

Master's thesis

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Politicization of immigration in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Poland between 2007 and 2016.

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1.0 Introduction

Historian Dominic Sandbrook (2016) wrote for The Daily Mail "There are times, not very often, when you can feel history being made. An archduke falls, a wall comes down, a plane hits a building, and in that moment, you can feel the ground shifting beneath your feet".

These words were written after the UK decided to leave the European union, when the earthquake of Brexit shook the world last year. While Brexit may seem shocking, maybe it should not, because we have been witnessing political developments pointing in the same direction for years. Parties on the center-right in Europe have been increasingly dogged by parties skeptical of free trade, globalization, and immigration. Right-wing populism seems to have taken roots in Western Europe, and has been increasingly shaping the political discourse.

The increasing popularity of right-wing populist parties and anti-immigration sentiments, however, does not seem to be confined to Western Europe. The US presidential election of 2016 has shown that similar trend can also be seen across the Atlantic. Further, the political developments in Poland, when a right-wing populist Law and Justice (PiS) won both presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015, show that these ideas are also spreading to Eastern Europe.

What the recent political developments in the US, UK and Poland have in common is that that politicians, and constituencies they represent, desire to regain control of the borders, and reclaim national sovereignty, often channeled through the increasing opposition to immigration. The anti-immigration sentiments, represented by right-wing populist politicians, are arguably driven by individuals who feel like they have been on the losing end of globalization. Globalization has increased the interconnectedness of nation-states through speeding up the flow of goods, services, communication, and people, across the world, and it seems safe to say that globalization is the main process that has been shaping the world for a very long time. It has brought various consequences to people across the entire world, with implications at global, international, and perhaps most importantly – national levels (Kriesi et al. 2008: 3).

Right-wing populist parties and politicians have become the main challengers of globalization, various forms of integration, and the main representatives of discontent. We have been witnessing an increasing conflict between those in favor of opening national societies and economies, and those who seek national isolation in, among others, trade,

immigration and cultural exchange (Kriesi et al. 2008).

Immigration has been a hot-button issue in many recent election cycles and it seems like it has become not only a very important, but arguably a defining issue not only for right-wing populists, but also many mainstream conservative parties. In the US, immigration has probably been the biggest concern in the presidential primaries and presidential elections of 2016, and many have argued that Brexit was essentially a referendum on immigration. In the Polish elections of 2015, immigration was raised as an issue for the first time in the country's history. Anti-immigrant views have been emboldened across the Western world, and while various groups have been attempting to fight these attitudes, very few politicians are now willing to make the case for immigration. Even though the data shows that immigrants do not have a damaging effect on wages or public services, and that in fact, immigration can be a solution to many challenges the ageing Western populations face, anti-immigration sentiments seem to be growing stronger, and the issue of immigration seems to have become highly politicized.

Politicization means making a matter a subject of public regulation and/or a subject of public discussion (de Wilde & Zürn 2012: 139), and all the aforementioned developments point towards the fact that immigration has become a highly-politicized issue. However, in today's world where feelings trump facts just a bit too often, important problems should not be taken at face-value. Immigration has seemingly become a very important political issue, and as such, it warrants a more thorough investigation of how and when it happened, and what the driving factors behind it are.

1.1 Research problem and research questions

The phenomenon of politicization has been studied in different ways by different scholars, and various scholars have come with different interpretations of politicization of immigration. While Kriesi et al. (2008) argue that opposition to immigration is part of a broader opposition towards globalization which has transformed the political landscape in Western Europe, and political contestation about immigration it is bound to manifest itself mainly at the level of national political parties, van der Brug et al. (2015), in their recent book about politicization of immigration, focused on the role of various domestic actors participating in the public debates about immigration, not only the political parties. De Wilde and Lord (2016) argue that for an issue to be politicized, a substantial involvement of domestic actors is not

necessary, and issues can also be politicized by foreign actors. With this kind of disagreement in the literature about how politicization can play out, the room for a thorough investigation of the topic is wide open.

The main goal of this thesis is to explore, describe and interpret how politicization of immigration has evolved in the recent years in terms of the amount of attention it has received, how polarized the public debate about immigration has been, and what actors have been involved. It will do so by investigating how the public debate about immigration has played out in the mass media, as there is a well-accepted conception in the literature that the mass media is the most important arena for public debates on politically relevant issues (Helbling & Tresh 2011: 174). In order to explore the patterns of politicization of immigration, empirical data has been gathered to answer the following questions:

- 1) *How has politicization of immigration developed, in terms of salience, in the US, UK and Poland between 2007 and 2016?*
- 2) *Has the issue of immigration become more polarized?*
- 3) *What actors have been involved in the politicization of immigration?*

1.2 Structure of the thesis

The following chapter will present an overview over previous research and theories that have been useful, both in terms of methodological choices made, but especially in terms of interpreting the empirical findings of this thesis. Next, research design and data-gathering methodology will be explained in detail. This includes how the empirical data was collected, a justification for why it was done this way, and an outline of exactly how the data-collection methods have been employed in order to answer the research questions. The research design and methodology chapter will be followed by a brief background which will provide an overview over immigration patterns and patterns of politicization in the US, UK and Poland, to put the current debate in a historical context. The analysis chapter will present and discuss the empirical data gathered for this study for each country separately, and will be followed by a brief comparative analysis. The conclusion will provide a short overview over the most interesting findings of this thesis, and offer some thoughts on studying politicization.

2.0 Literature review and theory

This chapter will present an overview over previous studies and theories which have been relevant for this research both in terms of the methodological choices that have been made, and for the further analysis of the empirical data. While this study is mostly descriptive and aims to describe what has happened and when, previous research and theories presented in this chapter have been very informative and useful in terms of understanding and interpreting various developments that have taken place in the public debates about immigration in the countries in this study.

The chapter will start by a review of different ways of looking at the phenomenon of politicization, and what role the media plays in this context. It will then provide an overview over previous research and theories about what actors can be involved in politicization of immigration, and what factors can provide an explanation for when politicization can happen.

2.1 Different ways of looking at politicization

Political conflict is the key ingredient of politics, and politicization can be defined as the expansion of the scope of conflict within the political system. The concept of politicization can be found in different contexts, and with different meanings, and can be studied in multiple ways.

Two main bodies of literature deal with how various issues become politicized. The first tradition is mostly concerned with agenda-setting, and points mainly to the relative attention, in other words salience, of issues (van der Burg et al. 2015a: 5). Some scholars, such as Hutter and Grande (2014) argue that salience is a crucial dimension of politicization, because if an issue is not debated in public, it can only be politicized to a limited extent, if at all. Hurrelmann et al. (2012: 4) take it even further, arguing that salience is not only the best indicator, but in fact the only necessary component of politicization.

The second body of literature focuses to a larger degree on party competition in terms of conflicts and disagreements, an approach highlighting the importance of positional competition, as well as the extent to which political parties and their electorate take different positions on certain issues. Various scholars (de Wilde 2011, Hutter & Grande 2014, van der Brug et al. 2015) have argued that a highly salient public debate among a broad range of actors does not exploit the full potential of politicization, and in order for an issue to be

politicized, actors must put forward differing positions, and there must be opposing camps. Polarization can be thus defined as an intensifying of conflict related to an issue, and the most polarizing constellation can be found when two camps advocate completely opposing issue positions with roughly the same intensity.

While salience and polarization used to be two alternative ways of understanding the relationship political actors have towards political issues, nowadays these two attributes are usually treated as complementary, a development that is reflected in more recent literature. Despite some persisting disagreements about which aspect of politicization is the most important, politicization, understood as salience and polarization, has been employed in a range of studies about the EU (Hutter & Grande 2014, de Wilde 2011, de Wilde and Zürn 2012, Statham & Trenz 2012), globalization cleavage (de Wilde, Koopmans & Zürn (forthcoming)), or immigration (van der Brug et al. 2015). Emphasizing the importance of including both salience and polarization when studying politicization, van der Brug et al. (2015) found that polarization and salience were virtually unrelated in all seven countries under scrutiny in their study, arguing that any study of politicization that only looks at one of those aspects would be essentially incomplete.

In addition to salience and polarization, according to some scholars (Hutter and Grande 2014, Statham & Trenz 2012, de Wilde & Lord 2016), politicization also requires the expansion of debates from closed elite-dominated policy arenas to wider publics. In addition to political parties, politicization is high when different actors are involved in a debate. If only few, and a restricted set of (elite) actors participate in public debates about an issue, it would indicate that the scope of conflict is limited (Hutter & Grande 2014). Thus, there is a good argument to look at politicization through investigating salience (the amount of attention an issue gets), polarization (intensity of conflict related to an issue), and what type of actors participate in debates about an issue. Keeping this in mind, and in order to thoroughly explore the topic, this thesis will investigate how politicization of immigration has played out in the US, UK and Poland between 2007 and 2016 by looking at salience to answer research question 1, polarization to answer research question 2, and the actors that have been involved in the public debates about immigration to answer research question 3. It will do so by looking at how politicization of immigration has played out in the mass media, and the following section will show why the mass media is a good source to find information about the public debates about issues.

2.2 Politicization and the media

There is a well-accepted conception in the literature that the mass media is the most important arena for public debates on politically relevant issues (Helbling & Tresh 2011: 174). In the age where voters depend on the mass media for access to political communication to a high degree, news, especially in the mass media, is a key location for political contestation. It is through the news that issues are made publicly visible, and mass media is an important forum through which actors attempt to get their message across to the audience. Because various actors aim at reaching wide audience to present their political claims¹, it is logical to study how this plays out in the public sphere. It is namely in the public sphere, and through the mass media in particular, that claims can reach the largest audiences (de Wilde 2013: 279). Another reason for looking at how political debates play out in the mass media is that studying politicization only through behavior in political systems might not be sufficient, as there can be no politicization without an infrastructure capable of mediating between political systems and society. In this respect, mass media play a central role in transferring issues from society to politics and back, from the private to the public sphere, as well as in both communicating and, equally importantly, forming public opinion (de Wilde & Lord 2016: 149). It is difficult to speak of politicization if issues are not contested in public and thereby reflected in public debates that unfold in mass media. Thus, it is important to have a holistic understanding of politicization, one that acknowledges that politicization implies contestation within the political system, within society, and within media that is the main source of communication between views in the society, and between the society and the political system. Politicization is a political, social and communicative process, a process that requires not only the study of conflict dimensions in the political system and the society, but also the ways in which the media cover those conflicts (Ibid.).

The media assigns political relevance and importance to various issues through the process of selection and emphasis on certain issues, and can thus put such on the political agenda. (Thesen 2014). In other words, the media have the power to select information and make decisions on what is important and worth showing to the wider public. Thus, even though it is not certain to what degree the media can determine the opinions of the public, they do have a big impact on what audiences think about (Wasicka 2014: 150). The literature

¹Political claims are instances where actors articulate political demands through various actions. It is a central concept for this thesis, and will be explained thoroughly in chapter 3.

about mediatization and political agenda-setting share a focus on how the mass media influence politics, and according to both agenda-setting and mediatization approaches, the media influence behavior of politicians, and have become increasingly influential in different spheres of society (Strömbäck & Esser 2014). Correspondingly, both agenda-setting and mediatization are something else than mediation, which is a more neutral act of communicating through the media.

Much can be said about the power balance and agenda interactions between the media and the political actors, about how political actors respond to the increased media coverage of certain issue or how the media responds to the actions of political actors and their attempts to put various issues on the public agenda and make them a matter of public debates. While some scholars contend that the media influences politics and political actors must adapt to the media, others argue that it is the political actors that influence the media, since the media will cover issues initiated by them. The media and politics are thus undeniably interdependent (Wasicka 2014: 152). However, since the intricacies of how politicians react to the media coverage, how the media coverage impacts behavior of political actors and the other way around are beyond the scope of this thesis, what is most important to note here is that the media is not a neutral platform where various political actors simply present their views when they choose to do so. The media has been an increasingly influential actor on their own and offers, as well as contributes to, different degrees and different ways of politicization of issues.

In their recent study, de Wilde and Lord (2016) identified three ideal types of trajectories of politicization of European governance presented in the media. Even though their research focused on the EU, the concept of different trajectories politicization can take in the media is also relevant when looking at politicization of other issues, such as immigration. The three trajectories identified by de Wilde and Lord (2016) are the remote conflict, the international conflict, and the domestic conflict. In the remote conflict, politicization takes a relatively limited form, where an issue is portrayed as a foreign problem, not affecting one's own state, and media coverage of particular events contributes to this trajectory (de Wilde & Lord 2016: 150). The key components of this way of politicization are comparatively high presence of foreign actors in the news, while the domestic voice is mainly restricted to executive actors. It is also characterized by low overall coverage, and the attribution of blame and responsibility to foreign actors (de Wilde & Lord 2016: 150). In the remote conflict trajectory politicization remains limited, and while there is

a public debate in the mass media, the conflicts unfold mainly outside the country. Such debates, however, according to de Wilde and Lord (2016), are still very relevant in terms of politicization, as they raise awareness of an issue through the news coverage, and bring new issues to the forefront of the public debate (Ibid. 154-155). In the international conflict trajectory, the issue at hand is presented as pitting one's own nation state against others, or against supranational institutions. The international conflict has a very strong motivational force, since national identity and articulated threats to the national interests have a high potential for motivating actions. This trajectory features audience expansion to include domestic public, and is fueled by competition between domestic political elites and outsiders. There is not much criticism of domestic policies, while international institutions are sharply challenged, and domestic opposition competes with the government about which one of them can best defend the national interests. The extent of politicization in terms of salience and resonance is greater than in the case of the remote conflict. A clear national interest is defined in the media and in politics, which leads to a more animated debate. Public resonance and actor expansion also tend to be greater because the visibility of the conflict, as well as the salience of the issue in terms of public opinion, are raised, causing different actors to vocally defend the national interest (Ibid. 152-156). The last trajectory, the domestic conflict, reflects politicization in more partisan terms. It comes to the fore in divided or polarized public opinion and partisan politics, and opens for a broad variety of shapes and forms of politicization (Ibid.).

