israel, first Arab-Israeli war

Table 1: Main events leading to the creation of the State of Israel

The Hussein-McMahon correspondence (1915-16) was a crucial step in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. During that period, the British High Commissioner in Cairo Sir H. McMahon, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca exchanged letters. This correspondence resulted in an alliance between the Arabs and the British, as well as an agreement to organize a revolt against the Ottoman Empire, with the attack of Turkey as a strategic point (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 67).

Britain and local Emirs in future Jordan had a common goal: to put an end to the Turkish rule of the Ottoman Empire. During the period of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the British chose Sharif Hussein of Mecca as a spokesperson. But Britain feared an anti-British rebellion among the official allies in the Middle East. At the same time, Hussein had received Turkish warning about a secret treaty between France and Britain that aimed to divide the Arab territory and put an end to the Ottoman Empire. Hussein's successor King Abdullah received the delicate task of finding a balance between the partnership with Britain and fulfilling his own interests towards Arabia (Wilson, 1987, p. 27).

The Sykes-Picot agreement had its 100th anniversary in 2016. This was originally a secret treaty between the French diplomat F. Picot and the British Member of Parliament Sir M. Sykes. They agreed to divide between themselves the Middle East region. The treaty was published only after the end of the First World War. Indeed, France had economic and political interests in Syria, and desired to control this zone for its own interest. The Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks started in 1916, at the same time as Palestinian nationalist movements (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 68).

The Balfour declaration on November 2nd of 1917 formalized the "establishment in Palestine of a national home for Jewish people." The foreign secretary of Great Britain A. J. Balfour sent this document in the form of a letter to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain, which promoted Jewish immigration to Palestine and the creation of a Jewish nationalist ideology. However, the text affirms "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine" (Harms & ferry, 2008, p. 69). Therefore, the Balfour declaration is a very controversial text, as it shows a certain support of Zionism without seeing the consequences for the indigenous population. The text is written in a rather unclear language,

and it refers to "home" but not "state." This questions the legal position and legitimacy of the declaration (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 70). The Balfour declaration is still today a key document that led to the creation of the Israeli state, and it remains highly controversial.

The end of the First World War marks the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France lacked the economic power to maintain their presence in the Empire. Britain still needed to secure a route to India for its access to oil by sea for the British Navy. Economic and commercial interests were manifest. France had contacts with the Catholic community in Syria and needed to preserve a supply of various goods, particularly cotton and silk (Wilson, 1987, p. 39).

Different commissions and protocols showed an important impact on the creation of the Israeli state and the Israel-Palestine conflict. They all have significance in the division of the territory and identity processes among Palestinians.

The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 resulted in the Treaty of Versailles, which formulated the responsibility of Germany in the First World War and the triumph of the Allied powers, particularly Great Britain, France and their colonies. The same period saw the birth of the League of Nations, which was the predecessor of the United Nations. This step was a decisive part of the necessary reflection around world peace that led to further peace resolutions established by the United Nations (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 72).

The King-Crane commission in 1919 was conducted by the United States in order to investigate the wishes of the communities living on the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. The United States showed a desire to study either the possibility of independence of these territories or some modalities of organization of a future mandate. The study area and interviews of local elites took place in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. The heads of commissioning, H. Churchill King and C. R. Crane, suggested in their report a limitation of Jewish immigration in Palestine (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 41). They favored the United States for a potential mandate as they saw their country as morally more suitable and having better diplomatic relationships with the local communities than the Imperial forces of Britain and France (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 41).

But these two last countries showed little interest to the results of the King-Crane commission as they were already determined to take over the power in the Middle East territories. During the San Remo Conference in April 1920, which determined the repartition of the mandates at the end of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain took over the responsibility of Palestine, Transjordan (modern-day Jordan) and Iraq, while the French took Syria and Lebanon. The decision was formalized in the Treaty of Sèvres, which Turkey refused to recognize, and this had important diplomatic consequences for the relations between the countries involved (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 41).

At the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab Revolt was led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca and supported by the British and French, who were the main Allies during the First World War. Turkey lost the territory of Transjordan, which would later become the Kingdom of Jordan. Britain and France, the main powers after the Sykes-Picot agreement, gave the responsibility of Transjordan to Abdullah I of Jordan. Transjordan was established in 1921 as a compromise between Britain and the Arab countries and as a way to use Britain for economic benefits. Britain agreed to leave the local leadership to Hussein's sons. King Abdullah, as the authority in Jordan, was believed to be the grandson of the prophet Muhammed. The role of Abdullah's alliances was crucial in rallying the tribes for support, as well as maintaining a nationalist strength in Jordan with the help of Britain (Wilson, 1987).

The total population of Transjordan was 225 000 in 1921, with 46% of the population living as nomadic. Tribalism was crucial in social alliances and formed a complex network characterized by land-ownership. Palestine and Transjordan maintained close relations mainly for strategic and economic purposes, as both territories were under the British Mandate. In Transjordan, the population was composed mainly of unskilled seasonal labor, while Palestine had a trained workforce that was needed for high positions in administrations (Wilson, 1987, p. 55).

The interwar period was characterized by a fear of Zionism and dispossession of land in Palestine. The spread of Arab nationalism increased at the same time as Jewish immigration in 1933, when Hitler was gaining power in Europe. Due to the Hitler's influence, Jews were more

and more seen as a threat for societies. The Holocaust, with the traumatizing consequences that we know, made between 40 and 50 million victims (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 81).

The growing Jewish immigration to Palestine, and conflicts on land, led in 1936 to a tentative of strike of Palestinians. King Abdullah tried to use his network to mediate relations between Palestine and Britain (Wilson, 1987). The Arab Revolt against Jewish immigration broke out in Palestine and was strongly repressed by the British. But Great Britain, also concerned with keeping its economic interests and diplomatic relations in the Middle East, proposed a compromise with the signature of the 1939 White Paper: Palestine would be under the protection of the British Empire for ten years, and Jewish immigration would be restricted. The Jewish community in Palestine rejected the decision (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 54). The formation of the Arab League and the Arab Liberation Army in Cairo in 1945 became an attempt to preserve Palestine's attachment to Arab countries, independence from the European Empires and an agreement of mutual protection in case of threat. The protocol did not succeed, as evidenced by the conflict that followed (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 80).

The Second World War weakened Abdullah's rivals in Palestine. Britain was too occupied in Europe to invest in military forces in the Middle East during that period. After the war, in May 1946, Transjordan gained independence from Britain and became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, recognized by the League of Nations as well as the Treaty of London that was implemented in June that year (Wilson, 1987).

The Jewish community, after the horrors of the war, found strong support from Allied powers, especially United States and Great Britain. These countries were tempted to bargain forgiveness for the atrocities of the war. Economic and political support from Western Europe reinforced Zionism, for example with the creation of the World Zionist Organization. The Zionist leader Ben Gurion benefited from growing support from the United States (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 82). The end of the Second World War found Britain in a poor financial situation and unable to maintain its colonial presence in the Middle East. The United States took over the control of the region (Wilson, 1987).

A context of increasing nationalism from both Palestinians and Jews led to considerable tensions between the two communities. The United Nations Special Committee for Palestine (UNSCOP), created in May 1947, suggested three things in its final report: the termination of the British Mandate; a progressive withdrawal of the British troops; and a partition plan of the territory between Jews and Arabs as two states independent from each other, with Jerusalem as an international entity (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). The United Nations General Assembly took the Resolution 181 in November 1947, which was the first one concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Arab institutions rejected the text, affirming that this went against self-determination of states stipulated in the United Nations principles. Fifty-six percent of Palestine was given to the Zionists and 44% to the Arabs. A civil war broke out right after the resolution was adopted, and the partition plan was never executed (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 83).

The Deir Yasin massacre occurred in April 1948 and resulted in 254 deaths, including those of children. The Zionist group Irgun acted in the context of the battle for Jerusalem, putting an end to the British Mandate and establishing the future Jewish rule of Palestine, which reinforced the Palestine-Israel conflict (Abu-Ghazaleh, 2010, p. 15).

May 1948 marks the withdrawal of British troops and the establishment of the Israel state, which invaded Palestine and took control of half the territory. Only 22% remained to Palestinians, as 300 000 Arabs fled the civil war, and neighboring countries such as Jordan and Lebanon were forced to intervene against Israel (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 98). The invasion of Arab armies in Israel marks the beginning of the first Arab-Israeli war. The period of 1947-48 is also known as *Al-Naqba* (from the Arabic, "catastrophe" or "disaster") (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 100).

2.3 KEY EVENTS AFTER THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

Nature of intervention	Date/Year	Purpose/goal	Major actors	Outcome/status
UN Resolution 194	11 December 1948	End of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war	UN members	Organization of a Conciliation Commission
Armistice agreement in Rhodes	24 February 1949	Cease-fire	Israel, Egypt	Egypt takes control of the Gaza strip, Jordan annexes the West Bank
UN Resolution 302	8 December 1949	Organization of assistance to Palestinian refugees	UN members	Creation of UNRWA
Declaration of Republic of Egypt	18 June 1953	Outcome of the Egyptian Revolution from 1952	M. Naguib and G. A. Nasser	M. Naguib first President, G. A. Nasser leader from 1954
Creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization	28 May 1964	Defense of Palestinian interests and land	Palestinian National Council	Anti-Zionist organization for the "Liberation of Palestine", Y. Arafat leader from 1969
UN Security Council Resolution 242	22 November 1967	As a result of the Six-Day War, June 1967	UN members	Egypt, Jordan and Israel accepted the resolution, PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) criticized the decision
UN Security Council Resolution 338	22 October 1973	As a result of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, calling for a withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai and Golan Heights	UN members	Creation of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), disengagement agreement of Israel and Syria in May 1974
UN General Assembly Resolution 3236	22 November 1974	PLO claim as representative institution for Palestine	UN members	Right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, PLO representative
Camp David Accords	17 September 1978	Peace process	Egyptian President A.E. Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister M.	1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty

			Begin, U.S. President Carter	
Oslo Accords I	13 September 1993	Outcome of the Madrid conference in 1991, peace process	PLO leader Y. Arafat, Israeli Prime minister Y.Rabin, U.S. President Clinton	Creation of Palestinian National Authority, mutual recognition of PLO and Israel
Oslo Accords II	24 September 1995	Establishment of Palestinian self- governance		Partition of occupied territories into 3 zones

Table 2: main events after the creation of the State of Israel

The creation of the Israeli State marks the beginning of Palestinian mass displacement. The invasion in July 1948 of Lydd and Ramle provoked the exodus of 50 000 to 60 000 civilians, which was one of the biggest forced displacements as a result of the Arab-Israeli war (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 101). However, these two cities were situated in the Arab area according to the UN partition plan. In December 1948, the UN adopted the Resolution 194, consisting of an attempt of Conciliation Commission but did not succeed (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 102). According to Harms (2008), the result of the conflict brought to question the ambivalent intervention of the United Nations. Indeed, the international community tried to find a solution but actually made things worse. The United Nations had precarious authority in the partition plan, which challenges the moral foundations of the Israeli state. The outcome of the conflict became a Palestinian refugee problem for the host countries (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 95).

The Kingdom of Jordan was opposed to the creation of the new state of Israel and became a rival for the rule of Palestine. In April 1950, Abdullah's army invaded the West Bank and East Jerusalem. West Bank Palestinians were granted Jordanian citizenship (Wilson, 1987). Many displaced Palestinians were torn between their desire to return and their desire to begin new lives in host countries. After the displacement flow of 1948, the situation of Palestinians started to embarrass the King, who was condemned by the Palestinian community for his inaction, especially for not defending an Arab state. The Kingdom found itself in a weakened position in Middle East and looked for a new alliance with Palestinians (Wilson, 1987).

In February 1949 Israel signed an armistice with Egypt, which marks the effective rejection of the UN partition plan. The remaining 22% of Palestinian territory was divided between Transjordan and Egypt. Egypt took control of Gaza, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan took the responsibility for the West Bank. The limit between Israel and West was called "Green Line" and is still recognized internationally today (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 99).

Many UN resolutions have been taken since then, coming both from the General Assembly and the Security Council. Resolution 302 of December 1949 establishes the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine (UNRWA), whose mission is to provide and coordinate relief aid for Palestinian refugees and requests the UN members to contribute to funding (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 395).

King Abdullah of Jordan, during his reign from 1921, tried to establish a partnership with Israel, which ended when a Palestinian nationalist assassinated him in July 1951 during a visit to Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 103). This event strongly influenced the Abdullah's successor, King Hussein, in his politics, leading him to seek peace with neighboring countries and establish one of the most liberalist politics in the Middle East. The Jordanian Constitution in its latest version was adopted in June 1952 (Wilson, 1987).

Growing tensions between Britain and Egypt had consequences on the Israel-Palestine conflict. At the end of the Second World War, Britain was weakened and could not maintain military presence in Egypt, one of its colonies, but still wanted control of the Suez Canal area for economic purposes. In 1954, following the 1952 coup with G. Abdel Nasser, who acted as the head of the revolution, Britain and Egypt negotiated a withdrawal of the British troops. However, the French and the British invaded Egypt again in 1956. As a result of the Suez Canal crisis, a coalition between France, Britain and Israel invaded the Gaza strip and the Sinai in October 1956. International pressure and demands for peace agreement from the United Nations forced Israel to withdraw its troops (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 118).

In 1959, the charismatic Y. Arafat founded the militant group Al-Fatah in Syria. In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed and gained power in the Arab League,

particularly with Arafat as its leader from 1969. The PLO was later strongly criticized in Jordan for its guerrilla and terrorist activities (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 167).

Given the threats of conflict coming, Jordan signed a defense agreement with Egypt in May 1967. In June 1967, the Six-Days War broke out, and Israeli troops invaded Gaza and the West Bank. Jordan had already signed a pact of alliance with Egypt, which means that the country was obliged to attack Israel (Wilson, 1987). As a result, Israel took control of 1.1 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 111). This episode saw little intervention from the United States, who was too occupied at that time with the war in Vietnam (Wilson, 1987).

The UN Resolution 242 of November 1967 appeared in response to the Six-Day war. The document called for a "termination of all claims or states of belligerency" and a withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories (UN Resolution 242, art 1.). The text is also referred as "land for peace," in giving back land to Palestinians in order to make peace (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 152). This expression highlights a strong symbolic representation of identity for Palestinians, as we will see later.

In March 1968, the Israeli troops initiated the Battle of Al Karameh in the Jordanian village, Karameh, near the Allenby Bridge. Palestinian resistance organization became a threat for the Hashemite kingdom. PLO, with Y. Arafat at its head, was successful and obtained supported from neighboring Arab countries. Palestinian resistance organizations became more and more powerful on the Jordanian territory and were said to represent a state within a state. King Hussein became aware of the threat and pressures from Israel to stop and disarm such organizations, mainly in refugee camps. In addition, Palestinians were critical against the Hashemite regime for its support to the Israel state in 1948 and attempt to destroy Palestinian resistance movement during the 1950s (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 157).

The civil war broke out in Jordan in September 1970, also known as Black September: a group of Palestinian resisters hijacked three airplanes and made them explode in Amman, the capital of Jordan, which provoked bloody reprisals, particularly in refugee camps. This led to the

Palestinian-Jordanian War between PLO and Jordan under the rule of King Hussein. A terrorist group took the name Black September and assassinated the Jordanian Prime Minister W. Tell in November 1971 in Cairo. King Hussein managed to expel PLO from Jordan with the support of Israel; the organization moved to Lebanon (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 161).

In October 1973, as a result of the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War broke out in the Golan Heights between Israel and a coalition of Syria and Egypt. The Arabs attacked Israel by surprise during Yom Kippur, the holiest day for Jewish people, which was meant as a strong symbol. The UN Resolution 338 from October 1973 called for a cease-fire between the states (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 170).

The UN Resolution 3236 from November 1974 formalized the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people (UN Resolution 3236, art. 1). This was also the first time that UN officially received PLO as a representative institution for Palestine and took its statements in consideration in the negotiations about the "question of Palestine". This marked an important step for Palestine as the territory became considered as separated from Israel in negotiations (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 194). The same resolution also reaffirmed the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees and the restitution of properties and land taken by Israel (UN Resolution 3236, art. 2). Since this was impossible for the moment, the displaced populations should have received compensation (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 322). This document is very particular due to its lack of similarity to international law, which has been very controversial among politicians (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 322).

The escalating violence during the 1970s led to the 1975 civil war in Lebanon that broke out initially between Maronite militias and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), joined by PLO. Syria was afraid of what had happened in Jordan with PLO and the risk that PLO would widen and operate independently in Syria after a possible Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The troops of the Syrian President H. al-Assad then attacked PLO in support of the existing Lebanese government. In October 1976, the Arab League established a cease-fire between the militias (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 182).

The Camp David Accords were signed in September 1978 between the Egyptian President A. El Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister M. Begin, in presence of the American President J. Carter in Washington. An Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was established in 1979 as a result of the accords (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 179).

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and called the operation "Peace for Galilee." The goal was to eliminate PLO and support the existing Lebanese government. Israel bombarded Beirut and caused thousands of civilian victims. A multinational peacekeeping force, represented by United States, France and Italy, organized the evacuation of PLO, which was dispersed to other countries (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 210).

The first *Intifada*, or Palestinian uprising, took place in December 1987, started with the killing of four Palestinians by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Jabalia refugee camp in the Gaza strip. This led to a wave of strikes and boycotts as well as episodes of violence with the throwing of stones and homemade explosives in the occupied territories. Many Palestinians participating were children, youngsters and civilians, leading the international community to condemn IDF for using military force on such vulnerable populations (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 220).

In August 1990, Iraq, with S. Hussein at its head, invaded Kuwait. The Gulf War broke out. Oil reserves were the main factor and challenge in order to keep the prices low (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 228). Many Palestinian workers were forced to leave. United States and other Western countries organized a massive trade embargo against Iraq and deployed heavy military force, which made thousands of civilians into victims. This marked also the end of the pan-Arab unity and another episode of unrest in the Middle East (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010). The Palestinians became progressively reduced to a "refugee problem" for the international community. The conflict emerged as not only a local problem, but also rather a global question that involves many international institutions (Harms & Ferry, 2008, p. 115).

The peace process started with the Madrid conference in 1991, followed by the Oslo Accords, which were signed in September 1993. This established mutual recognition between Israel and PLO, a withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied territories, and a self-government

arrangement. The Palestinian National Authority replaced PLO for official functions and negotiations (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 253). Palestinians and Israeli, however, continued to negotiate the implementation of the Oslo Accords. Oslo II Accords (the Taba Accords) were signed in September 1995, dividing the West Bank into three areas, A, B and C, differently controlled by IDF. But the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in November 1995 by an Israeli extremist, greatly disrupting the peace process (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 272).



