

# A qualitative reliability and operability analysis of an integrated reforming combined cycle plant with CO<sub>2</sub> capture

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## Abstract

Most of the current CO<sub>2</sub> capture technologies are associated with large energy penalties that reduce their economic viability. Efficiency has therefore become the most important issue when designing and selecting power plants with CO<sub>2</sub> capture. Other aspects, like reliability and operability, have been given less importance, if any at all, in the literature.

This article deals with qualitative reliability and operability analyses of an integrated reforming combined cycle (IRCC) concept. The plant reforms natural gas into a syngas, the carbon is separated out as CO<sub>2</sub> after a water-gas shift section, and the hydrogen-rich fuel is used for a gas turbine. The qualitative reliability analysis in the article consists of a functional analysis followed by a failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA). The operability analysis introduces the comparative complexity indicator (CCI) concept.

Functional analysis and FMECA are important steps in a system reliability analysis, as they can serve as a platform and basis for further analysis. Also, the results from the FMECA can be interesting for determining how the failures propagate through the system and their failure effects on the operation of the process. The CCI is a helpful tool in choosing the level of integration and to investigate whether or not to include a certain process feature. Incorporating the analytical approach presented in the article during the design stage of a plant can be advantageous for the overall plant performance.

*Key words:* CO<sub>2</sub> capture, Pre-combustion, Reliability, FMECA, Operability, Control degrees of freedom

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## 1 Introduction

2 Capturing the CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fueled power plants can be part of an over-  
3 all mitigation strategy to reduce the rise in atmospheric temperature. There  
4 are several approaches for capturing CO<sub>2</sub> from power generation. One is pre-  
5 combustion capture, where the fossil fuel is decarbonized to produce a syngas.  
6 The carbon, as CO<sub>2</sub>, is separated out before the combustion takes place. For  
7 coal, one could implement pre-combustion CO<sub>2</sub> capture in the integrated gasi-  
8 fication combined cycle (IGCC). IGCC plants exist, but none of them employs  
9 CO<sub>2</sub> capture. There are, however, a number of IGCC plants with CO<sub>2</sub> capture  
10 in the planning phase (Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage, 2009). For natural  
11 gas pre-combustion capture, the integrated reforming combined cycle (IRCC)  
12 that reforms natural gas into a hydrogen-rich fuel (Andersen et al., 2000),

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13 could be attractive. This technology has yet to be implemented in practice.  
14 The gas turbines in an IGCC or IRCC plant would fire a hydrogen-rich fuel.  
15 The IGCC cycle has been studied extensively in terms of thermodynamical  
16 analyses to arrive at a cycle efficiency, and also economical analyses (e.g.,  
17 Bohm et al., 2007; Descamps et al., 2008). To a lesser extent, aspects such as  
18 reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) have been studied for the  
19 IGCC cycle (Higman et al., 2006). Limited literature is available on reliability  
20 analyses of pre-combustion natural gas cycles. However, as large-scale imple-  
21 mentation of CO<sub>2</sub> capture from power plants draws nearer, there will likely  
22 be more focus on areas such as RAM and operability.

23 A main issue related to pre-combustion techniques is that the plant becomes  
24 more complex with the significant integration between the power cycle and  
25 the gasification (for the IGCC case) or reforming (for the IRCC case) process.  
26 In addition, some of the technology is less mature than for a pulverized coal  
27 plant or for a natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) plant. The gas turbine (GT)  
28 technology is, for example, much more mature for natural gas firing than for  
29 firing a hydrogen-rich fuel. Chiesa et al. (2005) address issues related to using  
30 hydrogen as fuel for GTs. Also, a GT designed for an IGCC or IRCC plant  
31 typically needs to be more fuel flexible, which requires special attention to the  
32 burner design (Bonzani and Gobbo, 2007) and the control system (Shilling  
33 and Jones, 2003). The less-mature technology and the integration present in  
34 IGCC plants are some of the reasons for the initially low availability of such  
35 plants (Higman et al., 2006; Beér, 2007). However, the availability of IGCC  
36 plants have steadily been improving since first introduced to the market.

37 In the RAM field, more literature is found if one looks for analyses of power

38 plants in general and do not limit oneself to CO<sub>2</sub> capture plants. Examples  
39 of RAM analyses in the literature include Eti et al. (2007) and Åström et al.  
40 (2007). Another related area is reliability analysis of chemical systems. A thor-  
41 ough literature review related to chemical system reliability is given by Dhillon  
42 and Rayapati (1988). An international standard for production assurance and  
43 reliability management has recently been published (ISO 20815, 2008). In this  
44 standard, the term “production assurance” is used with the same meaning as  
45 operability in this article.

46 Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) is a widely used qual-  
47 itative method for reliability analysis (e.g., see Rausand and Høyland, 2004;  
48 IEC 60812, 2006). Teng and Ho (1996) discuss the use of FMECA for product  
49 design and process control. Teoh and Case (2004) describe, among other top-  
50 ics, the connection between system functional diagrams and FMECA. FMECA  
51 can be used to identify critical areas during the design stage of the system.  
52 When the criticality of failures is not investigated, the FMECA is sometimes  
53 called failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA).

54 The complexity and efficiency of a process plant normally increase with the  
55 degree of integration. While the increase in efficiency is a desired result, the  
56 increased complexity can give rise to operability and risk issues (e.g., see Per-  
57 row, 1999). The degree of integration in a process plant should therefore be  
58 determined based on a trade-off between efficiency and complexity. Operabil-  
59 ity is dependent on plant design and efforts have been made to incorporate  
60 process operability and control at an early stage of the design process (Barton  
61 et al., 1991; Blanco and Bandoni, 2003). The procedures presented in litera-  
62 ture are computationally intensive and provide a level of rigor not required  
63 for the purposes of this work. A new index called the comparative complexity

64 indicator (CCI) presented here is a parameter for comparing complexity of  
65 processes that provides a simple guide to the engineer on the extent of inte-  
66 gration. As the name suggests, this indicator is useful only when comparing  
67 two processes and the absolute value of the indicator for a single process has  
68 no significance by itself.