2.3 Who politicizes immigration?

Much, if not most, of the literature on politicization of immigration has for a long time focused on the role of anti-immigration parties. Because anti-immigration ideologies are a common feature of the radical right-parties, their role in politicizing immigration has been emphasized. Arzheimer (2009: 259) argues that even though extreme right parties are heterogenous, the strong concern for the immigration issue is something they all share, and that distinguishes them from other parties. Taking extreme positions might be advantageous to political parties, because it helps to differentiate them from their competitors. These extreme positions are often the ideological core of a party, at least in the eyes of voters. Consequently, it can also be easier to develop issue ownership with relatively extreme positions (Wagner 2011). Thus, when a new issue enters the political debate, it is likely to be via parties that have an extreme position on that issue, as it was, indeed, the case with

immigration and far-right parties (Wagner 2011).

Until recently, the paramount role of right-wing anti-immigration parties in making immigration a high-salience issue has hardly been questioned. However, the recent findings of Support and Opposition to Migration (van der Brug et al. 2015) have challenged this assumption. One of the more interesting findings of the project was that radical right parties are not the main claimants, and it is, in fact, the mainstream parties that most frequently appear as claimants on the issue of immigration. Because of the natural advantage that mainstream parties have in getting their issue on the media agenda, they try to emphasize issues that benefit them electorally. Emphasizing immigration can pose a risk because the potential supporters of mainstream parties are often divided on the issue, thus one could expect that mainstream parties would try to depoliticize immigration. However, Van der Brug et al. (2015b: 194) found that this has not been the case. Faced with problems related to immigration, governments will have to address the issue, often through new legislation. Journalists will report on the legislation, and politicians from mainstream parties will consequently appear in the media defending their policies. The media will then also provide a platform for the critics of the legislation, and bring to light lack of consensus among the elites. Thus, paradoxically, it is the mainstream parties that are mostly responsible for the politicization of immigration, even when it is not intentional, or against their interests (Ibid.). In addition, one of the most interesting findings of their project, according to van der Brug (2015b: 184), is that government officials were the most important claims-makers in each of the countries in their study.

Because of the recent electoral success of right-wing anti-immigration parties, the ways in which mainstream parties deal with these has also been investigated. Dahlström & Sundell (2011), for example, wrote about different ways in which mainstream political parties cope with them. While some mainstream parties have attempted to counter anti-immigrant parties, others have tried to recapture lost voters by taking a tougher stance on immigration. According to de Wilde et al. (forthcoming), in some countries like Austria, France and the Netherlands, far-right populist parties have been on the rise, while in other countries, older conservative parties have moved to the right to occupy the same electoral niche.

Having said that, politicization of issues is not something restricted to political parties. In addition to far-right parties, prior studies about politicization of immigration also focused strongly on the role of organized groups, such as migrant organizations or civil society groups supportive of immigrants, and on the other hand nationalist and radical-right anti-immigration

parties and movements. However, van der Brug et al. (2015b: 183) found that anti-immigrant groups have not been the main actors who politicize immigration and, in fact, very few political claims are actually made by such groups. They found that less than 1% of claims recorded in the news were made by racist and extreme-right organizations. Civil society groups, on the other hand, appeared among the most important claims-makers, only thwarted by actors from the government and the legislative branch (Ibid.). It bears mentioning however, that while government actors are responsible for most claims related to immigration, it is possible that claims by the radical-right groups have more impact, and their influence is higher than it seems based on the amount of attention they receive (Ibid. 195).

2.4 What factors can contribute to the politicization of immigration?

Van der Brug et al. (2015) attempted to find explanations that can account for cross-country differences in the politicization of immigration in seven Western European countries between 1995 and 2009. Their research explored a broad range of potential theoretical explanations for politicization of immigration through developing a typology of four different types of explanations, further exploring the plausibility of each of those. Based on relevant literature, van der Brug et al. (2015a: 9) identified four factors which might contribute to politicization. These derive from two dichotomies. The first one depends on whether one sees politicization as a process mitigated bottom-up by citizens, or top-down by authorities and formal political institutions. The second distinction is between explanations that focus on the agency of actors and those that conceptually prioritize structural conditions.

There is a significant body of literature dealing with whether there is a causal relation between unemployment and immigration on the one hand, and anti-immigrant party support on the other hand. However, these have had mixed empirical support. Some studies have found that the number of immigrants or asylum seekers in the country positively affects the electoral support for anti-immigrant parties. For example, Swank & Bets (2003: 230) found that the volume of foreign immigration bolsters the vote for right-wing populist parties, which are often considered the main actors responsible for politicizing immigration, and the effect of international immigration is significant. Other studies have failed to establish such relationship. However, van der Brug et al. (2015b: 180) found that societal developments, such as immigration patterns and economic conditions, do not have a significant effect on politicization of immigration. In fact, while the proportion of immigrants in a country does

not have a statistically significant effect on the salience of immigration, levels of unemployment have negative effect, as during such period the attention goes to bread and butter issues. When the economy was slowing down in 2005, 2006 and 2007 as the financial crisis kicked in, the interest in the issue of immigration became significantly reduced (van der Brug et al. 181). The fact that societal developments do not really provide an explanation for the degree of politicization is, according to van der Brug et al. (2015b: 182) not that big of a surprise, as both political scientists and sociologists have observed that political actions in pursuit of goals are seldom spontaneous, as they require mobilization by mobilized interests.

As opposed to societal developments, political opportunity structures are a good indicator for explaining patterns of politicization (van der Brug et al. 2015b: 187). The concept of political opportunity structure was introduced following the recognition that grievances on their own are not enough to motivate people for taking collective action, and puts forth the notion that political environment shapes the extent to which various actors are able to mobilize support for their causes (Rueding 2015: 3-4). According to de Wilde and Zürn (2012: 141), important elements of political opportunity structure are national narratives, media receptiveness, competitive party politics, referendums and crises, and these have turned out to be good explanations of politicization. As already mentioned, Van der Brug et al. (2015) found that a very important element of political opportunity structures, which is a good indicator of explaining politicization, is the proportionality of the electoral system. While proportional representation provides opportunities for anti-immigration parties to be represented at the national level, in systems dominated by two main parties it is difficult for anti-immigration parties to become serious players in the national parliaments. As a result, various groups that wish to impose more restrictions on immigration will try to mobilize support for such policies through one of the main parties (van der Brug et al. 2015b: 187). Conflict dimension within a party system also proved to be a good indicator of patterns of politicization of immigration. In the UK, for example, divisions within the dominating parties appeared to be a factor tending towards depoliticization, while competition between parties have done the opposite (Carvalho et al. 2015: 177).

Further, in the literature on anti-immigration parties, socio-economic and cultural tensions are often seen as the main drivers of the surge of such parties. Anti-immigrant sentiments would arise from the fact that native citizens compete with immigrants for various resources (van der Brug et al. 2015b). Models of ethnic competition contend that people who most often support anti-immigrant parties are so-called losers of modernity, meaning groups

of citizens most likely to be negatively affected by the changes globalization has brought. However, van der Brug et al (2015) found that, as already mentioned, the attention to immigration is negatively related to unemployment figures, which calls into question the purely socio-economic explanations of anti-immigration sentiments. If the economic explanations were correct, one would expect immigrants to be blamed for the increasing levels of unemployment and the attention to immigration issues to increase, but the opposite happened in the seven countries under study. Findings were more in line with the notion that immigration has become more of a socio-cultural issue, characterized by the alleged incompatibility of immigrants' culture and the values of Western liberal democracy (Ibid.).

The increased cultural diversity caused by immigration was also identified as one of important reasons for the increasing anti-immigrant sentiments across Western Europe by Kriesi et al. (2008). Ethnically different populations have become symbols of potential threats to both standards and style of living for the so-called losers of globalization, who often see immigrants as a threat to the collective identity of the native population (Ibid.). According to Kriesi et al. (2008), however, this 'cultural competition' does not replace, but accompany and exacerbate the perceived economic competition between the native population and immigrants.

In addition to research on politicization of immigration, research on European union and electoral success of far-right parties offer useful insights into when immigration can become politicized. Research on politicization of European integration, for example, found that historical events and critical thresholds in the integration process are key factors in politicization of the issue (Hutter & Grande 2014). According to de Wilde and Zürn (2012: 140), 'the rising politicization of European integration is primarily a reaction to the increasing authority of the EU over time'. In this context, major integration steps, but also national decisions related to the EU, can be triggers of political controversies. Because immigration, like European integration, has also been a controversial issue, especially in recent years, and negative attitudes towards immigration are often linked with skepticism towards European integration, which in turn is closely related to globalization, denationalization and more broad issue of opening of borders, there is a good reason to expect that similar developments in the context of immigration will also affect politicization of the issue.

3.0 Research design and methodology

This thesis is a qualitative, interpretative study, with the main aim of describing and understanding the patterns of politicization of immigration in the US, UK and Poland between 2007 and 2016. It examines how politicization of immigration has evolved in the three countries during this period, and while the main focus is tracing changes over time, comparisons will also be made between the three countries under investigation in order to find similarities and differences in patterns of politicization. While the overarching goal is describing changes over time, I also aim to interpret and understand why various developments, such as sudden peaks in salience of immigration, have taken place, by looking at events in light of various explanatory factors found in theories and previous studies on the topic, which have been presented in the previous chapter.

3.1 Case selection

There were two reasons why the US, the UK and Poland were chosen as case studies for this thesis. One of the reasons is mostly practical. I got permission to use the data gathered for *The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism* (de Wilde, Koopmans & Zürn: forthcoming). It is a project about cosmopolitan and communitarian coalitions which have emerged as a result of the globalization cleavage, showcased through analyzing the public debates in the media in Germany, Mexico, Poland, Turkey and the United States. Because immigration is one of the components defining the globalization cleavage, the data about political claims made by various actors about immigration has been gathered for all the countries included in the project for the period between 2007 and 2011. After familiarizing myself with the codebook developed for de Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn's project, I found that collecting the data on immigration for my thesis could be done in the same way, and it would be suitable for exploring the main theme of the thesis, namely the changing patterns of politicization. I wanted to expand this data to include the most recent immigration-related developments which I could use for this thesis, while at the same time gathering more data that could be used should the *The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism* be continued. With this thesis thus being a cumulative study expanding an already existing database which I wanted to expand in time, the case selection was naturally limited. I chose to include Poland and the United States, both because of the language, and because these two countries seemed to be very interesting cases to explore.

Both Poland and the United States have, at least at face-value, seen politicization of immigration in the mass media increasing in the last few years. Further, because most studies about politicization of immigration have tended to focus on Western Europe, I thought including two countries that have not been objects of research in this field could provide interesting insights into the dynamics of the public debates about immigration. I also chose to include the UK, mostly because of the recent developments related to immigration in the country which culminated in the country's decision to leave the EU.

While there are many other countries that could be interesting to investigate, writing a master's thesis has time constraints, so I opted for the benefit of building on an already existing database which I could expand in time. However, even though a big part of the reason for this particular case selection was practical, I believe that the US, the UK and Poland are actually very interesting cases in the context of the theme of this thesis, which is exploring patterns of politicization of immigration. At first glance, these are three countries with very different immigration histories, different experiences with immigration, different cultural backgrounds, located in different regions of the world, and impacted very differently by the recent developments related to immigration, such as the refugee crisis in Europe. Nonetheless, at least at face value, all of them have seen immigration becoming an increasingly politicized topic in the last few years. Immigration has been the key issue of the last presidential election in the US, of the last parliamentary elections and the referendum campaign in the UK, and it was, for the first time in the country's history, one of the issues raised in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland in 2015. So what really happened? Has immigration really been as politicized as it seems? If it indeed is the case, when did this happen, and what can account for it? When has immigration become politicized and by whom? What are the patterns of politicization in all these countries, are there similarities and differences between how it has played out in the US, the UK and Poland? This is what this thesis attempts to explore, and the following sections will explain how it will be done.

3.2 Data collection methods

To answer the research questions, empirical data has been gathered in two ways. In order to answer the first research question: How has politicization of immigration developed, in terms of salience, in the US, UK and Poland between 2007 and 2016? I counted the number of articles including the key word search string in each of the chosen newspapers each month between 2007 and 2016². To answer the remaining research questions, I gathered the data following the political claims analysis approach. The following sections explain the sampling strategy, describe the political claims analysis method, why it was deemed appropriate for this research and how exactly it has been applied, as well as how and the data on salience of immigration was gathered and why it was done this way.

3.2.1 Sampling strategy

The sampling of documents for investigating patterns of politicization is not an easy task. Newspapers often have a distinctive ideological orientation which is embodied in their editorial line, and this might affect the selection of political information the newspaper presents to the audience. Consequently, to avoid bias as a result of selecting a specific newspaper, it is important to account for newspapers with different editorial profiles. For each country, a left ring\liberal and right\conservative daily newspaper was chosen, and for the US and the UK a local newspaper in addition. Because it was not possible to get access to archives for the entire period for any local newspaper in Poland, sampling in the case of Poland was only done from two newspapers. The newspapers used from the US are The New York Times (leftist), Washington Times (rightist), and Houston Chronicle (local). For the UK it is The Guardian (leftist), The Daily Mail (rightist) and the Liverpool Echo (local). In Poland, the two newspapers are Gazeta Wyborcza (leftist) and Rzeczpospolita (rightist). Rzeczpospolita archives were accessed through the newspaper's own webpage, while the articles from the remaining newspapers were accessed through LexisNexis.