Figure 3: Oslo II Accords (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 2007)

The unsuccessful Oslo Accords and negotiations led to a second *Intifada* in September 2000 until 2005, when Israel withdrew its settlements and military troops from the Gaza strip while still strictly controlling movements of people and goods (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 323).

Since 2006, the Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, have been rival powers in Palestinian territories, and their methods are highly controversial. Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007, after violent factional gun battles. The tensions and inability to share the power resulted in the collapse of the Palestinian unity government. The American Bush administration initiated the Annapolis Conference in November 2007. Most of the G8 countries attended, as they were concerned by the increasing influence of Iran in the Arab region (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 379). The interactions between international actors in the conflict remain problematic.

Today, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against products from occupied territories challenges international actors in order to increase economic pressure on the State of Israel. An agreement in July 2005 between Palestinian civil society organizations established this non-violent action in order to weaken the Israeli economy in occupied territories and force Israel to a peace process (Rigby, 2010, p. 71).

2.4 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN

There are various legal frameworks within which Palestinian refugees' rights can be discerned. Many are embedded within the Jordanian constitution and also drawn from international conventions. In addition, the origin and differences in implementation by humanitarian organizations such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinians (UNRWA) play a key role with regard to provision of humanitarian assistance. This legal framework is composed of different rights and provisions that the Jordanian constitution offers in the case of the Palestinian refugees. Changes that have occurred in the Jordanian law during different periods have affected the life conditions of Palestinian residents.

2.4.1 THE JORDANIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Jordanian constitution makes a provision of protection against extradition of political asylum seekers. However, the law does not mention refugees, and Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention related to the status of refugees, even if Jordan is one of the most frequented host countries for refugees and asylum seekers (Saliba, 2016).

The Jordanian citizenship law of 1928 was amended and replaced by a new document in 1954, also recognized by the Constitution signed in 1952. In this context, Jordan had annexed the West Bank and given Jordanian citizenship to West Bank Palestinians (Ramahi, 2015, p. 6). As a result, the Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality grants Jordanian nationality to persons of Palestinian origin who resided in the Kingdom between December 1949 and February 1954 (Saliba, 2016).

The unification of the West Bank and East Bank posed legal challenges. Different legal systems had to merge together: one was inherited from the Ottoman Empire in the East bank (previously Transjordan), while the other came from a legacy of the British Mandate in the West Bank. The annexation of the West Bank also questioned the necessary loyalty of Palestinians to the King of Jordan and the possibility of contestation or resistance movements against the government (Ramahi, 2015).

The Jordanian Constitution presents important challenges related to the granting of citizenship for Palestinians and their administrative status (Sherab, 2015). Jordan is a host country for the majority of Palestinian refugees, with over 2 million registered (UNRWA, 2016), which poses major challenges.

Palestinian refugees, who arrived from 1948 until 1954, are considered Jordanian citizens and granted a national ID number. They theoretically have a right to education, health care, property ownership and state protection like any other Jordanian citizen. In reality, the situation is more challenging for them, and it is common that civil rights are often denied (Sherab, 2015).

The Jordanian citizenship depends of date of entry and most recent place of residence from which refugees have fled. In 1948, approximately 440 000 Palestinians from the West Bank arrived in

Jordan. They were offered full citizenship, which is unusual compared to other international laws. This also differs from other host countries that justify residency permit as preserving Palestinian identity and maintaining Israel's responsibility in the situation (Sherab, 2015).

In 1983, the Jordanian government introduced a color code system of travel documents for Palestinians. Jordanians citizens from the West Bank got a green card, while the ones living along the Jordanian borders got a yellow card. They were granted temporary documents to renew every 2 years, which was extended to 5 years in 1995. This system is similar to the blue cards of Gazan refugees, but this color system is not stipulated in the citizenship law and should not be a basis for citizenship regulations (Sherab, 2015). Therefore, this decision is highly controversial. The procedure was supposed to facilitate the Allenby Bridge crossing between the West Bank and Jordan as well as control movements of people and goods at that strategic point. This would have allowed authorities to be sure that West Bankers remain in West Bank (Sherab, 2015).

A new modality of citizenship granting appeared after 1988 as a disengagement of the Jordanian government towards Palestinians, marking a turn for Palestine migration law. In 1988, King Hussein declared in a speech that given the increasing authority of PLO as representative of the Palestinian people, Jordan would give up the administrative control of refugees living in the West Bank. As a result, 1.5 million Palestinians-Jordanians became suddenly stateless, as they had not renewed their Israeli passports (Sherab, 2015).

Many NGOs and scholars consider that the citizenship revocation is an anomaly in opposition to both Jordanian and international laws, particularly in contravention of the Jordanian Constitution, as we saw previously. This questions the legality of this decision (Sherab, 2015).

During mid-2000, a campaign of nationality revocation, involving several organizations working for citizen rights, observed arbitrary revocation cases. Several reported cases of yellow cards replaced arbitrarily with green cards without consultation. There are significant impacts to access to resources, such as primary and secondary education, university higher cost for non-Jordanians, and poor access to employment. Non-Jordanians are not allowed to work in public services. They are restricted to working in organized professions such as law or engineering. They do not have

the possibility to own property, such as a car, or to make investments. Discrimination is pervasive concerning employment in Jordan. In 1996, only 10% of Palestinians were employed in public services, among the 35 000 employees in total (Sherab, 2015).

Refugees live in constant fear of losing their nationality, which leads to the extreme vulnerability of livelihoods. In addition, loss of nationality not directly reported to the people involved, but rather they realize it when they contact a governmental service for another reason. To address this, a petition movement started in 2010. In 2012, 3400 petitions were sent to the Jordanian government for abusive removal of citizenship (Sherab, 2015).

In addition, it is very difficult to know how many citizenship revocations have been executed in Jordan. The numbers are kept secret by the government. Only some NGOs, such as the Human Rights Watch (with its report in January 2010), have studied the situation, but the collected numbers are not based on official sources. Human Rights Watch and the Middle East Monitor (MEMO) estimate that between 2004 and 2008, 2700 persons have seen their nationality withdrawn due to the regulation of disengagement in 1988. This number is still growing today (Ramahi, 2015, p. 9).

The supposed equality of opportunities for all citizens of Jordan stipulated in the 1954 law on nationality appears as debatable. This affirmation is mainly due to the different modifications of the status of Palestinian refugees from 1948 until today.

2.4.2 STATELESSNESS AND INEQUALITY, THE CASE OF GAZANS AND SYRIANS-PALESTINIANS

The case of Gaza refugees is different from West Bankers but it also poses challenges. Unlike refugees from the West Bank, those arriving from Gaza in 1967 were never granted citizenship. They obtained a temporary residence even if they had lived in Jordan for 5 decades, and today there are still considered non-nationals (Sherab, 2015).

Gazans and their descendants who arrived after 1967 fall outside the UNRWA assistance, since they fled after 1948 and do not meet the UNRWA's definition of a "Palestinian refugee." Cards are basis for residency but not nationality; they serve only as travel documents. Gazans do not

have a national number, which means that they have no access to public services in Jordan. In case they need health care, they must pay the same fees as foreigners or non-insured Jordanians. They pay more than Jordanian citizens for universities, which are highly competitive and the granting of seats dependent of grades at high schools. Additionally, Gazans are not allowed to work in public services. All these restrictions challenge political freedom of expression: curtailment of rights is common in case of political participation or membership in Islamic groups (Sherab, 2015).

The status of Palestinians-Syrians is particularly challenging. In 2011, as a result of the Syrian conflict, 600 000 Syrians arrived seeking asylum in Jordan, with among them 145 000 refugees of Palestinian origin (Sherab, 2015).

Syrians-Palestinians today are not permitted to enter Jordan, and those who are in Jordan illegally risk to being deported; they live in fear of being arrested. Most of them are detained in Cyber City Refugee Camp in Northern Jordan, and many have been so since 2012. Restriction of movement is imposed on them, as they can only leave the camp to return to Syria (Sherab, 2015).

2.4.3 ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES

In this context, international humanitarian agencies such as the United Nations have a crucial role in relief aid and assistance. UNRWA and UNHCR are two organizations within the United Nations that were established in different circumstances and present different modalities of implementation towards refugees.

The League of Nations, an international institution created in January 1920 during the Paris Peace Conference, was replaced by the United Nations. The Declaration of the United Nations was signed on 1 January 1942 and initiated by the United States, URSS and China, which had declared war to Germany. These countries were eager to preserve fundamental human rights and freedom of expression as ground principles. Twenty-six signatory countries followed them. The declaration became officially the United Nations Charter, implemented after the San Francisco Conference in October 1945 (UN Declaration, 1942).

UNHCR was created as a result of the global conflicts and extreme vulnerability of refugees. The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was established at the issue of the Geneva conference in July 1951. The convention defines the term "refugee" and describes legal obligations towards refugee populations (Castle et al., 2014, p. 222).

In humanist terms, every citizen of a country should have the right to protection from its government. In the case that a state is unable to protect its citizens due to the political situation, the Refugee Convention engages the signatory countries to protect the individuals arriving in their territories. A definition of the refugee status is provided in the 1951 United Nations Convention, which is the main legal instrument in terms of refugee assistance. A refugee is a person who crossed an international border due to "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" and seeks for protection from a host country (UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, art.1, paragraph 2). Legal obligations are imposed to host countries in terms of relief aid and housing.

An important aspect to notice is that Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 United Nations Convention, and therefore does not have a proper refugee law. The Jordanian government has its own policy in contravention with international laws, which holds a contrary position towards the international legal framework concerning refugee assistance (Sherab, 2015). As we saw previously, the provisions of the Jordanian policy contravene international law. According to the Universal Declaration of Human rights of 1948, article 15, "everybody has a right to nationality". Jordan recognizes this right but does not specify in which conditions it can be obtained (UN General Assembly, 1948). Changes that had occurred in the domestic legal system in Jordan had a particular impact that affected the protection of civil rights of Palestinians.

The creation of UNRWA in 1949 responded to a main mission: to provide relief aid and coordinate services related. This organization provides humanitarian assistance in the West Bank, Gaza and the neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Syria and Jordan (UNRWA, 2016).

UNRWA was initially conceived as a temporary measure before a peace agreement would be signed, in the belief that Palestinians would be able to return home. However, in 1950, UN adopted a politics of permanent resettlement, different from relief aid. In 1982, UNRWA started to extend the eligibility to the Palestinian refugee status to all descendants of the 1948 and 1967 exoduses. Palestinian refugees and their descendants now number 5 million in the UNRWA area of intervention, posing a major dilemma in terms of budget and prioritization of the needs (Rosen, 2012, p. 3).

UNRWA proposes another definition of a Palestinian refugee: a person who fled Palestine as a result of the 1948 conflict with Israel (UNRWA, 2016). Descendants of these refugees are also included in the definition, even if they obtained a citizenship in another host country. This goes against the 1951 refugee convention established through UNHCR (Rosen, 2012, p. 3).

Controversially, UNRWA represents a rather different international framework from that established through UNHCR, as it does not provide international protection. Palestinian refugees have been voluntarily excluded from the UN Convention, because UNRWA was created especially for those who responded to the criteria as Palestinian refugees (Rosen, 2012).

UNHCR works at eliminating the refugee status and helping individuals to improve their livelihoods, such as becoming self-sufficient, in host countries. UNRWA, by voluntarily including descendants of Palestinians in their refugee category, seems to perpetuate the vulnerability of the refugee status by considering them as a source of conflict (Rosen, 2012, p. 5).

A considerable gap exists between UNRWA and UNHCR in terms of international protection and modalities of assistance, which poses major dilemmas in the implementation of missions. There are overlapping elements that represent important challenges in the case of Palestinian refugees. They are excluded from the 1951 Convention and UNCHR's assistance, since they are supposed to receive assistance from UNRWA, in order to avoid an overlap of benefits. But UNHCR provides international protection to refugees, while UNRWA and Palestinian refugees are still dependent on domestic legal systems in host/neighboring countries (Rosen, 2012).

Given this context, categorizing refugees according to origin and date of arrival constitutes a major dilemma. The situation makes the UNRWA legal framework controversial and questions its legitimacy according to international laws. The political and social context highlights crucial consequences for identity construction among Palestinian refugees (Sherab, 2015).

I have explored in this chapter the main elements of the social and political background that led to the Israel-Palestine conflict. I gave an overall insight to the historical elements related to the question of Palestinian culture and identity, especially after 1948, the year of the creation of the Israeli State. I discussed the contribution of a legal framework, particularly the implication of humanitarian agencies such as UNRWA and UNHCR. A theoretical framework will now be provided in order to understand and formalize social processes involved in cultural practices, place and identity construction among Palestinian refugees.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMWORK

In this chapter, I will present some theoretical approaches that will help explain the identity construction phenomenon among Palestinian refugees. I will introduce first some elements from social and cultural geography related to the concept of identity, then some definitions of the concepts of cultural practices, identity and diaspora.

3.1 APPROCHES FROM SOCIAL AND CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY

The relation between the concepts of people and place has long been a central question in human geography. The field of social and cultural geography shows a particular interest to the people-place nexus. Scholars in this discipline have attempted to define the modalities of relations between society and space. Through the term "modalities", I refer to social processes involved in the connection between concepts. Social geography intends to formalize a theorization of social life, to understand the organization of the world. Social geographers claim "social differences are spatially organized" (Del Casino, 2009, p. 20). According to the geographer, V. J. Del Casino, places are representative of a social order through practices in social arenas. Places are greatly characterized by social identities (Del Casino, 2009).

The field of social sciences and geography appeared during the 20th century and evolved through time. The Critical Social Theory, which appeared from the 1930s in Germany, is presented as a criticism of social processes, challenging social norms and cultural practices. This approach denounces social and economic inequalities as well as power relations in society. The Critical Social Theory is presented as a political practice in places (Del Casino, 2009, p. 20).

Human geography saw the emergence of urban ecology, which is an understanding of the interactions between social groups in urban areas (Del Casino, 2009, p. 36). The movement of the Chicago School in United States from the 1920s-30s until after the Second World War inspired a social ecology approach (Del Casino, 2009, p. 36). This perspective was characterized by environmental determinism, which states that behaviors of individuals are fixed and determined

by the places where they live (Del Casino, 2009, p.16). Several scholars, such as R.D. Mckenzie, E. Burgess and R.E. Park in the book, *The City* (1925), focused their study on the geographical agency of minority groups from different social backgrounds in American cities. The urban ecology approach was later criticized for its reductionism and negation of complex interactions between social groups (Del Casino, 2009, p. 34).

The discipline of social geography involved different approaches from its inception, until a "cultural turn" during the 1980s when it became focused on poststructuralism. Interest in the relation between people and place is particularly present in the poststructuralist approach, with special attention given to the structure-agency perspective, power relations and representation of human meaning in behaviors. Poststructuralist scholars conceptualize places as performance or representations, which leads to interactions and potential inequalities between social groups. Spaces are both revealing and challenging identities. They are culturally constructed through language, discourses and representations (Del Casino, 2009, p. 31).

Social geography serves as an analysis of how social categories influence everyday practice in societies. Space is representative of human meaning, which involves social differences and inequalities. This may be analyzed at both a local and global level, according to different scales (Del Casino, 2009, p. 28). In the case of Palestinian refugees, living space in camps emphasized mechanisms of exclusion of and discrimination against this population.

According to the American geographer C. Sauer (1925), place may be understood as a cultural landscape, or a representation of identity in public places (Del Casino, 2009, p. 22). People construct social spaces through interactions with cultural landscape, both material and symbolic. This means that individuals have different experiences of place. The cultural landscape represents places as a social and symbolic construct and as a result of interactions between people and places. Social inequalities and power relations are also represented through cultural landscapes. Social inequalities may characterize the geographical organization of ethnic neighborhoods. This is the case of occupied Palestinian territories, for example. The separation wall became a symbol of political expression through street art. Sauer shows that cultural landscapes are performances of multiple social identities (Del Casino, 2009, p. 22).

The British-American geographer J. Agnew (1987) proposes the concept of place according to three dimensions: location, locale and sense of place. Location is understood as a social environment involving "natural" or quantifiable factors in an economic market. Locale represents place as a meeting point for social interactions between individuals. Sense of place involves a more complex process of attachment to places, through individual experiences and memories that give meaning to these places (Anderson, 2010, p. 53). This may explain a certain need of social groups to defend places and identity related to these places, as it is the case of Palestinians.

According to the American geographer T. Cresswell (2015), space is shaped by the social norms of behavior that are different between social groups (p. 42). Indeed, processes of inclusion and exclusion from social groups are constantly dynamic. This involves feelings of being "in place" or "out of place", as Cresswell describes. Places are the site of dynamics in social life between individuals (Cresswell, 2015, p. 42). The process of gentrification, for example, has an impact on geographical aspects of identity in social groups. In this context, narratives of prejudice and segregation may constitute a part of group identities. A reflection from scholars and engagement on the otherness is then necessary in social geography (Valentine, 2008, p. 328).

Human geographers have been interested in resistance movements and the field of identity politics from the beginning of the 1990s. Social movements over identity led to the emergence of spaces of resistance as a part of the construction of places. Identity politics embrace strategic identities in order to gather individuals around a cause and support political purposes (Panelli, 2004, p. 162). Control over land is a crucial issue that may lead to tensions between social groups. Each social group interprets belonging to places and legitimate access to these places according to constructed identities. This may generate conflicts, contestations of place and resistance movements (Massey & Jess, 1995). This is the case of Holy sites in Jerusalem controlled by the Israeli army, which is highly controversial and the subject of tensions between Muslim and Jewish communities.

G. Valentine highlights that when people feel uncomfortable with the unknown, they elaborate strategies in order to cope with social difference (2008, p. 323). Places are cultural products of different social groups that may discriminate others. Places are characterized by social

differences, such as gender, class or ethnicity. This is the result of what the geographer D. Massey defines as "social othering" (Massey & Jess, 1995, p. 238). In this context, the concept of "cosmopolitan turn" offers a new modality of interactions between social groups and ethnic minorities. This needs a deconstruction of social processes. Space and identity are socially constructed and interact together; they are performances in the social arena (Valentine, 2008, p. 329).

Several concepts need to be explained in order to provide a further analysis. We will see that the concept of cultural practices may be linked to identity and place, which also involve the notions of belonging and sense of place. The concept of diaspora related to the Palestinian population will also be explained.

We can see that the relation between people and place may involve social aspects such as culture in communities. Understanding these concepts will allow us to explore the interactions between place and identity in the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. In the following, I will present some key elements.

