

Alice Zakova

Small states in multinational operations

A case study of the Czech decision to participate in ISAF

Master's thesis in Globalization: Global Politics and Culture

Faculty of Social Sciences and Technology Management

Department of Sociology and Political Science

Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

Trondheim, Autumn 2015

Preface

When the terrorist attack of 9/11 happened, I remember myself watching the TV news and asking my parents, what that meant, and whether it meant that there would be a war. I do not remember their answer, but for sure it was something that maybe there will be a war, but far away from our home, and not including us at all. The war or fight on terrorism did start indeed, and the actual fights were far away from our home, but as we soon realized the conflict included us as well.

Now, 14 years later, thanks to this thesis I, myself, are more included in the conflict than ever. I can only imagine how the actual battles look like, but I guess it can be compared at some point to writing this thesis – it is tough, it takes a long time to train and prepare yourself, while the actual battle (writing) takes only an eye twinkle. However, if you win the battle, you feel relief and happiness. Hereby, I would like to thank my brothers (and sisters) in arms who helped me to win this, particular battle.

First of all, my thanks go to Gunnar Fermann who supervised me through the whole thesis. His valuable advice and comments made this thesis and my professional me better.

Second thanks goes to my friends. Irrespective of whether they live few metres or thousands kilometres away, they inspire me, get me up when I fall, and are laughing at my (not only) master's thesis fun facts, even though they are not even funny.

Last, but very certainly not least, my family deserves their place here, as well. They supported me back then in 2001 when assuring me that everything is going to be fine, and they still support me now, even if I make rather irrational decisions, like for example to move to foreign country and fight another Master programme battle, just because it is fun. So, thank you that you are here for me.

Content

Preface.....	III
List of figures	VII
List of tables	VII
List of abbreviations.....	IX
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Problem clarification and research question	1
1.1 Theoretical approach.....	2
1.2 Methods.....	3
1.3 Structure	4
2 The multiple levels-approach of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as point of departure for theorizing political decision-making.....	7
2.1 The Foreign policy analysis approach (FPA)	7
2.2 Outside-in approach to FPA (i): Structural realism and the alliance dilemma	8
2.2.1 The tradition of realism and neo-realism – it is all about power and survival.....	8
2.2.2 The Alliance dilemma: To participate – without or with the brakes on.....	10
2.2.3 Structural realism, the alliance dilemma, and the Czech Republic in multinational operations.....	12
2.3 Outside-in Approach to FPA (ii): Liberal institutionalism	12
2.3.1 The liberal idealism tradition	12
2.3.2 Interdependence and international regimes.....	14
2.3.3 The Czech Republic in international security regime	15
2.4 Inside-out approach to FPA (ii): The Institutional Attributes of the Foreign Policy Decision-making State	16
2.4.1 Allison’s Three Models of Policy-making	16
2.4.2 Bureaucratic model applied on Czech decision-making	17
2.5 Summarizing the deductive lines of reasoning	18
3 Empirical mapping of the variables	21
3.1 Sources of collective memory in Czech politics	21
3.1.1 Brief review of Czech modern history	21

3.1.2	Czech political system.....	25
3.1.3	Czech foreign- and security policies	26
3.1.4	Czech political scene 2001 – 2013.....	27
3.2	The dependent variable – the decision to deploy Czech troops to Afghanistan	31
3.3	Independent variable, X1 – Czech perceptions related to fears of abandonment and entrapment.....	32
3.4	Independent variable, X2 – Czech perceptions of international norms	33
3.5	Independent variable, X3 – Institutionalization of the Czech decision-making process	34
3.6	Summary of the empirical mapping of the variables	36
4	Empirical analysis	39
4.1	The fear of abandonment – hypothesis (H1).....	39
4.2	Membership in the international organizations – hypothesis (H2)	43
4.3	The decision in the hands of the Czech authorities – hypothesis (H3)	45
4.4	Analysis mirror on the wall, which hypothesis is the most right of all?.....	50
5	Conclusion.....	55
6	References	61

List of figures

Figure 1: Relation between the dependent (Y) and independent (X) variables 19

Figure 2: Relations between the dependent (Y) and independent (X) variables..... 53

List of tables

Table 1: Explaining the Czech government’s decision to participate in ISAF – “deductive bridge” 19

Table 2: Czech political parties present in government and parliament in years 1998-2013 .. 28

Table 3: Number of elected deputies in the Parliament of the Czech Republic in years 1998-2002 35

Table 4: Overview of the variables and the empirical data related to it..... 36

Table 5: Chamber of Deputies voting results from April 9 2002 about participation in ISAF 47

Table 6: Senate voting results from April 18 2002 about participation in ISAF 48

List of abbreviations

CR.....	Ceska republika – the Czech Republic
CSSD.....	Ceska strana socialne demokraticka – Czech Social Democratic Party
FPA.....	Foreign Policy Analysis
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IR.....	International Relations
KDU-CSL.....	Krestansko-demokraticka unie–Ceska strana lidove demokraticka – Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party
KSCM.....	Komunisticka strana Cech a Moravy – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
MZV	Ministerstvo zahranicnich veci – Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
ODS.....	Obcansko demokraticka strana – Civic Democratic Party
OSCE.....	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
UN	The United Nations
US-DEU	Unie Svobody-Demokraticka unie – Freedom Union-Democratic Union
VV	Veci verejne – Public Affairs
WTO.....	Warsaw Treaty Organization

1 Introduction

1.1 Problem clarification and research question

As a member of NATO, the Czech Republic sent a troop of chemical experts in December 2001 and a field hospital in April 2002 as a response to the invoking of the infamous article 5 of the NATO treaty. During the operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), some 6500 men from the Czech army were deployed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 (Armada Ceske republiky (CR) Mise, 2015). Suddenly a conflict far away became personal. Many Czech started to ask, why the Czech soldiers were deployed and what they were actually fighting for. How can a small state such as the Czech Republic make a contribution to international security, and what would be the costs in lives, money and political risk? These kinds of questions were asked by politicians, press and laymen alike. Similar questions were posed within the International Relations (IR) scholarly community, too: How to optimally balance the opposing concerns of abandonment and entrapment within military alliances such as NATO? This alliance dilemma which small-state alliance members such as the Czech Republic were confronting, relates to an even broader debate concerning the coordination-problem in International Relations: How to achieve effective international cooperation for the purpose of upholding some public good (e.g. collective security, human rights, stable climate) when the participating parties may have strong individual incentives to abstain from contributing to the materialization of the public good?

This thesis relates to this generic IR-literature in the attempt to demonstrate the dilemmas junior alliance-partners face when confronted with demands and requests to honour their obligations to the alliance in terms of long-term participation in a multinational military operation thousands of kilometres beyond their own borders. In particular, the study will shed light on the following questions:

- *How did the Czech government respond to NATO's call for action in Afghanistan subsequent to the September 11 attacks?*

- *How was the decision-making process structured, and what agencies of the Czech Republic participated in the decision-making process?*
- *What framework conditions, concerns and motives may have contributed to the Czech government's decision to participate in the military intervention in Afghanistan?*

1.1 Theoretical approach

The thesis will use the theoretical approach of foreign policy analysis (FPA). FPA is the “*study of processes, effects, causes or outcomes from the foreign policy decisions in the similar or case specific sense*” (Fermann, 2013: 90). The foreign policy decisions of each state are made by the government, but are clearly influenced by framework conditions and actors in the external and domestic environment of the state, and the particular attributes of the decision-making and implementing processes within the state.

In international politics, “no man is an island”. This implies that states have to relate to and interact with other states, international governmental organizations, such as NATO and the UN, and international non-governmental organizations, such as the Red Cross, the Catholic Church, or producers of weapons. Several global and regional systems influence the foreign policies of states: One is the anarchical (unregulated) structure of the inter-state system (international politics), allowing the distribution of power among states to determine what is feasible foreign policy at a particular juncture (Waltz, 1979). Another is the structure of international regimes, the soft norms guiding what is acceptable for a state to do under particular circumstances (Keohane & Nye, 2001).

Global structures related to enforcement (anarchy, power-distribution) and persuasion (regimes, norms) are taken to influence foreign policy decision-making and are referred to as outside-in explanatory perspectives. The international systems-theories of structural realism and liberal institutionalism are chosen to make sense of the external structures influencing (enabling and/or limiting) the *Czech governments decision to participate in the mission in Afghanistan*.

However, foreign policy-makers have two environments to consider. The inside-out approach in FPA accounts for the domestic environment of the decision-making state. This approach invites us to account for how the public opinion, the organized civilian sector and/or representative bodies (the Parliament) influence decision-making also in the foreign policy realm. In the case of the Czech Republic, which is a parliamentary democracy, the parliament and the government are dependent on the votes from the citizens in regular elections. They represent the majority opinion, and should the policies be very different to the public opinion, the government would have to stand for mistrust voting in the parliament. In the internal decision-making process, many actors are taking part. Different groups have different interests and different weight of their voices. In this thesis the Allison's bureaucratic model of decision making processes (1969) will be used in order to analyse *how the decision to deploy Czech troops in Afghanistan was made*.