Because this thesis expands on the database of the *The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism*, I used the key word search string that was developed for that project. This way the data I collected is directly comparable, and the key word search string was developed to capture the information I need. For the US and the UK

²Both the key word search string and the newspaper selection will be discussed in the following section.

newspapers, the key word search string is 'migration and (immigration or emigration or integration or citizenship)', meaning that it captures the articles which include the word migration and one of the other words, in order to avoid false hits. However, because the key word search string used for the Polish newspapers in *The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism* project did not yield results, possibly because the search engines in different databases working differently, after much trial and error I identified a key word string that provided satisfactory results. The key word search string to sample articles from Polish newspapers ended up being 'imigrant or imigracja or imigranci or imigrantami or imigrantów and (obywatel or obywateli or obywatelstwo or integracja or integracji or integracją or emigrant or emigracja or emigrantom or emigrantów or przybysz or przybyszy or przybyszami or migracja or migracji or migracją)'. Because the word immigration in Polish is used much more frequently than migration while referring to the same phenomenon, I had to replace 'migration' with 'immigration' in order to get results, since there were hardly any results when I searched for articles containing the word 'migration'. However, because the word 'immigration' in Polish is usually used instead of the word 'migration' while, as already mentioned, referring to the same phenomenon, the results were very similar, in the amount and content, to those from the American and British newspapers, meaning that the data collected this way was both accurate and comparable.

3.2.2 Political Claims Analysis

To answer research questions 2 and 3, the methodological approach of this thesis follows is one that Koopmans and Statham (1999) developed in their seminal work 'Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest Event and Political Discourse Approaches', which was also used for the *The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism*, as this thesis builds on its existing database. Koopmans and Statham built on a combination of protest event research and media content research, and extended analysis of conventional social protest forms to a range of actors and action forms. These include institutional and non-institutional actors, as well as all forms of claims-making by these actors in the public domain, "whether routine or non-routine, conventional or unconventional" (Koopmans & Statham 1999: 206). While protest event analysis focuses mainly on social movements and protest events those actors are involved in from a quantitative point of view, political claims analysis extends this approach by including other actors (political parties, civil society groups and more), by covering other event forms (such as written and verbal statements, executive

and legislative actions and more), as well as by paying more attention to the content of the claims.

Statham & Koopmans (2009), as well as Helbling & Tresh (2011), provide convincing arguments for why looking at political claims in the mass media is a good method to investigate how political parties compete over issues by engaging in public debates in the mass media, and there is no reason to think that these do not apply to a wider range of actors engaged in public debates. In fact, there is a growing body of literature that has investigated public debates on various issues through looking at political claims made by various actors in the media, especially the newspapers. In their research, Koopmans and Statham (1999) applied the method to investigate mobilization about migration and ethnic relations in Germany and Britain. However, as already mentioned, political claims analysis has become an increasingly popular method in research on contentious politics, and has been employed in research on issues such as European integration (Statham & Koopmans 2009, Statham & Trezn 2012), globalization (de Wilde, Koopmans & Zürn (forthcoming)) and immigration (Statham & Geddes 2006, van der Brug et al. 2015).

As already explained in the previous chapter, there is a well-accepted conception in the literature that the mass media is the most important arena for public debates on politically relevant issues, and in the age when voters to a high degree depend on the mass media for access to political communication, the mass media is a key location for political contestation (Helbling & Tresh 2011: 174). Because various actors aim at reaching wide audience to present their claims, it is logical to study how this plays out in the public sphere. It is namely in the public sphere, in particular in the mass media, that claims can reach the largest audiences (de Wilde 2013: 279). Methodologically, it makes newspapers a good data source for examining political contestation. Data gathered from newspapers using political claims-making method is well-suited for a systematic analysis of political contestation which allows both for tracing changes over time and investigating short-term changes (Helbling & Tresh 2011: 175). It gives a thorough picture of political contestation, providing information on, among others, which actors participate in the debates, and what positions they take on the issues. Unlike data on political positions gathered from expert judgements or party manifestos, data gathered through political-claims analysis in the mass media gives a thorough picture of positions taken not only by the political parties, but also various other actors involved in public debates about issues. It also lends itself well to exploring changes over time. In other words, political claims-making analysis based on the data gathered from

newspapers is very well-suited for exploring what this thesis aims to explore, namely changing patterns of politicization over time. The following section will provide a thorough explanation of how exactly the method will be applied in this research.

3.2.2.1 Application of political claims analysis in this research

For each country, 20 random articles per year from the newspapers listed earlier in this chapter were sampled, but because of time constraints, only half of them, also chosen at random, were coded following political claims analysis approach. In order for articles published early and late in the year to be represented throughout the sampling period, for some years the first sampled article was from January, in others from December. As will be explained in more detail further in this section, the coding in this thesis is based on a codebook developed for *The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism* project (de Wilde, Koopmans & Zürn 2014). One of the reason for doing it this way is that coding claim aspects and variables as they were developed for that project are very well suited to answer the research questions in the thesis. The other reason is that since political claims were coded according to the same code book, it allows me to build on an already existing data base. In addition, it will be possible to use the coding I have done for this thesis for the possible future continuation of the de Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn's project.

One of the issues *The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism* gathered data on was political contestation about immigration in Poland and the US between 2007 and 2011. Because using the same codebook allows me to compare the findings directly, I used the data found for the project between 2007 and 2011 for Poland, which means that I coded articles for these countries between 2012 and 2016. Because the UK was not part of *The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism* project, I coded articles for the entire 2007-2016 period. This means that for the purpose of this thesis 200 newspaper articles were coded: 50 for the US (10 per year from 2012 to 2016), 50 for Poland (10 per year from 2012 to 2016), and 100 for the UK (10 per year from 2007 to 2016).

Political claims are strategic demands made by collective actors within a specific issue field. It is a type of political behavior defined as the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, either actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors (Koopmans & Statham 1999: 206-207). While the sampling units are articles

containing the key word search string, the unit of analysis are instances of political claims in the newspaper articles. Each time an actor makes a claim, the claim is coded according to the pre-developed codebook.

The coding of political claims in this thesis follows the codebook developed for *The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism*³ project, which investigates whether we are seeing a new emerging cleavage as a result of globalization. The study looks at political claims about five issues: immigration, trade, regional integration, human rights and climate change in the US, Germany, Poland, Turkey and Mexico. As mentioned earlier, there are several reasons why this thesis utilizes this codebook, and one of them is the fact that the variables and aspects to measure political contestation about immigration in a way which allows me to answer my research questions were already developed and more than suitable for this thesis.

In total, 12 values were assigned to each claim. These are the country of origin, year, source, claimant type, claimant scope, claimant function, claimant nationality, claimant party, problem scope, action, issue and position. However, since some of them ended up not being used in this thesis, I will only describe the coding of variables and aspects that were utilized to answer the research questions in this study.

In order to investigate polarization of immigration, thereby answer the second research question, graphs were made for each country based on what position actors involved in the public debate about immigration in the mass media were taking on the issue of immigration throughout the years. Claims coded as demarcate (in favor of closing of borders) and keep demarcated (claims in defense of the status quo where this is portrayed as relatively closed, or directly in contrast to claims arguing for a change in status quo towards further integration) were added together and assigned value -1. Claims coded as problem (claims that communicate that immigration is problematic but do not make clear what should be done about it) and no problem (claims saying that immigration is not an issue) were assigned value 0, and claims coded as integrate (in favor of more immigration and/or more open borders) and keep integrated (claims in defense of the status quo which is portrayed as relatively open) were assigned value 1. As already mentioned, a graph was created for each country based on those values, which shows both in which years the debate was most polarized, where the most polarizing constellation is when actors take opposing issue positions with roughly the

³ The full codebook can be found at <https://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2014/iv14-102.pdf>

same intensity, at the same time showing whether the general tone of the debate was positive/open or restrictive during the times when immigration was not very polarized.

To investigate what actors have been involved in the politicization of immigration, graphs that present percentage of claims made by different actors between 2007 and 2016 were created. In order for the table to be more comprehensible, it only includes ten types of actors who were the most frequent claimants. The 'organizations' actor was aggregated to include all international actors from the codebook, which are international organization, secretariat, council, assembly, agency, court, and bank. The 'finance' actor was also aggregated to include central bank, private finance, and business. Other actors, which made very few claims and thus are not represented in the graphs, are polity, public figure, rebels, religious actors, farmers, and police/military. However, after the empirical data was gathered and analyzed, it turned out that the debate about immigration in Poland hardly included political claims made by domestic actors, thus presenting what type of actors were involved in the debate became less relevant in the Polish context, because with such low number of claims made by domestic actors and a limited database based on 10 articles per year, the results would not be enough to see real changes over time. Thus, the answer to the third research question in the Polish context will be mostly based on different data, namely whether immigration was presented as a national, foreign or other problem. However, this will still allow me to answer the third research question, although in a slightly different way.

Because the debates on immigration in the mass media have played out differently in all three countries, other data will be presented slightly differently for each country, depending on what was deemed most relevant for understanding the politicization of immigration in those countries. For example, because, as already mentioned, hardly any political claims about immigration were made by Polish political parties, party positions will not be discussed in detail in the analysis of the debate in Poland, but they will be discussed in more detail for both the US and the UK, where political parties had a significant role in the debate.

3.2.3 Measuring salience

In order to measure salience of immigration and answer the first research question, I counted the articles published in the same newspapers which included the same key word string that was used for sampling the articles for coding of political claims. I registered the number of

articles published each month between January 2007 and December 2016 in the selected newspapers aggregated them in one graph for each country, something which resulted in a graph showing how the salience of the issue fluctuated in these countries from year to year during that period.

Much of the research looking at issue salience (for example van der Brug et al. 2015) measures salience by the number of political claims in the newspaper articles. However, I believe that measuring salience the way it was explained above, which is the total number of articles about the issue of immigration, is more suitable to answer the first research question. Part of this thesis is not just looking at what actors make claims and what their positions are, but also how visible the debate on immigration is to the public. Because in political claims analysis each political claim is only coded once, even if the same actor makes several claims in an article, the positions that repeatedly appear in an article are not duplicated, which can lead to a possible underestimation of salience (Helbling & Tresh 2011: 178). Further, since the articles sampled for political claims analysis were chosen at random in the amount of 10 articles per year, salience of immigration would not be captured accurately.

Empirical studies have shown that while the media reflects positions of political actors accurately in their coverage, the amount of coverage granted to various issues and actors varies depending both on the type of media and the editorial line (Helbling & Tresh 2011: 176-180). This means that while indicators of actor positions derived from the media are relatively similar, indicators of issue salience are more likely to vary. To avoid that, as already explained before, I aggregated the data from the newspapers in each country in one graph, which should present a better picture of how salient the debate on immigration was overall in each country. The newspapers from which the data was gathered are in each country a left-wing, right-wing, and where it was possible, either a local or religious newspaper. To show how salient the issue was generally in the country, the number of articles in each country from different newspapers was aggregated, so the final graphs, which are presented in the analysis chapter, shows the average from all newspapers in the respective countries.

An important thing to mention about the graphs showing salience which will be presented in the analysis chapter is that the total number of articles presented in the graphs might be slightly misleading due to the problem with duplicates in the newspaper archives. Some articles were registered multiple times, being archived every time when a word or a few words in an article were changed, and it was not possible to filter those in any way using different search tools available. Due to the time constraints, it was not possible to do it

manually either. Because some months saw over 300 articles which included the key word search string, and the duplicate articles were sometimes scattered across many pages, sometimes under different names, it would take time I did not have to go through all of them. I considered simply discarding the duplicates I happened to notice, but that way it would be done more at random, and not in a systematic way. Thus, the decision was made to leave the duplicates, because even with this problem, it is still possible to discuss when salience became higher or lower. Even though some peaks in the graphs might be slightly higher than they should be because of the problem with the duplicates, they still reflect the patterns of salience, and show when more articles about immigration were published. Consequently, the graphs will still be a good depiction of when the newspaper coverage of immigration increased and decreased, even though in some instances, as is the case for the peak in 2014 in the US, in reality they could have been a little lower than it appears in the graph.

4.0 Background: immigration patterns and politicization in the US, UK and Poland after WWII

In order to provide some context, the background chapter will present an overview over immigration patterns in the US, UK and Poland after World War II until today. It will also present a brief overview over patterns of politicization until around the mid-2000s, as patterns of politicization from 2007 to 2016 are what this thesis investigates based on the empirical data gathered, and will thus be presented and discussed in the analysis chapter.

4.1 The United States

4.1.1 Patterns of immigration after WWII

Immigrants from Europe had, since the country's conception, been the backbone of U.S. immigration flows (Zong & Batalova 2015). However, the dominance of western European immigration to the US ended in the 1960s, with the number of immigrants from other regions starting to rise (Zhao 2016), with the share of Europeans among the foreign-born population in the U.S. plunging from 75% in 1960 to 11% in 2014 (Zong & Batalova 2015). While the US still attracts European immigrants, many Europeans were now able and willing to find alternatives closer to home, and Western Europe itself has become a magnet for immigration (Zhao 2016).

After the 1965 Immigration Act abolished national-origin quotas which gave preference to European migration, immigration from the Western Hemisphere has been growing at a fast pace since the second half of the 20th century, and since the 1960s Mexico has been the most important source of immigration to the United States (Zong & Batalova 2015). Immigration from other Western hemisphere nations, including Cubans, Dominicans and Colombians also picked up pace in the 1960s, and at that time immigrants from Western hemisphere replaced Europeans as the driving force of U.S. immigration (Zhao 2016).