3.2 PLACE, SENSE OF PLACE AND BELONGING

3.2.1 CONTESTED SPACES AND PLACES

I refer to contested places as an opposition between social groups over occupation and use of a territory. According to Cresswell (1996), space is a control tool from the dominant social groups upon the others. A distinction between "proper" social groups, who respect social norms of behavior, and "transgressive" groups or considered as trespassing properties, highlight the existence of contested places and symbolic resistance (Cresswell, 1996, p. 164). Places serve to legitimize social behaviors and induce contestation movements that challenge social rules. Contested places highlight the possibility of social change (Cresswell, 1996, p 176). In the case of Palestine, Israelis and Palestinians are in conflict over the legitimacy of presence on the territory, particularly in sacred space such as the holy sites of Jerusalem, highly disputed for their symbolic power.

3.2.2 ATTACHMENT TO PLACES

The concept of place allows a multitude of interpretations in the field of human geography. Place may be understood as named localities in its strictest meaning, related to individuals' environment. But discussions among scholars emerged in several academic fields from the 1960s and highlighted the relation between people and their environment. This debate became more and more the object of critical analysis among academics (Relph, 2002).

Experiences of places seem subjective but also give meaning for certain social groups. The feeling of a sense of home is an example. This process is associated with belonging or attachment to places, which is often collectively experienced in communities. Understanding of place shows an ambivalence of feelings: home can be experienced as secure and cozy, but also as alienating, oppressing or as a source of distress (Relph, 2002, p. 909). This is the case, for example, in Palestinian refugee camps.

Sense of place may be understood as a sense of responsibility or awareness of place, or as different attitudes and behaviors from individuals towards their environment. This is differently perceived according to social differences such as gender, class or ethnicity, and the result of personal meanings (Relph, 2002, p. 909).

With the current growing phenomenon of globalization and global migration, some may say that places are losing their characteristics. In migration studies and with the influence of globalization, places are increasingly interconnected and therefore have "dislocating effects" (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p. 8). Places may lead to the possible disappearance of distinctiveness towards a "global village," due to increasing mixing of people, cultures and goods. This questions certain modalities of interactions between communities and requires a redefinition of places according to the current context (Massey & Jess, 1995).

3.2.3 BOUNDARIES AND TERRITORY

The notion of boundaries between places constitutes a part of the definition of the concept. According to Robins and Giddens, spatial movement within places included borders and boundaries. Due to the increasing globalization and movements of people today, these boundaries

are not so clearly defining places and homes. Blurred boundaries, both physical and in collective imaginations, constitute new challenges in definitions of places and sense of place as interlinked (Massey & Jess, 1995). The erosion of boundaries and the end of conventional nation-states allow the possibility to conceptualize places as imagined, virtual and constructed from a distance in different settings (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p. 9). This is the case of Palestinians imagined "homeland".

The representation of territory depends of a multitude of factors, such as social differences in different locations. This requires a process of "deterritorialization," necessary to constitute a new theoretical framework adapted to contemporary problematics (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p. 20). These different understandings highlight a characteristic of the concept: it is essential to reconceptualize the meaning of people and place, and furthermore the link between place and society (Del Casino, 2009).

3.3 CULTURAL PRACTICES

The concept of culture is particularly difficult to define, and it evolved through time according to different ideologies in history. From the end of the 18th century, culture was understood as an attribute at birth, which categorized people between social classes. Culture was seen as way of life in Western European societies, in opposition to colonized countries, considered as culturally inferior (Schech & Haggis, 2000, p. 18).

With the emergence of Darwin's theory of human evolution at the end of the 19th century, culture was understood as a stage of development in civilizations from a "primitive" to a "modern" stage, which made distinctions between Western European countries and colonized countries belonging to the European colonial empires at that period. This highlights the idea that some lifestyles at that time were recognized as cultures and some were not (Schech & Haggis, 2000, p. 18).

At the beginning of the 20th century, social sciences emerged, particularly the field of anthropology. Scholars were especially interested in meaning among social groups, according to the functionalist approach, mainly from the French sociologist E. Durkheim. Functionalist

scholars in anthropology see social structures as a complex system and emphasize the functions of social practices in building links between the individuals (Schech & Haggis, 2000, p. 20-21).

Culture is seen as a process of social development, which includes the idea of a hierarchy between societies. This coincides with the colonization period and the imperialism of European Western countries in colonies (Schech & Haggis, 2000).

Cultural practices may be understood as an application of culture in everyday life and as social practices that produce meaning, such as dressing, food habits, language or religion. This conception is mainly supported by the structuralist approach. Cultural expression is represented through symbols and rituals in the everyday practice. Structuralist scholars such as the French anthropologist C. Levi-Strauss, from the first half of the 20th century, focus on the power of language and communication, as a common set of meanings (Schech & Haggis, 2000, p. 22).

The structuralist vision of cultural practices has later been criticized for its restrictive understanding of social groups. Scholars may have a romanticized vision of traditionalism and the othering, whereby they consider the “other” to be exotic. This highlights a Western point of view, which questions authenticity of research methods in social sciences and the power relations involved (Schech & Haggis, 2000, p. 22).

Criticism appeared also with the concept of Orientalism from the Palestinian-American author E.Said (1991). Said formalized a criticism of the Western representation of the Orient. He states that the Western vision of cultural practices in the Middle East is understood through the prism of an imperialist hegemony. This involves power relations and cultural domination of the Imperial colonizers in colonized countries, such as Jordan and Palestine. Orientalism reveals a cultural hegemony and inequalities between civilizations. Social groups categorize cultures according to their own systems of thought (Said, 1991).

This theory may explain how the discourse about Israel and Palestine has been maintained and sustained, which affects the situation of Palestinian refugees. In the case of my study, the Western vision of the Israel-Palestine conflict may influence the academic research and my

understanding of the situation. Being aware of this phenomenon is essential in order to reflect on the objectivity of my research and more generally in migration studies.

In migration studies, a common conception that people "take" their culture "with them" when they migrate involves the presumption of distinct cultures. Modern means of communication and information today involve new forms of community sharing, transnational societies and a homogenization of culture at global level. This phenomenon may appear as a threat for cultural distinctiveness. But both cultural practices and places are more complex and interconnected. It is crucial to understand the effects of colonialism, globalization and capitalist economy in the Western world on cultural practices, in order to induce social change. The concept of space, as it links to culture, needs to be reterritorialized (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992).

Cultural practices are understood according to complex approaches. These different conceptions highlight that cultural practices are not linear or objective but are the result of social processes that involve power relations between social groups. This may have consequences on modalities of identity construction among social groups.

3.4 THE IDENTITY CONCEPT

Scholars struggle to agree on a precise definition of the concept of identity. This term is increasingly used but remains an unclear topic of discussion among human geographers. Some of them refer to identity as a "conception of a self-sustaining entity" that focuses on individualism (Gregory et al., 2009, p. 364). Identity induces dynamic social interactions, as a binary individual-society, but is also the object of conflicts due to social differences such as gender, ethnicity or class, that are hardly accepted in some contexts. Identity must be understood in a whole context of social and cultural diversity (Gregory et al., 2009, p. 365). The binary aspect of individual-society regarding identity has been challenged through time. Identity may be understood according to different dimensions: individual, social or group-based, national or ethnic.

Many scholars agree that the origin of the concept comes from the 17th century during the Enlightenment period. Identity focused on individualism rather than collective traditions and used to valorize self-achievement. This concept of identity is still present today (Gregory et al., 2009). The French philosopher M. Foucault proposes an approach to identity related to discourses and narratives (Panelli, 2004, p. 165). This involves an understanding of identity as an unfixed process associated to multiple contexts and subject positions. Identity involves places and their meanings for social groups. The concept supposes boundaries between the "self" and the others. This social process is fundamentally performed in places through language, and embodied in the social arena (Gregory et al., 2009, p. 365).

According to R. Panelli, identity refers to power relations, social resistance and active political engagement in places. Identity involves notions of self and is shaped by geographical contexts. This is not a fixed state but a social process constructed through discourses. Identity is performed and embodied through cultural practices in everyday life. Language is a mean of communication, through which identity is practiced (Panelli, 2004).

That is why the identity concept involves multiple and unfixed definitions. Conceptions of identity vary according to different subject positions in society. These modalities of human meanings are constantly challenged and re-negotiated. They contribute to constructing boundaries between self and the others (Panelli, 2004).

The practice of identity processes in contested places highlights the development of identity politics. They include social movements aimed at promoting contested identities as strategic ways to mobilize identity in places. Identity embraces a multitude of symbols that are meaningful for political purposes. Social struggle over identity contributes to constructing space and linking people to places they belong to (Valentine, 2008).

The concept of identity requires an analysis of social relations within group processes. Identity may emerge from conflicts between social groups or resistance movements. Social differences and divisions of gender, class, or race may be at the origin of these movements over particular identities. Politics of identity emerge from these tensions. Values, such as the importance of

homeland or nation, are predominant and involve strategies of resistance. Identity formation is clearly place-based and refers to a self-recognition and belonging with others. Identities are multiple and overlapping among social groups (Valentine, 2008).

3.5 THE DISPORA CONCEPT

The Swedish social scientist H. L. Schulz defines a diaspora as a "group of people that has been dispersed or has expanded to at least two countries of the world" (Schulz, 2003, p. 9). The formation of communities outside origin countries is often due to traumatic events that induce forced displacements. Diasporas embrace a transnational dimension, between home countries and host countries. Members of diasporas may have ambiguous relations with host countries.

The time aspect has much to say in the development of diasporas around the world. There has been a shift in its definition, from a geographic displacement, as a rooted aspect, to a social organization or even a transnational community. The conception of diaspora changed from the consideration of physical aspects to a social and transnational dimension (Schulz, 2003, p. 9).

It is particularly the lack of territory that defines a diaspora. That is the case of stateless Palestinians. Diaspora associated with space is a key component of national identities. Processes of marginalization and stigmatization by the othering of communities contribute to the formation of diaspora and national identities. In the special case of Palestinian national identity, the Palestinian diaspora is particular about having developed in exile (Schulz, 2003, p. 10).

Scholars have focused more and more on transnational approaches during these last few decades. Some see a link between social processes in origin and host countries through the phenomenon of diasporas. Members of diasporas may be redefined as "transmigrants", which questions the emergence of a new definition of migration and mobility. Diasporas reveal complex identity processes through transnational networks (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002, p. 15).

A particular characteristic of diasporas is that even if the migrants will not return to their origin countries, they participate in national development prospects and contribute to the

implementation of political negotiations and policies. They are often active and politically engaged in their causes, as it is the case for Palestinians. The role of diasporas is then crucial in the identity process of migrants outside of their origin countries (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002).

The role of diasporas in conflict areas is then decisive in participation to economic development and negotiations with diplomatic authorities in origin countries. Members of diasporas may have more resources to mobilize authorities and create social movements that encourage identity expression in conflict areas (Van Hear, 2011). This is the case of Palestinian refugees, as we will see later.

The context of complex emergencies may affect identity through the intervention of multiple actors. The implementation of humanitarian aid may be seen as a resource, an asset or a handicap for some groups of migrants. The identity concept questions the phenomenon of diaspora, which is suitable for the study of Palestinian refugees. Identities in diasporas require reflection on social processes and their consequences on livelihoods at a local level.

The diaspora concept is particularly relevant in migration studies and related to the identity concept. In pre-modern societies, identity was decided at birth through the social position of parents. Identity construction is today more flexible and constitutes an individual responsibility, as it is both a "freedom and burden" (Easthope, 2009, p. 65). The presumption of dislocated identities may affect identity construction, but hybrid identities appear in a context of high mobility. Attachment to places contributes to the shaping of identities through new forms of attachment. Identity is dynamic, constructed through power relations and offering the freedom for one to re-define oneself. This phenomenon is linked both to places and to mobility, through a dialectic characterized by both fixity and movement (Easthope, 2009, p. 76). Diasporas play a major role in new conceptualizations of culture, place and identity. Given this context, the diaspora concept has a crucial role in identity formation among social groups.

3.6 PLACE AND IDENTITY

Scholars have demonstrated that identity construction is connected with the concept of place. People identify to places as a part of their personality and identity, which are often collectively experienced. This is the case, for example, of homesickness (Relph, 2002).

The significance of place says a lot about personalities and behaviors, and it constitutes a central part of identities. Emotions about places are linked to modalities of identity construction. People may identify with places that produce meaning for them (Massey & Jess, 1995).

Sense of place is a key component of the interaction between place and identity. This results in a process of representation of identities in the social arena. Identity and place are connected through a feeling of belonging to a place. Sense of place may occur at different scales: local, regional or national (Massey & Jess, 1995).

Feelings about places involve a spatial distribution of power. Awareness of conflicts over social and cultural differences may encourage developing sense of place. Claim over place is an expression of power relations and tensions between social groups about controlling an area. This establishes differences between social groups, through a process of "othering," which is differentiation or opposition between groups. Thus, belonging may be defined through a contrast with other places. The production of difference between social groups, or the inside and outside of living areas, is a central aspect of the connection between place and identity (Massey & Jess, 1995).

This interaction between place and identity allows new modalities of reflection about politics of identity. Place and power are intertwined and compose often collective and individual identities (Massey & Jess, 1995). In the example of Palestinians, the homeland is socially constructed; relation to the land is what unites people, which makes that places are politicized (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p. 12). It is important for individuals to elaborate social causes attached to places, and to constitute a collective mobilization. This allows the construction of places of resistance and a critical discourse between social groups (Massey & Jess, 1995).

The interdependence of the concepts of place, culture and identity has been highlighted. These elements of social processes allow us to understand how identity is constructed and maintained out of territorial settings, for example in forced displacement in the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

The concepts of place, culture, identity and diaspora are valuable tools in analyzing identity formation of Palestinian refugees. Place and identity are interlinked and, as a whole, help in understanding the formation of Palestinian identity. Sense of place is a key link that allows exploring the relation between place and identity.

I presented in this chapter some key components of my theoretical framework that will serve the analysis of findings from my fieldwork. I demonstrated that these concepts are interlinked and relevant in analyzing identity formation of the Palestinian refugees. The concepts of place, sense of place and belonging stress the importance of emotional attachment.

This will allow for building a debate through the analysis, as well as address how they interact in the case of Palestinian refugees. These concepts provide an analytical base that will help explain some aspects of my research. In the situation of my fieldwork, which took place in different study areas, it will be interesting to analyze the answers in relation to political activism and expression of individual or collective identity in places, which underlie power relations.

This theoretical framework provided an overview of different conceptions of identity in social and cultural geography. It is fundamental for addressing the issues of identity, place, sense of place and culture in my study. These concepts will have an impact on the analysis of data, as we will see later. I will now present my methodological choices during the fieldwork and data collection.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

In this chapter I will present the different methods that I used along my study of identity, places and belonging amongst Palestinian refugees. Data collected during my fieldwork in Jordan is based on qualitative methods.

I will first discuss the choice of qualitative methods, its main characteristics and relevancy in the production of data, especially in my case about Palestinian refugees in Jordan. I will further on discuss the different challenges that I encountered during my fieldwork through several aspects and their implications on the research process and production of data. I will then examine some ethical considerations during my study.

4.1 CHOICE OF QUALITATIVE METHODS

The qualitative methodology is as a set of qualitative methods that are relevant to use during a research process. The choice of these methods provided for my research a singular understanding of people's everyday lives. Qualitative methods present a particular interest concerning the study of social phenomena at a local level. This is especially relevant in order to study the relation between people and place in human geography (Winchester & Rofe, 2010, p. 7).

I chose the qualitative methodology when I started my research process. In the case of Palestinian refugees more precisely, the use of qualitative methodology is crucial in obtaining an insight of identity construction and social processes involved. This gives a thorough understanding of people's points of view, decisions and social interactions.

4.1.1 INTERVIEWS

I conducted my fieldwork in Jordan during the summer 2016 amongst Palestinian refugees. I did interviews in 3 different areas of North Jordan: Jabal al Hussein, Baqa'a camp and Jerash camp. I conducted 20 interviews, among them 18 with individual informants, 1 group discussion and 1 interview with an NGO employee. I also did interviews in Oslo, Norway, with 3 Palestinian

informants, as background information but I did not use it in the analysis, because they did not provide useful insights due to the sharp contrast in refugee conditions in Norway and Jordan. The interviews lasted between approximately 30 minutes and 1 hour.

The choice of Jordan for my fieldwork appeared rather naturally. Jordan is one of the most frequently used countries for refugees from the Middle East today, and the main host country for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2016). That is why I think this country is especially relevant for my master program and my future career as a researcher on refugees. I also obtained contacts and practical information through professors at university, which facilitated the preparation of my fieldwork.

4.1.1.1 Respondent profile

The respondent profile included informants in the age range 19 -85 years old, both male and female. They represented different professional situations: student, housewife, employee or retired. They had different civil status: single, married, divorced, widow. The population living in Jabal al Hussein is mostly from the West Bank, more precisely the region of Lod (now the suburbs of Tel Aviv). Baqa'a camp is a mix of different geographical origins between the West Bank and the Gaza strip, while Jerash camp has been created mainly for refugees from Gaza. Refugees from the West Bank who arrived in 1967 or before, usually have a Jordanian citizenship and passport. But refugees from Gaza may have a two-year temporary passport and must apply to the Jordanian authorities to renew it. This highlights differences of status and consequence in access to facilities in daily life, as we will see later.

4.1.1.2 Data collection and management

Interviewing was the main method that I used in data collection. I chose semi-structured interviews in order to let the informants guide the process of discussion. The goal was to make the informants comfortable and able to develop their answers themselves. I had a prepared interview guide but I also used some follow-up questions in order to help the informants to develop their point of view. I used primary and secondary questions and intended to show flexibility during the interviews, to make the situation as effortless as possible (Dunn, 2010, p. 111).

This method allows for giving flexibility to both the researcher and the informants. Semi-structured interviews may be conceptualized as a pyramid structure, first with easy questions (a "warm-up" period), and then moving on to abstract questions that require more developed answers (Dunn, 2010, p. 115). In these cases, it was important that the informants do not feel threatened but rather can answer freely, so that they feel at ease in these situations.

The conditions of the interviews were quite suitable for the collection of data. The interviews took place mostly in the informants' homes, or in local community centers¹. The informants were aware of my visit and had agreed to participate prior to my arrival. I provided the gatekeepers with sufficient details on the selection criteria: various ages from 18 years old, different professions and civil statuses. The informants were told in advance that I would visit them, which means that they could prepare themselves and were willing to talk. They already gave their consent to the gatekeepers before the interviews, which facilitated the further work for me.

I recorded the interviews audio, with the consent of the informants, and took notes at the same time. Some elements were important to take into account, such as body language. Small talk and hesitations were also important to notice, because they may give indications about sensitive topics in the case of displaced persons.

The interview with a focus group was a very interesting experience that presented relevancy in the production of data for my study. It was particularly appropriate to study the social dynamics involved in the group, especially because it was a family (Cameron, 2010, p. 158). But the configuration of the focus group has influenced the content and mode of the production of data, as the participants showed different reactions to each other's answers to the same questions. This constraint was challenging but also interesting in the context of a focus group: it allowed for observing dynamics and the evolution of points of view. I tried to give time to each participant and encourage expression of opinions.