69 The main objectives of this article are: (i) To illustrate and discuss the use  
70 of qualitative reliability and operability analyses in the field of CO<sub>2</sub> capture  
71 as a first step in developing a methodology for the design of a power plant  
72 with pre-combustion CO<sub>2</sub> capture, and (ii) to introduce a new concept, the  
73 comparative complexity indicator, as a tool for choosing the level of process  
74 integration and to gauge the complexity of a CO<sub>2</sub> capture plant.

75 The remainder of the article is divided into the following sections: Section 2  
76 describes the process with functional descriptions of the building blocks. Sec-  
77 tion 3 describes the details of the methodologies used in the article. The results  
78 are shown and analyzed in Section 4, and concluding remarks are given in Sec-  
79 tion 5.

## 80 **2 Functional description of process**

81 A functional diagram of the cycle studied is shown in Fig. 1. The purpose of the  
82 plant is to generate fossil fueled power with low CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The process  
83 has a defined system boundary as shown in Fig. 1. Inputs to the system include  
84 natural gas, ambient air, make-up water, and cooling water. Outputs across  
85 the system boundary include compressed CO<sub>2</sub>, water that has been separated  
86 out, cooling water, exhaust from the heat recovery steam generator (HRSG)




Fig. 1. Functional block diagram of an integrated reforming combined cycle plant.

87 that originated in the gas turbine exhaust, as well as power generated in the  
 88 generator connected to the power train. In Fig. 1 the generator is incorporated  
 89 into the gas turbine and steam turbine blocks.

90 In addition to the functional diagram in Fig. 1, a process flow sheet of the  
 91 system is shown in Fig. 2. This representation of the system gives further  
 92 insight and will prove helpful in the operability analysis.

93 *2.1 Description of system inputs and outputs*

94 The system inputs and outputs crossing the system boundary in Fig. 1 are  
 95 described below.

96 **Natural gas**




Fig. 2. IRCC process flow sheet.

97 The supplied natural gas has an assumed pressure of 3.1 MPa and a temper-  
 98 ature of 16°C with a mass flow of 19 kg/s. The stream composition is given  
 99 in Table 1.

### 100 Ambient air

101 The ambient air is assumed at 0.1013 MPa and 15°C with 60% relative hu-  
 102 midity and a total mass flow (air to gas turbine and to air compressor) of 648  
 103 kg/s. The air composition is given in Table 2.

### 104 Exhaust

105 The exhaust originating from the gas turbine exhaust, passing through the  
 106 HRSG, and exiting through the stack has a temperature of about 90°C and a  
 107 pressure of 0.1013 MPa with a mass flow of 650 kg/s.

Table 1

Natural gas composition in model.

Component name	Chemical formula	Unit	Value
Methane	CH <sub>4</sub>	vol%	79.84
Ethane	C <sub>2</sub> H <sub>6</sub>	vol%	9.69
Propane	C <sub>3</sub> H <sub>8</sub>	vol%	4.45
i-Butane	C <sub>4</sub> H <sub>10</sub>	vol%	0.73
n-Butane	C <sub>4</sub> H <sub>10</sub>	vol%	1.23
i-Pentane	C <sub>5</sub> H <sub>12</sub>	vol%	0.21
n-Pentane	C <sub>5</sub> H <sub>12</sub>	vol%	0.20
Hexane	C <sub>6</sub> H <sub>14</sub>	vol%	0.21
Carbon dioxide	CO <sub>2</sub>	vol%	2.92
Nitrogen	N <sub>2</sub>	vol%	0.51
Hydrogen sulfide	H <sub>2</sub> S	ppmvd	5

Table 2

Ambient air composition in model.

Component name	Chemical formula	Unit	Value
Oxygen	O <sub>2</sub>	vol%	20.74
Nitrogen	N <sub>2</sub>	vol%	77.30
Argon	Ar	vol%	0.92
Carbon dioxide	CO <sub>2</sub>	vol%	0.03
Water	H <sub>2</sub> O	vol%	1.01

## 108 Water

109 Make-up water has an inlet temperature of 49°C and a pressure of 0.19 MPa.

## 110 Cooling water

111 The incoming cooling water for the condenser and cooler has an assumed  
 112 temperature of 15°C with a temperature increase in the heat exchangers of 10  
 113 K. Direct cooling by sea water is assumed.

## 114 CO<sub>2</sub>

115 The compressed CO<sub>2</sub> stream has above 99 vol% CO<sub>2</sub> and a pressure of 11.0  
 116 MPa with a temperature of about 41°C. The mass flow is 47 kg/s.



117 **Power**

118 The net power output from the plant is approximately 362 MW.

119 *2.2 Functionality and description of equipment*

120 The functional blocks in Fig. 1 are described below.

121 **Pressure regulating valve**


122 Function: To reduce the natural gas pressure from a delivery pressure of 3.1  
123 MPa to approximately 1.9 MPa.

124 The pressure is set in order to match the compressed air pressure at the  
125 entrance of the auto thermal reformer (ATR).

**Desulfurizer**

Function: To reduce the H<sub>2</sub>S content in the natural gas to 2 ppmvd.

Sulfur removal is necessary to protect the catalysts in the reforming and water-gas shift reactors. Because of the low sulfur content in the selected natural gas composition, 5 ppmvd H<sub>2</sub>S, a ZnO desulfurizer is selected. The sulfur is removed by flowing of the natural gas through a bed of ZnO granules according to the reaction



126 **Mixer**

127 Function: To mix the desulfurized natural gas with steam extracted from the  
128 steam turbine.

129 The steam to carbon ratio is set to 1.5 on a molar basis.

130 **Gas turbine**

131 Function: To generate power; to provide compressed air to the ATR; to provide  
132 hot flue gases to the HRSG.

133 The power cycle consists of a General Electric (GE) 9FA H<sub>2</sub>-fired gas turbine  
134 (GT). The fuel fed to the GT combustor in principle consists of a mixture  
135 of H<sub>2</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>. Because of the air-blown ATR, the water-gas shift reactors  
136 and the CO<sub>2</sub> capture processes, the fuel consists of approximately 50 vol%  
137 hydrogen. This enables use of available IGCC-type diffusion combustors (Todd  
138 and Battista, 2000; Shilling and Jones, 2003). The nitrogen acts as a fuel  
139 diluent. For further NO<sub>x</sub> control, steam is injected into the flame. From the  
140 gas separation stage the fuel mix is passed on to the gas turbine via a fuel  
141 compressor. The GT turbine inlet temperature has been reduced because of the  
142 high steam content in the turbine. The hydrogen fuel together with the injected  
143 steam lead to an H<sub>2</sub>O content entering the turbine of about 18.2 vol%. This  
144 leads to a higher heat transfer rate to the blades compared to a natural gas  
145 fired turbine. As a result, the metal temperature of the turbine blades is higher  
146 for the same turbine inlet temperature as in a conventional gas turbine. To  
147 obtain similar life of the turbine parts, the turbine inlet temperature reduction  
148 is necessary. Chiesa et al. (2005) report TIT decreases of 10-34 K for hydrogen  
149 combustion with nitrogen or steam diluent (VGV operation cases). As a model  
150 assumption, a TIT reduction of 30 K has been assumed for this work. In  
151 addition to running the GT on a hydrogen-rich fuel, the idea is to be able  
152 to operate on natural gas as a back-up fuel if the pre-combustion process is  
153 shut-down. This requires fuel flexibility for the combustor system (Shilling and  
154 Jones, 2003; Bonzani and Gobbo, 2007). In addition, start-up of the GT would  
155 be with natural gas fuel. It is also possible to run with a mixture of natural gas  
156 and the hydrogen-rich fuel. The gas turbine exhaust stream passes through  
157 the HRSG for pre-heating of the process streams and steam generation before

158 emitted to the atmosphere through the stack.

### 159 **Air compressor**

160 Function: To provide compressed air to the ATR.

161 The external compressor is introduced in order to better utilize the operation  
162 of the gas turbine. If too much air is removed prior to the combustion chamber  
163 in the gas turbine, the effect on the performance and temperature profile can  
164 be negative.

### 165 **Heat recovery steam generator**

166 Function: To pre-heat the compressed air, the natural gas/steam mixture, and  
167 the pre-reformed ATR feed; to generate steam.

168 A triple pressure steam cycle was selected. The HRSG includes pre-heating for  
169 the various process streams. The pre-heated streams include the NG/steam  
170 feed to the pre-reformer, the ATR feed stream coming from the pre-reformer,  
171 and air extracted from the compressor discharge stream of the gas turbine com-  
172 bined with an additional compressor air stream before supplied to the ATR.  
173 The steam cycle is designed for pressure levels of approximately 8.3/1.0/0.3  
174 MPa for the high, intermediate, and low pressure (HP/IP/LP) systems re-  
175 spectively. The pre-heating makes the HRSG design more complex and a lot  
176 of heat is removed from the gas stream at the hot part of the HRSG due to  
177 the high temperature requirements of some of the process streams. Note that  
178 the pre-heating is not entirely in the hot end of the HRSG but instead inter-  
179 mixed with the low, intermediate, and high-pressure sections. Equipment such  
180 as pumps for the different pressure levels, drums, valves, and so on, are not  
181 shown in the functional diagram.

### 182 **Steam turbine**

183 Function: To supply steam for the reforming process, the gas turbine, and the  
184 gas separation sub-system; to generate power.

185 The steam turbine (ST) has extractions for the GT steam injection, the re-  
186 forming process steam, and for the reboiler in the amine absorption system.

### 187 **Condenser**

188 Function: To condense the steam.

189 After exiting the last low pressure turbine stage the steam is condensed in the  
190 condenser.

### 191 **Pump**



192 Function: To pump the water up to feed water pressure.

193


### **Pre reformer**

Function: To convert the higher hydrocarbons into hydrogen and carbon monoxide.

Adiabatic pre-reforming of hydrocarbons is described by Vannby and Winter Madsen (1992). In the pre-reforming reactor the hydrocarbons higher than methane are converted to protect against coking in the primary reformer according to the reactions




Also, the exothermic water-gas shift reaction (4) converting the CO into CO<sub>2</sub> takes place in the pre-reforming reactor.



## Auto thermal reformer

Function: To reform the stream from the pre-reformer into syngas.

Auto thermal reforming is described by Christensen and Primdahl (1994); Dybkjær (1995); Christensen et al. (1998). In the ATR the exothermic reaction (5) provide heat to the endothermic reaction (6).



194 As in the pre-reformer, the water-gas shift reaction (4) converts some of the  
195 CO into CO<sub>2</sub>.

## 196 Syngas cooler

197 Function: To cool the syngas supplied by the ATR.

198 The syngas is cooled in the syngas cooler before entering the water-gas shift  
199 reactors. As a secondary function the hot stream supplied by the ATR is gen-  
200 erating high-pressure steam in the syngas cooler. This steam is then supplied  
201 to the HP superheaters in the HRSG. The reason for using the syngas cooler as  
202 an evaporator rather than as a superheater is due to the risk of metal dusting.  
203 Metal dusting is further discussed in Section 3.1.2.

## 204 Water gas shift reactors

205 Function: To convert CO to CO<sub>2</sub>.

206 The rest of the CO is converted to CO<sub>2</sub> according to reaction (4). The reasons  
207 behind dividing the water-gas shift reaction into a high temperature reactor  
208 and a low temperature one (HTS and LTS) are due to conversion rate and  
209 catalysts. To get a higher degree of conversion of the CO to CO<sub>2</sub>, two reactors  
210 are favorable compared to a one-reactor setup. Also, there is a need for a  
211 more active catalyst at the lower region of the temperature range (Moulijn

212 et al., 2007). It can therefore make sense to use a standard catalyst at the  
213 higher temperature range and then have a separate reactor with a more active  
214 catalyst for the low end temperature.

### 215 **Heat exchanger 3**

216 Function: To cool the stream from the HTS going to the LTS.

217 HE3 is also, together with the syngas cooler, producing high-pressure satu-  
218 rated steam to be added to the high-pressure superheater in the HRSG.

### 219 **Heat exchanger 4**

220 Function: To pre-heat the hydrogen-rich fuel for the gas turbine.

221

### 222 **Heat exchanger 5**

223 Function: To cool down the gas for the gas separation process.

224 Heat exchanger 5 (HE5) is also producing some of the steam necessary for the  
225 reboiler in the amine absorption process.

### 226 **Cooler and flash tank**

227 Function: To cool down the stream from HE5 and remove the water before  
228 the gas separation stage.

### 229 **Gas separation (amine absorption)**

230 Function: To separate out CO<sub>2</sub>; to provide H<sub>2</sub>-rich fuel.

231 In this model the gas separation stage is using the chemical absorbent acti-  
232 vated MDEA (van Loo et al., 2007).

### 233 **CO<sub>2</sub> compression**

234 Function: To compress CO<sub>2</sub> up to delivery pressure.

235 The CO<sub>2</sub> is passed on to the compression section where the gas is compressed in

236 the four compressor/intercooler stages and excess water is removed. To achieve  
237 the exit pressure of 11.0 MPa a pump is used at the end of the compression  
238 train.

### 239 **3 Methodology**

240 The plant model in Figs. 1 and 2 was analyzed from several angles, as illus-  
241 trated in Fig. 3, in order to determine reliability and operability aspects of the  
242 plant design. As basis for the reliability analysis the process was first thermo-  
243 dynamically analyzed. This is important to be able to define the functional  
244 requirements and reveal the part load behavior of the plant. Some of the fail-  
245 ure modes may affect the ability of the plant to operate at full load and the  
246 reliability of the plant will depend on the part loads. Even though the aim is  
247 to operate the plant at full load, it is also necessary to be able to operate the  
248 plant at part load. The thermodynamic analysis is not documented in this ar-  
249 ticle, but indicates that part load operation down to 60% relative gas turbine  
250 load is possible. The relative load is here defined as the actual load of the GT  
251 divided by the full GT load at actual ambient conditions.

252 The reliability analysis was carried out as a functional analysis followed by an  
253 FMECA. The operability analysis is based on the new comparative complex-  
254 ity indicator (CCI). In the following sections, the reliability and operability  
255 analyses are described.




Fig. 3. Analytical approach to process model study.

### 256 3.1 Reliability analysis

257 The first step of the reliability analysis was a detailed functional analysis that  
 258 was carried out to reveal and define all the required functions of the plant  
 259 elements. For each function, the associated performance criteria were deter-  
 260 mined. A thorough understanding of all required functions and their associated  
 261 performance criteria is a prerequisite for the FMECA.

262 The FMECA involves analyzing all the potential failure modes of the system  
 263 elements (components and subsystems) and identify the causes and effects of  
 264 these failure modes. The FMECA is also used to determine how failures may  
 265 propagate through the system, and to reveal the failure effects on the operation  
 266 of the plant. Another purpose of the FMECA was to identify the most critical  
 267 components/integration points for further and more detailed analyses at later  
 268 stages of the project.

#### 269 3.1.1 Functional analysis

270 The functional analysis was carried out at the equipment level of the system,  
 271 as shown in Fig. 4. The different subsystems and their equipments are listed  
 272 in Table 3 together with the functional requirements (e.g., see Murthy et al.,






Fig. 4. Functional levels of a system.

273 2008). On system (plant) level the functional requirements are: Plant power  
 274 output  $\geq 300$  MW (ISO); CO<sub>2</sub> capture rate  $\geq 90\%$ . The CO<sub>2</sub> capture rate  
 275 is defined as the fraction of the formed CO<sub>2</sub> that is captured. The functional  
 276 analysis that is documented in this article only includes the essential functions,  
 277 meaning that auxiliary functions, protective functions, and so forth, are not  
 278 covered.

### 279 3.1.2 FMECA

280 The FMECA approach that was selected for this project is illustrated in Fig. 5.  
 281 In this approach, a risk, or criticality, number is assigned to each and every  
 282 failure mode as a risk priority number (RPN). The RPN of a failure mode is  
 283 calculated based on an evaluation of the factors: detection, failure rate, and  
 284 severity, of a failure mode. Each of these three factors are typically assigned  
 285 numbers ranging from 1 to 10. There are several approaches for assigning these  
 286 numbers, one is described by Bevilacqua et al. (2000) where a Monte Carlo  
 287 simulation approach is used for testing the weights assigned to the RPNs. In  
 288 this article, the normal 1 – 10 scale was modified to the more limited 1 –  
 289 3 scale. The reason for this modification was to more readily being able to  
 290 identify the numbers the RPN are based upon.

Table 3

Functional requirements of the system. Subscript numbering in accordance with Fig. 2 stream numbering.

Subsystem	Equipment	Function	Functional requirement
NG processing	Pressure regulating valve	Decrease line pressure down to system pressure	$1.8 \text{ MPa} \leq p_2 \leq 2.0 \text{ MPa}$
NG processing	Desulfurizer	Remove sulfur	Exhaust $\text{H}_2\text{S} \leq 2 \text{ ppmv}$
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Generate power	$P_{rel,GT} \geq 90\%$
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide air	$m_{10} \geq 67.5 \text{ kg/s}, T_{10} \geq 350^\circ\text{C}$
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide hot gases	$T_{40} \geq 560^\circ\text{C}$
Power cycle	Steam turbine	Generate power	$P_{ST} \geq 125 \text{ MW}$
Power cycle	Steam turbine	Supply steam to pre-reformer	$S/C = 1.5 \pm 0.1$
Power cycle	Steam turbine	Supply steam to reboiler in amine system	$p_{45} \geq 0.32 \text{ MPa}$ . Heat flow provided $\geq 70 \text{ MJ/s}$
Power cycle	Generator	Generate power	Power output $\geq 300 \text{ MW (ISO)}$
Pre-heating	NG pre-heater	Pre-heat NG	$350^\circ\text{C} \leq T_3 \leq 425^\circ\text{C}$
Pre-heating	NG/steam pre-heater	Pre-heat NG/steam mix	$T_6 \geq 480^\circ\text{C}$
Pre-heating	Air pre-heater	Pre-heat air	$T_{15} \geq 450^\circ\text{C}$
Pre-heating	ATR feed pre-heater	Pre-heat ATR feed gas	$T_8 \geq 450^\circ\text{C}$
HRSG	LP	Generate LP steam	$m_{31} \geq 10 \text{ kg/s}$
HRSG	IP	Generate IP steam	$m_{32} \geq 20 \text{ kg/s}$
HRSG	HP	Generate HP steam	$m_{37} \geq 40 \text{ kg/s}$
Reforming	Pre-reformer	Convert higher hydrocarbons. Provide preref gas	$T_6 - T_7 \geq 40 \text{ K}, T_7 \geq 430^\circ\text{C}$
Reforming	ATR	Convert methane. Provide syn-gas	$900^\circ\text{C} \leq T_{16} \leq 1000^\circ\text{C}$
W-G shift	HTS	Convert CO to $\text{CO}_2$	$\Delta T \geq 75 \text{ K}$
W-G shift	LTS	Convert CO to $\text{CO}_2$	$\Delta T \geq 30 \text{ K}$
HX network	Syngas cooler (HE1, HE2)	Cool ATR product	$300^\circ\text{C} \leq T_{18} \leq 450^\circ\text{C}$
HX network	HE3	Cool LTS feed	$180^\circ\text{C} \leq T_{20} \leq 250^\circ\text{C}$
HX network	HE4	Heat fuel	$T_{29} \geq 180^\circ\text{C}$
HX network	HE5	Generate steam	$x_{52} = 1.0$
HX network	Cooler	Cool flash feed	$T_{24} \leq 30^\circ\text{C}$
HX network	Condenser	Condense steam	$p_{49} \leq 0.0044 \text{ MPa}$
HX network	Condenser	Condense steam	$p_{50} \geq 0.18 \text{ MPa}$
Pre-comb capture	Gas separation	Separate out $\text{CO}_2$	Remove $\geq 95\% \text{ CO}_2$
Compression	Air compressor	Compress air for ATR	$p_{13} = p_{10} \cdot m_{13} \rightarrow T_{16} = 950^\circ\text{C}$
Compression	$\text{CO}_2$ compression	Compress $\text{CO}_2$	$p_{55} \geq 10.0 \text{ MPa}$
Compression	Fuel compressor	Compress fuel	$p_{28} \geq 1.8 \text{ MPa}$




Fig. 5. Graphical representation of the FMECA approach.

291 The detection scale was defined as: 1 = highly detectable, almost certain  
 292 detection; 2 = moderately detectable; and 3 = non-detectable.

293 The failure rate scale was defined as: 1 = failure unlikely; 2 = occasional  
 294 failure; and 3 = frequent failure.

295 The severity scale was defined as: 1 = no, or very small effect; 2 = plant  
 296 operating at part load or bypassing CO<sub>2</sub> capture; and 3 = plant shutdown.

297 As a basis of the analysis, it is assumed that the plant is operating at full load  
 298 when a failure occurs. Furthermore, potential human errors are not considered  
 299 in the analysis.

300 A failure mode is defined as a failure to meet a functional requirement of a  
 301 specific equipment. Once a failure mode has been specified, the causes and  
 302 effects of the failure need to be identified. Regarding failure effects, the ef-  
 303 fects on the same equipment where the failure occurred were first analyzed.  
 304 Secondly, the effects on other equipment in the system were investigated, and

305 finally, the overall system effects were identified. One example of failure causes  
306 and their effects is coking, or metal dusting, in the reactors and heat exchang-  
307 ers (Grabke and Wolf, 1986; Grabke et al., 1993). Coking in pre-reformers is  
308 investigated by Sperle et al. (2005). Several failure causes, including metal  
309 dusting in a heat exchanger for synthesis gas, are investigated by Grabke and  
310 Spiegel (2003). Catalyst degradation due to coking in reactors is analyzed by  
311 Rostrup-Nielsen (1997).

312 Some of the failure causes for the gas turbine were listed as a protective load  
313 shed (PLS) cause or a trip cause. A protective load shed is described as an  
314 automatic deload of the GT due to an abnormal situation such as an elevated  
315 temperature. A trip occurs when a more critical event takes place. The reason  
316 for listing a failure cause as a PLS or trip cause is because the reasons for the  
317 PLS or trip can be many.