Since the 1990s, the total population of immigrants has increased and spread around the United States. Fuelled mostly by immigration from Latin America, most notably Mexico, and Asia, the foreign-born population in the United States grew from 9.6 million in 1970 (Passel & Suro 2005: 1) to 19.7 million in 1990, amounting to 7.9% of total population in the U.S. By 2010, around 40 million immigrants made up 13% of the overall population (The Pew Charitable Trusts 2014). According to Census Bureau data from 2015, immigrants, together with their US-born children, make up about 27% of US inhabitants (Renwick & Lee 2017).

4.1.2 Politicization of immigration after WWII

The United States is often called a nation of immigrants, and as the previous section has shown, with good reason. Consequently, it is not surprising that immigration has been a touchstone of the political debate in the United States for decades (Renwick & Lee 2017). The immigration debate was not very polarized in the country in the 1950s. The National Origins Act was the law, and there was not much public debate about the issue. Immigrants were mostly coming from Europe, during the Cold War the doors also opened for those fleeing from the Communist regimes, which garnered political consensus. The 1960s saw new developments. As the emphasis on human rights gained attention, exclusion of non-white immigrants in the US immigration policy also came into focus, supported by campaigns of various activists and the Civil Rights movement. Even though the public was opposed to letting in more people, there was a considerable liberal consensus, and both Republicans and Democrats wanted more to admit more immigrants to the country, using the language of democracy and universal rights (Dittgen 1997). Lyndon B. Johnson committed his administration to lift 'by legislation the bars of discrimination against those who seek entry into our country', and consequently repealed the National Origins quota system with the

Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965, which became a turning point in the formation of the country's immigration policy and its relationship to race (Scribner 2017).

In the late 1980s, when immigration law was deliberated and enacted by Congress and then signed by President Bush, immigration was a 'non-issue', and it was difficult to find any significant information about it in the newspapers. This was a curious development, given that at that time many European countries were already in the middle of a heated public debate about the issue, and despite historically high absolute number of immigrants in the US in the 1980s. Immigration was simply not a public issue at that point, and 'a broad consensus about the value of immigration seemed to prevail' (Dittgen 1997). The immigration legislation in the 1980s was not an incremental policy change, but a change of policy paradigm, because of a 'new cultural consensus favoring expanded immigration' (Ibid.). Even though immigration from Haiti and Cuba in the early 1980s produced significant anti-immigrant sentiment, the public debate was never dominated by it, and the issue of immigration was notably absent in the congressional and presidential debates (Ibid.). In 1986, Ronald Reagan passed a landmark piece of legislation, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, often referred to as 'Reagan Amnesty', which allowed roughly 3 million people who were in the country illegally to gain legal status (Nyce & Bodenner 2016, Caldwell 2016).

In 1990, George H. W. Bush signed a new Immigration Act, which was the first major overhaul of the legislation from 1965. The Immigration Act of 1990 was seen as a return to the pre-1920s open door immigration policy, and allowed for an increase in the number of legal immigrants into the country, as well as waived some conditions which had previously restricted immigration of certain groups. Soon after that, the broad political consensus on the value of immigration stopped, and a new debate about first illegal immigration, and later immigration in general, started (Dittgen 1997). The immigration issue started becoming politicized, and politicians started raising the issue in their campaigns. First it happened at local levels, but soon immigration became propelled to the national arena. Patrick Buchanan entered the race for the Republican presidential nomination in 1992, and announced at the Republican National Convention that the time had come for the US people to 'take back our culture' (Ibid.).

Republicans have been pressing the issue of tightening immigration restrictions during the 1994 campaign, and because of the political climate at that time, the Democrats felt like they could not oppose a bill aimed at dealing with illegal immigrants (Lind 2016). Further,

the Clinton White House welcomed an opportunity to show that it was tough on immigrants, and in 1996, Bill Clinton oversaw the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, which drastically increased all levels of immigration enforcement, expanded the Border Patrol, criminalized various types of low-level immigration violations, as well as facilitated and expanded deportation procedures (Chomsky 2017).

The 9\11 terrorist attack affected the country in many ways, including people's perspective on immigration, and reinvigorated the debate about the immigration reform. After 9\11, the U.S. immigration policy became inextricably linked with national security and border control policies (Frej 2016). However, even though national security became the cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy, the question of illegal immigrants coming to the country, as well as what should be done with those who are already in the US, has remained a constant political issue (Ibid.).

In the years after, various immigration reform bills, both partisan and bipartisan, have been launched and failed to be passed through the legislative as the Houses were not able to agree on the details. One of those bills was the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 which included providing legal status and a path to citizenship for over 10 million illegal immigrants living in the United States. The bill was supposed to be a compromise between increased border enforcement and at the same time path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants who were already in the country, but it received criticism from both parties, and was never voted on. While conservatives did not want to agree to providing a path to citizenship, which they argued would reward illegal immigrants for breaking immigration laws, liberals criticized the bill for being too restrictive. At the end of his presidency, George W. Bush said he should have pushed harder for immigration reform, and his inability to do it reflected how differently Republicans and Democrats felt about the issue, as well as how polarized the issue of immigration has become.

4.2 The United Kingdom

4.2.1 Patterns of immigration after WWII

While the UK has experienced prior periods of immigration, it was not until after WWII that 'colored' people started arriving to the country on a notable scale (Carvalho et al. 2015: 159). The British Nationality Act of 1948 codified the right to free entry for the citizens of Commonwealth and those from Eire. The legislation, against a background of full

employment, led to new immigration – first mostly from the West Indies, followed by other immigrants from the Indian sub-continent (Ibid.). Around 500 000 such immigrants had arrived to the UK before the Conservatives introduced Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962 (Ibid.).

During the 1960s and 1970s, emigration from the UK, especially to Old Commonwealth countries, exceeded immigration to the country (Hatton 2004: 2). Thus, despite immigration from the Commonwealth, the UK did not become a net-immigration country until the 1980s (Carvalho et al. 2015: 159). From the early 1980s, the historic pattern of net emigration from the country turned into net immigration, which increased significantly from the mid-1990s (Hatton 2004: 3). Since the 1990s, the increase of non-Commonwealth immigration, including asylum seekers, combined with the EU enlargements, led to immigration numbers by far exceeding the expectations of the British government (Carvalho et al. 2015: 160). From the early 1990s to the peak of 1998-2000 net immigration surged by more than 100 thousand annually (Hatton 2004: 2). For a long time the UK has seen more immigration than emigration, reaching another peak in 2005. In the wake of the economic crisis net migration began to drop, and then again from 2011 after the government restricted entry for various groups of people from outside Europe. However, now net migration has been on the rise again (Casciani 2014). Combined with high birth rates in many of the immigrant groups, this development has led to a predominantly white England taking on a more speckled hue (most immigrants have settled in England rather than in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). England's total population of 51.809.700 in 2009 was made up of 87.5% 'whites'. Of the largest minorities, 6.1% were Asian\Asian British, 2.9% Black\Black British and 1.8% mixed persons (Carvalho et al. 2015: 160).

According to the Office for National Statistics, net migration to the UK reached an all-time high in 2014, and continued increasing throughout 2015 and 2016 (BBC 2015, Ainger 2016). Figures also show that 8.3 million people living in the UK were born abroad, which constitutes 13% of the UK population. India is the most common non-UK country of birth in the UK population, and Polish is the most common non-British nationality (BBC 2015).

4.2.2 Politicisation of immigration after WWII

During the period between 1948 and 1962 the UK developed into a multicultural society due to the open-door immigration policy for immigrants from the Commonwealth, and the liberality of British immigration policy until 1962 was to a high degree propelled by the bipartisan ideological commitment to the former colonies (Kriesi & Frey 2008: 189). The post-war settlement of colored immigrants, however, became associated with social and urban problems, including race riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958. These developments showed potential for politicization, and the rise of anti-immigration political discourse indeed did follow. The Conservatives attempted to defuse the issue through the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. The Labour opposed the Act at first, but opinion polls evidence, which showed perception that the party was 'soft' on immigration, combined with rising unemployment, led to the acceptance of restrictions (Carvalho et al. 2015: 160).

The strict immigration policy was justified by the reference to the need to integrate immigrants into society. The 1960s and 1970s were thus characterized by a departure from open borders, and emphasis on integration, as 'both parties accepted that good race relations depended on strict migration control' (Kriesi & Frey 2008: 190). On the background of growing economic problems, and issues such as much-publicized arrival of expelled Ugandan and Malawian Asians, the period the period after 1960s was marked by a surge of anti-immigration parties (Carvalho et al. 2015: 160). The rise of Margaret Thatcher is also worth noting. Even though it was the economic issues that featured prominently in the 1979 election campaigns, opinion polls indicated that concerns about immigration were strong among the British electorate, leading the Conservative government to, among others, tighten the concept of British citizenship in the 1981 British Nationality Act, which also, combined with anti-European rhetoric, strengthened Thatcher's nationalist credentials (Carvalho et al. 2015: 161).

After a brief period of decline of immigration as a political issue, the riots of the 1980s drew immigration and integration to the forefront again. Growing willingness of the government to deal with community leaders and providing funds at the local level to facilitate integration helped limit violent outbursts, though some further disturbances by ethnic minority groups happened in the 1990s and early 2000s (Carvalho et al. 2015: 161). Disturbances led to official inquiries about their causes. One of them was found to be the lack of community cohesion, a term which quickly became fashionable among those who sought to point not only to residential segregation in some urban areas, but also to allegedly divisive effects of multiculturalism and the decline of a sense of common national identity (Ibid.)

Political debate on entry controls resurfaced as immigration began to increase again in the 1990s, mostly because of the rising numbers of asylum-seekers. This trend led to the Conservative government expanding restrictions on asylum through the enactment of the 1993 and 1996 Asylum and Immigration Acts. Following the return of the Labour to power in 1997, the asylum system was further reformed through the enactment of several acts, which were also predominantly restrictive (Carvalho et al. 2015: 162).

In the early 2000s Labor adopted a narrative of managed migration, emphasizing the economic benefits of labor migration. Before the Eastern EU expansion of 2004, there was willingness to accept new migration on neo-liberal economic grounds. However, impact of new migration also saw successive crises at the Home Office regarding the management of inflow of new immigrants. These were followed by the resignation of an immigration minister, as well as two successive home secretaries. After taking over from Tony Blair, Gordon Brown sought to tighten immigration policy in some areas while also highlighting the need to create a new sense of national unity and purpose. This period also saw new political rhetoric on immigration, exemplified by the 'British jobs for British workers' slogan (Carvalho et al. 2015: 162). The mantra of 'managed migration' became a guiding policy concept from 2005 onwards, first promoted under the auspices of shaping immigration to serve UK employers, later with the focus on reasserting state control (Lewis et al. 2012: 87). Immigration has clearly been an important issue in the UK for a long time, and this has not changed in the recent years -rather on the contrary, and the analysis chapter will explore the more recent developments.

4.3 Poland

4.3.1 Patterns of immigration after WWII

From the end of WWII until the collapse of the communist regime in Poland in 1989, the country's migration policy, not unlike that of other countries of the Soviet Bloc, reflected isolationist principles. Because of restrictive passport and exit-visa policies it was very difficult for Polish citizens to leave the country (Iglicka & Ziolek-Skrzypczak 2010). However, despite those difficulties, it is estimated that over 1 million people emigrated from Poland between 1980 and 1989, out of which 200 000 returned to Poland after the fall of the communist regime. Immigration to Poland at that time was also virtually non-existent, with asylum largely limited to other countries experiencing 'class struggle', such as Vietnam

(Bachman 2016). Despite a lot of experience with emigration, Polish society had not experienced any significant immigration until the 1990s, even though sporadically the country accepted refugees and immigrants usually guided by political or ideological considerations, as was the case with the aforementioned case of Vietnamese immigrants.

These policies began to change in the 1990s, and migration trends in Poland swiftly adapted to the new political situation after 1989. Political and economic changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe led to a completely new migration situation in Poland for two main reasons. First, Poland, with now more open borders, became a transit country for those who wanted to migrate to Western Europe. Second, because of the economic reforms and subsequently improved economic situation, Poland became an attractive destination country for immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union countries, many of whom come to Poland to seek employment and engage in various forms of trade (Kosowicz 2009: 18). Between 1990 and 2005 the five most common countries of origin of immigrants coming to Poland were Ukraine, Germany, Belarus, Vietnam and Russia (MSWiA 2007: 36).

The data about dynamics of immigration in Poland suggests that the watershed moment for Poland becoming a more attractive destination for immigrants was not when the country joined the EU in 2004, but when it joined the Schengen zone in 2007 (Konieczna-Sałamatin 2014: 5). Since then, the number of immigrants in Poland has been increasing at the rate of around 8 000 per year. Between 2007 and 2013, the most rapidly growing immigrant population was immigrants from Ukraine Belarus, in other words from the same cultural background (Ibid. 6). Given the very low birth rate in Poland, if immigration to the country increases at similar pace in the future, the number of immigrants in the country would reach 1% of the population in about 45 years (Ibid.). Even though immigration to Poland has been increasing, the scale of immigration is still very low. Census data from 2011 shows that only 47 000 foreigners lived in Poland permanently, which constituted 0.1% of the country's population (Dragan 2016: 8).

