Introduction: Migration in Europe
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In 2016, the ECPR and its professional journal, *EPS,* agreed to collaborate on an annual debate/roundtable series, to take place at the ECPR General Conferences. The plan is for the editors of the *EPS* to invite four experts (both academic and/or practitioners) to discuss a pressing theme in a plenum session of the General Conference. The hope of the organizers is that the debate will encourage professional political scientists to engage with pressing political issues, and to generate broader engagement on these issues. Toward that end, the debates are to be subsequently published in the pages of *EPS.*

The inaugural debate in this series was held at the 10th General Conference of the ECPR at Charles University in Prague on 8 September, 2016. As an outgoing member of the *EPS* editorial staff, I was commissioned to organize this first debate, and I used it to address the challenges associated with migration and free movement in Europe. With this objective in mind, I invited four noted experts, who have commented on and published widely in the field: Rainer Bauböck, Professor of Social and Political Theory, European University Institute; Viriginie Guiraudon, CNRS Research Director at The Centre d'études européennes, Sciences Po; Peo Hansen, Professor at the Institute for Research on Migration, Ethnicity and Society (REMESO), Linköping University; and Philippe Legrain, consultant and founder of the Open Political Economy Network (OPEN) think-tank.

To prepare for the debate, I asked each of the discussants to organize their remarks around three simple questions:

- How can and how should Europe cope with the mass migration to the continent?
- Does Europe's future include the free movement of people (both internally and from beyond)?

- How is that future different from the Europe of today?

The underlying motivation and context for the discussion should be familiar to readers of *EPS*. Still, a light empirical backdrop might help to highlight the individual contributions that follow. The European Union is experiencing an existential crisis, which includes (but is not limited to) the difficulty that Europe has in dealing with migrants. The continent wrestles with the realization that it no longer sheds workers to other parts of the globe; today's Europe needs to attract workers to care (and pay) for its ageing and shrinking population. Like its leading politician, Europe seems to lack confidence in its ability to tackle the significant challenges in its path.[1]

While navigating these challenges, Europe was struck by two concomitant blows. The first was delivered by the Great Recession. Bound by their membership in a common monetary union, many states in Europe were unable to respond adequately to the financial crisis. As unemployment levels rose, and government supports receded, hundreds of thousands of workers were forced to search for job opportunities in other European states. The Latvian response to the Great Recession, often heralded as a model for Europe, is indicative of the problem. In that small country of just under 2 million people (and falling!), over 150,000 people emigrated between 2007 and 2011 in search of better livelihoods abroad (Moses 2017: 138)! These Latvian workers had lost faith in the ability of their elected officials to improve conditions at home: they chose exit over voice or loyalty (Hirschman 1970). Absent their government's ability (or willingness?) to manage the domestic economy, Europe's most desperate and frustrated denizens are turning to emigration and more radical (xenophobic and populist) political agendas.

The second blow was delivered by the wave of refugees that was concomitantly washing up on the shores of Europe's southern flank. As can be seen in the figure below, over a million

people (in total) entered Europe in 2015; at its peak (in October), 221,084 people arrived in Europe in a single month, in search of a better future. Even as the number of arrivals is declining rapidly, the number of deaths from those that try to enter Europe illicitly is on the rise. The UNHCR estimated that the Mediterranean death rate per 100 arrivals has climbed from 1.8 in 2015 to 3.4 in the first three months of 2017 (*The Economist*, 2017).[2] The IOM estimated that 5,098 people died trying to enter Europe in 2016 (IOM 2017).

Figure: Number of arrivals to Europe in 2015 and 2016



Source: IOM (2016: 5)
Note: Total number of arrivals, by land and sea

Such was the political and economic context when we began to organize the first *EPS* debate. Europe was near the height of its migrant/refugee crisis, and the ghost of Brexit had just raised its head. We hope to stimulate further discussion of what the recent wave of migration—on both internal and external fronts—means for the future of Europe and the European Union.

THE DEBATE

In Prague, each discussant was allowed 15 minutes to present an opening statement that responded to the three above-mentioned questions, and each was subsequently given an opportunity to respond to questions from the audience and to the proposals made by the other contributors. The result was a very lively debate with much input from a full-capacity audience. In the aftermath of the debate, we agreed that it would be difficult to write a short piece that could adequately cover each of the three questions, so we decided to focus the responses on the first question: How can and should Europe cope with the mass migrations to the continent?