The interpreters, who were also gatekeepers, chose the sampling of informants. This method was perhaps not totally objective because some of the chosen informants were actually friends or

¹ Community Based Organizations (CBOs) or non-profit local organizations

from networks of the interpreters. In this way, people involved had a previous privileged contact with the interpreters, which facilitated the relation with me during the interviews. This was not a problem because the information they provided was relevant. Despite this aspect, the key criterion was that the informants are Palestinians refugees and suit the analytical category.

Interviews are particularly important for the documentation of oral history among different cultures. This method is particularly interesting as a testimony of people who experienced harsh conditions of life, because it is a way to give them a more empowering voice to denounce inequalities that they may experience (Crang & Cook, 2007, p. 58). This is especially the case with elderly who experienced forced displacement by the Israeli Army in 1948 and 1967. Oral history is a crucial tool to document elements as a proof of the past (George & Stratford, 2010, p. 141).

4.1.2 OBSERVATION

Observation is also an important part of qualitative methods. This is particularly relevant in analyzing the organization of domestic space, as in the case of most of the interviews I carried out. Observation gives a crucial insight of social phenomena at a local level and an understanding of the livelihoods involved (Winchester & Rofe, 2010, p. 10).

Qualitative methods present the characteristic of a subjective interpretation and analysis of social processes. Crang and Cook (2007) explain that one of the main preoccupations in qualitative methods may reside in the danger of subjectivity. In ethnographic research, for example, they say that data is constituted through the relationship between the researcher and the participants (Crang & Cook, 2007). Ethnographic research aims at deconstructing the myth of the distanced researcher and observer in the field, and rather exploring the characteristics of this relationship in order to produce data. They note that the distinction between the researcher and the participant, or the observer and the observed are blurred. But it is possible to be aware of how to use these methods. Using qualitative methods may reveal a potential insight in local cultures and everyday reality of people (Crang & Cook, 2007, p. 14). Cultural elements interacting between the informants and me have an impact on the way people share their stories and the way I understand it.

The implementation of qualitative methods shows that data is not only collected but also constructed along the research process. Knowledge is therefore created through the experiences of all the participants (Winchester & Rofe, 2010, p. 14).

4.1.3 THE INTERPRETERS/ GATE KEEPERS

I have been in contact with the interpreters in Jordan through a Norwegian researcher who works in partnership with NTNU. This contact was helpful and sent me to reliable people, which had a positive influence on the quality of the data, as they did all what they could to help me in organizing my fieldwork.

I worked with three interpreters, one male and two female. I did not know them before the fieldwork, but we exchanged several e-mails before I arrived on the field, which prepared the bases of our work. We had a good relationship and interesting discussions. I can say that there was professional distance through delimiting roles and responsibilities, but at the same time we got to know each other and work well together.

Since I worked with both male and female interpreters, it required some planning, and this may have induced power relations. The interpreters had different points of view about my research since they live in Jordan, and two of them are of Palestinian origin. Therefore, they had a privileged contact with the informants, which was very positive but also influenced the objectivity of data, as the opinion of the interpreters can have different effects on the answers of the informants. Previous contact and small talk was very important during the interviews with women, which perhaps made the female informants more comfortable to talk about their daily life. On the contrary, the male interpreter did not know the informants: the interviews with men were more formal, more focused on the political situation in the study area.

The interpreters were very helpful, easy to talk to and gave me some advice before the interviews and about the context of the situation. Because of their experience of contact with Palestinians and living in Jordan, they had their own opinion about the situation. But this fact may also challenge the objectivity of data, as they interpret what the informants say according to their own points of view: I have no possibility to really control the work of interpreters as I do not speak Arabic.

Making the informants comfortable was a priority during the interviews. It was important to use time for small talk, in order to make the informants at ease. This technique was useful to get as much data as possible. Some interviews were then very long, around one hour, but they created better conditions for the participants since they had time to feel comfortable and think about how to answer the questions.

4.2 CHALLENGES DURING THE FIELDWORK

4.2.1 DESIGN OF THE INTERVIEW GUIDE

The interview guide was an important part of the preparation of the fieldwork. This step helped me in the process of sorting out priorities about what I wanted to find out. I thought about starting with simple questions and develop more open questions later. I asked first the informants some questions about the circumstances of their arrival in Jordan or their conditions of life. I also asked about their cultural habits, network and relatives near their living places. The interview guide would progressively focus on the concept of identity, which can be a sensitive issue in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. But the interpreters told me that it is not such a sensitive issue for the informants, since they have the habit to participate to research and answer to this type of questions.

I also changed the order of the questions during the fieldwork with some informants, mostly men. The objective was to help them to concentrate on my questions and answer precisely. I had to modify the interview guide sometimes, due to differences of behavior between men and women, which was challenging in obtaining precise answers: I will explain this more in the section below. This issue is related to gender differences, an aspect that may influence the collection of data. The gender aspect constituted a difficult task that I had to take in account all along the fieldwork.

I added a few follow-up questions about identity to help the participants to concentrate on the topic. I removed a question about moving freely outside the camp since I found out it was not very relevant. There is no restriction of movement for Palestinian camps in Jordan, at the opposite of Syrian refugees.

4.2.2 BEHAVIOR OF THE RESPONDENTS

Some elements in the behavior of the respondents may have had an influence on the construction of data. The gender dimension was very present throughout the research process. During the interviews with women, a lot of small talk was necessary before starting the interviews, as it seemed to make the informants more comfortable. The approach with men was more formal, and this may have influenced data, as the male informants talked more about politics and focused on an institutional level, while women shared more about their personal life, details about the households or their children.

Some practical aspects may have influenced the quality of data collection. Sometimes several people were in the room during the individual interviews: family members, neighbors or friends who were visiting. They answered or added details to the conversations, which made it difficult for me to determine who said what. The elderly needed sometimes help from children to remember some details, and some of these children at times took over the conversation and gave their own point of view. I had to help the interviews to come back to the main informants. Several of the individual interviews were in fact group discussions, because several family members or friends were there and participated to the discussions. The research setting was in households where it is difficult to exclude some members from the discussion. In some instances it is a cultural practice for all members to gather whenever there is a visitor while in others members feel more secure when they are surrounded by relatives. It was interesting to hear different opinions but at the same time perhaps confusing. In the case of older informants, it may have been challenging to express their own points of view while the others "monopolize" the conversation!

During the group discussion, it was challenging to make everybody participate. Men talked more than women, and they seemed more politically engaged. Men usually have more access to higher education and contacts outside the camp in this context, and they seemed to think that they have more experiences of discrimination. But approaches from both women and men were interesting and compatible, and they gave an overview of different points of view.

In a context of forced displacement, dealing with emotions was an important part of the challenges that I encountered. I used questions about their migration history in the interview guide that may have been experienced as emotionally challenging. Some informants cried or showed distress when answering to questions. In these cases, I tried to express empathy and to encourage the informants to take a break. I demonstrated that I was willing to hear their distress while at the same time keeping my position as researcher.

Since the informants and I had differing agendas in the interviews, I may have misunderstood what they really wanted to say. For example, due to the political situation, some informants were eager to give information about the situation in the camps, the vulnerability that they experienced in daily life. I may have misunderstood or neglected some aspects of their own agendas because I was more focused on my interview guide than them.

I met different challenges during several steps of my fieldwork. There are perhaps some methods I should have used, such as participant observation, if I had more time in the field. It would have been very interesting to have more contact with the informants by myself, in order to control more the modalities of relations with them, apart from the interpreters. I would have liked to observe work in community centers for example, to look at the dynamics of groups in a more informal setting than interviews. My choice of data collection, particularly interviews, could have limited the results.

4.2.3 INTERVIEWS WITH ORGANIZATIONS

Interviewing a member of a Non-Governmental Organization gave me an important insight about the situation at an institutional level, and particularly the political context in Jordan. This was a very useful tool in order to have an overview of different levels of analysis later on. A particularly interesting detail is that my fieldwork took place a few weeks before the elections of the Parliament, which was a crucial moment for NGOs working on civil rights and may have an impact on the answers of the informants. I had the occasion to discuss about it with several informants.

The interview with the NGO employee was perhaps easier than those with individual informants. I did not need an interpreter; I contacted the person directly and we spoke English. I got this

contact through the Norwegian-Palestinian committee. This person talked freely about the political situation in Jordan and discrimination against Palestinians. We discussed for example the problem of corruption in the government, particularly in the context of elections of the new Parliament during that period.

The political situation in Jordan is very specific concerning its relation to democracy and civil rights. Criticizing the King of Jordan is actually restricted, which constitutes a challenge for the citizens to speak freely in public. Some informants fear that undercover Israelis try to get information about Palestinians. For this reason, people are sometimes skeptical towards foreign researchers. Perhaps, as an alternative strategy, I should have taken more time to reassure the informants of my student status and trustfulness towards the protection of data.

This aspect may have affected the information obtained during the data collection and represent a constraint, as the informants answered not only according to what they wanted and what I asked but also what is allowed or socially accepted to talk about. Political context definitely influences behaviors of individuals at a local level, as we see in the analysis chapters.

4.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4.3.1 RESPECT OF THE INFORMANTS

Qualitative methods are definitely engaged in research ethics. They aim at giving a voice to populations who cannot express themselves as easily as in other countries, because of the political situation where they live, their social status or class (Crang & Cook, 2007, p. 58). This is the case with Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

Involving refugees in a research process may create dilemmas as it poses challenges to the collection of data, since respondents may not be able to provide much information without compromising their safety. Respondents involved must face choices in how much information they decide to provide. Interviews with refugees involve risks for the informants. It is a possible

ethical dilemma for the researcher in putting the informants in a dangerous situation that may have consequences during or after the data collection.

The respect of privacy and anonymity must be a priority in the implementation of qualitative methods. The real names of the informants have been anonymized in the data. The researcher enters a private space during interviews and observation, which may be experienced as challenging for the participants. Another important concern is not to cause psychological harm through questions that remind them of trauma or painful episodes of life. This aspect requires that both the researcher and the informants are aware of the difficulties in recalling these episodes (Kearns, 2010, p. 256).

The respect of anonymity and informed consent are crucial in qualitative methods. In the case of my fieldwork, the informed consent of the participants was given orally to the interpreters or gatekeepers. Using a tape recorder requires also consent. This has sometimes been challenging, as some informants were skeptical or scared that sensitive information would be leaked to the authorities, but they all accepted that the interviews were recorded.

Qualitative methods show different scales of understanding. Cross-cultural studies present an interest in qualitative methods, and particularly ethnographic methods. The research process in a different cultural context requires taking in account cultural protocols, namely traditions that the researcher has to be aware of during the interactions with the informants. This aspect involves the importance of context in order to understand social phenomena and the subjectivities of the participants (Howitt & Stevens, 2010, p. 52).

4.3.2 MY POSITION AS A FOREIGNER

My position as a foreign researcher, or as an "outsider", may have impacts on the research process and the way data was collected. The fact that I am a young woman interviewing older men may have affected the data as some male informants seemed eager to "teach" me how the situation is in the country! Some of them focused on political aspects of the Israel-Palestine conflict but that were not mentioned in my questions. This demonstrates power relations during interviews, distributed according to gender, age or cultural origin.

But I may also have prejudices about the Arabic culture, since I am from Europe and have little knowledge of the Middle East, for example about the importance of Islam in cultural habits. This challenges the position of the researcher towards the informants and consequences during the research process.

The field of cross-cultural studies may help us to analyze relations between cultures in a research context. Hay (2010) writes that cross-cultural studies find its origin in the post-colonial period of some European Empires such as Britain, France or Spain, during the second part of the 20th century. This field aims at deconstructing Western points of view about developing countries or decolonized countries. Cross-cultural studies require a reflection about the impact of domination and power relation between countries, as well as a reflection at a global level (Howitt & Stevens, 2010, p. 56).

Qualitative research demands that the researcher shows open-mindedness to the participants and avoids stereotyping behaviors. This requires a change of point of view and challenges our Western way of thinking. This qualitative method induces the opposite of ethnocentrism, which stems from colonialism and describes the favoring of the Western World (Howitt & Stevens, 2010, p. 64).

Cross-cultural studies warn against reductionism in analysis of phenomena in different cultures. The Palestinian-American author E. Said in 1978 proposed the concept of orientalism, as a Western collective construction of the Orient (Said, 1991, p. 5). This is particularly relevant to be aware of during my study of a population living in the Middle East.

I gained more and more confidence during the fieldwork and did not react the same way at the beginning and through the fieldwork. This has influenced the interactions between the informants, the interpreters and me, as I conducted the interviews with more self-assurance at the end of my fieldwork than at the beginning. For example, I felt more confident to ask personal or sensitive questions to the informants at the end of the fieldwork.

As in many cases of the research process, the personal engagement of the researcher has much to say in the quality of data construction. Experiences, beliefs, values of the researcher influence the modalities of interactions with the participants (Hay, 2010). This requires critical reflexivity, criticism on my intervention and myself. I must be self-conscious of the implications involved. Personal engagement has influence on how meaning and data is constructed, through social interactions with the participants (Dowling, 2010, p. 31). During the fieldwork, I tried to show understanding of people's situations and adapt myself to their cultural habits.

4.3.3 ANALYSIS

The analysis process started before the fieldwork and continued during the research process. The answers during the interviews are perhaps influenced by different participants in groups, in the case when several informants were together in the room. Analysis is not a linear process, but a continuous practice all along the research project (Crang & Cook, 2007).

Implementing the analysis step represented a challenge for me in finding a balance between what the informants say and how I understand or analyze it. These elements show that critical reflexivity is a crucial aspect of the research process. An inward looking at actions is necessary in order to be aware of my own practice (Dowling, 2010, p. 31). This may induce ethical dilemmas all along the research process.

Back in Norway, I transcribed the interviews as soon as possible while I still remembered the main elements. The interpreters translated the interviews from Arabic to English. I have to mention that English is not my native tongue, which means that I had to be careful about the accuracy of my transcriptions. During the transcribing step, I tried to be as precise as possible, in order to avoid modifying elements of data. I also took notes of non-verbal gestures and body language. This step was also a part of the analysis process.

I used mainly the coding method, or content analysis. I tried to find key words and titles to ideas, and I grouped them accordingly. I looked at similarities and differences between the interviews, according to gender, age, professional situation, or living place (Cope, 2010, p. 291).

In reading the transcriptions and notes from my fieldwork, several particular concepts emerged from the data. The validity of my research, which depends of accountability and quality of my interpretation, should be considered. This investigates whether the data is trustworthy enough to be generalized, and allowing for patterns of explanation to be found. Validity of the research poses a dilemma with such a complex and subjective set of data. That is why it is crucial to use rigor so that data becomes as reliable as possible (Mansvelt & Berg, 2010, p. 347).

I made the choice, for example, not to discuss differences of religion in the analysis of data. As the practice of Islam is common and similar both in Palestine and Jordan, I decided that this aspect was less relevant than others in order to analyze processes of identity.

I am aware that a part of the research process is a result of interpretation. My fieldwork is based on a sampling of people, which does not represent a larger population but shows some tendencies. A thorough quest of meaning is important in the construction of data during the entire research process. We will see now how data has been analyzed and what the main characteristics are in relation to the concepts of place, identity and belonging. In the next chapter, I will present how identity is formed, its different modalities of expression and the social processes related to this phenomenon.

CHAPTER 5: FORMING OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

In the previous chapter, I provided a review of the qualitative methods implemented along my research process. I will now look at identity construction in socio-politically contested places, especially in the case of Palestinians. I will present how Palestinian identity is explained by scholars and with the contribution of data, and reveal its different characteristics in Jordan.

5.1 DEFINING PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

5.1.1 WHO IS CONSIDERED PALESTINIAN?

In Chapter 3, I provided some general definitions of the identity concept and its implication in social processes. Several aspects define more precisely Palestinian identity.

Palestinian identity may be constituted from a "crisis of identity" in host countries where refugees have been displaced. In Jordan, Palestinian and Jordanian identity may differ, which highlights complex cultural practices (Brand, 1995). Although these two cultures show some similarities, it is crucial to notice certain differences between them and the outcomes that they embrace in the construction of identity.

The Palestinian population of refugees seems in contrast with the Jordanian identity. Differences of social classes were predominant among Palestinians before 1948. The Palestinian middle class felt more and more comfortable over time to express a strong identity, while members of the bourgeoisie became successful in business and accepted a political quiescence in exchange for an economically stable situation (Brand, 1995, p. 49).

Jordan's focus on monarchy is highlighted by the legitimacy of the King as a descendant of the prophet Mohammed and grandson of Sharif of Mecca. He was the leader of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire from 1916. This hegemony of the King is understood as a strategy to create a movement of Arab nationalism and to merge Palestinian identity with the Jordanian one under the same entity (Brand, 1995, p. 51).

Statelessness is an important characteristic of Palestinian identity. The majority of Palestinians are not only refugees but also stateless, which make them the largest stateless community in the world (Shiblak, 2010, p. 113). It is estimated that over 2 million of Palestinians have seen their Jordanian citizenship revoked in 1988, when Jordan nullified its engagement towards West Bankers (Shiblak, 2010, p. 119). The situation finds roots in history, particularly through the British support for Jewish immigration. The eradication of Palestine in 1948 as a political entity was due to the joint effort of Jordan and Israel, as these two countries tried to inherit the territory. Palestinians were forced to face the inability to have their own state and experience an internal colonization. They still do not have proper representation in international law (Shiblak, 2010, p. 115).

Palestinians in occupied territories are considered as foreign residents if they refuse an Israeli citizenship. These methods are claimed as similar to ethnic cleansing (Shiblak, 2010, p. 115). In addition, identity papers may become invalidated if the citizens are out of occupied territories. This aims at depriving Palestinians of identity papers and residency rights once they are out of Israel. Palestinian refugees are condemned to live in limbo, neither able to return to their homeland nor integrate into host countries (Shiblak, 2010, p. 117). This situation of statelessness participates to the formation of a diaspora, through transnational networks that relate countries of origin and host countries.

The passport is not only a form of identification but also a means of control from the Jordanian government and a way to ensure loyalty from its citizens. The preservation of refugee identity becomes a legal instrument that marginalizes and excludes Palestinians. They are concentrated in "legislative ghettos" and blocked in Arab countries (Shiblak, 2010, p. 119).

The right to nationality is a fundamental human right, according to the Universal Declaration of human rights of 1948. A stateless situation is worse than a refugee status, because it provides no protection from any international entity. Stateless communities are the first ones to pay the price for political instability. It is then crucial for Palestinians to change their life conditions from refugees to "regular" citizens (Shiblak, 2010, p. 120).