Poland has experienced an increasing number of refugee applications since the late 1990s (Iglićka & Ziolk-Skrzypczak 2010). Until 2009, Russia (mostly people from the war-torn Chechnya) has been the leading country of origin of refugees coming to Poland (Europejska Sieć Migracyjna 2009: 22). Since 2014 the immigration situation has been dominated by immigrants from Ukraine, coming to Poland because of the conflict raging in their country (Europejska Sieć Migracyjna 2014, Europejska Sieć Migracyjna 2016). In 2013, the total number of immigrants amounted to 0.3% of population in Poland, showing that

immigration to the country is still a marginal issue (Konieczna-Salamatin 2014: 62).

4.3.2 Politicisation of immigration after WWII

Because the issue of immigration was not politicized in Poland until recently, it is not possible to write a historical overview over politicisation as thoroughly as it could be done in the case of the UK and the US. Because immigration to Poland has been so low, it was not an issue of public concern, nor something the media wrote much about. When they did, it was usually articles in local newspapers about refugee centers in the local communities. When the national media were raising the immigration-related issues, it was normally in the context of legislation which addressed problems of Poles living abroad and wanting to return to the country. Even when Poland accepted significant numbers of refugees from Chechnya in the 1990s, the issue was not really politicized. Even though there was some media coverage, and usually fairly negative, questioning whether it is safe for Poland to accept Chechnyan refugees and whether the country can afford it, immigration was still not a political issue (Iglicka et al. 2004: 3) It is also worth noting that Chechens, like most other immigrants to Poland, treated the country as a transit place, and the majority of them emigrated to Western Europe fairly quickly.

Immigration was not an issue central to Polish political parties either. It has been pushed aside in favor of more pressing issues that needed to be solved, something that can be attributed to the very low numbers of immigrants in the country historically and thus not being an issue the public was interested in (Trojanowska-Strzeboszewska 2010: 2). When political parties even mentioned the word immigration in their programmes, it usually related to what can and should be done for Polish people returning to the country.

Polish migration policy is still in its early stages, thus it is difficult to talk about both political discourse around immigration and its politicization (Malinowski Rubio 2011: 143). Even when in 2003, before Poland joined the EU, and in 2007, right before Poland joined the Schengen zone, the country saw two rounds of granting amnesty to illegal immigrants, the issue of immigration still did not receive public attention, partly because illegal immigration was such a small problem that the public simply did not care about it. In fact, in 2004, only 1% of Poles believed that immigration was a problem for the country (Ibid. 144-145). Therefore until mid-2000s, immigration was not an important issue to the public or the government, and it had received very little media attention (Ibid. 147). Judging by the

unprecedented amount of attention immigration has been given by the media in the recent years, this situation has now changed completely and, as it is the case with all countries in this study, recent developments in this area will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.


5.0 Analysis

This chapter will present the empirical findings of this research and answer the research questions. It will describe and interpret patterns of politicization seen in terms of salience, polarization, and types of actors involved, exploring how the public debate about immigration has evolved between 2007 and 2016. It will first be done for the US, UK and Poland separately. Each country sub-chapter will start with discussing salience, followed by polarization, and end with the analysis of what actors have been involved in the debate. The entire chapter will end with a comparative analysis of patterns of politicization in all three countries.

5.1 Patterns of politicization of immigration in the US in 2007-2016

5.1.1 Salience

Graph 1: Salience of immigration in the US between 2007 and 2016



Even though this can not really be derived from the graph on its own, it is worth mentioning that research by de Wilde et al. (forthcoming) has found that between 2007 and 2011 in the US, migration was the most polarized and salient issue out of five issues included in their analysis, which were migration, regional integration, trade, climate change and human rights. It can be thus be concluded that the issue was highly salient even before the peaks visible in the graph starting in 2014.

As the graph shows, the salience of immigration was relatively steady until a very significant peak in July 2014, which, based on the content of the sampled articles, can be mostly attributed to the surge of unaccompanied minors from Central America crossing the US border. The number of unaccompanied minors attempting to cross the border started to surge in 2012. However, the media coverage spiked in July 2014, when President Obama urged Congress to authorize emergency funds to deal with the border crisis. Republican members of the Congress pushed back, arguing that the border crisis was a result of Obama's policy problems and lax enforcement at the border (Park 2014). This points to the fact that while critical events, such as the intensification of the border crisis cause result in increased media coverage, this becomes even more intensified when disagreements between political parties become even more pronounced, and when one side, in this case the Republicans, attempts to score political points on emphasizing the problem. The debate about immigration reform became subsequently intensified during this period, and headlines such as '57.000 Reasons Immigration Overhaul May Be Stalled for Now' could be seen frequently in the media.

After the numbers of children crossing the border returned to their pre-crisis level in August\September, the political and media focus on the issue went down, something the graph clearly reflects. Here, however, even though salience went down after the border crisis, it did not go down to the levels from the earlier years – a development that might be attributed to several reasons.

In addition to the coverage of the border crisis, the media was also covering the refugee crisis extensively. On top of that, the mid-term elections were under way, something that, as the background chapter has shown, has often resulted in an intensified political debate about immigration in the US since the 1990s. According to Gallup poll, in 2014, immigration was cited as the most important problem facing the country by the voters (Rucker et al.

2014). The Ebola outbreak could have also contributed to the high salience; it caused much public anxiety about infected people crossing borders, with some politicians pressing for stricter travel controls, including a travel ban, for those coming from affected West African countries (Keating 2014).


Immigration remained highly salient in 2015 and 2016. Both the refugee crisis ('European Officials Take Steps to Spread Weight of Migrant Crisis Through Quotas', 'Merkel Urges Germans to See Migrants as 'an Opportunity,' Not a Threat') and Brexit in the UK ('As More Immigrants Arrive, Anxiety and Resentment Rise in Britain', 'British Leader, Firm on Immigration, Sets Stage for 2019 Exit From E.U.') were covered extensively. Last but not least, and possibly most importantly, Donald Trump made immigration the centerpiece of his presidential campaign, something that naturally resulted in high salience of the issue throughout the campaign.

The unemployment in the US started decreasing in 2011, and the economic recovery started picking up around the same time. As van der Brug et al. (2015) found, during periods with high unemployment and economic crisis, public debate is often dominated by 'bread and butter' issues, and when the situation improves, more attention is given to other political issues, and it seems like this can also be a part of explanation of why the salience of immigration increased when the economy started doing better and the unemployment started decreasing. Van der Brug et al. (2015) also found that politicization of immigration is not related to the numbers of immigrants in the country, and the patterns of salience between 2007 and 2016 in the US confirm this. Illegal immigration is the type of immigration Americans are mostly concerned about, but the number of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico declined by 1 million between 2007 and 2014 (Connor 2016), showing that peaks in salience were not related to the numbers of immigrants in the country. Overall, it seems that increases in salience of immigration as a public issue were most likely caused by critical events (the border crisis, the refugee crisis) and party competition (renewed immigration reform debate during and after the border crisis, recent presidential campaign), and the media's intense coverage of those developments, both domestic and foreign.

5.1.2 Polarization

After having presented how salience of the immigration issue has evolved in the United States between 2007 and 2016, the following section will explore patterns of polarization.

Graph 2: Polarization in the US between 2007 and 2016



The public debate is considered polarized when involved actors take extreme positions on an issue, with few neutral claims. As the graph shows, immigration was a polarized topic during most of the time-period under investigation.

Polarization was generally very high between 2007 and 2014, with roughly equal amounts of positive and negative claims. This might be attributed to the presidential election campaigns and party competitions, pointing to political opportunity structures, such as competitive party politics, being a good indicator of polarization. The very high polarization during that might simply show that the immigration debate in the US during that period was 'business as usual', meaning polarized the way it has been for years. De Wilde et al.

(forthcoming) found, as already mentioned before, that immigration is the most polarized and salient issue in the country. As the background chapter has shown, at first there was a broad consensus about the value of immigration, and it was not a matter of the public debate (Dittgen 1997). However, immigration became a political issue since the early 1990s. For the last two decades, the Congress has been debating various pieces of immigration reform, some considered comprehensive and some piecemeal, but most of them were never passed through the House, because of the disagreements between Democrats and Republicans, mostly relating to what should happen with illegal immigrants who are already in the United States. While Democrats favored giving undocumented immigrants some form to achieving legal status, often referred to as 'amnesty', Republicans tended to oppose those ideas, arguing that they would reward those who deliberately broke immigration laws, and encourage more people to come to the country illegally.

The highest polarization could be observed in 2012. One of Barack Obama's key campaign issues that year was passing a comprehensive immigration reform. However, since he was not able to pass any legislation through the Congress, he broke new ground on immigration by creating Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) through an executive order. The policy, while not granting permanent legal status, allowed illegal immigrants who were brought to the US as children, and fulfill certain criteria, to come out of the shadows, work legally and obtain various documents without fear of deportation (Preston & Cushman 2012). The measure was not consulted with Congress, where Republicans generally oppose any measures which would benefit illegal immigrants. DACA was criticized strongly by the Republicans, some of them accusing President Obama for violating the law and being an affront to the process of representative government because he, through using executive action, circumvented the Congress (Ibid.). The political fight about sanctuary cities was also contributing to the polarization of the debate, with some states, such as Texas and Arizona, proposing laws that would, for example, permit law enforcement officials to question a detainee's immigration status. The fact that mid-term elections were underway, as it often is the case with the immigration issue during election campaigns in the US, made the debate even more polarized, again pointing to the political opportunity structures as a good indicator of high polarization.

High polarization continued throughout 2013 and 2014. In 2014, President Obama tried to expand DACA to undocumented parents of U.S. Citizens and permanent residents. However, roughly half of the states sued the administration, arguing that the proposal violated

federal law and the Constitution. All this was happening on the background of the border crisis explained in the previous section. The border crisis overtook Obama's plans to use executive actions to expand DACA, and led to increased deportations during the time when the President was preparing to allow more undocumented immigrants to stay in the country. Politically, the border crisis allowed the Republicans to use the crisis as evidence that Democratic policies were inviting illegal immigration. Obama was calling the border crisis an 'actual humanitarian crisis', and said it only underscored the need to move past partisan divisions and fix the broken immigration system. However, the political debate during that period remained very politically charged, with the Republicans slamming Barack Obama for not taking sufficient action on people who cross the border illegally. While there seemed to be an agreement that the immigration system needs an overhaul, as the background chapter had shown had been the case for many years, there was no bipartisan agreement on how that should happen. The differing positions were voiced very strongly by both sides of the debate, and covered intensely by the media. The tone of the debate also became more restrictive during 2014, which might point to the fact that the Republicans were more vocal in their criticism Barack Obama and Democrat immigration policy in general, in an attempt to score political points during the time when immigration, according to the polls, was identified by the public opinion as the most important problem facing the country (Gallup 2014).

According to the graph, the debate became less polarized in 2015, with majority of claims becoming positive towards immigration. This is a curious development for which I believe there are two possible explanations. The first possibility is that the results could have been affected by the random sample of the articles, and simply did not reflect the debate the way it played out. There is, however, another interpretation that could possibly explain this trend, which makes it plausible that, in fact, the political debate about immigration had an overall less restrictive tone that year. Van der Brug et al. (2015) found that the number of positive claims about immigration increase the more right-wing the government is, because pro-immigrant groups and left-wing parties make more claims in favor of migrants. Even though there was no right-wing government in office in the US in 2015, it is possible to argue that with the amount of negative and inflammatory comments made about immigration and immigrants by the Republican presidential candidates, similar phenomenon happened. When Donald Trump announced he was running for the presidency, he accused Mexico of sending it's worst people, including criminals and rapists, to the US. 'They're sending people that have lots of problems and they're bringing their problems', he said and continued '[t]hey're


bringing drugs, they're bringing crime, they're rapists, and some I assume are good people but I speak to border guards and they tell us what we are getting' (Neate 2015). This type of rhetoric was so harsh that it was unprecedented even in the context of the highly polarized immigration debate in the US, and it could have produced a backlash from other actors fighting for the rights of immigrants and refugees. This interpretation does not seem completely implausible, since 2015 indeed did see an increased amount of claims made by civil society actors, with a significant majority of them being positive towards immigration, both when it comes to undocumented immigrants, and in favor of the US accepting refugees.

The 2016 saw the situation change, with the amount of negative claims significantly outweighing the amount of positive claims, and the debate was not polarized to the same degree as in the earlier years. This could be explained by the fact that with Donald Trump beating all other Republican candidates in his race to the White House, the Republicans realized that anti-immigration sentiments are strong among the public, and emphasizing their commitment to deal with immigration would score them political points, seeking to use immigration as a political issue, while at the same time painting the Democrats as weak on immigration. It seems like Donald Trump's hard-line stance on immigration worked, attracting notable congressional endorsements, like those from Senator Jeff Sessions. Subsequently, Donald Trump's Republican primary rivals were forced to take hard-right positions on immigration as well. Ted Cruz, for example, toughened his position on immigration significantly, changing it from supporting a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants to leading the fight against amnesty, and voicing his commitment to deport undocumented immigrants.

In addition to covering the presidential campaign, the media also covered the Brexit referendum campaign extensively, and the majority of claims presented in that context were negative, as they were often made by the pro-Brexit British politicians. This could have also contributed to the increasingly restrictive tone of the debate, and while it is not possible to know about causality based on the empirical data gathered for this study, it seems that the way the media covered the issue of immigration, not only showing the political debate in the US but also immigration-related issues from other countries, usually with a negative undertone, shows that the media was also an important actor contributing to politicization of immigration.