After the debate took place, Philippe Legrain was not able to produce a written contribution. Still, the tone and scope of his contribution can be easily followed by tracking the argument he has made in other contexts. The other three contributions, which follow below, offer fresh reflections, written after the debate, on the challenging topic of how Europe might respond to the current crisis.

Legrain's oral contribution in Prague was informed by the work of his newly minted think-tank, and a recent report that he produced in cooperation with Tent, entitled: 'Refugees Work: A humanitarian investment that yields economic dividends'. This report offers a comprehensive, international study of how refugees can contribute to advanced economies, and it argues that refugees constitute a dynamo for economic growth, rather than a drain on a country's limited resources. Using International Monetary Fund estimates of the economic impact of asylum seekers and refugees on the European Union, the report calculates that for every euro spent on welcoming a refugee, nearly two euros in economic benefits are generated within five years (Legrain 2016). For several years, and in a variety of different contexts, Legrain has been encouraging us to consider the potential benefits of immigration (in all its sundry forms), as a

counter balance to prevailing stories about the cultural erosion and economic ruin that are expected to follow in the wake of immigration.

In the article that follows, Peo Hansen's contribution shares a similar point of departure: he argues that European attitudes about immigration are in conflict. On the one hand, Europe wants to minimize immigration in the hopes of protecting its cultural identity and/or defending its welfare state; on the other hand, Europe needs to encourage immigration in order to address its serious, and growing, demographic imbalance. Put simply, Europe needs young immigrants to help care (and pay) for Europe's aging population. Hansen's argument is refreshingly novel, if controversial: he argues that there are real economic benefits from embracing Europe's refugee crisis, and that the short-lived experiences of Sweden and Germany demonstrate the potential for a Keynesian refugee effect.

In making this argument, Hansen implies that the current crisis says less about Europe's attitude with regard to foreigners than it does about Europe's embrace of austerity. Like Legrain, Hansen recognizes that states will need to expand their level of spending if they are to welcome and integrate these foreigners; but Hansen's research on the German and Swedish cases demonstrates how this sort of investment might be used to prime Europe's economic pump. By increasing government spending, these countries were able to stimulate domestic economic activity. In light of these experiences, it is remarkable how both countries subsequently experienced an about-face in policy. When the embrace of refugees in these two countries came to challenge the EU's 'master regime of fiscal austerity' (Hansen 2017: 7), both countries were forced to retreat from their positions. In effect, Europe was asked to choose between a false dichotomy: welcoming refugees or embracing austerity. They chose the latter.

Both Legrain and Hansen wish to focus our attention on the good that can be done, for ourselves and for others, by welcoming refugees in our midst. They do not advocate open

borders in these contributions, but their work suggests that we can best help ourselves by helping others. Hence, their attention is not focused on the sort of political and institutional mechanisms that states and the European Union will need in order to deter and/or integrate further migration.

Rainer Bauböck's (2017) contribution offers a very different reading of the political landscape: he lays out the divergent moral choices facing Europe, with respect to how we should deal with the growing number of refugees at our doorstep. For Bauböck, Europe's crisis resolves around a fundamental disagreement about values, not about interests. In particular, he argues that it is not reasonable to expect democratic states (and thus also the member states of the European Union) to open their borders fully to states that are not democratic or lack comparable systems of social protection. Here we see the first important difference separating our contributors: while Hansen (and Legrain) argue that it is wrong to think of immigrants as an economic and /or social drain on resources, Bauböck implies that migrants represent a challenge to sovereignty that requires political redress.

Having said this, Bauböck acknowledges there are at least three reasons why Europe might embrace greater immigration: 1) states have reason to accept free immigration from other states in order to promote the free movement of their own citizens on the basis of reciprocity; 2) regulated labour migration is often beneficial for the host country, the sending state and the individual migrant; and 3) liberal states have a duty to admit refugees and family members of previously-admitted immigrants on the grounds of universal human rights. On Bauböck's view, refugee admission is not a matter of promoting free movement or securing economic benefit from migration. It is the moral duty of states to protect those who have lost the protection that citizenship is meant to provide in the international state system. In order to translate this moral duty into effective policy, states need to cooperate so that the burdens of refugee protection are shared. Bauböck supports a scheme that might optimally redistribute migrants across states,

matching the preferences of states and refugees, while allowing states to trade admission quotas among themselves. Hence, those states that are willing to accept more refuges would receive financial transfers to help support them. If Hansen's argument is correct, this is just the sort of pump priming that could get Europe's economic engine running again!

