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0102/DOC_OC05772690/C05772690.pdf,F-2014-
20439,Clinton_Email_August_Release,Fw (Reuters) U.S. commander orders
probe into UK Afghan aid worker's death,, Abedin, Huma
<AbedinH@state.gov> ,NEWS-Mahogany; NEWS-Afghanistan, Monday, October 11,
2010 831 AM ,F-2014-20439,C05772690,08/31/2015,RELEASE IN FULL,,
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No.
C05772690 Date 08/31/2015 RELEASE IN FULL From Abedin, Huma
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(Reuters) U.S. commander orders probe into UK Afghan aid worker's death
From Deyo, Justin A To SES-O_Shift-II; SES-O_OS Cc NEWS-Mahogany; NEWS-
Afghanistan Sent Mon Oct 11 081544 2010 Subject (Reuters) U.S. commander
orders probe into UK Afghan aid worker's death KABUL (Reuters) - The
commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus,
has ordered a probe into the death of a British aid worker killed during
a rescue bid by U.S. forces, the U.S. military said. Initial reports
indicated the explosion was caused by a detonation triggered by one of
the captors who was in close proximity to Linda Norgrove. Subsequent
review of surveillance footage and discussions with members of the rescue
team do not conclusively determine the cause of her death, it said. The
statement comes shortly after British Prime Minister David Cameron told a
news conference Norgrove may have been killed by a grenade from foreign
forces during the rescue operation. Justin Deyo U.S. Department of State
Operations Center (S/ES-0) 202-647-1512 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of
State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05772690 Date 08/31/2015  "
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Monday, June 28, 2010 1132 AM ,F-2014-20439,C05770115,08/31/2015,RELEASE IN FULL, Lowey to Remove Assistance for Afghanistan From Foreign Aid Bill Chairwoman Announces Oversight Hearings on Corruption in Afghanistan WASHINGTON In light of two troubling news reports on corruption within the Afghan government, Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Appropriations State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee, today announced she is removing funding for Afghanistan beyond humanitarian aid from her 2011 bill scheduled for markup this week. The alleged shipment of billions in donor funds out of Afghanistan and allegations of Afghan government insiders impeding corruption investigations are outrageous, said Lowey. I do not intend to appropriate one more dime for assistance to Afghanistan until I have confidence that U.S. taxpayer money is not being abused to line the pockets of corrupt Afghan government officials, drug lords, and terrorists. Furthermore, the government of Afghanistan must demonstrate that corruption is being aggressively investigated and prosecuted. Rampant corruption fosters the conditions that threaten the security of our troops and the stability of the Afghan government and economy. The State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee will mark up its Fiscal Year 2011 Appropriations Act on Wednesday June 30th. The subcommittee will not consider any bilateral assistance for the Afghan government other than lifesaving humanitarian aid at this time. Lowey also announced the Subcommittee will hold oversight hearings after the July 4th recess to get to the bottom of these allegations. Too many Americans are suffering in this economy for us to put their hard-earned tax dollars into the hands of criminals overseas, said Lowey. We will not commit billions more in taxpayer money for Afghanistan until there are assurances that such funds will be used for their intended purposes and that the government of Afghanistan is willing and able to root corruption within its ranks. U.S. taxpayers deserve nothing less. , UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770115 Date 08/31/2015 RELEASE IN FULL From Verma, Richard R <VermaRR@state.gov> Sent Monday, June 28, 2010 1132 AM To H; Lew, Jacobi Subject FW Afghan release -- about to be sent out by lowey. Lowey to Remove Assistance for Afghanistan From Foreign Aid Bill Chairwoman Announces Oversight Hearings on Corruption in Afghanistan WASHINGTON In light of two troubling news reports on corruption within the Afghan government, Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Appropriations State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee, today announced she is removing funding for Afghanistan beyond humanitarian aid from her 2011 bill scheduled for markup this week. The alleged shipment of billions in donor funds out of Afghanistan and allegations of Afghan government insiders impeding corruption investigations are outrageous, said Lowey. I do not intend to appropriate one more dime for assistance to Afghanistan until I have confidence that U.S. taxpayer money is not being abused to line the pockets of corrupt Afghan government officials, drug lords, and terrorists. Furthermore, the government of Afghanistan must demonstrate that corruption is being aggressively investigated and prosecuted. Rampant corruption fosters the conditions that threaten the security of our troops and the stability of the Afghan government and economy. The State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee will mark up its Fiscal Year 2011 Appropriations Act on Wednesday June 30th. The subcommittee will not consider any bilateral assistance for the Afghan government other than lifesaving humanitarian aid at this time. Lowey also announced the Subcommittee will hold oversight hearings after the July 4th recess to get to the bottom of these allegations. Too many Americans are suffering in this economy for us to put their hard-earned tax dollars into the hands of criminals overseas, said Lowey. We will not commit billions more in taxpayer money for Afghanistan until there are assurances that such funds will be used for their intended purposes and that the government of Afghanistan is willing and able to root corruption

within its ranks. U.S. taxpayers deserve nothing less. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05770115 Date 08/31/2015 "

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5.pdf,F-2014-20439,HRCEmail_JulyWeb,U.S. national held over Afghan boy's  
shooting,H, Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov> , SES-O_Shift-II; SES-  
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November 11, 2009 234 PM ,F-2014-20439,C05765705,07/31/2015,RELEASE IN  
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Phillip T Sent Wednesday, November 11, 2009 228 PM To S; D(L); D(S); P;  
SSRAP_StaffAssistants; M_SpecialAssistants; CA-Staffers Mailbox; SCA-  
Staff-Assistants-DL; C Cc SES-O_Shift-II; SES-O_Shift-III; SWO; Bitter,  
Rena; Sullivan, Stephanie S Subject U.S. national held over Afghan boy's  
shooting Colleagues I have attached a Reuters report below about a U.S.  