1.2 Methods

As the research questions are formulated above, the thesis points towards an *explanatory* research-ambition. According to Bryman (2008: 366), the qualitative research strategy rather “*emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data.*” This research strategy is being often criticized for its difficulty of replication as the interpretation is based on the researcher's ingenuity, studied concepts are socially constructed meanings, and everybody focuses on different topics based on their own predilections (Bryman, 2008: 391). However, qualitative research offers more exhaustive data and can offer more detailed and intensive analysis. For the analysis of small states behaviour in alliance politics and decisions to participate in multinational military operations, the method of single-case study is appropriate. This design is being associated with a location, and as such, two locations and limitations for this case study were chosen. First, the Czech Republic was chosen as a representative, typical or exemplifying case of a small state. As Bryman (2008: 54) argues the notions of representativeness and typicality can be sometimes confusing and lead to conclusions of everyday and commonplace situation. However, this type of case is aiming to exemplify a broader category of which the case is a member, and by detailed and intensive analysis of this one single case a suitable context for certain research question can be answered. In this case, the broader category and phenomena to be explained is small-state behaviour in alliance politics. The second location chosen was the NATO military operations in Afghanistan,

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Czech white papers on national security (Bezpečnostní strategie ČR, 2001, 2011) throughout the years clearly define terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destructions especially to the non-state actors as the biggest threats to the Czech national and international security. After the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, the UN, resp. NATO sent multinational operation ISAF to Afghanistan to fight Taliban and Al-Qaida, and to help reconstruct the country's security sector. The Czech Republic participated and thus was trying to make a contribution to international security. Therefore, by choosing this second location the framing of broader concept of small states in alliance is complete. As Bryman (2008: 55) points out, case studies have often problem with external validity or generalization. It is indeed to be considered how a single case can be possibly representative that the findings could be applied to other cases. I am well aware that findings from the Czech case cannot be applied on other small states, but this thesis can serve as a starting point for other case or comparative studies and thus contribute to the field of study about small states.

In order to analyse the foreign policy decision, the strategy of grounded theory will be used. This task requires the gathering of relevant data through the reading of Czech white papers, NATO-documents, newspapers and interviews. Furthermore, the research design is in need of a theoretical approach able to account for both external and domestic influences on security policy-making, as well as inviting a thorough understanding of the decision-making processes going on within the government when demanding questions requires a clear and urgent response.

1.3 Structure

The thesis is divided into five chapters - an introduction, three main chapters, and a concluding chapter. In Chapter 2, the “deductive-bridge” from theoretical assumptions to empirical propositions (hypotheses) is built. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is presented as a dualistic outside-in and inside-out approach capable of accounting for both the external and domestic enabling/limiting framework conditions (structures) and motivational impulses (actor-interests) that may influence foreign-policy decision-making. From this over-arching approach, more

specific theories are applied on the different levels of analysis from which particular hypotheses are deduced.

In Chapter 3, the dependent and independent variables of the study are mapped and described, based on official documents, interviews and media-sources.

Chapter 4 brings together the theoretical reasoning and empirical data elaborated in an effort to evaluate the empirical support for the various hypotheses, and eventually provide qualified answers to the research questions. In the end, a final synthesis will show which of the external and internal factors were more and which were less important.

Finally, in chapter 5, I recapitulate all the previous parts and the main findings in the study.

2 The multiple levels-approach of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as point of departure for theorizing political decision-making

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is an eclectic approach to explaining political decision-making that draws on insights from several levels of analysis (the global and domestic environments of the state, attributes of the state and the decision-makers), and invites the researchers of foreign policy-making to trace the structural and motivational factors influencing the decision-making process. In the present chapter, the relevance of FPA for the research question is explained. This is a necessary precursor to the presentation of the more specific theories – neorealism, liberal institutionalism, and the bureaucratic model of decision-making – from which is deduced empirical propositions as to what made the Czech government decide to participate in the ISAF operation.

2.1 The Foreign policy analysis approach (FPA)

FPA is the over-arching, multi-level approach within which the particular theoretical approaches “sit” and within which the conclusion will be drawn. It allows us to efficiently use the theory and empirical data that is provided in order to create a full standing analysis. Fermann (2013: 90) describes FPA as a study of processes, causes, effects, and outcomes of the decisions of the foreign policy makers. In other words, it offers an analytical framework researchers can use to ask systematic and precise questions about foreign policy-making, and to comprehend foreign policy decisions (Broadbeck 1968 in Fermann, 2013: 90).

The task of foreign policy-makers is not easy as they have to navigate between the state’s interests and actual possibilities. They have to design, implement, and justify effective measures to represent their motives and advocate the interests of the nation in question (Fermann, 2013: 89). All this is happening between a rock and a hard place. The “rock” is the external environment of the state, and the “hard place” the domestic environment. The foreign policy-making is caught between different demands, opportunities, and limitations both, in the external environment of international politics and in the internal domestic politics. The dual outside-in and inside-out approaches of FPA accounts for both these environment. The inside-out approach allows us to explain why states with similar positions in global politics can make

different decision due to differences in domestic politics. And vice-versa, outside-in FPA can clarify how global politics (e.g. anarchy, norms, division of labour) influence foreign policy decision-making process such that domestically similar states may produce very dissimilar foreign policy decisions (Fermann, 2013: 123).

The interaction of inside-out and outside-in impulses on foreign policy-making go a long way to decide the space for political manoeuvring available for decision-makers. This begs the question as to what specific outside-in and inside-out theories may be applied to explain the workings of the dual environments of foreign policy-making on the space for manoeuvring available for political engineering? Moreover, how does the institutionalization of the decision-making process influence exactly how the space for political manoeuvring is utilized? And finally, we will have an eye on how theories of International Relations may be *translated* for the purpose of explaining foreign policy-decisions.

Below, the outside-in approach of structural realism (Waltz, 1979), alliance dilemma theory (Snyder, 1984) and liberal institutionalism (Keohane & Nye, 2001), and the inside-out approach of Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics model of institutional decision-making (Allison, 1969) are presented as ontological bases for the deduction of empirical propositions (hypotheses) as to why the Czech government decided to participate in the ISAF mission.

2.2 Outside-in approach to FPA (i): Structural realism and the alliance dilemma

2.2.1 The tradition of realism and neo-realism – it is all about power and survival

The tradition of political realism in international relations has deep roots in classical texts. It has been coiling through the history since Thucydides' *The History of the Peloponnesian War* through Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Hobbes' *Leviathan* to 20th century represented by Edward Hallet Carr and Hans Morgenthau. All these and many others realistic authors focus on different aspects of the theory, but Drulak (2010: 55) sums the main thoughts as following:

- Power is what matters the most in the international relations. The main aim of the actors is to gather as much power as possible. The power distribution is the main characteristics of the system.
- Power can be deducted from different dimensions, but often the economic and military is the most deciding.
- There is constant state of hostility and rivalry between the actors of the international relations.
- Whereas the most important actors of the international relations are states. Other actors are either states' instruments (international organizations) or unimportant.
- States define their aims and national interests rationally.

During the 20th century, this realistic traditional theory was challenged by the idealistic and liberal theory, which led to its transformation. In connection with this theory debate, Kenneth Waltz defined the neo-realism in his *Theory of International Politics* (1979). In this theory, the realism lost its prejudice towards the corrupted and antagonistic human nature, and at same time accepted the neoclassical economic theory. These changes caused a shift from the main focus from power to the structure of the international relations (Drulak, 2010: 61).

This structure of international politics is then described as anarchical. In contrast to the domestic politics that have set hierarchy by the state's constitution with an authority on a top and other actors being subordinated to this authority and each other. However, in the international environment, there is no such authority and states are "equal" to each other. The use of quotation marks is proper as states can never be really equal to each other when it comes to the matters of power. Further Waltz (1979 as cited in Drulak, 2010: 62) mentions the balance of power as the implication of the anarchistic character of the international system.

Assuming that foreign policy decision makers are sensitive to this notion of international politics, Waltz' Theory of International Politics may be translated for the purpose of FPA. That suggests that if one state gets significantly more powerful, other states would be inclined to enter into an alliance against the powerful state under the leadership of another great power. However, here Waltz leaves the classic realists' presumption of the hostility of human nature and rather refers to John Herz's (1951: 157 as cited by Drulak, 2010: 62) concept of security

dilemma. Not because of the natural aggression of other states, but because of the anarchistic system, states cannot be sure about intentions of the more powerful states and therefore increase their army expenditures, which causes other states' insecurity and armament, etc. According to Waltz anarchy is fixed and because of the security dilemma causes that even initially peaceful states turn into military. Although Waltz' has made it clear that his structural theory is targeted towards explaining outcomes of state-interaction, it is reasonable to assume that the structural logic of anarchy is something foreign policy decision-makers are aware of and is likely to consider in their decision-making.

Another feature of the structure of the international relations is the distribution of power, which is set by the number of great powers in the system. The structure is either multipolar (several great powers) or bipolar (two great powers). Waltz does not expect unipolar system as that would indicate the failure of the logic of balance of powers, and imply that international politics has been transformed into a regional or global empire.

