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Islamophobia's Biography and Personality:

Diagnosis of Its Cognitive, Social, and Moral Disturbances

Master's thesis

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to ‘strangers’.

We have a lot in common. Similarities among us are far more than differences. We are not strangers.

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And my mother and father…without whom my life would be meaningless.

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates Islamophobia as a negative attitude toward Muslims. Differentiating between Islamophobia and Muslimophobia, the phenomenon in Europe and the U.S. is reviewed. Cognitive and social underpinnings of Islamophobia and how it can partially be related to cognitive and social biases are discussed. The alliance detection system explains categorization of Muslims based on coalitional computations. The Moral Foundations Theory is used to look into the evolutionary aspects of morality which are related to people's attitudes toward others. Cognitive attitudes of 109 individuals toward Muslims in Norway were experimentally studied. Using backward stepwise regression procedure, participants' age, sex, religion, moral foundations, and their sensitivity to salience of Muslim identity in text were analyzed. Results show that there is not a significant difference between non-Muslims' and Muslims' cognitive attitudes toward Muslims suggesting that perceived group membership does not essentially lead to holding more positive attitude toward ingroups. The moral foundation Sanctity/degradation significantly predicts negative attitude toward Muslims suggesting that those who care more about purity are more likely to be prejudiced against others, be them perceived ingroups or outgroups. Salience of Muslim identity had no significant effect on the cognitive attitude toward Muslims implying that stereotypes may be too rigid to be affected by manipulations through a single textual story. Religion significantly interacts with Loyalty/betrayal, and with Fairness/cheating in predicting cognitive attitude toward Muslims. The interactions indicate that non-Muslims' cognitive attitude toward Muslims is less sensitive to Loyalty/betrayal and Fairness/cheating, while Muslims' cognitive attitude is more dependent on these two moral foundations.

This study is important because it looks into Islamophobia through new lenses. It provides insights for better understanding and predicting Muslim and non-Muslim individuals' attitudes toward Muslims.

Keywords: Islamophobia, Muslim, attitude, coalitional computation, moral foundations

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INTRODUCTION

"- You are an Englishman. Are you not loyal to England?

- To England and to other things".

- Lawrence of Arabia: 54:10 (Spiegel & Lean, 1962).

Can Moral Foundations Theory predict cognitive attitudes toward Muslims? Can perceived group membership alone determine the quality of Muslim-individuals' cognitive attitude toward Muslims? Can emphasis on Muslim identity in textual stories about Muslim individuals affect cognitive attitudes toward Muslims? Are there any interactions among the moral foundations, religion, and textual stories about Muslim individuals in predicting cognitive attitudes toward Muslims? These are the questions this thesis aims to address.

Attitude and morality have been studied, thought, and argued about since old times. These efforts have yielded broad knowledge on these subjects. There exists an extensive literature on issues such as how attitudes toward people are formed, what personality traits contribute to one's certain attitudes toward outgroups, what functions attitudes may have, and so forth. Also, there are many interesting research on prejudice based on sex, age, and 'race', which has led to important findings about the nature of human social behavior. Morality too has been explored extensively in philosophy and psychology.

Nevertheless, there is still a dearth of solid research on the association between age and attitude toward Muslims because it ought to involve a longitudinal study in order for the researcher to actually find age-difference effects. Some conflicting results have been found on the relationship between gender and attitude toward Muslims. I found no thorough research on Muslims' attitude toward Muslims as a group in comparison with non-Muslims' attitude toward

Muslims. I found no published research in which the Moral Foundations Theory was used to see if any of the moral foundations proposed therein, separately or interactively with other factors, can predict attitudes toward Muslims. Manipulation of attitudes toward Muslims by framing would also provide more insights into how individual portrayals would be superimposed onto group portrayals in one's mind in contexts with varying emphasis on Muslim identity. My sincerest hope to try to partially fill these gaps in the literature resulted in this study.

I will start off by examining through the literature on Islamophobia and discuss this literature further. Next, I will look into cognitive and social underpinnings of the phenomenon. I will then move on to the Moral Foundations Theory and its implications for Islamophobia. Finally, I will present my experimental research.

Islamophobia?

Intolerance toward Islam and Muslims has been referred to by an international cluster of terms and phrases. Yet the most widely known is *Islamophobia*, though there have been objections to the term. It seems to have been coined on an analogy with xenophobia. In the 1910s, the first known use of the French word *Islamophobie* appeared in a book by Alphonse Etienne Dinet, a painter who converted to Islam. In an English version of the book, however, the word was translated as "feelings inimical to Islam", not as "Islamophobia" (Richardson, 2009). Yet Dinet's biographer, Denise Brahimi, eventually used the term Islamophobia in 1984. The first use in English in print appears to have been in an article by Edward Said in 1985 (entitled "Orientalism Reconsidered"). It still occasionally appears in inverted commas which implies that there is no worldwide consensus of the phenomenon or of the meaning of the term (Richardson, 2009).

The word Islamophobia was later popularized in 1997 by the Runnymede Trust, a UK left-wing independent race equality think tank, as unfounded hostility toward Islam, and fear or dislike of Muslims (Lee et al., 2009). Oxford English Dictionary defines Islamophobia as: "intense dislike or fear of Islam, especially as a political force; hostility toward Muslims". Lee et al. (2009) in development of their Islamophobia scale, operationally defined Islamophobia as the fear of Islam and Muslims yet investigated the cognitive, affective, and behavioral facets of the phenomenon. Johnson (2011) treated Islamophobia as "prejudice against Islam as an entity and Muslims as Individuals". From a social science perspective, the emotions (e.g., dislike, hostility, and fear) a person feels when thinking about members of a particular group is labeled prejudice and have to do with one's (*negative*) *attitudes* (Whitley & Kite, 2006, p. 7).

According to the three-component model of attitude structure with impressive supporting empirical evidence, attitude has three dimensions: cognitive, affective, and behavioral (Breckler, 1984). Accordingly, when it comes to negative attitudes toward groups, social psychologists often differentiate negative beliefs or opinions (*stereotypes*), from negative affects or emotions (*prejudice*), and from negative behaviors (*discrimination*) (Atkinson & Hilgard, 2000/2006). Islamophobia in this study has been treated as a negative attitude that also has three dimensions. To my knowledge, the cognitive facet of the phenomenon has not been extensively investigated. Therefore, I mainly focused on the cognitive dimension of Islamophobia as a negative attitude toward Muslims.

Islamophobia as a phenomenon can be studied using various perspectives. For instance, it can be addressed in cultural, social, and political studies as well as in psychological studies. In order to avoid confusion, it is important to make it clear what we mean by Islamophobia and what we do not mean. From this point on, I will speceifically use the term Islamophobia as

negative attitudes toward *Islam* as a religion, and will speceifically the term *Muslimophobia* as negative attitudes toward Muslims, as a group. Yet, I will put the term Islamophobia in ‘’ when citing a work in which the author(s) has/have referred to the phenomenon as Islamophobia, and when both the religion and the group are concerned, as is the case with perhaps quite many publications.

What I will not mean to say by use of either term has, first and foremost, to do with what *phobia* means as a technical word in clinical psychology. According to Davey (2008), specific phobia is a psychological anxiety-based disorder with the prevalence rates of 7.2% - 11.3%. Islamophobia or Muslimophobia are not essentially mental illnesses. Nor were ‘Islamophobes’ or ‘Muslimophobes’ born specifically Islamophobes or Muslimophobes. Yet the number of people with such negative attitudes does not seem to be small enough to correspond to the prevalence rates of this specific ‘phobia’. In 2012, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) rated ‘Islamophobia’ as a 5.9 on a scale of one to 10. In 2010, CAIR rated the state of ‘Islamophobia’ in America as a 6.4. According to a YouGov opinion poll published in *The Guardian* (2015), a British national daily newspaper, 55% of Americans voice an unfavorable opinion of Islam. As Richardson (2009) points out, to accuse someone of being mentally ill, irrational, and the like, not only offers any help to solve the problem, but also is offensive and can make them defensive and defiant. Negative attitudes toward people, be them Muslims labelled by non-Muslims as whatever given stereotype conveys or non-Muslims labelled by Muslims as ‘Islamophobes’ or ‘Muslimophobes’, might simply have ego-defensive function. This will be further discussed in due course.

Muslimophobia

A critical point to make is the difference between Islamophobia and Muslimophobia. Since these two terms have sometimes carelessly been used interchangeably in the literature, more light ought to be shed on the difference between these two. Islamophobia by definition is (supposed to be) about negative attitudes toward Islam and Muslimophobia is (supposed to be) about negative attitudes toward Muslims. Triandafyllidou (2010) states that Muslimophobia is distinct from Islamophobia in that it targets Muslims as citizens or residents rather than Islam as a religion, and the fear in Europe emerges as a group prejudice against Muslims and those who are perceived as Muslims. The misuse of the terms in scientific literature can lead to misrepresentation of phenomena.

I suggest that there is a possibility that someone might hold negative attitudes toward Islam yet not necessarily be Muslimophobic. An example of this can be a non-Muslim person (as well as someone who grew up in Muslim countries and has become atheist) who has Muslim friends. S/he might hold unfavorable opinions of Islam, overall yet not have any problems with Muslims. S/he might have happened to develop some negative attitudes toward Islam on the basis of what s/he has known, read, heard, seen, and how s/he has interpreted them. Conversely, someone might be Muslimophobic, but not Islamophobic. An example of this can be a non-Muslim person living and studying in a non-Islamic country with no Muslim friends for geographic reasons. If s/he has been introduced to Islam in a positive way in school yet from time to time via mass media learns about terrorist activities of individuals who claim to be 'Muslims', s/he might happen to be Muslimophobe but not necessarily Islamophobe. S/he might ascribe such hostile activities to intentional or unintentional erroneous interpretation of Islam by the perpetrators who claim to be 'Muslims'.

My suggestion of these alternative possibilities follow Allport's (1954) *contact hypothesis* which proposes that interpersonal connections with members of a different group can attenuate prejudice toward members of that group; a theory that has received the attention of researchers ever since. The contact hypothesis has been compatible with research findings supporting that contact history is related to prejudicial attitudes. For instance, Lee et al. (2009) were inspired by such research findings in the development of their 'Islamophobia' scale and also reported that contact history was found to be significantly related to 'Islamophobia', even if that involved friendship with only one Muslim individual. Participants with at least one Muslim friend reported significantly lower scores on the 'Islamophobia' scale compared to those without a Muslim friend. The researchers suggest that friendships with atheists (as participants with atheist friends also reported to be significantly less Islamophobic), and Muslims may reflect a "willingness to be around individuals with unconventional belief system" (p. 101). Richardson (2009) by quoting from Tariq Modood, a professor of sociology, politics, and public policy at Bristol University: "The South Asia I am from is contoured by communal religious identities. It has nothing to do with belief. If you assert 'I am an atheist', people will still think it is meaningful to ask 'yes, but you are a Muslim, a Hindu?' " suggests that belonging to a religious tradition or community does not necessarily entail holding certain religious beliefs or engaging in certain religious practices. He adds hostility toward a certain ethno-religious community (e.g., Muslims), has nothing necessarily to do with that of any specific religious beliefs (e.g., Islamic).

A key distinction to be drawn is between *belief* and *affiliation*. Chalabi (2015) in her article in *The Guardian* writes: "Attitudes toward Islam and attitudes toward Muslims should be considered separately, however, studies suggest that the two overlap considerably, as many people fail to distinguish between the two". According to Triandafyllidou (2010), the two

concepts are complementary in their impact on Muslims' conditions in Europe today and the presence of them in different European countries indicate the obscurity of diversity of Muslim communities by generalizing discourses and blanket policies. I add that it also indicates the obscurity of differences among branches of Islam though they do have partly different ideologies encompassing different perspectives, interpretations, and practices. It is easy to think of these two terms−Islamophobia and Muslimophobia−as practical synonyms with the same implications, but they are not identical and must be used appropriately. Muslim identity does not necessarily entail holding distinctive beliefs or engaging in certain practices. Rather, it can be related to (perceived) sense of belonging (Richardson, 2009).

Much opinion poll research supports the existence and rise of 'Islamophobia'. A YouGov poll in March 2015 indicated that 55% of surveyed Americans had an unfavorable opinion of Islam. Figure 1. shows the percentage of respondents interviewed with somewhat to very unfavorable opinion of Islam considering demographic variables age, ethnicity, and political orientation. The data suggests that Islamophobic sentiments are more common among Americans who are 45 and older; Americans who are White; and Americans who are Republicans (Chalabi, 2015). The results are consistent with past research on the relation between demographic variables and prejudicial attitudes: Whites tend to have less positive attitudes toward ethnic minorities than their non-White counterparts (e.g., Wang et al., 2003); older people tend to be more prejudiced as well (e.g., Strabac et al., 2014); and Republicans tend to express stronger discriminatory beliefs than their non-Republican counterparts. In line with overall prejudicial attitudes, Whites have reported higher affective-behavioral scores on the Islamophobia scale (Lee et al., 2009); females tend to be less prejudiced and more tolerant (Pedersen, 1996; Strabac

et al., 2014); and finally Republicans have reported higher affective-behavioral and cognitive scores (Lee et al., 2009).



Figure 1. Anti-Islam sentiment in the US. Photograph: Mona Chalabi/Data via YouGov (*The Guardian,* 2015 December 8)

It is worth mentioning that the figure above also suggests that the older a person is, the more likely s/he is to be Islamophobic, such that Americans who were 65 and older, had the most unfavorable opinion of Islam in comparison with the other age ranges. Yet, looking more closely at the respondents, swing voters (independent) who self-reportedly were not affiliated with any political party, had the most Islamophobic sentiments with the peak percentage of 76% among all other respondents.

There are quite many arguments about and measures of 'Islamophobia' in which being Muslim has been associated with being Arab. Although a large number of Muslims are Arabs, these two categories must not be deemed the same. Muslim is a religious identity and Arab is an ethnicity. Indonesia as the most populous Muslim majority country, is a very ethnically and linguistically diverse country while most Indonesians are not Arabs. Iran also is an Islamic country while most of Iranians are not Arabs and do not speak Arabic either. There are also Europeans and Americans who have converted to Islam. Moreover, there are Arabs who are not Muslims. The number of atheists or individuals in/from Muslim countries who believe religion must be personal and personally chosen is not few although they may officially be considered as Muslims according to the laws of the country they were born in. As Lee et al. (2009) suggest, that distinction is important because Islamophobic sentiment does not solely target Arabs.

Although Lee et al. (2009) had predicted a gender-difference effect based on past research that demonstrated gender and prejudicial attitudes are related, they found no gender differences in Islamophobic scores. Yet they observed a small but significant relation between race (ethnicity) and affective-behavioral scores. Specifically, Whites tended to report higher affective-behavioral scores compared with non-Whites. They found the same pattern with religious affiliation such that Christians tended to report higher affective-behavioral scores compared with non-Christians. However, race (ethnicity) and religion did not seem to influence the extent to which participants perceived Islam as a danger.

Following the tripartite model of attitude structure (see Breckler, 1984), Lee et al. (2009) found significant moderate correlations between the scores of the 'Islamophobia' scale and prejudicial attitudes composed of cognitive, affective, and behavioral items. Their findings were consistent with their conceptualization of the phenomenon as being related to a prejudicial

mindset. They showed that individuals with high scores on the 'Islamophobia' scale tend to report low acceptance and tolerance toward racially (ethnically) different individuals compared to their lower scoring counterparts. More tellingly, Lee et al. note that the magnitude of the relations persisted even after controlling for the effects of demographic variables and response bias tendencies. Their results supported the association between Islamophobic sentiments and a prejudicial outlook. Importantly, race (ethnicity), religion, and friendship with atheists were only correlated with the affective-behavioral part of their 'Islamophobia' scale than with the cognitive part (Lee et al., 2009). According to the researchers, this pattern suggests that the affective-behavioral facet of 'Islamophobia' is more sensitive to particular demographic groups than the cognitive facet.

According to European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, 2006b), European Muslims have been seriously affected by an increasingly hostile social climate especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. They believe a great deal changed from the 9/11 and nowadays many Muslims in Europe feel they are under intense scrutiny. They also feel excluded from economic, social, and cultural life and this is particularly the case in States where a large part of the Muslim population has no access to citizenship (e.g., Germany as suggested by the respondents), a status which is critical to ensuring a sense of belonging (EUMC, 2006b).

Yet even as citizens of a State, according to EUMC (2006b), they still can feel excluded. They feel that they are perceived as 'foreigners', a threat to the society, and treated with suspicion. More tellingly, this feeling is reported to be stronger among young European born Muslims than their parents. As stated in the report, they also believe there is limited recognition of the contribution that Islamic civilization has made to the world. Nor is there recognition of the

contribution Muslims have made to the societies in which they live. They also feel there is a lack of understanding in public and policy discussions about the diversity between and within Muslim communities and, above and beyond, the public focuses more on those with extreme views than on those for whom their faith identity provides a set of values, values that, they believe, are actually compatible with those of Europeans (EUMC, 2006b). In their opinion, as explained in the report, the media present largely a negative image of Muslims through selective reporting. They believe Islam is often presented as monolithic, authoritarian, and oppressive toward women, which they claim to be the consequence of the constant focus of media and public discussions on issues of women in some Muslim 'communities' such as forced marriages and female circumcision (EUMC, 2006b). Anti-Muslim prejudice is pervasive in the mass media and public debates (Nadal et al., 2012; Strabac et al., 2014). Such negative portrayal of Muslims can lead to overt and covert discrimination against Muslim people and have detrimental impacts on their self-esteem, mental health, and social identity (Nadal et al., 2012).

Nadal et al's. (2012) findings revealed six microaggression themes that Muslim Americans experience: endorsing religious stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists; pathology of the Muslim religion; assumption of religious homogeneity; exoticization; Islamophobic and mocking language; and alien in own land. Participants in their focus groups pointed out that many instances of discrimination they experienced were yet blatant and verbally assaultive.