318 The most common protective load shed causes are found to be:

- 319 • Thermo-acoustic instabilities
- 320 • Abnormal exhaust temperature
- 321 • Controls and instrument problems
- 322 • HRSG trip

323 The most common trip causes are found to be:

- 324 • Thermo-acoustic instabilities
- 325 • Flame monitor
- 326 • Abnormal exhaust temperature
- 327 • Controls and instrument problems
- 328 • Bearings (temperature, vibration)

329 • Manual trip

330 The detection rating was, for the most part, derived based on knowledge in  
331 instrumentation and controls. For example, an abnormal temperature or pres-  
332 sure change is easy to detect, whereas a change in a gas composition can be  
333 more difficult to sense. With the 1 – 3 scale, the numbers were fairly easy to  
334 assign. To determine the failure rate numbers, several data sources were con-  
335 sulted (OREDA, 2002; NERC, 2007). The severity ranking was established  
336 based on studying the effects of the various failure modes. The RPNs were  
337 computed by multiplying the detection, failure rate, and severity numbers,  
338 and must therefore range from 1 to 9.

### 339 3.2 Operability analysis

340 Main contributors to operability problems are (i) component and subsystem  
341 failures and (ii) system complexity and coupling between subsystems. The first  
342 aspect was discussed in the previous section.

343 The complexity of a plant and its control system is directly related to the  
344 number of manipulated variables. A *manipulated variable* is the variable that  
345 is changed, in a control strategy, to achieve a certain process condition. It is  
346 desirable that the complexity of a control system is as low as possible (Sko-  
347 gestad, 2004). The main aim is thus to have a system with a small number of  
348 manipulated variables for better operability.

349 As a qualitative measure of the complexity of a process we introduce the new  
350 *comparative complexity indicator* (CCI), as the number of variables that can  
351 be manipulated in a process while accounting for integration between different

352 process areas.

353 The CCI is based on a well-established concept in control system design - the  
354 control degrees of freedom (CDOF), defined to be the number of manipulated  
355 variables that can be used in control loops. The CDOF of a process is therefore  
356 the number of process variables: temperatures, pressures, compositions, flow  
357 rates, or component flow rates, that can be set by the control system once the  
358 non-adjustable design variables, such as vessel dimensions, have been fixed.

359 It is important to distinguish between the CDOF and the design degrees of  
360 freedom, even though the CDOF is the same as the design degree of freedom  
361 for some classes of processes (Luyben, 1996). If there are  $C$  components, then  
362 there are  $(C + 2)$  *design* degrees of freedom. This implies that the designer  
363 has choice over feed stream composition, pressure, and temperature. This is  
364 true during the design of a process. In an actual control scenario, the only  
365 manipulation possible is to change the stream flow. Whatever may be the  
366 nature of the control loop (flow, level, pressure, temperature, or composition),  
367 ultimately the manipulated variable is the flow rate of a process stream.

### 368 *3.2.1 Procedure for calculating control degrees of freedom*

369 To determine the CDOF of a process is the most important step in evaluating  
370 the CCI. The procedure used in this article is adapted from Murthy Konda  
371 et al. (2006) and further expanded in Vasudevan et al. (2008). As mentioned  
372 above, the manipulated variables will always be process stream flows. The  
373 motivating question behind calculating CDOF is whether it is possible to  
374 manipulate all the process streams and, if not, what are the restrictions? This  
375 leads to:

- 376 • CDOF of a unit  $\leq$  Total number of streams associated with that unit, or
- 377 • CDOF of a unit + Restraining number = Total number of streams associ-
- 378 ated with that unit.

The *restraining number* is the number of streams that cannot be manipulated. Murthy Konda et al. (2006) and Vasudevan et al. (2008) list the restraining number of commonly used units in process plants. To find the CDOF for a process, the following formula is used:

$$\text{CDOF} = N_S - N_R \quad (7)$$

379 where  $N_S$  is the total number of streams in the process and  $N_R$  is the sum of  
380 restraining numbers for all units in the process.

381 A simple utility heater or cooler has a CDOF of 2 (Murthy Konda et al., 2006).  
382 A heat exchanger implies a more complex and tightly integrated process. In  
383 this analysis, a heat exchanger should therefore have a higher CDOF than  
384 the value of 2 proposed by Murthy Konda et al. (2006). In practice, many  
385 heat exchangers have by-pass streams that usually are not shown on process  
386 flow diagrams. The number of streams for a process/process heat exchanger  
387 would then be 6, rather than 4, leading to a CDOF of 4 (compared to 2). In  
388 this article, this is included in the procedure to calculate the CDOF of heat  
389 exchangers.

390 Fig. 6 shows a simple Westerberg process with ten process streams (including  
391 the energy stream). The restraining numbers for each of the units in the process  
392 are shown in Table 4.

393 The CDOF of the Westerberg process is  $10 - 4 = 6$ .




Fig. 6. Westerberg process

Table 4

Restraining numbers for units in the Westerberg process.

Unit	Restraining no.
Mixer	1
Reactor	0
Cooler	1
Flash drum	0
Splitter	1
Compressor	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>

394 3.2.2 Evaluating the comparative complexity indicator

395 The CDOF does not sufficiently represent how tightly a plant is integrated  
 396 and particularly, integration between different process areas. The CCI adds a  
 397 level of realism to the CDOF procedure by considering the way the different  
 398 process areas of a plant are integrated.

399 The procedure for evaluating the CCI is shown by the flow diagram in Fig. 7.  
 400 The first step involves decomposing the plant into *functional* process areas.  
 401 For example, in the IRCC plant the reforming section is one process area and  
 402 the CO<sub>2</sub> compression section another. The CDOF of each process area is then  
 403 calculated as described in the previous section. If the flow between two process  
 404 areas is a manipulated variable then an extra degree of freedom is added. This






Fig. 7. Calculating the comparative complexity indicator (CCI) of a process.

405 check is repeated for each stream between the different process areas in the  
 406 plant. The CCI is then calculated as the sum of the CDOFs of the process  
 407 areas and the “extra degrees of freedom”. This means the CCI is an addition  
 408 of the total number of CDOFs and the, between process areas, connecting  
 409 streams that are manipulated variables.