The concept of balance of power and security dilemma was further developed by another neo-realist, Stephen Walt (1987 as cited by Drulak, 2010: 68). He suggests to rather think of the balance of power in terms of balance of threats. Firstly, if a state gains more power, it is possible that some states will not perceive it as a threat. Other factors such as ideology, intentions or geography would matter. Secondly, if gaining power of one state would be recognize as a threat, alliance would be to consider as well as militarization. Such alliance of two or more states would weight up a great power and thus ensure balance of powers and threats.

2.2.2 The Alliance dilemma: To participate – without or with the brakes on

The security dilemma and the phenomena connected were elaborated on by Glenn H. Snyder (1984). According to Snyder, the most notorious methods the states use to achieve the balance of powers and threats is armament, territorial aggrandizement, and alliance formation. He picks up at the alliance formation and develops the theory further in this direction.

In a multi-polar system, each state has to, according to Snyder (1984: 462), decide whether to enter or to abstain alliances. If all states are equally powerful, there will not be a need for alliances since they carry various costs. However, if states have different levels of power, states are willing to reduce their freedom of action or commit to defend interests, which might not be its own, in order to increase their security. And then states form alliance for following reasons: To increase moderate security; this increase will be substantial if others abstain from similar behaviour, to avoid isolation or to prevent an alliance being built against them.

But even though the alliances are formed, states have to balance their interests and possibilities again. Each state is caught between the fear of abandonment and entrapment. Snyder (1984: 466) explains abandonment as various kinds of “defection:” realigning with the opponent, de-aligning while abrogating the alliance contract, failing to make good on ally’s commitments, or failing to provide support when expected. On the other hand, entrapment is described as “*being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially*” (Snyder, 1984: 467). The relationship itself between the allies is determined by their relative dependence and on the degree of strategic interests. That is to say depending on how much the states actually need each other (direct dependence) and how much are they willing to risk in defending each other (indirect dependence) (Snyder, 1984: 471-2). In the terms of the relative dependence Snyder (1984: 471-2) indicates that the most important components of the alliance relationship are following four factors: state’s need for assistance (1), partner’s capacity to supply the assistance (2), state’s degree of conflict and tension with the adversary (3), and the state’s realignment alternatives (4). Next, the strength of the alliance depends on the degree of explicitness of the agreement. A vague alliance agreement tends to increase the fear of abandonment, while explicit agreement rather reduces such fears. On the other hand, an explicit agreement carries greater risk of entrapment, whilst a vague agreement minimizes it.

As Snyder (1984: 484) adds, the risk of being entrapped in the alliance is bigger for smaller allies. On the example of West-European members of NATO during the Cold war he shows that entrapment, especially extra-regional is a serious concern for the lesser allies since they share only partially a superpower’s global interests. While superpowers have better capacities for taking initiatives on the global scale, the weaker allies’ capacity to restrain the superpower is very limited. Because of these limitations, the lesser allies have also fewer options to support

the super power's actions (Snyder, 1984: 485). Nevertheless, the weaker allies will still have some worries about not being supported by their much bigger allies in “*less-than-ultimate issues*” (Snyder, 1984: 486).

2.2.3 Structural realism, the alliance dilemma, and the Czech Republic in multinational operations

How does the above exposition relate to the Czech Republic's decision to take part in the ISAF operation? The Waltzian notion that the anarchical structure of international politics induces states to see interaction as a struggle for survival, and Snyder's conception that junior-partners in alliances – in lack of other options – fear abandonment more than entrapment, imply that;

H1: The Czech Republic's decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was due to fear of abandonment by the NATO-alliance, and the United States in particular (X1).

For the purpose of validating or negating this empirical proposition, I will look for evidence in the security white papers, parliamentary discussions as well as in the modern history of the Czech Republic.

2.3 Outside-in Approach to FPA (ii): Liberal institutionalism

2.3.1 The liberal idealism tradition

Opposing some key tenants of realpolitical thought, the liberal tradition offers some novel ideas, which may be fruitful for our purposes. Linked to the antique stoicism, middle age scholastic, and age of enlightenment, liberal idealism is viewing the international relations as full of possibilities for peace and cooperation between states (Drulak, 2010: 72). The basic definition of the liberal idealism is even less precise than the realism's one. As it comes from many different approaches throughout the history, there is a shift between liberalism and idealism direction. Liberalism assumes that the stable peace will be gained by economic cooperation (the complex independence approach of Keohane & Nye (1977)), while the idealist logic is focusing

on the change of the norms of international relations (the liberal institutionalism of e.g. Krasner). Both versions of the liberal school of thoughts deconstruct the role of state as the one and only actor of the international relations, and introduce more actors as e.g. international organizations and transnational corporations. At the same time both, liberalism and idealism understand the international relation in many dimension, whereas the security dimension is only one among others (e.g. economical dimension), and does not need to be the determining one. Liberal idealism puts emphasis on the role of international institutions, complex interdependence, the impact of intra-state interest groups on foreign policy-making, individuals or public opinion. The state is then not viewed as a unitary actor, but rather as a mixture of different actors and interests. Those actors are being rational, but are accumulating wealth and economic and technical effectivity rather than power and security (Drulak, 2010: 73; Moravcsik 1997).

Similarly, to the tradition of realism, liberalism has also evolved and reformed in the second half of the 20th century. Up to a point, neoliberalism accepts the neorealist notion that international cooperation is limited by the anarchic character of the international environment that encourages fear, uncertainty, and distrust (Sterling-Folker, 2010: 117). But, contrary to neorealism, the neoliberals highlight the growing number of both, formal and informal, international institutions. Those institutions can then be designed in better ways in order to achieve collective goals and lessen the negative effect of the anarchic states of international relations. Neoliberalism also shifts towards the realist and neorealist tradition in its view of the state as unitary, rational, and utility-maximizing actors who dominate the international relations. Furthermore, states are thought as to make decisions according to their self-interested priorities and strategic cost-to-benefit analysis of potential choices, reactions, and outcomes. However, the neoliberalism still shows the liberal idealism heritage in assumptions that human reasoning can lead to collective benefits and more effective institutional arrangements in order to promote freedom, peace, prosperity, and justice on a global level (Sterling-Folker, 2010: 117-118). In order to see how this ontology may be relevant for our task of explaining Czech decision-making, it is necessary to shed light on the liberal understanding of interdependence and international norms.

2.3.2 Interdependence and international regimes

Within the neoliberalist paradigm the theory of interdependence plays an important role. In the 20th century, we experienced a boom of international organizations and thus building up of interdependence between states and the creation of international regimes. Interdependence means mutual dependence of the actors of the international relations. This dependence is the result of a multitude of international transactions, such as the flow of money, goods, information, and migration. These transactions carry within themselves certain costs and constraints. However, the definition of interdependence is not limited to the positive effect and mutual benefit as it would exclude such cases as for example the interdependence of the USA and Soviet Union. (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 7-8). As Keohane & Nye (2001: 8-9) further point out, interdependence always involves strategic weighing of costs and benefits for the actors, and asymmetry. Less dependent actors can use the relationship as a source of power to bargain and affect others. However, it is possible to balance the asymmetry by creating international regimes. An international regime is a set of “*rules and institutions that affects how states manage their interdependent relationships*” (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 290). Small states, such as the Czech Republic, often use international regimes as barriers to greater powers’ abuse of power and position in the interdependent relationship. International regimes that work well share the following attributes (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 291-292):

1. Burden sharing – with clear rules and procedures it is harder for states to evade their obligations.
2. Providing information to governments
3. Helping great powers to keep multiple and varied interests¹
4. Helping reinforce continuity when administrations change

From this overview, it is clear that international regimes offer significant advantages. Especially for the small states with limited resources, keeping multiple and varied interests at one place

¹ For the NATO case, it would mean reducing costs and possible failures for states when having multilateral treaty instead of sets of bilateral treaties.

might mean a big step for effectivization of their activities. How does this apply on Czech Republic and its membership in the UN and NATO?

2.3.3 The Czech Republic in international security regime

If Czech Republic's membership in NATO and the UN should be compared to the international regimes functions, one can see why the Czech Republic possibly joined the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, although it might mean significant costs, both financially and in loss of lives. The international regime of collective security in the North Atlantic region provides its members security and protection against certain threats. NATO as well as the UN also allow the members to share strategic information with every other member at once, and offer them one single alliance treaty instead of having to have several sets of treaties. Thus the regime of the organization reduces the costs of the interdependence, but at the same time the rules and procedures of the organization make it difficult for the members to opt out from their obligations as for example to host a summit or to take part on the multinational operations, e.g. in Afghanistan. The Czech Republic as a small state identifies membership in international organizations as a key instrument of its foreign policy (Ministerstvo zahraničních vecí, 2003: 3, 4, 5) and at the same time fully respects the international law as it provides it protection from great powers and equal position with other sovereign countries in its international regime. Based on such insights, the following hypothesis is suggested:

H2: The Czech Republic's decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was made possible because the operation fulfilled requirements of the international law (X2).

In order to examine this hypothesis, I will look at which requirements on international operation the international law demands, which and how resolutions applied for the operation, and how the Czech Republic reacted to them. For this analysis, I will use official documents of both, international organizations such the UN and the NATO, and Czech official documents. Furthermore, the contemporary news will also help to examine this hypothesis and decided why the Czech Republic participated in the ISAF operation.