Subsequent incidents following the 9/11 attacks such as the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings in 2005 further exacerbated attitudes toward Muslims and fuelled more incidents of hostility and aggression against them. The intimidating emergence and international activities of 'Islamist terrorist organizations' within the last two decades in particular such as al-Qa'ida (AQ), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also known as Islamic

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and al-Nusrah Front, have clearly contributed to the exacerbation of 'Islamophobia'. The long list of committed terrorist attacks by extremists including Islamist extremists that have received substantial press coverage and public's attention is horrific. The terror attacks started especially from the 1980s, increased in number to reaching the peak in 2015, and continued to frequently happen as horribly in 2016. Yet, such tragic events might still continue to happen, threaten many people's lives, and lead to tremendous non-human consequences. More recent incidents include Baghdad bombings (July 2016, Iraq), Orlando mass shooting (June 2016, USA), Kabul attack (April 2016, Afghanistan), Lahore suicide bombing (March 2016, Pakistan), Brussels bombings (March 2016, Belgium), Zliten truck bombing (January 2016, Libya), Tell Tamer bombings (December 2015, Syria), Paris attacks (November 2015, France), and as I write this thesis (14 July, 2016), CNN reports that another terrorist attack purported to be committed by an ISIS-allied man has just happened in Nice, France. Terrorism is undoubtedly a global threat today. Yet it has other consequences that are less vivid than its direct human and non-human losses, which may be one of the strategies extremist organizations aim at: creating 'Islamophobia'.

'Islamophobia'can in turn elicit heinous reactions. Untoward activities can be provoking. Perceived threat, in an 'Islamophobic situation', can as well lead to tragedies. The 2011 Norway terrorist attacks committed by Anders Breivik who decried the rising prevalence of Muslims in Europe is an example highlighting how problematic prejudice toward Islam and Muslims can be (Johnson, 2011). It seems logical to think that creation or exacerbation of 'Islamophobia' may be a strategy of the 'Islamist terrorist organizations'. A strategy to make it sound a daunting task to combat against them and their ideology, to make non-Muslim individuals become cynical about Muslims, exclude them, make them feel alienated, and by doing do, be perceived as racists, to

position people in front of each other, to create chaos, and thus, to make people divided in the society. In the resulting vacuum, Muslims' sense of belonging to the society they live in may be at stake. Extremist groups may, then, be able to take advantage of the situation by trying to draw the attention of 'isolated' Muslim individuals as a 'welcoming host', and motivate them to 'punish' the target societies by taking violent and destructive actions.

'Islamophobia' can affect anyone involved, both non-Muslims and Muslims. In the U.S., according to FBI (2014), hate crimes motivated by religious bias in 2014 alone, accounted for 1,092 offenses reported by law enforcement 16.3% of which were anti-Islamic (Muslim). Yet Muslimophobia has not merely targeted random Muslim individuals but also Muslim communities. Europe has gone through increasing tensions between national majorities and marginalized Muslim communities such as violence in northern England between native British and Asian Muslim youth in 2001; the civil unrest among France's Muslim Maghreb communities in 2005; and the Danish cartoon crisis following the publication of pictures of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam (Triandafyllidou, 2010). In 2011, Muslim community Yorba Linda in the US held a fundraiser to combat homeless and domestic violence in their community that was met with protests by both local community members and Congressional representatives (Johnson, 2011). Politicians and academics have intensively debated the grounds underlying such tensions and what should be done to enhance civic cohesion in European societies. According to Triandafyllidou (2010), the question has arisen of how much cultural diversity can be accommodated within liberal and secular democratic societies. Some have claimed that Muslims are impossible to accommodate in European countries because their cultural traditions and Islamic faith are incompatible with secular democracies. Some others have argued that the accommodation of Muslims in such societies is possible provided that they adhere to a set of

civic values that reflect the secular nature of society and politics in Europe and lie at the heart of European democracy (Triandafyllidou, 2010). In many European countries, including France, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, although they are among the top ten European countries with largest Muslim populations, concerns about growing Muslim communities have led to calls for restrictions on immigration (Hackett, 2015).

Yet, according to Triandafyllidou (2010), many Muslims who are fully integrated in their country of settlement believe that they are sometimes at a disadvantage compared to citizens of other member states of the European Union (EU). Although EU supports minority protection and combats discrimination, the overall Europeanization process has not made the integration of Muslims in specific states simpler (Triandafyllidou, 2010). A Pew Research Center survey conducted in early 2015 revealed that 61% of people in Italy, 56% in Poland, 42% in Spain, 24% in Germany, 24% in France, and 19% in the UK have unfavorable views of Muslims. More specifically, the majorities in Italy and Poland do not have favorable views of Muslims (Stokes, 2015). It also showed that French, British, and Italians 50 years and older have significantly less favorable views of Muslims than do 18-29 year-olds (Stokes, 2015). However, the survey was conducted before the emergence of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as a separated group from al-Qa'ida in February 2014 and its contribution to the mind-blowing terrorist attacks especially occurred routinely ever since including the November massacre in Paris (2015), the March bombings in Brussels (2016), and the most recent one, the July truck attack in Nice (2016). Yet, as Stokes (2015) points out, the hostile activities of a few radicals are not necessarily reflected in the views of the general public. The survey was conducted after the Charli Hebdo massacre and the simultaneous attack on a Jewish grocery store, perpetrated by radical Islamists in Paris (Stokes, 2015).

According to Hackett (2015), Muslims are younger than other Europeans overall. In 2010, the median age of Muslims throughout Europe was 32, while the median age of other Europeans (including Christians, and those who were religiously unaffiliated) was 40. The Muslim populations in Europe are composed of immigrant and native Muslims. As explained in Triandafyllidou (2010), immigrant Muslim populations in Europe have mainly arrived during the second-half of the 20th century as a result of post-war population movements. They have mainly settled in the countries of North and West Europe such as Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. In addition, there is a large number of Muslims that have arrived during the last two decades and have mainly settled in the countries of the South Europe such as Italy, Spain, and Greece (Triandafyllidou, 2010).

The second and third generation of European Muslims of immigrant origin are now native of Europe. There also are natives settled in Europe following population movements in the context of the Ottoman or Russian empires or are native populations that converted to Islam under Ottoman rule, hence mainly settled in the countries of Central, East, and Southeast Europe such as Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia, and in Russia or natives that converted to Islam at some point themselves (Triandafyllidou, 2010).

According to Pew Research Center's (2010) most recent population estimates, the largest Muslim populations in Europe are respectively found in Russia, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands ranging from about 14 million people in Russia to 1 million in the Netherlands (Hackett, 2015). According to Hackett (2015), the Muslim share of Europe's total population during the last two decades has been increasing steadily by 1

percentage point per decade from 4% in 1990 to 6% in 2010 and it is expected to continue through 2030, when Muslims are projected to make up 8% of Europe's population.

In Norway, according to Statistics Norway (2015), a total of 141027 Muslims were living in the country as of January 2015. The number is, however, not completely accurate. The statistics, as explained on the website, is based on communities' annual applications for central government subsidies. Yet some communities do not apply for subsidies every year and some others never apply for subsidies. Due to this fact, the number of members in some categories varies. Furthermore, being a member of an ethnic community does not necessarily reflect one's religious affiliation. Religion in European countries is considered to be a private matter and could be a ground for discrimination (Triandafyllidou, 2010).

According to the Pew Research Center (2015) survey, views of Muslims vary widely among European countries (Stokes, 2015). The data shows that while only 30% of participants in Poland have favorable attitudes toward Muslims, it is 76% in France; and while as much as 61% of participants in Italy have unfavorable attitudes toward Muslims, it is 19% in Britain. Ash (2005) writes in *The Guardian*: "What we call Islam is a mirror in which we see ourselves". He believes most people in the West do have troubles with Islam. He states that most terrorists who threaten the West, claim to be 'Muslims', although the vast majority of Muslims are not terrorists. According to Ash (2005), most countries with a Muslim majority are resistant to European and American modernity, including the essentials of liberal democracy. He, then, sets out six different fundamental views which alone or along with another, locate the nub of the problem (September 15):

1. *Religion:* The problem is religion in general. It is "superstition, false consciousness, the derogation of reason". It is better to understand the truths revealed by science, have confidence in human reason, and embrace secular people. Many highly educated people hold such a view.

2. *Islam:* The problem is a particular religion, Islam. It does not allow the separation of the religion and politics. It holds "systematic discrimination against women, barbaric punishments for homosexuality, and militant intolerance". It is stuck in the middle ages and needs Reformation.

3. *Islamism:* The problem is Islamism. It is a revival movement by fanatics in "the service of political ideology of hate". These "ideologists and movements of political Islamism" must be combated.

4. *Arabs' history:* The problem is rooted in the history of Arab nations. It lies in their specific "history, economics, political culture, society, and a set of failed attempts at post-colonial modernization". None of Arab countries is a "home-grown democracy".

5. *The West:* The problem is the West. The West itself has created the antipathy to western liberal democracies "from the Crusades to Iraq, western imperialism, colonialism, Christian and post-Christian ideological hegemonism", and by whatever believed to be its contribution to the establishment of Israel and the plight of the Palestinians.

6. *Muslims' perceived alienation:* The problem is the alienation of young, first- or second-generation Muslim immigrants who faced prejudice, rejection, and

> discrimination in Western and European countries in particular. Minority extremists' embraced fierce and radicalism has its roots in their feelings of perceived rejection or perceived alienation by the reality of their marginalized lives in the West.

Furthermore, Richardson (2009) adds another view: "Conflicts of material interests" (December 9). He suggests that the problem, when it comes to the West, may be related to the attempts to gain "power, influence, territory, and resources, particularly oil", and when it comes to Europe, may be related to concerns about "employment, housing, health, and education". Such conflicts are, however, "religionized or culturalized" resulting in each side celebrating and idealizing their traditions and cultural heritage while rejecting the traditions of the other. In Norway, for example, a large number of people experience the loss of their jobs as a result of downsizing in many workplaces, though unemployment is not extensive in Norway unlike many other European countries. Such concerns often take the form of ethnic nationalism (Gullestad, 2002).

Ash (2005) contends whatever view a given person holds in this regard, it has a word to say about herself/himself also. For what we call Islam, he believes, is a mirror in which we see ourselves. He asserts: "Tell me your Islam and I will tell you who you are". Although the article does not further to advocate this assertion, it is intriguing per se and resonates that our attitudes are not formed in the vacuum, but rather, 'reflect' some information about us.

However, Johnson (2011) contends that 'Islamophobia' as a prejudiced attitude has deeper origins than reactions to violent extremism and anti-Muslim prejudice is not rooted in the 9/11 and other terrorist incidents. Strabac and Listhaug (2008) in their multilevel analysis of

survey data from 30 European countries, observed significantly higher levels of anti-Muslim prejudice in Western Europe, also in the period prior to the 9/11, indicating that the problem has deeper roots predating the chain of international events triggered by the terrorist attacks on the United States. The roots that may not be in the preceding incidents such as the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979 and following hostage crisis, either. Although such events have contributed to the profile of Islam in the West (Semati, 2010), 'Islamophobia' as a prejudiced attitude seems to have deeper roots.

Immigration from developing countries into developed countries including those of Europe is generally considered as a dilemma nowadays. In Norwegian debates on the issue of immigration, the boundary is not only organizational, but also cultural (Gullestad, 2002). Yet, it has been much negative focus on Muslims in the mass media and public discourses (Nadal et al., 2012; Strabac et al., 2014). The emphasis on culture and ancestry, as is the case with many contemporary debates on the subject, often tacitly provides a common ground between racism and nationalism (Gullestad, 2002). Yet there are close relations among "egalitarian themes, majority nationalism, and racism" (p. 45).

According to Gullestad (2002), in Norway as a case in point, immigrants from 'Third World' countries started to enter Norway in the late 1960s. An immigration ban was imposed in 1975. Although the relative number of immigrants in Norway is smaller than that of other countries such as Sweden, the debates about them concern extensive organizational form and cultural content (Gullestad, 2002). She explains that Western world's egalitarian individualism which is commonly emphasized as *equality* in Nordic countries including Norway, results in people's tendency to having to feel that they are ('supposed to be') more or less the same in order to be of equal value, what she calls *imagined sameness*. She believes that the central value

concept rooted in Norway's egalitarianism is 'likeness' (*likhet*), 'similarity', 'sameness', or 'identity'. The egalitarian logic, however, can be woven into both egalitarian hierarchical models of society, not only to the term *likhet* but also to other expressions including 'to fit in together' (*å passe sammen*) and 'to share the same ideas' (*ha sammenfallende synspunkter*), as stated in Gullestad (2002). She suggests that it implies that there is a problem when others are perceived to be 'too different'. Immigrants (including Muslims) who do not play down their difference, are perceived as provoking hostility, and thus threatening Norway's homogeneity.

Gullestad (2002) alleges that the discursive dichotomies between 'Norwegians' ('us') and 'immigrants' ('them') appears to be rigid and fixed. Since the imagined sameness produces a solution (demands for sameness) to a problem it has itself contributed to creating (differences), many Norwegians turn to the simultaneous production of 'differences' while calling for 'sameness' (Gullestad, 2002). I will return to the issues of cognitive representations and relations of ingroups ('us') versus outgroups ('them') in the cognitive and social underpinnings section.

Strabac et al. (2014) conducted a research on attitudes toward Muslim immigrants across four countries: USA, UK, Sweden, and Norway. They found no higher levels of anti-Muslim attitudes compared to anti-immigrant attitudes, neither in general nor even in the two countries that have experienced large-scale terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists, namely USA and UK. The results were surprising as they had hypothesized that anti-Muslim attitudes would turn out higher, particularly in the US and UK.. Yet more surprisingly, they found lower anti-Muslim attitudes relative to levels of anti-immigrant attitudes in the US and UK. They also found that educated people hold more positive attitudes toward Muslims. Strabac et al. suggest that the 'absence' of particularly anti-Muslim attitudes in the general view of people and the 'reluctance' to openly express such attitudes in the US and UK can account for the lower anti-Muslim

attitudes relative to anti-immigrant attitudes. Partially similar to Stokes's (2015) account of general public views with respect to the radical hostile acts of a few, as brought up earlier, the researchers' hypotheses of the negative effect of media and public debates focusing on Islam and Muslims turned out to have been overestimated. Thus, they endorse that the negative media attention does not necessarily translate into higher levels of people's prejudice toward Muslim immigrants as a group (Strabac et al., 2014).

However, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) in their multilevel analysis of data from 30 European countries (including the UK and Sweden but excluding Norway) found that anti-Muslim attitudes are more widespread than negative attitudes toward other immigrants. Yet the aggregate level of prejudice against Muslims was higher than the corresponding level of prejudice against immigrants. In addition, the researchers also found that the heightened level of anti-Muslim prejudice was higher in the Eastern Europe. Consistent with the EUMC's (2002b) report on 'Islamophobia' in Europe, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) state that the results of their study suggest that Muslims are prone to becoming targets of prejudice in Europe. They also note that analysis of the individual-level predictors of prejudice (level of education, sex, size of place of residence, income in lowest quartile, and age) indicate that the pattern of anti-Muslim prejudice is fairly similar to anti-minority prejudice in general. The researchers suggest that Muslimophobia is not a novel or exceptional phenomenon concerning prejudice. Rather, Muslims are a new target group that has come into spotlight.

Strabac & Listhaug (2008) found little evidence in order for religious or cultural elements to play a prominent role in 'Islamophobia'. By running the models with measures of anti-immigrant prejudice and ethnic prejudice, the researchers again suggest that we are dealing with a familiar form of ethnic prejudice.

Strabac & Listhaug (2008) found weak support for that deteriorating economic conditions result in increased prejudice. Besides, they found no effect of the size of the Muslim population on the level of anti-Muslim prejudice in a country. The latter is consistent with that of the Pew Research (2015) survey, as discussed before, in which attitudes toward Muslims were found to be varying across countries. Although Germany, France, and the UK are among the European countries with the largest Muslim populations, negative attitudes toward Muslims were relatively lower than that of other countries (Hackett, 2015).

In the *current* situation in Europe and the U.S., 'Islamophobia' may *still* be on the rise (e.g., Lee et al., 2009, p. 93). It is "a highly politicized construct", according to Lee et al. (2009, p. 94). Awad (2016), the executive director at CAIR, calls it "anti-Muslim propaganda". Processing goals may interfere with learning the distinctions among individuals in their attitude positions (Brewer, Weber, & Carini, 1995).

Cognitive and Social Underpinnings of 'Islamophobia'

Behavior is a function of characteristics of *individual* and *context*. According to introductory psychological textbooks, any individual brings a unique set of personality traits to the context and this causes them to act differently in the same context. Yet in any context a unique set of forces affect the individual and this causes them to act differently in different contexts. Studies have frequently shown that the role of context in our behavior is greater than it is assumed. Further, one does not solely react to objective features of the context, but also to their own subjective interpretations of the context (Atkinson & Hilgard, 2000/2006). A perceived threatening situation elicits different reactions than does a perceived 'challenging' situation. In our attempt to find out the *cause* and *effect*, we might make systematic mistakes that would

affect our social judgments. We most often do not gather data *randomly*, we have *negativity bias,* there is *overconfidence barrier*, we might get 'fooled' by the *vividness* of features and overlook more important information, our *schemas* biasedly affect our perception and memory and they are resistant to change (*schemas constancy*), our evaluations and judgments are greatly affected by our *prior knowledge*, we tend to *selectively recall* data from our memory, we often engage in the *fundamental attribution error*, and there also is *outgroup homogeneity effect*. Nevertheless, we tend to generalize our information. Thus, the very intuitive theories which are supposed to help us make the right judgments, can also mislead us into the misunderstanding of data, misestimating of simultaneous changes, and misevaluating of the cause and effect relationships (Atkinson & Hilgard, 2000/2006). I will proceed to possible connections between some systematic mistakes mentioned above that affect our social judgments in the context of 'Islamophobia'. Addressing all possible cognitive and social underpinnings of the phenomenon is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the aim is to examine some of them more deeply.