410 The calculation of the CCI for different IRCC configurations, as well as, for  
 411 an NGCC plant with and without post-combustion capture are presented in  
 412 the next section.

#### 413 **4 Results and discussion**

414 The documentation of the analysis and of the results of the FMECA is com-  
 415 prehensive. Therefore, only a part of the results is shown in this article. Table 5  
 416 includes the failure modes with an RPN greater than 6. As seen from the ta-

417 ble, many of the high risk results are linked to the gas turbine. This is not  
418 unexpected. In a regular NGCC plant the gas turbine and its auxiliaries are  
419 also responsible for the largest part of the forced outages (NERC, 2007).

420 For an IRCC, there may be additional GT failures stemming from issues re-  
421 lated to the supply of the hydrogen-rich fuel and because of the lower level of  
422 experience with hydrogen-fired GTs compared to NG-fired GTs.

423 One may criticize the risk priority rankings and argue that some of them  
424 should be changed. Certainly, if another person performed the FMECA, dif-  
425 ferent results would arise, but the key results, such as what equipment is most  
426 critical in the plant, should be similar if performed by someone else.

Table 5

FMECA: highest risk failure causes. Subscript numbering in accordance with Fig. 2 stream numbering.

Subsystem	Equipment	Function	Functional requirement	Failure mode	Failure cause	Effects on same equipment	Effects on other equipment	Effects on overall system function	Detection (1-3)	Failure rate (1-3)	Severity (1-3)	Risk (DxFxS)
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Generate power	$P_{rel,GT} \geq 90\%$	60% $\leq$ $P_{rel,GT} <$ 90%	Fuel supply	Part load operation	Reduced steam production in HRSG. Reduced power output from steam turbine	Reduced plant load	2	2	2	8
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide hot gases	$T_{40} \geq 560^\circ\text{C}$	$T_{40} < 560^\circ\text{C}$	Fuel supply	Part load operation	Reduced steam production in HRSG. Reduced power output from steam turbine	Reduced plant load	2	2	2	8
Reforming	Pre-reformer	Convert higher hydrocarbons. Provide preref gas	$T_6 - T_7 \geq 40\text{ K}$ , $T_7 \geq 430^\circ\text{C}$	$T_6 - T_7 < 40\text{ K}$ , $T_7 < 430^\circ\text{C}$	Catalyst issue	Lower conversion rate	Higher hydrocarbons to ATR (coking)	Reduced plant load. Decreased CO <sub>2</sub> capture rate	2	2	2	8
Reforming	ATR	Convert methane. Provide syngas	$900^\circ\text{C} \leq T_{16} \leq 1000^\circ\text{C}$	$T_{16}$ outside range	Catalyst issue	Lower conversion rate	Hydrocarbons to HTS	Reduced plant load. Decreased CO <sub>2</sub> capture rate	2	2	2	8
Reforming	ATR	Convert methane. Provide syngas	$900^\circ\text{C} \leq T_{16} \leq 1000^\circ\text{C}$	$T_{16}$ outside range	Burner issue	Possibly lower temperature. Flame shape distortion $\rightarrow$ mechanical damage to reactor walls	Hydrocarbons to HTS. Lower temp to HE1	Reduced plant load. Decreased CO <sub>2</sub> capture rate	2	2	2	8
W-G shift	HTS	Convert CO to CO <sub>2</sub>	$\Delta T \geq 75\text{ K}$	$\Delta T < 75\text{ K}$	Catalyst issue	Lower conversion rate	Higher CO content to LTS	Reduced plant load. Decreased CO <sub>2</sub> capture rate	2	2	2	8

Subsystem	Equipment	Function	Functional requirement	Failure mode	Failure cause	Effects on same equipment	Effects on other equipment	Effects on overall system function	Detection (1-3)	Failure rate (1-3)	Severity (1-3)	Risk (DxFxS)
W-G shift	LTS	Convert CO to CO <sub>2</sub>	$\Delta T \geq 30$ K	$\Delta T < 30$ K	Catalyst issue	Lower conversion rate	CO content to gas separation stage	Reduced plant load. Decreased CO <sub>2</sub> capture rate	2	2	2	8
NG processing	Pressure regulating valve	Decrease supply pressure down to system pressure	1.8 MPa $\leq p_2 \leq$ 2.0 MPa	$p_2 > 2.0$ MPa	Valve malfunction	-	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Generate power	$P_{rel,GT} \geq 90\%$	$P_{rel,GT} < 60\%$	Trip cause	GT trip	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Generate power	$P_{rel,GT} \geq 90\%$	$P_{rel,GT} < 60\%$	Protective load shed cause	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Generate power	$P_{rel,GT} \geq 90\%$	$P_{rel,GT} < 60\%$	Combustion problems	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Generate power	$P_{rel,GT} \geq 90\%$	$P_{rel,GT} < 60\%$	NO <sub>x</sub> emissions	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Generate power	$P_{rel,GT} \geq 90\%$	$P_{rel,GT} < 60\%$	Other gas turbine problems	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	2	1	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide air	$m_{10} \geq 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} \geq 350^\circ\text{C}$	$m_{10} < 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} < 350^\circ\text{C}$	Trip cause	GT trip	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide air	$m_{10} \geq 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} \geq 350^\circ\text{C}$	$m_{10} < 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} < 350^\circ\text{C}$	Protective load shed cause	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6