5.1.3 What actors have been involved in the politicization of immigration

Graph 3: Actors involved in the politicization of immigration in the US between 2007 and 2016



During the period under investigation, 74% of political claims in the US newspapers were made by actors from the US, a development already pointing towards the fact that immigration was to a large degree politicized by domestic actors. Further, 68% of the claims presented immigration as a national or subnational problem. This indicates that the public debate about immigration as presented in the media falls under the domestic conflict trajectory (de Wilde & Lord 2016). The domestic conflict reflects politicization in more partisan terms, comes to the fore in divided or polarized public opinion and partisan politics, and presents the issue at hand mostly as a problem affecting one's own state. As both the previous section and the background chapter have shown, partisan politics was a very important factor contributing to politicization of immigration in the United States, further confirming that the political debate on immigration in the country is an example of politicization taking a domestic conflict trajectory.

As the table above shows, overall during the period under scrutiny the most frequent

claimant was the government. Government actors were followed by the legislative, experts, citizens, civil society and the media\journalists. While other actors were less visible in the debate, their presence shows that while government and other political actors dominate the debate, something that is in line with the findings of van der Brug et al. (2015), the political debate about immigration playing out in the mass media was not only confined to a restricted set of elite actors, indicating that the scope of the political conflict about immigration is broad.

When it comes to the political parties, the overall tone of Republican claims was highly restrictive, with 77% of claims being negative towards immigration, and only 12% positive. Democrats were significantly more positive towards immigration. Overall, only 29% of the claims made by the Democrats were negative, and 54% of claims made by the party were positive. This trend was fairly steady throughout the entire period under analysis, although the Republicans have presented even more negative, while the Democrats have presented even more positive claims, in the period between 2012 and 2016.

There seems to be an agreement among researchers that polarization has increased significantly among political elites (Abramowitz & Saunders 2008: 542), and this is also reflected by the empirical data gathered for this thesis, as can be seen with the increased polarization between the Democrats and the Republicans. However, while there seems to be a consensus among scholars about the increasing importance of ideological divisions at the elite level, there is less agreement about how significant these divisions are at the mass level.

Fiorina et al. (2008: 557) argue that there is no solid evidence of polarization of views among the American public, and that most of the electorate does not strongly identify with a political ideology. However, Pew Research Center (2014) study found that ideological consistency among the American public has become more common, and at the same time increasingly aligned with partisanship. Further, there is also evidence showing that deepest divisions can be found among 'the most interested and informed citizens' (Abramowitz & Saunders 2008: 542).

The Pew Research Center (2016) survey confirms the widening divisions between Republican and Democrat voters, and Donald Trump's idea of building a wall along the Mexican border show how big these partisan differences are. While 63% of Republican or Republican-leaning voters support building the wall, only 13% of the Democrat and Democrat-leaning voters do, and a striking 84% of Donald Trump voters were in favor of


building the wall (Ibid.). Since voters with most extreme views are the ones that are most active and interested, they are consequently more likely to participate in political activities, including voting. This might explain why the Republicans have intensified their harsh rhetoric on immigration – their claims, with very restrictive tone, were more frequent than claims made by the Democrats, which might point to the fact that the Republicans tried to make the immigration their issue, painting the democrats as weak on immigration, thereby mobilizing their own base.

This section has shown that while various actors have been involved in the public debate about immigration, it has mostly been politicized by the domestic actors in the country, especially by the politicians. The last two years also saw a significant increase of claims made by citizens, civil society, and experts. The expansion of actors is one of the key dimensions of politicization. If only a small restricted set of actors participate in public debates about an issue, it might indicate that the scope of the conflict is limited. Even though the debate in the US has been dominated by domestic political actors, other actors have also been involved, and the notable increase of claims made by citizens and civil society can be seen during the last three years shows that together with the increased salience of immigration, the public became more engaged in the immigration debate, thereby indicating that the issue has become more politicized.

5.2 Patterns of politicization of immigration in the UK in 2007-2016

5.2.1 Salience

Graph 4: Salience of immigration in the UK between 2007 and 2016



The graph shows how often articles about immigration appeared in the three selected newspapers in Britain. It is difficult to say how salient an issue is without having data on the salience of other issues to compare it to, thus this graph on its own does not say much about the salience in absolute terms. However, as the main aim of this study is exploring the patterns of changes in the period under analysis, the graph still provides useful and interesting information on when the issue of immigration received increased coverage in the media.

The figure suggests that the perceived importance of immigration oscillated, increasing sharply in 2015. Compared to the other periods, salience was significantly lower between 2008 and early 2010, something that might be attributed to the economic crisis and high unemployment for the same reasons as were outlined in the discussion of salience in the US. When the economic recovery picked up, and the unemployment started going down since 2011, issues related to the economy stopped dominating the public agenda, and both the media and political actors started devoting more attention to the issue of immigration.

The gradually increasing salience of the issue seen from 2010 also reflects the renewed debate about immigration in the country. During the election campaign in 2010, immigration was one of the top issues. It became an important concern among the public, and the Conservative party made reducing net immigration and introducing an annual immigration cap their key election issue. The following developments, including a rift over immigration cap in the coalition government between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats were covered extensively by the media.

The following years were also characterized by an increased salience of immigration. The economy was recovering and unemployment levels were decreasing, thus no longer pushing other issues off the agenda. Between 2010 and 2014 various issues related to immigration were dominating the public debate. Headlines such as 'Immigration is a real problem' could be seen frequently. Eastern European immigrants became a political issue, the coalition rift persisted, and the Conservatives continued talking about the immigration cap and other restrictive measures related to immigration which, again, the media covered extensively. It seems like the increased salience during that period can mostly be explained by the domestic political debate, where the topic of immigration was raised frequently by political parties, especially the Conservatives. The fact that the coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats was disagreeing on how to manage immigration also contributed to the media's extensive coverage. Further, immigration became even more salient on the backdrop of the refugee crisis, the Eurozone crisis, and polls suggesting the support for strongly anti-immigrant UKIP surging. All that time immigration ranked very high among the most important issues the country was facing according to the British public, and the majority of the British public believed that it should be significantly reduced (The Migration Observatory 2016).


In 2014, UKIP won the elections to the European Parliament, with immigration being their key campaign issue. At the same time the refugee crisis was intensifying, and the Conservatives started talking about renegotiating EU membership, again with the immigration being the key reason for that initiative. Opinion polls during that year also showed that 65% of the British public worried about the level of immigration to the UK. Immigration was the main issue of concern, and 77% of the public wanted immigration reduced (NatCen 2017). Further, net migration hit all time high in 2014. While previous research (van der Brug et al. 2015) found no evidence that immigration patterns to the country cause increased salience of the immigration issue, a high peak in salience in 2014

coincides with record high net migration during that year, although it is difficult to say whether it was the increased numbers of immigrants coming to the country that contributed to the increased salience, or whether it was caused by other developments mentioned above, such as the EP elections, the refugee crisis, and the immigration issue being raised frequently by the political parties, especially the Conservatives.

The very high salience in 2015 reflected the immigration being the main topic of the general election campaign, with the Conservatives again restating their commitment to slashing net immigration and coming up with new measures to get immigration under control. Further, David Cameron set out his plans to hold a referendum on the EU membership after his party won the general election. In 2015, immigration was still one of the highest concerns among the British public, trumped by the defence in late 2015 after the terrorist attacks in Paris (Apps 2016). The highest salience throughout the entire period can be seen in 2016, in the months before the EU referendum, where leaving the EU was often framed in terms of the country finally taking back control of its borders and reducing immigration ('There's no doubt immigration will be the prime issue for the referendum'). Answering the first research question, the issue of immigration has indeed become increasingly more salient, with significant peaks in the attention given to the issue in the media starting in 2014.

5.2.2 Polarization

Graph 5: Polarization of immigration in the UK between 2007 and 2016



As the graph shows, the overall character of the immigration debate has been highly restrictive, and except for 2010, 2015 and 2016 it can not be characterized as very polarized. Throughout the period from 2007 to 2016, overall almost 48% of political claims about immigration were negative, and only less than 20% positive.

Van der Brug et al. (2015) found that out of the seven countries in their study, the UK displayed the highest levels of polarization between 1995 and 2009. However, as the graph shows, political debate on immigration was not consistently polarized between 2007 and 2016, with three notable exceptions – 2010, 2015 and 2016.

2010 was the first year in the period under analysis when polarization was very high. 2010 was characterized by an increased debate on immigration, which is also reflected by a peak in salience. It was the year of general election, where immigration was the second highest concern among the public. The Conservatives made introducing an annual cap on immigration their main campaign issue, and after the election, the Conservative-Liberal Democrats coalition government pursued that goal. However, there were significant differences of opinion within the government itself on how to handle the issue. Liberal Democrats opposed the cap, arguing that it would hurt business and harm economic growth by preventing entrepreneurs from outside the EU from coming to the country (Prince & Porter 2010), a view that was supported by the business actors and many experts. The cap was often criticized for being a purely political measure, introduced by the government wanting to play tough on immigration, well-aware of the harm immigration issue did to the Labour government (Townsend 2010).

Between 2011 and 2014 polarization decreased again and the debate returned to its previous very restrictive tone. In the midst of the fears of Eurozone collapsing, and with the prospect of Romanians and Bulgarians gaining free access to the UK labour market, reducing immigration from the EU was added to the government's political agenda, on top of reducing net migration overall. The political rhetoric on immigration intensified, and Liberal Democrats started accusing the Conservatives of 'grubbing for UKIP votes with irresponsible and populist rhetoric reminiscent of both Enoch Powell and prewar antisemitism' (Wintour 2013). The Coalition partner also accused the Conservatives for creating a panic in Britain about the scale of migration from the European Union. Tories started talking about caps on immigration from the EU, something that according to the EU law had no chance of being implemented. However, because claims made by Liberal Democrats and other actors criticizing the direction and effectiveness of initiatives to reduce immigration by the

Conservatives were much less visible in the media, this conflict was not reflected by an increased polarization.


2014 was the least polarized year, with 79% of all claims made that year being negative towards immigration, and there seemed to be a consensus among political actors that immigration to the UK must be significantly reduced. Immigration hit the new record in 2014, and UKIP won the elections to the European Parliament, nearly doubling their result from 2009. Immigration was the key issue of UKIP's election campaign, with the party calling for, among others, a five-year ban on immigration to Britain, and arguing that because it is not possible for the UK to have its own immigration policy while in the EU, the country should leave the Union. UKIP's overwhelmingly good performance, both in the elections and the opinion polls before the elections, proved to be a real headache for the Conservatives. Research shows that overwhelmingly negative claims combined with good electoral performance by anti-immigrant parties contributes to polarization of immigration. However, it seems like in this case, instead of contributing to the polarization of the debate, the success of UKIP caused the Conservatives emphasize their tough stance on immigration even more in an attempt to recapture voters that might have gravitated towards UKIP.

After a period where the debate was characterized by a highly restrictive tone and was not polarized, it became highly polarized in 2015 and 2016. In the course of the election campaign, the Conservatives restated their commitment to reducing immigration, and David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum on EU membership if his party wins the elections. During the election campaign, Labour seemed to be downplaying the importance of the immigration issue, possibly because the party's immigration policies and the effects of their policies hurt them electorally in the past. Liberal Democrats were very open in their support for immigration, with Nick Clegg accusing both UKIP and the Conservatives of 'scaremongering' and 'the immigrant bashing', and making empty promises that all the country's problems 'will disappear if only we shut up shop and stick a 'closed' sign on the door' (Wilkinson 2015). The fact that the political debate was most polarized during the election campaign and elections in 2010, as well as in 2015 and 2016, two years that saw both domestic elections and the referendum about the EU membership, points to the fact that political opportunity structures are indeed a good indicator of polarization. However, Carvalho et al. (2015) found that division within the dominating parties are a factor tending towards depoliticization, while competition between parties has the opposite effect. The developments in the UK between 2007 and 2016, however, seem to have been different from

that observation. As already shown, polarization was very high in 2010, when the divisions between the coalition government on the desirability of the immigration cap were very pronounced, which was reflected in headlines such as 'Vince Cable warns coalition colleagues over immigration cap'. The second period with highest polarization, 2015 and 2016, also saw a very pronounced rift among the Conservatives related to whether the UK should leave the EU or not, and the media coverage of these developments was very extensive, which is also reflected by very high salience of immigration issue during that time. This shows that even if there was an attempt on the part of the governments to depoliticize the issue, it was not very effective

5.2.3 What actors have been involved in the politicization of immigration

Graph 6: Actors involved in the politicization of immigration in the UK between 2007 and 2016



Overall, the hegemony of government actors as claims-makers is evident in the graph, although this has changed in 2015 and 2016. Other frequent claimants have been the legislative, experts, the media and civil society. In total, 76% of all political claims during

that period were made by actors from the UK, pointing towards the fact that immigration was to a high degree politicized by domestic actors. The graph also shows that immigration has been mostly politicized by political actors with, as already mentioned, the government and the legislative overall being the two most frequent claimants. 2015 saw a significant increase of claims made by both civil society and the citizens, pointing towards the fact that immigration became a more politicized issue which expanded from an elite-dominated policy arena to the wider public, something that was also shown by the significantly increased salience since 2015. 2015 and 2016 also saw a significant increase of claims made by the legislative compared to the claims made by the government, something that was also reflected by a significantly higher polarization during that period, which indicates that during the election campaign and Brexit campaign competition between the Government and the other parties in the legislative, as well as the rift over Brexit within the government coalition, the political disagreements became even more pronounced and enunciated.