Our non-random data gathering

Contrary to that of scientific research, our main source of data is by large people we personally know. Although that can have positive effects on our social judgments about people and groups according to the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), it does not provide a valid basis for the evaluation of the whole group. It also is subjective, hence varies from person to person. This methodological error often results in information which is not derived from a random data collection and because of that, it is not solid. Muslimophobia targets Muslims as a whole. In order to gain a robust idea about a group, we will need to conduct some scientific studies which uses representative samples. Somebody who personally knows a Muslim woman who is perceived to be oppressed by her husband, might think that all Muslim women are oppressed as

such if s/he solely relies on her/his personal information. She might then be uninterested to, for example, marry a Muslim man because she thinks she would be oppressed as well. Her Muslimophobia in this context might hinder her to truly befriend Muslim men.

Our another main source of information about social groups is mass media. Ruling out possible political influence and special interests concerning media, they simply report the news, the events. If they report terrorist attacks in Brussels by three men who claimed to be affiliated with the Islamic terrorist group ISIS, they just report them. It should not be taken that all Muslims are terrorists or all terrorist attacks are committed by Muslims. The media does not engage in *non-events*. They do not report an event that has not happened. "Terrorist attacks in Washington DC by two suicide bombers did *not* happen yesterday", does not sound a good headline for the news. Thus media usually get us non-random non-representative samples and because of that, data derived from the mass media does not allow us to consider it as basis for any generalization.

Negativity Bias

Our thinking can be counterfactual. Negative information is more likely to stand out in our memory than positive information. If somebody mentions a number of positive points about a person we have not yet met but also mentions a negative point, we are more likely to remember the negative one (Baron, Byrne, & Branscombe, 2006). Baron et al. (2006) explain that from an evolutionary perspective, such a tendency would have helped secure survival. Negative information reflects features of the external word that may be threatening, hence our higher sensitivity to such information. The negativity bias effect implicates that the negative information will have a stronger influence on our desire to meet people.

An implication of the negativity bias is that in an 'Islamophobic' climate where negative pieces of information about Muslims too often resonate with news, debates, and arguments, people may develop negative attitudes toward Muslims. Social interactions between non-Muslims and Muslims may be then hampered. Non-Muslim individuals will be less likely to be interested to meet 'Muslim' individuals. Such dynamics operate as a vicious circle in which less desire will result in less social interactions, less social interactions will result in more social distance, longer-maintained negative attitudes toward Muslim people on the non-Muslim side and perceived alienation, separation, rejection, and discrimination on the Muslim side. Muslimophobia and perceived Muslimophobia hold back the two sides from meeting each other, and will definitely not help social integration and cohesion in societies where people of different religions and ethnic backgrounds live 'together'. Knowledge of social psychological effects of the mass media outputs in particular will help prevent 'unwanted' consequences.

Overconfidence Barrier

Then there is the overconfidence barrier, an optimistic bias about the quality of our own judgment. We tend to have greater confidence in our own beliefs and judgments (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985. as cited in Baron et al., 2006). This tendency often leads us to rate our own beliefs higher than others' beliefs and to be reluctant to immediately accept opinions that are different from ours. A Muslimophobe may be driven by this false confidence to consider Muslim individuals who do not represent her/his negative attitudes as 'exceptions' or 'not-yet' threatening, and thus, sustain the 'validity' and 'reliability' of her/his intuitive theories about Muslim individuals. It also can hinder the mind to 'restore' attitudes to the 'default' state once Islamophobic attitudes are formed. The overconfidence barrier in this manner, will possibly lead

Muslimophobic attitudes to persistently continue to exist and consequently, will hamper interventions.

Vividness

Vividness of information is one of the factors that affect attention and stored information. In a classic study on attention, Nisbett and Ross (1980) showed that when two sets of clear and unclear information are pitted against each other, our estimates and judgments are more likely to be affected by clear information as that of face-to-face conversations and visual scenes in the news even if unclear information as that of written statistical summaries is more valid and informative. It implicates that people are more likely to pay a lot of attention to and remember news of terrorist attacks owing to the vividness of information. Besides, such news are usually shared by many on popular and widely used online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter. Many people share posts and tweet about them over and over again and for that it also is easier to access and is repeatedly noticed, even if you are unwilling to follow them. Seifert et al. (1985) observed that participants in the memory test were challenged to tell apart the information provided in a story they had read and their own inferences. It indicates that self-inference affects retrieval of information from memory so that it contains both received and perceived information. Therefore, what one recalls might not be exact and pure. Yet memories of individuals, groups, objects, and incidents are not merely image-like reconstructions of the original stimuli, but simplified reconstructions of our own main perceptions (Atkinson & Hilgard, 2000/2006).

Schemas

Schemas are our organized memory structures and representations of any category of people, objects, and events. They play a vital role in our understanding of the world around us. Encountering any new situation activates the schematic processing through which the corresponding schemas with most critical similarities are looked up (Fiske, 1993). Yet schemas themselves affect both perception (of what we encounter) and memory (of what we already encountered). Stereotypes are schemas about people.

According to Fiske (1993), since accuracy is not absolute but rather dependent on one's purpose, the pragmatic approach suggests that we are just *good-enough* perceivers. In many situations, we possibly pay special attention to certain features and overlook the others. Moreover, expectancy effects are so persistent although they diminish with time and are moderated by many variables (Fiske, 1993). According to Fiske (1993), incongruency of the situation with the 'corresponding' schemas especially affects *encoding* when perceivers are motivated to understand it or when expectations are *weak*, which alerts the person to potential cognitive threats at an early stage. This is why people are more likely to remember behaviors that are substantially incongruent with their schema-based expectations as suggested by Stangor and McMillan (1992). Yet congruency especially affects *retrieval* and *responding* or when expectations are *strong* which allows the person to maintain and use her/his 'supported' schemas (Fiske, 1993).

Schemas of Muslims which provide bases for interpreting Muslims-related situations possibly vary to a considerable extent from a Muslim-friendly or an attitudinally neutral person to a Muslimophobe. That is, essentially different schemas of Muslims will get activated through

the schematic processing when relevant. Different schemas will then lay out different foundations for one's understanding, interpretation, evaluation, and judgment of the same subject. Perceptions of Muslims may as well be qualitatively different, so is the *working* content of their memories. Consequently, the results will proportionately be different, maybe opposing. In this context, information that is congruent with the schemas of Muslims for a Muslimophobe may be incongruent with that of a Muslim-friendly person and vice versa. A Muslimophobe's typical schema of Muslims might be a brutal bushy-bearded Taliban with a Kalashnikov in hand, whereas a Muslim-friendly person's typical schema of Muslims might be a defenseless family man escaping from the very brutal bushy-bearded Taliban. Assuming there is a picture of the situation above, a Muslimophobe might pay more attention to the Taliban who is going after that family man, whereas a Muslim-friendly person might pay more attention to the family man who is running from that Taliban for his life. Both perceivers then, will find 'supporting' data for their own stereotypes of Muslims by focusing on the congruent piece of information in the picture. Thus, influenced by their own kinds of schemas about Muslim people, their perceptions of the same issue will be quite different. Such a difference in the content of people's 'relevant' schemas to Muslims, indicates a huge difference in their attitudes and sentiments about them. Fiske's supposition that incongruency has an advantage in encoding and congruency has an advantage in retrieval and responding may be well illustrated in the following examples.

Assume a Muslim individual living in her/his Islamic country of origin. Most people s/he has seen, have probably been Muslims and just ordinary citizens−as is the case for most Muslim people living in their country of origin. Her/his schemas of Muslims then, are more likely to reflect ordinary citizens and not, say, "Jihadi John" (Muhammed Emwazi) who was the executioner of ISIS before his death, alleged to be the masked left-handed man with British

accent who beheaded the captives in a number of videos distributed by a media outlet of ISIS. Facing such a weird man in real life would out of hand send incongruent signals to our Muslim individual alerting her/him to the potential danger. The perceived threat would be very unexpected.

Yet any news about untoward activities of Muslim individuals, groups, and countries would generally be congruent with a Muslimophobe's schemas of Muslims and in line with her/his expectations. The ensuing retrieval would then provide compatible schemas with the 'supporting' data. If that involves responses, they would be invoked accordingly so as to be fitting the setting. Methodologically, this process in particular resembles doing a scientific research in an unscientific fashion. First, data is collected and then, search for compatible theories and literature is carried out. If data happens to be consistent with a theory or hypothesis (that is the case for congruency), this procedure would essentially result in the theory or hypothesis being supported by data leading the researcher to make a type I error.

In the first example, the individual is likely to remember the incongruent character in particular (as suggested by Stangor & McMillan, 1992), and in the second example, the individual is likely to remember the congruent pieces of information in particular (as suggested by Cohen, 1981).

Schemas constancy

Schemas, particularly ideological schemas, are resistant to incongruent or opposing information (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). It has been shown in a well-known experiment by Lord et al. (1979). Participants with divergent opinions on the efficacy of death penalty in prevention of murder, read two researchers' study reports. One indicated that the death penalty

was preventive, whereas the other indicated that it was not. Then, they read a critique of either researcher's methodology. Results revealed that the participants found the study report and methodology which were more congruent with their own opinions, more convincing. Furthermore, they became even more convinced that their opinion on the subject was 'correct'. It implicates that in public debates, moderating evidence will possibly lead to polarize the public opinion. Supporters of any side are likely to pick the evidence that endorses their own opinions on the subject (Nisbett & Ross, 1980).

Thus, as a matter of schemas constancy, a Muslim individual or someone who is against Muslims are both primarily likely to rely upon evidence that supports their own beliefs. On this account, I suggest that schemas constancy can especially make it difficult for Muslim people to change their opinions if they are contextually supposed to do so, as long as the subject matter challenges their religious beliefs. The reason is that Islamic beliefs provide a fundamental ideology for Muslim people to see the world through. Islam lays out a *paramount* ideological model based on the criteria and values in which, rightness or wrongness of things must be established.

In France today, a fairly new issue is Muslim women wearing burkini−an Islamic swimsuit which covers most of one's body−at the beach. The current French rules reject the right to wear burkini as a perceived symbol of extreme political Islam which does not fit the French secular society. Although secularism is not a 'state religion' in France to be used against other religions as president Francois Hollande stated in a recent speech in Paris, Muslim women were banned from wearing burkini at the beach this summer in around 30 towns in France (AFP & Holmes, 2016). According to the Islamic faith in most branches of Islam, women must cover their body from men in order to further guard their 'decency'. Such standards to which Muslim

people must conform are primarily instructed at early childhood. Thus, in line with Islamic instructions, schemas of a 'decent' lady begin to be formed in Muslims' minds quite early, presumably earlier than all other conflicting theories are argued (against), benefiting from the primacy effect as well. Similarly, self-schemas pertinent to 'a Muslim woman' and 'a Muslim man' began to be formed at early ages also. A Muslim lady's self-schema who wears burkini at the beach is presumably that "I am a 'decent' Muslim woman" while a Muslim man's self-schema is presumably that "I am a Muslim man with 'gheerah'". Owing to the self-schemas constancy, a typical Muslim person's self-schema persists in containing such characteristics that demand consistent behaviors, even if they appear to be inconsistent with the values of an external system such as the French secular society. For her/him, a main guideline may be: "*No matter where I am living. I am Muslim after all*". Muslims who are nowadays confronted by the French authorities at the beach for the perceived violation of the French secular values, have already lived for years with their own values. The values that have happened to be conflicting with that of France today yet they must not be violated either. Therefore, a Muslim lady in burkini who is forced by the authorities to take off her garment, will feel highly pressured if doing so. She may then dare refuse to take the order and struggle to 'protect' herself or simply leave the beach. If she is accompanied by a male relative such as brother, father, or husband, they will feel pressured as such, so as to react because their 'gheerah' does not allow them to keep silent in such a situation. Since schemas including self-schemas are resistant to change, both Muslim men and women will probably be reluctant to accept those expectations after all. They will be unlikely to change their mindset in this regard. Even if they want to do so, it will not be easy. Consequently, such a 'cultural' clash will possibly result in the avoidance of Muslim women to go to the beaches and might lead them to develop anti-French sentiments.

Prior Knowledge

We often give more weight to information which comes first. Our perception and data-storing may be biased owing to the primacy effect. Primary information is usually recalled better than information presented later on, affecting one's general understanding of the situation (Atkinson & Hilgard, 2000/2006). In the context of 'Islamophobia', the primacy effect predicts that if Muslims are primarily portrayed in a negative way, people will then be more likely to recall the negative pieces of information, even if Muslims are later portrayed in a positive way. Due to the strong effect of the prior knowledge, people may then automatically associate Muslims with negative conceptions in this context so long as the subject matter concerns Muslims. On this account, it is particularly important how children are reared and educated. If they have been told that Muslims are bad, they will be likely to think that way thenceforth. In kindergartens or schools for instance, they may not be willing to play with children whom they think they are 'Muslim', or their parents are (Muslim) immigrants. They might bully them, or beat them. On the other hand, in those Muslim born children anti-social sentiments may begin to grow. Today, special attention to children may be required with regard to the kind of information they receive or have access. Many children have smartphones and access to the Internet and if they are not monitored until they are able to think and analyze information independently, they can easily be influenced by various information available online. Knowing the importance of the prior 'knowledge', in Iraq and Syria, ISIS takes advantage of children. In a few videos that are available online, children kill the captives by ISIS. They 'teach' them to be brutal.

Selective Recall of Data

Recall of 'data' from memory is often selective in the sense that information will often be recalled that is congruent with our schemas of the subject matter (Atkinson & Hilgard, 2000/2006). Since there is bias in this process, the recalled information may not mirror the whole picture. The following exemplifies this: Assumption of Muslims as related to terrorism is an Islamophobic conceptualization of Muslims (Lee et al., 2009; Nadal et al., 2012). Figure 2. illustrates four conditions some of which a 'Muslimophobe' is likely to rule out with respect to the involvement of Muslims in untoward activities when relevant information is recalled selectively. It classifies people in an assumptive society based upon whether or not they are Muslims and if they are involved in untoward activities.

	Muslims	Non-Muslims
Involved in untoward activities	A	B
Not involved in untoward activities	C	D

Figure 2: Four possible conditions of involvement in untoward activities relating to Muslimophobia**.** Muslims involved in untoward activities, non-Muslims involved in untoward activities, Muslims not involved in untoward activities, and non-Muslims not involved in untoward activities. A 'Muslimophobe' tends to rule out conditions B, C, and D, and selectively recall data for condition A.

Assuming that one holds the (invalid) stereotype of Muslims as groups that are often involved in untoward activities, they tend to look solely at condition A while overlooking the other conditions: B, C, and D, and similarly, selectively recall the data for condition A (Atkinson & Hilgard, 2000/2006). This is specifically the case in the context of 'Islamophobia'. One would have to see if there is actually any correlation between being 'Muslim' and involvement in untoward activities. Even if there is any correlation for a given condition, one would still have to look into the other three conditions to see if they correlate as well. It is crucial to allow for all possible conditions. Yet if we have relevant schemas to lead us to expect two certain things change simultaneously, we are likely to overestimate the 'correlation' between them. Conversely, if we have no relevant schema in that case, we are likely to underestimate the correlation between them. These two phenomena occur even if the data indicates the opposite (Chapman & Chapman, 1969). Atkinson and Hilgard (2000/2006) state that it is partly because data for all possible conditions is not usually available. Besides, we might not even 'reckon' that it is necessary to consider those data if they are not congruent with our relevant schemas. Condition A might, then, provide yet clearer information. Moreover, we often rule out events that have not happened. These so-called non-events are not easy to realize. The absence of non-events can happen to make the mass media sound reinforcing stereotypes as they routinely report 'events' (Atkinson & Hilgard, 2000/2006).

Fundamental Attribution Error

We seem to possess a kind of schema relating to others' behavior that makes us place greater value on *dispositional* factors than on *situational* factors, leading us to underestimate the effect of external causes (Ross, 1977). According to Jones and Harris (1967), we tend to make a dispositional attribution even if the situational factors are clear and strong enough to account for

why someone has behaved in a certain manner. They note that even when major decisions about the direction and form of behavior are made for a given person, her/his performance still remains a powerful source of variation in the attribution results. Thus, according to the researchers, perceived behavior engulfs the perceiver's attribution and makes it difficult for her/him to assign appropriate weights to the situational factors. Gilbert and Jones (1986) showed that we may dispositionally attribute our own opinions to others. In their studies participants clearly showed a tendency to dispositionally attribute the opinions to the speaker that were congruent with the positions they had chosen for the speaker themselves. That is, participants as inducers who engaged in explicit behavioral induction nonetheless displayed correspondence bias in their attributions. Importantly, according to the researchers, the magnitude of the inducers' bias was not less than that of the observers. It suggests differential access to relevant information about the social interaction (Gilbert & Jones, 1986). Gilbert and Jones (1986) suggest that we are inducers in real-life and often engage in tasks that are twofold. One is that we may originate constraints via our expectations, desires, or thoughts, which determine the form and direction of the target person's behavior. The other is that we also may implement the very self-generated constraint that can change the target person's behavior in accordance with our purpose. Thus, it appears that 'self-generated realities' actually form our perceptions in part.

The fundamental attribution error can partly account for overall negative attitudes toward Muslims in the context of 'Islamophobia'. Muslimophobia targets Muslims as if they form an entitative group. Such an attitude highly involves the dispositional-attribution, hence the fundamental attribution error. Possibly, a 'Muslimophobe' uses dispositional attribution more often than a 'Muslim-friendly' person does when it comes to Muslims. Gullestad (2002) addresses an argument about the integration of Muslims in Norway by Wikan (1995) which in

my opinion is a very good instance of the fundamental attribution error. She quotes the following directly from Wikan (1995):

> 'Immigrants' and the 'immigration problem' have virtually become synonymous with Muslims.
>
> Why?
>
> Let me state immediately: I do not think that this is due to 'racism'.
>
> When so many Norwegians−including myself−regard Muslims as a problem, there is a reason for this: Muslims in Norway are problematic in many ways: one has the impression that they distance themselves further from basic Norwegian values than do other groups. Many practice segregation. Many oppose their children having Norwegian friends. This does not apply to all, but it applies to far too many. (Wikan, 1995a: 85-86; Wikan 1995b: 26. as cited in Gullestad, 2002, p. 52).

Gullestad (2002) then argues that Wikan in her writings does not consider the possibility that immigrants−including Muslims−might keep to themselves because the familism and home-centeredness of Norwegian social life can make it difficult for 'outsiders' to be included. That, immigrants (possibly) encounter discrimination in Norway, and their inward turn might be partly an attempt to retain material and emotional support, dignity, and self-respect. This opposition in the attitudes of Wikan and Gullestad can be well explained by the extent to which each dispositionally/situationally attributes. Wikan largely dispositionally attributes Muslims' social behavior in the Norwegian society, whereas Gullestad draws attention to possible alternative situational attributions. Wikan believes that Muslims distance themselves further than do other groups, because, so to say, they are Muslims, and they themselves wish to do so. In other words,

it is Muslims who fail to integrate into the society. She focuses on the internal factors and attributes the behavior dispositionally. By contrast, Gullestad believes that external factors such as perceived discrimination may be the reason why Muslims keep to themselves, and it can be the society that fails to integrate Muslims. She takes account of the external factors and sheds light on the possibility of alternative situational attributions. Thus, by focusing too much on the perceived internal factors and overlooking possible external factors, Wikan seems to be involved in the fundamental attribution error, while Gullestad makes a point. Therefore, as Gullestad (2002) points out, it is important to try to see the scenario from the point of view of each other.

Stability and controllability

Weiner (1993) suggests that we also take account of *stability* and *controllability* of behaviors as dimensions independent of internal (considered in dispositional attribution)-external (considered in situational attribution) factors. That is, whether the 'causal' factors that affect others' behavior are: (1) Stable over time or likely to change, and (2) Controllable such that they can be influenced. On this account, it seems logical to assume that Muslimophobia might also have to do with this presumption that Muslims' certain behaviors as disliked by a 'Muslimophobe', are likely to be stable and unlikely to be controllable. Therefore, a 'Muslimophobe' might hold that: Muslims do not fit in 'our' society because they do not change, they often behave in the same manner as they did or would do in their 'home' country or in Islamic countries although that is in contradiction with 'our' values.

Outgroup Homogeneity Effect

According to Medin (1989), categorization involves treating distinct entities as equivalent in some definitive aspects in the service of accessing knowledge and making predictions

promptly, orderly, and with ease. Categories as well as concepts serve as building blocks for human thought and behavior though they do not essentially exist in the real world, nor do they necessarily correspond to mental representations of them (Medin, 1989). One's encoding and retrieval of the cognitive representations of groups may underlie their judgments about groups and group members (Messick & Mackie, 1989). Yet, there is the *outgroup homogeneity effect* in 'us' versus 'them' social categorization. As a result of the categorization process, according to Taylor et al. (1978), within-group differences tend to be minimized, whereas between-group differences tend to be clear. As stated in Messick & Mackie (1989), people judge groups to which they do not belong as more homogeneous than their own group. Conversely, ingroups perceive their own group as more heterogeneous than other groups. According to Brewer et al. (1995), however, this effect applies to natural social categories outside the laboratory. Experiment 2 by Brewer et al. yielded contradictory results to the outgroup homogeneity effect indicating that it does not apply to artificially created social categories.

In line with 'us' versus 'them' social categorization, cues to group membership will serve as triggers of the social categorization along the perceived direction. Once a person is perceived to be an outgroup member, owing to the outgroup homogeneity effect, 'her/his' group will be quite likely perceived as (more) homogeneous. S/he is, then, likely to be 'supposed' to represent the whole group and take the blame for whatever stereotypes the given group has been labeled. Semati (2010) argues that in the context of 'Islamophobia', "brown" skin color may be a signifier of 'Muslim outsiders'. So long as the ingroup-outgroup categorization is concerned, any visual markers that 'may' signal group membership, will gain social significance. Thus, individuals perceived to be Muslims may as well be subject to prejudice due to the assumed affiliation−not because of their beliefs (Richardson, 2009).

The idea of *passing* may be an important concept in understanding prejudice toward people perceived to be Muslims. As Brown et al. (2013) also suggest, when a non-Muslim individual is perceived to be Muslim, s/he is likely to be prejudiced against in the first place as are many Muslim individuals. By contrast, when a Muslim individual 'passes' for the dominant group as non-Muslim, s/he may not experience the same (mis)treatments relative to those who are easily identified as Muslims (Nadal et al, 2012). Yet it can be sometimes difficult to recognize behaviors specifically motivated by religious prejudice. Nadal et al. (2012) note that microaggressions that Muslim Americans experience may not only be religiously charged. Rather, it might as well be due to ethnicity and gender. It may also be a combination of factors. Imagine a Muslim woman of color with disability facing a perceived discriminatory treatment. How would she analyze the perceived prejudice? How would an observer analyze the observed discrimination?

Muslimophobia as a negative attitude toward 'outgroup-Muslims' can partially be explained by the outgroup homogeneity effect. It is associated with the perception of Muslims as a relatively homogeneous group. A 'Muslimophobe' tends to (over)generalize certain negative attitudes to the entire 'group' of Muslims as if there are no considerable within-group differences among Muslim individuals. Stereotypes and prejudice against many people as members of a particular group, would have "no leg to stand on" if the given person perceives the group as heterogeneous. The more social groups are perceived to be entitative, the more they are likely to be perceived as 'groups' instead of 'individuals', and thus, the processing of information and categorization of that group involves holistic perception, rather than, person perception (Brewer et al., 1995). Gullestad's (2002) account of assumed dichotomy of Norwegians and immigrants (including Muslims) in the pattern of 'us' versus 'them' is that an outsider is *as if* needed to be

created in order for the internal sameness, unity, and sense of belonging to be confirmed. She suggests that what seems to be at stake for many Norwegians is a threat to the imagined moral community and the Norwegian welfare state as the incarnation of this community. Muslims who have come to the spotlight nowadays may then be considered as 'outsiders' who are not 'deemed' by some people to be sharing the same values in particular. In the 'us' versus 'them' categorization, they will, then, be considered as 'them' and owing to the outgroup homogeneity effect, they will be perceived as a relatively homogeneous group. Therefore, the whole group of Muslims would be targeted by Muslimophobia.

Coalitional Computation

It was believed for long that encountering any new individual activates three primitive or primary dimensions: sex, age, and race which the mind encodes in an automatic and mandatory fashion (Brewer, 1988. as cited in Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; Messick & Mackie, 1989), across all social contexts and with equal strength (Brewer, 1988. as cited in Kurzban et al., 2001; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992; Taylor et al., 1978). According to Messick and Mackie (1989), race along with gender and age are of primary or primitive generic categories that social targets initially activate. But, they suggest that there was little direct evidence to that (p. 54). The researchers stated that there was increasing agreement on the point despite possible benefits that subcategorization might have for intergroup perception. According to the researchers, race is one of horizontally linked concepts as well as gender and age, which are at a similar level of generality. Cognitive representations of groups are assumed to be multi-element structures with both horizontal and vertical links reflecting the hierarchical progression from more to less inclusive categories (Messick & Mackie, 1989). Similarly, in their experiments Stangor et al. (1992) supported that race as well as sex is a physical feature based on which

individuals are immediately and spontaneously categorized. The researchers stated that the findings of their studies added support to then-prevailing models of person perception proposing that category-based judgments reflect the default mode of person perception. According to Stangor et al, social category memberships such as belonging to a given 'racial' group, present immediately apparent physical features and are spontaneously attended to and remembered. Yet they found sex more informative than race in the sense that it provides more insight into the target's underlying personality. Furthermore, they observed that high-prejudice participants (not low-prejudice participants) tended to categorize the targets based on race. In line with these findings, they observed that physical features are used only to the extent that they are perceived as informative about the underlying disposition of the target person. In addition, instructions to choose a person who presents a favorable image was found to be effective in changing the perceiver's orientations toward the stimulus information (Stangor et al., 1992). In another study, Taylor et al. (1978) obtained similar results as well. The researchers argued that race and sex are social categories that are among the most dominant categorical systems. They also noted that social groups are stereotyped themselves as a function of their subgroup makeup and suggested that processes that underlie person perception and object perception have much in common.

Notwithstanding the empirical support for 'race' as a primitive or primary dimension, Kurzban et al. (2001) in a prominent study contended that an evolutionary analysis indicates that the dimension 'race' is likely to be wrong. Kurzban et al. (2001) argue that during the evolutionary history, our ancestors would have inhabited a social world in which the sex and age of a person would have enabled a large variety of useful probabilistic inferences about that person. The ancestral hunter-gatherers primarily traveled by foot and for that, residential moves of greater than forty miles would have been rare (Kelly, 1995. as cited in Kurzban et al., 2001).

Given the breeding structure inherent in such a social world, in all likelihood, they would never have encountered individuals sampled from populations genetically distant enough to qualify as belonging to a different 'race' (Kurzban et al., 2001). That holds even assuming that the term race is applicable to human which is a non-polytypic species and the overwhelming preponderance of genetic variation–at most geographically graded rather than sharply bounded–is within population and not between population (Lewontin, 1972). According to Lewontin (1972), only less than 15% of all human genetic diversity is accounted for by between-population differences. With intraracial differences accounting for 8.3% alone, just 6.3% is actually accounted for by 'racial' classification. He points out that man's perception of relatively large differences between human 'races' and subgroups is indeed a biased perception. Human 'races' are remarkably similar to each other (Lewontin, 1972).

Yet it is unclear how race is defined in many studies. This construct sounds difficult to define. According to Kaessmann, Wiebe, and Pääbo (1999), there is a little genetic diversity among humans compared with, say, chimpanzees although chimpanzee population size is far smaller than that of humans. From the biological perspective, humans do not qualify for the concept of subspecies or 'race' (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003).

Thus, human racial classification is of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance. It is of no social value either but is destructive of human relations (Lewontin, 1972). Therefore, *natural selection* that would plausibly have favored human's neuro-computational machinery that encodes one's sex and age (Cosmides et al., 2003), would not have built race into our evolved cognitive machinery. There could have been no selection for cognitive adaptations designed to preferentially encode such a dimension let alone in an automatic and mandatory fashion (Kurzban et al., 2001).

However, studies have established that we encode the race of each person we encounter, and do so via computational processes that appear to be automatic and mandatory. If true, this would be important because categorizing people based on their race can be a precondition to treat them differently (Kurzban et al., 2001). Analytically, race encoding cannot be caused by computational machinery designed by natural selection for that purpose as discussed above. Kurzban et al. (2001) state that it must be a byproduct of the cognitive adaptations which have designed our machinery for some alternative function. Three proposals have been advanced in regard to race encoding (Cosmides et al., p. 175):

(1) "Race encoding is a byproduct of domain-general perceptual/correlational systems" (Taylor et al., 1978).
(2) "Race encoding is a byproduct of an essentialist inference system that evolved for reasoning about natural kind categories" (Atran, 1998; Gil-White, 2001; Hirschfeld, 1996. as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003).
(3) "Race encoding is a byproduct of computational machinery that evolved for tracking coalitions and alliances" (Kurzban et al., 2001).

Race encoding and perceptual/correlational systems

One proposal in regard to race encoding concerns perceptual systems. Humans as well as many other species seem to have computational machinery designed to pick up correlations between perceived features and events just like classical conditioning (Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000). Timing experiments indicate that we also learn the temporal intervals, as stated in Gallistel and Gibbon (2000). Evidence by Lewontin (1972); Kaessmann, Wiebe, and Pääbo (1999); and that of reviewed by Hirschfeld (1996. as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003), undermines

the notion of biological kinds in regard to race. For race encoding to be a byproduct of perceptual or correlational systems, one should equally encode perceptual attributes of all stimuli such as color and shape. There is evidence which strongly weighs against the perceptual byproduct hypothesis (e.g., Brewer et al., 1995; Stangor et al., 1992; Hirschfeld, 1996. as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003; Pietraszewski, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014).

Experiment 1 by Brewer et al. (1995) revealed that category-based processing is influenced by the meaningfulness of category distinctions above and beyond visual salience. The findings of their experiment 2 turned out to be in contradiction with the so-called homogeneity effect suggesting that the effect rarely if ever applies to artificial categories though it is frequently observed within natural social categories outside the laboratory. Consistently, in the absence of interdependent competing dimensions in their experiment 3, the researchers realized that the presence of a salient ingroup-outgroup categorization was not sufficient to induce category-based processing beyond the effects of visual cues alone. Nevertheless, as far as competitive interdependence between categories was concerned, the social significance of intergroup differences and representations at the category level was increased. Using the memory confusion protocol, Stangor et al. (1992) showed that the encoding of color is not automatic and mandatory. Hirschfeld (1996. as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003) showed that children do not privilege skin color over other perceptual dimensions when judging similarity especially for human targets. Furthermore, given that instructions to attend to color/shape increase the extent to which it is encoded with non-social stimuli (Nosofsky, 1987), Stangor et al. (1992) showed that it has no effect on encoding of race. Moreover, for the hypothesis to be credible, perceptual similarity should affect how strongly race is encoded. In other words, one should find prototypicality effects in racial categories just as one finds in artificial categories (Rosch,

Simpson, & Miller, 1976; Homa & Cultice, 1984). Perceived similarity of 'same-race' people, should produce powerful effects in categorization, learning, inference, recall, and recognition (Cosmides et al., 2003). Rosch et al. (1976) showed that structural relations of items in a category, can generate the typicality effects that characterize natural semantic categories. Homa and Cultice (1984) found that classification is not random. There is some consistency across classifications of objects, and patterns perceived to be belonging to the same category are often grouped together. Furthermore, one does not merely classify patterns, but rather, provide a similarity judgment in some sense (Homa & Cultice, 1984).

However, Stangor et al. (1992) found no prototypicality effects in their studies and reported that in conditions where the same-race targets were very similar in physical appearance, race was encoded just as strongly as in conditions where they were very different in physical appearance. Also, Cosmides et al. (2003) highlight that recognizing which people are members of each category should be trivial if racial categories were inductively built from perceptual features in a bottom-up fashion. Put it another way, development of racial categories should not be bottom-up if the hypothesis in question is plausible. Yet, Hirschfeld (1996. as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003) showed that preschoolers who knew and used racial category terms, were rather poor at telling which individuals fall into which racial category. Tellingly, their categories were driven by labels, not perceptual features. Furthermore, according to Cosmides et al. (2003), the perceptual byproduct hypothesis has a major limitation. It cannot explain why membership in a racial category is the basis for making inferences about one's behavior although it is determined by perceivable phenotypic surface features. Yet one of the most obvious features of racial thinking is racial stereotypes: inferences about one's personality, moral dispositions, traits, behaviors, affiliations, and goals.

Race encoding and essentialist reasoning

Another proposal concerns essentialist reasoning. There are three theories on natural kinds and essentialism:

(1) ***Essentialism and social categories***

Rothbart and Taylor's 1990 theory of essentialism (as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003) and social category suggests that the essentialist system can be applied to "any social category whenever cultural beliefs imply that category membership is inalterable and carries inductive potential" (p. 176).

(2) ***Essentialism and folk sociology***

Hirschfeld's 1996 theory of essentialism and folk sociology (as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003) suggests that "humans organize themselves into collectivities and define themselves into social kinds as a function of group membership" (p. 119). Human cognitive system has evolved an intuitive "theory of society", the function of which is to produce expectations about the society including "what kinds of people there are" using an essentialist mode of construal. Essentialist reasoning leads to the notion that humans are biologically clustered and contributes to generating a "folk biology" (p. 119).

(3) ***Essentialism and ethnic groups***

Gil-White's (2001) theory of essentialism and ethnic groups holds that human cognitive system has a module designed for reasoning about living kinds (i.e., species). It includes an essentialist inference system sensitive to within-group breeding and descent-based membership. On this account, ethnic groups would have activated this module as they manifest both cues.

Nevertheless, as different ethnic groups hold different cultural norms and represent norm boundaries, the essentialist inference that category membership predicts a set of non-obvious shared properties conferred a selective advantage. In consequence, natural selection produced a new module specially designed for reasoning about ethnic groups. A module, which is sensitive to non-obvious ethnic differences such as norms rather than phenotypic differences (Gil-White, 2001).

Atran (1998); Gil-White (2001); and Hirschfeld (1996. as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003), have supported the essentialist inference system byproduct hypothesis. It also has been supported that the way individuals reason about natural kinds is different from the way they reason about arbitrarily defined categories (Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999; Medin, 1989). When two things are judged to be members of the same natural kind, we infer that they have common properties. Those things will, then, be assumed similar in some way, though their common properties might not be vivid. Therefore, relevant schemas to either of them are most likely to be relevant to the other as well (Cosmides et al., 2003). Medin (1989) notes that a major problem with using similarity as a basis of categorizing is that similarity is very intuitive, yet more elusive, and too flexible. As he explains, categorization is a knowledge-based process driven by theories about the world, rather than a similarity-based process, because concepts need conceptual coherence that are, in fact, provided by theories. Yet coherence may be achieved in the absence of any obvious source of similarity (Medin, 1989).