Bauböck recognizes that the European Union provides the sort of institutional framework that should allow burden sharing and redistribution: it consists of member states that are committed to sincere cooperation, and it has developed political institutions and instruments for facilitating that cooperation. In contrast with Hansen, Bauböck places the blame for the failure of the EU to develop a fair system of refugee relocation squarely with the member states and their defection from cooperative solutions. While Bauböck is aware of the scope of the challenge (e.g., in noting that the principles behind Schengen and those embedded in the Dublin Regulation seem to pull in very different directions), he has not lost all hope that Brussels may still succeed in the long run to create a more Europeanized refugee admission and protection system.

This brings us to the final contribution, by Virginie Guiraudon. Guiraudon struggles with a fascinating and important counterfactual: why did the 2015 refugee crisis not offer a turning point for the EU and its border control system? This system was obviously failing, and the pain of its failure was evident for all to see, yet European policymakers continue down the same, failed, policy path. How can that be?

For Guiraudon, the root of the problem lies in the nature of European policymaking. Europe's migration regime was established by a small number of (relatively secluded and autonomous) law and order officers, who were given a free hand to develop the 1990 Schengen agreement, with little parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. This Schengen agreement was subsequently rushed through national parliaments, without any opportunity to amend the text. As Guiraudon notes: 'Intense intergovernmental negotiation among a small group of like-minded

functionaries took place in a closed setting without dissenting voices…and their decision could not be debated and challenged' (Guiraudon, 2017: 7).

While this (less than democratic) consensus might have been maintained over a period of economic prosperity, it lacked legitimacy. In this context, European border policy should be susceptible to change. For Guiraudon, it is odd that the ghastly news images in 2015—especially the picture of a three-year old Kurdish boy from Syria, Alan Kuri, who had washed up on a Turkish beach—did not change the tide of European policy. These images provided an opportune moment, a 'focus event', which should have shocked the status quo, and allowed policy entrepreneurs to reframe the refugee crisis. Guiraudon implies that this sort of shock should have broken the policy monopoly for the EU security community, and introduced a more reasonable, data-driven policy that could have aligned the needs of Schengen, Dublin and respect for human rights. Why didn't this happen?

Instead of reform, Guiraudon points to four recent decisions in response to the crisis that show how the old paradigm underlying EU borders' policy, borne of special (and narrow) interests, still dominates. In particular, she suggests that policy-feedback and policy failure combined to form a self-reinforcing mechanism, that have blocked necessary (and desirable) reforms that could help Europe deal with the refugee crisis in a much more effective (and just) manner.

The individual contributions to this debate differ on how to assess the cost/benefits of refugees to Europe, and they differ about the role that Europe might play in addressing this cost/benefit analysis. Hansen and Legrain argue that these refugees should be seen as an asset: that we should embrace them for how they can complement and improve upon the shortcomings of current policy in Europe. In contrast, Bauböck and Guiraudon imply that the refugee crisis

entails significant costs, both political and economic, but that these costs are worth bearing: Europe's inability to bear those costs reveal significant flaws in Europe's institutional design.

Absent a Trump-like wall that can hermetically seal our continent from the rest of humanity, I wonder if Europe's fate lies somewhere in between the positions advocated below. Europe's challenge lies less in the face of the foreigner, and more in its ability to face its own, indigenous, shortcomings. First and foremost, Europe needs to address its inability to manage the domestic economies of its member states (in a way that can deter economic crises, and the migration and political radicalism that these generate). At the same time, Europe must also learn to work together in a way that can generate a common response to those who require our assistance. The sundry contributors to the debate that follows have shined some light on how we can address both of these important shortcomings.

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Notes

[1] Angela Merkel jettisoned her optimistic slogan "*Wir shaffen das!" (*"We can do this!") in September of 2016, at the time of this debate.

[2] See also http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean