

Master's thesis

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
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Guarding the Gates of Democratic Europe

Norway and the Spanish
accession to NATO

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Føreord

Då eg sa ja til å skrive denne oppgåva ante eg ikkje kva eg tok på meg. Det er ikkje berre berre for ein statsvitar å ta fatt på eit historieprosjekt som omfattar alt frå å rote rundt i gamle stortingsforhandlingar til å søkje statsministaren sjølv om innsyn i klassifiserte dokument. Det skulle bli eit halvår prega av venting, frustrasjon og irritasjon, av oppturar og nedturar. Det faktum at eg greidde å dra dette i land har eg mange å takke for.

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Abbreviations

AAB	Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek [Archives of the Norwegian Labour Movement)
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Country
CSCE	Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
EC	European Communities
EU	European Union
EWG	Executive Working Group
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [Basque Homeland and Freedom]
IR	International Relations
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party]
RA	Riksarkivet [Norwegian National Archives]
SA	Stortingsarkivet [Norwegian Parliamentary Archives]
UD	Utenriksdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America

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1.0 Introduction

Opposition to General Francisco Franco's authoritarian regime was an enduring feature of Norwegian foreign policy. This opposition went so far that the possibility of Spanish membership in NATO caused the Norwegian Government to threaten to exercise its veto within the Alliance. Evidence suggests that this was the first and, for the time being, the only time that Norway has made this threat during its time as a NATO member.¹ For decades Norway maintained a policy of demonstrative distancing and fought Spanish NATO membership with all its might.² How did this policy change from the death of the Spanish dictator and up until Spain eventually did join NATO in 1982? The main purpose of this thesis is to answer this question.

The Spanish question is an inherently interesting piece of Norwegian foreign policy history. In refusing to accept Spain as an ally, Norway opposed both the major powers and the majority within the country's most important alliance. And, importantly, Norway succeeded in preventing Spanish membership for decades. Being a small state, Norway had – and still has – relatively limited influence on the wider international developments. Even within NATO Norway can only expect to influence the decision-making processes to a certain degree.³ Studies focusing on small states in international relations tell us that small states enhance their political influence through engagement in international organisations and through the creation of global regimes, laws and norms.⁴ In doing so Norway has been successful, and has indeed built an international reputation that surpasses its small population, size and military capacity. Through peacekeeping and norm entrepreneurship Norway has, according to Christine Ingebrigtsen, created its own niche in world politics.⁵ But the fact remains that, although international organisations often create advantages for small states, they do not exist outside the realities of international politics. The basic principles of power apply also within such organisations, a fact that translates into powerful states being more able than small states to set the agenda, weight their votes, promote their policy choices, and ignore the organisation

¹ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 53-55.

² Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965*. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 47.

³ Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 40.

⁴ Jeanne K Hey, "Refining Our Understanding of Small State Foreign Policy", in *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour*, ed. Jeanne K. Hey, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 187.

⁵ Christine Ingebrigtsen, *Scandinavia in World Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2006), 57, 71.

when it acts against their preferences.⁶ As a consequence of this, small states are traditionally depicted to avoid policies and political behaviour that may threaten to alienate the more powerful states in the system.⁷ But this was not the case with Norway and the Spanish question. The US, the only superpower within the Alliance, greatly favoured Spanish membership. As long as the threat of Norwegian veto remained, however, Spain would be excluded.

1.1 Research question

From the fact that Spain did join the Alliance in 1982, it is clear that the Norwegian stance at some point had to have changed. It may also be clear that the death of the authoritarian leader was important, as it is readily assumed in previous research.⁸ What is less clear, however, is the answer to how much this fact changed the Norwegian position. For decades Norway had stood between Spain and NATO. Did this long lasting, deep felt opposition die with Franco? This is an assumption I question, for the simple reason that Spain did not join NATO in 1975. Seven years passed between the death of Franco and the Spanish accession to NATO. The main research question will therefore be:

When, how and why did the Norwegian stance on Spanish membership in NATO change?

In order to answer the main question, a set of sub-questions are addressed: were there concerns about the level of democracy in the new regime? Was there consensus across party lines? Did the Government and the Parliament face internal and/or external pressure? How did the international context change, and how did this influence the Norwegian stance?

To be able to answer these question, and due to the lack of previous research on the subject, thorough empirical research is needed. Because NATO is an international organisation, and a vital part of the integration of Europe, the Norwegian policy had implications beyond Norway's own borders. As Norway became a gatekeeper for Spanish accession to NATO, it by extension became a gatekeeper for Spanish EC membership.⁹ In order to investigate how

⁶ Jeanne K. Hey, "Refining Our Understanding of Small State Foreign Policy", in *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour*, ed. Jeanne K. Hey, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 188.

⁷ Maurice East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models". *World Politics* 25, no 4 (1973): 557.

⁸ Olav Riste, *Norwegian Foreign Policy: A History* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 191; Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 49; Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 138.

⁹ Otto Holman, *Integrating Southern Europe: EC Expansion and the Transnationalization of Spain* (London: Routledge, 1996).

Norway could assume this role, the theoretical framework of rhetorical action by Frank Schimmelfennig is applied to the empirical data.

1.2 Previous research

The literature covering relations between Norway and Spain is not vast, and certainly not when it comes to the question of Spanish NATO membership. What characterises the literature that does exist is a broad agreement both on the reasoning behind the Norwegian policy and the effects of it, clearly highlighting the need for further research of the subject.

The better part of the literature concerning the Spanish question is found in books on Norwegian foreign policy and books on Norway's role within NATO. These studies do not go deeply into the subject, and they only discuss the years leading up to 1975. Generally, the perspective is the same, with a line of recurring arguments. First of all, Norway's role as an advocate for the democratic profile of NATO is highlighted. It was of fundamental importance for Norway that the Alliance should consist of democratic states. Secondly, it is argued that the international context played a certain part, but that the main reason for Norway's stand on the question was domestic politics. In addition to widespread ideological opposition to the Spanish regime, Spanish membership would have created a huge debate about Norway's participation in the Alliance. Hence, the question did not only concern Spanish, but also potentially Norwegian membership. Last, but not least, they all argue that Norway was the main reason why Spain was kept outside the Alliance up until 1975.¹⁰

There are, however, two exceptions to the generalisations above: one study that deals with the subject in depth and another with a different focus. The first of them, and perhaps the research most relevant for this thesis, is *Franco-Spanias fiende nummer en? Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960*, written by Hilde Haraldstad. It thoroughly analyses Norway's relations with Spain from 1946 to 1960, both bilaterally and in international organisations. Her main arguments on Norway and Spanish NATO membership, although generally in agreement, are more emphatic than the arguments mentioned in the previous section. Her conclusion is that Norway distinguished itself amongst the Western countries as "Spain's Number One Enemy". Furthermore, Haraldstad claims that this consistent, pronounced and

¹⁰ Frode Liland and Helge Ø. Pharo, "Norge og stride nom NATOs geografiske virkeområde". In *NATO 50 år- Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år*, eds. Chris Prebensen and Nils Skarland, (Oslo: Den norske Atlanterhavskomiteé, 1999), 183-184; Rolf Tamnes and Knut Einar Eriksen, "Norge og NATO under den kalde krigen". In *NATO 50 år- Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år*, eds. Chris Prebensen and Nils Skarland, (Oslo: Den norske Atlanterhavskomiteé, 1999) 7-38; Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie Bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 48-49.

long term resistance against Spanish membership in NATO did not find its counterpart in any other Western country, and that the Norwegian policy had decisive influence on the fact that Spanish membership was not even officially discussed at NATO meetings.¹¹ The second exception is *Tusen Dager: Norge og den spanske borgerkrigen 1936-1939*, by Jo Stein Moen and Rolf Sæther. The main focus of this book is Norway's role in the Spanish Civil War and how the conflict in turn influenced the Norwegian society. Regarding Norway and the Spanish accession to NATO the arguments are, once again, in line with the other sources. The perspective, however, is different. Like the rest of the book, the discussion of the issue is marked by a strong focus on the thoughts and actions of the Norwegian Labour Movement.¹²

It is at this point clear that previous research on the subject is sorely lacking in perspectives and chronological coverage. Furthermore, none of these studies discuss the years after 1975. Several of them highlight the fact that at the time of Franco's death in 1975 Spain was still not a member of the alliance, but not one of them goes past this point.

1.3 Justification of the study

This thesis is justified on three grounds. Firstly, the lack of empirical research alone points to the need of further investigation of the topic. There are no studies based on primary sources, or attempts at explaining how the policy changed and why. Since 1949 NATO has been the cornerstone of Norwegian security and defence policy, and a close relationship with the US has always been regarded as vital for the territorial defence of Norway.¹³ The fact that the question of Spanish membership is the only time the threat of veto has been exercised, says something about the relevance of this question for Norwegian policy. This thesis therefore has value to add to our understanding of Norwegian foreign policy.

Secondly, this case is one of the few times where Norway has been attributed decisive influence on questions regarding international relations. This thesis can therefore contribute to the understanding of the influence of small states within international organisations. Indeed, as Spanish membership in NATO has been dubbed the decisive factor for EC membership¹⁴,

¹¹ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 135-141.

¹² Jo Stein Moen and Rolf Sæther, *Tusen dager: Norge og den spanske borgerkrigen 1936-1939* (Finland: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2009), 300-302.

¹³ Nina Græger, "Norway between Europe and the US", in *New security issues in Northern Europe: the Nordic and Baltic states and the ESDP*, ed. Clive Archer (London: Routledge, 2008), 111.

¹⁴ Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, "Introduction: Spain and the Great Powers". In *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, (London: Routledge, 1999), 10.

one could argue that the Norwegian policy thus had implications for European integration in a broader sense.

Thirdly, this thesis provides a political science perspective to historical research. By applying and modifying the theory of rhetorical action the analysis can provide new insights into how strategic argumentation influences the decision making process in international organisations.

1.4 Approach and sources

This thesis offers a qualitative analysis of the Norwegian policy with regards to the question of Spanish NATO membership, from the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975 to the Spanish accession in 1982.

The analysis is primarily based on archival sources, of which some have been open to the public, some have been classified and yet others have been declassified for the purpose of this thesis. Needless to say, the so-called raw primary sources provided by archival research offer many advantages. They enable us to address a broad range of questions, uncover brand new information and thus expand our empirical understanding of the subject at hand.¹⁵ As such, archival research provides insights perhaps no other approach could provide, something that has been of infinite value with regards to the underresearched subject of this thesis.

Archival research does, however, bring with it certain challenges. It is, according to Masters, “not the passive recording of objective data but a reader’s constructive, subjective ordering and making meaning out of what he or it chooses to examine”.¹⁶ It is therefore important to have a clear understanding of yourself as a researcher. What you choose to ignore and what you regard as important is dependent upon who you are and your previous experience.¹⁷ In my case, especially one factor needs to be taken into consideration. I have my background in political science, and this thesis is my first encounter with the historical method and archival research. A political scientist attempting to do a historian’s job is faced with many challenges, something Andrew Moravcsik got to learn the hard way. His book *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* was certainly not treated with kid gloves when reviewed by historians. Though highly praised by many, his work was

¹⁵ Douglas B Harris, “Recovering History and Discovering Data in the Archives: An Alternative Mode of Research for Congress Scholars”, in *An American Political Archives Reader*, eds. Glenn Gray, Rebecca Johnson Melvin and Karen D. Paul (Lanham: Scarecrow Press 2009) 429-430.

¹⁶ Thomas Masters, “Reading the Archive of Freshman English”, in *Working in the Archives – Practical Research Methods for Rhetoric and Composition*, eds. Alexis E. Ramsey, Wendy B. Sharer, Barbara L’epplattenier and Lisa S. Mastrangelo (Illinois: Illinois University Press, 2010) 157.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 158.

accused of almost completely disregarding the international context, of seeing too much through the eyes of a theorist,¹⁸ and of suffering from “soft sources and weak evidence”¹⁹. There are clearly many pitfalls, but as they are acknowledged, they may also be avoided.

As to avoiding the above mentioned pitfalls, this thesis does consider both the international and domestic situation. Due to the limitations in scope of this thesis, the international context is not discussed at length, but remains an important consideration. Moving on to the theoretical aspect, I do not claim that the theoretical approach chosen for this thesis is able to explain the entire process, but argue instead that the logic of rhetorical action – the strategic use of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences – may provide a deeper insight into the Spanish accession to NATO and the Norwegian policy with regard to this question. In this insight lies also the possibility for generalisation, for a deeper understanding of how small states without heavy bargaining power are able to influence the enlargement processes of international organisations. Modifications to the theory are made, an approach some might be uncomfortable with. It is not hard to argue, however, that it is better than the often used alternative, which is forcing the facts to fit the theory. Like Robert W. Rauchhaus²⁰, I argue that by being problem-driven – trying to answer the questions at hand – rather than theory-driven – only looking at the questions defined by the theoretical approach – the strengths and weaknesses of IR theory may become even more apparent. Lastly, the broad range of archival sources ensures that the analysis has a strong foundation.

The archives I have visited for the purpose of this thesis are *Utenriksdepartementets Arkiv* (the Archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), *Riksarkivet* (the Norwegian National Archives), *Stortingsarkivet* (the Norwegian Parliamentary Archives) and *Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek* (the archives of the Norwegian Labour Movement). Additionally I have been given access to archival sources from the UK and US National Archives, procured by project associates.

Parliamentary proceedings and secondary literature like books and articles and have been used to complement the archival sources. Interviews with people directly involved in the process, which might have made another supplement, have been excluded due to time

¹⁸ Pierre-Henri Laurent, review of *Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, by Andrew Moravcsik, *The International History Review* 21, no 4 (1999): 1096-1098.

¹⁹ Robert S. Lieshout, Mathieu L.L and Johanna Maria van der Vleuten, review of *Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, by Andrew Moravcsik, *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6, no 4 (2004): 89-139.

²⁰ Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Explaining NATO enlargement”. *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no 2 (2007): 191.

constraints, but also because written sources are better suited for later verification and because they reduce the natural risk of incorrect recollections. Since more than thirty years have passed since the Spanish accession to NATO, the risk of incorrect or inadequate recollections of the events is substantial.

1.5 Thesis outline

The next chapter provides an assessment of the theoretical framework of the thesis, which is based on Frank Schimmelfennig's theory of rhetorical action. It explains the logic of rhetorical action and how it can provide insight into the process of NATO enlargement. The main argument is that rhetorical action, with a few modifications, seems suitable to explain Spain's accession to NATO and important elements of the Norwegian policy on this issue.

Chapter three describes the development of the Norwegian policy towards Spain, from the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 to the death of the authoritarian leader Francisco Franco in 1975. It explores the effects the Civil War had on the Norwegian society and considers the Norwegian policy both in bilateral relations with Spain and in international cooperation. The chapter argues that the Spanish question inhabited a unique position in Norwegian foreign policy throughout this period and that Norway continuously acted as one of Franco's main opponents in international cooperation.

Chapters four to six analyse the Norwegian policy on Spanish NATO membership from 1975 until the Spanish accession in 1982. The analysis follows the chain of events chronologically, and assesses the events in the context of both the international and domestic situation. Chapter four analyses the first years after the death of Franco, and argues that the restrictive Norwegian policy was maintained throughout this period. In demanding evidence of Spain becoming a fully-fledged democracy, Norway acted as a gatekeeper for NATO. Chapter five analyses the Norwegian policy from June 1977 to September 1981. The main argument is that though Norway no longer directly opposed Spanish membership, they maintained one of the most restrictive policies on the issue. This policy was characterised by objections on form and timing, though based on concerns of another nature. Chapter six analyses the Norwegian policy from the change in government in October 1981 to the Spanish accession in May 1982 and claims that the change from a Labour to a Conservative government marked a turning-point with regard to the question of Spanish NATO membership. This turning-point meant that Norway's role changed from that of brakeman to active proponent of Spanish accession.

Chapter seven, which summarises and furthers the analysis, is structured thematically. The main argument is that the changes in the Norwegian policy may be boiled down to being a result of two important elections and that the logic of rhetorical action provides valuable insights into the process of the Spanish accession.

2.0 Theoretical approach

Facts never really speak for themselves. Every historical interpretation therefore needs a conceptual core, some kind of theoretical framework to give meaning to the empirical evidence that is found. A theory, on the other hand, needs empirical support to clarify its meaning and prove theoretical points.²¹ In this way empirical data and theory are able to complement and enrich each other.

This chapter will account for the theoretical approach of the thesis. The purpose is to establish a wider framework for the empirical analysis in order to understand the context in which the process of Spanish accession to NATO took place. By providing a theoretical explanation for the enlargement of international organisations, the Norwegian policy can be seen as part of the bigger picture of international relations. The chapter starts with an analysis of the relevance of Frank Schimmelfennig's rhetorical action to the case of this thesis. It then goes on to give an introduction to rhetorical action and its explanatory power with regard to NATO enlargement. The main argument is that, with some modifications, the theory of rhetorical action seems suitable to explain Spain's entry into NATO and the Norwegian policy on this issue.

2.1 Theoretical framework

An important contribution to the debate on NATO enlargement has been provided by Frank Schimmelfennig. His focus is on the Eastern enlargement and his study may be broken down to two main arguments. The first is that the main explanatory factors in the expansion of NATO and the EU are not constellations of power and interests but, on the contrary, the constitutive liberal rules of the Western international community. The second is that these community rules have influenced enlargement through rhetorical action, which is the strategic use of arguments.²²

This approach is chosen because it provides valuable insight into the question of Spanish membership in NATO. The logic of rhetorical action is applicable to this case in two different ways. Directly applied, it helps explain how Spain eventually achieved membership. Additionally, if we turn the argument around, it explains many of the characteristics of the

²¹ Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method* (Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2006), 30, 39.

²² Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.

Norwegian policy and how reluctant member states managed to exclude Spain from the Alliance for years, even in the face of strong pressure from the dominant power.

Other alternatives do, of course, exist. On the one hand, realist explanations continue to provide valuable knowledge of the enlargement of NATO. Many such studies explain NATO enlargement as a result of supreme US bargaining power.²³ Schimmelfennig himself admits that the decision to enlarge NATO may very well be attributed to US dominance in the Alliance. He claims, however, that such rationalist arguments cannot explain the whole process of enlargement.²⁴ The same goes for the case of Spain. US interest in Spanish membership may explain why Spain eventually was admitted into the Alliance, but not why it was excluded for so long, or why the US did not pressure weaker states to accept Spanish membership. On the other hand, constructivist approaches explain NATO enlargement as international socialisation. Once a state has come to share the community's values and norms, it is accepted as a member.²⁵ Such approaches has gained momentum since the 1990s, but has been criticised for taking states' acceptance of international norms and values for granted.²⁶ As the analysis will show, the assumption of automatic inclusion is another weakness inherent in such approaches. Schimmelfennig, however, does not make such presumptions, as is explained in the next section of this chapter. In combining rationalist and constructivist arguments, he is able to provide a more thorough explanation of the enlargement of international organisations. Several of his arguments can also be found in other studies of NATO expansion.²⁷

A weakness in Schimmelfennig's approach does nonetheless exist. Focus is put on two different stages of the enlargement process, the initial preferences of member states and the final outcome. On the period in between, however, Schimmelfennig is rather vague. By providing an excellent example of this middle stage, the case of Norway and Spain makes a contribution

²³ Robert W. Rauchhaus, "Explaining NATO enlargement". *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no 2 (2007): 190; Ryan C. Hendrickson, "The enlargement of NATO: The theory and politics of alliance expansion". *European Security* 8, no 4 (2007): 96; Kenneth N. Waltz, "NATO expansion: A realist's view", *Contemporary Security Policy* (2007): 35.

²⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 282.

²⁵ Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe'". *International Organization* 59, no 4 (2005): 975-976.

²⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study of World Politics". *International Organization* 52, no 4 (1998): 670-671.

²⁷ Andrew Kydd, "Trust Building and Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement". *International Organization* 55, no 4 (2001); K.M. Fierke and Antje Wiener, "Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO enlargement". Paper presented at the ECSA Sixth Biennial International Conference, Pittsburgh, USA, 2-5 June 1999.

to the theoretical approach. My argument is that at this stage, the role of the gatekeeper is essential. What is meant by “turning the argument around” is that the focus is shifted to a state’s ability to prevent other states from achieving membership. With the use of strategic argumentation, instead of letting itself be shamed into accepting new memberships, Norway managed to exclude Spain from NATO by relying on the very same type of strategic argumentation. In this situation Norway played the role of the gatekeeper. To exercise gatekeeping is by Crombez, Groseclose and Krehbiel defined as an actor having “a unique, unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo”.²⁸ In this thesis the term will be used about Norway’s role in preventing Spanish NATO membership. Because of strong opposition both inside and outside the ruling party the gap between domestic and foreign policy was bridged by the use of strategic argumentation. The result of this was that Norway, by demanding certain democratic credentials from the Spanish regime and assuming the authority to judge whether these had been met or not, enforced the status quo.

2.2 Rhetorical action

When analysing the Eastern enlargement, Schimmelfennig highlights two apparently conflicting observations. The first is an initial policy outcome that reflects the distribution of material bargaining power and self-interested state enlargement preferences. The second is an eventual policy outcome that, on the contrary, reflects the collective identity and social norms of an international community. The choice to include the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), he argues, was not a rational one. First of all, seen as a whole, the expected costs of the Eastern enlargement were higher than the expected benefits. Second, both organisations already had efficient institutional forms for their relations with the CEECs. Finally, he claims that neither the supporters within the organisations nor the CEECs themselves possessed the bargaining power to compel the more reluctant member states to accept enlargement. Combined, these factors caused both the EU and NATO to initially reject the CEECs’ demands of full membership. A few years later, however, accession agreements with many of the CEECs had been opened. Any attempt to explain the decision-making process on enlargement must be able to link and reconcile these contradictory facts. Schimmelfennig argues that “rhetorical action” is a mechanism able to do that.²⁹

²⁸ Cristophe Crombez, Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel, “Gatekeeping”. *The Journal of Politics* 68, no 2 (2006): 322.

²⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement”. *International Organization* 55, no 1 (2001): 48-62; Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4-8.

Rhetorical action is according to Schimmelfennig “the strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences”.³⁰ An important presumption for this mechanism is the existence of both actors intent on securing national interests and an institutional, normative environment. In such an environment political actors have to refer to common values and norms to gain the legitimacy that is needed to advance their goals. At the same time, however, rational political actors can use strategic argumentation to reduce the constraints of legitimacy by manipulating these values and norms. Finally, and most importantly: Political actors are, through the strategic use of value-based and normative arguments, able to achieve a collective outcome different from the one that would have resulted from the distribution of power and interests alone. Every international organisation has its own institutionalised standard of political legitimacy to which members have to adhere. It is based on the values, norms and ideological beliefs of the political community, and defines the rights and duties of the member states. This does not mean, however, that political actors take this standard of legitimacy for granted or as a moral imperative. Rather, Schimmelfennig assumes that it is regarded as a resource that may be used to strengthen political influence and advance political goals.³¹

2.2 Enlargement of NATO and rhetorical action

If we follow the logic of rhetorical action, NATO enlargement can be seen as the result of the CEECs and their supporters within the Alliance using arguments based on community norms and values to shame their opponents into compliance.³² Schimmelfennig argues that national self-interest and the distribution of power were what shaped the early stages of the enlargement process, but that the final outcome was the result of community rules and rhetorical action.³³

Material self-interest in security and welfare provides a reasonable explanation for the initial preferences of members and potential candidate states alike. The preferences of the member states reflected the varying degree of interdependence with the candidate countries, which again varied with geographical proximity. For the CEECs, on the other hand, membership was

³⁰ Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 5.

³¹ Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Double Puzzle of EU enlargement: Liberal norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East”, paper presented at the ECSA Sixth Biennial International Conference, Pittsburg, 2-5 June 1999, 28-30.

³² Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 229.

³³ *Ibid.*, 281.

attractive because it could increase welfare and security. Initial preferences were, in other words, a result of individual calculations of national interests. The same can be said for the initial result of the enlargement process: association with NATO through the Partnership for Peace programme and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). These agreements opened up for closer cooperation in fields of mutual interests while at the same time denying the CEECs decision-making power and the security guarantee of full members. As such, they mirrored the superior bargaining power of the enlargement sceptics vis-à-vis the supporters and the CEECs themselves. The distribution of power and preferences is not, however, sufficient to explain the move from association to full membership. On the one hand, US superior bargaining power may account for the decision to include the CEECs in NATO. Why the US initially rejected the enlargement proposals and later became the CEECs strongest supporter within the Alliance, on the other hand, cannot be rationalised simply as a calculation of national self-interest.

Constructivism, however, does provide a credible explanation of this and of the final outcome. NATO is, according to this perspective, an organisation of the Western international community. One of the main activities of the Alliance in this regard is to socialise outside states to its rules, which are based on the identity, norms and values of this community. When a state has adopted these, it should be regarded as a member of the Western community and thus be entitled to join its organisations. The rules would not be enough though. According to Schimmelfennig, rhetorical action was necessary to compel the reluctant members to adhere to the rules.³⁴

As Schimmelfennig shows, the CEECs used a range of rhetorical strategies. One of their main tactics was to appeal strongly to the values and norms of the Euro-Atlantic liberal community. Through public speeches, interviews and articles addressed to NATO and its members, they accentuated their democratic norms and values. Repeatedly they defined themselves as part of Europe, and as an indisputable part of the Western community. Democratic achievements were highlighted, while stressing the instability in the region. Interdemocratic solidarity was essential, they claimed, for the future of Europe. For this reason, and because of earlier practice and promises, NATO was obliged to accept them as members.³⁵ If they did not accept enlargement, the member states would be acting inconsistently and betraying the values and norms to which they were committed. In short, they would be endangering their reputation as

³⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 282.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 229-234.

community members. As a consequence of this, Schimmelfennig claims, the reluctant members were shamed into accepting Eastern enlargement.³⁶

In this way, the Eastern enlargement is explained as a result of egoistic calculations of self-interests, community rules and values, and strategic argumentation. Though Schimmelfennig focuses mainly on this specific round of enlargement, he claims that some of the results of his study can be generalised to the entire enlargement history of the major West European regional organisations.³⁷ The focus on strategic argumentation ensures that the approach is not only applicable, but in fact valuable for the case of Spanish membership in NATO. With the addition of the element of gatekeeping, the logic of rhetorical action seems well suited to explain Spanish accession and, more importantly, essential elements of the Norwegian policy on this matter.

³⁶ Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 282-283.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

3.0 Historical background

74 years ago General Francisco Franco declared his victory in the Spanish Civil War. A failed coup d'état in July 1936 was followed by 989 days of bitter war, ending in almost half a million dead and as many refugees. With the help of Hitler and Mussolini, the rebel army defeated the Republic. The result was almost 40 years of dictatorship,³⁸ the existence of which determined the nature of Spanish-Norwegian relations.

Norway's direct involvement in the Spanish Civil War was modest. The Civil War would, however, have an important impact on the Norwegian society. For a long time it was one of the main topics of public debate, dominating the front pages of all the largest newspapers. In its wake followed public mobilisation, artistic engagement, political division, crisis of government and diplomatic complications.³⁹ The Norwegian political left had sided strongly with the Republic during the Civil War, and ideological opposition to the Spanish regime was widespread. This was reflected in a strong and lasting emotional commitment and made normalisation of relations with Franco's regime problematic. Franco's sympathy and cooperation with the Axis powers during the Second World War further compounded the matter.⁴⁰ Should Norway oppose Spain through unilateral or international campaigns, or should relations with the regime be normalised? During the post-war years this was one of the questions in foreign relations that got the most attention.⁴¹

3.1 Solidarity

With the increasingly belligerent attitude of Hitler's Germany and the expansionist intentions of Fascist Italy, the Spanish Civil War broke out at a time of growing tension in Europe. The political divisions of the conflict corresponded closely to those of contemporary Europe, and each of the two Spanish camps looked to its European counterparts for help. This meant that after only a few weeks the conflict had transcended the borders of Spain.⁴² In Norway, the Civil War set off a massive campaign of solidarity. Enthusiasm and sympathy for the Spanish cause was widespread and led to the first massive international act of solidarity in

³⁸ Ronald Radosch, Mary R. Habeck and Grigory Sevostianov, *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2001), 11.

³⁹ Jo Stein Moen and Rolf Sæther, *Tusen dager: Norge og den spanske borgerkrigen 1936-1939* (Finland: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2009), 11; Ronald Radosch, Mary R. Habeck and Grigory Sevostianov, *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2001), 11.

⁴⁰ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 135.

⁴¹ Knut Einar Eriksen "Norge i det vestlige samarbeid", in *Vekst og velstand: Norsk politisk historie 1945-1965*, eds. Trond Bergh and Helge Øystein Pharo (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1989), 194.

⁴² Sheelag Ellwood, *Franco* (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 1994), 78.

Norwegian history.⁴³

The aid was for the most part organized by the labour movement and the parties on the Left, and came in two very different forms. The first was humanitarian aid, shipments of sanitation and hospital equipment, food and clothes to the civilians. The second was of direct or indirect military character and organized illegally. Though the numbers are uncertain, it is believed that approximately two hundred Norwegians joined the international brigades and fought for the Republic.⁴⁴ The solidarity work clearly illustrated the ideological dimension and the emotive power of the Spanish conflict. While the enthusiasm and generosity were ample amongst the people on the political Left, the Conservatives in Norway were at best lukewarm in their support, sometimes directly hostile to the relief work and the fundraising campaigns. One might assume that most would support campaigns in favour of a legally elected government. This question, however, was more complicated than that. Many feared Stalin and Communism more than they did Fascism and Nazism and, though exceptions existed, the Conservatives kept the relief work for Spain at arm's length.⁴⁵

While its party organisation mobilised for active solidarity for Spain, the Labour Government chose to follow the policy of non-intervention initiated by their French and British colleagues. Norway took the commitments of this agreement seriously, and as the autumn of 1936 passed an increasing number of measures to maintain neutrality were taken.⁴⁶ The workers' movement's fury over the coup and their commitment to the Republic found an outlet through the comprehensive relief work. At the same time, it helped lessen the pressure on the government's policy. During the first weeks of the War the Committee for Cooperation between *Landsorganisasjonen i Norge* (the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions) and *Arbeiderpartiet* (the Norwegian Labour Party) established an internal panel that would take responsibility for the management and coordination of the fund-raising. The extent of the campaign, however, demanded efficient organisation, and the work needed a wider and more neutral platform. Thus, at the end of October 1936, the panel initiated the creation of a larger committee to lead a nationwide fundraiser. This led to the establishment of *Spaniakomiteen* (the Norwegian Committee for Spain). With the new committee, the level of activity increased dramatically. In a matter of months the Committee for Spain had more than 110

⁴³ Jo Stein Moen and Rolf Sæther, *Tusen dager: Norge og den spanske borgerkrigen 1936-1939* (Finland: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2009), 53-54.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 319.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

local groups and managed to organise the most professional, nationwide act of solidarity Norway had ever seen.⁴⁷

Franco's dictatorship survived the Second World War and the perseverance of the regime became a traumatic topic for the Norwegian Left. After five years of German occupation the hatred towards the Spanish authoritarian leader had not subsided. The fact that one of Hitler's allies remained in power was regarded as an atrocity, as was the way in which he kept Spain in his iron grip.⁴⁸ This would come to influence Norway both in bilateral relations with Spain and in international cooperation.

3.2 Bilateral Relations

Despite the fact that an increasing degree of normalisation did take place during the first post-war decades, the relationship between Norway and Spain remained tense and cool as long as Franco remained in power. Norway was usually one of the last countries to formalise any kind of bilateral agreement with the regime, even though it had great economic interests in the Iberian Peninsula.⁴⁹ Opposition against any cooperation with Franco's Spain was especially strong during the first years after the Second World War. At the time, the Norwegian Government wanted as little official contact with the regime as possible. Private firms nevertheless ensured that trade between the countries resumed after the War ended. By 1947 partial diplomatic representation was also restored. The main reason for not breaking all bonds with Spain was economic. Trade-relations between Norway and Spain had traditionally been good, and cooperation had been far closer in the economic field than in any other. After the War, it was primarily in the area of trade that the two regimes maintained good relations. There were times when the Norwegian attitude towards Spain, especially in the UN, caused difficulties for Norwegian exports and shipping. But even so, trade never decreased dramatically.⁵⁰ As the distance to the War increased and the rest of the world improved relations with Spain, relations between Norwegian and Spanish authorities were gradually normalised.⁵¹ After 1950 Norway adopted a more conciliatory policy on bilateral agreements with Spain. Trade and diplomatic relations were normalised through official agreements. This

⁴⁷ Jo Stein Moen and Rolf Sæther, *Tusen dager: Norge og den spanske borgerkrigen 1936-1939* (Finland: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2009), 52-54.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 289.

⁴⁹ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 8.

⁵⁰ Olav Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations: A History* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 190-191.

⁵¹ Knut Einar Eriksen, "Norge i det vestlige samarbeid". In *Vekst og velstand: Norsk politisk historie 1945-1965*, eds. Trond Bergh and Helge Øystein Pharo, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1989), 194-195.

appeasement was concluded with the cultural accord of 1959. The debate surrounding this accord nevertheless points to the controversy surrounding the relation with Franco's Spain at the end of this period.

This process of normalisation took place in a context of domestic protests, on the one hand, and expectations of closer cooperation between the two countries from both Spanish and Norwegian business interests, on the other. Two organisations distinguished themselves in this debate. While *Rederforbundet* (the Shipowners' Association) fought for normalisation of relations between the two countries, *Spaniakomiteen* (the Committee for Spain) wanted Norway to maintain a policy of demonstrative distancing. Both organisations were active and influential in putting the Spanish question on the agenda, thus putting pressure on the Government.⁵² The Government itself was for many years torn on the issue of Spain. During the Civil War, sympathy for the Republicans had extended far into the Labour Party, and it was with a heavy heart that some of the ministers had accepted the Norwegian policy.⁵³ The fact that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had belonged to the group of politicians personally invested in the Spanish question would prove important for the Norwegian stance in international organisations.⁵⁴

3.3 International cooperation

For many years Norway stood out among the Western European countries as "Spain's Number One Enemy". At the end of the 1940s it was given this epithet by both Conservative and Communist papers, and in the next decade even by Franco himself.⁵⁵ Norway sought the most restrictive standpoint bilaterally, in the UN, the OEEC and most clearly in NATO. A certain normalisation eventually did take place, and the Norwegian Government gradually resigned their resistance within the UN and the OEEC. But this does not amount to a reversal of Norway's particular position with regards to the Spanish question. As a clear illustration of this, a spokesman of Norwegian business interest declared at the end of the 1950s that "since the War our attitude towards Franco's government has not only been reserved, but outright

⁵² Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 41-42.

⁵³ Jo Stein Moen and Rolf Sæther, *Tusen dager: Norge og den spanske borgerkrigen 1936-1939* (Finland: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2009), 40-41.

⁵⁴ Einar Gerhardsen, *Mennesker og politikk: Erindringer 1965-1978* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1978), 186.

⁵⁵ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 135.

aggressive”.⁵⁶ The next sections will explore the Norwegian policy towards Spain within UN, the OEEC and NATO.

3.3.1 The UN

The Norwegian policy on Spanish membership in the UN underwent great changes during the period from 1946 to 1955. For the first four years after the War, Norway maintained a firm attitude towards the question of Spanish accession to the UN. The country’s policy on the matter was offensive, and the Government took initiatives to prevent the authoritarian regime from joining.⁵⁷ In 1946, following a Norwegian initiative, Resolution 39 was passed in the UN. This resolution condemned the Spanish government, claiming it had actively hindered the efforts of the allies during the Second World War. It ascertained that the Spanish government did not represent the Spanish people, and recommended that Franco’s regime should be excluded from membership in the UN and all its sub-organizations until a new, acceptable government was established. Finally, the resolution encouraged all members of the UN to withdraw all accredited ambassadors and ministers from Madrid.⁵⁸ The following years, this resolution would be the topic of a lot of debate within the organisation. Before long, the tense international situation and US pressure forced many of the UN members to aim for a softer policy towards Spain and opt to revoke Resolution 39. Norway consistently opposed this, even when it was the only Western European country to do so.

Domestic factors were decisive for this policy. The Labour leadership, the majority in Parliament and large fractions of the population wanted UN action against Franco. Additionally, Norway’s new allies acted cautiously and did not push for the country to change its policy, despite the fact that Norway voted with the Eastern bloc in 1949. From 1950 to 1952 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to balance internal and external interests to a greater extent than before. The tense international situation made the Government considerably more determined to follow their allies. The US now actively tried to revoke the resolution against Franco, and wanted Norway to vote in favour of withdrawing the resolution. Simultaneously, influential groups within Norway fought to maintain the firm policy on Spain. The abstentions of 1950 and 1952 were results of this compound pressure. After 1950, however, even abstention stood out as demonstrative behaviour towards Franco’s regime. Spanish authorities

⁵⁶ Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie Bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 48.

⁵⁷ Hilde Haraldstad, “Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960” (Masters’ thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 44-45.

⁵⁸ Miguel Marín-Bosch, *Votes in the UN General Assembly* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 39-40.

reacted strongly when the Nordic countries refrained from voting in 1952, and accused Norway of causing the abstentions. One might argue, therefore, that the Norwegian policy of this period did not represent a complete break with the restrictive policy from the previous period. By 1953, however, the Norwegian standpoint had changed.⁵⁹ The main reason for this change was the so-called principle of universality. The majority of Norwegians now felt that the UN should be an organisation for all the states in the world, and in 1955 Norway voted to accept Spain as a member.⁶⁰

3.3.2 The OEEC

Spanish accession to the OEEC took place gradually, from restricted participation in the organisation's agricultural cooperation in 1954, to observer status in 1958 and full membership in 1959.⁶¹ Through all these stages the Norwegian policy was wavering and dependent upon the stand of the other members. Unlike in the UN or NATO, Norway never chose to swim against the current in this organisation. Norway did, however, belong to the group of countries with the most restrictive stand also in the OEEC. Belgium and, to a certain degree, Sweden were more willing to voice their concerns about Spanish participation in the organisation. The Norwegian Government seemed to find it difficult not to side with countries willing to oppose Spain, having been one of Franco's main opponents on several occasions.⁶²

The question of Spain in the OEEC attracted very little attention in Norway, something that may seem strange. The fact that the issue for the most part was treated confidentially in private meetings was probably important. But not even when the fact that Norway had voted for full Spanish membership was known, did many critical voices arise. This suggests that saying yes to Spanish membership in the OEEC was not seen as a departure from the restrictive line against Franco. It must have been easier for Norwegian politicians to follow the majority of the organisation on an issue where the domestic opposition was weak. Business interests, on the other hand, were heard and considered. Norwegian shipping was clearly better served with Spanish membership than without.⁶³ Economic considerations were most likely determinant for Norway's willingness to accept Spain into the cooperation. The

⁵⁹ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 44-45.

⁶⁰ Olav Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations: A History* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 191.

⁶¹ Julio Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the process of European integration, 1957-85* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 31.

⁶² Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 97-98.

⁶³ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 97-98.

economic ties between the two countries were already strong, despite the political disagreement.⁶⁴ It has also been claimed that Norwegian opposition to admitting Spain into NATO may have influenced the question of membership in the OEEC. The fact that Norway decided to follow the other members and not to stand out may be interpreted as a form of compensation for the country's attitude in NATO, where moral political considerations were seen to be so much more important.⁶⁵

3.4 NATO

When Norway joined NATO in 1949, Spanish membership was out of the question. Foreign Minister Halvard Lange made this perfectly clear when he announced that “the question of Spain is quite another than that of Italy, which was decided before we joined. One cannot imagine that Socialist ruled countries will vote for Spain's participation. We will in any case vote against. If we have to stand alone, we will”. It seems that this was an attitude that found support both in Parliament and in the public opinion. The declaration of the Foreign Minister was also a promise to the NATO opposition within the labour movement. It was necessary to convince the security policy opposition that Norway would not accept Spain as an ally. In a statement to the American news agency Associated Press in March 1949, Lange declared that Norway opposed Spain joining NATO because it would “weaken the foundation of the alliance, which was created to defend democracy”. This was the main argument for Norwegian opposition to Spanish membership as long as Franco remained in power.⁶⁶

In the early 1950s, increasingly convinced that Spain was essential for the defence of Western Europe, the US Government were reconsidering the Spanish question. As a result the Truman administration started negotiating a bilateral agreement in order to link the Francoist regime to the Western system. The outcome of these negotiations was the Pact of Madrid, which took the form of three separate executive agreements that guaranteed economic and military aid for Spain. In return, the US was to be permitted to build and use air and naval bases on Spanish territory.⁶⁷ The increasing US interest in Spain led to fears that the Americans might press to include the country in the Alliance. Norway kept a low profile, however, and did not object

⁶⁴ Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie Bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 48.

⁶⁵ Hilde Haraldstad, “Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960” (Masters’ thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 98.

⁶⁶ Hilde Haraldstad, “Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960” (Masters’ thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 99-100.

⁶⁷ Pablo del Hierro Lecea, “Beyond Bilateralism: Spanish-Italian Relations and the Influence of the Major Powers” (PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2011), 260, 287.

when military negotiations with Spain were opened. The lack of reaction indicates that the Norwegian Government may have seen the Madrid Pact as an alternative to NATO membership.⁶⁸ For the US, though, this was not the case. The possibility of including Spain in NATO was still on the US agenda. The issue was discussed at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting in 1954, where the Government recommended postponing the ultimate objective of Spanish membership because it did not seem possible in the foreseeable future. Eisenhower himself declared that there was no point in discussing Spanish accession because of the hostile attitude of many NATO members, especially the Scandinavian and Benelux countries. The issue was therefore put aside.

A year later the question was nonetheless raised again. In June 1955 the US Senate passed a motion where they urged the State Department to promote the admission of Spain in NATO. Though this motion did not have a binding force, it forced the Eisenhower administration to reopen the debate. The same happened in 1957, when the House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution arguing for an attempt to include Spain in the Alliance. This meant that discussions regarding the Spanish question intensified in the Western countries.⁶⁹ In Norway the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed the suggestions vehemently. In 1955 and 1957 both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister publicly opposed Spanish membership. This introduced a period where Norway would play a more decisive role. Norwegian influence increased, not because of any change in the Norwegian stance, but because of decreased resistance in other NATO countries.⁷⁰ By 1957 most of the allies were positive, or at least not negative, with regard to including the Spaniards. Both Britain and France, previously among the strongest opponents of Spanish membership, had taken more flexible stances.⁷¹ Norway now assumed the role as the main opponent of Spanish membership in NATO. During 1956 and 1957 Norway repeatedly confirmed its opposition. By the end of 1957 only Norway, Denmark and Iceland opposed Spanish membership, and it was indicated that Denmark and Iceland would follow Norway if it decided not to vote against Spain. According to American and Spanish sources, the verdict was clear: the Norwegian

⁶⁸ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 104-108.

⁶⁹ Pablo del Hierro Lecea, "Beyond Bilateralism: Spanish-Italian Relations and the Influence of the Major Powers" (PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2011), 287-290.

⁷⁰ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 113-115.

⁷¹ Pablo del Hierro Lecea, "Beyond Bilateralism: Spanish-Italian Relations and the Influence of the Major Powers" (PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2011), 290-293.

stance was decisive in blocking Spanish participation in NATO.⁷² The Eisenhower administration decided not to rush the matter. Secretary of State Christian Herter declared that “the United States will continue as appropriate to discuss the question of Spanish membership with other NATO members. Although it does not appear wise for us to press openly the question of Spanish membership at present, it is a question to which we are devoting a great deal of thought”.⁷³

The fact that the issue was still on the US agenda was perfectly clear to the Norwegian Government. From 1958 to 1960 a number of enquiries reached the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the US asked whether the policy had changed or not. This suggests that Norway was the reason why Spanish membership was not treated officially at NATO meetings during this period. Normal procedure within the organisation was that such issues would not be addressed if it was known that one of its members would vote negatively. During the spring of 1959 an alternative solution was suggested. A committee could be established, to give an account of and discuss the question of Spanish membership closely. Norway immediately opposed the idea. This advance demonstrates the fact that powerful groups within NATO now wanted Spanish participation. The quick response also illustrates the uncompromising Norwegian stance.⁷⁴ Even when Danish support could no longer be taken for granted, Norway maintained its strong opposition.⁷⁵

It is generally agreed that domestic considerations were the main reason for the Norwegian policy.⁷⁶ The consensus within the Labour Party and the political leadership was decisive for the consistent attitude towards Spanish entry to NATO. The prevailing reluctance to accept undemocratic allies, combined with the emotional Spanish question, gave the issue a special, symbolic role in Norwegian politics. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that this was the only time Norway threatened to use its veto.⁷⁷ Additionally, Norway would have no direct security advantages from Spanish participation. The political leadership was worried that

⁷² Haraldstad, Hilde 1994. ”Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960”, Masters’ thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, Oslo, pp 113-115.

⁷³ Pablo del Hierro Lecea, “Beyond Bilateralism: Spanish-Italian Relations and the Influence of the Major Powers” (PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2011), 293-294.

⁷⁴ Hilde Haraldstad, “Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960” (Masters’ thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 118-199.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁷⁶ Liland, Frode and Helge Ø. Pharo 1999. “Norge og stride nom NATOs geografiske virkeområde” in Chris Prebensen and Nils Skarland (eds.). *NATO 50 år- Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år*, Oslo: Den norske Atlanterhavskomiteé, pp 183-184; Haraldstad, Hilde 1994. *Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960*, Master Thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, Oslo, pp 127.

⁷⁷ Hilde Haraldstad, “Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960” (Masters’ thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 133-134.

Spanish membership could increase focus on the Southern flank, and that the Northern areas would be given less priority. This geopolitical consideration may have influenced the Norwegian policy.⁷⁸ Aside from the burden of taking this stance alone, also external factors weighed against Norway accepting Spain as a member of the alliance. The détente period in international politics from the mid 1950s, combined with conflicts within the organisation, made it easier for the Norwegian government to choose its own policy in NATO.⁷⁹ Moen and Sæther claim that Norway faced strong pressure from the US to accept Spanish membership.⁸⁰ Documents from the American Ministry of Foreign Affairs show, however, that the US took the Norwegian stance seriously and was not willing to use any harsh measures to make the Norwegians change their position.⁸¹

The Eisenhower administration continued to study the question of Spanish membership for years. Lecea assumes that, due to the relentless opposition, the question gradually faded away thereafter.⁸² This, however, was not the case. On the contrary, the US kept inquiring about possible changes in the Norwegian position and suggesting different moves that would forge some kind of connection between NATO and Spain.⁸³ But the Norwegian stance did not change, and the US attempts did not lead anywhere. In 1973 Norway prevented the NATO fleet from visiting Barcelona, and a year later a Spanish naval vessel from joining the NATO fleet at sea.⁸⁴ Foreign Minister Lange had kept his promise from 1949; The Government would not accept Spain as a NATO member, even if Norway was the only one left to object. The result was that when Franco died in 1975, Spain was still outside the Alliance. The question was now what would happen next.

⁷⁸ Hilde Haraldstad, "Franco-Spanias fiende nummer 1? : Norges politikk overfor Franco-Spania, 1946-1960" (Masters' thesis, Universitetet i Oslo, 1994), 132.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 134.

⁸⁰ Jo Stein Moen and Rolf Sæther, *Tusen dager: Norge og den spanske borgerkrigen 1936-1939* (Finland: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2009), 300.

⁸¹ US National Archives, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1960-1963. Box 1837, 959.00/12-960, XR 959-5, "Current Situation in Norway: Norwegian-American Relations", 09.12.60.

⁸² Pablo del Hierro Lecea, "Beyond Bilateralism: Spanish-Italian Relations and the Influence of the Major Powers" (PhD thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2011), 294.

⁸³ UD 33.6/3, bind 6, Journalnummer (JN) 00447, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Washington, 28.03.1972. UD 33.6/3, bind 6, JN 00680, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Washington, 24.04.1973; UD 33.6/3, bind 6, JN 00973, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 08.06.1973; UD 33.6/3, bind 6, H-JN 001887, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 20.12.1973.

⁸⁴ UD 33.6/3, bind 6, JN 001160, Utgående melding til NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 18.07.1974.

4.0 There is a price to pay

Franco's death in November 1975 and the gradual dismantling of the authoritarian regime were met with high expectations of democratic progress, both from the Spanish people and the international community.⁸⁵ Coinciding with the cooling relationship between the two superpowers of the Cold War⁸⁶, the death of Franco assured that the question of Spanish membership in NATO was, now more than ever, on the agenda.

This chapter analyses the Norwegian policy during the first years after 1975. Previous research seems to assume that Norwegian resistance to Spanish accession to NATO died with Franco.⁸⁷ The main argument of this chapter, however, is that Franco's death in itself did not have much influence on the Norwegian stance. Norway, acting as a gatekeeper for NATO, demanded evidence that Spain had become a fully fledged democracy before they would adjust their position.

4.1 A step in the wrong direction

The months leading up to the death of Franco were characterised by increasing efforts on the part of the United States to create a connection between Spain and NATO. In April the US contacted the Norwegian administration. Linking Spain to NATO, they argued, would help keep Spain on a stable and moderate course. During negotiations concerning the renewal of the Madrid Pact, Spain had expressed wishes to establish closer connections to NATO and for the members of the Alliance to recognise the importance of Spain's contribution to the defence of Western Europe. From the American perspective it was deemed important, with regard both to the Spaniards themselves and the public opinion, to declare that the possibility of a Spanish role in the Alliance did exist. In closing, the Norwegians were told that all the members of the Alliance should consider what steps might be taken, to pave the way for a Spanish connection to NATO.⁸⁸

Barely a month later, a new enquiry from the Americans reached the Norwegian Government. A communiqué from the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting in Brussels was now being drafted, and the US administration wanted Norwegian support for it to express that Spain, through cooperation with the US, "continued to play an important role in support of the

⁸⁵ Paul Preston and Denis Smyth, *España ante la CEE y la OTAN* (Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1985), 77-78.

⁸⁶ Ralph B. Levering, *The Cold War 1945-1987* (Illinois: Harland Davidson, 1988), 138-139.

⁸⁷ Olav Riste, *Norway's Foreign Relations: A History* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 191; Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie Bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 49;

⁸⁸ UD 33.6/3, bind 6, Journalnummer (JN) 01855, Notat, "Spania-spørsmålet i vestlig samarbeid", 01.12.1975.

NATO defence effort”.⁸⁹ When the American suggestion was discussed during a NATO meeting of the Ministers of Defence there was general agreement amongst the European allies that Spain’s importance to NATO defence should not be highlighted. The Norwegian, Danish and Dutch Foreign Ministers preferred Spain not to be mentioned at all, while others felt that it was necessary to avoid the impression that Spain was joining the Alliance.⁹⁰ In the end, the formulation agreed upon differed significantly from the original American suggestion in that it confirmed that the military arrangement between the US and Spain “remained outside the NATO context”.⁹¹

The US initiatives mentioned above did not lead anywhere. With Franco still in power many member states, and most certainly Norway, were very sceptic about the creation of any clear link between NATO and Spain. The initiatives are nonetheless a good demonstration of the role the US played as a driving force for Spanish membership in NATO. This was a role the US maintained, as the next chapters will show, right up until the moment Spain joined the Alliance. The Norwegian reluctance to even mention Spain in connection with NATO was, on the other hand, a clear indication of the continuation of the restrictive policy towards Spain. There was to be no doubt about how the Norwegian authorities felt about forging connections between NATO and Spain, or that rhetorical action was a part of the Norwegian strategy.

During a NATO summit in May 1975 Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli made the following statement:

[...] Our security is also highly dependent on the political and moral strength of our societies. In the declaration which we signed a year ago we recall that we have proclaimed our dedication to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress. The events last year which relieved our alliance of two totalitarian regimes were strongly welcomed. These events also relieved the Alliance of the liability of an anachronistic colonial policy which harmed the image of NATO in the world. To establish a link between NATO and Spain in the present circumstances, would in the view of my Government be a step in the wrong direction. It is our earnest hope that the situation in Spain will

⁸⁹ UD 33.6/3, bind 6, Journalnummer (JN) 01855, Notat, ”Spania-spørsmålet i vestlig samarbeid”, 01.12.1975.

⁹⁰ UD 33.6/3, bind 6, JN 00874, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til UD, 23.05.1975.

⁹¹ UD 33.6/3, bind 6, JN 00876, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til UD, 23.05.1975; UK National Archives, Kew Gardens, FCO 41 1640, ”Tel. 128 to UKDEL OECD”, 28.05.1975.

undergo changes in a democratic direction in a not too distant future. When this happens, Norway would be interested in discussing the question of closer relations between Spain and the Western democracies.⁹²

The Norwegian stance was also made clear in bilateral conversations between Norway and Spain. At a UN meeting in September the same year, Foreign Minister Frydenlund told his Spanish colleague that the recent executions⁹³ in Spain had destroyed the efforts of normalisation between Spain and Western Europe. Further death sentences and executions, he added, would render a normalisation of relations between Norway and Spain impossible.⁹⁴

In addition to the issue of democracy, the domestic political climate would come to be important for the Norwegian policy towards Spanish NATO membership. With Norway's accession to NATO in 1949 the Labour Party broke not only with their own, but with all Norwegian foreign policy tradition. For the first time Norway was a member of a defence alliance that made the country an active participant on one side of the main division in international politics. This realignment also had important effects on political life in Norway, not least on the Labour Movement. It was within this movement that the main concerns over what was conceived as a major change in foreign policy asserted itself, and where it would be difficult to gain support for everything that came with membership in NATO. Foreign and security policy were major problem areas which led to friction about the contents of the policy, the internal democracy of the movement, and finally caused a division of the Labour party, when *Sosialistisk Folkeparti* (the Socialist People's Party) was formed in 1961.⁹⁵

4.2 The Right and the Left: different views, different solutions

The death of the Spanish Caudillo did not bring about any immediate changes in the Norwegian policy. In December 1975 the Norwegian evaluation was that Franco's death was too recent for any realistic judgment on the situation to be made. Prospects for a stable democracy in Spain, the Government claimed, were highly uncertain. The hitherto restrictive Norwegian policy should therefore be maintained. Spain's changing situation called, however,

⁹² UK National Archives, Kew Gardens, FCO 41 1640, "Norwegian Minister", 30.05.1975.

⁹³ The 25th of September 1975 two members of ETA and three members of *Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico* (the Revolutionary Antifascist and Patriotic Front) were executed, accused of killing a civil guard and several policemen. These executions were facilitated by an anti-terrorism decree passed in August the same year, imposing the death penalty for crimes of abduction or assassination. Julio Valdeon, Joseph Perez and Santos Juliá, *Historia de España* (Madrid: Gran Austral, 2006), 530.

⁹⁴ UD 33.6/3, bind 6, JN 01855, Notat, "Spania-spørsmålet i vestlig samarbeid", 01.12.1975.

⁹⁵ Trond Bergh, *Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge 5: Storhetstid (1945-1965)* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1987), 250-254.

for Norway actively encouraging and supporting the democratic forces within the country. With this in mind Norway should express that democratic reforms would contribute to a more accommodating Norwegian attitude regarding future cooperation between Spain and the Western democracies, also in the field of security policy.⁹⁶

That this attitude enjoyed public support, and that Spain had not been forgotten by Norwegian politicians, was quite clear from the domestic debate. The seventh of April 1976 Spain was the subject of the following interpellation in the Norwegian Parliament: “What has Norway done and what more can Norway and Norwegians do to strengthen the democratic forces in Spain?” This interpellation had been presented by *Sosialistisk Venstreparti* (the Socialist Left Party), a party which has its roots in the left wing of the Labour Movement and with a history of opposition towards NATO and Norway’s post-war foreign and security policy.⁹⁷ Presented long before the death of Franco, the interpellation was still a subject of heated debate. Withdrawing it had not been an option, despite reports of improvements on the peninsula. The situation in Spain, it was claimed, was still one where violence, abuse and torture were parts of everyday life. The Socialist Left Party wanted to know what could be done, and how far the Government was willing to go in supporting the Spanish democratic opposition. In particular, they wanted reassurance that Norway would not make any concessions to the Spanish regime within international organizations. Concessions should not be given, they argued, before all the democratic demands of the Spanish opposition had been met.⁹⁸

The Labour Government was not dismayed by the questioning of its approach towards Spain. Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund answered the questions of the interpellation thoroughly. First of all he highlighted the fact that Norway had been, and still was, the country in Western Europe with the most restrictive policy with regard to Spain. He then went on to describe the results of this policy. It had, among other things, resulted in the consistent opposition to Spanish participation in NATO and the Council of Europe. Repeating the main argument of Norwegian opposition, his view was that Spanish participation would have violated the purpose clauses of democracy and human rights of these organisations. Another result mentioned by Frydenlund was several campaigns against the Spanish regime. The latest came as a result of the five executions in 1975, which caused uproar all over Western Europe. The Norwegian Government had, he claimed, employed relatively sharp diplomatic measures in

⁹⁶ UD 33.6/3, bind 6, JN 01855, Notat, ”Spania-spørsmålet i vestlig samarbeid”, 01.12.1975.

⁹⁷ Trond Bergh, *Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge 5: Storhetstid (1945-1965)* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1987), 310.

⁹⁸ Stortingsforhandling nr 335, sak 4, 07.04.1976, 3105-3107.

order to voice their concern. Whether such campaigns had any effects, he admitted, was hard to measure. He claimed, however, that “what a campaign of this kind must have made perfectly clear to the Spanish Government, is that there is a price to pay to be accepted in Western Europe. This price is the introduction of full democratic rights to the Spanish people.”⁹⁹

This would not be the last time the Norwegian Government set forth the demand that Spain had to pay the price of democracy to be accepted. It would, on the contrary, come to characterise Norway’s role as gatekeeper for NATO. An important point to note is the fact that such statements were never accompanied by a definition of what concrete democratic steps Spain would have to take before the country could be accepted. This suggests that the Norwegian Government may have been setting the bar deliberately high, in an attempt to postpone the complicated question of Spanish NATO membership.

Regarding the future of the relations between the two countries, the Foreign Minister was quite clear. The Norwegian stance had not - and would not - change until democratic requirements had been met. In an assessment of the need to re-evaluate the restrictive policy he admitted that the death of Franco had meant a turning point in the history of Spain. For the first time in 40 years the possibility of a democratic development existed. The development over the last months, he argued, nonetheless indicated that the political forces influenced by Franciosm were still strong. He could not see any decisive moves towards liberalisation and democratisation. Because of this insecurity the Government believed that the right thing to do was to maintain a wait-and-see attitude. Norway wanted concrete signs of democratic progress before making any decisions. The Government were, he assured, monitoring the situation closely and wanted to contribute to a real democratic development in Spain.¹⁰⁰

As for what Norway could do to support the democratic forces, Frydenlund highlighted the role of political parties, the workers movement and relief agencies. Pointing to the fact that there are limits to what a government can do without violating the principle of non-involvement, he argued that much of the support had to go through such organisations. In particular, he mentioned the Committee for Spain and praised them for their effort ever since the outbreak of the Civil War. In closing he stated that democratic forces in Norway had

⁹⁹ Stortingsforhandling nr 335, sak 4, 07.04.1976, 3108-3109.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 3109.

nothing less than a moral responsibility to support the development of democracy in Spain, irrespective of party or organisational affiliation.¹⁰¹

Frydenlund's last statement may be interpreted as a small jibe aimed at the parties of the Right. This because the old cleavages between the Right and the Left, which had characterised the Spanish question during the years of the Civil War, were still evident. The only one from the Conservative Party to participate in the debate on this occasion was Paul Thyness. He did not directly criticise the Government's policy, but his comments caused heated debate nonetheless. His answer to the two questions of the interpellation, what Norway had and could do to help the democratic forces in Spain, was quite simply "not much"¹⁰². The main responsibility for a country's governance and form of government rests, he argued, with the country itself. As an exception from this rule he mentioned countries like Poland, Eastern Germany and Romania, where a foreign power has forced a certain form of government upon them. This comment shows that another characteristic from the time of the Civil War still persisted. The battle against Communism seemed for the Conservatives more important than establishing democracy in Spain. The Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships had in Thyness's opinion held quite unique positions. They were neither Communist nor, he argued, particularly brutal. Nevertheless they had lasted for a surprisingly long time. His explanation for this was that these regimes in all likelihood had enjoyed stronger popular support than one would believe. "Fact is that in the wants of any people, order takes precedence over freedom".¹⁰³

On the question of Spanish participation in international organisations Thyness admitted that the time was not yet ripe. Spain was still a dictatorship, to claim anything else would be futile. But, he argued, to continue to keep the regime politically isolated would be wrong. Thyness felt that the time had come to establish connections on every level where positive influence was possible. Spain had to feel that the way into the Western European community lay open, as long as they took the necessary democratic steps. Norway had to realise, he claimed, that not much could be done to change the domestic politics of Spain. What little could be done had to be done through political and economic rewards, not through never-ending condemnation. Last but not least, he highlighted the fact that democratisation of a country is not done over night. Progress would happen slowly, and Norway had to adjust their policy

¹⁰¹ Stortingsforhandling nr 335, sak 4, 07.04.1976, 3109-3110.

¹⁰² Paul Thyness, Stortinget 1976, Stortingsforhandling nr 335, sak 4, 07.04.1976, 3131.

¹⁰³ Paul Thyness, Stortinget 1976, Stortingsforhandling nr 335, sak 4, 07.04.1976, 3131.

thereafter.¹⁰⁴ Many of the same arguments regarding limited Norwegian influence and the need for encouragement rather than condemnation were proposed by Erland Stenberg, representing the traditionally conservative Centre Party.¹⁰⁵

Being the two only representatives of the political Right participating in this debate, the statements made by Thyness and Stenberg suggest that, like during the Civil War, the Right did not show enthusiasm with regard to the Spanish question. They did not directly oppose the Government's policy, but were quite sceptical to getting involved with what they regarded as Spain's domestic concerns. As chapter six will show, the Norwegian policy would be quite different with a Conservative Government.

4.3 American enthusiasm, Norwegian scepticism

The 28th of April 1976 the Spanish Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro, a prominent Francoist¹⁰⁶, held a speech where a schedule for the progress of the young democracy was put forth. This did not go unnoticed, and was thoroughly discussed by the NATO delegation in Brussels. The American ambassador claimed that the promised measures would entail vast progress. A positive attitude from NATO and its members, he argued, could exert a powerful influence on the developments in Spain. NATO Secretary-General Luns wholeheartedly agreed with this, and stressed the significance of friendly countries making "favourable noises" about the Spanish programme. Luns also stated that the time might be ripe for indicating an incipient, but highly limited connection between Spain and NATO. This connection could come, for instance, in the form of inviting Spanish observers to meetings on environmental protection and NATO exercises. These suggestions were received with scepticism from the other members of the Alliance, except for lukewarm support from France and Germany.¹⁰⁷ The Norwegian ambassador was more than sceptical, and it would soon be clear that neither the speech given by Arias, nor the general development in Spain, were seen as "vast progress" in Norway.

After this meeting a thorough evaluation of the situation in Spain was made by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, and later put forth at the NATO summit in Oslo 20-21 May 1976. The Norwegian stance was quite clear. The regime change gave reason, not necessarily for optimism, but at least for guarded hope that the way might be paved for the development of a

¹⁰⁴ Stortingsforhandling nr 335, sak 4, 07.04.1976, 3112-3113.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 3114-3115; Roar Madsen, *Motstraums: Senterpartiets historie 1959-2000* (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 2001), 25.

¹⁰⁶ Paul Preston and Denis Smyth, *España ante la CEE y la OTAN* (Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1985), 78.

¹⁰⁷ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, JN 00926, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til UD, 11.05.976.

democratic society in Spain. Some progress had admittedly been made, but recent events indicated that the Spanish Government's policy of slow reform had been over-cautious, and could lead to polarisation of the political forces in Spain. The danger of liberalisation coming to a stand-still also had to be faced. The Norwegian delegation then asked the question of how one could impress upon the Spanish authorities the need to continue the reform process, without being charged with interference in domestic affairs. Spain had clearly expressed the desire for closer cooperation with the Western nations. The answer was therefore, they argued, to use the leverage given by this desire to emphasise, in positive terms, the interdependence between a continued progress towards democracy and the improvement of Spain's relations with and position in the Western world. A premature acceptance, on the other hand, might lessen motivation for further reforms. Norway had so far adopted a cautious attitude with regard to expanding the political contacts with the Spanish Government. They did not exclude the possibility of Spain eventually taking part in Western cooperation. But the price for full acceptance should be the introduction of full democratic rights. This applied in particular to the question of establishing a possible link between Spain and NATO.¹⁰⁸

This view was repeated when Prime Minister Nordli held a press conference in June the same year. Here he emphasised the fact that the Atlantic Treaty states that every member state must comply with the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. It had to be noted, he argued, that no decisive progress toward democratisation of the Spanish society had yet taken place, although certain plans in this regard had now been drawn up. Norway, along with a majority of member countries in NATO, he claimed, felt that Spain did not yet meet the Treaty's provisions on democracy.¹⁰⁹ In many ways, Nordli was right. Strong forces within the Spanish army, the law enforcement and the political Right still supported the Francoist constitutional system. Given the uncertainty of how these forces would react Franco's successor, the young King Juan Carlos, did not rush the country towards democracy. Already after the first months of 1976 it became clear that the new Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro, for his loyalty to Franco, lacked the will to make major changes. The slow progress towards democracy served to reinforce the left and accelerate the process of unification, but it also resulted in a tremendous wave of political activism in the form of strikes and demonstrations.¹¹⁰ In light of this situation, the Norwegian Government had

¹⁰⁸ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, JN 01065, NATO's utenriksministermøte i Oslo 20-21 mai 1976, Talking Points.

¹⁰⁹ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, JN 01282, Statsminister Nordlis pressekonferanse, Notat, "Spania og NATO", 16.06.1976.

¹¹⁰ Paul Preston and Denis Smyth, *España ante la CEE y la OTAN* (Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1985), 77-78.

chosen to adopt a cautious attitude to the internal development in Spain and consequently also to the question of Spanish membership in the Western defence alliance.¹¹¹

Nordli's reference to the Atlantic Treaty is an excellent example of the Norwegian use of rhetorical action. Schimmelfennig argues that the interaction between members and the outcome of the decision-making process in an international organisation is affected by the community environment in four ways. The first one is that it causes discussions about the legitimacy of different preferences and policies. Actors are not only able to, but also to a certain degree forced to, use the community ideology as basis for the justification of their preferences. The second is that it influences the balance of power within the organisation. The actors that pursue preferences in line with the values and norms of the community add legitimacy to their actions and thus have increased bargaining power. The third is that political actors are forced to be concerned about their image. They are judged by other members not only on how well they conform to community rules and norms, but also on how credible their argumentation is. Finally, the structure of the international community complicates opportunistic argumentation. Because members interact on a regular basis, argumentative inconsistencies are easily detected.¹¹² This means that it is possible to "shame" members into compliance when their preferences are in conflict with community values. Because they are concerned about their image they will not want inconsistencies between earlier commitments and current action to be exposed.

These arguments may help explain how Norway was able to maintain its restrictive stance with regard to Spanish membership. By turning Schimmelfennig's use of rhetorical action around we can see how Norway was able to assume the role of gatekeeper and thus exclude Spain from the Alliance. First of all, Norway was able to justify its attitude with the use of principles stated in the North Atlantic Treaty. All members had committed to these principles, and they therefore legitimised Norway's argumentation. Secondly, because Norwegian preferences were in line with the community norms and values, other actors could not shame Norway into changing its stance. This though, did not stop them trying.

4.4 David versus Goliath: Norway punching above its weight

During a meeting in Brussels in October, Secretary-General Luns informed the ambassadors that he had received an enquiry about how the Alliance would respond if Spain was to obtain

¹¹¹ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, JN 01282, Statsminister Nordlis pressekonferanse, Notat, "Spania og NATO", 16.06.1976.

¹¹² Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 206-208.

observer status in the North Atlantic Assembly. His intention, he went on, was to reply that this was a question the Assembly had to assess directly. Should the answer be positive, however, it would not pose a problem as far as the Alliance was concerned. When the others seemed to be content with this statement, the Norwegian ambassador reacted strongly. This reply, he argued, could be both misused and misunderstood. It would certainly be preferable to wait with any kind of response until the Assembly itself had had the opportunity to make a statement on the matter. The NATO Council, he said, had always been careful not to interfere with the business of the Assembly.¹¹³ This principle should be applied also to this issue. These statements were then given support by the Danish and the British ambassadors.¹¹⁴

This meeting is a good illustration of the Norwegian willingness to speak out, and the fact that objections often gained support when stated. Members often had reservations, but were reluctant to be the one to voice them. It does not seem like Norway, at this point, had the same qualms about objecting or fears of standing alone. We must remember, however, that countries discussed these matters in advance of and between the meetings, often signalling potential support. Knowledge of such support may have made it easier for Norway to express preferences that went against those of the majority or the great powers. It also seems like Norway to a certain degree got rhetorically entrapped, got locked in the position as the one to object even when others had the same concerns. This would not be the last time that Norway was the one to stand out, while other member states afterwards supported the objections.