As illustrated in Cosmides et al. (2003), category labels as well as perceptual similarities provide support for the judgment that they belong to the same natural kind. Nevertheless, perceptual similarities are not necessary for kind membership. We adopt an essentialist heuristic as though natural kinds have a set of defining *essences* telling them apart (Medin, 1989).

According to Cosmides et al. (2003), the essentialist system does not care whether human races form natural kinds. Rather, it is activated by certain input conditions. Yet any stimulus that fits a given condition will be treated as a natural kind, hence may invite the inference that individuals are divided into different races, hence different 'kinds' when it comes to race. Multiple studies have demonstrated that children will encode otherwise similar-looking people as members of two different natural kinds when being told that there are 'black people' and 'white people' (Atran, 1998; Gil-White, 2001; Hirschfeld, 1996. as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003). Thus, as Cosmides et al. state, perceptual similarity may feed the essentialist system through perceived similarity in appearance. It accounts for the reason why children who know racial terms do not sort people into racial categories on the very basis of perceptual similarity (Hirschfeld, 1996. as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003). On this account, the essentialist system has mistakenly mapped arbitrary racial categories onto the conceptual system that can be automatically encoded by congruent racial signs as signals to the pertinent natural kinds (Cosmides et al., 2003). Therefore, knowing which 'natural kind' a person of different 'race' belongs to invokes the 'relevant' schemas.

In sum, as explained in Cosmides et al. (2003), human cognitive machinery contains various computational systems. It may contain a system designed for tracking coalitional alliances alongside several functionally different essentialist inference systems designed to identify living kinds, social groups, or ethnic groups separately. Hirschfeld (1996. as cited in Cosmides et al., 2003) showed that inferences about coalitional identity and phenotypic traits do not follow the same logic. The latter reflects those of a living-kinds template, whereas inferences about identity seem to follow a more coalitional logic. Therefore, different beliefs about 'race', according to Cosmides et al. (2003), can be generated by different inferential machinery, and

according to Atran (1998), can be a byproduct of different evolved inference mechanism in different subpopulations within a culture.

Race encoding and coalitional psychology

The other proposal concerns coalitional psychology. Using unobtrusive measures, Kurzban et al. (2001) conducted experiments that showed categorizing individuals by race is not inevitable. They suggested that encoding by race is instead a reversible byproduct of cognitive machinery evolved to detect *coalitional alliances.* The results of their experiments showed that participants encoded coalitional affiliations as a normal part of person representation. Besides, when cues of coalitional affiliation no longer tracked or corresponded to race, the participants evidently reduced the extent to which they categorized individuals by race to the point of ceasing to do so entirely. Stangor et al. (1992) suggest that attention is paid to physical features of a target individual only to the extent that they are considered to be informative. In their study on attentional engagement, Correll, Guillermo, and Vogt (2014) observed that Black faces neither captured attention faster nor held attention longer than White faces. The researchers pointed out that such flexibility emerged even for participants with strong stereotypic associations. In fact, according to Kurzban et al., only less than four minutes of exposure to an alternate social world panned out to be effective enough to eliminate the tendency to categorize by race despite a lifetime experience of race as a predictor of social alliance. Thus, their results provide support for this optimistic possibility that racism may be a volatile and eradicable construct that solely persists as long as it is sustained through being linked to parallel systems of social alliance (Kurzban et al., 2001).

According to Kurzban et al. (2001), from the evolutionary perspective, throughout our species' history, intergroup conflicts attended the categorization of the social world into *us* versus *them*. The researchers argue that when such a divide occurs along racial lines, this categorization and its consequences appear to be stably persisting. Categorizing individuals into two social groups predisposes us to discriminate in favor of our ingroups and against the outgroups in both allocation of resources and evaluation of conduct (Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980). These findings are consistent with Heider's balance theory. According to Locksley et al. (1980), perception of group inclusion induces liking for ingroups while perception of group exclusion induces disliking for outgroups. Yet, as the researchers explain, ingroup favoritism will be enhanced by information about group similarity, whereas information about similarity or dissimilarity of outgroups have no impact on ingroup favoritism. In other words, highlighting intragroup similarity will result in increased ingroup favoritism. An implication of this for Muslimophobia is that in Western or European countries where immigrants are commonly recognized as 'immigrants' for life−"not somebody who once entered, but is perpetually entering" (Gullestad, 2002, p. 51)−the emphasis on local commonalities and national values may lead to induction of the presence of social categories of 'natives' and 'immigrants', promotion of perceived intragroup similarities, and enhancement of ingroup favoritism. Under this condition, minority group members such as Muslims might happen to be disfavored by non-Muslim people and feel discriminated. It will then be easy for them to impute Muslimophobia to those disfavoring them and take it as a form of racism although it is not necessarily exclusively linked to racism, Islamophobia, or Muslimophobia. Perceived exclusion may then cause that the disfavored Muslim individuals develop a dislike toward outgroups. Studies have shown that perceived categorical similarity may be the primary factor in eliciting

social discrimination (e.g., see Brewer, 1979). Further, social categorization can be made on the basis of random and arbitrary criteria while it is sufficient to elicit differential responses to categorized groups (Locksley et al., 1980).

Once there is no categorizing along racial lines, there will be no base for racially discriminatory behaviors. This is an important implication of the studies by Kurzban et al. (2001). They showed how easy it is to reduce and even to eliminate racial categorization in spite of the fact that such a social categorization−and possible ensuing discriminatory behaviors−are very easy to elicit. Kurzban et al. (2001) write:

> "Given that categorizing people into groups along nearly any dimension elicits discrimination, it would be discouraging to learn that the human mind was designed such that people cannot help categorizing others by their race. This would imply that racism is intractable" (p. 15387).

Kurzban et al. (2001) proposed that there should be no part of the human cognitive machinery specifically evolved to encode race. Rather, the encoding of race is instead a byproduct of cognitive adaptations to serve an alternative function that was a regular part of our ancestors' lives: *detecting coalitions and alliances.* Hunter-gatherers lived in bands within which there were coalitions and alliances and neighboring bands frequently came into conflict with one another (Manson et al., 1991). They also cooperated with groups of non-kin on difficult joint projects such as hunting, weaving (large fishnets for example), and defending territory (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). According to Kurzban et al., our foraging ancestors would have benefited by being equipped with neurocognitive machinery which tracks alliances that can situationally be shifting. If our computational machinery is well designed to detect coalitions and alliances, then

it should be sensitive to two factors: (1) patterns of coordinated action, cooperation, and competition, and (2) cues that predict one's political allegiances–either purposefully or incidentally (Pietraszewski et al., 2014; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). If so, the mind should contain a set of adaptations for detecting alliances: an *alliance detection system,* which monitors for, encodes, and stores alliance information (Pietraszewski, Curry, Petersen, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2015).

Both factors mentioned above have been supported by further studies. Early studies using adversarial alliances showed that one's mind spontaneously detects cooperating individuals against a common enemy based on patterns of cooperation and competition−as Aristotle put it: "a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies" (as cited in Pietraszewski et al., 2014, p. 1). It is in line with 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' phenomenon. Yet Pietraszewski et al. (2014) demonstrated that peaceful cooperation can also activate one's alliance detection system and make race fade in relevance. In another study, Pietraszewski et al. (2015) examined whether shared political opinions produce the same effects. Their findings confirmed that party politics engages the mind's alliance detection system and political contexts can diminish the extent to which individuals are represented in terms of their race (Pietraszewski et al., 2015).

According to Kurzban et al. (2001), actions that manifest coalitional affiliations may be transitory and often unavailable to inspect. Therefore, in order to spot such rare revelatory behaviors as they occur, our alliance-tracking machinery should have been evolved so as to enable us to note them. Furthermore, it ought to be capable of some kind of cue mapping so as to isolate further cues that are more continuously present and perceptually easier to assay when they happen to correlate with coalition (Kurzban et al., 2001).

Such a system allows one's mind to construct patterns–the very schemas as discussed before–corresponding to the behavior of some people to predict what 'others' are likely to do. Thus, as explained in Kurzban et al. (2001), since such a circuitry detects correspondences between one's certain allegiance and their appearance, stable dimensions of shared appearance, which may be otherwise meaningless, emerge in the cognitive system as markers of social categories. With the consequent bias underlying one's cognition, coalitional computation increases their subsequent perceptual salience, and hence encodes them at higher rates. As a result, any readily observable feature–however arbitrary–can gain social significance and cognitive efficacy when it 'validly' signals patterns of alliance. Ethnographically well-known examples include dress, dialect, manner, gait, family resemblance, and ethnic and coalitional badges (Kurzban et al., 2001).

According to Kurzban et al. (2001), ancestrally, one's sex was fixed throughout one's life but one's coalitional affiliation was not. They explain that since new patterns of alliance typically emerge as new issues arise, coalitions are subject to change over time and vary in internal cohesion, duration, and surface cues. Accordingly, cue validities would need to be computed and revised dynamically to track such changes. In order for the mind to go about such a process, no single coalitional cue (including cues to race) should be uniformly encoded across all contexts (Kurzban et al., 2001). Even allowing for one's personal and genetics-based characteristics and dispositions that are inherited from parents, environmental factors such as those derived from social, cultural, educational, and political milieus, still highly influence one's opinions and decisions as to which group to be a member of. Yet when it comes to conflicting ideas, family and society may be pitting against one another in contributing to building one's beliefs. It may especially be the case in the lives of first generation immigrants (including that of

Muslims) with a somewhat traditional family background in 'modern' Western or European countries.

According to Sidanius & Pratto (1999), arbitrary cues (such as skin color) should acquire significance only insofar as they acquire predictive validity for coalitional affiliation. Nevertheless, in societies that are not highly racially integrated, shared appearance such as skin color as a highly visible cue, may be correlated with schemas of association, cooperation, and competition (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Thus, coalitional detectors may perceive/misperceive race-based social alliances allowing one's mind to map race onto the cognitive variable *coalition* (Kurzban et al., 2001). Therefore, as long as race is not a valid probabilistic cue to the different underlying variable *coalitional affiliation*, which the mind should have been evolved to automatically seek out (Kurzban et al., 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), race encoding should not be automatic and mandatory.

Results of the experiments by Kurzban et al. (2001) indicated that the participants did encode a new dimension–coalition membership. They did so even on the basis of verbal cues of implied affiliation alone and in the presence of race as a competing and visible dimension. Yet they encoded the race of the targets as well when verbal allegiance cues were the only basis for inferring the targets' coalition membership. However, when coalition membership was marked by cues of shared appearance, the degree to which participants encoded the perceived coalition membership increased substantially (Kurzban et al., 2001). More importantly, the researchers observed that the arbitrary coalition membership of targets was encoded far more strongly than race and even more than it was at its strongest. Thus, endowing coalition with the attribute of visibility by an arbitrary cue amplifying the alternative and contextually relevant coalitional categorization was an effective manipulation. As a result, no statistically significant tendency

was found for the participants to encode the race of targets where coalitional membership was reinforced through shared appearance, according to the researchers. In this condition, "it would appear that the extent to which subjects encoded targets by their race was not merely diminished, it was erased" (Kurzban et al., 2001, p. 15391). Thus, coalition totally overrode race during both encoding and retrieval when it was far easier to perceive while the irrelevance of race to coalition was far easier to perceive also. It suggests that coalition is a "volatile, dynamically updated cognitive variable, easily overwritten by new circumstances", so is race (Kurzban et al., 2001, p. 15391).

However, the encoding of targets' sex remained strongest in all conditions. It did not result in any reduced encoding of coalition. This observation rules out the attentional constraint as a credible explanation that a tradeoff view would predict (Kurzban et al., 2001).

According to Pietraszewski et al. (2014), such an evolved suite of cognitive specializations containing an alliance detection system specialized for tracking alliances also functions in retrieval of relevant schemas to help our understanding of situations. The researchers showed that alliances do not need to carry perceptually salient cues such as an identifying color to activate one's cognitive machinery in order to down-regulate categorization by race and instead, up-regulate categorization by coalition. Behavioral cues about cooperative activities as such, can up-regulate categorization by coalition and down-regulate categorization by race to the point of elimination of race-encoding when race provides no signal for the ongoing alliance structure (Pietraszewski et al., 2014). In fact, the researchers point out that racial categories do not exist owing to the saliency of skin color, but rather, they are constructed and regulated by the alliance detection system in the environments where race happened to be a predictor of coalitions and social alliances. Their findings clearly rule out the counterhypothesis suggested by theories

invoking similarity-based or perceptual categorization. Otherwise, crossing race with a striking color difference that had nothing to do with coalitional alliances, would affect racial categorization (Pietraszewski et al., 2014). According to Pietraszewski et al., the presence of a cross-cutting visually salient category per se cannot explain the effect of coalitional variables on racial categorization. The researchers also showed that the effects of coalitional variables on race cannot be explained by any factor that might produce competitive category retrieval either such as limits on attention or working memory (Pietraszewski et al., 2014).

Consistent with Kurzban et al.'s (2001) findings, in the experiments by Pietraszewski et al. (2014), and Pietraszewski et al. (2015), sex remained a strong dimension such that no reduction in categorization by sex was reported. Pietraszewski et al. (2014) suggest that a system, which is well-engineered for tracking cooperative alliances, should have retrieval functions that discriminate between race and sex (i.e., alliance categories and other categories). The researchers note that gender categories are so fundamental to mammalian life that they should be constructed by mechanisms specialized for the function. They believe gender categories are probably retrieved by a large number of motivational systems (Pietraszewski et al., 2014). Notably, according to Pietraszewski et al. (2015), no reduction in age-based categorization was reported either.

Muslimophobia seems to follow the coalition-detection logic. Muslims' *alliance* can readily be detected by cues that gain social significance such as name, facial features, dress, and manner. Activation of the alliance detection system will, then, lead to the retrieval of relevant schemas if there are any stored in one's mind. Sentiments associated with schema-driven evaluative attitudes will then be invoked. Thus, Muslims as a *categorized group* may initially elicit positive or negative judgments in the perceiver that might be accompanied by certain

reactions. Yet today, with numerous sources of information contributing to creating and shaping one's mental images including those of certain groups of people, anything that validly signals a given alliance, will activate one's alliance detection system as well. Therefore, it is possible that somebody develops positive/negative opinions about a group of people such as Muslims whom s/he might not have yet seen even in real-life. In the case of Muslimophobia, the activation of the so-called Muslimophobe's alliance detection system, makes their associated negative attitudes come to surface.

In a study, Brown et al. (2013) investigated prejudice toward men perceived to be Muslims by pitting cues of foreignness against phenotype. One single portrait of a man was used in different conditions with respect to name, skin color, and dress. The researchers found interactions between name and dress, not skin color. Although skin color has commonly been used as an indication of the so-called racial difference, the perceived alliance of the man overshadowed his 'race' and affected participants' overall impression of him. The results indicated that there was generally no main effect of complexion on participants' perceptions, which is consistent with Kurzban et al.'s (2001) account of the primitivity of coalitional alliances relative to race. Further, it suggests that perceptions of Muslims *focus* on certain cues of foreignness (i.e., name and dress), rather than phenotype (i.e., complexion). According to the researchers, the man with Western name and in 'Western' dress was perceived most positively. As no surprise, when the same man, however, appeared with Muslim name and in 'Arab' dress, was perceived far less positively. Yet the man's perception remained less positive when he appeared with Muslim name but in 'Western' dress. Brown et al. note that there seems to have been a ceiling effect regarding positive evaluations of the man with Muslim name as it was never rated as positively as the man with Western name and in 'Western' dress. Nevertheless, no

ceiling effect was observed regarding negative evaluations of him with Muslim name. They also note that ratings of the man with Muslim name were never extremely positive but moderate. Surprisingly, although the man with Western name and in 'Western' dress was perceived most positively than the other three conditions, when he appeared with Western name but in 'Arab' dress, was persistently perceived least positively (Brown et al., 2013).

The findings of Brown et al. (2013) are particularly interesting in terms of the interaction between name and dress in the condition where the 'Western' man appeared in 'Arab' dress. Given that all of their participants were Westerners, the researchers suggest that the participants may have perceived the Western man in 'Arab' dress to violate an ingroup norm or value. According to Haidt and Kesebir (2010), a willingness to punish norm-violators is a crucial component of group maintenance. Brown et al. explain that the participants may have been particularly suspicious of the character in the portrait and considered him as a traitor, hence rated him lowest in trustworthiness.

Moral Foundations

Van Leeuwen, Park, and Penton-Voak (2012) investigated whether morality is another primitive dimension along which we categorize newly encountered individuals. They argue that the capacity to judge others along moral values would help find out whether the person is generally moral or immoral and thus if s/he can be trusted. On this account, cognitive mechanisms designed to encode that inference, which appears to be very basic, would facilitate adaptive choices of social interaction partners (van Leeuwen et al., 2012). According to the researchers, avoiding potentially costly interactions is particularly important and for that, mechanisms for avoiding costly interactions may include the tendency to categorize others along

morality. Van Leeuwen et al. found support for this hypothesis and stated that people may spontaneously categorize others based on morality and it is more than categorization on a general valence dimension. They noted that the observed pattern in the data suggests that when the targets are not individuated, they are categorized along morality. Their study revealed the importance of morality as a basis for categorization and for the kinds of impressions that perceivers form as part of person perception (van Leeuwen et al., 2012).

Social psychologists have long studied topics related to morality such as fairness, norms, prejudice, and aggression. In fact, having figured out how to write, human beings began writing about morality, law, and religion, which were often the same thing (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Haidt and Kesebir (2010) explain that deontology and consequentialism were two main approaches to morality in the age of enlightenment. Deontologists such as Kant focused on duties, namely on the rightness or wrongness of actions independently of their consequences, while consequentialists such as Bentham and Mill focused on consequences, namely that actions must be judged by their consequences alone. Yet Haidt and Kesebir note that despite the many differences between those two approaches, they have much in common, including an emphasis on parsimony in the sense that ethics can be derived from a single rule, an insistence that moral decisions must be reasoned, rather than felt or intuited, a focus on the abstract and universal, rather than the concrete and particular, and shrinking the scope of ethical inquiry from the virtue ethicist's question of "whom should I *become?"* down to the narrower question of "what is the right thing to *do*?" (Haid & Kesebir, 2014, p. 798).