Until now, only the outside-in approach was presented. However, the Foreign Policy Analysis includes all possible factors on the foreign policy making, including those internal. This inside-out view will be done in next subchapter where the Allison's bureaucratic model of decision-making will be presented as the possible theory explaining the effects of the internal politics on the international relations.

2.4 Inside-out approach to FPA (ii): The Institutional Attributes of the Foreign Policy Decision-making State

2.4.1 Allison's Three Models of Policy-making

Making decisions is states' every day's practice. Relevant for the purpose of this thesis – the explanation of the Czech Republic's participation in ISAF - is the question as to *how* such decisions are made. Traditionally it has been assumed that decisions are made rationally according to the state's best interests and possibilities (Rational actor model). In 1969, Graham Allison published article "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis" in which he introduced a new theory about decision making in the state apparatus. In this article, he challenged the rational actor model of making decisions, until then the most used for explanation of a state's foreign policy behaviour. To overcome the limitations of the rational actor model, Allison developed two additional models of decision-making (1969).

According to the rational actor model, the only actor of the decision-making process is a state. The decisions are made rationally in order to achieve in advanced specified goals. When comparing international affairs to a chess game, the rational policy game would be played by an individual, who moves the pieces with "*reference to plans and manoeuvres toward the goal of winning the game*" (Allison, 1969: 691). The organizational model leaves the precondition of a state as a unitary actor optimizing its activities. But the reason for such behaviour is the complicate world, in which much information cannot be considered between all the important decisions. In order to be effective, responsibility for particular areas is divided and many situations are decided on the base of previous experience, standardized operating procedures and routine (Drulakova & Drulak, 2007: 92-93). Allison (1969) again suggests the similarity with chess game: "*the chess player is not a single individual, but rather a loose*

alliance of semi-independent organizations, each of which moved its set of pieces according to standard operating procedures ... according to a fixed plan” (Allison, 1969: 691).

However, neither the bureaucratic politics model nor the organizational process model accept the assumption of a rational and unitary state. In the bureaucratic politics model, the decision-making state is seen as a group of diverse actors (institutions) and each of them is led by different goals and intentions, which they believe are the “*state interests*” (Drulakova & Drulak, 2007: 95). The final decision is then understood by Allison (1969: 707-708) as a result of a compromise, coalition, competition and a confusion. The final decision is made by bargaining between many actors of the foreign-policy mechanism. According to this model, the chess game is rather “*bargaining among players with separate and unequal power over particular pieces and with separable objectives in distinguishable sub games*” (Allison, 1969: 708) than a course of action or routines of organizations.

These individual players and actors can be particular institutions like the president, the ministry of foreign affairs or some other ministries, as well as just parts of these institutions – action does not have to presuppose intention (Allison, 1969: 711). When defining their goals, the institutions follow their own intentions, mandates and outlooks. Those do not have to be the same as the after all taken action. The defined position sets handicaps and advantages with which each player enters the bargaining game to fight for its goals. These preliminary attributes are set by the player’s position in the decision and policy-making mechanism, personality in case of one-person actor, power, bargaining skills etc. (Allison, 1969: 709-710). The attitude of an actor can be then described as “*What you see, depends on where you sit*” (Drulakova & Drulak, 2007: 96).

2.4.2 Bureaucratic model applied on Czech decision-making

This model was chosen for the explanation of why the Czech Republic took part in ISAF operation, because as a democratic states, the decisions of the Czech Republic has to be ratified by the authorities – the parliament, the government, and the president. Furthermore, the

existence of many political parties throughout the whole political spectrum suggests that many interest groups were or might have been involved and thus influence the decision. On this backdrop, the following hypothesis is suggested:

H3: The Czech Republic's decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was due to the particular character of the decision making process of the Czech foreign policy and the individual decisions of the critical actors of that process (X3).

In order to test this hypothesis, I will introduce the Czech parliamentary system and the political parties present in the parliament and involved in the decision-making process. In contemporary newspaper, I will also look for possible lobby of other interest groups, which might have influenced the parliament polling.

2.5 Summarizing the deductive lines of reasoning

The present study aims at explaining the Czech decision to send their soldiers to Afghanistan. This is the dependent variable (Y). For the purpose of explaining this dependent variable, I have outlined three theoretical lines of reasoning from which three empirical propositions (hypotheses) have been deduced. Included here are three independent variables:

- the fear of abandonment-variable (X1)
- the obedience to international law-variable (X2)
- the institutionalizing of decision making among the Czech authorities-variable (X3)

Taken together, the variables and hypotheses add up to the following explanatory model including inside-out and outside-in explanations:




Figure 1: Relation between the dependent (Y) and independent (X) variables

The operationalization of the concepts (indeed, variables) are indicated below, and is a necessary requirement for empirical mapping and analyses which will follow in chapters 4 and 5. All for the purpose of answering the research question formulated in the introduction to this study: “Why is the Czech Republic participating on NATO military operation in Afghanistan?” The “deductive bridge’s” analytical levels of analysis via theoretical approaches and hypotheses, to the operationalisations of independent variables are illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Explaining the Czech government’s decision to participate in ISAF – “deductive bridge”

Level of analysis	Level-specific theoretical approach	Empirical propositions/ hypotheses	Empirical foci
States external factors/ international system level	Structural realism/ Balance of power (Waltz), Alliance theory (Snyder)	H1: The Czech Republic’s decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was due to fear of abandonment by the NATO-alliance, and the United States in particular (X1).	Czech national security strategy; history and development of the Czech international security relations and strategies
States external factors/ international system level	Liberal institutionalism (Keohane mm)	H2: The Czech Republic’s decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was made possible because the operation fulfilled	Czech reaction to the 9/11 attacks, UN resolution 1386, and revoking of Article 5 of NATO treaty; governmental and parliamentary documents

		requirements of the international law (X2).	
States internal factors/ internal level	Bureaucratic model of decision making (Allison)	H3: The Czech Republic's decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was due to the particular character of the decision making process of the Czech foreign policy and the individual decisions of the critical actors of that process (X3).	Parliament polling, political discussions connected to the deployment of Czech military staff

3 Empirical mapping of the variables

In the previous chapter (Ch. 3), three theories were outlined and three hypothesis inferred to suggest why and how the Czech government decided to participate in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In the present chapter (Ch. 4), I will present the empirical facts gathered to shed empirical light on the research question and the hypotheses in the analysis in the subsequent chapter (Ch. 5).

In order to better understand the cultural and political codes influencing any post-Cold War Czech government, the first section of the present chapter will introduce the reader into the Czech recent history, political system and political parties, and the Czech foreign and security policy. Such narratives and facts belong to the perceptual programming of Czech foreign policy-makers and may be considered a second layer on which the subsequent empirical analyses as to why and how the Czech decision to participate in ISAF may resonate.

In section two, the Czech decision to contribute forces to ISAF will be described in detail (the dependent variable, Y). The same descriptive procedure will be applied to the independent variables (X1, X2, X3) in sections three through five – based on the empirical. In the final section, section six, the empirical mapping of the four main variables of the study is presented in a table as a preamble to the empirical analyses of relationships between variables in chapter 4.

3.1 Sources of collective memory in Czech politics

3.1.1 Brief review of Czech modern history

After its establishment in 1918, the Czechoslovak Republic was facing several challenges. As a new state bordering with almost only losers of the WWI it had to fight for its integrity and find measures to ensure its security. Two foci were set: on alliance with great powers and on the international system, at that time guaranteed by the Versailles agreement. From the Czechoslovak perspective, a primary warrantor of this system was France. The alliance between Czechoslovakia and France was sealed in 1924, but after French unsuccessful occupation of the

Ruhr valley in 1923, Czechoslovakia was not willing to tie itself militarily (Vesely, 2009: 61). Czechoslovakia was also developing the relations with the United Kingdom and the USA. However, these relations did not get closer and official alliance agreements were not made. Furthermore, the new republic was engaging itself in the establishment and functioning of the League of Nations. It was also present on the negotiating and adopting of the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in 1924 and the Kellogg–Briand Pact in 1928 (Vesely, 2009: 62-63).

After 1933, Czechoslovakia tried to agree with Germany on the guarantee of the German East borders, but the attempts were unsuccessful. Therefore, Czechoslovakia went in French footsteps and entered in 1935 an alliance agreement with the Soviet Union. Although this agreement was conditioning France to fulfil its alliance commitments in order to enter into force, it meant a big step for Czechoslovak security as it had borders with mostly non-democratic states at that time (Vesely, 2009: 64).

While the threat from Nazi Germany grew, the UK and France were applying the policy of appeasement, which peaked in 1938 at the Munich conference. Four European great powers agreed in September 1938 on Czechoslovakia having to surrender its border areas to Nazi Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Czechoslovak diplomats were not invited to these negotiations, and were only informed about the agreement after its signature. The acceptance of the agreement was expected; France and the UK clearly stated that they would not support Czechoslovakia if attacked by Germany. Neither could Czechoslovakia trust the Soviet Union to help safeguarding Czech borders. What remained for Czechoslovakia was the guarantee that France and the UK offered for its continued existence, but depending on its surrendering of its territory to those three Central European states. However, when Nazi Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in March 1939, France and the UK only protested the German occupation on the diplomatic level (Vesely, 2009: 66-68).