It is important to observe differences between statelessness and the refugee status, as the two situations do not give access to the same types of resources, and they impose different outcomes that increase vulnerability of livelihoods. The process of identity construction becomes in this case even more challenging for stateless populations in terms of modalities of attachment to a land or country, and questions the conception of nationalism.

5.1.2 BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION

Palestinian identity, as other identity processes in different contexts, requires categorizing individuals in order to recognize common components. Tribe systems and clans are predominant in classifying people according to social classes. Places of origin are also determinants in identity processes.

5.1.2.1 The Jordanian tribe system

Tribes are an important component of Jordanian cultural practices that Palestinians adopted when they arrived in the Kingdom. This system is also present in the West Bank, but it is particularly predominant in Jordan (Gao, 2015, p. 50).

The tribe system in Jordan includes a noticeable deference to sheikhs. Tribes were already present during the Ottoman Empire and still have today an important implication on Jordanian politics. This system contributes to negotiations and political decisions, more often on the occasion of municipalities and national elections. Tribes are social entities that provide its members with social incentives and are sources of social and financial support for its members. Tribal identity involves tracing roots back to common ancestors, which represents a history of collaboration through several generations. Some tribe members during the Ottoman Empire were forced to join as slaves. In this case, the supposed shared heritage or common biological descent may be real or imagined. Large tribes are divided into clans, then in nuclear families. Its members originally had a nomadic living and grazed camels or sheep before a progressive sedentariness (Gao, 2015, p. 51).

The weakened government security forced during the Ottoman Empire pushed tribe members to contribute to the protection of inhabitants in settled areas. Villagers were told to pay tax, or *khawa* for protection. Paternal relations were primordial, which meant that children tended to live

near their relatives and prioritize the members of their father's side. Sheikhs were particularly influential and inherited their title based on prominence and reputation in the communities (Gao, 2015, p. 52).

This basis of order and justice in the tribe system began to change when the Jordanian monarchy was established more firmly. Bedouin tribe members were placed in prominent government positions. Tribes were encouraged to settle down: sedentariness gave more control to the state through access to public services such as schools or hospitals. Education became increasingly crucial in facilitating transition from tribal to national identity. Jordanian schoolchildren and children of migrants were encouraged to develop a nationalist belonging. Meritocracy was rewarded not only because of tribe of origin but also education and skills. This offered new opportunities for the youth who moved away from their families, which weakened social power systems and increased migration to Jordanian urban centers, such as Amman. In 1975, the tribe law was abolished but it is still used informally today, especially to settle family conflicts. The path to "modern" society progressively weakened the influence of tribes, but tribal mentalities have not disappeared (Gao, 2015, p. 54).

The tribe system is still common today during elections, in helping to find work or regarding participation in charity organizations. Elections of municipal councils and Parliament are dominated not mainly by political parties but by tribe members. Dominant families have better chances to bring a majority of candidates to the elections, thus produce strategies and competition between social groups. They mobilize members of tribes to support their candidates (Gao, 2015, p. 56).

Small tribes can form coalitions. Patronage is very common through the use of *wasta*, meaning an intercessor to facilitate recruitment (Gao, 2015, p. 58). This system reinforces power relations through family obligations to support each other, as well as through a hierarchical organization. Mayors and Council members traditionally hire extra employees who were unnecessary, which creates significant costs. It has become such a problem that the Jordanian government has taken measures to prevent this situation. The opposition now accuses the government of reinforcing tribes and suppressing political parties to its advantage. Palestinians are "less" tribal but become

more and more used to this system in order to adapt to Jordanian cultural practices (Gao, 2015, p. 64). This demonstrates the Palestinians' ability to align to a powerful political and cultural setup in Jordan. Slimane explained:

Here in Jordan or in Palestine, clans rule us more than laws and regulations; there are laws and regulations, but it all goes back to the clans.

The tribe system demonstrates that identity is strongly related to power relations. In this case, the social position of this institution impacts upon political machinations and policies from the Kingdom (Gao, 2015).

5.1.2.2 Gazans

Palestinian identity varies between different ethnic groups in Jordan, such as Bedouins and Gazans. Inequalities of status and livelihoods highlight certain identity processes, especially the categorization phenomenon. Arwa, when asked if she feels treated differently from Jordanians, answered:

No, the same, but sometimes there are racist things, because I'm from Gaza, it feels like I am from a lower class. My brother faced some problems with the police because of his origin when he came to visit me. The police stopped him and wanted to take him to the police station.

Sofiane added:

Gaza used to be a protectorate of Egypt, so people who came from Gaza had an Egyptian travel document. They are not really considered as Egyptian, nor really as Palestinians, nor considered as Jordanians or anything.

Informants revealed that being from Gaza has consequences in terms of discrimination, segregation, and differences of consideration from Jordanians. As demonstrated previously, Gazans do not have the same status and civil rights as Jordanian citizens. This has important impacts on the livelihoods and vulnerability of the Gazan refugees. Differences have also been observed according to places of origin and the cleavage between cities and the countryside.

Rachida commented:

I got offended sometimes, not because I am a refugee but because I am from the suburbs, the countryside. Neighbors are from cities; they always remind me that I am from the countryside, not the city ... All of us are refugees, but there are differences.

5.1.2.3 *Bedouins*

Some ethnic groups such as Bedouins are communities that have a major role in social and political institutions in the Jordanian society. On the contrary, Israel considers Bedouins as a minority group. The hegemonic power of the state decides which group is a minority or not: this reveals power relations and marginalization. The group's ethnic classification is used as justification by the Israeli government to disempower them politically. Making distinctions between ethnic groups reveals a will of political construction, through domination by certain social groups over other. The political purpose is often to strengthen nationalism amongst the elite inside the country, or social groups not considered as minority (Jabukowska, 1992, p. 85).

The question of land registration is rather delicate. Bedouins are originally a nomadic and pastoral people. Sedentariness has been encouraged by the state, for political purposes of control of the population. Since Bedouins are no longer nomadic, they may face an identity "crisis" and have to re-negotiate modalities of cultural practices (Jabukowska, 1992, p. 86).

Unlike in Israel, Bedouins are well regarded in the Kingdom of Jordan. Bedouins profit from a special status on historical grounds: they have long supported the Hashemite Kingdom and obtained high positions in the government (Gao, 2015, p. 53). Bedouins in Jordan benefit from a higher social status and better access to employment in the public sector than Palestinians, as well as seats in the Parliament. These lead to inequalities for Palestinians, regarding to access to economic and social resources, and leading to resentment toward Bedouins (Gao, 2015, p. 63).

Wahid explained:

As Palestinians who came here in 1948, we are somewhat segregated from the Jordanians who are originated from the Bedouins, we have difficulty finding jobs. We have a saying: "Don't let the Bedouin get used to visiting your house..." Hospitality and generosity are a really big thing, so if you are generous to them, invite them to your house and get them food and coffee, they will come to you every time! That's a Palestinian thing.

Social differences, such as class or ethnic origin, are emphasized here as decisive components of identity. They enhance power relations between social groups and contribute to processes of discrimination and exclusion. This is the case amongst the Palestinian and the Jordanian populations.

5.1.3 THE ROLE OF THE CAMP IN SUSTAINING AND REINFORCING IDENTITY

In my theoretical framework, I presented the concept of cultural landscape, borrowed from C.Sauer. Scholars such as J. Peteet (2009) in Lebanon refer to refugee camps as "landscapes of despair," rather than as "cultural landscapes" (Pettet, 2009, p. 1). Refugee camps reproduce representations of identities. They are spatialized forms of power relations and internal governance. Narratives of past and present illustrate identities that connect individuals together (Peteet, 2009, p. 2). Different forms of marginalization exist in camps: spatial (such as confinement), institutional (through exclusion from civil rights), and economic (as a consequence of lack of employment) (Peteet, 2009, p. 14). Palestinian identity involves ethnography of place, a physical embodiment of social relations. Human agency in refuge camps interplays with global forces in order to shape local cultural practices. Camps show the interaction of structure and human agency levels in cultural landscapes. Identities in contested places are organized to reproduce spaces left behind, in this case, the Palestinian homeland (Peteet, 2009, p. 19). In this regard, the cultural landscape theory is confirmed, and contributing to the understanding of the Palestinian situation in Jordan. To the question "does the fact that you live here reinforce your Palestinian identity?", Yacine answered:

It enforces it, enhances it, because Jordan is the unique country in Middle East where we have freedom of speech. In Lebanon, for example, the Palestinians are living in camps. They cannot have a car, they cannot build a house, and they cannot find a job. Meanwhile in Jordan, we are treated as citizens: we work, we buy cars and we have land, anything. It is a full citizenship. So these privileges empower us, to keep asking for our right for Palestine. In other countries, they are chasing after food every day. That is a big difference. If I were asked a million years from now, "Where are you from?" I would say I am from El Lydd [Lod, located south of Tel Aviv, Israel].

Sofiane commented:

We were raised as Palestinians. Everything that happens in the house is related to Palestine, even if my parents were not born in Palestine.

Fatima had a different point of view:

I feel at home in the house but not in the town. It's not my hometown. I don't have that issue [cultural differences between Palestine and Jordan] because I was born here. I'm not familiar with moving from Palestine to here. We can celebrate [special days] in our houses but not express it

outside because of the government. The only days we can celebrate [outside] are the Jordanian celebrations, otherwise nothing. For example, in Amman you meet different nationalities, different backgrounds. It can make you feel lost in the crowd. Here you are in a surrounding that you belong to, the same traditions, and the same culture. You feel that you fit.

The informants show that the collective experience of encampment and marginalization reinforces Palestinian identity. This expression of identity seems strongly embedded in places, in the case of Palestinian refugee camps. As explained in Chapter 3 and according to Cresswell, experience of transgression in contested places enhances the forming of identity. Living in such conditions among a social group from the same origin appears here as a strategy and an important component that contributes to identity construction.

5.2 EXPRESSIONS OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

5.2.1 HOW IS IDENTITY TRANSFORMED BETWEEN GENERATIONS?

Here I intend to define Palestinian identity and its main components. Identity involves several characteristics of expression in the context of contested places. Links with the historical background highlight consequences on different expressions of Palestinian identity and belonging. I will observe how cultural practices have evolved over time and which aspects contribute to defining Palestinian identity.

Arab nationalism was created as a consequence of the Turkish rule during the Ottoman Empire and as a reaction against domination. In consequence, the attempt of King Abdullah to deal with Zionists was seen as treason for Palestinians. This sentiment grew particularly in the context of the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank, which appeared as a goal of "jordanization" of the territory (Brand, 1995, p. 52).

The Great revolt during 1936-39 led to the emergence of a Palestinian identity, especially from 1949. Those who decided to exile were intellectuals and highly educated, while the Palestinians who remained did not have resources to be politically active in the context of military occupation. The differences of expression of Palestinian identity inside and outside the West Bank showed

the crucial role of the diaspora. Palestinian identity started with the support of intellectuals and writers (Abu-Ghazaleh, 2010, p. 6).

Tensions around Palestinian identity find a historical basis. The increasing power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1970-71 and the events of Black September led to the expulsion of the organization from Jordan as well as to a particular skepticism between Palestinians and Jordanians. According to Brand (1995), Palestinians often seemed to the Jordanians to be ungrateful of the refuge provided in their country (p. 52). Preferential recruitment of Jordanians in public services and tribal ties progressively structured a public/private sector divide. In 1989, a wave of riots pushed the regime into implementing a political liberalization, through economic restructuring and privatization, and freedom of expression became allowed. The Kingdom installed "organized" political activity and showed efforts to develop a hybrid identity that would represent the different ethnic communities (Brand, 1995, p. 54-55). Wahid explained:

I don't discriminate between Palestinians and Jordanians; they make discrimination. [Translator: a few weeks ago, 100th anniversary of the Grand revolution]. It's unrealistic, untrue. It's the 100th anniversary of cooperating with the British. The British gave the Jews Palestine and gave Jordan to the Hashemites.

Yacine commented:

The British mandate built an airport in Lodd before the Second World War, then the Jews raped the land and took it by force. Jews came for agriculture, to use the land, also for Holy sites, and to dismember the Arabic society. I am from Salt, [where] people live together, [in the] same culture. I would say, it's two faces of the same coin, whatever they [Jordanians] enjoy, we [also] enjoy, because we are so close. Even at the beginning of 20th century, there was no border. Everything was under the Ottoman Empire, things were open, people from Salt were going to Nablus, [they] could cross the Jordan River. In Salt now there are a lot [of things] originally from Nablus. For example, our main dish is Mansaf, and the most famous city doing Mansaf is Karak. On the other side of the river, the main dish is also Mansaf. All was one country, we enjoyed the same values, the same traditions, and the same culture. We share the same language, the same religion. The only difference is the [civil] rights.

I am Arabic, Palestinian, Jordanian, Egyptian, Yemenite ... Why would I go around and say that I am Palestinian while I am living in Jordan? If someone asks what is my country, I would say Palestine.

The Jordanians and Palestinians are [in fact] all Jordanians, it depends on the context. For example, about security in Jordan, Palestinians and Jordanians are [supporting] security in Jordan, if we are talking about the right of return to Palestine, the Jordanians and Palestinians are together. I don't see any difference in access to facilities ... I feel I am loyal to this country, I helped build this country and I enjoy the benefits. And when it comes to Jordan, I am full Jordanian; when it comes to my roots as Palestinian, I want Palestine to be a free state.

Asma added:

Salt and Nablus were the same territory, why we don't remember [that] it was like this? During the Ottoman Empire, [it was] like states.

The informants show multiple and hybrid identities and how they are strategically deployed and used. Identity construction is very dependent on the context and circumstances, as expressed above. But there has been a shift in identity modalities, in part due to the contribution of historical insights, as demonstrated in Chapter 2. Resistance movements have been formalized as strategy in identity construction and have become an important component for the youngest generations of Palestinians. Refugees in camps express a strong resentment against Israel but also against assimilation on host countries. From the 1970s, the younger generation that grew up in camps appeared to be more militant than the elderly. Scholars observe a shift from a mourning generation who experienced the loss of land, to a revolutionary generation involved in political engagement (Schulz, 2003, p. 124). This phenomenon of resistance movements in the camps reveals the importance of the politics of identity. On the basis of my theoretical framework, and as demonstrated here, activism in the refugee camps highlights the crucial role of human agency in shaping and sustaining cultural meaning in spaces of resistance. Tariq revealed:

Because I live in the camp, I do feel that it reinforces my Palestinian identity, but if I lived outside the camp it would have suppressed my Palestinian identity. Baqa'a has also been a symbol for Palestinian refugees, [because] it is the largest assembly of Palestinian refugees in the world and in Jordan. With a group of young men we founded a voluntary group [...], we do campaigns to enhance things, we have a campaigns schedule before Ramadan, and during Ramadan we did

voluntary campaigns where we stood [outside] at that bridge and we gave out dates, you know when people are not near their room to break their fast, so we gave out water and dates.

Common history is an essential component in expression of Palestinian identity, as it determines modalities of power relations in social groups. Some material objects contribute to this common identity construction.

5.2.2 SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATIONS AND EXPRESSION OF IDENTITY

Several material objects represent important symbols of Palestinian identity. The olive tree is one of them. Palestine is often compared to roots that reach deep in the ground, at the same time as leaves try to touch the sky. Land is a key symbol in Palestinian identity. According to Abu-Ghazaleh, "the land does not belong to them, they belong to the land": people and land are indivisible (2010, p. 9). The loss of land is experienced as a loss of identity, of belonging to places of origin. The fact that half of the population lives outside of the country brings into question modalities of identity expression. The paradox of Zionism (a national movement to end Jewish homelessness) was that the Palestinians were made homeless. Historically, the myth of a "land without people," according to Israel, highlighted the negation of Arab presence and culture. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 led to the paradoxical situation of Palestinians living in camps in their own country: they became a minority in their own land. As a result, many were forced to seek refuge in neighboring countries, including Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. They started to develop a national identity inside host countries in opposition to expectations of assimilation, which occasioned conflicts with the host populations. The expansion of the Palestinian diaspora took place at the same time as Palestinians losing their land (Abu-Ghazaleh, 2010, p. 18). Wahid confirmed:

My maternal grandfather had a piece of land in Jaffa. They [Israeli authorities] offered me 7 million and I refused. How can I sell my own country?

The difficulty for Palestinians to constitute an identity may be due to history's dislocations and multiple displacements. Discourses in Western media regard Palestine as "a land without a people" before the Jewish immigration (Bowman, 1993, p. 74). As an example, photography of the Holy Land during the 1800s showed no people or portrait, only desert land, which highlights

the important symbolic of representations for the Western world. The Arab Revolt was the first event that raised Western awareness about Palestinian indigenous (Bowman, 1993, p. 74).

The process of constructing group identity requires the rejection of other identities. The symbolic representations of the language, clothing or the flag, are all parts of an identity, and they offer different meanings in different contexts. In occupied territories, Palestinians usually speak Arabic. This language is also used to distinguish the Hebrew, as a sign of resistance and opposition to Israel. Symbols of national identity are mobilized as strategies appropriate to contexts (Bowman, 1993, p. 75-76). The process of "othering", as I referred to in the theoretical framework section, also takes place through the symbols and material objects shared among communities.

An important aspect is that the state of Israel seems to be based on an imagined community, but at the same time denies Palestinians their national interests. Palestine was also constituted as an imagined entity at the moment of its loss. Palestinians refugees have traditions to carry in exile, and they share a common history of suffering and exile (Bowman, 1993, p. 77).

A widespread Palestinian peasantry marked the pre-1948 period. Identity was mostly based on local and class interests rather than nationalist solidarity. Memories from before 1948 involve local villages or class groups as specific experiences. This shows that Palestine as a proper community is imagined differently in different contexts. Expression of identity may involve challenges in maintaining "social harmony" in the diaspora. Different social groups of Palestinians recognize suffering as a common aspect of their identity but perceive different causes and enemies at a local level. Many members of the Palestinian bourgeoisie managed to escape before 1948 to Europe and United States, as they were socially and economically assimilated but they still showed a certain sense of Palestinian identity. Not all social groups have been affected in the same way by the Israeli occupation (Bowman, 1993, p. 87).

This is how the informants answered when they were asked which special days and/or material items are important for them. Arwa explained:

15th of April 1948 and 8th of June 1967. September 2000, the second Intifada, the story of the kid who got shot by Israelis... The husband of my aunt got shot there, so we put the TV on and listen to Palestinian music.

Tariq confirmed:

[On the] 15th of May, there is a festival in the camp for Nakba. We call it the festival of "Come back", to give hope that someday we will go back, [We do] Speeches about the Palestinian causes, [we sing] songs and [organize a] photo gallery. In the festival there is information about Palestinian legacy. The dresses of the women are the biggest symbols of Palestinian legacy, heritage. You can see that based on the pattern of embroidery of the dresses, you see tell if it's from Nablus, from Quds or other areas of Palestine, just by the pattern of the embroidery.