According to Haidt and Kesebir (2010), seculars such as Turiel argued that the moral domain concerns justice, rights, and welfare, and Harris argued that happiness and suffering are vital elements for morality. Turiel specifically excludes rules and practices that do not directly

prevent harmful or unfair consequences to people and Harris illuminates the immorality of the Bible and the Koran as books that are not primarily about happiness and suffering yet they advocate harming other people in many places (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).

Haidt and Kesebir (2010) suggest that a functionalist approach to moral psychology is what it takes to move it from moral parochialism (i.e., the belief in one universal moral domain) to moral pluralism (i.e., the belief in multiple incompatible but defensible moral domains). In the 1990s, moral studies began to shift from moral reasoning to moral emotion and intuition following the assimilation of emotion and evolution into dual processes models of behavior in which the automatic processes were the ancient, fast emotions and intuitions, and the controlled process was the evolutionarily newer and motivationally weaker language-based reasoning studied by Kohlberg and relied upon by moral philosophers, though the idea basically goes back Freud, 1900/1976, and Wundt, 1907 (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).

There is intuitive primacy in moral cognition (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). As outlined and elaborated in Haidt and Kesebir (2010), people make rapid evaluative judgments of others, moral judgments involve brain areas related to emotion, morally charged economic behaviors involve brain areas related to emotion, psychopaths have emotional deficits, moral-perceptual abilities emerge in infancy, manipulating emotions changes judgments, people sometimes cannot explain their moral judgments, reasoning is often guided by desires, research in political psychology points to intuitions, not reasoning, and research on prosocial behavior points to intuitions, not reasoning. They note that this is not meant to say that moral reasoning does not matter but that intuition matters more. Haidt (2001) draws an analogy between the reasoning system and the 'rational' tale getting wagged by the 'emotional' dog. Haidt and Joseph (2004) point out that intuitions arise because the mind is composed of two distinct processing systems. The human

mind, like the animal mind, goes about most of its work through automatic pattern matching and distributed processing. As the authors elucidate, it may be exemplified by how our visual system operates in part on built-in processing shortcuts, or heuristics which are integrated with learned knowledge about the things in one's visual world as the mind appraises such features as gender, age, status, and threat. Yet unlike the animal mind, human mind has a developed second system in which processing occurs slowly, deliberately, and within conscious awareness (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). As the authors elucidate, when one thinks in words or reasons through a problem, they are using reasoning. Nonetheless, people have quick gut feelings that come to the surface of consciousness as soon as a situation is presented to them and their responses to the dilemmas mostly emerge from the intuitive system. In fact, most of cognition can be referred to as intuitive or automatic system (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Most of the action in moral psychology is in automatic process, and reasoning is said to be a frequent contributor to moral judgment in discussions *between people* and within individuals *when intuitions conflict* (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).

Haidt and Joseph (2004) reviewed works that offered lists or taxonomies of moral values or social practices across cultures and considered the *building blocks* of morality that are found in other primates. The theory was first developed from this work in which they investigated four moral modules: *Suffering, Hierarchy, Reciprocity,* and *Purity*. The theory was later created by a group of social and cultural psychologists to understand why morality varies so much across cultures yet still shows so many similarities and recurrent themes. It proposes that several innate and universally available psychological systems are the foundations of *intuitive ethics* and each culture constructs virtues, narratives, and institutions on top of these foundations ("Moralfoundations"). The Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) proposes the following five

hypothesized candidates for which they think the evidence is best: *Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect,* and *Purity/sanctity* (Haidt & Graham, 2006; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Graham, et al., 2012). For each of the hypothesized foundations there are plausible evolutionary stories, and for four of them (not purity) there was some evidence of continuity with the social psychology of other primates (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). The proposed foundations refer to groups of virtues or issues upon which cultures create an enormous variety of moral systems (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). As stated in their website ("MoralFoundations"), the MFT is an extension of Shweder's theory of the "three ethics", and is influenced by Fiske's relational models theory. They expanded the theory in 2007 and modified the names of the foundations (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011), and later reformulated the theory in 2011 based on new data and presented an updated version of the moral foundations ("MoralFoundations"). The five moral foundations set out in their latest update are as follow:

1. Care/harm: This foundation is related to our evolution as mammals with attachment systems and the ability to concern for the pain of others. It underlies virtues of kindness, gentleness, and nurturance.

2. Fairness/cheating: This foundation is related to the evolutionary process of reciprocal altruism and generates ideas of justice, rights, and autonomy.

3. Loyalty/betrayal: This foundation is related to our history as tribal creatures able to form coalitions. It underlies virtues of patriotism and self-sacrifice for the group, and gets activated anytime a person feels that it is "one for all, and all for one".

4. Authority/subversion: This foundation is related to and shaped by our primate history of hierarchical social interactions. It underlies virtues of leadership and followership, including deference to legitimate authority and respect for traditions.

5. Sanctity/degradation: This foundation is related to and shaped by the psychology of disgust and contamination. It underlies religious notions of striving to live in an elevated, less carnal, more noble way, and the widespread idea that the body is a temple which can be desecrated by immoral activities and contaminants. The latter is not unique to religious traditions.

Yet, they suggest there are several other very good candidates, especially:

6. Liberty/oppression: This foundation is related to the feelings of reactance and resentment felt toward those who dominate and restrict liberty. It underlies the hatred of bullies and dominators and motivates people to come together in solidarity to take down the oppressor.

The sixth foundation (Liberty/oppression) was not included in the original theory. However, they did not claim that they had proposed a comprehensive taxonomy that would have captured every human virtue. They still think there are several other good candidates for "foundationhood".

It has been argued that the evolutionary process has created innate knowledge of various kinds. Infants appear to have hard-wired knowledge of faces and sweet tastes, because their brain is already equipped well enough to recognize them (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). They come prepared to learn a set of things easily and others hard. For example, humans are born with hard-wired fears, but they acquire certain fears easily. We are 'prepared' to fear of snakes, mice, spiders, and open spaces but not flowers or even knives and guns, because evolutionary has not prepared our minds to learn such associations. Similarly, the MFT posits that the foundations make it easy for

children to learn some virtues easily and others hard (Haidt & Graham, 2006). It seems that in all human cultures, people often react with flashes of feeling linked to moral intuitions as they perceive certain events in the social world. For instance, when they see others suffering (especially young others), and others who cause that suffering; and when they see others who are disrespectful or who do not behave in a manner befitting their status in the group (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). The authors note that the hallmark of human morality is yet third-party concern: person A can get angry at person B for what s/he did to person C. This may be particularly the case in Muslimophobia. For example, people can get disgusted with or angry at what a few groups of extremists who claim to be 'Muslims' do to other people. Similarly, many Westerners hold that Muslim women are often oppressed by Muslim men and this may invoke their disapproval of or anger at Muslim men, especially if the oppressed woman is identified as a single victim and the oppressor man is made known in the story. Kogut and Ritov (2005) showed that there is a consistent interaction between the singularity or plurality of the target and the availability of identifying information. The findings of their research on people's willingness to help victims indicate that a single identified victim elicits higher contributions than a non-identified individual.

Haidt and Joseph (2004) utilize the concept of *modularity* to further expound their argument. They explain that an evolved cognitive module is a processing system designed to handle problems or opportunities in the ancestral environment of species. Modules are ways of enabling fast and automatic responses to specific environmental triggers, akin to the very way that heuristics as shortcuts or rules of thumb behave to get us a quick approximate solution (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). The authors point out the distinction between the *proper* and *actual* domains of a module. The proper domain refers to the set of specific scenarios or stimuli as the

original triggers that the module was evolved to handle, whereas the actual domain refers to the set of whatever now happens to trigger the module. They present four moral modules: suffering; hierarchy; reciprocity; and purity, and the emotions and virtues associated with them.

In respect of suffering, the proper domain includes suffering, and vulnerability of one's children, while the actual domain also includes baby seals, and cartoon characters. The characteristic emotion involved in suffering is compassion, and the relevant virtues are kindness, and compassion. In respect of hierarchy, the proper domain includes physical size, strength, domination, and protection, while the actual domain also includes gods, and bosses. The characteristic emotions involved in hierarchy are resentment versus respect/awe, and the relevant virtues are obedience, deference, and loyalty. In respect of reciprocity, the proper domain includes cheating versus cooperation in joint ventures, and food sharing, while the actual domain also includes marital fidelity, and broken vending machines. The characteristic emotions involved in reciprocity are anger/guilt versus gratitude, and the relevant virtues are fairness, justice, and trustworthiness. In respect of purity, the proper domain includes people with diseases or parasites, and waste products, while the actual domain also includes taboo ideas such as racism, and communism. The characteristic emotion involved in purity is disgust, and the relevant virtues are cleanliness, purity, and chastity (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 59).

According to Haidt and Joseph (2004), cultures vary in four ways with respect to the modules. One way concerns the content of actual domain for the modules. It is possible to teach children to be cruel to certain groups of people, but the authors note that such training is most likely accomplished by exploiting other moral modules. They exemplify racism and explain that it can be taught by invoking the purity module and triggering flashes of disgust at the 'dirtiness' of a certain group, or by invoking the reciprocity module and triggering flashes of anger at the

cheating ways of a certain group. In their opinion, Hitler used both strategies against Jews. Thus, different cultures can create variable actual domains that are broader than the universal proper domains for each module (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). A second way concerns cultures' relative use of the modules. According to the authors, American Muslims and American conservatives value mostly virtues of kindness, respect for authority, fairness, and spiritual purity, whereas American liberals value mostly virtues related to suffering, and reciprocity including equality, rights, and justice. For liberals, as stated in Haidt and Joseph (2004), the conservative virtues of hierarchy and order may seem too closely related to oppression, and purity to have too often been used to exclude or morally taint whole groups such as people of color, the LGBT community, and I suggest Muslims as well. Anti-Muslim attitudes are explicitly mirrored in the words of a number of American conservative politicians in particular nowadays. The third way concerns cultures' assignment of different meanings and underpinnings to particular virtues (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). According to the authors, loyalty can be grounded in reciprocity intuitions (as is loyalty to peers and friends) on the one hand, and be in the context of hierarchy (as is loyalty to chiefs and other superiors) on the other hand. Similarly, the virtue of honor can be incarnated as integrity (in reciprocity), as chivalry or masculine honor (in hierarchy), or as chastity or feminine honor (in purity). Thus, different moral underpinnings provide different eliciting conditions and different appropriate behaviors and responses for each virtue (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Finally, the fourth way is the complex interactions that virtues can generate which express a great deal of a culture's conception of human nature and moral character (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). In any culture, terms can be found that are related to more than one virtue although there are not necessarily connections among those virtues. The same concept might not exist in many other cultures and for that, the translation of the term into another language may not produce an exact equivalent

term. An example of this is the concept of *gheerah* in Islamic culture. The term denotes the virtues highly prized by many Muslim people including protective jealousy of womenfolk (e.g., their wife, sisters, daughters, mother, and female relatives), sense of ownership of the wife, bravery in war, national loyalty, determination to success, although there is no necessary connection between these virtues. One could imagine someone brave in war without having the sense of ownership of his wife. Yet gheerah, to my best of knowledge, has no equivalent in English that conveys all the virtues mentioned. Thus the virtue complexes that each culture generates, as stated in Haidt and Joseph (2004), can be unique.

The MFT presents a broadened conception of morality (Graham et al., 2011). According to Haidt and Graham (2006), as a society becomes more modern and more individualistic, the first two foundations (Care/harm and Fairness/cheating) become more important than the last three (Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation). Therefore, Care/harm and Fairness/cheating may be referred to as "modern" foundations and Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation may be referred to as "traditional" foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2006). The researchers note that the concept of traditional foundations in particular, became suspect after the horrors of fascism. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) refer to the first two foundations as "individualizing foundations" and the last three as "binding foundations".

Research by Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) provided evidence for relationships between a variety of attitudes and beliefs, and moral foundations endorsements. According to the researchers, liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. In their study 1, they showed that liberals and conservatives hold different opinions about what considerations are relevant to moral judgment. They observed differences primarily as a function of political

identity such that they did not substantially or consistently vary by gender, age, household income, or educational level. These effects suggest that the political left and right have generally different descriptions of moral concerns (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Their study 2, demonstrated that liberals are more concerned about issues of Care/harm and Fairness/cheating, whereas conservatives are more concerned about issues of Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation. Besides, the effects were observed across both explicit and implicit political identities, in regard to both moral relevance and moral judgments. Furthermore, asking someone their political identity was observed to be largely sufficient for predicting what they would consider relevant to their moral judgments (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The researchers in their study 3, showed that liberals refused to make trade-offs on most of the items related to the individualizing foundations (Care/harm and Fairness/cheating) but reported more willingness to perform actions that would violate the binding foundations (Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation). By contrast, conservatives showed a more even distribution of moral concerns and reported less willingness to perform actions that would violate the binding foundations (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). The researchers suggest that a general across-the-board political difference on the permissibility of making moral trade-offs illuminates the results yielded in the study 3.

Pietraszewski et al. (2015) showed that shared political opinions such as political party support, engages the mind's alliance detection system. Moreover, taking into consideration that liberal and conservative politicians vary in their endorsements of the moral foundations, hence in their attitudes on societal values as well as how groups of people including immigrants such as Muslims should live and be treated in the society, it is evident that voting behavior of people is mutually important to analyze and predict. Franks and Scherr (2015) showed that endorsements

of the moral foundations can predict voting behavior. According to the researchers, the moral foundations predict prospective candidate choice above and beyond politically relevant demographic variables. They note that minorities and less religious individuals favored Barack Obama (the liberal nominee of the Democratic Party) over Mitt Romney (the conservative nominee of the Republican Party) in actual trends of the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Among the important demographic variables, Franks and Scherr in their study 2, found that religiosity was the strongest predictor. According to the researchers, increased religiosity predicted support for Mitt Romney, whereas ethnic minority status, lower income, and lower religiosity predicted support for Barack Obama. In their study 3, they found that increased concern with Sanctity/degradation predicted increased support for Mitt Romney, whereas Fairness/cheating concerns significantly, and Care/harm concerns marginally, predicted support for Barack Obama, while religiosity persistently remained the most powerful demographic predictor (Franks & Scherr, 2015). Thus, stronger endorsement of Sanctity/degradation will lead voters to support Republican candidates who represent conservatism, whereas stronger endorsement of Fairness/cheating and Care/harm will lead voters to support Democratic candidates who represent liberalism. Collapsing the five moral foundations into individualizing and binding compositions was also found to consistently produce similar effects: individualizing foundations (the first two) predicted support for liberal Barack Obama, whereas binding foundations (the last three) predicted support for conservative Mitt Romney. In addition, increased religiosity which was highly correlated with the disgust-related Sanctity/degradation moral foundation, predicted support for conservative candidates (Franks & Scherr, 2015).

According to Graham et al. (2011), the individual is the locus of moral values in liberalism, whereas it is not the primary locus of moral values in conservatism. Accordingly, in a

liberal moral world, moral regulation revolves around protection of individuals from harm or unfairness, whereas in a conservative moral world, moral regulation revolves around order of communities in which proper relationships between parent and child, man and woman, and human and God are of great importance. Haidt and Graham (2006) suggest that liberals may have a special difficulty in understanding the morality of conservatives in the sense that what liberals see as a non-moral motivation for system justification may be a moral motivation to protect society, groups, and the structures and constraints that can be beneficial for individuals.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The present study is exploratory. It was conducted in three large cities in Norway: Oslo, Trondheim, and Stavanger. I particularly aimed to investigate whether the MFT with the moral foundations proposed therein, separately or in interactions with other factors, can predict cognitive attitudes toward Muslims. To my knowledge, this is the first direct study which uses the MFT in that context. Graham et al. (2011) examined attitudes toward various social groups and found that the MFT and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) help discover moral prejudices. They found that the MFQ indicates varying patterns of moral concerns that might lead some people to dislike some groups. This suggests that attitudes toward social groups may often be expressions of moral judgments (p. 381). Graham et al. (2012) suggest that knowing a person's MFQ scores, provides important information about their social group attitudes, because there is a tight relationship between social and moral judgment (p. 19). Franks and Scherr (2015) also suggested that further research should examine which moral foundations best predict attitudes across important political issues such as immigration (p. 229)−which in many cases primarily reflects concerns about Muslim-immigrants in particular.

The dependent variable was the cognitive attitude toward Muslims. Lee et al. (2009) suggest that the affective-behavioral facet of 'Islamophobia' is more sensitive to demographic variables than the cognitive facet. That is, the cognitive facet is less associated with demographic variables. Further, the cognitive dimension of attitudes reflects intentional beliefs about and comprehension of groups (Nordtug, 2008). Thus, I was inspired to examine whether the cognitive facet of 'Islamophobia' is associated with any of the moral foundations. Therefore, using another scale which is particularly developed to measure the cognitive aspect of the phenomenon, I focused on this dimension of attitude. Owing to the pivotal interest of the present study to find out whether a person's moral foundations are related to their explicit cognitive attitude toward Muslims and not their feelings or actual behaviors, explicit attitudes were measured. Moreover, similar works have primarily used explicit cognitive attitudes (e.g., Lee et al., 2009).

Twenty-five variables were examined in this research as predictors:

- Nine individual variables: demographic variables (3): sex, age, and religion (being Muslim or non-Muslim); (the) five moral foundations (5): Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal (formerly known as Ingroup/loyalty), Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation (formerly known as Purity); and story (1).