national who has been arrested in Northern Afghanistan over a shooting  
incident. Ops spoke with Kabul ACS Chief Katie Nutt who said that this  
incident occurred on November 8. Kabul has kept CA/OCS in the loop about  
the case. The man, who works for a NGO, has not yet been charged and is  
being held at a NDS (National Directorate of Security) site in a private  
cell. He is being treated well and has hired an attorney from the  
Consular Section's list. The Consular Section has kept in touch with him,  
and the Swedish-led PRT in Mazar-i-Sharif has also been in contact. -  
PhiII Phillip T. Slattery Senior Watch Officer U.S. aid worker held over  
Afghan boy's shooting KABUL, Nov 11 (Reuters) - An American aid worker in  
northern Afghanistan is being held by Afghan authorities over the fatal  
shooting of an Afghan teenager at his home, a provincial police chief  
said on Wednesday. Mohammad Bilal Niram, chief of police in the northern  
Sar-i-pul province, said the aid worker had killed his landlord's 16-  
year-old son with three gunshots, possibly suspecting a burglary when the  
boy tried to enter his home. He is in Afghan government custody for  
investigation. He has not been charged, Niram said. The man worked for GP  
he said, referring to Global Partners, a UK-based aid group which says it  
has run programmes in Afghanistan since 1993. Staff at the organisation's  
London headquarters declined to comment on the incident. John Groch, a  
spokesman for the U.S. embassy, confirmed that an American had been  
arrested in Sar-i-pul but said he could give no further details pending  
the Afghan police investigation. (Reporting by Hamid Shalizi and Peter  
Graff, writing by Peter Graff, editing by Mark Trevelyan) UNCLASSIFIED  
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20439,Clinton_Email_August_Release, U.N. Rejects 'Militarization' of
Afghan Aid (NYT, Nordland) , , Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivaral@state.gov> ,
Cooper, Kurtis A; Pelofsky, Eric J , Thursday, February 18, 2010 1118 AM
,F-2014-20439,C05767257,08/31/2015,RELEASE IN FULL,FYI, UNCLASSIFIED U.S.
Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767257 Date
08/31/2015 RELEASE IN FULL From Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivaral@state.gov>
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'Militarization of Afghan Aid (NYT, Nordland) FYI Original Message From
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Eric J Subject U.N. Rejects 'Militarization' of Afghan Aid (NYT,
Nordland) By ROD NORDLAND Published February 18, 2010 KABUL, Afghanistan
-Senior United Nations officials in Afghanistan on Wednesday criticized
NATO forces for what one referred to as the militarization of
humanitarian aid, and said United Nations agencies would not participate
in the military's reconstruction strategy in Marja as part of its current
offensive there. We are not part of that process, we do not want to be
part of it, said Robert Watkins, the deputy special representative of the
secretary general, at a news conference attended by other officials to
announce the United Nations' Humanitarian Action Plan for 2010. We will
not be part of that military strategy. The American commander in
Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, has made the rapid delivery of
governmental services, including education, health care and job programs,
a central part of his strategy in Marja, referring to plans to rapidly
deploy what he has referred to as a government in a box once Marja is
pacified. Mr. Watkins did not specifically criticize the Marja offensive,
saying, It is not the military that will be delivering the services, they
will be clearing the area so the government can deliver those services.
However, the United Nations would not be participating, he said. Wael
Haj-Ibrahim, head of the United Nations' Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs here, said the military should not be involved in
providing health care or schools. If that aid is being delivered as part
of a military strategy, the counterstrategy is to destroy that aid, Mr.