Overall, claims made by the Conservatives were overwhelmingly negative (78%), and out of all political actors, it is claims made by the Tories that were most visible in the media. This is not very surprising, given that previous research has found that government actors have the easiest access to the media, and during the period under scrutiny the Tories that were in the government from 2010. Political actors want to feed the media with the issues they care about, which either are their own preferences or the preferences of their constituencies. This is especially pronounced if such issues are damaging for their competitors, which produces competitive advantage (van der Brug et al. 2015). With the public attitudes towards immigration being very negative, it seems like the Conservatives, through emphasizing their hard stance towards immigration and their commitment to dealing with the problem, wanted to make immigration their core issue, partly to recapture the UKIP votes, and partly because immigration issue has been damaging for the Labour. While Labour's claims were also mostly negative (59%), they also made many neutral claims (36%), which also might reflect their reluctance to politicize immigration. Labour has often been accused of allowing migration to get out of control when it was in charge of the government, and given the highly negative public attitudes towards immigration in the period over investigation, the relatively high amount of neutral claims made by the Labour might point to the fact that it wanted to depoliticize the issue. The party that was most positive towards immigration were Liberal Democrats, with only 19% negative claims, and 56% positive. All claims made about immigration by UKIP were negative, but the party was not a frequent claim-maker, which


confirms the findings of van der Brug et al. (2015), namely the fact that anti-immigration parties do not receive much coverage in the media. However, it is not impossible that radical anti-immigration parties and groups make claims that have more impact, and their influence is higher than it seems based on the amount of the attention they receive. This interpretation might explain what happened in 2014, where the electoral success of UKIP might have contributed to the public debate about immigration having the most restrictive tone out of all years this study has covered, even though the party itself was not seen as as frequent claim-maker as the largest parties.

The aforementioned developments point to the fact that the public debate about immigration in the UK is an example of a combination of the domestic and the international conflict trajectory of politicization (de Wilde & Zürn 2012). Domestic conflict trajectory reflects politicization in more partisan terms, and comes to the fore in polarized public opinion and partisan politics (de Wilde & Zürn 2012). During the period under analysis in the UK, claims made by the citizens were indeed divided, and party competition was an important aspect of the debate. International conflict trajectory is characterized by an issue, in this case immigration, presented as pitting one's own state against other states or supranational institutions (Ibid.). National identity is often brought up, and there is a clearly defined threat to national interests which has a motivational force. Clear national interests are defined, something that leads to an animated public debate (Ibid.). In the UK, national interest, which is reduced immigration levels, was definitely clearly defined by the political actors. Further, this national interest was often pitted against the EU, which did not allow the UK to have control over the country's own borders, and for putting a stop to immigration to the country from the EU. Immigration, a clearly defined threat to the national interests, definitely had a motivational force, as it motivated people enough to vote for leaving the EU in the referendum on June 23rd 2016, causing a political earthquake which has been reverberating across Europe ever since.

5.3 Patterns of politicization of immigration in Poland 2007-2016

5.3.1 Saliency

Graph 7: Patterns of saliency of immigration in Poland between 2007 and 2016



Saliency of immigration in the Polish media was relatively low and stably until 2014. However, as was the case with both the UK and the US, the perceived importance of immigration increased significantly since 2014.

The first small peak in 2007 can most likely be attributed to Poland joining the Schengen area. The media did cover the issue, but the coverage was not very extensive, and the focus was mostly on the practical arrangements related to the abolishment of border controls, and the prospects of Polish people emigrating from the country because of the access to the work market in Western Europe. After that the media coverage of immigration issue has been fairly stable and relatively low, pointing to the fact that the public debate on immigration was still not politicized.

The increased saliency in late 2014 can be attributed to the intensification of the

refugee crisis and subsequent increased coverage of the issue by the media, as well as the developments on the immigration front in the UK, with the discussed restrictions and cuts to the welfare benefits of the EU citizens being relevant to over 800 000 Poles living in the UK at that time.

The highest peak in the second half of 2015 seems to be related both to the parliamentary and presidential election campaigns, and the terrorist attacks in Paris from November. During the election campaign, for the first time in the country's history immigration became an issue, though still not the main one. The EU's refugee relocation plan was discussed, with the Civic Platform (PO) government agreeing, although reluctantly, to participate in the arrangement. The Law and Justice Party (PiS), the biggest opposition party at that time, argued against Polish participation. When Andrzej Duda, the PiS presidential candidate, won the presidential elections, he was very vocal in his opposition to Poland taking in refugees. Among others, he warned the government, which was still PO government at that time, that if it was willing to make concessions to the EU and accept refugees, it had to 'ensure that Poles are well protected against epidemiological risks', adding that refugees were bringing in 'all kinds of parasites' (Győri 2016: 53). The political rhetoric became much harsher, and combined with the increasing opposition of the public to accept refugees, the media was covering the issue extensively. Brexit debate and the general situation related to immigration in the EU also featured prominently in the media coverage.


The amount of coverage increased even more after the terrorist attacks in Paris, which various right-wing politicians used as an argument to withdraw Poland from the participation in the EU refugee relocation arrangement, and headlines such as 'Fighting Islam is the enemy of our civilization' or 'Europe more skeptical towards refugees' could be seen relatively frequently. The extensive, and almost exclusively negative, coverage of the immigration-related issues in 2015 was reflected by the increasingly negative attitudes towards immigration among the public. While in 2014 only 7% of the public opinion indicated that immigration was among the top two issues facing the country in Autumn 2014, a year later Eurobarometer recorded sharp increase in the level of concern about immigration, with the number of Poles indicating immigration was one of the top two issues facing the country jumping up to 17% (Győri 2016: 48).

The salience decreased again in 2016, although it still remained significantly higher than it was before the peak in 2015. The media coverage was usually related to the situation on other countries ('Refugees stuck in Greece'), the refugee crisis ('The EU at Libya's

mercy?', 'The EU border is like swiss cheese'), Brexit, and the increasingly anti-immigrants sentiments in the United Kingdom. After the terrorist attacks in Brussels in March, the PiS Prime Minister Beata Szydlo announced that Poland would not accept any refugees under the plan, and the refugee relocation agreement became covered again as the political debate intensified ('PiS getting tough with Brussels. The Polish government will not be held hostage by the EU'). Unable to withdraw from the agreement signed by the previous government, the current right-wing populist PiS government chose to stall the issue on the grounds of perceived security risks. Poland has yet to accept a single refugee despite signing the agreement in 2015.

5.3.2 Polarization

Graph 8: Polarization of immigration in Poland between 2007 and 2016



As the graph shows, not unlike in the UK, the immigration debate in Poland can not be characterized as very polarized during most of the period between 2007 and 2016.

Between 2007 and 2011 the debate was characterized by a positive tone, and as shown

in the previous section, it was not salient during that time. In 2007 and 2008, for example, almost 60% of the political claims about immigration were positive. It was the time after Poland joined Schengen, and the debate seemed to be influenced by that development, which was generally considered very good for Poland by different actors participating in the debate. Similar trend continued until 2011, with the majority of the claims still being positive.

After 2011 the situation changed completely, and the immigration debate unfolding in the media took a very negative turn. Immigration was still not very polarized, but the tone changed drastically, with significantly higher proportion of negative claims. In 2011 and 2012, the newspapers started reporting on immigrants from Northern Africa, and the dangers they might pose both to the EU and to the Schengen agreement.

In 2015 and 2016, the number of negative claims skyrocketed, and as the previous section has shown, the debate became also significantly more salient during this period. In 2015, the European Commission took action to help address the refugee crisis in the EU, and proposed to relocate refugees across EU member states. As already mentioned, the Polish government, headed by the Civic Platform (PO), agreed to participate in the relocation program, though very reluctantly. This move was criticized by virtually all political parties, including significant numbers of politicians from the governing camp. Civic Platform (PO) was generally negative towards EU's attempts to deal with the refugee crisis by redistributing the refugees, and mostly opposed the mandatory quotas the agreement would impose. The new Law and Justice (PiS) government attempted to cancel all commitments made by the PO government to accept the refugees under the EU agreement. PiS and their coalition partners were opposed to Poland taking in refugees from the very beginning, thus it was not surprising that it decided to pursue a reversal of a policy it assumed was very unpopular with the public. Given the negative attitudes towards immigration among the public opinion during this time, it was probably not an unreasonable assumption.


To sum up and answer the second research question, the public debate about immigration in Poland between 2007 and 2016 cannot be characterized as polarized. The tone of the debate, however, became drastically different. While it was highly positive between 2007 and 2011, it became very restrictive during the later period, which corresponded with the increased salience discussed in the previous section. This change can be attributed to the developments related to the refugee crisis and the overall negative media coverage of related issues, the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, and the reluctance (by PO) and straight-out opposition (by PiS and the coalition parties) to Poland accepting refugees.

5.3.3 What actors have been involved in the politicization of immigration

The debate about immigration in Poland has played out completely differently in terms of what actors have taken part in the debate compared to what was the case for the US and the UK. First of all, it has to be mentioned that only 34% of all claims in the Polish newspapers were made by actors whose nationality was coded as Polish. Further, since 2015, when the issue of immigration became significantly more salient, only 2% of the claims were made by the Polish government or the legislative. Thus, it is not possible to discuss domestic, and especially political, actors taking part in the debate in the same way as with the US and the UK, since the majority of claims were not made by national actors. However, this is a very interesting observation on its own, and invites another interesting debate about the trajectory of politicization of immigration in Poland, as outlined in de Wilde and Lord (2016).

According to de Wilde and Lord (2016: 150), in the remote conflict politicization takes a relatively limited form. The issue is mostly portrayed as a foreign problem not affecting the state in which the debate unfolds. This is visible in the graph below, showing when immigration was portrayed as a global, foreign, national, regional, bilateral, or subnational problem.

Graph 9: Problem scope, Poland between 2007 and 2016



Overall, immigration was presented as a foreign problem in 55% of the claims, followed by 21% presenting it as a national problem, and 15% as an EU problem. The highest frequency of immigration as a national problem could be seen between 2007 and 2011, and as mentioned earlier, much of the (limited) debate during that period revolved around the new situation for the country that was caused by Poland joining the Schengen zone, both in terms of emigration from Poland, and immigration caused by opening Polish borders to some Eastern European countries. However, overall, even during that period immigration was portrayed as a foreign and EU problem more frequently than national.

The amount of claims characterizing immigration as a national problem decreased significantly from 2012, only to increase slightly in 2015 and 2016. Between 2012 and 2016, portrayal of immigration as a foreign problem was clearly dominant, followed by portraying immigration as an EU problem. This can most likely be explained by the various developments related to the refugee crisis. Because of its geographic position, the historical lack of immigration, and the status as a transition economy better known for exporting labour than being able to create jobs for immigrants, Poland was never going to be at the centre of the refugee crisis (Gyóri 2016: 47-48). Thus, even the refugee crisis was presented as an EU or a foreign (affecting other countries) problem. The significant increase of the foreign scope happened at the same time as the issue became more salient, and the tone of the debate took a highly restrictive tone, as shown earlier in the chapter. The media often presented the immigration situation in other EU countries in highly negative way, which in many cases seemed to suggest that this is what might happen to Poland if more immigrants, especially from Northern Africa and the Middle East, come to the country. The public opinion also started becoming more negative towards immigration at that time, and more people started identifying immigration as an important issue facing the country. Even though 2014 saw an increase of the number of immigrants coming to Poland from Ukraine, driven away from their own country because of the war, the total numbers of immigrant population was still very low.

In 2011, 75% of Polish people said they had never met a foreigner personally in the country (Malinowski Rubio 2011). Since public opinion is influenced both through interpersonal interactions with immigrants, and through being exposed to images and news about immigrants in the media, as well as statements about immigrants made by public actors, it is not unreasonable to assume that because of very low numbers of immigrants in

the country, Polish people hardly interact with them in person. This points to the fact that the public opinion about immigration in Poland is mostly shaped by the media coverage of the issue, especially since the increased negative coverage of immigration, especially from 2015, corresponds with the increasingly negative attitudes of the Polish public towards immigrants.

These developments point to the fact that the debate about immigration in Poland can be characterized as having the remote conflict trajectory (de Wilde & Lord 2016). While the public debate in the media was present, it was relatively limited, even despite the increase in salience in 2015 and 2016, and the conflict unfolded mainly outside the country. However, the slight increase of the amount of claims portraying immigration as a national problem can be attributed to the fact that Poland agreed to, and then expressed the desire to withdraw from the EU refugee relocation agreement, which would potentially have affected the country. Despite the limited politicization of the issue in these type of debates, according to de Wilde and Lord (2016), they are still relevant in terms of politicization, as they raise awareness of an issue through the news coverage. This also points to the importance of the media as an actor politicizing immigration, and I would argue that in Poland, the media is, in fact, the most important and influential actor in this regard.

The media has become increasingly influential in different spheres of society (Strömbäck & Esser 2014). It assigns relevance and importance to issues through selecting what to cover, and can thus put different issues on the agenda. There seems to be an agreement that media influence what people think about (de Wilde & Lord 2016, Thesen 2014), but it is not certain to what degree they actually influence the public opinion. However, it seems that the way the media cover immigration in Poland did, in fact, influence the public opinion. As already mentioned, the majority of Poles have never personally met an immigrant. Nonetheless, in 2015, when the debate about immigration was the most salient in the media and had a very negative tone, the amount of people with negative attitudes towards immigration, and identifying immigration as a problem for the country, increased significantly. There was no significant increase of actual immigration levels to Poland at that time, thus the chances of more people having met immigrants and changing their opinion about them based on interpersonal interactions, were very low, pointing towards the explanation that it was the way immigration was covered in the media that contributed to this shift of attitudes among the mass public.

5.4 Comparative analysis

After having presented and discussed the patterns of politicization in the US, UK and Poland, the following section will present a brief cross-country comparison which might allow for detecting general patterns shared by all three countries, as well as patterns and developments that are specific to the respective countries..