- Eleven two-way interactions: religion by each moral foundation (5), religion by story (1), and each moral foundation by story (5).

- Five three-way interactions: religion by each moral foundation by story (5).

Participants in this research were not recruited systematically (e.g., via national registry). Sex and age were included to test if unsystematic recruitment of participants would yet yield similar results to those of past works in which participants were recruited systematically. Further, research on sex-related difference in attitudes toward social groups have yielded somewhat conflicting results.

Understanding how people's attitudes toward perceived ingroups are different from others' attitudes toward perceived outgroups, can help open up effective lines of discussions to address intergroup challenges. Religion was included to find out whether Muslim individuals' attitudes toward Muslims were significantly different from that of non-Muslim individuals. In other words, whether shared religion (i.e., perceived group membership) alone, necessitates that Muslim individuals hold better opinions of Muslims as their perceived ingroups compared to non-Muslims' opinions of Muslims as their perceived outgroups. In addition, if religion interacts with the moral foundations, non-Muslims' and/or (depending on the direction of the interaction) Muslim individuals' evaluations and attitudes toward 'groups' of Muslims would be better understood and predicted. If religion interacts with the story, it would provide insights into effective framing that fits one's religious background if contextually required. Therefore, religion was also tested for these interactions.

Moreover, the five moral foundations were tested to find out which foundation would best predict anti-Muslim attitudes. The application of the MFT in understanding and predicting anti-Muslim attitudes would be highly beneficial if the moral foundations proposed therein have significant relationships with any facet of the attitudes. This study examines if the moral foundations are related to the cognitive dimension of anti-Muslim attitudes. Furthermore, if the moral foundations interact with the story, it would provide insights for prevention of

development of negative attitudes toward social groups such as Muslims as well as insights for early intervention in the explicit attitudes against social groups.

Finally, two short stories were made up and used. The stories were introduced by a putative Muslim person in one of which s/he emphasizes her/his Muslim identity, whereas in the other s/he emphasizes her/his national identity. The reason why one individual was used as the exemplar of the group, was that stories about individuals are more effective than stories about groups (see Kogut & Ritov, 2005). Since the exemplar→group generalization can be expected according to the Intergroup Contact Theory (Allport, 1954), the attitudes were measured toward the group as a whole. In addition to implications of the interactions between the story and the moral foundations, and the story and religion that were discussed above, the stories were used to examine if salience of Muslims' religious background would make a difference in people's attitudes toward Muslims. The stories also served to prepare the participants for the anti-Muslim attitudes scale and to imply who primarily was referred to as Muslim(s) in the statements of the scale.

Method

Two surveys were set up on the server of the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Each was composed of four parts. First the demographic variables appeared on the screen, then, the MFQ, then either of the stories, and finally, the Cognitive Attitude Toward Muslims Scale (CATMS). The experiments were randomized. Participants were recruited at random.

A stepwise method of backward elimination was used to test if the demographic variables, the moral foundations, and the stories, significantly predicted participants' attitudes

toward Muslims, if there were three-way interactions among religion, the moral foundations, and the story, and, if there were two-way interactions between religion and the moral foundations, religion and the story, and the moral foundations and the story. This method was chosen because this study was an exploratory work and there were many variables. That would construct a complex model with several predictors. Furthermore, I did not find quite similar work in my literature review. Thus, the stepwise regressions were chosen and due to the risk of the suppressor effects, the stepwise method of backward elimination was preferred over the forward method, and was ultimately used.

Confidentiality

Participation was strictly anonymous. Participants were not identified according to the answers they provided. All information collected in this study was held in absolute confidence. Since the surveys were conducted on only one computer, only one IP address was stored in the server. It was explained to the participants that their answers would not be given out for any purpose, or to anyone who was not directly working with the researcher, and he would not share any information which could identify them to anyone or in publication.

Participation

Participation in the experiment was entirely voluntary. Participants were told that If they felt uncomfortable during the experiment, they could withdraw their participation at any time. They confirmed that the purpose of the study was thoroughly explained to them in English/Norwegian/mother tongue to their satisfaction. They confirmed that they understood that any information on their sex, age, faith, moral beliefs, and attitudes for this research would be

kept confidential. They also confirmed that they understood that their participation was voluntary and they were free to stop at any time.

Participants

In total, 121 people in Oslo, Trondheim, and Stavanger participated in this research. They were mostly originally from different countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 12 people either left the survey unfinished or provided no useful information, so their data was deleted. In the end, 109 people fully completed their survey (57 females, 52 males, 54 Muslims, 55 non-Muslims, mean age 25.79, SD = 7.25). Target participants were chosen at random. They were randomized to either of the experiments through flipping a coin.

Design

Two multiple-stage surveys were set up on the online survey system of NTNU called *SelectSurvey.* The surveys were composed of four stages in the following order: demographic questions, MFQ, a story, and CATMS. Had the stages been ordered differently, the CATMS in particular, it might have seemed way 'fishy', hence could have caused false alarms, since my data collection was specifically aimed at Muslims. That way, the social desirability effect would be a considerable concern. The surveys only differed in the content of the story and they were randomized for each participant. Two short stories were made up and appeared in a text format on the screen and the participants were asked to read it. The stories varied in the extent to which the Islamic faith of the Muslim storyteller was made emphasized and more salient. In one of the stories, the storyteller emphasizes her/his religious background (as a Muslim-Norwegian) in sentences such as "my religious beliefs make me strong", and in the other story, s/he emphasizes her/his national background (as a Norwegian-Muslim) in sentences such as "This year we

celebrate the 200th anniversary of our constitution, on Grunnlovsdagen". The stories were considered helpful in portraying Muslims in a positive way. Moreover, studies by Seifert, Robertson, and Black (1985) show that when reading narratives, inferences about goals, plans, and actions are likely to be explicitly made and become part of the long-term memory representation of the narratives. Thus, the stories were also considered to be contributing to the desirable representation of Muslims when referred to in the CATMS.

Measures

Two questionnaires were used in the surveys. One concerns the moral foundations and the other concerns anti-Muslim attitudes.

Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ)

Morality is referred to the way we categorize actions as either right or wrong based on which we judge a situation. It also is something that varies widely among people and in different cultures. The MFQ is developed by Graham et al. (2011) based on the theoretical model of five universally available but variably developed sets of moral intuitions: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation. It does not include Liberty/oppression as it is not yet officially considered as another moral foundation by the theorists. Therefore, Liberty/oppression was not included in the current research. The MFQ consists of 32 items in total. 30 items concern the five moral foundations, six items for each. 2 other items are not scored but are included both to force people to use the top or bottom end of the scale, and to catch and cut participants who respond with first or last 3 response options (e.g., "It is better to do good than to do bad."). It measures the degree to which a person endorses each moral foundation. The scale has two parts. The first part intends to measure abstract assessments

of moral relevance (e.g., “Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country.”, for Loyalty/betrayal foundation) and the second part intends to measure levels of agreement with more specific and contextualized moral judgment statements (e.g., “People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong.”, for Loyalty/betrayal foundation). The MFQ is substantially reliable and valid and it is not specific to Western participants. There is much cross-cultural variation in the patterns of moral foundation endorsement, even controlling for politics, age, gender, religious attendance, and education (Graham et al., 2011).

Cognitive Attitude Toward Muslims Scale (CATMS)

Attitudes toward Muslims were measured using a cognitive attitude scale. The original scale was developed in Norwegian language by Nordtug (2008) in order to measure explicit attitudes toward Arabs. The scale used in the current study was a translated version of that scale into English. Yet the “Arab(s)”-related words in the original scale were replaced by Muslim(s) to make it specifically relevant to Muslims. It consists of 18 items in total, 13 negative (e.g., “Police should be especially aware of Muslims due to the danger of terrorism.”) and 5 positive (e.g., “Muslims are generally in favor of equal rights for males and females.”) statements about Muslims. The answer format is a typical five-point Likert-scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

Materials

The surveys were accessed online. One laptop was used to collect data. In some places where no internet access was provided, I used a cell phone to connect the laptop to the Internet

via activating *packet data,* and then, *tethering and portable hotspot* from the network settings menu of the cell phone.

Procedure

I met my target participants in various places: mosque, library, café, restaurant, university, and at home. After introducing myself and explaining what my research was about and how confidential it was, those who were interested to participate in my project, were assigned to either of the surveys at random, and then, they sat at my computer. On the first page, they indicated their sex, age, and religion as being either Muslim or non-Muslim. On pages two and three, they answered the MFQ. On page four, they read the story. On page five, they answered the CATMS. After that and on the last page, they were thanked and the survey ended. The survey took about 15 minutes on average to finish.

Expectations

The current study is exploratory in which 25 predicting variables were examined, hence specific predictions were not made. However, main effects and interactions among the variables were expected to appear in the explorative data analysis. Past research suggest that demographic variables such as sex and age are associated with the level of prejudice, hence their relevance to this study. Religion is central to the subject. The moral foundations are related to the way we grasp about the social world, and to our evaluations and treatment of others, albeit situationally. Finally, the stories exemplify the kind of people whom the research is concerned. Therefore, they were all included in the design.

RESULTS

According to Green (1991. as cited in Field, 2009, p. 222), in order for the sample size to be large enough to ensure normal distribution of data when testing individual predictors, 104 + k cases of data should be collected in which "k" denotes the number of predictors. Thus, with 25 predictors in this study, the sample size should be 129.

Following that, though these are not distinct categories where a few more subjects make an all-or-none difference, 121 participants were ultimately recruited. Nevertheless, with 12 cases of data deleted from the data set later, the actual sample size turned out 109.

The central limit theorem states that samples above about 30 are large enough for the sampling distribution to take the shape of a normal distribution (Field, 2009, p. 42, 782). Therefore, assuming that the sample size was still large enough to be fairly robust to deviations from normality, the data analysis was conducted.

A backward regression analysis was used to test if the demographic variables, the moral foundations, and the story, separately or interactively, significantly predicted cognitive attitude toward Muslims. The process went on for twelve steps, starting with 25 variables in the first step and ending with three variables in the last step.

Main Effects

The regression analysis indicated that there was a significant effect for Sanctity/degradation. Participants who cared more about that moral foundation, showed more negative attitude toward Muslims. Table 1. shows the final model with significant predictors.

Interactions

The regression analysis indicated that there were two significant interactions: religion by Loyalty/betrayal, and religion by Fairness/cheating. The religion by Loyalty/betrayal interaction suggests that Muslim participants' attitude was more sensitive to concern for this foundation. Muslim participants for whom Loyalty/betrayal was more important, reported more negative attitude toward Muslims than did non-Muslim participants. The religion by Fairness/cheating interaction suggests the same pattern though in the opposite direction. Muslim participants' attitude toward Muslims was more sensitive to concern for this foundation. Yet, Muslim participants for whom Fairness/cheating was more important, reported more positive attitude toward Muslims (see Table 1).

Table 1. Predictors in the final model

Predictors	Coef	SE	t	P > |t|	Beta
Sanctity/degradation	-0.161	0.052	-3.12	.002**	-.278
Religion X Fairness/cheating	0.376	0.08	4.68	.001***	1.19
Religion X Loyalty/betrayal	-0.294	0.097	-3.04	.003**	-0.765

Note: N = 109, female = 57, male = 52, Muslim = 54, non-Muslim = 55, mean age = 25.79, SD = 7.25, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Model

The full model, at the first step, consisted of 25 variables. Non-significant factors were eliminated step by step. The backward regression process went on for twelve steps. The final model consists of three predictors which significantly predict cognitive attitude toward Muslims. The regression model is significant. Table 2. shows the final model.

Table 2. Model summary

Source	SS	Df	MS	R Square	Adjusted R Square	F	P > F
Model	11.231	3	3.743	.268	.247	12.79	.001***

Note: N = 109, female = 57, male = 52, Muslim = 54, non-Muslim = 55, mean age = 25.79, SD = 7.25, *** $p < .001$.

According to Field (2009, p. 222), when stepwise methods are used, it is advisable to cross-validate the model. He mentions data splitting, and adjusted R^2 as two main methods of cross-validation.

With respect to data splitting, Field (2009, p. 222) advises to run the stepwise regression on a random selection of about 80% of cases, and then, to force the model on the remaining 20% of the data. In the current study, however, the 20% of the data (i.e., 22 cases) do not meet the minimum requirements for the number of subjects. There would not be enough people in those

20% for the regression to be meaningful. Therefore, the model was not cross-validated using data splitting.

Adjusted R^2 indicates the loss of predictive power of the model or "shrinkage" (Field, 2009, p. 221). Whereas R^2 tells us how much of the variance in Y is accounted for by the regression model derived from the sample, adjusted R^2 tells us how much variance in Y would be accounted for if the regression model had been derived from the population from which the sample was taken (Field, 2009, p. 221). Therefore, comparison of R^2 with adjusted R^2 will help assess the accuracy of the regression model and its generalizability power.

The regression model derived from the sample in this study, accounts for 26.8% of the variance in the cognitive attitudes toward Muslims ($R^2 = .268$). It would account for 24.7% of the variance if it had been derived from the population from which the sample was taken (Adjusted $R^2 = .247$). The discrepancy between R^2 and adjusted R^2, according to the figures above, is then -2.1%. It suggests that the power of the regression model in predicting cognitive attitudes toward Muslims would be 2.1% less if the model had been derived from the population from which the sample was taken. However, I calculated adjusted R^2 using Stein's formula as well because that tells how well the regression model would predict scores of a *different sample* from the same population (Field, 2009, p. 221), and it gave me 21.8%. It suggests a discrepancy of -5% in the predictive power of the model if it had been derived from the population. Thus, according to Stein's formula, 21.8% of the variance in cognitive attitudes toward Muslims would be explained by the regression model if it had been derived from the population.

DISCUSSION

Sanctity/degradation (Purity) was a significant predictor of cognitive attitudes toward Muslims. A greater concern for purity goes with a poorer opinion of Muslims. People with higher concern for Sanctity/degradation had more negative attitudes toward Muslims. Thus, stronger endorsement of Sanctity/degradation foundation predicted poorer opinions of Muslims. This being a main effect, and there being no interaction with religion, it seems that this trend applies even to Muslims. Not only non-Muslim participants, but also Muslim participants for whom this moral foundation was more important, reported more negative attitudes toward Muslims. According to the theory, purity is associated with negative feelings of aversion and disapproval (i.e., disgust), as is prejudice. It should not, therefore, have come as a surprise to be a predictor of negative attitudes toward Muslims in this study. Yet, one more explanation for why Muslims for whom Sanctity/degradation was more important, also reported more negative attitudes, can be that some statements in the CATMS are about interactions of Muslims in the Norwegian society. That would involve interacting with 'non-Muslims' and 'Norwegians' who do not belong to the same coalition as Muslims. Thus, Muslims who concern more about purity may be less likely to appreciate that.

Sanctity/degradation did not interact with religion. Religion (being Muslim or not) did not significantly predict attitudes toward Muslims and was dropped out at the fifth step. Non-Muslims' opinions of Muslims did not differ from that of Muslims overall. Plainly speaking, Muslim participants in this study did not necessarily have better opinions of Muslims as their religious ingroups than did non-Muslim participants. Non-Muslim participants alike did not necessarily have poorer opinions of Muslims as outgroups of sorts than did Muslim participants. This seems to be consistent with what Brewer at al. (1995) found in their experiment 3. They

found that compared with majority group members, minority group members were more interested in differentiation among individuals within their own group. Furthermore, whether memory for information is organized at the individual or category level, is a function of motivations, expectancies, and processing strategies (Brewer et al., 1995). Thus, an important view may require being revisited: is sharing the same religion all it takes to hold better opinions of ingroups? The results of this study with respect to religion suggests a negative answer to that question. People hold differing opinions about groups they have a sense of belonging to. An implication of this is that group membership alone may not lead to people having better opinions of ingroups or poorer opinions of outgroups. Therefore, the assumption that Muslim individuals are, or think, or do alike, is simply wrong and must not be taken for granted. They may or may not support other Muslims. They do condemn what the extremist groups do. Reconsideration of our attitudes toward others in the light of such simple facts, will help a variety of intergroup challenges in our global society. Perceiving groups as less entitative may decrease endorsements of perceived 'discrepancies', stereotypes, and attention to stereotype consistent information (Johnson, 2011).

Religion had interactions with Fairness/cheating, and with Loyalty/betrayal. The religion by Fairness/cheating interaction comes from Muslim participants with a greater concern for this moral foundation having a more positive attitude toward Muslims, while the non-Muslims' attitude is less sensitive to concern for Fairness/cheating. The same pattern of sensitivity was found in concern for Loyalty/betrayal. Viewing the scatter plots suggests that increasing concern for Loyalty/betrayal is associated with a poorer opinion of Muslims, although that factor dropped out of the regression early. What is still in there is an interaction between religion and Loyalty/betrayal that seemed rather less obvious from looking at the scatterplots. The religion by

loyalty interaction seems to come from Muslim participants' attitude being more dependent on concern for this moral foundation than the attitude of non-Muslims. Although Loyalty/betrayal, and Fairness/cheating, had interactions with religion, these two and the other two moral foundations, namely Authority/subversion and Care/harm, did not independently predict the outcome significantly. Loyalty/betrayal foundation was dropped out at the third step of regression. One reason for Loyalty/betrayal not being a significant predictor may be that this foundation should involve a context where at least a third factor determines the situation of ingroup/outgroup for the individual. That is, as long as it is unspecified whether the individual self-describes oneself as belonging to the target group or not, Loyalty/betrayal will not be a determining factor. When it comes to Authority/subversion it should matter which authority is concerned. This variable was dropped out at the seventh step. The effect of Care/harm is uncertain as it should go either way depending on who is assumed to be needing protection. This foundation was dropped out at the fifth step. Fairness/cheating too involves similar conception of the ongoing situation as to who is assumed to have been treated unfairly. It was dropped out at the third step.