Although UK, France, and Italy cancelled the agreement later during the WWII, it remains a bitter memory, even nowadays after more than 75 years. These events are often referred to as the “Munich betrayal” in the Czech Republic and many people still question what would have happened, if Czechoslovakia would not have had accepted the agreement (Wirnitzer, 2012).

With other events from the second half of the 20th century, the events of 1938 and 1939 have had a big impact on the foreign and security policy making.

The first post-war alliance agreement was signed already in 1943 between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. After the end of the WWII, more alliance agreements followed, with Yugoslavia in 1946 and Poland in 1947. Czechoslovakia was also negotiating a new alliance agreement with France, but the differences between the communist and non-communist politicians in the government slowed down the dialog, and in the context of the later events this alliance agreement was not signed (Vesely, 2009: 70, 74).

In the brief period 1945-48, the Czechoslovak foreign policy was directed towards being a mediator between the great powers whose partnership was falling apart after the WWII. Nevertheless, the communist party was gaining steadily more power in Czechoslovakia and after a coup in February 1948, Czechoslovakia sided with the Soviet bloc (Vesely, 2009: 73-75).

Subsequent to the communist coup in 1948 further alliance agreement were signed with other communistic countries: Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. The position towards the Soviet Union also changed – from an ally Czechoslovakia became a satellite state that had to consult on any foreign policy action with the Soviets. On Soviet insistence, Czechoslovakia left the International Monetary Fund and changed its initially positive attitude towards the state of Israel (Vesely, 2009: 76-77).

In response to establishment of NATO in 1949 and the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western military alliance, Soviet Union and other states of the Eastern bloc established the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in 1955. All previous alliance contracts were thus put on multilateral level and that allowed even bigger control of the Soviet Union over its satellite states (Vesely, 2009: 78).

After the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, it was possible for Czechoslovakia to ease up on the relationship between the East and the West. Later, during the 1960s, there was wider liberalization of the political regime in Czechoslovakia, which culminated in spring 1968. This also included new bilateral alliance agreements with Poland, Hungary, Romania, and later also with the German Democratic Republic. The aim for Czechoslovakia in the foreign policy was equal position of the member states of the WTO and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). However, these intentions were not corresponding with the Soviet policies and therefore the armies of the members of the WTO entered Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The only countries within WTO who did not take part in the military intervention of Czechoslovakia were Albania and Romania. The WTO forces stayed and occupied Czechoslovakia until 1991. The liberalization-process declined and Czechoslovakia was forced to accept the occupation as an act of brotherly relief (Vesely, 2009: 79-80).

These events are similarly as the events of 1938-39 still remembered very well in contemporary politics in Czechoslovakia. It still affects the collective memory and the policy-making process.

After the Velvet Revolution in 1989, Czechoslovakia regained its sovereignty and started to participate actively in the international environment. It took an active part in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), re-joined the International Monetary Fund, and under UN mandate sent a battalion to support the international coalition operation in Kuwait (Vesely, 2009: 86-87). In 1992, the Czech and Slovak politicians agreed on splitting the country.

During the 1990s, Czechoslovakia, resp. the Czech Republic participated in several UN peace-keeping missions, e.g. in Angola, Namibia, and in the former Yugoslavia. In March 1999, the Czech Republic fulfilled the main political goal of joining NATO. Already in June 1999, the Czech authorities agreed on joining the operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo, and in only ten days deployed 126 soldiers who were monitoring boarder areas (Marek, 2013: 109). In addition, the Czech Republic was also participating for several years in the NATO operations Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosna and Herzegovina, and Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo.

3.1.2 Czech political system

The Czech Republic is a parliamentary republic where the constitution confirms the separation of the state-power in an executive, legislative, and judicial branch. The judicial power is not that important as an actor in foreign policy. However, the Supreme Court has the possibility to find an international agreement in conflict with the constitution, and thus invalid. This procedure is not possible in the case of agreements on human rights (Drulakova & Drulak, 2007: 80).

The executive branch has two main segments: the president and the government. The president is elected every five years. Until 2012, the election was taken part in the Parliament. Since 2012, the President is elected directly by the citizens (Ustava Ceske republiky, 1992). The president is the head of the state and have significant powers – to appoint the prime minister and, after consultation with the prime minister, appointing other ministers. The president also assigns judges and generals, and is the highest authority in the army. The president's duty is to enter and ratify international agreements (Ustava Ceske republiky, 1992). However, in all this execution of political power the president needs the co-signature of the prime minister, or the relevant minister. In case of a conflict and contradictory opinions between the president and the government, usually government holds the stronger position (Drulakova & Drulak, 2007: 74).

The government has 18 members, incl. the prime minister and his deputy prime ministers.² The core of the foreign policy agenda falls naturally on the ministry of foreign affairs, but it closely works with other ministries and the relevant parliamentary committees. Examples of such committees are the Committee for EU or the National Security Council with its Committee on Intelligence and Committee for Coordination of the Foreign Security Policy (Drulakova & Drulak, 2007: 74).

The National Security Council consists of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Defence,

² The number of ministries can vary between 15 and 20 according to the actual agenda (Vlada CR, n.d.).

the Minister of Interior, the Minister for Industry and Trade, the Minister for Transport, and the Minister for Health. The Governor of the Czech National Bank, the President of the Administration of State Material Reserves, and the Manager of the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic also attend the meetings. Its task is to coordinate and evaluate the security situation of the Czech Republic in order to ensure its security and sovereignty (Drulakova & Drulak, 2007: 75). As such, the National Security Council was the initiator of the governmental proposal to engage in ISAF in 2001, and was an important actor of the decision-making process.

The legislative body of the Czech Republic is the Parliament that consists of two chambers: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The Chamber of Deputies has 200 members that are elected every four years. The Senate has 81 members whereas every two years a third of them is being elected in selected administrative regions – thus every administrative region appoint one senator every six years through democratic elections (Ustava Ceske republiky, 1992: Article 16). Among other, the parliament also decides about entering into the state of war in case the Czech Republic is attacked or whether to deploy military contingents to coalition-forces abroad within the scope of the alliance agreement. In such case, the agreement of more than a half of the deputies in both chambers is needed (Ustava Ceske republiky, 1992: Article 39).

3.1.3 Czech foreign- and security policies

After the revolution in 1989, Czechoslovakia had to build a new security policy. Despite its engagement in OSCE, the Czech Republic viewed this organization as ineffective and not sufficient to safeguard Czech security-needs. Therefore, it focused on the transatlantic region and the aim was admission to the NATO and the EU as part of security, resp. economic policy. In this the Czech Republic succeeded and became member of NATO in 1999 and later in 2004, member of the EU, as well (Vesely, 2009: 89-91; MZV, 2003: 3).

The Czech Republic considers terrorism, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, and cybernetic attacks as key threats to her security (Bezpecnostni strategie Ceske republiky, 2003: 9). Recently this list has been extended by adding the threat of weakening of the system of co-

operative security and international law system, and the instability of the transatlantic area and its immediate neighbourhood (Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky, 2015: 11). At the same time, the security policy paper (2003: 7; 2015: 8) mentions that the risk of a direct attack on the country is rather low due to Czech membership and geo-political position within NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, the Czech security policy is adopting the approach of indivisibility of security. Therefore, security of the whole transatlantic area, resp. the global security is crucial to the security of the Czech Republic, as well (Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky, 2003: 5). In connection with this interconnectedness, the Czech Republic perceives the economic stability of whole area as crucial. Economic instability is connected with underfinancing of the defence sector and asymmetry of the allies when it comes to their contributions to NATO. The instability also leads to dominating of nation interests above those of the alliance more than usually, and thus causes alliance weakening and decrease in effectivity (Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky, 2015: 9).

3.1.4 Czech political scene 2001 – 2013

After the revolution in 1989, the Czech Republic became a democratic constitutional republic. The 1990s can be understood in retrospect as transformation period where the new political system was consolidated, the legal system was adapting to the democracy and requirements that were needed to fulfil in order to become a member of NATO and the EU.

During the 1990s, many political parties and movements were established or picked up on their tradition from before 1948. In the Table nr. 2 there is the overview of parties present in the government and the parliament during the electoral terms that decided about the Czech engagement in ISAF.

Table 2: Czech political parties present in government and parliament in years 1998-2013

Party (Czech abbreviation)	Position on the political spectrum	Present in government	Present in chamber of deputies
Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)	Centre-left	1998 – 2006	1998 – 2013
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	Centre-right	2007 – 2009 2010 – 2013	1998 – 2013
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)	Left	---	1998 – 2013
Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL)	Centre	2002 – 2006 2007 – 2009	1998 – 2009
Freedom Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU)	Centre	2002 – 2006	1998 – 2006
The Green Party	Centre	2007 – 2009	2007 – 2009
Public Affairs (VV)	Centre-right populist	2010 – 2013	2010 – 2013
TOP09 (Tradition Responsibility Prosperity)	Centre-right	2010 – 2013	2010 – 2013

Source: Vlada CR, Cesky statisticky urad

As it is clear from the Table nr. 2 there were three parties present in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic for whole period – CSSD, ODS, and KSCM. In addition, five other parties participated on the decision making process whether to engage in multinational operations or not.

Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) is centre-left political party that focuses on the maintaining and improving of the democratic and the social system. It supports Czech active membership in international organizations, especially in the UN, NATO, and the EU (CSSD, n.d.: 26).

Civic Democratic Party (ODS) is the “traditional” opposition to CSSD. It is placing itself on the centre-right side of the political scale. It is a conservative and liberal party that puts emphasis on individual freedoms, private ownership, entrepreneurship, and equal chances for every citizen. How much rivalry between those opposing parties it might be, they stand on similar positions when it come to the foreign and security policy. ODS is also emphasizing the relationship with the EU and NATO as the key areas of Czech foreign policy interests (ODS, 1995).

The communistic party (KSCM) is in correspondence to the communistic ideas supporting generous social system. In this, they have similar goals as CSSD, but yet because of the history of communism in Czechoslovakia they have not been invited to the government since 1990 although they have stable position as the third biggest party in the chamber of deputies. Regarding the foreign and security policy, KSCM (V. Sjezd KSCM, 1999) is profiling itself as aiming for world peace, which should be achieved by dissolving power blocs such as NATO. KSCM promotes European integration, but is not satisfied with the focus of security policy only on USA, NATO, and the EU. In its programme, KSCM clearly states that they want the Czech Republic to leave NATO in order to “*dissolve aggressive power blocs*” (V. Sjezd KSCM, 1999: 18).

KDU-CSL is a centre party that has focus both, on the functional and sustainable social system as well as maintaining and improving the democracy system. In the security and foreign policy issues, KDU-CSL supports the membership in NATO and the EU. The party also backs up Czech engagement in the multinational operations as part of fulfilling of the membership. However, it rather encourages deployment of peace-keeping troops as such field hospitals or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence units (KDU-CSL, 2006: 79).

US-DEU was centre party that was rather small and with little influence. Their foreign and security policy was similar to the others – they were in favour to European integration with focus on adopting euro as quickly as possible. Likewise other governmental parties they were supporting Czech membership in NATO (Mares, 1999).

The Green Party is a centre party with focus on environmental issues, but also on functioning and effective social state. They are strongly pro-European, and in their programme (Strana zelených, 2006: 55) call for even further integration of the EU, including in the security sector. They support Czech membership in NATO, but at the same time request that European countries become stronger opponents to the USA in terms of the internal NATO discussions.

TOP09 is centre-right party that was established in 2009 by both, people without a political affiliation and people who left KDU-CSL, ODS, US-DEU. As such, it has same opinions on the foreign and security policy of the mentioned parties: it promotes Czech membership in the EU structures as well as in NATO (TOP09 s podporou Starostu, 2010).

The VV were present in the parliament and other authority bodies only shortly in years 2010-2013. Similarly, to other parties they are also in favour to Czech participation on European integration and in NATO. However, in their programme they mention reducing the army expenditure while referring to Czech Republic being a small state and as neighbour to member states of NATO in lower risk of direct attack (Veci Verejné, 2010: 24).

Having introduced the Czech factual background, we can now have a look at the data connected to its respective variables. Firstly, the dependent variable of the Czech decision to participate (Y) will be described, and later more data light will be shed on the individual independent variables (X).

3.2 The dependent variable – the decision to deploy Czech troops to Afghanistan

On September 11 2001, four aeroplanes were hijacked by the terroristic group of al-Qaida and crashed in the USA. As a reaction to these attacks, two international missions were conducted – the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The first operation was a peace-building, enforcement coalition-force under US leadership and is not subject to analysis in this study.

The second mission, ISAF was a mission under an UN mandate and from year 2003 under the leadership of NATO. The mission was established in December 2001 and lasted until December 2014. During those 13 years, the Czech Republic deployed 227 troops in order to serve under the NATO leadership in Afghanistan (NATO, 2014). The Czech Republic deployed within this mission different kind of troops: The first unit sent to Afghanistan in 2002 was a field hospital followed by airport and meteorological unit, Protection Contingent, Air Adviser Team, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, Helicopter Unit, Provincial Reconstruction Team, and even the Special Forces. The last Czech soldiers under the ISAF mission left Afghanistan in October 2013 (Armada CR Mise, n.d.).

The decision to deploy and keep the Czech soldiers was adopted by the Czech Chamber of Deputies firstly on December 20 2001 (this decision authorized mainly the participation on OEF with possibility for participation in ISAF) and later on April 9 2002 (authorization for ISAF only). The prolonging and extended the Czech involvement in the mission was being continuously adopted later as it was requested. The last voting about engagement in the ISAF mission was on June 12 2012.

That the Czech Republic provided its troops to ISAF is now a historical fact, but it is still to be explained why the Czech Republic was giving up partially its sovereignty in favour to NATO and was willing to share the costs of the mission. In order to decide on the possible reasons the empirical data on the particular independent variables will be now presented.

3.3 Independent variable, X1 – Czech perceptions related to fears of abandonment and entrapment

The first independent variable (X1) is related to the fear of abandonment by the NATO-alliance and the United States in particular. Two kinds of empirical data for the Czech threat perceptions are important in this regard – the Czech history in 20th century and its security and foreign policy white papers.

As was mentioned in the background subchapter, the Czech Republic, resp. Czechoslovakia was abandoned by its allies twice during the 20th century. Firstly, in 1938 during the negotiations of the Munich agreement and its aftermath. And secondly, during the night to August 21 1968 when armies of the states of Warsaw Pact entered Czechoslovakia without the permission and knowledge of the Czechoslovak authorities. Czechoslovakia itself was a member of the Warsaw Pact then, so this event stays in history as a moment when powers of a security organization invaded its own member (Vesely, 2009).

A second source of empirical data for this variable are the security and foreign policy white papers. Those were also introduced in the background subchapter. The Czech Republic builds its security mainly on its membership in international organizations – NATO, the UN, and EU. The authorities also openly state that the security of the interest area (Europe and North Atlantic area) is undividable, and that the relationship between the Czech Republic and the USA is very important to them (Ministerstvo zahranicnich veci, 2003: 11).

Furthermore, it is to be remembered that although the Czech Republic might be a middle-sized state according to its population and economy, the democratic and liberal character of the state lead to behaviour on the international level that is typical for small states: lower level of the participation in the international relations, focus on state's own region, preferring the diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments, focus on international law and the activity in international organization (Hey, 2005: 5; East 1973: 557; Drulakova & Drulak, 2007: 63). In terms of the military capacities, the Czech army is rather small as well. In compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe that Czechoslovakia signed in 1990, the Czech army cut its capacities by more than half of the number of its tanks, armoured vehicles, and

artillery (Janosec, 2013: 26-28). Simultaneously the length of the national service was reduced, and later, in 2005 terminated completely. Since then the Czech Republic has only a professional army with reduced number of reserved soldiers (Janosec, 2013: 28, 132).

These historical and official data will be further discussed in the chapter 5 in terms of the Snyder's theory of abandonment. Further analysis will then show whether these historical events have had influence on the Czech decision whether to participate in the ISAF mission, or not.

3.4 Independent variable, X2 – Czech perceptions of international norms

The second independent variable (X2) relates to relevant aspects of international law and international commitments, and Czech perceptions as to how such normative frameworks relates to the particular question as to whether the Czech Republic is committed or justified to participate militarily in ISAF. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, both the UN and NATO discussed these events in their plenum. NATO invoked for first time in its history the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty about collective defence on September 12 2001, which led to first NATO operation outside its area, and engaging its members actively in the fight against terrorism (NATO, 2015a).

At the same time, the UN was also discussing the events of 9/11 and on December 20 2001 adopted unanimously on resolution 1386. This resolution authorized the establishment of the ISAF mission and called upon member states of the UN to participate on it (United Nations, 2001). This resolution gave mandate to the mission only for six months, but was followed by several other resolutions prolonging the mandate, and in 2003, NATO took the lead of the mission (NATO, 2015b).

The discussion in the Chamber of Deputies (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b) about the deployment of the Czech field hospital to the ISAF mission gives us better insight on the perception of the UN resolution. The participation was among other reasons argued with the thoughts of maintaining the Czech international image – as keeping on its engagement,

particularly the engagement of the fight against terrorism (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b). During the later talks about prolonging of the Czech engagement, lastly in 2012 (Poslanecka snemovna 2010-2013, 2012), the Czech participation was being reasoned in terms of continuity.

These data, together with the Czech security and foreign policy papers that were introduced earlier will be analysed in following chapter 5 with the help of the theory of international regimes in order to decide which factors led to the Czech participation in the ISAF mission.

3.5 Independent variable, X3 – Institutionalization of the Czech decision-making process

The third independent variable (X3) relates to the character of the decision making process of the Czech foreign policy and the individual decision of the critical actors of that process.

The decision making process about a deployment of Czech soldiers is embedded in the constitutional system of the Czech Republic. The Article 39 of the Czech constitution (Ustava Ceske republiky, 1992) says that positive attitude towards a deployment is needed from more than a half of all deputies in both chambers of the parliament. In addition, the proposal has to be ratified by the Prime Minister and the president.

Immediately we got a list of the crucial actors who had to be in agreement in order to approve the participation in the ISAF mission: the government with the Prime Minister, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and the president.