Subsystem	Equipment	Function	Functional re- quirement	Failure mode	Failure cause	Effects on same equipment	Effects on other equipment	Effects on over- all system func- tion	Detection (1-3)	Failure rate (1-3)	Severity (1-3)	Risk (DxFxS)
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide air	$m_{10} \geq 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} \geq$ $350^{\circ}\text{C}$	$m_{10} < 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} <$ $350^{\circ}\text{C}$	Combustion problems	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide air	$m_{10} \geq 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} \geq$ $350^{\circ}\text{C}$	$m_{10} < 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} <$ $350^{\circ}\text{C}$	NO <sub>x</sub> emis- sions	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide air	$m_{10} \geq 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} \geq$ $350^{\circ}\text{C}$	$m_{10} < 67.5$ kg/s, $T_{10} <$ $350^{\circ}\text{C}$	Other gas turbine problems	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	2	1	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide hot gases	$T_{40} \geq 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	$T_{40} < 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	Trip cause	GT trip	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide hot gases	$T_{40} \geq 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	$T_{40} < 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	Protective load shed cause	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide hot gases	$T_{40} \geq 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	$T_{40} < 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	Combustion problems	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide hot gases	$T_{40} \geq 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	$T_{40} < 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	NO <sub>x</sub> emis- sions	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	1	2	3	6
Power cycle	Gas turbine	Provide hot gases	$T_{40} \geq 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	$T_{40} < 560^{\circ}\text{C}$	Other gas turbine problems	GT shutdown	Shutdown of all subsystems	Plant shutdown	2	1	3	6

Table 6

CDOF evaluation for process areas in IRCC plant

Area	Total streams	Restraining no.	CDOF
Reforming area	36	7	29
CO <sub>2</sub> capture area	24	9	15
CO <sub>2</sub> compression area	24	10	14
GT fuel preparation area	5	2	3
CCPP area	79	28	51
<b>Total</b>			<b>112</b>

427 For the operability analysis, the IRCC process can be decomposed into the  
 428 following five process areas:

- 429 (1) Reforming area
- 430 (2) CO<sub>2</sub> capture area
- 431 (3) CO<sub>2</sub> compression area
- 432 (4) Gas turbine fuel preparation area
- 433 (5) Combined cycle power plant area

434 The CDOF of the five areas are calculated and shown in Table 6.

435 The total “extra degrees of freedom” in the system equals 3. Thus the com-  
 436 parative complexity indicator for the IRCC plant shown in Fig. 2 is 115. The  
 437 overall efficiency of the process is 41.9%.

438 Process modifications will affect both efficiency and the CCI of the overall  
 439 process. The subsequent paragraphs briefly analyse two process modifications  
 440 with regard to the efficiency and CCI of the process and identify if the modi-  
 441 fication is favorable or not.

442 **Process modification 1:** Streams 33 and 51 are extracted from the deaera-  
 443 tor (not shown in Fig. 2) at 105°C (pre-heated in low-temperature economizer

444 before entering the deaerator). The low temperature heat in stream 23 could  
445 be used to pre-heat the boiler feed water from 30°C to 105°C for HP and  
446 LP steam generation in the reforming process (rather than pre-heating in  
447 low-temperature economizer). The efficiency increase by including this mod-  
448 ification is negligible, whereas the CCI of this modified process is 118. This  
449 implies this process modification is not favorable as the complexity of the  
450 process increases without any corresponding improvement to efficiency, the  
451 decision variable.

452 Thus for processes with the same efficiencies, the heuristic is to select the one  
453 with least CCI.

454 **Process modification 2:** If the LP steam generator HE5 in Fig. 2 were  
455 ignored, the cooling water requirement would increase and the stream extrac-  
456 tion from the steam turbine to the CO<sub>2</sub> removal section would increase. This  
457 reduces the overall efficiency to 41.5%. The CCI for this modified process is  
458 111. The efficiency drop of 0.4%-point is significant in the context of this pro-  
459 cess. Thus, even though the complexity of this option is less than the original  
460 design, the efficiency drop causes this process modification to be disregarded.

461 In processes where efficiency improvements are essential, increasing complexity  
462 is acceptable within limits. For example, a process modification causing the  
463 efficiency to increase by 0.5%-points while increasing the CCI by 15 can be  
464 deemed less favorable compared to a modification that causes an efficiency  
465 increase by 0.4%-point with a CCI increase of 7.

466 For reference, the CCI for a natural gas combined cycle power plant without  
467 CO<sub>2</sub> capture is 48. Process areas such as reforming, CO<sub>2</sub> capture, and CO<sub>2</sub>  
468 compression are not included in an NGCC plant without CO<sub>2</sub> capture. The

469 CCI for a natural gas combined cycle power plant with post combustion CO<sub>2</sub>  
470 capture is 82.

## 471 5 Conclusions

472 Functional analysis and FMECA are important steps in a system reliabil-  
473 ity analysis, as they can serve as a platform and basis for further analysis.  
474 Also, the results from the FMECA can be interesting in themselves. From the  
475 FMECA performed in this work, it is clear that the gas turbine is the most  
476 critical equipment in an IRCC plant. One of the reasons for this is the signif-  
477 icant integration present. The gas turbine feeds air to the ATR, receives fuel  
478 from the pre-combustion process, and the steam turbine supplies steam to the  
479 GT combustor. This integration has an effect on the overall reliability of the  
480 system and shows up in the FMECA, not the least in the “Effects on other  
481 equipment” column in Table 5. In addition to the integration issues, the gas  
482 turbine technology is less mature for hydrogen fuels than for natural gas fuels.  
483 It should also be mentioned that even in a natural gas fired combined cycle  
484 plant the gas turbine is the most critical equipment. With all this said, the  
485 strong dominance of gas turbine failures in a list with the highest risk priority  
486 numbers such as in Table 5 is not unexpected. Operability analysis is another  
487 important tool during the design stage. The CCI is a helpful tool in choos-  
488 ing the level of integration and when investigating whether or not to include  
489 a certain process feature. Incorporating the analytical approach presented in  
490 the article and displayed in Fig. 3, during the design stage of a plant, can be  
491 advantageous for the overall plant performance.



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