Haj-Ibrahim said. Allowing the military to do it is not the best use of
resources. Instead, he said, the military should confine itself to
clearing an area of security threats and providing security for
humanitarian organizations to deliver services. The distribution of aid
by the military gives a very difficult impression to the communities and
puts the lives of humanitarian workers at risk, Mr. Watkins said. Last
month, eight leading humanitarian organizations working in UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767257 Date
08/31/2015 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439
Doc No. C05767257 Date 08/31/2015 Afghanistan, including Oxfam and
ActionAid, issued a joint report that was highly critical of the
International Security Assistance Force, as the American-led NATO force
is known, because of the international militaries' use of aid as a
'nonlethal' weapon of war. They maintained that this violated an
agreement between international forces and the United Nations that the
military's primary role should be to provide security and, only when
there is no other alternative, to provide limited developmental and
humanitarian assistance. The agencies maintain they are able to work in
conflict areas of Afghanistan when local residents see them as
independent and not connected with the military, and this approach puts
that at risk. Military-led humanitarian and development activities are
driven by donors' political interests and short-term security objectives

and are often ineffective, wasteful and potentially harmful to Afghans, a statement by Oxfam said. The United Nations officials expressed the same concern, though more diplomatically, and one official, who did not want to be quoted by name because of the political sensitivity of the issue, said the United Nations had repeatedly raised those concerns with the international forces without success. The American military refers to its strategy, first enunciated in Iraq in 2006, as clear, hold and build. Previously there were insufficient foreign and Afghan troops in Afghanistan to pursue that strategy systematically because they were unable to hold large areas for long periods of time. The offensive in Marja is intended as a showcase where the strategy can work, and the coalition says it has adequate forces now to do that. Clear, hold and build, it's short-sighted for two reasons, the United Nations official said. Territory changes hands in a conflict, and if the services are associated with a particular group, it will be destroyed. That has happened often with projects like schools and clinics around the country. The officials were particularly critical of NATO's planned civilian surge, bringing in more government-financed aid workers involved in projects like the country's provincial reconstruction teams, which are located in each province and designed to provide fast-track development and aid services in their areas. These reconstruction teams are NATO groups run by various allied countries, including Canada in Kandahar, and Britain in Lashkar Gah, and they primarily disburse development and aid money locally in each province. Many of the reconstruction teams, the official said, see their role as providing services in exchange for intelligence-gathering and political activity directed against the insurgents. He declined to identify any that operate under that premise, although he added that not all did so. In many parts of the country, only nongovernmental organizations are able to operate safely because of the security situation, and they fill the gap in governmental services. Because the reconstruction teams are run by foreigners and are associated with their countries' militaries, they need to go out with heavy security, and aid groups worry that locals begin to associate all aid workers with the military. Oxfam said the military was going way beyond its remit in Afghanistan, citing an American Army counterinsurgency manual that defines humanitarian aid as a nonlethal weapon. A statement issued Wednesday by the international forces emphasized the military's new, population-centered approach to fighting the insurgents. The conduct of Operation Moshtarak is visibly demonstrating that the force has changed the way it operates and that it is working with and for the people of Afghanistan, the statement said, referring to the Marja offensive. It also suggested the military phase of the operation could be protracted. The insurgents are tactically adept, have resilience and are cunning, so continued tactical patience on the part of the combined force is important. Mining is significant in areas, and the combined UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767257 Date 08/31/2015 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767257 Date 08/31/2015 force must be very deliberate in its movement in order to minimize local Afghan and combined force casualties. The United Nations' Humanitarian Action Plan has a proposed budget of \$870.5 million, a substantial increase over previous years, because the increased level of NATO military activity has led to increased needs for services in many parts of the country, according the United Nations. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767257 Date 08/31/2015 "

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been killed by American shells and bombs. So what should Obama do? First of all he has time. He is not going to win or lose the war in the next year. Like it or not he is stuck with Mr Karzai and he should get used to the idea. It is reasonable to suggest helping to produce a larger Afghan army and police force but this cannot be done overnight. Most military recruits are there for the money and are too malnourished even to wear American flack jackets. Speeding up security training for Afghan police meant over the summer that terrified men, often on heroin, were being sent to man dangerous and isolated police posts with just three weeks training. Many of them did not come back. One way Obama could strengthen the Afghan army and police is to make sure their men are paid properly. In Kabul many facilities are being guarded by policemen earning \$70 a month, which is not enough to live on unless supplemented with bribes. This contrasts with \$250,000 a year paid to foreign consultants who lurk inside heavily defended compounds. Paying the Iraqi army properly really did make a difference in Baghdad and might do the same in Afghanistan where 40 per cent of men are unemployed. A difference is that Iraqi oil revenues last year were \$62 billion while the Afghan government is dependent on foreign aid. The US and its allies will have to pay. It is carefully thought out measures like this that Obama should be considering and not the panicky dispatch of US Special Forces or tens of thousand of more troops. , UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05764318 Date 07/31/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From sbwhoeop Sent Thursday, October 8, 2009 1014 AM To Subject H