Dekker and Van Der Noll's (2007) research on non-Muslim Dutch youth aged 14-16 suggest that evaluated direct contact, perceived threat on symbolic issues, and received information from others are the most important predictors of attitudes toward Islam and Muslims that together with national attitude, gender, religiosity, and beliefs about Islam and Muslims account for 71.5% of the variance. Previous studies in which data were collected systematically have shown that females tend to be more tolerant than males (e.g., Pedersen, 1996; Strabac et al., 2014). However, Strabac et al. (2014) found significant gender differences in attitudes toward Muslims only in Sweden and USA and not in Norway and the UK. Lee et al. (2009) found no

significant relationship between gender and prejudice toward Muslims. In the current study in which unsystematic data collection was used, with sex being dropped out at the fourth step, no significant difference was found between people of different sexes. Thus, this study stands in line with previous research which did not support sex-related difference in attitudes toward Muslims, though individuals who often go to the same places (e.g., universities, libraries, mosques) are more likely to have more similar interests and views than those who often go to different places. A large number of participants in this research were recruited at libraries, mosques, and universities, albeit at random. That might have played a role in the obtained relative similarity of opinions about Muslims across different genders. If the data were collected via national registry in this research, different results might have been possible to get.

Past research in which data were collected systematically have shown that older people are less tolerant than younger people (e.g., Strabac et al., 2014; Chalabi, 2015; Stokes, 2015). Yet, when it comes to age-related difference in attitudes, robust findings should be derived from longitudinal studies so that researcher(s) will be able to pursue possible changes. Further, the effects of age have often been found to be non-linear (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). In this study, age was not a significant predictor of cognitive attitudes toward Muslims and was dropped out at the second step. Since most participants in this study were young, and there were only a few 45 years and older with the oldest ones in their early 50s, the results may generally reflect the attitudes of young people. Therefore, the age range and proportionality of the participants in terms of their age in the current study, might not have been great enough to reflect possible effects of age.

Story was a non-significant variable. Although it survived all the way along the regression until the last but one step, it did not reach the significant level after all. Thus, the

regression says that the stories did not affect cognitive attitudes toward Muslims, no matter whether the storyteller identifies as a Muslim-Norwegian (story A, religion emphasized) or a Norwegian-Muslim (story B, religion not emphasized). The process of stereotyping has a contextual basis which facilitates or inhibits the imputation of stereotypes to individuals (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). That does not sound to have been met through the textual stories used in this study. With that being said, our schemas about people seem to be too rigid to be affected by simple single stories. Taylor et al. (1978) suggest that any factor that makes an individual's group membership salient, tends to engage the stereotype of the group for the individual. If there are visible cues to coalition membership, that enhances the effect. Perceived ingroup loyalty activates coalitional computations and then the target person will be categorized accordingly. That would be the case if the statements in the CATMS specifically referred to the person described in the stories. For example, "I would never vote for him for a political office". That way, participants' opinions about two differing *characters* would be examined, and not about the same group. By contrast, following the contact hypothesis, the stories in relation to the CATMS were designed in the way that the storyteller's perceived group membership was supposed to engage the impression of the individual for the whole group. Either, possibly due to the length or the content of the stories, the intended impression was not made strongly enough to engage the frame of the kind of Muslim individual portrayed in the story and challenge participants' own schemas about Muslims, or that did not just happen owing to some other factors. Another possible explanation is that the boundary conditions for the exemplar→group generalization (e.g., if the exemplar is considered atypical) might have affected (punished) the modulation. One more explanation is that simple single textual stories about individuals might not be powerful enough to influence people's own frame of (certain) others. Participants' prior

knowledge and schemas constancy about Muslims possibly had greater impacts on their responses to the CATMS.

Intolerance toward others is an old phenomenon in the history of humanity. The concept of tolerance is applied to all forms of difference including ethnicity and religion, and religious tolerance is understood with reference to religious diversity (Triandafyllidou, 2010). According to Triandafyllidou (2010), it implies that there are attitudes and practices that are disapproved yet exist in a given context. Johnson (2011) suggests that individual characteristics such as belief in a just-world or social dominance orientation are related to 'Islamophobia'. We all have multiple identities but that does not mean they all matter to us equally. Muslim individuals who feel they are considered as 'inferior' and being 'tolerated', are likely to be much more wedded to their group identity (Triandafyllidou, 2010). It is expectable that if righthanders suddenly started beating up lefthanders, lefthanders who had hardly paid attention to handedness would become more aware of this coalition marker and would band together with other lefthanders.

The homogeneity might increase social cohesion yet might also ensure more visible cues to coalition membership. The targeted outgroup then might react in the same fashion, further increasing visible (or audible) cues to coalition membership. For example, the willingness to manifest religious identity as a marker of coalition membership might be increased in order to advertise the given coalition membership to secure support from one's own coalition. This might be the case in areas where people happen to be intolerant of Muslims. The more ingroup-outgroup categorization is perceived, the more it is likely for both groups to be prone to increase cues to their coalition membership. This study based upon the results found for Sanctity/degradation, as well as, the studies by Brown et al. (2013) and Taylor et al. (1978) suggest that it will result in greater association of negative attitudes to members of the rival

group. Consequently, intergroup conflicts will be likely to increase. That explains why Muslim men wearing 'kufis' or 'thawbs', and Muslim women wearing hijab or 'burqua', may be more likely to face hate incidents.

Richardson (2009) suggests that fears, insecurities, and scapegoating relating to national identity may arise from globalization, multiculturalism, and pluralism not essentially from encounters with perceived opposing ideologies or perceived 'threatening' minority groups. Scapegoat theory of prejudice suggests that hostile attitudes toward minority groups may have ego-defensive function as they often take the form of both personal and social issues (Atkinson & Hilgard, 2000/2006). It sounds plausible that Islamophobic attitude of some individuals might have ego-defensive functions in the sense that they function to protect the person against anxiety or threats to the self-esteem by self-distinguishing from Muslim-others in a 'superior' way. Situationally, such a standpoint might be purposely emphasized by the person in order to influence others' opinions in their own favor. For example, electoral candidates who emphasize 'we' as separate from 'them', might purposely be trying to induce people that 'we' are better than 'them' (e.g., Muslims) in the hope of making people feel they are special and superior over 'others'. Thus, by making people feel possibly better about themselves, they might earn more popularity over the course of campaign, and increase their chance to get their votes. Furthermore, electoral candidates have time after time opposed and attacked each other in debates so as to draw public attention to the weak points of their opponents to make themselves be seen better and more competent. Islamophobic attitude of some individuals might follow the same pattern. The simplistic assumption that any Muslim individual is so malleable that they could be brainwashed by radical Islamists at some point, and hence 'must' be monitored, echoes a far too overgeneralized attitude of some highly prejudiced individuals or 'political candidates' who

perhaps strive to capitalize on the susceptible situation for the electoral success. Islam is one of the most branched religions. It is a heterogeneous composition of individual believers with dynamic characteristics who adapt to new situations, rather than a homogeneous monolithic entity (Johnson, 2011). The media, however, rarely present information about, say, a strand of Islam that is less conservative (e.g., Sufism) than what it often refers to as Islam.

There is something that appears to be a bit odd with the attitude toward Islam in non-Islamic countries. Wahhabism as a very conservative and authoritarian strand of Islam is prominent. One would expect that the left would be very much opposed, while social conservatives should consider conservative Muslims as their natural allies. Mostly one gets the opposite. It seems that the left's defense can be explained partly by strong feelings about Fairness/cheating, partly by an "my enemy's enemy is my friend" phenomenon, because Islamists happen to oppose the great imperial power, the USA. The same concern for Fairness/cheating should result in far less positive views if people's thoughts are focused on, for example, women's rights. The right's opposition, might primarily be motivated by Loyalty/betrayal. That is why Bin Laden was seen as a 'good guy' when he fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. His methods or his motives did not really seem to have changed qualitatively when he turned against the Americans.

Participants in this research were citizens of various countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa, with a fairly wide range of demographics: gender, age, ethnic background, religious belief, educational level, nationality, marital status, employment status, occupation, and location. Thus, this study may be notable as individuals' cognitive attitude with differing backgrounds were examined to look into 'Islamophobia' from new perspectives.

Limitations and Challenges

The data collection was not systematic. The target participants were not reached and recruited via national registry. Most of my participants were randomly picked at places such as libraries and mosques. Therefore, it is important to take into account that participants who were met at the same places might have had similar opinions. Thus, the sample used in this study might not fully represent the whole target population.

Some statements in the CATMS were related to Norway in one way or another. Given that many participants were not Norwegians, it makes sense to consider that some participants might not have been certain enough about the situation in Norway to provide a very precise answer, although they were all living in Norway.

The data collection was quite challenging. Reaching and recruiting people, particularly Muslim individuals who would like to participate in the project, was tough. I visited various places to find my target participants dozens of times, including the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), the mosques, and the libraries in Trondheim; the Islamic Cultural Center, Rabita, and Central Jam-e-Mosque in Oslo; and the University of Stavanger.

It might have been hard for some participants to maintain their concentration during the experiment as in some occasions, where we were sitting was not quite silent.

A few participants were challenged by the English language of the survey. They were, however, welcome to ask if there were any words or sentences they were unsure about.

Convincing some target participants about the fact that I was just a student working on my master's thesis and not a 'secret agent' was in some cases challenging and took some time.

CONCLUSIONS

'Islamophobia' reflects a negative attitude toward Islam and Muslims. Some of the same cognitive and social biases that account for other forms of negative attitudes toward groups, also account for this phenomenon. The alliance detection system that automatically encodes individuals' perceived coalitions, also detects Muslims' religious identity via cues that have gained social significance. According to the Moral Foundations Theory, individuals in all cultures are born with the capacity to cultivate based upon the five foundations: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation. The moral foundations underlie the intuitive ethics that affect our attitude toward others. Cues to Muslim identity will lead coalitional computations to immediately encode the target person's coalition and categorize her/him accordingly. Such a categorization superimposes the features of the whole picture onto the target person. It does not go the other way around through textual stories about individuals. Muslims' and non-Muslims' cognitive attitudes toward Muslims are not necessarily different. Stronger endorsement of the moral foundation Sanctity/degradation (Purity) predicts negative cognitive attitudes toward Muslims. Religion (defined as being Muslim or non-Muslim) interacts with Loyalty/betrayal suggesting that Muslims' attitude is more sensitive to concern for this foundation than non-Muslims' attitude. Religion also interacts with Fairness/cheating suggesting that Muslims' attitude is more sensitive to concern for this foundation as well.

This study examined whether endorsements of the moral foundations are related to the cognitive dimension of anti-Muslim attitudes. Further research should examine if the emotional and/or behavioral dimensions of the attitudes are also related to the moral foundations. The stories were putatively told by a Muslim person who was Norwegian while cognitive attitude of

participants as Muslims or non-Muslims were examined. Future research should also examine the attitudes of participants as Norwegians or non-Norwegians to find out if nationality has a main effect or interaction with any of the moral foundations. Last but not least, since the current study was exploratory and no specific predictions were made beforehand, further research using specific predictions should examine the results found in this study.

"Love is wise, hatred is foolish. In this world, which is getting more and more closely interconnected, we have to learn to tolerate each other".

- Bertrand Russell: 27:51 (Burnett, 1959 March 4).

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

MFQ A

Page 1 of 5

1. Sex:

- ○ Female
- ○ Male

2. Age:

3. Religion:

- ○ Muslim
- ○ Non-muslim

Neste

4. **Part 1.** When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale:

   0 = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong)

   1 = not very relevant

   2 = slightly relevant

   3 = somewhat relevant

   4 = very relevant

   5 = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally	○	○	○	○	○	○
Whether or not some people were treated differently than others	○	○	○	○	○	○

Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country						
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority						
Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency						
Whether or not someone was good at math						
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable						
Whether or not someone acted unfairly						
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group						
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society						
Whether or not someone did something disgusting						
Whether or not someone was cruel						
Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights						
Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty						
Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder						
Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of						

Tilbake Neste

Page 3 of 5

5. **Part 2.** Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement using this scale:

0 = Strongly disagree

1 = Moderately disagree

2 = Slightly disagree

3 = Slightly agree

4 = Moderately agree

5 = Strongly agree

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue	○	○	○	○	○	○
When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly	○	○	○	○	○	○
I am proud of my country's history	○	○	○	○	○	○

Respect for authority is something all children need to learn						
People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed						
It is better to do good than to do bad						
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal						
Justice is the most important requirement for a society						
People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong						
Men and women each have different roles to play in society						
I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural						
It can never be right to kill a human being						
I think it's morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing						
It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself						
If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty						
Chastity is an important and valuable virtue						

Tilbake Neste

Page 4 of 5

Please read the story below by a Muslim-Norwegian:

I'm Norwegian. I like Norway. However, first of all I'm Muslim. I believe in Islam, hence the importance of my religious identity for me. I pray five times per day and I regularly attend the mosque nearby. My religious beliefs make me strong. Without my faith, I might have become depressed many times. I get along with all people but when I hang out with my Muslim friends I feel more comfortable. I eat halal meat and I don't drink alcohol. I don't go to night clubs. I don't like such places.

Tilbake Neste

Page 5 of 5

6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Disagree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Agree

	strongly		/nor		strongly
It is natural to be wary of people from Muslim countries					
Muslims are generally in favor of equal rights for males and females					
I would never vote for a Muslim for a political office					
Muslims and ethnic Norwegians will be able to work well together even if they have different values					
Norwegian culture can profit from the influence of Muslims' rich cultural history					
Police should be especially aware of Muslims due to the danger of terrorism					
It is good for the Norwegian democracy that Muslims in Norway are politically active					
Differences in Muslim and Norwegian family values make integration difficult					
Muslims' influence on Norway is positive for diversity					
Muslim values make integration into the Norwegian society difficult					

Muslim view of females' and males' position in society makes integration of Muslims difficult	○	○	○	○	○
Norwegian identity will be weakened by the influence of Muslim immigrants	○	○	○	○	○
Immigration policies should be particularly strict for people from Muslim countries	○	○	○	○	○
Muslim immigrants are often involved in crime	○	○	○	○	○
Muslim immigrants are a burden for our social services	○	○	○	○	○
To be accepted, Muslim immigrants should promise to adapt to our customs and culture	○	○	○	○	○
Muslims are a future threat to Norway	○	○	○	○	○
Muslims cannot expect to be respected in Norway, when they do not respect Christians in their own countries	○	○	○	○	○

Tilbake Ferdig

Completed

Thank you for taking the survey!

Appendix B

MFQ B

1. Sex:

- Female
- Male

2. Age:

3. Religion:

- Muslim
- Non-muslim

Neste

4. **Part 1.** When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? Please rate each statement using this scale:

   0 = not at all relevant (This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and wrong)

   1 = not very relevant

   2 = slightly relevant

   3 = somewhat relevant

   4 = very relevant

   5 = extremely relevant (This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong)

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally	○	○	○	○	○	○
Whether or not some people were treated differently than others	○	○	○	○	○	○
Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country	○	○	○	○	○	○

Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority						
Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency						
Whether or not someone was good at math						
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable						
Whether or not someone acted unfairly						
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group						
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society						
Whether or not someone did something disgusting						
Whether or not someone was cruel						
Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights						
Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty						
Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder						
Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of						

Tilbake Neste

Page 3 of 5

5. **Part 2.** Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement using this scale:

0 = Strongly disagree

1 = Moderately disagree

2 = Slightly disagree

3 = Slightly agree

4 = Moderately agree

5 = Strongly agree

	0	1	2	3	4	5
Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue	○	○	○	○	○	○
When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly	○	○	○	○	○	○
I am proud of my country's history	○	○	○	○	○	○
Respect for authority is something all children need to learn	○	○	○	○	○	○

People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed						
It is better to do good than to do bad						
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal						
Justice is the most important requirement for a society						
People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong						
Men and women each have different roles to play in society						
I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural						
It can never be right to kill a human being						
I think it's morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing						
It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself						
If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty						
Chastity is an important and valuable virtue						

Tilbake Neste

Please read the story below by a Norwegian-Muslim:

I am Muslim but, first of all, I am Norwegian. By that I mean that my national identity is way more important to me than my religious identity. Religion is a private matter, but a shared national identity is important for society. This year we celebrate the 200th anniversary of our constitution, on Grunnlovsdagen. I look forward to the 17th of May parades with flags, Kransekaker and the like. I love our language and actually think people living here should try to speak Norsk instead of English. I think this is the first step towards integration into the society. Many may say we Norwegians are cold, but I don't think so. It's all about perception. I have many friends in Norway, some Muslim, some not. We must work together to build a society, so it matters that we get along, regardless of religion.

Tilbake Neste

6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Neither /nor	Agree	Agree strongly
It is natural to be wary of people from Muslim countries					
Muslims are generally in favor of equal rights for males and females					
I would never vote for a Muslim for a political office					
Muslims and ethnic Norwegians will be able to work well together even if they have different values					
Norwegian culture can profit from the influence of Muslims' rich cultural history					
Police should be especially aware of Muslims due to the danger of terrorism					
It is good for the Norwegian democracy that Muslims in Norway are politically active					
Differences in Muslim and Norwegian family values make integration difficult					
Muslims' influence on Norway is positive for diversity					
Muslim values make integration into the Norwegian					

society difficult

Muslim view of females' and males' position in society makes integration of Muslims difficult					
Norwegian identity will be weakened by the influence of Muslim immigrants					
Immigration policies should be particularly strict for people from Muslim countries					
Muslim immigrants are often involved in crime					
Muslim immigrants are a burden for our social services					
To be accepted, Muslim immigrants should promise to adapt to our customs and culture					
Muslims are a future threat to Norway					
Muslims cannot expect to be respected in Norway, when they do not respect Christians in their own countries					

Tilbake Ferdig

Completed

Thank you for taking the survey!