As was mentioned in the chapter 3.1.2, for the foreign and security policy matters, the National Security Council is important as the first body of authorities to address security issues, such as a terroristic attack or participation on a multinational mission. Among its members in terms of foreign affairs, three persons are in the centre: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defence. In the period between September 2001 and April 2002 when the particular proposal about the Czech contribution to ISAF was being drawn, these

positions were occupied by Milos Zeman (CSSD, Prime Minister), Jan Kavan (CSSD, Minister of foreign affairs), and Jaroslav Tvrdik (CDDS, Minister of defence) (Vlada CR, n.d.).

Furthermore, the Parliament was an important actor in the process. Therefore the Table nr. 3 introduces the distribution of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate as per the electoral period that includes the period from September 2001 to April 2002.

Table 3: Number of elected deputies in the Parliament of the Czech Republic in years 1998-2002

Party (Czech abbreviation)	Chamber of Deputies, 1998-2002	Senate, 2000-2002
Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD)	74	14
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	63	22
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)	24	---
Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL)	20	19
Freedom Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU)	19	16
Independent candidates with no party affiliation	---	10
Total	200	81

Source: Cesky statisticky urad (2015), Senat PCR (2002)

The last main actor of the decision-making process is the president. However, the position of the president is not that strong since he/she always needs a co-signature of the Prime Minister in the foreign and security issues. Although the president is the formal head of the Czech army, in case of a disagreement with the government, usually the Czech government would hold stronger position than the president would and as such, its opinion would matter (Drulakova &

Drulak, 2007: 74). The Czech president in 2001 (and until 2003) was Vaclav Havel (no party) (Prazsky hrad, n.d.). In his speech, announcing the start of the operation against terrorism, the president expressed his support for NATO and the multinational operations (Havel, 2001).

The main actors of the decision-making process were now introduced as well as the necessities of the decision-making process. In the analysis chapter, the positions of each actors will be analysed in the terms of the Allison’s bureaucratic model.

3.6 Summary of the empirical mapping of the variables

Before the analysis itself, the variables and their empirical background are shortly summed up in following Table nr. 4.

Table 4: Overview of the variables and the empirical data related to it

Variable	Focus	Key empirical findings
Y	Decision of the Czech Republic to participate in ISAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Czech reaction to the 9/11 attacks – Deployment of Czech field hospital in 2002
X1	Fear of abandonment by the NATO allies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The small size of the Czech Republic – Czech notion on security of the North Atlantic territory – Negative historical experience
X2	International law requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Invoking of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the UN Resolution 1386, and the Czech reaction to it – Notion of the international organizations in the Czech environment

X3

Character of the Czech decision-making process and individual decision of the crucial actors of the process

- Parliamentary system of the Czech Republic
- Crucial actors: the government, the parliament (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate), the president; and their individual positions

4 Empirical analysis

In previous chapters, the theoretical bases and the empirical data have been argued and mapped. This has been done as a preparation to shed light on the following research question: “Why did the Czech Republic decide to participate militarily in the (year) ISAF mission in (country)?” The present chapter will scrutinize whether and how the empirical propositions (hypotheses) deduced find support in the empirical material. The ontological insights embedded in the three theories presented in Chapter 2 will also be drawn upon in the analyses.

4.1 The fear of abandonment – hypothesis (H1)

To what extent and how – if at all – is the hypothesis (H1) that the Czech Republic’s decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was due to fear of abandonment by the NATO-alliance, and the United States in particular (X1) supported in the empirical data presented? The hypothesis was deduced from the realist and neo-realist theoretical approach that focuses on power and defending the states existence by security and power games. In the traditional realist point of view, states would aim to achieve balance of power (Drulak, 2010). After the end of the Cold War, this might imply creating a coalition against the hegemon – USA. However, in neo-realist theory this assumption was transferred into rather more suitable model of balance of threats since other factors such as ideology, geography or intentions matter (Walt, 1987 as cited in Drulak, 2010). Snyder (1984) further elaborated on this phenomenon and theorized that most used techniques how to achieve the balance of threats is armament, territorial aggrandizement, and alliance formation. For small states such as Czech Republic³ is armament and territorial aggrandizement rather challenging way of balancing of threats, so it is almost dependent on alliance formation.

³ Czech Republic is and refers to itself as middle size state, but its behaviour, esp. foreign and security policy is of a small state (Drulakova & Drulak, 2007: 63).

The technique of alliance formation has been in the Czech, resp. Czechoslovak foreign policy since its establishment in 1918. The nearly century of independence can be then divided into three periods according to the Czech, resp. Czechoslovak alliance partners (Vesely, 2009):

1. 1918 – 1938: Alliance agreements with France from year 1924 and Soviet Union from year 1935 (this would enter in power only in case of French involvement); and through their alliance agreement with the UK was the UK also important supporter
2. 1948 – 1989: After 1948 and the Communist coupe, Czechoslovakia became Soviet satellite, and thus the guarantor of Czechoslovak security was the Soviet Union.
3. 1989 – until now: After extricating from the Eastern bloc, the country focused its security planning back on Western Europe and the USA, and in 1998 entered the NATO.

The first period ended by the Munich agreement and WWII. The Czechoslovak authorities were not allowed to join the negotiations, and the British and French prime ministers in compliance with the policy of appeasement agreed with the Nazi Germany on giving up the bordering parts of Czechoslovakia in favour to Germany, Hungary, and Poland. As mentioned, at that time Czechoslovakia had an alliance agreement with France from year 1924. However, the Czechoslovak authorities were warned by France that in case of not accepting the Munich agreement they would be all by themselves, and nor France nor Britain or other states would come to help them. Thus, the Munich agreement broke the alliance agreement between Czechoslovakia and France, and Czechoslovakia was abandoned and had to surrender its border territories to the Nazi Germany, Poland, and Hungary (Vesely, 2009: 65-66). Snyder (1984: 466) explains abandonment as a defection of the ally, in the case of Munich agreement the politics of appeasement might be viewed as defection of realigning with opponent and failing to provide support when expected. Nowadays, in the Czech Republic the Munich agreement is still viewed very strongly as a case of abandonment, and is often even referred as the Munich betrayal (CT24, 2013).

Second defection of the ally Czechoslovakia experienced in the second time period presented earlier in this chapter. In 1968, the armies of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) invaded Czechoslovakia as the result of the process of liberalization of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. According to Snyder (1984: 466), this invasion could be classified as

abandonment by de-aligning. While the abrogating the alliance contract was not involved since the WTO was dissolved in 1991, the act of invading its own alliance member can be considered as de-aligning.

From this overview, we see that in two out of the three periods according to alliance partners, the Czech Republic, resp. Czechoslovakia experienced abandonment by its allies. It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse those cases of abandonment in 1938 and 1968, so these will be taken as historical facts. However, they have had significant implication on the Czech security and foreign policy as a deterrent experience that is unwanted to be repeated.

As was outlined in the second chapter, Snyder (1984: 771-2) drew the components of the alliance relationship as state's need for assistance, partner's capacity to supply the assistance, state's degree of conflict and tension with the adversary, and the state's realignment alternatives. How does this apply to the Czech Republic? To be or not to be in the alliance and the military operations?

The Czech Republic is rather small state, both politically and militarily. As a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and partaker in its predecessor – the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Czech Republic, resp. Czechoslovakia signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and according its mandate cut the army capacities. The Czech Army was dismantled in compliance with the treaty more than half of its tanks, armoured vehicles, and artillery as well as some jets (Janosec, 2013: 26-28). At the same time the Czech Republic reduced the length of the national service, and in 2005 terminated this part of the army totally, and has had only professional army since (Janosec, 2013: 28, 132). It is thus clear that in case of a military attack, the Czech Republic itself would not have the capacity to defend itself, and would need assistance from other members of the NATO. Hence, the Czech Republic is dependent on its alliance members.

On the other hand, the alliance can offer its capacities to supply the assistance. The US expenditures on its army are in long term highest in the world, and is thus the military super power. France, the UK, and Germany are also present in the top 10 of the highest expenditures

in the world (SIPRI, 2015). That indicates that the NATO alliance has capacities to assist the Czech Republic in the case of a crisis, and consequently enlarges the Czech dependence on the alliance.

The third factor to determine the dependence of the allies is state's degree of conflict and tension. In the Czech security white paper, the Czech authorities assume that there is only a low risk of an extensive and direct military attack against its own or its allies' territory (Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky, 2003: 6). However, the white paper indicates that the Czech government is aware of the threats outside of the North Atlantic area and the asymmetric character of the fight against terrorism. The Czech degree of conflict or tension is thus rather low and lessening the Czech dependence on the alliance.

As the inner state of NATO, the Czech Republic's possible de-alignment would be rather difficult. The rather peaceful character of the relations between states in the recent years suggest also no need for re- or de-aligning. In its white papers, the Czech Republic concurs with the NATO goals and priorities, and strongly shows its interest for the whole North Atlantic area (Bezpečnostní koncepce České republiky, 2003: 5). So, the dependence of the Czech Republic on NATO is in this point rather high. The de-alignment would mean either de-alignment of the whole Central Europe area or the Czech Republic being a lone island in the middle of NATO members.