Afghan. Sid Hillary FYI I found this one of the most sensible and informed brief articles on Afghanistan. Patrick Cockburn, of the London Independent, is one of the best informed on-the-ground journalists. He was almost always correct on Iraq. Sid Patrick Cockburn To say this war must be won in a year is nonsense <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/patrick-cockburn-to-say-this-war-must-be-won-in-a-year-is-nonsense-1799296.html> Thursday, 8 October 2009 SPONSORED LINKS Eight years ago I was standing on a hill 50 miles north of Kabul watching the flashes in the night sky as the US air strikes started again at the Taliban front line. There were a few ineffective puffs of fire from Taliban anti-aircraft guns which could do nothing against the bombs and missiles raining down on them. It was a strange war to cover, not least because so little real fighting took place. The reputation of the Afghan fighting man is partly based on agilely joining the winning side at the right moment. In the meantime they don't fight too hard for anybody and try to avoid getting killed. The US and British press mostly reported the war of 2001 as a real military conflict and rather missed the point that the Taliban had just gone home. I remember visiting the former headquarters of a Taliban armoured brigade in the city of Ghazni south west of Kabul. The tanks and armoured vehicles had all been smashed to pieces by American bombs, but when I asked local people how many men the Taliban had lost, I was told none at all. They could see what was going to happen so they just ran away. Just as the US military victory of 2001 was overstated, so eight years later is the sense of military crisis which is being busily stoked by Gen Stanley A McChrystal, the top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan. In Washington military officials are quoted as saying that the war will be won or lost in the next twelve months. This is nonsense. The Taliban have been able to advance so rapidly in the last three years because they have Pakistani backing and because of the spectacular political and military weakness of President Hamid Karzai's government. But the Taliban draw all their strength from the Pashtun community, which makes up 42 per cent of the Afghan population. They will have great difficulty advancing into areas occupied by the other 58 per cent of the population where there is a Tajik, Hazara or Uzbek majority. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05764318 Date 07/31/2015 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439

Doc No. C05764318 Date 07/31/2015 Squads of six or eight Taliban on motorcycles might be harassing the roads around Kabul, but there is no need to treat them as if they were North Vietnamese divisions at the gates of Saigon in 1975. The strength of the Taliban is that not that they can take and hold territory, but that they can inflict quite small military losses on the US which are politically unacceptable back home. They can do this through roadside bombs, something the US army speaks as if it were a new device, though it was being used against the British army in Ireland in 1921. If the Americans and British try to hold territory supposedly cleared of Taliban with penny packets of troops then these are vulnerable to being suddenly targeted by the other side. It is to prevent this happening that Gen McChrystal has asked for an extra 40,000 soldiers. But Afghans tell me that more foreign troops will simply mean more violence and dead Afghans as more of the country becomes a battlefield. It is absurd to imagine that the world's most heavily equipped military force is not going to use its weapons when it comes under attack. Polls also show that Taliban support is at its height in just those areas where Afghan civilians have been killed by American shells and bombs. So what should Obama do? First of all he has time. He is not going to win or lose the war in the next year. Like it or not he is stuck with Mr Karzai and he should get used to the idea. It is reasonable to suggest helping to produce a larger Afghan army and police force but this cannot be done overnight. Most military recruits are there for the money and are too malnourished even to wear American flack jackets. Speeding up security training for Afghan police meant over the summer that terrified men, often on heroin, were being sent to man dangerous and isolated police posts with just three weeks training. Many of them did not come back. One way Obama could strengthen the Afghan army and police is to make sure their men are paid properly. In Kabul many facilities are being guarded by policemen earning \$70 a month, which is not enough to live on unless supplemented with bribes. This contrasts with \$250,000 a year paid to foreign consultants who lurk inside heavily defended compounds. Paying the Iraqi army properly really did make a difference in Baghdad and might do the same in Afghanistan where 40 per cent of men are unemployed. A difference is that Iraqi oil revenues last year were \$62 billion while the Afghan government is dependent on foreign aid. The US and its allies will have to pay. It is carefully thought out measures like this that Obama should be considering and not the panicky dispatch of US Special Forces or tens of thousand of more troops.

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05764318 Date 07/31/2015 "

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<SullivanJJ@state.gov> ,, Wednesday, September 30, 2009 103 PM ,F-2014-
20439,C05766340,07/31/2015,RELEASE IN FULL, Levin opposed the surge, but
voted for funding the troops. Pasted below is Levin's speech on troops in
Afghanistan. We'll have a copy for you as well. Afghan speech below FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 11, 2009 Contact Senator Levin's Office Phone
202.224.6221 Senate Floor Speech - Surge the Afghan Army Remarks as
prepared for delivery Today we mark a solemn anniversary. Eight years ago
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July that a lack of Afghan troops is absolutely our Achilles heel. What do we need to do to increase the size of the Afghan army and police? According to Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, there is no lack of Afghan manpower; we've been assured it is available. But we will need significantly more trainers. We asked General Formica, who is in charge of the American effort to train Afghan security forces, whether such an increase is possible. He indicated he would make an assessment of what would be necessary in order to meet the earlier timetable. In the meantime, we should also press our NATO allies with much greater forcefulness to provide more trainers. If our NATO allies are not going to come through with the combat forces they have pledged, at least they could provide additional trainers. Larger Afghan security forces will also require more mid-level Afghan officers. In addition to supporting efforts to graduate more Afghan officers from army academies, we should consider the