In January 1977, NATO flexibility studies, initiated by the US, suggested that Spain's relations to NATO ought to be examined formally. Norway opposed this suggestion vehemently. It was the view of the Norwegian Government that the questions concerning relations between Spain and NATO should not be discussed in the Executive Working Group (EWG) or the Defence Planning Committee (DPC). They constituted "questions of high politics" which for the time being should not be included in the defence planning agenda for the Alliance.¹¹⁵ The Norwegian delegation emphasised that it did not consider the time ripe for discussions in NATO that affected Spain's relationship with the Alliance, and that Norway would oppose a follow-up work on the flexibility studies should they include these measures. Norway did not gain support from the other members in these objections, and were criticised

¹¹³ The Council (the North Atlantic Council or NAC) is the chief political body of the organisation and has decision-making powers, while the Assembly (NATO Parliamentary Assembly or NATO-PA) provides parliamentary oversight. Julian Lindley-French, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: The Enduring Alliance* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 88-90.

¹¹⁴ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, JN 01509, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til UD, 06.10.1976.

¹¹⁵ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-Journalnummer (H-JN) 000047, Innstruks fra UD til NATO-delegasjonen, 01.02.1977.

by the American Defence Adviser, Dr. Legere. A single member state, he argued, could not prevent a NATO body discussing any question it might wish to raise.¹¹⁶ The Norwegians were then encouraged to discuss the matter again with their authorities. The Government would not adjust their position, however, so when the matter was revisited in Brussels later that month the Norwegian stance was confirmed. It now gained partial support from the Danish and Italian ambassadors. It was agreed that the issue of Spain would not, for the time being, be formally discussed.

Though the Norwegian ambassador reported back to the Government that the Secretary-General seemed to have a “certain understanding for the Norwegian view”¹¹⁷, he may have been more than a little exasperated by Norway’s unwillingness to change its position. It certainly seems reasonable to assume that he had Norway in mind when he warned that “NATO should not set itself up as judge over the democratic development in Spain”.¹¹⁸ It also seems reasonable to see this as an attempt at shaming the Norwegians into adopting a more flexible attitude towards the issue of Spain. Regardless of what the intentions of the Secretary-General may have been, the Norwegian authorities did not take the statement to heart.

By May, the official Norwegian position was that Norway gladly noted the democratic reforms that had been implemented in Spain. It was deemed appropriate, however, to await the coming elections and the subsequent government formation in Spain. Only then could Norway consider whether it was suitable to adopt a more accommodating attitude towards closer cooperation between Spain and the Western democracies in the area of security policy.¹¹⁹

4.5 Guarding the gates

Franco’s death in 1975 did not cause the Norwegian policy to change. Instead, Norway maintained the restrictive policy and objected to every single initiative that would link Spain to NATO. The repeated argument of Spain having to pay the price of democracy to gain acceptance by the Western community, is indeed descriptive of the Norwegian stance during this period. It is also a clear example of how rhetorical action was used in attempts to prevent Spanish membership in NATO. In assuming the authority to judge whether the demanded, though never formulated, democratic credentials had been met, Norway acted as a gatekeeper

¹¹⁶ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000027, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til UD, 25.01.1977.

¹¹⁷ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000047, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til UD, 01.02.1977.

¹¹⁸ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, JN 00454, Notat, ”Spania/NATO”, 02.05.1977.

¹¹⁹ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, JN 00454, Notat, ”Spania/NATO”, 02.05.1977.

for the North Atlantic Alliance. The gates were closed, and would remain so as long as Spain, in the eyes of Norwegian authorities, was unable to prove itself to be a stable democracy.

In addition to the issue of democracy, the political climate in Norway may have influenced this restrictive Norwegian stance. During the years around 1970, issues concerning the Cold War and NATO had been overshadowed by the battle over membership in the EC. Around 1975, however, a new, intense debate about security policy emerged. One of the reasons for this re-emergence was the political radicalisation caused by the conflict over the EC, another was the cooling relations between the superpowers and the increased Western involvement in the defence of the flanks. According to the critics, US armament in the North would tie Norway closer to the superpower's global strategy.¹²⁰ In such a climate it may have been seen as unfortunate to bring up another potentially controversial NATO issue, a concern that would also be central during the next period.

¹²⁰ Rolf Tamnes, *Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Historie bind 6: Oljealder 1965-1995* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 93-94.

5.0 Not the most ardent proponents

During the summer of 1977 Spain could celebrate the first democratic elections after almost 40 years of dictatorship. Franco's regime, it seemed, had finally been laid to rest. After decades of Francoism, formal political democracy was undoubtedly a great achievement. In many respects it was nonetheless only a timid beginning.¹²¹ Often, the young Spanish democracy seemed about succumb to the problems of terrorism, military subversion and economic stagnation. All these issues were, to a certain degree, the legacy of General Franco. The rigid centralism of his dictatorship and the frequent use of violence in the Basque Country were the origins of ETA terrorism. Similarly, his assiduous cultivation of the civil war mentality, dividing the country into winners and losers, meant that he did not lack supporters who, after his death, portrayed a frenzied aversion against democracy. Furthermore, the solution of these problems was complicated by the serious economic imbalances left by the Franco regime.¹²²

Both the success and the problems of the young democracy would come to influence the Norwegian policy analysed in this chapter. The main argument is that though Norwegian authorities after the elections in Spain would no longer directly oppose Spanish membership, Norway remained the NATO member with the most restrictive policy towards Spain. Partly due to tension within the governing party, and partly due to rhetorical entrapment, Norway still acted as a gatekeeper for NATO. Perhaps the policy of this period can best be described by a quotation from an internal evaluation made by Norwegian NATO ambassador Rolf T. Busch:

Regarding the question of Spanish membership in NATO it is on the one hand clear that we will not oppose this and, on the other hand, equally clear that we will not act as the most ardent proponents of membership.¹²³

5.1 New considerations: from democratic doubts to procedural objections

As the democratic process in Spain advanced, new considerations were introduced to the Norwegian evaluation of the membership question. The issue of Spanish membership in NATO was complex, it was argued, and had to be seen in relation to Spain's own situation, in relation to the Alliance and the East-West context. The internal debate process in Spain about membership had not come very far, and there were not yet any expressed desire for affiliation

¹²¹ Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (New York: Methuen, 1986), 119-121.

¹²² Paul Preston and Denis Smyth, *España ante la CEE y la OTAN* (Barcelona: Ediciones Grijalbo, 1985), 77-78.

¹²³ Rolf T. Busch 1977 in UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000681, Notat, "Spørsmålet om spansk medlemskap I NATO", 29.09.1977.

from a democratically elected Spanish government. Neither was it certain that Spain, after the coming round of clarification, would see joining NATO as the best alternative. Norway's view was therefore that it was appropriate to postpone the issue until the formation of the new Spanish Government and their program was clear. This was a matter that should not be rushed. In the meantime, the interests of the Alliance were taken care of through the bilateral agreement between the US and Spain. Norway would, however, support any proposal that NATO should conduct a thorough assessment of the consequences of Spanish membership. And, interestingly enough, such a study should also discuss the possibility of Spain's future relationship with the Western defence being arranged through bilateral agreements.¹²⁴ Even though the majority of the Alliance now supported Spanish membership, Norway seemed to hope that there was another alternative.

Further considerations were made clear during a Council Meeting in Brussels on 24 October when the Spanish question was again raised, this time on the account of a suggestion from the Canadian ambassador. The Norwegian ambassador then argued that there was no need, at the moment, for any formal debate on the subject. The Norwegian authorities preferred any exchange of evaluations and information about this question to be maintained at an informal, discrete level. Should the Alliance open up a formal and methodical discussion of Spanish membership, one would have to assume that this sooner or later would become publicly known. This might create the impression that NATO as an organisation was seeking to influence the Spanish decision. This would, in turn, not only make the membership question more controversial in Spain, but also create a controversial attitude towards the Alliance as such. The Norwegian conclusion was therefore that the Alliance should maintain a positive but discrete wait-and-see attitude.¹²⁵

The American Chargé d'Affairs agreed that the consultations within NATO should be carried out with the utmost discretion. Some things, he argued, could nonetheless be done. The social democratic parties in Northern Europe should discretely attempt to influence the PSOE¹²⁶ to adopt a more agreeable attitude toward membership by explaining what the Alliance stood for. Furthermore, members should focus on strengthening bilateral relations with Spain, it was

¹²⁴ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000482, Notat, "Spørsmålet om spansk medlemskap I NATO. Endel momenter og opplegg til norsk holdning", 30.06.1977.

¹²⁵ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000814, Notat, "Spania og NATO", 25.10.1977.

¹²⁶ *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* or the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party is one of the oldest political parties in Spain. The party played a vital role during the transition to democracy, and constituted for a long time the most fervent opposition against Spanish NATO membership. Laura Desfor Edles, *Symbol and ritual in the New Spain: The transition to democracy after Franco* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 74-75.

important to “get to know each other better”. The Spaniards were, he claimed, to a certain extent still worried that they might be rebuffed by NATO. They would prefer an invitation from the Alliance to become a member. The American view was that one had to avoid the possibility of Spanish membership being lost just because of a misinterpretation of the attitude of member states, or the impression of a negative attitude among member countries causing Spain to swing in the direction of non-alignment. It was therefore important that each member state made the Spaniards understand that should Spain decide to apply for membership, it would be welcomed. With the exception of Norway, Luxembourg and Iceland, all the member countries informed that they already had - or soon would – confirm in bilateral conversations with Spain that their country would welcome Spain into the Alliance.¹²⁷

The fact that this was not the first time Norway had been informed that Spain preferred an invitation to the Alliance, having received the same report from the embassy in Lisbon months earlier¹²⁸, provides a certain perspective to the seemingly positive new stance adopted by the Norwegian Government a few weeks later. As of 31 October 1977 the Norwegian policy was that the question of Spanish membership in NATO was an internal Spanish concern that the Spanish authorities should handle without pressure or advice from abroad. Norway should therefore not make any enquiries to Spain about this question. It was another matter should they receive a specific request from the Spanish Government about the Norwegian stance on the issue. To such an enquiry they would respond positively, provided that the NATO countries at such a time agreed that the Alliance should be extended.¹²⁹

The argument that the decision to join NATO had to be made by Spain, and Spain alone, was not a Norwegian one. All the members were very aware that if they seemed to be pressuring Spain in any way, then the task of the NATO proponents within Spain would be all the more difficult. The reason for this was that national sensitivities demanded that, if Spain was to join NATO, then it had to be a Spanish decision made for Spanish reasons, rather than one provoked by external pressure or the needs of the Alliance.¹³⁰ The way in which Norway put this argument to use, however, certainly differed from that of most members. On several occasions the Norwegian authorities used it as justification for opposing Spanish participation

¹²⁷ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000814, Notat, ”Spania og NATO”, 25.10.1977.

¹²⁸ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, JN 016082, Notat, ”Eanes’ besøk i Spania – Mondales besøk i Lisboa”, 13.06.1977.

¹²⁹ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000808, Notat, til regjeringens medlemmer fra utenriksministeren, ”Spørsmålet om spansk medlemskap i NATO”, 31.10.1977.

¹³⁰ Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 140.

in NATO exercises.¹³¹ Later, as this chapter will show, it would also be used to attempt to stall the process when it, in the eyes of Norwegian authorities, seemed to be going too fast.

The view that Spanish membership perhaps ought to be avoided because of the possible negative impact NATO enlargement might have on the relations between the East and the West, on the other hand, would not gain appreciation that easily. The General agreement in Brussels was that there was no immediate danger of such an impact, and that it would be irresponsible to forgo the strengthening of the Alliance Spanish membership would entail. Additionally, and a fact of which Norway was quite forcefully reminded, it would not be in accordance with the communiqué from a NATO summit in 1976. Here the ministers had stated that the Alliance would remain a free association open to all European states devoted to the defence of the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples. Norway was also reminded of the fact that the right of states to belong or not to belong to treaties of alliance was confirmed in the Final Act of Helsinki.¹³²

This is a good example of Schimmelfennig's point about political actors referring to common values and norms to gain the legitimacy that is needed to advance their goals. And, as this chapter will show, these particular arguments would also prove another one of Schimmelfennig's arguments; that actors also use strategic argumentation to reduce the strains of legitimacy by manipulating these values and norms. Norway would later incorporate these points into its own argumentation and use them as justification for its stance, all the while making countless attempts to stall the process of Spain's accession.

5.2 Less enthusiasm than before

By the end of 1977 the question of Spanish NATO membership had more or less reached a standstill. It was never of the table, but the positions were fixed and whenever the issue was brought up it got the same response; Norway was in favour of Spanish membership, but objected to initiatives because they were not, in Norwegian eyes, correctly formulated or because they would give the wrong impression.¹³³ The situation changed, however, when on

¹³¹ UD 33.6/3, bind 8, JN 000804, Notat, "Spørsmål om å invitere spanske observatører til å overvære NATO-øvelsen "Display Determination".", 20.09.1978; UD 33.6/3, bind 8, JN 000804, Inkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til UD, 20.09.1978; UK National Archives, Kew Gardens, DEFE 241306, "From UKMILREP Brussels to Moduk II", 20.07.1977.

¹³² UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000811, Inkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til DU, 08.11.1977. The Helsinki Final act was the final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, signed by 33 states in an attempt to improve relations between the West and the Communist bloc. John Young and John Kent, *International Relations since 1945: A Global History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 443.

¹³³ UD 33.6/3, bind 8, JN 000804, Notat, "Spørsmål om å invitere spanske observatører til å overvære NATO-øvelsen "Display Determination".", 20.09.1978.

23 February 1981 Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero led a group of the Guardia Civil in an occupation of *el Congreso de los Diputados* (the Congress of Deputies). The attempted coup, later known as 23-F, failed, but clearly demonstrated the existence of insurrectionary elements within the army.¹³⁴

In the aftermath of 23-F, reports came of increased interest from the Spanish government to accelerate the initial steps aimed at Spanish membership in NATO. The Spanish Government had still not made a final decision, but hoped “very soon” to pass a positive resolution. NATO members were therefore asked if they within a week's time could announce whether they in principle were prepared to react positively to Spanish membership, should the Spanish government decide to apply. Before Spain was to make a final decision, they wanted a confidential statement from the Secretary-General about whether the member countries would welcome a Spanish application. Once again protests came from the Norwegian ambassador, pointing to the general consensus that, for a while now, had existed within the organisation about responding positively should Spain decide to apply for membership. The approach Luns now suggested, he argued, seemed to deviate from the envisioned scenario where the initiative should emanate from Spain and Spain alone.¹³⁵

The fact that the issue now seemed to proceed faster than previously envisioned caused the Norwegian Foreign Ministry to carry out a new thorough evaluation of the Spanish question. The situation in Spain in the aftermath of the coup was described as a state of "latent coup situation", the majority of generals were seen to sympathize with the rebels, and it was believed that they would not obey the King if another coup was attempted. Many, including Norwegian newspapers, claimed that the coup represented an important test of democratic strength, and that Spain had passed with flying colours. According to the Norwegian evaluation, however, this was a hypothesis that should be viewed with scepticism. On the contrary, they saw the relatively mild reaction to the coup makers as evidence of how weak the foundation of democracy in Spain still was. It had to be carefully evaluated, they argued, whether one should try to strengthen democracy in Spain by giving the country membership in NATO or whether to try to postpone membership until democracy in Spain had been strengthened. If the first alternative was pursued, the risk was that NATO might get another undemocratic country in their midst. The effect of Spanish membership in NATO, they

¹³⁴ Pilar Cernuda, Fernando Jáuregui and Manuel Ángel Menéndez, *23-F: la conjura de los necios* (Madrid: Foca ediciones y distribuciones generales, 2001), 27-28.

¹³⁵ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 00025, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 24.03.1981.

claimed, might be so small that it would not be enough to prevent another undemocratic regime in Spain. It could just as easily be argued that Spain should strengthen its democracy and remain democratic in a natural, organic way rather than by the use of NATO membership. They admitted that a dismissive attitude from NATO could potentially strengthen the anti-democratic forces in Spain. This, however, should not be decisive for the Norwegian stance towards a Spanish request for membership in NATO. Emphasis should instead be placed on the risk of Spain - despite membership in NATO - again falling back to an undemocratic regime. The conclusion was that there should be no rush to include Spain in NATO, and that Norway therefore would try to ensure that Spain considered all aspects of NATO membership before the country formally might apply for such membership.¹³⁶

When the discussions above were summarised, the note quite simply stated: “It seems like Spain is pushing for a fast decision on the question of membership. Norway will not oppose membership, but there is currently less enthusiasm than before.”¹³⁷ To what extent there had ever been enthusiasm about Spanish membership in Norway is debatable, but the attempted coup certainly triggered new worries about Spain’s democratic credentials. Norway’s role as self-appointed gatekeeper for the North Atlantic Alliance, it seemed, was not yet over.

5.3 Exploiting the argument of democracy: increasing pressure from strategic argumentation

Traditionally, Spain’s concept of national security had differed quite sharply from those of the West European members of NATO, in that they shared few of the same defining historical experiences. In the post-Franco period these differences would remain. The main threats to Spain’s individual security were not defined in terms of the Soviet Union or the Cold War, but focused on the British possession of Gibraltar and the Moroccan claim to the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla.¹³⁸ Although Spain made several attempts to address these concerns, neither of them would be covered by the NATO guarantee. Spain had, nonetheless, reasons for wishing to join the Alliance. One such reason was the domestic unpopularity of the Madrid Pacts, clearly imbalanced and by many viewed as a relic of Franco’s regime. More important, however, was perhaps the link between NATO and the EC. Despite continuous attempts to treat membership in the organisations as separate issues, they were in reality closely linked. Membership in the EC was the key aim in Spanish foreign policy and NATO

¹³⁶ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 00025, Notat, ”Spørmålet om spansk medlemskap i NATO, 25.03.1981.

¹³⁷ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 00025, Utdrag av referat fra morgenmøte/avdelingssjefmøte, 25.03.1981.

¹³⁸ Hal Klepak. *Spain: NATO or Neutrality?*, National Security Studies no 1 (Kingston: Centre for International Relations Queens University, 1980), 79-80.

membership, though much more controversial, could be used to exert pressure on states which were members of both organisations. With continuing opposition against early membership in the EC, the hope was that joining NATO might make the reluctant members look more favourable upon EC entry.¹³⁹ The fact that Spain indeed did have its own agenda became ever clearer through their use of rhetorical action, something that did not go unnoticed in Norway. This seems clear from the fact that the Norwegian State Secretary at one point claimed that Spain was “exploiting the argument that NATO membership would help strengthen democracy in Spain”.¹⁴⁰

The increasing interest in NATO membership from the Spanish authorities became obvious as Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo and Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca both publicly announced that they very soon hoped to make a formal request to NATO for Spanish membership in the Alliance. Public statements were increasingly accompanied by appeals to the values and norms of the Euro-Atlantic community. Spanish participation in NATO, and to an even greater extent the EC, would, they argued, strengthen the democratic forces in Spain. A negative attitude from Western Europe towards the Spanish integration efforts, on the other hand, could fuel undemocratic attitudes and strengthen the cause of those who argued that the country should return to the isolated state experienced during the Franco era.¹⁴¹

The Spaniards also tried to convince the NATO members, perhaps especially those who had questioned the strength of the Spanish democracy, of their democratic credentials. In a conversation with the Norwegian delegation in Brussels, Spanish ambassador de Carcer emphasised that Spain considered itself, despite the known difficulties they had lived through, ready to join the cooperation between the other Western democracies. The democratic process was well established, he argued, after the success of two national elections and with ongoing negotiations to solve the problems with the provinces that wanted greater autonomy.¹⁴²

Still the greatest advocate for Spanish membership, the United States welcomed the increasing efforts of the Spanish authorities and advised them to go into bilateral consultations with the member states. Most members reacted positively to the Spanish inquiries but, according to the US, the Spanish Government had reported some uncertainty with regards to

¹³⁹ Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 145-146.

¹⁴⁰ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 000320, ”Samtale mellom den amerikanske ambassaderåd, Chargé d’Affaires Barkley og statssekretær Holst”, 02.04.1981.

¹⁴¹ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 000276, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Madrid, 27.03.1981.

¹⁴² UD 33.6/3, bind 10, H-JN 000545, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 12.06.1981.

the attitude of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. This made the Americans react and the Norwegian ambassador in Washington was told to report back to his Government that the Spaniards felt that they had a genuine need for reinsurance. Such reinsurance, they argued, should be provided both bilaterally and through Secretary-General Luns. Spain could not take the chance of being met with a negative response to their application.¹⁴³

No more than a day later, Norwegian State Secretary Johan Jørgen Holst was approached by the American Chargé d'Affairs, Barkley. The Americans wanted to be fully informed about the Norwegian stance on Spanish membership, all the while emphasising the fact that NATO could help the Spanish democracy in a very difficult situation. Maintaining that Norway in principle supported Spanish membership, Holst informed Barkley about the results of the Norwegian evaluation made in the aftermath of the attempted coup. Interestingly enough, some new concerns were also expressed. The fact that one of these concerns was the problem of incorporating past Franco generals into NATO's command structure suggests that the memory of the Civil War, as outlined in chapter three, was still very much alive within the Norwegian administration. Another concern was the fact that it would be very difficult to keep the matter secret, and that it would create a lot of problems in Spain as well as in Norway should the relationship become known. Holst told Barkley that the matter had been handled very discreetly in Norway. The Government had, of course, discussed the issue, but it had not been submitted to the Parliamentary bodies.¹⁴⁴

The fact that the question of Spanish membership had not been submitted to the Parliament is an indication of the Spanish question still holding a special position in Norwegian politics. Ever since Norway gained its independence in 1905, the Norwegian foreign policy has been designed in close collaboration between the Government and the Parliament - since 1918 mainly through the Foreign and Constitutional Committee. In most countries, relations with other states are primarily the domain of the executive branch, and this close interaction between the government and the Foreign Affairs Committee has contributed to the distinctiveness of Norwegian foreign policy. Most foreign policy issues of importance were presented to and discussed with the Foreign Affairs Committee before the policy was developed. The discussions were generally both comprehensive and pointed, and the political positions did not always follow party lines. In many important cases, coalitions were formed

¹⁴³ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 00025, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Washington, 25.03.1981.

¹⁴⁴ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 000320, "Samtale mellom den amerikanske ambassaderåd, Chargé d'Affairs Barkley og statssekretær Holst", 02.04.1981.

across them. There was hardly any other area where the cooperation between the Government, the parliamentary majority and the opposition was so close and constant.¹⁴⁵ When the Government did not discuss the issue of Spanish membership with the Parliament it must have been for a reason, a subject that will be revisited later in this chapter.

5.4 Not right now: an issue of timing

The crisis in Poland in 1980-1981, precipitated by the emergence of the mass movement “Solidarity”, posed an insidious threat to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe. Throughout the world the fear was that, like on previous such occasions – East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 – the Soviet leaders would resort to military force to protect its vital security interests.¹⁴⁶ Being one of the Soviet Union’s next door neighbours, and in the light of Soviet threats that Spanish membership might “force” them to make a countermove¹⁴⁷, this situation would also come to influence the Norwegian policy. Evidence suggests that it was both a genuine concern and later on an excuse to stall the Spanish accession.

During a Council meeting in NATO at the end of March 1981 a large majority of the ambassadors agreed that the Secretary-General could informally respond to the Spanish Government that the Alliance would be positive to a Spanish request. The only exceptions were, again, Denmark and Norway. The two countries did not, however, offer the same objections. Denmark, though in principle favourably disposed towards Spanish membership, argued that Spain would have to submit a formal application before a decision could be made. Before such an application existed, they saw no reason for the Alliance to take a stand. An element in the assessment of a Spanish application, they added, had to be that the Spanish Government's position on the issue had sufficient support in the Cortes.

The Norwegian objection was quite another. Norway’s position on the question of Spanish membership in NATO was still, in principle, favourable. With regard to this question, the Norwegian Government attached importance to the fact that the right of any state to join defence alliances had been explicitly expressed in the final act of Helsinki. As to the timing of such a move, the Norwegian Government seriously doubted, however, that it would be

¹⁴⁵ Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 18-19.

¹⁴⁶ Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War”. *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no 2 (1999): 189-191.

¹⁴⁷ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, JN 024273, Notat, ”Ambassadør Kirichenkos samtale med statssekretær Holst”, 09.09.1981.

advisable to pursue the question of Spanish membership just now. The crisis in Poland was now in its most acute and possibly also decisive stage. At the same time the follow-up meeting of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid and the fate of the conference on disarmament in Europe were approaching a decisive point. In these circumstances it was the view of the Norwegian Government that it was not advisable, at the moment, to raise the issue of Spanish membership in the Alliance in a manner that would attract public attention. They would, however, not object to the Spanish Government being told informally and in full secrecy that the attitude of this alliance towards Spanish membership remained a favourable one. It was the Norwegian view, however, that the Secretary-General should add that the aspect of the international situation did not make it advisable to raise the matter publicly just now. Although the Norwegians in principle still responded positively to Spanish membership, they had taken a definite reservation about the timing for a possible Spanish decision to apply for such membership. This should be expressed in the message he was to convey to the Spanish ambassador.¹⁴⁸

No other members expressed the view that the issue of membership should be related to the international situation. Despite this, the Norwegian concerns were included in the summary given to the Spanish ambassador. The response from the other NATO members may not have been altogether positive though, because the Norwegian ambassador reported back to Oslo that: “We have to face the fact that it is not only the US that would have preferred a statement with fewer reservations”.¹⁴⁹ Denmark might have gotten the same indications, because two days later the Danish objection had already been lifted.

Though the Danish reservation did not last for long, it caused a rather interesting debate in Norway. It was never a reservation Norway agreed with, but, the Foreign Ministry claimed, it could be a problem if it got out that Denmark had objected on a certain area and Norway had not. It was seen as very fortunate, however, that the Norwegian reservations had been included in the summary of Secretary-General Luns.¹⁵⁰ The fact that *not* objecting was seen as a problem seems to confirm the argument that the Norwegian Government to a certain degree was rhetorically entrapped, that stepping out of the role as the main opponent of Spanish membership was not an easy thing to do. The evidence suggests, moreover, that there may have been more discord within the ruling party than the Government wanted to admit, an

¹⁴⁸ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 00028, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 30.03.1981.

¹⁴⁹ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 000304, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen til UD, 02.04.1981.

¹⁵⁰ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 000304, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 02.04.1981.

issue that will be revisited later in the chapter. Evidence also suggests that Norway was not alone in their worry about the international situation.

During a conversation between the Norwegian and French Foreign Minister, the Spanish request for membership in NATO came up. Francois-Poncet agreed with Frydenlund that the timing was not particularly fortunate in view of the critical situation in Poland. France, however, had enough problems in their relationship with Spain as it was (with the conditions in the Basque Country and the EC negotiations), and would therefore not raise any objections.¹⁵¹ Similar concerns may also have existed in other member countries. Ambassador Vibe later informed the Norwegian Government that when the other countries had not expressed concern about the timing, it was his impression that this first and foremost was out of concern that they might give the impression that they were opposed to Spanish membership. A conversation with the German ambassador a few months later confirmed that this was also a concern in Germany.¹⁵²

5.5 Accusations: international situation as cover for Norwegian opposition?

During a Council meeting in Brussels in June 1981, Luns informed the Permanent Representatives that the Spanish ambassador had indicated that the Spanish request for membership might come before the end of June, instead of September as they had previously hinted. Ambassador de Carcer therefore wanted reassurance that Spain could be absolutely certain that the country would be accepted as a member of the Alliance should this initiative be taken. Furthermore, de Carcer hoped that the allies could provide an answer within two weeks after the request had been received. Ambassador Vibe stated that he was afraid that the information now presented on the acceleration of the Spanish initiative would create concern in Oslo. In fact, he had been asked to maintain that Norway attached great importance to the choice of the right moment for such an application from Spain. Repeating the earlier arguments about the international situation, he declared that Norway considered these deliberations of even greater importance than before.

Luns was clearly not very happy with the Norwegian objections, and stated that he sincerely doubted how much importance they should grant the situation in Poland. He then pointed to the fact that the international situation had been equally difficult at the time of Turkish, Greek and West German accession. Spain could not be blamed for the situation in Poland, and the

¹⁵¹ UD 33.6/3, bind 9, JN 00502, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Paris, 30.03.1981.

¹⁵² UD 33.6/3, bind 10, H-JN 000556, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 15.06.1981.

timing would never be perfect, so waiting for such a moment was useless. Luns noted that he did not want the Spaniards to get the impression that the international situation was used as a cover for opposition against Spanish membership. In Spain, he claimed, this was already a concern. Ambassador Vibe was later informed by the Secretary-General that even among the allies there was some concern that Norway and Denmark in reality were against Spanish membership because of, among other things, the attitude of the Spanish Socialists to NATO.

Whether the view of the Spanish Socialists was important for the reluctance of the Norwegian Government is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that the two socialist parties had been in regular contact ever since the Civil War¹⁵³, and that the Labour Government in Norway kept a close eye on how PSOE felt about Spanish NATO membership throughout the period analysed in this chapter.¹⁵⁴

When the Norwegian ambassador later asked Luns whether he should inform the Spaniards of the Norwegian considerations regarding the timing, he was told that this could only cause concern in the Spanish Government, and should be avoided at all costs.¹⁵⁵ This warning did not, however, prevent ambassador Vibe from giving the Spanish ambassador a full report on the Norwegian considerations.¹⁵⁶ It is perhaps not surprising then, that this would not be the last time Norway was accused of harbouring ideological opposition towards Spanish NATO membership.

5.6 No hidden opposition?

During June 1981 the US several times suggested that a more fundamental reluctance against Spanish membership was the basis for the importance Norway attached to the choice of timing of the Spanish request for membership in NATO. To draw a parallel between Spain and the situation in Poland, they argued, was to make Spain a hostage of the Soviet Union's policy towards Poland. These accusations were thoroughly rejected by the Norwegian delegations in both Washington and Brussels. The Norwegian stance was, they argued, that democratic Spain had the same right as any democratic country in Europe to solve their

¹⁵³ AAB, D.Dd.365, 55-16-25, Notat, til den norske regjering, fra Oslo Arbeidersamfunn, "Uttalelse om Spania", 07.04.1976.

¹⁵⁴ UD 33.6/3, bind 7, H-JN 000482, "Spørsmålet om spansk medlemskap i NATO. Endel momenter og opplegg til norsk holdning", 30.06.1977; UD 33.6/3, bind 8, JN 016503, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Madrid, "Spansk utenrikspolitikk – det spanske sosialistpartis syn", 12.06.1978; UD 33.6/3, bind 9, H-JN 000347, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Madrid, "Spania og NATO. PSOE's syn", 13.04.1981.

¹⁵⁵ UD 33.6/3, bind 10, H-JN 000544, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 12.06.1981.

¹⁵⁶ UD 33.6/3, bind 10, H-JN 000545, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 12.06.1981.

security issues through membership in NATO. There was no hidden opposition in Norway and the hesitation was no more than an issue of timing.¹⁵⁷

Whether all opposition to Spanish membership in Norway was really gone, however, remains uncertain. A month before these American suspicions were acknowledged, a report from Copenhagen revealed that there was now considerable resistance to Spanish NATO membership in Denmark. Resistance existed not only within parties to the left of the Social Democratic Government, but also in the party's own left wing. Some still held on to old notions, claiming that Spain was not yet a democracy, while others agreed with Norwegian considerations regarding the international situation. Even the Prime Minister was reserved with regards to Spanish membership now. When the Danish Prime Minister discussed these matters with the Norwegian Government, Foreign Minister Frydenlund gave the impression that the Norwegian Labour party did not have the same problems.¹⁵⁸ When the Spanish Foreign Minister visited Oslo on 21 June, however, he got another story. After giving a thorough report of the situation in Spain, Perez-Llorca asked for the Norwegian stance towards Spanish NATO membership. The reply from Frydenlund was that he, at the moment, had to be reserved in his answer. Although he personally believed that the membership would strengthen democracy in Spain, there were those within the ruling party who would be sceptical to Spanish accession, partly because of the crisis in Poland and partly due to the internal developments in Spain.¹⁵⁹

Frydenlund's answer to Perez-Llorca suggests that lingering opposition towards Spanish membership may still have existed within the Labour Party. What is certain, moreover, is that the tensions within the party regarding foreign policy in general at this point were severe. From the late 1960s to the late 1970s, the security policy of the Labour Party had, for the most part, been uncontroversial. Opposition to NATO still existed within the Labour movement, but was not very visible. From 1979 and well into the 1980s, however, it was once again made clear how much conflict security policy could cause within the Labour movement. Over a period of almost five years, controversy over security policy issues came to dominate the debate, reaching unusually high temperatures. Three specific cases, all closely connected, were responsible for triggering fierce battles within the party: NATO's decision in December

¹⁵⁷ UD 33.6/3, bind 10, H-JN 000565, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, "Spania og NATO", 18.06.1981. UD 33.6/3., bind 10, H-JN 000569, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Washington, "Spania og NATO – amerikansk inntrykk av norsk holdning", 19.06.1981.

¹⁵⁸ UD 33.6/3, bind 10, JN 00693, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i København, 14.05.1981.

¹⁵⁹ UD 33.6/3, bind 10, H-JN 000608, Notat, "Spørsmålet om spansk NATO-medlemskap. Samtale 21.06.81 I Oslo mellom Utenriksministeren og den spanske utenriksminister, Perez-Llorca", 18.06.1981.

1979 to deploy medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the issue of pre-positioning US military equipment in Norway, and the question of a nuclear free zone in the North.¹⁶⁰ What made these issues stand out from former feuds and confrontations was the fact that the opposition against the official policy was so widespread. While the opposition previously had consisted of a small number of NATO opponents, it now spread far into the ranks of NATO supporters. The majority of those who now opposed NATO decisions about production and deployment of new nuclear missiles, were supporters of Norwegian participation in the alliance.¹⁶¹ From 1979 to 1980 the opposition was so strong that the Labour Government feared that the discontent might undermine both the party and the NATO membership.¹⁶² Therefore - lingering opposition against Spanish NATO membership or not - this may not have been the best moment for the Labour Government to bring another NATO issue to the table.

5.7 Leaving the gates ajar

As of September 1981 it was clear that Norway no longer held on to objections concerning Spain's democratic credentials. They did, however, maintain the concerns regarding the timing.¹⁶³ Why these objections now were put to rest is an interesting question. An obvious answer is that the events of 23-F did not cause the Spanish democracy to fall apart but, on the contrary, caused widespread indignation and would, a year later, lead the PSOE to a spectacular electoral victory.¹⁶⁴ As this thesis has shown, however, democratic progress in Spain did not automatically cause the Norwegian stance to soften. Another explanation may be that, as the use of rhetorical action from Spain, the US and Secretary-General Luns increased, holding on to these concerns now might be endangering Norway's reputation as a community member.

At the end of September, NATO's first official response to Spanish application was discussed, and whether this should be followed by a council resolution. The only one to object to such a resolution was Denmark, a fact which implies that the Spanish question created the same link between domestic and foreign policy in Denmark as it did in Norway. The Norwegian ambassador reported that he had a certain understanding for the Danish position, but that he

¹⁶⁰ See Tamnes 1997, 93-94 and 108-111 for further elaboration.

¹⁶¹ Jostein Nyhamar, *Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge bind 6: Nye Udfordringer (1965-1990)* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1990), 465-467.

¹⁶² Rolf Tamnes, *Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Historie Bind 6: Oljealder 1965-1995* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 94.

¹⁶³ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 000936, Notat, "Spania og NATO", 22.09.1981.

¹⁶⁴ Raymond Carr, *Spain: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 280.

had not yet received any instructions. Pointing to the approaching change of government, he informed that Norway did not yet have an official stance in the matter.¹⁶⁵ This change of government, as the next chapter will show, would in many ways change the Norwegian stance towards Spanish membership in NATO.

¹⁶⁵ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 00962, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 25.09.1981.

6.0 An example to be followed

The Spanish accession came at a difficult time for NATO. The late 1970s was a period characterised by a series of crises within the Alliance, both exposing and actively creating serious divisions between the member states. With the Second Cold War as backdrop, one of the main threats to the West was within NATO defined as the threat of division among its members and a subsequent disintegration of the international political and economic structure of Western Europe.¹⁶⁶ Such fears of division would also come to influence the Norwegian policy in the period analysed in this chapter, from the end of 1981 and up until Spain joined NATO in May 1982. The main argument is that the Norwegian policy changed with the governments; from the objections and stalling characteristic of the Labour dominated period, to an emphasis on joining the consensus in the Alliance and even a role as an active proponent of Spanish membership under the Conservative Government. An important reason for this change was the foreign policy of the new Government. But it was also a result of previous promises: Having clung to the argument of democracy for so long, the situation in Spain both enabled and forced the Norwegian policy to change. Now that Spain evidently was a democracy, Norway's role as a gatekeeper was over.

6.1 Changing the tune: new Government, new approach

As of 29 October 1981 it was clear that Norway would no longer maintain the objections concerning the timing of Spanish membership.¹⁶⁷ The question had been evaluated a few weeks earlier, where these objections had been confirmed¹⁶⁸. The new evaluation, however, stated that Norway previously had been opposed to Spanish NATO membership because Spain during the Franco era had been a dictatorship. Now that Spain was a democratic country, this objection was gone. Norway would therefore be positive to Spanish NATO membership if Spain should apply for it. Spain's entry into NATO would not represent any fundamental changes in the international security and defence policy situation. Norway understood, however, that Spain would rather be part of a multilateral alliance than maintaining the bilateral agreement of the former defence cooperation with the United States. Furthermore, Spanish membership in NATO might help to stabilise democracy in the country, provide security and give Madrid the opportunity to pursue an independent foreign policy.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 136,158.

¹⁶⁷ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 001189, Utenriksministerens besøk i København, "Spania og NATO", 29.10.1981.

¹⁶⁸ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 000936, Notat, "Spania og NATO", 22.09.1981.

¹⁶⁹ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 001189, Utenriksministerens besøk i København, "Spania og NATO", 29.10.1981.

Arguably, one of the most important changes that had occurred between these two evaluations was the fact that Norway now had a new, Conservative Government. Their foreign and security policy suggests that this change in government may have been one of the main reasons for this relatively sudden change in the Norwegian stance on the Spanish question. The Conservative Party was, during this period, more assertive with regard to their security policy than in any other political area. To the new Prime Minister, Kåre Willoch, and many in his inner circle, the Soviet Union appeared at the beginning of the 1980s as an existential threat. The Prime Minister demanded that no minister should be appointed that did not support the agreed policy, the policy of loyalty to NATO. This premise of internal cohesion in NATO reflected the Conservative Party's basic understanding of the Cold War dynamics. The Soviet Union had to be kept in check, and the means to achieve this had to be Western strength through unity in NATO.¹⁷⁰

At this point two things are worth mentioning. Firstly, Spanish NATO membership was not discussed during cabinet meetings after the Conservative Party came to power, a fact that suggests that the issue of Norwegian support was obvious or had already been decided while in opposition.¹⁷¹ Secondly, the question was never, during the period in focus for this thesis, discussed in the Conservative Party's Parliamentary Group.¹⁷² This indicates that the matter was decided at the highest level.

6.2 Unwilling to oppose: changing Norwegian role

When it was clear that a Spanish application would definitively come, the activity in Brussels increased once again. This clarification came after the 29 October when the Spanish Cortes gave the Spanish Government authorisation to apply for membership, with 186 against 146 votes.¹⁷³ The Norwegian attitude towards the new initiatives indicates that Norway's role within the Alliance had changed quite notably. Gone were the objections and reservations from the previous period, exchanged for focus on maintaining agreement and cohesion within NATO.

¹⁷⁰ Rolf Tamnes, *Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Historie bind 6: Oljealder 1965-1995* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 120-121; Hallvard Notaker, *Høyres Historie: Opprør og modernisering 1975-2005* (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2012), 148-151.

¹⁷¹ RA/S-1005/A/Aa/LOO44, Referat fra regjeringskonferanser, Regjeringen Willoch, 15.10.1981-17.12.1981; RA/S-1005/A/Aa/LOO44A, Referat fra regjeringskonferanser, Regjeringen Willoch, 05.01.1982-29.03.1982; RA/S-1005/D/Da/LO248, Regjeringen Willoch, Notater til regjeringskonferansene, 14.10.1981-31.12.1982.

¹⁷² SA, Høyres Stortingsgruppes Protokoller 1975-1982.

¹⁷³ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, JN 01558, Telegram fra ambassaden i Madrid, 30.10.1981.

A few weeks after the vote in the Cortes, Secretary-General Luns wanted the member countries' stance on possibly inviting the Spaniards to be observers during the Council meetings in December. In its instructions to the Norwegian ambassador, the Government admitted doubt as to whether this would be appropriate. They were not willing, however, to oppose the suggestion, assuming that the other NATO members agreed to the invitation. Regarding the domestic approval of the application, the Foreign Ministry expected that this could be done quickly, and would be ready in time for the NATO summit in December. Lastly, the Norwegian stance was very flexible towards how extensive the discussions with Spain between the signing and ratification of the Protocol should be. Should any of the allies have objections to these discussions being too comprehensive, Norway would also accept a less comprehensive plan.¹⁷⁴

As it turned out, several countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands and Denmark) held the same concerns regarding the appropriateness of inviting Spain until the country was an official member, ensuring that the suggested invitation was not sent.¹⁷⁵ The Norwegian reservation to voice their concerns nonetheless suggests an attitude, absent in the previous period, where being the one to raise objections had to be avoided. This was an attitude that would come to characterise the Norwegian policy during the months leading up to Spain's accession to the Alliance, evidently still concerned with the image they were projecting, but by now wanting to create another.

The same approach could be seen in the discussions regarding Secretary-General Luns's suggestion for the first official response to the Spanish application. The Norwegian Government felt that the draft went a bit far in anticipating the decision of the Spanish Foreign Minister. It would, on the other hand, be wrong to give the impression that Norway received Spain's desire for membership with mixed feelings. The section about the accession process could perhaps be made more descriptive, so as to avoid giving the impression that the process was a mere formality. The instructions from the Government emphasised, however, the importance of the Norwegian delegation adopting a low profile, with the aim of joining the consensus.¹⁷⁶ This instruction about keeping a low profile supports the view that Norway, during this period, wanted to avoid standing out, at least in the negative sense of the word, within the Alliance.

¹⁷⁴ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 001149, Utgående melding til NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 05.11.1981.

¹⁷⁵ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 001171, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 11.11.1981.

¹⁷⁶ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, JN 01652, Utgående melding til NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 13.11.1981.

6.3 Domestic approval

Even though it was now clear that the Norwegian Government would support Spanish accession to NATO, the issue still had to be cleared domestically. Before signing the protocol on Spanish membership, the Government would have to consult with the Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee, and the ratification of the Protocol would later have to be submitted to Parliament.¹⁷⁷ The time had come for a litmus test for how the Spanish issue had evolved in Norwegian politics.

Conservative Foreign Minister Sverre Strøm's statement to the Parliament's Foreign and Constitutional Committee regarding Spanish membership in NATO differed on certain points from the rhetoric of the Labour Government. After Franco's death, he argued, the democratisation process in Spain, and the country's desire to participate actively in the cooperation between the Western democracies, had changed the attitude these countries once had toward Spain. The reintroduction of democracy in 1975/1976 had made the Western countries able to accept Spain as an equal partner. Strøm admitted, however, that the democracy in Spain still had its problems. The attempted coup in February was a reminder of this. NATO membership would in itself be no guarantee against attempted coups. It entailed, however, recognition of the Spanish democracy, and such recognition could help to consolidate and strengthen democracy in the country. Furthermore, Spanish NATO membership did not involve any change in the balance of power between East and West. Last, but not least he highlighted the fact that Spain's decision to seek NATO membership came about as a result of a democratic decision process. Norway, he argued, had no right to overrule this. The Government would advocate Norway's endorsement of Spain as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance.¹⁷⁸

This was a view the Foreign and Constitutional Committee had no problems endorsing. When they later wrote their recommendation to the Parliament, the Committee expressed the view that Spain's participation in NATO would mean a strengthening of the Alliance as a defence organisation. In view of the positive development and democratisation process that had taken place in Spain in recent years, the Committee saw the fact that Spain now had taken steps to express desire for membership in the Alliance as a natural consequence of the country's progress. On this basis it would also be valuable that Spain joined as a full member of the

¹⁷⁷ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 001189, Sammenotat, "Spania og NATO", 29.10.1981.

¹⁷⁸ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, JN 032319, Notat, Utkast til Utenriksministerens redegjørelse for Stortingets utenriks- og konstitusjonskomité vedrørende spansk medlemskap i NATO, 24.11.1981.

defence pact, which included most countries in Western Europe. The Committee, unanimously, advocated that Norway should approve the Protocol on Spain's accession.¹⁷⁹ The fact that the Committee unanimously agreed on this, suggests that there was broad agreement on the question. Traditionally, it was in the Foreign Affairs Committee that concerns about the new international commitments were expressed, and where many of the most vocal proponents of national sovereignty and the strongest scepticism towards incorporation into the new international organizations were found.¹⁸⁰

6.4 An affront to Spain: Norway as an active proponent of Spanish membership

Norway would no longer play the role as one of the brakemen with regard to Spanish membership in NATO. In fact, the Norwegian Government in some situations now acted as one of the drivers of the process, reminding other members of earlier practice and promises and pointing to inconsistencies in their behaviour. This new role was evident when problems regarding the Spanish accession emerged in the Netherlands and in Greece, and Norway, in order to avoid inconsistencies between earlier commitments and current action to be exposed, actively promoted Spanish membership.

At a Council meeting on 26 November, it was clear that the Netherlands could not take a final stand on Spanish membership and, consequently, could not approve the official statement of the Secretary-General. Though the Dutch ambassador was quite certain it would be positive, the Dutch stance would not be clear until the next meeting of the Government, which would take place on 1 December. Several of the permanent representatives emphasised the fact that the Dutch reservation might have unfortunate consequences, especially if the delay was leaked to the press. Among the members to criticise the Netherlands for this reservation, was Norway. The Norwegian ambassador pointed out that the timeframe for consultations with the parliamentary bodies in the members' capitals would now be further shortened. In particular, it would be unfortunate if the case had to be submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee without the argument of complete agreement between the Allies.¹⁸¹ This is an example of how the Norwegian role within the Alliance had changed. Whenever somebody else had raised

¹⁷⁹ UD 33.6/3, bind 12, JN 00154, "Innstilling fra utenriks- og konstitusjonskomiteen om samtykke til å godkjenne en protokoll vedrørende Spanias tiltrreden til den Nord-Atlantiske Traktat, undertegner den 10. desember 1981", 27.01.1982.

¹⁸⁰ Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie Bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 18-19.

¹⁸¹ UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 001249, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 26.11.1981.

objections during the previous period, either the Norwegian delegation remained silent, or they supported the objections. The fact that they now were among the members to reprehend others for deviating from the agreed procedure, seems to lend support to the argument about focus on cohesion within the Alliance. The role of the US, however, remained unchanged. If anything, the American use of strategic argumentation was more pronounced than ever.

The US ambassador expressed strong disappointment with the Dutch attitude, which he found most unfortunate. Pointing to the fact that the Council had worked on the scenario for Spanish accession for months, he argued that this delay should have been unnecessary. If anyone had doubts about Spain's democratic disposition, there was hardly anything that would be able to play more into the hands of right-wing extremists and isolationists in Spain than this Dutch hesitation. Accepting Spain as a full member of the democratic Europe was a historic event, he added, and should not be obscured by procedural questions. In closing, he argued that it was unreasonable for a single Government to break the previously stated consensus in this matter.¹⁸² A few days after this meeting, on 2 December, the Spanish Government contacted the Secretary-General of NATO and officially expressed the desire to be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. The protocol was then supposed to be submitted for signature at the NATO summit in Brussels 10 December. After the Dutch Government confirmed their positive attitude¹⁸³, everything seemed to be in place for Spain to join NATO.

The process of entanglement, however, was not yet over. Complications emerged when Greece suddenly objected to the procedure regarding the NATO Council's handling of the Spanish request for membership in the Alliance, which all of the members had agreed to follow in order to ensure a rapid enlargement process. Greece now wanted the Secretary-General only to acknowledge that the Spanish inquiry had been received, and to inform that the NATO Council would discuss the inquiry.¹⁸⁴ The Norwegian reaction to this move from Greece is perhaps the best indication of the changes in the Norwegian policy towards Spanish membership, and not least of how Norway now used rhetorical action to persuade other members to accept the will of the majority in the Alliance.

The first of December the Norwegian Foreign Minister summoned the Greek ambassador. Referring to information from Brussels about the Greek objection, he emphasised that

¹⁸² UD 33.6/3, bind 11, H-JN 001249, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 26.11.1981.

¹⁸³ UD 33.6/3, bind 12, JN 01772, Telegram til NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, "Spania og NATO. Nederlands holdning", 01.12.1981.

¹⁸⁴ UD 33.6/3, bind 12, H-JN 001258, Utgående melding til NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 01.12.1981.

Norway regarded this as very unfortunate. Any member of the Alliance was free to express concerns regarding enlargement, but if Greece held such concerns they should have informed the other members at an earlier stage. Greece also had every right not to ratify the Protocol of the Spanish accession, but it was very unfortunate that they only now raised objections to the agreed procedure. Regardless of any technical matter, however, the importance lay in the substance of the objection. The Foreign Minister asked the Greek ambassador to inform his government that Norway, a friend of the democratic Greece, could not understand the Greek position. If the Alliance followed the procedure suggested by Greece, it would be an affront to Spain. The Greek attitude could only be perceived as a Greek objection to Spanish membership, and Norway could not understand why Greece was opposed to Spanish membership. Norway would be prepared to participate in discussions about Greece's own relationship with the Alliance, but this question should not have anything to do with the question of Spanish membership.¹⁸⁵

This rather strong Norwegian reaction came after receiving a message from the Norwegian embassy in Washington. The American State Department viewed Prime Minister Papandreou's move with the utmost seriousness. Their assessment was that this could be seen as an attempt by the Greeks to exploit the situation to their own advantage. By demanding that consideration of Spain's accession be postponed to the Ministerial meeting, they could be seeking to achieve a connection between this question and their own claim to a NATO guarantee of the Greek Eastern flank. It was the State Department's hope that strong requests from the Allies to Athens would make sufficient impression on Papandreou to change his course.¹⁸⁶ Apparently, it did work, because during the Council meeting the next day it was made clear that Greece would not oppose Spanish membership in NATO. They would also accept the agreed procedure, only with a few textual changes in the statement from the Secretary-General.¹⁸⁷

6.5 Ratifying the protocol: Norway takes the lead

Thursday 4 February 1982 Spanish accession to the North Atlantic Treaty was approved in the Norwegian Parliament.¹⁸⁸ Even though the question was portrayed as nothing more than a formality and most parties now were in favour of Spanish accession, by more or less turning

¹⁸⁵ UD 33.6/3, bind 12, H-JN 001258, Utgående melding til NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 01.12.1981.

¹⁸⁶ UD 33.6/3, bind 12, H-JN 001285, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Washington, 01.12.1981.

¹⁸⁷ UD 33.6/3, bind 12, H-JN 001288, Innkommet melding fra NATO-delegasjonen i Brussel, 02.12.1981.

¹⁸⁸ UD 33.6/3, bind 12, H-JN 000287, Notat, Statsministerens besøk i Bonn, "Spania og NATO", 16.02.1982.

into a debate on the purpose and democratic influence of NATO, it nonetheless caused quite a debate.

The Conservative Party and the Centre Party expressed wholehearted support for Spanish membership, highlighting Spain's democratic progress and NATO's role as a defender of democracy. It was the primary role of NATO, they argued, to secure democracy and human rights in the member states of the Alliance. This argument was not well received by the representatives from *Sosialistisk Venstreparti* (the Socialist Left Party), who called the statement a drastic overstatement of NATO's ability to influence authoritarian regimes. Claiming that the Portuguese dictatorship had in fact been supported and prolonged by NATO and its members, they maintained that there was nothing in the historical record to suggest that NATO membership was any guarantee for further democratic development. Their main argument for opposing Spanish membership, however, was that it was very unfortunate to strengthen the division between the power blocks within the international system. In the light of this, Spanish membership would be a poor contribution to Norwegian security and détente in Europe, it might even have the opposite effect.¹⁸⁹

These statements must be seen in the light of the history of the Socialist Left Party, which had its roots in the previously mentioned Socialist People's Party, founded in 1961 by dissenters from the Labour Party. The central political background to the formation of this party was the internal disputes about security policy in the Labour Party, and in particular the question of nuclear weapons in Norway's and NATO's defence. However, for some of the members the opposition went much deeper than this particular issue. The basic idea for those who came to form the core of the new party was a fundamental and principled opposition to Norwegian membership in NATO and to all policies that might reinforce the divisions of the Cold War.¹⁹⁰ This opposition has, up to the present, continued to influence the party's foreign and security policy, and may explain why it was the only Norwegian party to oppose Spanish membership in the Alliance.¹⁹¹

The representatives from the Labour Party were more reserved in their statements, but left no doubt about their support for Spanish membership. Underlining the fact that Spain's accession to the Alliance did not alter the military balance in Europe, they argued that the enlargement

¹⁸⁹ Stortingsforhandling nr 140, Sak 1, 04.02.1982, 2106-2112.

¹⁹⁰ Trond Bergh, *Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge bind 5: Storhetstid (1945-1965)*, (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1987), 446-447.

¹⁹¹ Frank Rossavik, *SV: Fra Kings Bay til Kongens Bord* (Oslo: Spartacus Forlag, 2012), 469-471.

was an advantage to the Alliance as well as to Spain. It had been a tendency, one representative claimed, for Norway to forget countries, which had generated such a level of engagement during a state of emergency, as soon as things started to improve. The conclusion was that Norway should respect and trust Spain, also in this matter, and welcome them to participate in the cooperation of their choosing.¹⁹² The answers to why the Labour Party now seemed to have no reservations with regard to Spanish NATO membership may be many. A possible explanation is that such support now would have less serious consequences for the tensions within the Party. It does seem to confirm that the stalling and objections from the previous period stemmed less from ideological convictions against Spanish NATO membership, and more from a fear of bringing yet another potentially controversial issue to a party already wrought with simmering conflict over NATO decisions. Another explanation is that this support from the Labour Party, no longer in government, may have been a result of the fact that it now was not their party that would have to bear the responsibility in case the Spanish democracy collapsed.

In the end, the resolution to accept Spanish membership in NATO was adopted with only four opposing votes, three from the Socialist Left Party and one from the Labour Party.¹⁹³ Norway was one of the first countries to ratify the Protocol of Spanish accession, something that did not go unheeded in Spain. The Spanish authorities expressed profound gratitude for the rapid and convincing way the ratification process had been completed in Norway, and complemented them for being an example to be followed for the other NATO members.¹⁹⁴

6.6 Opening the gates

The fact that the Spanish authorities now saw Norway as a good example for the other NATO members tells us that the Norwegian policy had come a long way from the days of being “Spain’s Number One Enemy”. This chapter has shown that the change of government caused a change in Norway’s role within NATO, from gatekeeper to active proponent of Spanish membership. While there is no doubt that the Norwegian policy changed, this change was also consistent with the continual insistence on only accepting democratic states joining NATO. Now that Spain was a democracy enlargement had to be accepted, or Norway would be acting inconsistently and betraying the norms and values to which it was committed.

¹⁹² Stortingsforhandling nr 140, Sak 1, 04.02.1982, 2107-2110.

¹⁹³ UD 33.6/3, bind 12, H-JN 000287, Notat, Statsministerens besøk i Bonn, ”Spania og NATO”, 16.02.1982.

¹⁹⁴ UD 33.6/3, bind 12, JN 00243, Innkommet melding fra ambassaden i Madrid, 19.02.1982.

7.0 Norway and the Spanish accession to NATO

The Spanish accession to NATO took place 30 May 1982 and was followed by a landslide victory for the PSOE in the elections in October the same year. The PSOE would remain in power for fourteen years and oversee the final consolidation of the Spanish democracy, the establishment of regional autonomy, the introduction of a wide range of crucial social reforms and Spain's entry into the European Community.¹⁹⁵ The accession to NATO has been termed the crux of the issue of the entry into the EC¹⁹⁶, a fact that suggests that the Norwegian policy had implications for the wider process of Spain's integration into the Western European community.

This chapter summarises and furthers the analysis and evaluates the contribution of rhetorical action to the subject at hand. The main argument is that though the process was far from simple, the main changes in the Norwegian policy towards the Spanish accession to NATO were results of two elections: the first democratic elections in Spain in nearly forty years and the elections where the Labour Party was replaced by the Conservative party as the ruling party in Norway. Although the underlying desire to protect democracy remained intact, these two elections allowed for a change in the Norwegian stance. The fact that such events were needed in order for the position to be altered, demonstrates the constraints imposed by rhetorical action on the governments.

7.1 Answering the questions: the when, the how and the why

This thesis has given an account of the Norwegian policy on the question of Spanish NATO membership from 1975 to 1982. Returning to the research questions posed at the beginning of the thesis, it is now time to assess whether they have been answered. When, how and why did the Norwegian stance on Spanish membership in NATO change?

The analysis has shown that the relinquishment of Norwegian opposition would demand much more than the passing of a hated dictator. The Norwegian policy of demonstrative distancing was maintained throughout the first few years after Franco's death, and all initiatives that would link Spain more closely to NATO were rejected. The policy did not begin to soften before the first democratic election had been celebrated in Spain, after which

¹⁹⁵ Javier Tusset, *Dictadura franquista y democracia 1939-2004* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2005), 329; Sebastian Balfour, "Spain from 1931 to the Present". In *Spain: A History*, ed. Raymond Carr, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 278.

¹⁹⁶ Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, "Introduction: Spain and the Great Powers". In *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, (London: Routledge, 1999), 10.

Norway declared that they would respond positively to a Spanish request for membership. This softening, however, did not mean that the Norwegian policy had fundamentally changed. The Norwegian governments continually challenged Spain's democratic credentials, and later also questioned the stability of the emerging democracy. When the objections regarding Spain's democratic credentials were laid to rest in September 1981, they had already been substituted by concerns about the timing of a possible Spanish accession. These concerns regarding the timing were maintained until October 1981 – a mere two weeks after the Labour Party had been replaced by the Conservative party as the ruling party in Norway. My argument is that the Norwegian policy softened and was adjusted to the situation at hand, both within and outside the Alliance. But it did not really change until the Conservative Government had taken over.

In answering when the Norwegian policy changed, we have in many ways already provided an answer to how it changed. The changes the Norwegian policy underwent during the years of Labour rule were in many ways superficial. It was gradually adjusted, from outspoken opposition, to being positive in “principle” but objecting to the form and timing of initiatives, to outright stalling, until the Conservative Government made a Norwegian turnaround.

It is, however, perhaps equally important to ask how Norway was able to maintain such a restrictive policy in the face of increasing pressure from the US. The fact that President Nixon was “furious” when Norway prevented the NATO fleet from visiting Barcelona in 1973,¹⁹⁷ clearly illustrates that the Americans from the outset did not appreciate the Norwegian attitude. The decision making process in NATO is obviously very important with regards to answering this question, in that every member in theory has veto power. Nothing could have prevented the US, however, from pushing harder and making threats in order to change the Norwegian stance. It seems that something must have differed from the case of Italian membership, where Norway opposed the accession but yielded to Italian protests and American pressure.¹⁹⁸ The international context may also have been important, as these events took place during a period when the Soviet Union seemed to be gaining strength.¹⁹⁹ Cohesion within the Alliance must have been regarded as more important than ever, and the Alliance might seem weak if internal problems were made official. As argued in chapter four, however, my claim is that Norway during the first years after 1975 was able to maintain its opposition

¹⁹⁷ UK National Archives, Kew Gardens, FCO 91 816, “US/Spanish Defence Links”, 28.06.1973.

¹⁹⁸ Eriksen, Knut Einar and Helge Øystein Pharo 1997. *Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie Bind 5. Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949-1965*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp 44.

¹⁹⁹ S.J. Ball, *The Cold War: An International History 1947-1991* (London: Arnold, 1998), 182-183.

to Spanish membership through the use of rhetorical action. Because Norway could justify its stance by referring to the norms and values of the community, it was able to assume the role of gatekeeper and thus enforce the status quo.

With regard to why the Norwegian policy changed, chapter six argued that the turnabout came as a result of the Norwegian elections. The Labour Government, in charge for most of the period in focus for this thesis, was replaced by a Conservative Government. With a fundamentally different view on the international situation and how the threat of the Soviet Union should be handled, the foreign policy of the new government was founded on the principle of loyalty to NATO. This focus on loyalty and cohesion within the Alliance was clearly evident in the Norwegian policy towards the Spanish accession after the change of government. Another important element is that the Conservative Government did not have to cope with internal conflicts about their foreign and security policy. The emphasis put on avoiding such conflicts is evident from the Government's so called inner vote of confidence.

As with the previous question, it is also important to ask why the Norwegian policy did *not* change. Why did almost seven years pass between the death of Franco and the death of Norwegian opposition? First of all, and that also answers one of the sub questions, Norway held genuine concerns about the level of democracy in Spain. It is obvious that the first few steps towards democracy were not considered to be sufficient by the Norwegian Government, still clearly influenced by the emotional and political resonance of the Spanish question. Furthermore, these concerns about Spain's democratic credentials lasted all the way up to September 1981. The evaluation made by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the aftermath of 23F tell us that this was, first and foremost, out of fear that NATO might end up with another undemocratic country in its ranks. Mark Smith argues that one of the main reasons for NATO wanting Spain to join was that a young democracy joining NATO could lend added weight to the idea of NATO as a democratic alliance. This meant that what had previously been the reason for excluding Franco's Spain from the alliance – the regime's lack of democratic credentials – now became the reason for including the country.²⁰⁰ It seems, however, that this might have been one of the main reasons why Norway wanted to stall the process: the fear of what might happen should Spain join and later revert to an undemocratic regime. This would have consequences not only for the reputation of NATO as such, but also

²⁰⁰ Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (New York: Palgrave, 1998), pp 141.

for Norwegian membership in the Alliance and not least for the level of tension within the Labour Party and movement.

As argued in chapter five, the main reason for the stalling and the objections regarding procedural matters with regard to Spanish NATO membership was tension within the Labour Party and Movement. The most important for any politician is, after all, to get re-elected. Getting re-elected is not easy when your party is simmering with conflict, and avoiding another potentially controversial foreign and security issue was crucial. Considerations for the other member states in NATO were therefore outweighed by considerations for the tensions within the Labour Party. Another element that might have been influential was related to Norway's so called "struggle for the Northern flank".²⁰¹ Chapter three showed that Norwegian politicians during the 1950s and 1960s were worried that enlarging NATO towards the South might lead to a lower priority to the Northern flank. Throughout the 1970s, however, NATO's willingness to give priority to the defence of Norway was greatly improved. This meant that the outlook for Norway's defence during the 1980s was better than it had been since the Cold War began²⁰², and opposing the US in NATO was probably not seen as going at the expense of Norwegian security. Lastly, it seems as if Norway to a certain degree got locked in the position of spokesman for objections concerning Spanish NATO membership. Once such a position was taken, it was not easy to take another, both with regard to the opposition within the party and the other members in NATO.

In summary, the change in the Norwegian stance may boil down to being a consequence of two elections: The first democratic elections in Spain in almost forty years made Norway relinquish active opposition to all but questions regarding procedure and timing. A few years later, the Norwegian change of government turned Norway into an active proponent of Spanish NATO membership.

7.2 Answering the questions: consensus, pressure and context

One of the sub-questions posed in chapter one has already been addressed, but the rest remain to be assessed. As for consensus across party lines in the Norwegian Parliament, chapter four showed that although the Conservative parties did not always agree with the Government's policy, they did not directly oppose it. An explanation of this is that, while it was a source of conflict within the Labour movement, the foreign policy after the Norwegian accession to

²⁰¹ Olav Riste, *Norwegian Foreign Policy: A History* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001), 225-226.

²⁰² Ibid.

NATO helped to curb cross-party conflicts. Usually it received broad political support, and it became a self-imposed task for the non-socialist parties not to challenge the Labour Party and its left wing in such a way that the foreign policy could go off course. In much the same way, the Labour Party worked for the broadest possible support for their foreign policy. The new alliance politics was not a party matter, but a national matter where Norway had to speak with one voice. In this way, NATO membership also created a close connection between foreign and domestic policy. The Labour Party and the non-socialist parties often curbed domestic political differences in the name of foreign policy.²⁰³ The fact that the Conservative Party indeed had different ideas about the Spanish accession than its predecessors became obvious as they came to power in 1981. An additional explanation why this differing view was not more visible lies in the fact that the Labour Government to a great extent kept the issue away from Parliament after 1976.

Moving on to the question of external and internal pressure the analysis has shown that the Norwegian Government did indeed face pressure, both from the US and from the opposition within the Labour Movement. The internal pressures was, for the most part, of an indirect character and lead the Government to attempts at stalling the process of the Spanish accession, while the pressure from the US was direct and increasingly characterised by strategic argumentation.

As the analysis has shown the international context was also important for the Norwegian policy. The Cold War and the Spanish transition provided the crucial backdrop, and on several occasions international events influenced the Norwegian stance on Spanish membership directly. In line with previous research, however, I argue that the domestic political climate was the decisive factor throughout the period in focus for this thesis.

7.3 Norway and the Spanish accession to NATO in light of rhetorical action

IR-theory, by design, offers only partial explanations. The same goes for the theory of rhetorical action and its application to this case. But this fact does not diminish the value of the insight this theory can provide for the process of Spain's accession to NATO and the Norwegian policy on the matter.

Schimmelfennig's use of rhetorical action is helpful in understanding the end result of this round of NATO enlargement. With the transition in Spain coming to an end, the new liberal

²⁰³ Trond Bergh, *Arbeiderbevegelsens Historie i Norge bind 5: Storhetstid (1945-1965)*, (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1987), 250-254.

identity of the country necessitated an open door policy on the part of NATO. At this point strategic argumentation also became an effective tool for Spain itself and its supporters within the organisation. With regard to the rest of the process, however, the explanatory power of Schimmelfennig's approach is not the strongest. Directly applied to the empirical data, the theory is not able to explain Spain's exclusion, or the Norwegian influence on this decision. This does not mean however, that the logic of rhetorical action is not useful in answering these questions. In its modified form the theory of rhetorical action sheds considerable light on this part of the process and, in doing so, it enables me in this thesis to make certain contributions to the theoretical approach.

The contribution of this thesis to the theory of rhetorical action is threefold. Firstly, it shows the complexity of the middle stage of the enlargement process of international organizations. Between the initial preferences of each member state and the normative conformity that secures membership for new states, the role of the gatekeeper is essential. By turning Schimmelfennig's argument around this thesis has shown how Norway used rhetorical action to exclude Spain from the Alliance. Through the strategic use of value-based and normative arguments, Norway was able to achieve an outcome different from the one that would have resulted from the distribution of power and interests alone. Despite the fact that the majority and the most powerful of NATO's members, the US, favoured Spanish membership, Spain was excluded for seven years after the death of Franco.

Secondly, this thesis has shown that the image of rational actors may be questioned. In the case of Spanish NATO membership Norwegian foreign policy was clearly influenced by the emotional resonance of the Spanish question in the Labour Movement. This created a link between domestic and foreign policy, and resulted in a behaviour that cannot always be termed rational.

Lastly, this thesis shows that strategic argumentation is used both domestically and internationally, a fact that may also help explain how actors get locked in positions once they are taken. Once Norway had taken the role as the most outspoken opponent of Spanish membership, it was not easy to leave it behind. The opposition within the Labour party expected Norway to take the most restrictive stance, and the tension might have increased if it did not. The discussion about the Danish objection in chapter five clearly illustrates this point. Additionally, Norway got locked into this position by other members. Knowing that Norway

would voice their concerns, they kept silent and only afterwards agreed with the Norwegian position. This way they avoided potential criticism for being the ones to speak out.

7.4 Concluding remarks

In providing new empirical evidence about the Norwegian policy towards the Spanish accession to NATO, this thesis has elucidated a hitherto underresearched part of Norwegian foreign policy history. In doing so it might broaden our understanding of Norwegian foreign policy, especially in instances where the domestic and intraparty situation to a certain extent determines the country's policy towards other states and in international organisations.

The thesis has also portrayed the process of NATO enlargement from another perspective. The fact that Norway succeeded in keeping Spain out of the Alliance for such a long time provides a good example of small states occasionally being able to hinder the implementation of policies wanted by both the majority and the great powers within an alliance. One might also argue that the Norwegian policy had consequences that went beyond NATO. One of the main arguments of the proponents for Spanish NATO membership was that Spain's accession to the organisation entailed recognition of the country as a democracy. Such recognition was crucial for Spanish membership in the EC, and the Norwegian opposition may thus have influenced the process of European integration in a wider sense. In the light of this, the evidence of this thesis has implications for the influence small states are able to obtain within international organisations.

Finally, this thesis has illustrated that rhetorical action was a frequently used tool in this round of NATO enlargement. Used both to promote and to prevent the Spanish accession, strategic argumentation was able to influence the decision making process within the Alliance. There is no doubt that this was a conscious strategy. As Einar Gerhardsen²⁰⁴ commented on Norwegian insistence on not accepting authoritarian regimes in NATO:

‘Since the foundation of NATO no people in Europe has lost its freedom’.
We thought this was a good argument, and used it frequently.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ Einar Gerhardsen was the Prime Minister of Norway three times, and was vital for the establishment of the Norwegian welfare state.

²⁰⁵ Einar Gerhardsen, *Mennesker og politikk: Erindringer 1965-1978* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1978), 186.

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