I teach Q'ran in one mosque and one of the students in the next few days plans to go to the West Bank, so I asked him to bring some soil from Palestine ("Tariq").

[Some time ago], a woman [in the camp] said her grandmother passed away, and the key of her house in Palestine was on her neck when she died, so the key is always the symbol of home for Palestinians.

Sofiane stated:

Without a home, I wouldn't feel at home. [I celebrate] The two Nakba, the two Intifada, the day Yasser Arafat passed away. In the youth center, [we do] revolutionary songs and speeches, but we have to get a security clearance, anything that happens in the camp needs a security clearance ... Palestine is a country and Jordan is another country ... Our accent, songs are different, we were born different. Even a Palestinian young man walking in the street would be identified as Palestinian, as different.

Slimane claimed:

My home, sanctities of Al-Quds are unforgettable. My home that I was born in, our lands and possessions; our aloe tree, olive trees and fig trees; we used to be farmers, we planted and harvested... it's unforgettable. I wish whilst I'm still alive, I would go there, live under a carob tree and die, I wish. This [Jordan] is a surrogate home; we will remain [temporary] in the eyes of the people, which mean the return of the Palestinian people, but we're not getting that. When we left, they told us "one or two weeks and you'll be back"; it has been 68 years, going into 69, and we are still refugees; why? And all of Europe sympathizes with Israel and gives them money... it [Israel] displaced all of our people from their roots!

The culture has remained the same. But, for the youth ... I mean, instead of wearing a *Dishdasha* and *Abaya* [thawbs], [the youth], would wear jeans and a shirt. Our heritage is to wear a keffiyeh and agal, and on occasions would wear an Abaya. But for the youth, there has been some change; he would wear jeans and a shirt and would style his hair. There's a difference between them and us.

Leyla remembered:

My grandparents used to tell me that I you don't have a home, you have a certificate
If I didn't have certificate, I wouldn't be worth anything, your passport is your certificate.

Material objects constitute important souvenirs and memorabilia. Images and symbolic representations through land, houses left behind in Palestine, and the key are important components and representations of identity passed down through generations. Cultural practices, such as traditional dances, festivals, or the way people dress are also expressions of identity. These very powerful narratives are particularly linked to belonging to Palestinian land, and provide good insights about the perception of stateless people. As stateless people, Palestinians value the passport as symbolic representation of their identity and belonging. Material objects reveal how identity is constructed and sustained in time and space.

5.2.3 NOTIONS OF HOME AND INTERACTIONS WITH IDENTITY

Inherent desire to return among Palestinians reveals also how home is defined from the refugees' perspective. Sense of home and identity are intertwined and interact together. For many of the informants, home is in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, even though they were born in Jordan and, in some cases, have never seen Palestine. Yet, many refugees relate to Palestine as their home place, through mental constructions and shared narratives. For them, home is where they feel belonging and an emotional attachment. Palestinians relate to their place of displacement as their "imagined" homeland in order to grasp and progressively construct a sense of place. The notions of boundaries and territory, explained in Chapter 3, are blurred in this case: they can exist physically or remain imaginary and contribute to the formation of sense of place. Riad explained:

We have never forgotten Palestine, and through these celebrations and memorials that we do, we keep Palestine's memory alive. Jordanians encourage that because they don't want us to consider Jordan as an eternal country. We do not need something to remind us of Palestine. Palestine is alive in our hearts. When I am asked, I say that I am Jordanian in identity but also Palestinian in

origin and identity. My belonging, allegiance is to Palestine. Loyalty. I am Palestinian but I am granted all civil and political rights as a full Jordanian. We take pride in our Jordanian citizenship and rights and for the Jordanian government for offering us this, but there is no country in the world that can replace Palestine.

Asma added:

I would like to move out of the camp, but we can't afford it. I feel Palestinian. I still want to go back home. I have never been there, but I think about that place.

Tariq revealed:

I'm originally from Palestine but I lived here and sort of went along the stream, and I count this place as my own as well ... There is a country that I never visited, there is a nostalgic feeling to a home, always in ... my head.

Dounia explained:

I don't feel anything weird with that because I never felt the feeling of being home. The love of the land, the hometown is an instinctive feeling, sometimes you don't know anything about your hometown, you have never been there but you just love it, because it's your land, it's something you belong to.

Experience of belonging is complex for Ahmed:

I have 3 homes, Palestine, Jordan, and my home town, the place where my head fell [where he was born, in Emirates]. Palestine is more important, it's a subconscious belonging.

Slimane claimed:

I'm Palestinian in origin, but I have the Jordanian citizenship, and I also take pride in the Jordanian citizenship. [I'm] Palestinian - Jordanian. Because I live in Jordan and I drink from its water, and breathe its air. And we feel safe. I've lived in this land more than I've lived in Palestine. It [Jordan] has a duty towards us, and we have a duty towards it.

According to Agnew and as explained in Chapter 3, sense of place is constituted through attachment and emotions related to these places. The notion of homeland holds a powerful symbol that contributes to the forming of sense of place.

Sense of home is also subject to gender considerations. Several informants claimed that visa requirements to visit the West Bank and Gaza are very restricted, especially for men under 50 years old, due to suspicion of participation in terrorist attacks or resistance movements. As a consequence, women are more able to travel there and visit relatives or friends than men. They bring with them material items such as fabrics, embroideries or gifts for their children. Women play in this case a major role in transmission of cultural practices between both territories, and participate to the construction of an idealized sense of home. When Mounia was asked if she feels Palestinian or Jordanian, she answered:

Both, but Palestine is more important, I visited [my family] twice, I got a visa.

The informants presented different characteristics such as a variation of age, gender and level of integration, which had consequences on cultural practices and identity construction.

The forming of Palestinian identity is a key process that is elaborated according to class differences or as a result of loss of land and statelessness. Elements of classification are maintained through the tribe system but also especially for Gazans and Bedouins. The role of the refugee camps is determinant in reinforcing identity as it includes a group dimension through acts of resistance and activism in contested places. Expressions of Palestinian identity evolve through generations and are often strongly linked to the historical context of displacement. The informants expressed very powerful and poetic affirmations, full of symbolism, that show the particularities of Palestinian culture and identity. This may prove wrong the common assumption that displaced persons "forget" their origins and sense of home when they settle down in host countries. Sense of home is a key process in identity construction, perhaps even more in a context of forced displacement.

These powerful narratives demonstrate several characteristics about the situation of refugees and the relation between place and identity. In the case of Palestinian refugees, forced displacement proves to have a major impact on identity construction through different social processes. Palestinian refugees experience particular cultural practices in Jordan, though the construction of collective narratives based on the historical context of displacement, and though different classification systems such as social class, tribes or place of origin. The conditions of life in

refugee camps strongly influence these cultural practices and further the construction of a hybrid identity. With regard to my empirical findings and my theoretical framework, the concepts of place and identity are clearly key components in the context of displaced Palestinians.

Identity involves a complex network of components through history. I will present in the next chapter how Palestinian identity may represent strategies, assets or dilemmas for the refugee population in Jordan.

CHAPTER 6: PALESTINIAN IDENTITY, ASSETS AND DILEMMAS

Palestinian identity has been revealed as complex and including multiple specific components, when relocated in a host country for refugees such as Jordan. I will present in this chapter how Palestinians define themselves, versus how they are perceived by their host country and aid agencies in Jordan. I will discuss then how humanitarian agencies, and particularly the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine (UNRWA), invoke Palestinian identity, and the challenges related to this. Palestinian identity may present different characteristics in different contexts, understood as assets for the populations, but also pose important dilemmas.

According to the human geographer, J. Rigg, assets are defined as "material (physical) and non-material (social) resources that people possess" (2007, p. 33). They are understood as resources used in order to cope with the practical challenges of everyday living. This concept focuses on the human agency perspective as an alternative to the structure-human agency perspective, as defined in Chapter 3. Assets are also conceptualized as capitals of different types: human (workforce), financial (income), natural (land), physical (equipment, properties, etc.) and social (network, relatives) (Rigg, 2007, p. 31).

6.1 PERCEPTIONS AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND JORDANIANS

The perception of Palestinian identity in Jordan differs between Palestinians themselves and Jordanians, through several aspects such as discourses and narratives, political involvement and nationalism, or experiences of discrimination.

6.1.1 CONTRIBUTION OF IDENTITY NARRATIVES AND DISCOURSES

As I refer to in my theoretical framework and according to Foucault (1990), identity is constructed through discourses and narratives. It involves characteristics of locations that indicate a feeling of belonging and sense of place. Identities are constantly negotiated and dynamic. They refer to symbolic aspects of cultural practices (Panelli, 2004, p.165).

As explained in Chapter 3, the poststructuralist perspective characterizes places as performances, representations of power relations through language. In this case, discourses play a major role in the construction of refugee identity. Discourses about refugees, very present in media today, often portray origin countries as dangerous, which may help refugees to justify their status, and host societies to legitimate their presence. A dilemma exists for refugees in talking about difficult issues and at the same time avoiding opinions that sounds like complaining for the host populations. The concepts of identity and place interact together to justify or discredit the presence of certain groups in society. It is then crucial to understand mobility and movements of people both at an international and local level (Kirkwood et al., 2013, p. 463).

According to the social scientist D. Silva Guimaraes (2010), narratives constitute a dominant part of Palestinian identities, in opposition to other social groups, such as Israelis. Oral history and storytelling are forms of narratives that often mix real facts and symbolic or imaginary elements. Hammack (2010) refers to several main components of Palestinian narratives, real or imaginary: dispossession of land, powerlessness, living under risk, resistance. These narratives are constructed in opposition to the Israelis, considered as the invaders, the powerful military force, threatening whoever tries to resist, through oppressive methods. This contributes to confirm and support the collective experience of Palestinian identity through oral history (Silva Guimaraes, 2010, p. 542). As demonstrated through the data, even if most of the youngest Palestinian refugees in Jordan have never been in contact with Israelis, they identify and support these narratives. The "othering" process also intervenes here in order to structure meaning through suitable narratives that gather Palestinians around the same goals.

6.1.2 PERCEPTION OF PALESTINIANS AMONG JORDANIANS

Historical narratives are key components in identity construction and for nationalist purposes.

National identity evolved from a focus on tribes to one on nation-states. This aims at showing common history and culture for political purposes.

According to R.M. Nasser (2005), the Jordanian historical narrative evolved from a tribal discourse, which appeared in 4000 B.C., up through the rise of Islam during the 17th century. A religious discourse emerged from the rise of Islam to the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. With the establishment of the new Empire, a nationalist discourse appeared from the late 19th

century until today, or particularly in the 1960s, during the attempt of a Palestinian revolt. The contemporary narrative in Jordan aims at promoting similarities instead of differences, and it refers to a past when both Banks were united under the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom, considered as the motherland (Nasser, 2005).

A bi-nationalism has progressively been established in Jordan. The Kingdom has long tried to contain expressions of Palestinian discontent, and the relation between Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians has for a while been politically taboo (Frisch, 1997, p. 262). Perceptions of the obstacles to integration are different between Palestinians and Jordanians. Indeed, Jordanians think that the growing number of Palestinians is an obstacle to national unity; while Palestinians focus on discrimination they endure and denounce favoritism to Jordanians in the economic sector. Palestinians perceive a Jordanian collusion with Zionism, which creates skepticism and reluctance to integrate in the country. The perception of Jordan is instrumental rather than the object of affective considerations from Palestinians (Frisch, 1997, p. 263).

The Jordanian government shows, still today, a political will to integrate Palestinians so that they can actively contribute to the Jordanian society. But a condition required is that Palestinians adapt themselves to the Jordanian culture, and that cultural differences are erased for easier assimilation. This strategy shows embedded power relations between the different social groups (Frisch, 1997, p. 268).

6.1.3 PERCEPTIONS OF PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES

Discrimination is not perceived in the same way between the different social classes in the refugee camps. Looking at data, some informants allow themselves to express a feeling of discrimination from the Jordanian government. This ability may depend of situations in social classes, economic and social resources.

The answers of the informants were also different between the study areas. The informants in Baqa'a and Gaza camp expressed more political engagement and activism for the protection of civil rights for Palestinians than in other places. They are more isolated from Amman, which probably represents less risk of oppression from the government. Although the Jordanian constitution guarantees freedom of speech, criticizing the King of Jordan in public has been

punished in many cases (Lucas, 2003, p. 137). Some informants took the risk to express their skepticism towards the current government. Loyalty to Jordan may be expressed differently according to different backgrounds.

Experience of discrimination depends of the impact of interactions with other social groups or tribes and increases when two different groups are confronted. As I refer to in my theoretical framework, Cresswell (2015, p. 42) highlights the feeling of being "in place" or "out of place" in the process of identity construction and the "othering" process. As demonstrated, the experience of exclusion and power relations causes tensions and involves consequences on the identity construction in opposition to other social groups (Cresswell, 2015, p. 42). During a focus group discussion, Ali explained:

After having studied at university and lived the Jordanian life, I feel there is racism, for example in paper work. On my ID paper it says that I'm born in Baqa'a, so as soon as people see my papers they know that I am Palestinian, their behavior would change. It's [tribes] the base ground for racism. It depends on them, some people at university without doing anything make me somehow feeling angry there is always something between you and them. If there were a problem between a Jordanian and me, people would help the Jordanian, not me. I have Palestinian friends, both male and female, [who are] also originally Jordanian friends. I go and eat and drink with them, and they are my friends, but here we are not meant for each other. Their father would say that I am Palestinian. A lot of fights happen at university, between tribes.

Mounia added to Ali's comment:

Before you ("Ali") started university, you didn't know about this segregation between Jordanians and Palestinians.

Lack of interaction between groups does not involve the same experience of prejudice, or assumptions about the others. Ali shows an awareness of discrimination from the moment when he started to interact with Jordanians at university. Prejudices may appear and contribute towards skepticism of the opposite social groups.

I noticed in several informants' houses some portraits of Saddam Hussein on the walls. After discussing about it in Gaza camp, I found out that this late leader of Iraq is considered as a savior

for many Palestinians. Saddam Hussein played a major role during the conflict as a local hero and showed solidarity between Iraq and Palestine during the war. As often presented, the responsibility of Saddam Hussein in the Iraq war is very controversial in the Western world. He showed allegiance to Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque, and he intended to protect the Holy site against Israel, which suits the Palestinian cause and convictions. Several informants also mentioned that the Islamic group, Muslim brotherhood, provided assistance to Palestinians in camps. This highlights differences in perceptions and political strategies involved in the acquisition of assets in order to improve livelihoods.

My interview of an NGO worker in Amman was very useful in order to obtain a broader background of the political situation in Jordan. Foreign policies have a deep impact on the Jordanian economy, and particularly on the partnership Jordan has with the United States. American NGOs are strongly linked to political parties, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI; which is linked to the Democratic Party), and the Republicans Abroad International (RAI; which is affiliated with the Republican Party's interests). The United States have economic interests both in Jordan and Israel, particularly in terms of security issues linked to terrorism, which is strongly controversial in the international community. Foreign policies of Jordan have crucial consequences for Palestinian refugees.

The historical context from which Jordan's internal politics stem is primarily the instability of the relations with Palestine and the threat of communism during the 1950s. This led to the signature of the Martial Law in 1956, which imposed a firm control of political parties and forbid attempts of alternative political gatherings. Today, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) is one of the most powerful parties, as it benefits from a strong support of the Kingdom. This party openly supports the Muslim Brotherhood, which claims to defend the Palestinian cause, particularly the Hamas Palestinian party.

I was lucky that my fieldwork took place two months before the elections of the Jordanian Parliament, on the 20th of September 2016, during the campaign period, so I could ask some informants and interpreters their opinion about it. Cases of corruption and a high percentage of abstention show that citizens do not trust Jordanian politicians. During the elections of 2013, only

56% of the population voted. The informant explained as an example that the second district of Amman, where 90% of the population is from Palestinian origin, is represented with only 6 seats in the Parliament. On the contrary, districts occupied by mainly Bedouins are represented with 30 seats (out of 195 seats in total). The district where Baqa'a camp is situated has only one seat. This underlines important differences between areas, regarding the discrimination manifested in tribal politics.

Different perceptions of Palestinian identity enhance the power relations involved. An evaluation of the vulnerability levels of refugees between different social groups highlights cases of discrimination against Palestinians, which has important consequences for the provision of assistance from UNRWA.

6.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO THE DIFFERENT GROUPS OF REFUGEES

Humanitarian assistance and benefits from the Jordanian government and UNRWA depend on different administrative statuses among different social groups. Some criteria that are used in provision of benefits pose important dilemmas concerning the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I will discuss the status of Gazans, Syrians, and criterias for provision of welfare services.

6.2.1 GAZANS

As I explained in Chapter 2, conditions of life for Gazans are very challenging. Respect of civil rights depends of the geographical origin of refugees. Palestinian refugees from Gaza and from the West Bank do not have the same administrative status and access to public services and facilities in Jordan, which is highly controversial for the Palestinian community. Fatima explained:

There are a lot of obstacles for being Palestinian. For example, to get the temporary passport, you will have to get a lot of papers done. You can't get the passport the same day, you have to wait 10 days at least to get it done. In the camp, you always remember that you are Palestinian because you live in misery and poverty. You will always demand rights to get supported.

Riad added:

Before the West bank was occupied, it was a protectorate for Jordan, so we were displaced, it was from Jordanian land to Jordanian land. The only thing that was changed was the location, we had full rights as Jordanians and also received assistance from UNRWA. But the real Palestinians who struggle are the Gazans. You would see a great difference between Gazans and myself, the Palestinians of this camp and the Palestinians of Gaza.

According to Jasmine,

Gazans don't have access to medical insurance offered by the government, because they are Gazans. There are limitations for Gazans: we cannot buy a house, own a land or own a car. We are not able to access to a lot of services from the government. We have 3 ways to get medical care for Gazans: UNRWA, loan or live with pain and die. Many people became sick and with time got worse; they could have been treated early.

Driss revealed:

It was our land that we left, that we know. I am a refugee, we can't even register a meter of land in our name. Being identified by the government as a Gazan is what is the handicap, but as a Palestinian it isn't, but I am not actually born in Gaza, but since I lived in Gaza I'm identified as Gazan.

As "Driss" indicates, the place of departure is commonly used to identify Palestinians, as opposed to the place of birth. This demonstrates that the refugee status is a construction of the Jordanian authorities and thus is based on assumptions and not real facts. This situation shows that such criteria are controversial Gazan origin became a stigma, a criterion for exclusion from civil rights in Jordan. This means that the needs of the Gazans are unmet due to this construction of identity.