recommendation of Defense Minister Wardak that previous mid-level officers who fought the war against the Soviets return to service on an interim basis. Minister Wardak emphasized that those men are well qualified and well motivated, and while they may not be trained in the most current tactics, they nonetheless could temporarily meet the need of the enlarged army while the new group of officers is trained. A larger Afghan force will need supporting infrastructure, such as barracks. While the available infrastructure may not be the most modern, it is adequate and exists in sufficient amounts. Larger Afghan security forces will require additional equipment. There must be a major effort to transfer a significant amount of the equipment that is coming out of Iraq to the Afghan army and police. Such a significant commitment to equip the Afghan security forces would also help demonstrate U.S. determination to take the initiative and create momentum in the right direction. There is an enormous amount of equipment coming out of Iraq; our military is calling it one of the greatest transfers of military goods in the world's history. A significant part of it could be transferred to the Afghan forces, increasing their capability without weakening our own readiness. And yet there does not seem to be that kind of a crash effort in place to do that. We need to obtain on an urgent basis a list of the basic equipment needs of the Afghan forces and a list of how those needs could be met in a major program to transfer equipment leaving Iraq. Rapidly expanding Afghanistan's military and police forces would address one of the major problems and risks we now face there. General McChrystal told us he worries that waiting until 2013 for a larger Afghan force creates a gap in capabilities that brings significant risk of failure. But by accelerating the training and equipping of Afghan forces by a year, we address his concern. Depending on additional capability from Afghan, rather than U.S., forces, also addresses a major problem of public perception in Afghanistan. The larger our own military footprint there, the more our enemies can seek to drive a wedge between us and the Afghan population, spreading the falsehood that we seek to dominate a Muslim nation. Finally, we should make a concerted effort to separate the local Taliban from their leaders. In Iraq, large numbers of young Iraqis who had been attacking us switched over to our side and became the Sons of Iraq. They were drawn in part by the promise of jobs and amnesty for past attacks, and in part by the recognition that the status quo was creating horrific violence in their own communities. In their own interests and the interests of their nation, they switched sides and became a positive force. That same prospect exists in Afghanistan. Afghan leaders and our military say that local Taliban fighters are motivated largely by the need for a job or loyalty to the local leader who pays them and not by ideology or religious zeal. They believe an effort to attract these fighters to the government's side could succeed, if they are offered security for themselves and their families, and if there is no penalty for previous activity against us. General McChrystal himself has

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LEVIN, JilotyLC@state.gov, H, 80, 2009-09-30T040000+0000, 2015-06-30T040000+0000, DOCUMENTS/HRCall_1_1-29_JuneWEB/6_7_8/DOC_0C05759468/C05759468.pdf, F-2014-20439, HRCEmail_JuneWeb, Fw Sen. Levin, 'JilotyLC@state.gov', H <hrod17@clintonemail.com >, , Wednesday, September 30, 2009 9:17 PM , F-2014-20439, C05759468, 06/30/2015, RELEASE IN FULL, Pls print., UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05759468 Date 06/30/2015 RELEASE IN FULL From H <hrod17@clintonemail.com > Sent Wednesday, September 30, 2009 9:17 PM To 'JilotyLC@state.gov' Subject Fw Sen. Levin Pls print. Original Message From Sullivan, Jacob J <Sullivan.1.1@state.gov> To H Sent Wed Sep 30 13:03:07 2009 Subject RE Sen. Levin Levin opposed the surge, but voted for funding the troops. Pasted below is Levin's speech on troops in Afghanistan. We'll have a copy for you as well. Afghan speech below FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE September 11, 2009 Contact Senator Levin's Office Phone 202.224.6221 Senate Floor Speech - Surge the Afghan Army Remarks as prepared for delivery Today we mark a solemn anniversary. Eight years ago this morning, our nation was attacked by terrorist extremists motivated by hatred and bent on destruction. It is always appropriate to remember the shock of that day, the innocent lives lost, and the efforts our nation has made since that day to ensure that Afghanistan, the nation that hosted those terrorists, cannot again become a safe haven for terrorists seeking to attack us. But today is an especially appropriate occasion to take stock of those efforts, and consider how best to continue them. I recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan, where I was joined by my colleagues Senators Jack Reed and Ted Kaufman. The situation in Afghanistan is serious. Security has deteriorated. But if we take the right steps, we can ensure that Afghanistan does not revert to a Taliban-friendly government that could once again provide a safe haven for al Qaeda to terrorize us and the world. The Obama administration's new strategy, focusing on securing the Afghan population's safety and partnering with the Afghan security forces in that effort, is an important start at reversing the situation in Afghanistan. The change in strategy has led our forces, in the words of General McChrystal's Counterinsurgency Guidance, to live, eat and train together with the Afghan security forces, plan and operate together, depend on one another, and hold each other accountable...and treat them as equal partners in success. The Guidance goes on to say that the success of the Afghan security forces is our goal. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05759468 Date 06/30/2015 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05759468 Date 06/30/2015 To achieve that goal we should increase and accelerate our efforts to support the Afghan security forces in their efforts to become self-sufficient in delivering security to their nation before we consider whether to increase U.S. combat forces above the levels already planned for the next few months. These steps include increasing the size of the Afghan Army and police much faster than presently planned; providing more trainers for the Afghan Army and police than presently planned; providing them more equipment than presently planned; and working to separate local Taliban fighters from their leaders and attract them to the side of the government as we did in Iraq. While the security situation in Afghanistan has worsened, we still have important advantages there. The Afghan people hate the Taliban. Public opinion polls show support for the Taliban at about 5%. In addition, the Afghan army is highly motivated and its troops are proven fighters.