Saliency, the relative attention different issues get, is a crucial dimension of politicization. If an issue is not debated in public, there is a limit to how politicized it can be. While immigration has been a salient issue in the US during the entire period under scrutiny in this thesis, there was a significant expansion starting in 2014, which continued throughout 2015 and 2016. The 2014 increase in saliency seems closely related to the border crisis and the surge of unaccompanied minors coming to the US from Central America. While the problem started in 2012, it was not covered extensively by the media until 2014, when Barack Obama took action to authorize emergency funds to deal with the situation. In 2014, the President also attempted to expand DACA, which resulted in an intensified debate about immigration in the country. The fact that saliency remained very high in 2015 and 2016 can be attributed to the media's intense coverage of the refugee crisis, Brexit campaign and referendum in the UK, and last but not least, the presidential campaign in the country, where immigration soon became one of the most important campaign issues for the Republicans. The peaks in saliency were clearly not related to the amount of immigrants in the country, since the number of illegal immigrants, which Americans care about the most, decreased by around one million between 2007 and 2014. Further, the issue of immigration became more salient as the economy was recovering and unemployment decreased, pointing towards the fact that patterns of saliency were not related to the aforementioned societal developments, which is in line with the findings of van der Brug et al. (2015). Rather, the increased saliency seems to be related to critical events and the political situation, both domestic, such as the border crisis along the Mexican border and election campaigns, and foreign, such as the refugee crisis in Europe and Brexit in the UK.

In the UK, the expansion of saliency in the media happened in 2010, 2014 and continued throughout 2015 and 2016. All those years saw elections (parliamentary in 2010 and 2015, EP elections in 2014, and Brexit campaign and referendum in 2016), which were naturally covered extensively by the media, and immigration was one of the key issues, arguably the key issue, in all those election campaigns. Saliency of immigration was also lower when unemployment was higher and the economy was doing worse during and in the

immediate aftermath of the economic crisis, which is similar to the pattern that we saw in the US. 2014 saw record high net migration to the country and the intensification of public concern about immigration. However, it is difficult to say whether the increased salience of immigration was related to the increased number of immigrants coming to the country, or the political debate and all other developments covered by the media that happened during the same year.

In Poland, the significantly increased salience of immigration from 2014 could not have been related to the numbers of immigrants in the country, since no significant increase of the number of immigrants coming to the country took place. More Ukrainians applied for asylum, but since Ukrainians come from the same cultural background, Polish people hardly consider them immigrants. The most plausible explanation for the increase of salience seem to be external events, such as the refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, as well as the presidential and parliamentary election campaigns of 2015, when immigration was an issue discussed, though not extensively, by the political parties.

In line with the findings of van der Brug et al. (2015), the increased salience of immigration in all countries was not related to the levels of immigration, although it is possible that it played a role in the UK in 2014. Immigration also became more salient as the economy started recovering and the unemployment started to decrease, pointing to the agenda-setting role of the media, and the significance of the media as an actor in politicizing the public debate about immigration. It seems like the increased salience in all three countries in this analysis in the last two years can to a high degree be attributed to the media's coverage of both external (such as the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks), as well as the domestic developments in the countries, like the border crisis in the US, Brexit campaign in the UK and the election campaigns in Poland in 2015.

There seems to not be much correlation between salience and polarization in all the countries covered by this study. In the US, polarization was the highest between 2007 and 2013, before the significant peaks in salience occurred. The public debate about immigration was most polarized when the public debate about immigration was 'business as usual', characterized by party competition between Republicans and Democrats, where multiple attempts at passing comprehensive immigration reform were failing because the Republicans and Democrats in the Congress could not reach an agreement, especially when it came to the question of what to do with the undocumented immigrants who were already in the country. The public debate became characterized by a restrictive tone in 2014, when in the midst of

the border crisis Barack Obama tried to allocate extra funds to deal with the situation, something that the Republicans opposed vehemently, and it seems that they tried to use the situation to paint the Democrats as weak on immigration, while at the same time intensifying their anti-immigration rhetorics.

The public debate in the UK had an overall restrictive tone, with increased polarization happening in 2010, 2015 and 2016, which can be attributed to the elections and the Brexit campaign and referendum, pointing towards the fact that political opportunity structures are a good explanation of polarization of the public debate about immigration. Most negative claims about immigration could be seen in 2014, a development that can be attributed to the electoral success of anti-immigrant UKIP, even though the party itself was responsible for very few claims, and the Conservative party emphasizing their intentions to curb immigration to the country, indicating that they might have attempted to take ownership of the immigration issue in an attempt to recapture some of the lost voters that gravitated towards UKIP.

The immigration debate was not polarized in Poland either, although the patterns differed significantly from those in the UK. Between 2007 and 2011, the public debate in Poland can be characterized as highly positive, with pro-immigration claims significantly outweighing those against immigration. This changed in 2014, when the debate took a highly restrictive tone. This change corresponded with the increase of the salience of the immigration issue, and seems to have been mostly related to developments outside the country, such as the refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels.

When it comes to the extent to which domestic actors contribute to the politicization of immigration, it seems like there were many similarities between the US and the UK, while it played out completely differently in Poland. In the US and the UK, 74% and 76% claims, respectively, were made by the domestic actors. Further, in both countries there was a clear hegemony of government actors as most frequent claimants, followed by the legislative, pointing to the fact that political actors are the main actors responsible for politicizing the issue of immigration. In addition, the Tories in the UK, and the Republicans in the US, were most visible in the media, especially since 2014, compared to other parties, and other political actors. Van der Brug et al. (2015) found that radical anti-immigration parties were not the main claimants, but it was mainstream parties that most frequently appeared as claimants on the issue of immigration. The empirical data collected for this study showed that this was also the case in the US and the UK between 2007 and 2016. Both Tories and Republicans were

responsible for more claims on immigration than their competitors, and an overwhelming majority of claims made by these parties was negative. Taking extreme positions might be advantageous, as it helps parties to differentiate themselves from their competitors, and it is easier to develop issue ownership with relatively extreme positions. Through doing this, they both put the issue of immigration on the public agenda, and presented themselves as the only parties that can address the concerns about immigration among their voters, at the same time painting their main political opponents as weak on immigration. Last, but not least, there was an increase in claims by actors other than politicians, such as citizens, experts and the civil society in both countries in the last couple of years, pointing to the fact that the public debate about immigration has not been confined to a set of elite-actors, but the mass public has become more involved.

The situation was very different in Poland. Only 34% of claims overall were made by domestic actors, showing that domestic actors in the country do not contribute to the politicization of immigration to a significant extent. Since the debate became highly salient in 2015, only 2% of the claims registered were made by government or legislative actors from Poland. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the public debate on immigration in the country has not been politicized. According to de Wilde and Lord (2016), an issue can still be politicized even though domestic actors do not contribute to this to a significant degree. This type of politicization can be characterized as the remote conflict, where the issue is mostly presented as a foreign problem, and even though the scope of politicization is more limited, the public debate can still be considered politicized because the issue of immigration has been put on the public agenda.

6.0 Conclusion

This thesis has investigated how the public debates about immigration have played out in the mass media in the US, the UK and Poland between 2007 and 2016. This was done through describing and interpreting the patterns of salience of the issue in the media, based on the amount of articles about immigration in the newspapers.. Further, the method of political claims-making analysis was employed to explore the patterns of polarization, and investigate to what extent different actors contribute to the politicization of the debate.

Many findings of this research are in line with the findings of van der Brug et al. (2015). Among others, they found that salience and polarization, the two most often used

indicators of politicization, were not systematically related, and the empirical data gathered for this project confirms it. They can, however, happen at the same time, as was the case with the UK in 2015 and 2016 when both polarization and salience of immigration were very high, but as already mentioned, overall there does not seem to be a systematic relationship between the two. The changing patterns of salience of immigration can generally be better explained by specific events, domestic or foreign, and in most cases peaks in salience correspond with negative public attitudes towards immigration, especially when the public opinion identifies immigration as one of the most important problems facing the country. The data has also shown that salience of immigration is not systematically related to the levels of immigration to the country, which is especially visible in the case of Poland, and that the salience increases when other issues, such as economic downturn or high unemployment, no longer push it off the public agenda, pointing to the importance of the media as a politicizing actor with their agenda-setting role. Polarization, on the other hand, seems to be more of an institutional feature within the countries, closely related to political opportunity structures which provide both incentives and structures for various actors to take clear polarizing positions which, again, is in line with the findings of van der Brug et al. (2015).

Another interesting finding is that overall, the tone of the debate in all three countries has become more restrictive, and the mainstream parties turned out to be the most important claimants politicizing immigration, while anti-immigrant parties were hardly visible in the media. However, the influence of anti-immigrant parties can not be ruled out. Even though they do not manage to get many claims in the media, mainstream parties may feel pressured to address their concerns, especially when the electoral support is at stake, and the public opinion is negative towards immigration. With the recent electoral successes of populist anti-immigration parties and the increase in anti-immigration sentiments among the wider public, this might explain the generally restrictive tone of the public debates about immigration in the recent years, and conservative mainstream parties emphasizing their commitment to deal with the problem.

What I believe is the most interesting finding of this thesis is that politicization of immigration, if one agrees with de Wilde and Lord (2016) that an issue can be politicized even when it is mostly done by foreign actors in the media, has happened in Poland without any significant presence of immigrants in the country. Van der Brug et al. (2015) found that while politicization of immigration does not systematically intensify with the increasing number of immigrants in the country, a significant presence of immigrants is necessary for

politicization. However, the recent developments in Poland have shown that if one looks at politicization in terms of salience and the general expansion of the public debate about an issue to different actors, significant presence of immigrants was not necessary for it to happen. The number of immigrants in Poland did not change to significant degree in the recent years, and while immigration was mostly presented as a foreign problem in the media, the salience skyrocketed in 2015 and 2016, and various actors, especially the citizens, became significantly more involved in the debate. This development also points to the importance of the media as an active actor involved in the public debate, to a high degree responsible for deciding people think about by putting issues on the public agenda. While finding out whether the media influences the public opinion, or whether it is the public opinion and policy-makers that determine what the media covers, what happened in Poland in the last two years clearly indicates that the media does indeed influence the public opinion to a significant degree. Only a minority of Polish people say they have personally interacted with immigrants, but the public opinion has still become much more negative towards immigration since the media started writing about the issue extensively, and usually in a highly negative way focusing on the negative sides of immigration and negative episodes abroad where immigrants were involved, it seems like the public attitudes are to a high degree affected by how media portrays the issue. This, again, points to the importance of the media as an actor involved in the politicization of immigration.

Since this is a qualitative, interpretative study based on observations of how politicization has evolved in the US, UK and Poland between 2007 and 2016, I can not make a definite statement on when the issue was most politicized, as that might require the creation of an index combining all aspects of politicization the way, for example, Hutter and Grande (2014) did. The political debate about immigration in the UK seems to be a very good example of high politicization between 2015 and 2016, when significantly increased salience, very high polarization and involvement of various actors in the debate happened at the same time. However, based on the observations made, I would argue that immigration has been highly politicized in all the countries under investigation between 2015 and 2016, despite the fact that it did not display high polarization in the US and in Poland.

Even though the debate in the US and Poland could not be described as highly polarized during this period, the issue of immigration has not been this visible in the public sphere at any time before. It has been one of the key issues addressed by politicians, and of high concern for the public opinion. If one followed the news and the public debate in the last

years, it was not difficult to see that immigration has been one of the main topics on the public agenda. This leads me to argue that salience and the involvement of different actors are the best indicators of politicization, and that high polarization is not necessary for an issue to be considered politicized. Taking the US as an example, polarization was highest between 2007 and 2013, but as argued in the analysis chapter, it was more of a business as usual in the country characterized by very competitive party politics and vehement disagreements between the Republicans and Democrats on how immigration should be handled. As shown in the background chapter, immigration has been a matter of the public debate since the 1990s, but never before has the public opinion been this engaged, and the issue this visible in the media as it has been starting in 2014, and since 2015 in particular. Thus, while party competition in terms of conflicts and disagreements is important, my argument is that an issue can still be considered politicized when significant polarization is not visible, when different actors are involved, the public opinion considers an issue important, and the media puts it on the public agenda both to reflect the current political debates, but also by virtue of their own role as an important actor in the public debate.

6.1 Recommendations for future research

Socio-economic tensions are often seen as the main drivers of the surge of anti-immigration parties, and the argument goes that anti-immigrant sentiments would arise from the fact that native citizens compete with immigrants for various resources. However, both van der Brug et al. (2015) and the empirical data gathered for this research show that politicization of immigration is not caused by the number of immigrants in the country. Moreover, immigration is less salient during the times of economic hardships and low unemployment, pointing to the fact that socio-economic tensions are not a good explanation of patterns of politicization of immigration. Since politicization of immigration seems to be related to negative public attitudes towards immigration, it seems fair to hypothesize that politicization of immigration and negative attitudes towards immigration might also be related.

A thorough investigation of what drives anti-immigration sentiments, and thus possibly contributes to politicization of immigration, was beyond the scope of this thesis, as this research focused on exploring patterns of politicization of immigration. However, given that neither politicization of immigration nor strong anti-immigration sentiments are systematically related to the numbers of immigrants in a country, it seems like opposition to

immigration is not just about immigration, but it is a part of a bigger picture, where certain segments of society, sometimes called losers of globalization, react to the changing character of their countries caused by the various developments globalization has brought. Many people are uncomfortable with change, and immigrants seem like an easy target to blame for such changes, something populist politicians seem to have aptly capitalized upon. With the recent electoral successes of populist, anti-immigration parties, it would be interesting to see more research which provides a deeper understanding of what exactly are the driving forces behind the increasing anti-immigration sentiments, and if these are actually about immigration, or if they are an amalgamation of anti-globalization, anti-establishment, anti-EU sentiments and pandering to the majority identity.

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