6.2.2 SYRIANS AND OTHER ARAB NATIONALITIES

The situation in neighboring countries in the Middle East presents important repercussions on Jordanian politics and assistance to Palestinian refugees. The particular emergency situation in Syria led to a shortage of assistance from UNRWA. There has been a categorizing of priorities and divide in the budget between the populations in need. Riad explained:

Compared at that time and today, the Syrian refugees what they get, they give them Sneakers bars, I mean fancy... Whaa!... Your reaction would be like this when you will visit Gaza camp ("Riad").

This is Slimane's reaction to the refugee crisis in Yemen:

The Palestinian had nerves of steel, he was self-sufficient, and a dear dignity. He used to work, eat, and not spread his hands to other people. Not like the Yemeni people and the Syrian people... There's war, and there's mendacity. You either fight or beg. There are millions of these people. We're not saying that we'll stand in the way of the people in need... May God not leave anyone in need. But, when you come from Yemen, and beg money for Abdullah Saleh (Yemen's former president) and the Huthi, those are the reason of your mendacity! Why don't you fight them instead of begging? Young people come here, 20 or 25... I'm an old man, one step and I become 90 and you come and spread your hand to me? A young man... you're the one who should be helping me.

Slimane refers to the current conflict in Yemen and the displacement of the population to Jordan. Massive immigration to the country represents a challenge in sharing resources, and the armed conflicts in the neighboring countries of the Middle East aggravate the situation. Iraqi refugees who benefit from a good economic situation are accused of worsening the economic inflation in Jordan. They are also represented in different religious groups, such as Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims, which contribute to tensions between the different communities. This illustrates different forms of social conflict that emerge from this religious identity and diversity. Yacine commented:

The only difference with Palestinians who came in 1948, Jordan treated them as normal citizens, those Palestinians helped in building the country and enjoyed the same privileges, while the other waves of refugees, they are here as guests, we hope that one day they will go back to their home, now there is a lot of shortage in public services... But each wave [of refugees] has its own characteristics, the Iraqis brought a lot of money, so they have a negative impact on the economy, inflating all the prices, the Syrians they are poor, they need everything, it creates another burden, to provide with water, education... And the international community did not tell Jordan enough to deal with it.

Asma revealed:

After the war in Syria started, a lot of men married as second wife Syrian women, maybe because the Syrian women don't ask for a lot of money or something....

The geographical origin of refugees in Jordan may be considered either as an asset or a disadvantage, which poses different dilemmas in the provision of humanitarian assistance. These inequalities may cause tensions between communities, especially in camps that receive refugees from different origins, such as in Baqa'a camp.

6.2.3 GENDER INEQUALITIES

Palestinian women in refugee camps are particularly vulnerable to degradation of livelihood assets. Different rules are applied to men and women concerning citizenship allowance, which has consequences on the access to benefits from the Jordanian welfare system, on the income of families and vulnerability of livelihoods. Driss explained:

Generally, if a woman has citizenship and the man doesn't, she can grant the Jordanian citizenship to the kids; however, if the man is Gazan, she cannot. If a Palestinian woman marries a Jordanian man, the Jordanian man can give the citizenship to his kids. But if a Jordanian woman marries a Palestinian man, or a Gazan man, she would not be able to do so.

The differences of status between Gazans, West Bankers and Jordanians lead to strategies in marriage and alliances between families. As a result, women are the objects of strategies and discrimination based on geographical origin.

Several informants stressed the decreasing intervention of UNRWA in humanitarian assistance. During my fieldwork, an interpreter told me about a possible cut of education help, regardless of the income of families. The amount of financial assistance provided would instead depend of the number of men in families who reached the age of eighteen. They are automatically considered as able to find employment and provide financially for their families. Otherwise, the families must prove that the boys are students, which requires verification from universities each semester.

Divorce according to the Sharia law is mainly practiced in Jordan, as in other Middle East countries. Giving dowry to the bride's family before weddings is very common. If the wife seeks a divorce, she must give back the dowry in form of a fee. Also, the custody of their children is generally given to the father's family. This means that the mother must contribute to financial support for the children, which may be challenging for many families.

6.2.4 RELIGIOUS ASPECTS

Islam is an important part of cultural practices in the Middle East. This may influence the way people receive assistance from the government and UNRWA as well as impact upon living conditions in refugee camps. Jasmine revealed about a local community center:

[It] doesn't help everyone, only people that they see as very religious: women who wear the whole veil or men with big beards. That's it. But they are the only NGOs in the camps. They donate to certain people, and to me only in Ramadan.

Islamic NGOs may consider religious aspects and discriminate some populations. In this case, religion as a component of identity may become an asset or a disadvantage for Palestinians.

The different types of assistance and benefits from the Jordanian government and humanitarian organizations are not provided according to the same modalities to the different social groups. Criteria of geographical origin, nationality, gender, religion and social situation influence the access to assets and often create inequalities and vulnerability among refugee in camps. Social differences play a major role in access to livelihood assets and constitute important components of identity.

While UNRWA has played a crucial role in humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees in Jordan, it has also contributed to discrimination.

6.3 SHIFT IN THE TYPES OF ASSISTANCE FROM UNRWA AND CHALLENGES INVOLVED

Humanitarian assistance from UNRWA has evolved in time, and some important changes occurred according to the historical and social contexts, which will be explored below.

6.3.1 INFLUENCE OF THE JORDANIAN CONTEXT ON PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

According to R. Khalidi (1997), Palestinian identity followed three stages of construction. Before the First World War, Palestinian people were mainly illiterate, local farmers and from a wage-worker social class. The Arab heritage was very present during this period, but at the same time people expressed loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. After the First World War and at the beginning

of the British rule, the education level increased, which reduced the socio-economic gap within the Palestinian population. As the Jewish immigration expanded, however, the Arab population became more vulnerable. From 1948, the majority of Palestinians turned into refugees and experienced a common dispossession of land and civil rights (Khalidi, 1997).

The refugee status became the most visible symbol that defines Palestinian people. The narrations of forced expulsion are very common and constitute mechanisms that link past and present situations. Narratives of alienation and discrimination support the refugee identity. *Nakba* has become a common component in Palestinian discourses (Shabaneh, 2010, p. 223).

The Jordanian Minister of Occupied Territories' Affairs controls local gatherings. This institution can decide to dissolve administration councils if they are considered as a threat for public order. In response to this phenomenon, the expansion of a strong civil society took progressively place in Palestinian camps in Jordan. In this way, the Jordanian government plays a major role in identity construction among Palestinian refugees. While trying to restrain political gatherings and activism in camps, the Kingdom may reinforce Palestinian belonging (Shabaneh, 2010, p. 234).

Palestinian identity is linked to material interests, as individuals act according to strategies in order to gain better livelihood assets. A need for collective identity goes against economic considerations. Identity construction is influenced by political considerations and regulated both for security and economic reasons. In this way, the Intifada restored more than blurred the Green line, or the demarcation between Israel and neighboring countries after the 1967 war, as I explained in Chapter 2, by strengthening political activism in distinct geographical areas such as refugee camps (Frisch, 1997, p. 259).

Palestinians choose to live in camps in order to improve their access to resources. An important detail is that Palestinians can actually benefit from UNRWA assistance outside the camps. This shows that living places such as refugee camps are used strategically and interact with identity. Jamila revealed why she thinks the camp is her home:

It's homier than other places where I lived because of the support here from people, we contact each other...

When asked if the fact that she lives in the camp reinforce her Palestinian identity, Jamila answered:

Yes, it makes it stronger, because of how people react to everything that happens in Palestine, what they do ... like the roundabout in the center of the camp with the key ... How people act for anything, especially Palestinians here, they do a lot of stuffs, marches, they talk more about politics.

Jamila emphasizes the importance of collective identity in the refugee camp as contributing to social wellbeing; people may share common political values. The geographical characteristics of the surroundings in the refugee camp, such as the "key" roundabout in Baqa'a camp (see figure), play a part in strengthening Palestinian belonging and sense of place. In the camps, people have easier access to social and economic assets, due to their proximity to other Palestinians. Solidarity and local networks enhance processes of collective identity. This highlights the importance of assets and strategies in the formation of Palestinian identity.



Figure 3: the "Key" roundabout, Baqa'a camp

Political relations between Palestine and Jordan have an impact on collective identity of Palestinians. Driss added:

Their [Jordan] kings marry our women [King Hussein, and now King Abdallah, married a Palestinian], there are political relations between Palestine and Jordan [Queen Rania is Palestinian].

Palestinians may benefit from a particular status in the Jordanian government, in comparison to refugees from other origins. Palestinians take pride in the fact that Jordanian Kings usually marry Palestinian women, which is an important symbol. Several informants argued that both sides of the Jordan River – today the West Bank and Jordan – have had important economic relations through history. But today, the relation between Jordanians and Palestinians does not seem to have any direct and discernable benefit, and it seems rather culturally symbolic. This reveals that political agendas in Jordan are likely to interfere in modalities of humanitarian assistance to Palestinians.

6.3.2 HUMANITARIANISM AND CHALLENGES INVOLVED

The provision of humanitarian assistance through the UNRWA mandate has seen a major change of priority related to the emerging refugee crisis today. Humanitarian assistance is required not only by the ‘overstayed’ Palestinians, but also the new arrivals of Syrian and Iraqi refugees. This is what Riad said about UNRWA:

They reduced their assistance a lot, food assistance has decreased a lot; health care and [budget to] education have also been decreased. Recently they suggested canceling the UNRWA education and keeping only governmental education, but a lot of opposition fired against that.

Decreasing assistance from UNRWA represents important consequences for many households in refugee camps, as they often depend on this as the only resource. Globalization of conflicts and mass displacement as a consequence of the expansion of needs impose harsh conditions of life in host countries. The structure-agency perspective is useful here to understand humanitarian aid at a local level. Humanitarianism must be combined with a thorough diplomatic framework of negotiations, focused on conflict resolution. The implementation of assistance in camps highlights both the economic and political priorities strongly linked to foreign policies.

UNRWA played a major role in the reconstruction of Palestinian identity. The experience of refugee camps prevents integration into the host countries, which keeps Palestinian identity distinct from the others. UNRWA became a substitute for the welfare state in terms of education, health care and professional training. This facilitated the development of small cultural centers, known as Community Based Organizations (CBOs) (Khalidi, 1997).

The UN Resolution 194 stipulates that refugees should have the possibility to return to their home countries, and, if it were not possible, they would receive compensation (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 102). Many scholars have discussed this condition, as the meaning of assistance in this text has never been defined. Citizens from host countries feel resentment, after realizing that their displacement to Jordan would lead to a permanent resettlement. The main donors of UNRWA are the United States, the same country that strongly supports Israel, which is highly controversial. Palestinian refugees used UNRWA to construct their cultural distinctiveness in opposition to Israel. The reconstruction of Palestinian nationalism is a bottom-up rather than a top-down process that started at a local level and develops according to humanitarian structures (Shabaneh, 2010, p. 219).

The humanitarian intervention of UNRWA highlights important challenges and dilemmas in its implementation among Palestinian refugees. This questions not only the possibility of influence on Palestinian identity, but also the refugee status. Are all Palestinians in Jordan considered to be refugees? This makes it difficult to determine whether Palestinian identity and refugee identity are distinct entities or rather they interact together. As UNRWA provides humanitarian assistance to all Palestinians who arrived after 1948, including their descendants who live in neighboring countries, they are automatically considered to be refugees, according to the legal framework. But a major portion of these Palestinians also benefit from a Jordanian citizenship, which supposes that they have been fully integrated in the country. Unfortunately, this is not the case, which highlights more complex mechanisms. Expressions of identity depend on how much the Palestinian households rely on UNRWA assistance and whether they identify themselves as refugees. This aspect underlines the importance of economic and social resources in order to cope with living conditions in host countries. The refugee status today is often about a social class phenomenon and a question of social difference, which causes discrimination and inequalities.

This highlights different points of view from Palestinians themselves, but also projected expectations and considerations from governmental institutions and even the international community. UNRWA does not distinguish between the Palestinian identity and their refugee status. In this way, UNRWA contributes to the blurring of boundaries between Palestinian and refugee identity, which is still "in the making", as all Palestinians who benefit from UNRWA are considered as refugees, which affects the way they are assisted.

The UNRWA institutional framework has been heavily criticized, as it may lead to discrimination among refugee populations. Today, the assistance from UNRWA is not a guarantee of protection of civil rights. The implementation of aid is strongly influenced by different political agendas in the international community.

The refugee status is more and more shaped as a certain victimhood status, and these questions the real nature of humanitarian assistance. During my fieldwork, I saw children begging in the streets and coming to us to ask for money. At this occasion, one of the interpreters told me that Palestinian refugee camps developed a reputation of "beggars," especially in Baqa'a, which is closest to Amman and seems to get more funding than other camps, according to one of my interpreters. The youngest generations have been raised with the idea that they would obtain financial help from Western humanitarian organizations. There has been a paradigm shift in generations: the efforts of parents who "paved the way" to make life conditions easier for the younger generations are seen as very controversial.

It is important to notice differences in contexts and perceptions. The answers to my interviews in Oslo were rather different than in Jordan. The informants showed that they refused victimizing narratives. This may be explained by the fact that refugees migrating to Europe have more social and economic resources, as well as often higher education and income. They are able to show more distance towards Palestinian narratives of struggle and victimhood, and experience different modalities of integration in host countries such as Norway. The narrative of Palestine as a paradise is seen as an illusion for some of them.

Narratives of struggle question the possible dichotomy between Palestinian identity and a refugee identity. This phenomenon challenges the perceptions of the different actors, including Palestinians themselves. As explained in Chapter 3, the orientalism theory characterizes the Western vision of culture in the Middle East as hegemonic: this can be transposed into the Western humanitarian intervention today that does not necessarily serve the interests of the Palestinian population.

The structure-agency perspective highlights decisions at an institutional level from UNRWA or the Jordanian government that have a critical impact on livelihoods at a local level. What would originally be assets may become disadvantages as the institutional system perpetuates the refugee status and vulnerability of populations condemned to live in refugee camps. This raises discussable issues and depends highly of perceptions of the different actors involved (Rosen, 2012, p. 5).

The situation raises the question of complex emergencies in the implementation of humanitarian measures today. Scholars refer to the concept of complex emergencies as life-threatening situations or armed conflicts that last over time. This requires a reflection about tangible solutions for the best of all the stakeholders. Complex emergencies appear in a context of multiple actors and different geopolitical agendas involved in the conflicts (Calhoun, 2008, p. 83).

Refugees are often the most visible part of humanitarian crises. In the case of Palestinian refugees, the waves of forced displacement in 1948 and 1967 and the refugee status provided were supposed to remain temporary. Fifty years later, these populations still live in limbo and do not have the resources to ensure stable livelihoods. UNRWA was conceived as a temporary relief aid organization but is now condemned to work as long as the Israel-Palestine conflict carries on (Rosen, 2012, p. 5).

Cultural practices and identity may reveal valuable assets, but they also reveal disadvantages that lead to discrimination and vulnerability in the Palestinian population in Jordan. This poses important dilemmas and highlights power relations involved between the different social groups.

In this chapter, I discussed how Palestinians perceive their own identity, and the interactions between Jordanians and Palestinians, which includes discrimination and "othering" processes. Benefits from UNRWA differ according to which groups refugees belong to, such as Gazans, Syrians and other nationalities from the Middle East. I presented in which ways there has been a shift in the implementation of the UNRWA assistance, which questions how the Palestinian identity is framed in the provision of humanitarian assistance and challenges the conceptualization of relief aid. The implication of UNRWA has an inherent influence on Palestinian identity. This questions the role of the structure-agency perspective and highlights the position of identity as strategy at different levels of analysis. Palestinian identity reveals assets or disadvantages, and it poses crucial dilemmas in the implementation of humanitarian aid from UNRWA.

The experience of cultural practices among Palestinians refugees in Jordan reveals much about the interaction between place and identity. The humanitarian framework, and especially UNRWA, is supposed to provide assistance to people in need. But more than that, UNRWA has a deep impact on the construction and transmission of identity, by perpetuating the beneficiary status common to Palestinian refugees in this setting. Living conditions in refugee camps influence definitely Palestinian identity and its modalities of expression.

In the next and last chapter, I intend to sum up the main aspects of the interaction between place and identity in the case of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. I will also present some concluding remarks.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this final chapter, I will present the main elements of my overall analysis and a discussion of the findings from my fieldwork. I will also provide some new perspectives and reflections around the question of identity among Palestinian refugees.

7.1 CENTRAL FEATURES OF ANALYSIS

My research questions focus on how Palestinian refugees experience and sustain their cultural practices outside of their country, in the case of camps in North Jordan. I wonder also if these cultural practices are influenced by the living places in host countries. Another question is if some aspects of Palestinian identity represent a resource or constraint for this population. Several underlying concepts contribute to my analysis, such as culture, place, identity and belonging. This study highlights significant consequences of forced displacement for cultural practices and identity processes.

I looked first at the forming aspects of Palestinian identity, such as statelessness and the refugee status, classifications according to social differences such as the tribe system, Gazans and Bedouins, and differences of access to welfare system in Jordan. The role of the camps in identity formation has been explored through the concept of cultural landscapes, the evolution of narratives between generations and the impact on identity formation, and in relation to the historical context of the Israel-Palestine conflict that resulted to mass displacement. The development of resistance movements and political activism are an important part of daily life in camps in Jordan.

Expressions of identity are present through strong symbols such as land, the Arabic language, important days as *Nakba*, and material objects, and they contribute to uniting the Palestinian

community and fostering a common belonging. Palestinian identity rests on the notion of home and homeland, through imagined or real aspects that contribute to social processes.

In my second analysis chapter, I looked at the aspects of identity revealed as assets or disadvantages. Narratives and discourses are important insights that contribute to the transmission of cultural practices and oral history. The othering process is emphasized in a context of exclusion and discrimination that defines Palestinians as different from the rest of Jordanian citizens. Different perceptions between Jordanians and Palestinians themselves underline the importance of narratives in each social group. Discrimination in Jordanian politics stresses the impact of political agendas and relations with foreign actors, such as the United States and Israel. The structure-human agency perspective contributed to understanding the interaction between the different levels of analysis and their mutual influence. Assistance from UNRWA and Jordanian authorities depend on administrative classifications. These differences of administrative status and civil rights between Gazans and West Bankers emphasize an even more complex situation with the arrival of refugees from neighboring countries, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Social differences, like gender or religion, are also criteria for discrimination.