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20439,C05765160,07/31/2015,RELEASE IN PART, sbwhoeop Thursday, November
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http://www.qpi.corn/Ton NewsiAnalysis/2009111104/Corranentary-Wariords-R-
UsitiP1-16551?57351379/ ornment- Nanot T i s u ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE UPI
Editor at Large WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (UPI) -- If we are successful beyond
President Obama's wildest dreams -- e.g., the Taliban is wiped out and a
tough new Afghan government does not allow al-Qaida or other terrorists
to conspire against us on their territory -- would that make us safer
from radical Islam? The answer, of course, is no, because this is riot
about geography. Two veteran intelligence operatives with much Middle
Eastern and Afghan experience, speaking not for attribution, agreed a
stable, secure Afghanistan doesn't change the equation, at least not
significantly. The popular perception of al-Qaida in Afghanistan is the
same propaganda news clip, shown a gazillion times over the last eight
years, replete with terrorist trainees in shalwar-kameez (knee-length
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Pakistan's madrassas, who look forward to a one button push to the land
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Qaida's martyrs don't need Afghan training camps for WMD terrorism. In
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Afghanistan for its next terrorist objective. In fact, those who follow events in Afghanistan closely were taken aback when Obama said Afghanistan was a war of necessity because that's where al-Qaida is. They haven't been there since Afghanistan was liberated in October 2001. They moved to Pakistan's tribal areas where they attracted volunteers from the Middle East and Europe. When a reconstituted Taliban insurgent force re-entered Afghanistan in large numbers in 2004, al-Qaida was not interested in its now insecure old training camps. Even if Pakistan's current offensive against the Taliban and al-Qaida in the tribal areas is successful, al-Qaida is not an entity that can be captured or destroyed. Its clandestine operatives are widely scattered in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, North and South America. As alternatives to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen, in the vernacular of the intelligence community, will do/is doing it. Somalia will do/is doing it. West African states whose writ doesn't extend much beyond their capitals will do/are doing it. Grimy North African suburbs of major French cities will do/are doing it. British provincial towns with Pakistani enclaves will do/are doing it. And the Internet's thousands of pro-al-Qaida Web sites will do/are doing it. Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri are believed to be comfortably installed in a tribal chiefs compound somewhere near Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's constantly rebellious Baluchistan province, which has 48 percent of the country's land with only 10 million of its 175 million people. There is no al-Qaida central issuing orders to thousands of adherents the world over. If there is no connection between Afghanistan and the core problem of no more Sept. 11s, what are the United States and 41 friendly nations doing there? Even in the event of a Taliban victory in the years to come, the Taliban would not be stupid enough to invite al-Qaida back. Three months prior to Sept. 11, 2001, there was palpable tension between Taliban leader Mullah Omar and bin Laden. Omar complained that bin Laden was issuing too many fatwas (religious edicts) which he has no business doing as he didn't complete his religious education. Omar also prevented journalists from seeing bin Laden. The Taliban leader knows he lost power and his country because of what bin Laden and his terrorists did to the United States. In today's Afghanistan almost everything turns out to be corruption and mismanagement. The average citizen has seen little benefit from expenditures in the \$250 billion range -- on top of \$1 trillion in Iraq. The U.S. effort has been plagued by fraud, laced with mismanagement and bereft of strategic focus. One example among many others came in 2007 when the United States awarded a massive contract worth some \$300 million to AEY, a Florida-based company, to supply the Afghan army with 52 types of ammo, chiefly bullets for AK-47s. All requirements for safety inspections, mandatory for all ammo delivered to U.S. forces, were removed. Thus AEY was able to shop around in Eastern Europe for the cheapest ammo available. Millions of rounds of old Chinese ammo made in the 1960s turned out to be substandard and dangerous. The State Department was aware of what was going on but did not object as speed was the only criterion. AEY and its officers were eventually indicted in Florida. But U.S. officials involved got off with a slap on the wrist. Wherever U.S. inspectors look, they find fraud and abuse. There are even cases -- reported by GlobalPost reporter Jean Mackenzie -- of American contractors paying bribes to the Taliban to ensure aid projects are not disrupted. This is a recipe for a war without end. She also reports a disguised Taliban office in Kabul that reviews all aid projects and determines the amount to be paid to the Taliban. If true, the United States is paying the Afghan government to fight the Taliban while also paying the Taliban to fight the Afghan government. The key lies in Pakistan. Almost all terrorist trails in Europe lead back to Pakistan -- and its madrassas. These are the free Koranic schools that have stepped into the vacuum of no education system for the poor as the military takes

up 50 percent of government revenue. A fraction of what the United States has spent in Iraq and Afghanistan would go a long way to turning Pakistan around. Instead, Congress, in its infinite wisdom, after authorizing \$1.2 trillion in both wars allocated \$7.5 billion to Pakistan over five years -- with umpteen caveats. In a country of 175 million, a drop in the proverbial bucket. , UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05765160 Date 07/31/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From Sent To Subject sbwhoeop Thursday, November 5, 2009 1018 AM H FYI has some valuable info on af/pak. Sid tittp//www.qpi.corn/Ton NewsiAnalysis/2009111104/Corranentary-Wariords-R-UsitiP1-16551?57351379/ornment- Nanot T i s u ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE UPI Editor at Large WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (UPI) -- If we are successful beyond President Obama's wildest dreams -- e.g., the Taliban is wiped out and a tough new Afghan government does not allow al-Qaida or other terrorists to conspire against us on their territory -- would that make us safer from radical Islam? The answer, of course, is no, because this is riot about geography. Two veteran intelligence operatives with much Middle Eastern and Afghan experience, speaking not for attribution, agreed a stable, secure Afghanistan doesn't change the equation, at least not significantly. The popular perception of al-Qaida in Afghanistan is the same propaganda news clip, shown a gazillion times over the last eight years, replete with terrorist trainees in shalwar-kameez (knee-length shirts over baggy pantaloons) running through obstacle courses and emerging from tunnels, presumably to kill us all in our beds. Al-Qaida doesn't need commando-steeled volunteers to attack the United States and its allies. For the next Sept. 11, the chances are they have already selected highly motivated, brainwashed wackjobs among the graduates of Pakistan's madrassas, who look forward to a one button push to the land of plenty in the sky where 72 impatient maidens await their arrival. Al-Qaida's martyrs don't need Afghan training camps for WMD terrorism. In fact, to be inconspicuous, they should not have the physique of an avoid-at-all-cost likely to arouse suspicion. Al-Qaida does not need Afghanistan for its next terrorist objective. In fact, those who follow events in Afghanistan closely were taken aback when Obama said Afghanistan was a war of necessity because that's where al-Qaida. is. They haven't been there since Afghanistan was liberated in October 2001. They moved to Pakistan's tribal areas where they attracted volunteers from the Middle East and Europe. When a reconstituted Taliban insurgent force re-entered Afghanistan in large numbers in 2004, al-Qaida was not interested in its now insecure old training camps. Even if Pakistan's current offensive.against the Taliban and al-Qaida in the tribal areas is successful, al-Qaida is not an entity that can be captured or destroyed. Its clandestine operatives are widely scattered in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, North and South America. As alternatives to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen, in the vernacular of the intelligence community, will do/is doing it. Somalia will do/is doing it. West African states whose writ doesn't extend much beyond their capitals will do/are doing it. Grimy North African suburbs of major French cities will do/are doing it. British provincial towns with Pakistani enclaves will do/are doing it. And the Internet's thousands of pro-al-Qaida Web sites will do/are doing it. Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri are believed to be comfortably installed in a tribal chiefs compound somewhere near Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's constantly rebellious Baluchistan province, which UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05765160 Date 07/31/2015 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05765160 Date 07/31/2015 has 48 percent of the country's land with. only 10 million of its 175 million people. There is no al-Qaida central issuing orders to thousands of adherents the world over. If there is no connection between Afghanistan and the core problem of no more Sept. 11s, what are the United States and

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Women's office? Are the Congress Members ok w our work and priorities so far? What about the 2010 budget? Who will be the UN women's voice on the inside and outside? How will we mark 15th anniv of Cairo? Let's do a thorough review about CEDAW strategy. Should we ask to be on contract w H to lead our efforts? What's followup w Doug Hattaway? Are you working w Alec Ross? ECA? Are you working w WHA and Julissa Reynoso on econ issues? What are we doing w MEPI? Are you staffed up now? Did you see Kay Warren when she was in DC for Eric Goosby's swearing in? , UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05759757 Date 06/30/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From H <hrod17@clintonemail.com> Sent Sunday, September 20, 2009 1053 AM To 'pverveer Cc H2 Subject Follow up Here are some matters I haven't raised w you but wanted to get your reaction Was there any followup to offer to help/advise on Afghan women? Re your memo about S/GWI priorities for FY 09 and 10-- Will we be announcing the global womens fund and/or other partnerships at UNGA? Are we closely coordinating w the WH and its Council? How can we strengthen the AID Women's office? Are the Congress Members ok w our work and priorities so far? What about the 2010 budget? Who will be the UN women's voice on the inside and outside? How will we mark 15th anniv of Cairo? Let's do a thorough review about CEDAW strategy. Should we ask to be on contract w H to lead our efforts? What's followup w Doug Hattaway? Are you working w Alec Ross? ECA? Are you working w WHA and Julissa Reynoso on econ issues? What are we doing w MEPI? Are you staffed up now? Did you see Kay Warren when she was in DC for Eric Goosby's swearing in? UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05759757 Date 06/30/2015 "

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military command. The UN has lost a number of staff in the quake, and is not keen to risk more lives. But the Haitian people seem to scare aid workers more than Somali warlords, Darfuri Janjawid or Afghan Taleban. Frightened Dutch aid workers abandoned a mission without reaching the collapsed building where people were trapped, and frightened doctors have left their patients unattended. The experience of CNN's medical reporter, Dr Sanjay Gupta, is telling. In a makeshift clinic he encountered a Belgian medical team being evacuated in a UN bus. UN rules of engagement apparently stopped them providing security for the doctors. The Belgians took most of their medical supplies with them, to keep them out of the claws of robbers. Dr Gupta and his camera team stayed the night, monitored the abandoned patients' vital signs and continued intravenous drips and they were not robbed. Some rescuers are leaning so much toward security that they will allow people to die. The media are not helping. CNN rules in the rubble. Outside of a military conflict, this is our biggest international deployment since the tsunami in 2004, according to Tony Maddox, the managing director of CNN International. So the image of the aid operation being beamed back is primarily American and one of the big problems is the American view of Haiti. CNN won't stop telling aid workers and the outside world about pillaging (the incidence of which for the first four frustrating days at least did not compare with what happened after Hurricane Katrina) and about how dangerous it is to distribute food, because of the likelihood of stampedes. Nor is the US Government, the biggest player in