I presented the legal framework concerning Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and highlighted a shift in the implementation of aid, particularly the modalities of assistance from UNRWA. This poses dilemmas and challenges in the implementation of humanitarian aid. The Palestinian situation is an example of a complex humanitarian emergency situation that continues on without a satisfying or durable solution for the refugees. UNRWA influences identity formation as it perpetuates vulnerability through the refugee status for all generations of Palestinians, by creating categories of beneficiaries among the third generation of refugees. The access to Jordanian citizenship can be combined with a refugee status according to the UNRWA principles, which makes the situation challenging. The narratives of struggle and victimhood also emphasize inequalities between Western countries and the Middle East, through the orientalist perspective and the analysis of colonial history. This puts the Western humanitarian organizations in a delicate position and underlines dilemmas. Globalization and the capitalist economic system generate a complex network of alliances with Western countries. Refugees pay the price for conflicting political agendas among the international community. My analysis highlighted how structural

decisions have repercussions on livelihoods at a local level for the Palestinian refugee populations in Jordan.

In this context, Palestinian identity is experienced as a constraint, especially when Palestinians encounter discrimination from Jordanians in daily life. In other situations, identity represents a resource that tends to be reinforced among communities living in camps. This underlines the possibility of interactions between Palestinian identity and refugee identity, and how both aspects are revealed in living places.

Regarding my theoretical framework and the findings from my fieldwork, the experience of Palestinian cultural practices is very complex, especially in a context of displacement in Jordan. These cultural practices are intrinsically influenced by the living place in refugee camps. Cultural practices influence the forming of identity through complex social processes. They interact with geographical elements of living places, in order to form particular processes of belonging and sense of place.

7.2 NEW PERSPECTIVES AND REFLECTIONS

7.2.1 CITIZENSHIP VERSUS NATIONALITY

An important detail in migration and development studies is the difference between citizenship and nationality. As Yuval-Davis states, citizenship demonstrates a participatory aspect, through political involvement, such as the right of vote, civil rights through the welfare state and responsibilities towards the state (2011, p. 28). As a citizen, the individual is fully recognized by the state and has a legitimate place in society (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p. 28).

But in the situation of Palestinians in Jordan, citizenship does not guaranty the provision of civil rights, and many cases of discrimination have been reported. Palestinians who live in camps are still not recognized as equal to other Jordanian citizens. In addition, the concept of nationality concerning Palestinians is challenging, as Palestine is not considered as a country but rather as a problem for Israel.

Thus, notions of nationality or nationalism are still blurred and refer to belonging to a country as a social entity. Different degrees of implication of the state, based on nationalism, lead to mechanisms of inclusion or exclusion from societies. Cultural practices enhance belonging to nations. This points to the importance of considering the politics of belonging in migration studies.

7.2.2 OVERLAPPING NARRATIVES

Khalidi (1997) observed an overlapping and shift in narratives between Arab, Jordanian and Palestinian cultures, which has an impact on Palestinian identity. Palestinians have not fully defined themselves to the other cultures, particularly in relation to the Western world (Khalidi, 1997, p. 11).

From an Arab nationalist perspective, the concept of nation-state was imported from the British and French Imperialist powers. From an Islamic perspective, Palestinian nationalism is assimilated to heresy, as it tends to split the Islamic *Umma* ("people" or "nation") into independent countries (Khalidi, 1997, p. 155). In this context, nationalist consciousness is relatively modern. Social and economic trends that favored nationalist movements appeared after the First World War: increases in the urban population, wage labor and education level. These elements played a major role in the Palestinian identity process (Khalidi, 1997).

As a part of a larger whole, with the contribution of the Ottoman or Arab cultures during different historical periods, pan-Arabism represented an attempt of a transnational ideology. In addition, an overlap of loyalties to clans and families play an important part in the identity process. The historical context, however, questions bonds between countries. Arab nationalism is the successor of Ottomanism, representing a search for common identity and unity. The Ottoman Empire has long represented the enemy of Arabs, and it showed an important distinction between both populations (Khalidi, 1997, p. 158).

The promise of Arabism to protect population against Israel has apparently failed. Palestine faces suddenly a position of minority group in a country Palestinians thought was their own. *Nakba* marks the "lost years" and the beginning of a mass displacement from Palestine (Khalidi, 1997, p. 178).

Palestinians have long struggled for legitimacy and acceptance in the Western world. As the Israeli Prime Minister G. Meir said in 1969, "There was no such thing as Palestinians... they did not exist" (Khalidi, 1997, p. 147). In this way, the negation of Palestinian existence is highly significant in discourses among the international community (Khalidi, 1997).

Zionism is not the main factor in the construction of Palestinian identity but an element of a universal process in the Middle East. During the mid-1960s, a rebirth of Palestinian nationalism appeared with the creation of the political party, Fatah. Overlapping narratives of Arabism and Islam interact and may lead to conflicts (Khalidi, 1997, p. 172).

The historical context sheds light on an uneasy relationship between Palestine and Jordan, the latter being a country where Palestinians in 1948 became a majority of population but a minority in terms of political power and civil rights. Residents of refugee camps in Jordan identify with cities or villages of origin, even if most people of the third generation never saw Palestine. This reveals the particular power of cultural transmission through narratives and symbols (Khalidi, 1997).

All Palestinian children from the third generation received an education through support from UNRWA. An awareness of Palestinian belonging has become apparent among the youngsters and provided them the resources necessary in order to contest the current discrimination. In many common narratives, victims of the Palestinian tragedy are portrayed as heroic, and resistance movements such as *Intifada* are portrayed as triumphant against Israel. Strategic narratives are used in order to make Palestinian identity survive, or especially in a context of forced displacement in host countries. In such portrayals, revolt and martyrdom are key components. In this way, the two Intifada gave a boost to Palestinian nationalism. These resistance movements reestablished the influence of "inside" Palestine more than the "outside" impact of diaspora in media and among the international community (Khalidi, 1997, p. 200).

A focus on historical narratives helps to understand the evolution of Palestinian identity construction. Narratives highlight the importance of oral history through the elderly who maintain a link between generations and contribute to identity construction processes.

7.2.3 POLITICS OF BELONGING TODAY

Politics of belonging have attracted more and more attention these last decades among scholars. Belonging, or emotional attachment to places, may also refer to a feeling "at home." This may lead to critical discourses on nationalism. Belonging is highly politicized and sometimes threatened, as it depends of membership or lack of membership in social groups (Yuval-Davis, 2011).

Categories of social groups differ according to positionality in an axis of power relations. Categorizing processes depends on historical contexts and involve different locations. These multiple axes of social difference highlight that identities are subjective narratives, depending on self and others' perceptions of being in a social group. Identity narratives are complex and multiple and contribute to the construction of belonging to places. Identities become especially central when people feel threatened and less secure, e.g. after a terrorist attack. The performative dimension involves repetitive cultural practices in social space (Yuval-Davis, 2011, p. 25).

Belonging is particularly challenged in the case of Palestinians as a stateless group. They are not welcomed either in Israel or in neighboring countries. Indeed, Palestinians who live in the occupied territories of the West Bank are considered to be foreigners and thus non-citizens of Israel, which is in opposition to international law. Palestinians are generally not naturalized in neighboring Arab countries. They cannot access to stable employment, accommodation and equal interactions with host communities. This exposes them to discrimination and long-term poverty, as well as the denial of political and civil rights (Shiblak, 2006).

Statelessness is a major constraint in the case of Gazans, who hold only temporary Jordanian passports. UNRWA maintains their refugee status in neighboring countries. Palestinian refugees do not benefit from the same protection as refugees under the UNHCR framework and the 1951 Convention, which creates considerable inequalities. This situation has perpetuated a vulnerable status for four generations (Human Right Watch, 2010).

The contestation and challenge through politics of belonging highlight a participatory dimension of citizenship. The boundaries of national communities, challenged by refugee populations, constitute a current dilemma. A need for alternative theories that encompass social difference is

pervasive today. The consequences of the politics of belonging on the welfare state are made evident by the fact that the authorities decide who "deserves" assistance or not. Migration and foreigners are today seen as a threat to national cohesion. These points to a multicultural issue as the outcome of the globalization phenomenon, but with unwanted consequences (Yuval-Davis, 2011. p. 29).

7.2.4 DIASPORA AND MOBILITY

The Palestinian diaspora represents collective memory through social relations that connect the countries of origin to host countries. This phenomenon leads to multiple identities, through "diasporic interconnections" and new abstract forms of communities (Aoudé, 2001, p. 164). The existence of diasporas raises the question of how relations to homeland may influence cultural maintenance and identity construction (Aoudé, 2001).

Diaspora and mobility are crucial concepts that participate in and relate to global development. During my fieldwork, I learned that local organizations and Community Based Organizations played a major role as meeting places in refugee camps, which allowed socializing between Palestinians who experienced the same daily life. The spread of local organizations for displaced Palestinians in camps strengthens a feeling of collective belonging and solidarity.

The appearance of hybrid identities, in a context of displacement, requires reconceptualizing the social processes involved. Attachment to places is dynamic, evolving in time and place, and it is constructed through relations with social groups. Politics of identity focus on the awareness of social differences that may become assets and encourage political activism. In this context, identity is experienced as a strategy. Identities are fluid in our post-modern societies; they allow for potentially redefining oneself through constant renegotiation (Easthope, 2009, p. 65). Identities are the products of our society and are intrinsically tied to place and home. The dialectic between roots and mobility has evolved until place represents today both stability and change. The concepts of identity and place strongly interact with the diaspora phenomenon, and they are fundamental in development studies (Easthope, 2009).

For Palestinian refugees, home and place represent a particular symbol that has an impact on collective identity construction. Palestinians relate to the notion of home through their emotions and symbolic meaning. Powerful discourses and narratives transmit notions of home through

generations of refugees as a result of oral history. Identity, place and home are related according to complex social mechanisms in the case of Palestinian refugees. Homeland becomes the main goal and justification for political activism and resistance movements in camps.

7.2.5 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

A crucial question today lies in the interaction of international policies in conflict with national laws. An example of this is the situation of a Palestinian family that has been sent out of Norway because the grandparents were Jordanian citizens but did not inform the Norwegian authorities (Olsen, 2017). This highlights the complexity of the situation of Palestinians and their vulnerability, as they may be considered to be refugees in Jordan but do not have a legitimate access to welfare state or the same civil rights as in other host countries. This is the case when Palestinian identity cannot be claimed under some circumstances, even when desired. It presents an inherent challenge within citizenship criteria in which children inherit parent's nationality and gives limited room for alternatives. Identity is then revealed as a constraint that leads to discrimination and inequalities of citizenship rights.

The Israel-Palestine conflict presents a very uncertain challenge. Palestinian politicians are accused of participating in the conflict as they encourage a status quo situation. Corruption in many institutional levels prevents the money provided for humanitarian aid from being delivered directly to refugee populations. The political elites in Palestine are divided between Fatah – initiated by Y. Arafat, and which favors a two-state solution – and Hamas – present mostly in Gaza, and which supports the "liberation" of Palestine and the dissolution of the Israeli state. In this context, the young generations today are disillusioned about Palestinian politicians and their unrealistic propositions. The Palestinian Authority has been seen more and more as a false institution and a parody of government, and it has progressively lost credibility among both Palestinians and the international community (Rubin, 1999, p. 69). While the Palestinian generation during the 1960s and 1970s was ready for a revolution, the young generation today focuses on employment opportunities, respect for civil rights and freedom of speech. It seems that the President of the Palestinian Authority M. Abbas wants to repress its own people, who became aware of the inefficiency and corruption in the government. The current violence episodes are not less than a sign of distress due to a lack of vision and clear political program. A

greater attention should be paid in transparency and responsibility in the negotiations between Israel and Palestine (Rubin, 1999).

During my fieldwork, several informants and interpreters confirmed this information about corruption. Money from UNRWA donors is transmitted through different administrations managing the camps, so that it "disappears" along an administrative labyrinth. Palestinian politicians receive money from international donors, who pay their salaries. Development aid and the intervention of the United Nations contribute indirectly to the conflict, especially through the Oslo agreement that created the Palestinian authority and was revealed as unsuccessful. International donors, mainly the European Union and United States, are today torn between denouncing the violations of human rights in the Palestinian conflict and the necessity to satisfy Israel for economic and diplomatic purposes.

The suggestion of a two-state solution reveals more and more complex mechanisms. The multiple peace processes and diplomatic negotiations since mid-1970s and at the same time the growth of Israeli settlements in occupied territories makes a peaceful issue of the process rather doubtful.

My analysis demonstrates an exploration of how cultural practices, through real and imaginary elements, may help us to achieve a thorough understanding of very specific Palestinian identity processes embedded in host societies. In a wider context, a shift in humanitarian practices and search for durable solutions for the stakeholders involved is necessary both at a local level and among the international community.

In relation to my research questions, to the theoretical framework and key findings from my fieldwork, differences between Palestinian and Jordanian identity are often related to social class, or to the Jordanian political context. Statelessness shows particular repercussions on identity construction. Elements of classification and differences of status such as the tribe system, the Gazans' situation and the Bedouins' position in the Jordanian society, are important elements to take into consideration. Places, and especially refugee camps, play a major role in forging identity and political activism. Expressions of identity highlight a shift between generations, due to historical insights, which leads to hybrid identities as strategic. The symbolic power of cultural

practices and the Palestinian imaginary conception of homeland, contribute to the construction of belonging. Palestinian refugees experience cultural practices in opposition to Jordanians and according to specific social processes, such as the "othering" phenomenon. These elements of analysis show that cultural practices are influenced by the place where Palestinian refugees live.

To answer to my last research question, Palestinian identity can be both a resource and constraint according to different settings. Assets and dilemmas involved in Palestinian identity include the contribution of narratives and discourses through oral history. Interactions between social groups lead to different perceptions and experiences of discrimination. Access to humanitarian aid, particularly for Gazans, Syrians and other nationalities from the Middle East, highlights a shift in the UNRWA provision of assistance and its role in Palestinian identity. The decrease of assistance accentuates the vulnerability of Palestinian refugees. This shows that UNRWA contributes to blur boundaries between refugee and Palestinian identity.

As I argued in my study, Palestinian identity as an asset reveals not only key insights, but also important dilemmas, especially for the younger generation. Identity construction depends on different perceptions among social groups through narratives of struggle internalized among the different generations living in camps. The evolution of UNRWA assistance and the Jordanian legal framework create the current challenges and institutional discrimination that influence identity construction. In this context, the structure-agency perspective contributes to understanding the relations between global North-South. These factors explain the sustenance of Palestinian identity and its distinctiveness in the Middle East. An exploration of these powerful social processes may help elucidate why Palestinian identity has survived despite political opposition and a decline in civil rights.

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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF RESPONDENTS

Informant	Age	Marital status	Citizenship	Occupation	Education	Period of stay at the camp	Migration history	Place of birth
Samir	24	Single	Jordanian	Employed	University	Born there	Parents from the West Bank	Amman
Wahid	85	Married	Jordanian	Shop owner	Primary school	2003	Lebanon, Koweit	West Bank
Yacine	85	Widow	Jordanian	Retired	Construction worker	1949	Displaced to the Jordan River	West Bank
Rachida	70	Widow	Jordanian	Retired	None	Since 1968	From the West Bank	West Bank
Asma	54	Single	Jordanian	Unemployed	None	Born there	Mother from the West Bank, arrived in Amman in 1963	Jordan
Arwa	43	Married	Jordanian	Housewife	None	Born there	Parents from Gaza	Amman
Tariq	26	Single	Jordanian	Free lancer	University	Since he was 7	Parents from the West Bank, came in 1967	Saudi Arabia
Riad	50	No information	Jordanian	Liberal profession	University	40 years	Displaced from the West Bank	West Bank
Slimane	80	Married	Jordanian	Retired	None	Since 1955	From the West Bank	West Bank
Dounia	45	Divorced	Palestinian, Jordanian temporary passport	Unemployed	None	30 years	Mother from the West Bank	Egypt
Fatima	35	Divorced	Jordanian	Employed	University	Born there but	Mother from	Amman

						lived 7 years in Jerash camp	the West Bank	
Jasmine	69	Widow	Gazan, Jordanian temporary passport	Retired	10th grade of school	Since 1967	From the West Bank, displaced to Gaza	West Bank
Sofiane	19	Single	Gazan	Student	High school	Born there	Parents in Emirates	Emirates
Driss	84	Widow	Gazan	Retired	None	Since 1945	Displaced to Gaza	West Bank
Ahmed	20	Single	Egyptian	Student	University	6 months	Father Gazan, parents live in the Emirates	Emirates
Leyla (Same household)	18	Single	Egyptian travel document	Student	University	6 months	Parents in Emirates	Emirates
Jamila	35	Widow	Jordanian	Unemployed	High school degree	2 years	From the West Bank, mother from Gaza	Amman
Nour	80	Married	Jordanian	House wife	None	Since 1967	From Gaza, displaced to the West Bank	Gaza
Aicha	70	Widow	Jordanian	Retired	None	Since 1979	West Bank	West Bank
Mounia	39	Widow	Jordanian	Housewife	None	Born there		West Bank
Ali	23	No information	Jordanina	Employed	Bachelor degree	Born there		Jordan
Oumar (Same household, focus group discussion)	22	No information	Jordanian	Employed	None	Born there		Jordan

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR REFUGEES

Civil status:

Age, gender, civil status (married, single, widow)

Do you go to school? Do you work? Where do you work? What type of work? Are you paid?

How many people live with you? Who?

Household, livelihood:

How long have you lived here? In the camp? In Jordan?

How did you arrive? By foot, car, bus...

Do you have family here? Friends? Network?

Do you know Palestinian or Jordanian people?

Did you know some people here when you arrived?

How have you been welcomed by people here? NGOs, neighbours...

How have you welcome new people arriving here?

Is it easy to get to know people here? Why?

How did you find a house/place to live?

Do you have a passport? Identity papers? Which citizenship do you have?

Do you receive help from the government? From NGOs?

Do you receive help from family, friends?

Social relationships:

Are you member of an organisation? Which one? Why?

Are you able to move freely here? Do you have access to facilities like hospitals, schools, ...?

Do you feel at home here?

What does it mean for you to be a refugee? Do you feel that you are a refugee?

Do you feel that you are treated differently from Jordanian citizens?

Do Jordanian people treat you differently?

Culture:

What celebrations are important for you? Do you have any special days that you celebrate?

Which ones and why? How do you celebrate them here?

Do you find challenging to perform some rituals here, for example marriage? Why?

Do you celebrate Jordanian national festivals?

What kind of food do you like to eat most? Can you find it here?

Have you kept some objects/souvenirs/pictures from your home country?

Which ones and why?

Do you see differences of culture here and in your home country?

Do you think it is possible to have two cultures at the same time? Why?

Projects:

Do you plan to settle down here? Do you plan to move to another place? Why?

Do you have projects in the future?

APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NGOS

What are the differences of status between Palestinians and Jordanians?

What are the main challenges for Palestinian refugees in Jordan?

How is your organization financed?

Do you work with Palestinian political parties? How?

What is your relation to the Jordanian government?

What is your relation to UNRWA?