the aid operation, doing anything to help to relax the atmosphere. On the contrary. When President Obama said that the US aid effort would be aggressive he meant it. The humanitarian operation is not led by civilian agencies, but by the Pentagon. Mr Obama ordered 9,000 troops and a fleet of nuclear-powered ships to move in. Victims of the war in Congo (which has cost five million lives in the past years) and of the genocide in Darfur would love so much American attention but it is Haiti's fate to lay in America's backyard and to have been a sore to American eyes for decades already. One, perhaps even two million Haitians already live in the United States, but more try to come. Every day dead Haitian refugees wash up on Miami's sunny beaches. Haiti is a constant pain for US taxpayers who feel that the billions of dollars that have been poured in should have at least lifted the country out of its position as one of the poorest places on Earth. Even when the earthquake struck, investigations were taking place into the fate of several million dollars of aid funds, sent to victims of a hurricane that hit Haiti in 2008, that have disappeared. Furthermore, to the horror of many godfearing Americans, voodoo is an officially recognised religion in Haiti. And, perhaps above all, Haitians are poor and black. In the view of some Americans those two add up to ... murderous gangs. The invasion of soldiers and humanitarian workers at the airport of Port-au-Prince reminds me of the American military invasion of Haiti authorised by President Clinton in 1994. I'd lived and worked there for almost two years as a correspondent for Dutch radio. There were 20,000 soldiers but they were surprisingly nervous about what reception the unarmed Haitians might have in store for them. It turned out to be a wave of slum dwellers streaming to the air and sea port to greet the American guests. In abundant conga lines they snaked through the city, tea cosies on their heads to express just how happy they were. Liberte! Merci Beel Cling Dong! they shouted. A terrified American GI, still a teenager, saw the mass of pitiful creatures approaching him, and asked me if the tea cosies were some kinda voodoo? . He calmed down only when a line of BMWs and Mitsubishis appeared and filed past to watch the invasion. Where the soldier came from, the owners of vehicles like these are respectable citizens. In Haiti, they are likely to be the ones smuggling drugs and making US aid dollars disappear. The good guys in Haiti are the defenceless people in the slums. For Western city dwellers, this is the

world turned upside down. Back! Back! the soldier shouted, aiming his weapons at the good guys. The rescue teams that stay put at the airport are one reason why we still don't really know what is going on. Seventy survivors had been pulled from the rubble so far, the International Red Cross said on Sunday. That's 14 rescues per day as a joint result of the 1,739 international specialised rescue workers that are there. That number would surely jump if some of the professional equipment that they brought was made available to the countless groups of local people desperately digging for victims with their bare hands, day and night. Let's hope that the food distributors worrying about their safety know that yesterday hundreds of people in Port-au-Prince dropped to their knees praying outside a warehouse where workers for the agency Food for the Poor had announced that they would be distributing rice and beans. The crowd allowed children and the elderly to go first in line without having guns aimed at them first. Linda Polman's War Games The Story of War and Aid in Modern Times will be published by Penguin in April , UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05767623 Date 08/31/2015 RELEASE IN PART B6 From sbwhoeor B6 Sent Monday, January 18, 2010 9:27 AM To H; MillsCD@state.gov Subject Anecdotal, attitudinal, but maybe helpful. Sid http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6991697.ece From The Times January 18, 2010 Fear of the poor is hampering Haiti rescue American views rule among the rubble of Port-au-Prince. That's one reason aid is taking so long to get to those in need Linda Polman Aid workers have already baptised the earthquake in Haiti a historical disaster . It will rate high in the annals of the humanitarian aid world because of the number of victims and scale of the destruction. But the rescue operation is also becoming notorious for the slowness with which aid is reaching the victims. Five days after the quake hit, many places are still largely bereft of international aid. Not through lack of funds, supplies or emergency experts. Those are all pouring in from dozens of countries. But most of the aid and aid workers seems stuck at the airport. Rescue teams have pulled survivors from five-star hotels, university buildings, a supermarket and the UN headquarters, all in Port-au-Prince's better neighbourhoods. In poor areas, where the damage appears much greater, apparently forgotten victims report on Twitter that they have yet to encounter the first foreign rescuer. Many aid workers are reported to have orders not to venture out without armed guards which are not there at all, or only after long debates with the UN military command. The UN has lost a number of staff in the quake, and is not keen to risk more lives. But the Haitian people seem to scare aid workers more than Somali warlords, Darfuri Janjawid or Afghan Taleban. Frightened Dutch aid workers abandoned a mission without reaching the collapsed building where people were trapped, and frightened doctors have left their patients unattended. The experience of CNN's medical reporter, Dr Sanjay Gupta, is telling. In a makeshift clinic he encountered a Belgian medical team being evacuated in a UN bus. UN rules of engagement apparently stopped them providing security for the doctors. The Belgians took most of their medical supplies with them, to keep them out of the claws of robbers. Dr Gupta and his camera team stayed the night, monitored the abandoned patients' vital signs and continued intravenous drips and they were not robbed. Some rescuers are leaning so much toward security that they will allow people to die. The media are not helping. CNN rules in the rubble. Outside of a military conflict, this is our biggest international deployment since the tsunami in 2004, according to Tony Maddox, the managing director of CNN International. So the image of the aid operation being beamed back is primarily American and one of the big problems is the American view of Haiti. CNN won't stop telling aid workers and the outside world about pillaging (the incidence of which for the first four frustrating days at least did not compare with what

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