From this analysis, we see that the Czech Republic is quite dependent on its allies in the NATO. Snyder (1984: 471-2) describes further the relation between more and less dependent alliance member: *"the more dependent a state is, and/or the less dependent the ally appears to be, the more likely it is that the costs and risks of abandonment will outweigh the costs and risks of entrapment."* Thus, the first hypothesis (H1) that the Czech Republic's decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was due to fear of abandonment by the NATO-alliance, and the United States in particular (X1) has considerable support. The Czech Republic as the more dependent ally is with its historical experience of abandonment even more sensitive towards this possibility, and rather risks the case of entrapment with its all financial and non-financial costs. However, the final evaluation as to the validity of the hypothesis will have to await the separate analyses of two more hypotheses.

4.2 Membership in the international organizations – hypothesis (H2)

The second hypothesis, similarly as the first one, looks at the foreign policy decision as a result of outside-in factors. The hypothesis (H2) that the Czech Republic took part on the ISAF operation (Y) because the operation fulfilled requirements of the international law and because the Czech membership in the UN and NATO (X2) is theoretically embedded in the theory of liberal institutionalism and international regimes. To what extent and how – if at all – is this empirical proposition supported by facts? For a small, democratic state as such the Czech Republic, the international institutions are important mean for promotion of its opinion and policies. Therefore, Czech Republic itself is supporting the role of international organizations and diplomacy (Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky, 2003; Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí, 2003). According to Keohane & Nye (2001: 291-292) international regimes that are established by the statutes of international organizations allow their members to keep multiple and varied interests at one place and therefore lower the costs of international cooperation. Regimes also provide their members' governments with compact and integral information, help them to reinforce continuity in the cases of administrative change (e.g. with change of leading party), and to share the burden of states obligations by giving them clear rules and procedures. In the case of multinational operations, the latter two regime functions may lead to the state's involvement in an operation, in this thesis namely the Czech participation in ISAF.

After the 9/11 attacks, the security situation was discussed both, in the UN and the NATO. December 20 2001 the Security Council adopted unanimously the resolution 1386 and authorized the ISAF operation (United Nations, 2001). At the same time, NATO invoked for the first time the article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the establishing treaty of NATO, which classified the attack against the USA as against all NATO member states (NATO, 2015a). At first NATO launched the Operation Enduring Freedom, and in 2003 took over the ISAF operation.

According to the international law, states should beware of use of armed forces and any act of aggression in dispute solving, and should maintain international peace. The UN Charter recommends to states to *“first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or*

other peaceful means of their own choice” (United Nations, 1945: Article 33). In case any peaceful measures fail to resolve a quarrel and disagreement, the UN Security Council may *“take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”* (United Nations, 1945: Article 42). Simultaneously are all members of the UN obliged to contribute to actions of the UN necessary for the purpose of maintain international peace. This includes both, special agreements as well as providing their assistance, armed forces, and facilities (United Nations, 1945: Article 43). These quotes from the Charter of the United Nations and the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty how the function of international regimes about clear rules and procedures that help to share the burden of states obligations.

For the Czech Republic, it meant that as soon as the Article 5 was invoked, the particular plans and possibilities were discussed. However, the same was not applied in the case of the UN resolution as plans were already prepared due to the Czech involvement in the Operation Enduring Freedom. As was highlighted in the chapter 3.2, the article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked on September 12 2001; the UN resolution 1386 was adopted on December 20 2001. The day before that the Czech Chamber of Deputies adopted a governmental proposal about deployment of the Czech soldiers to Afghanistan. This adopted proposal was mainly about deploying to the OEF, but it also counted with the participation in ISAF, although not from its very start. How was it possible that the Deputies were voting about such proposal before the adoption of the UN resolution? As stated by iDnes.cz (2001), the deputies and senators got the resolution proposal in advance and were only presuming its adoption. From this, we see that although the resolution 1386 was adopted, for the Czech authorities the Article 5 of NATO treaty and the NATO request for assistance were sufficient.

Second voting about deployment to Afghanistan (and first about participation in ISAF) passed on April 9 2002. According to the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b), the deployment of the Czech field hospital to the ISAF mission was necessary to maintain the Czech image as keeping on its engagement, particularly the engagement of the fight against terrorism. The future (then possible) prolonging of the mission was as well mentioned with the note of Czech possibilities to be part of the prolonged mission as well. The deputies then could not predict how long will the mission take, but from the later

discussion, it comes out that the element of continuity was important for the decision of staying in Afghanistan until 2013. The last voting about the Czech participation in the ISAF mission was on June 12 2012. Also then, the deployment was discussed in terms of continuity. Nevertheless, the main discussion was about the ending of the mission and its outcomes (Poslanecka snemovna 2010-2013, 2012). One can see from the discussions that the continuity of the Czech foreign and security policy is being partially ensured by the membership in international organizations. Another component of the international regimes – the clear rules and routines making the process of decision-making easier, is to be seen in the process as well. As soon as the international community of NATO and the UN agreed on taking action in Afghanistan, the Czech authorities started the process of planning of the participation and the necessary legislative process. By having only the proposal of the UN resolution 1386, which legitimized the ISAF mission, the Czech deputies voted in favour of the Czech engagement in order to fulfil the Czech membership in these international organizations. The character of international regimes has thus its share on the decision-making process of the Czech authorities to participate in ISAF. The second hypothesis (H2) that *the Czech Republic took part on the ISAF operation (Y) because the operation fulfilled all requirements of the international law (X2)* has a considerable support in the empirical data, but its final ratio of the whole decision is to be discussed in chapter 4.4.

4.3 The decision in the hands of the Czech authorities – hypothesis (H3)

The last hypothesis (H3) unlike those two previous is looking at the deployment of Czech soldiers as a result of a crucial inside-out factor – that *the Czech Republic's decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was due to the particular character of the decision making process of the Czech foreign policy and the individual decisions of the critical actors of that process (X3)*.

To what extent and how – if at all – is the hypothesis supported in the empirical data presented? As the theoretical framework for the analysis, the bureaucratic model of decision-making was described in the chapter 2. This model leaves the assumption of a rational state as an unitary actor. This model looks at a state as a group of actors (institutions) where each of them follows their own beliefs of what is a state interest, its goals and intentions (Drulakova & Drulak, 2007:

95). The final decision is then made by bargaining between these actors, their ability to compromise and to build coalition or confusion (Allison, 1969: 707-708).

In the Czech environment, the choice about deploying Czech soldiers to ISAF mission was taken as the result of the bureaucratic process between the main security actors, which are the government and its particular ministries, the president and the parliament, and which were introduced in previous chapter (3). Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the task force of the Defence Department was called in a meeting (Petra, 2001), and two weeks after the attacks the National Security Council held a meeting as well (Vlada CR, 2001). The Security Council as a part of the government is in their discussions dependent on its members and their party classification. From the overview of the empirical data in chapter 3.5, we see that the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defence were from one party, specifically the CSSD. This party presents their policy as EU and NATO friendly and promotes active membership in the international organizations (CSSD, n.d.: 26). Therefore, the immediate reaction to the invocation of the Article V of the Washington Treaty was viewed as natural and the government drew a proposal about the possible participation of the Czech Republic not only in the ISAF mission, but also in the OEF (Idnes.cz, 2001).

This proposal about deploying Czech forces to Afghanistan to OEF and possibly ISAF was being decided later on December 19 2001 in the Parliament. The exact results of the voting are not officially available due to confidentiality (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2001). However, this voting was only partially about ISAF, and as such only shows the procedures and quick response of the Czech bureaucracy. On the other hand, the voting on April 9 2002 involved the particular proposal on deploying a field hospital within the ISAF mission. As it arises from the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on April 9 2002 (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b), there were several issues to decide on, not only whether to deploy or not. The parties' preferences and arising elections were considered as well as the financing of the mission or the need for it. Both, the Minister of Culture who represented the proposal on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defence were presenting the proposal with a call on other deputies for its approval because of three reasons: Firstly, because of the Czech security and the security of other NATO members. Secondly, in order to maintain the

good name of Czech Republic in the international community. And thirdly, for the sake of improvement of the Czech army (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b).

The strongest position against the Czech participation and the need of such mission was presented by the Communistic party during the discussion in April 2002. In their speeches in the discussion both, Vaclav Frank (KSCM, then member of the Chamber of Deputies' Committee on Defence and Security) and Miloslav Ransdorf (KSCM, then member of the Chamber of Deputies' Committee for Foreign Affairs), expressed their disagreement with the Czech participation with the regard of the purpose of the mission as well as financing and logistics of the mission (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b). This problem of financing and logistics seems to have been the strongest element of disagreement among other parties as was articulated also in the speech by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence and Security, Petr Necas (ODS). However, he also mentioned that not participating in ISAF would be a mistake (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b), and by that only confirmed his party's (ODS) position toward the participation in ISAF and NATO as was presented in the chapter 3.1.4. In following Table nr. 5 the overview of the voting and party position are presented.

Table 5: Chamber of Deputies voting results from April 9 2002 about participation in ISAF

	ODS	KDU- CSL	CSSD	KSCM	US	No party
Yes	44	13	60	0	9	1
No	2	0	0	18	0	0
Abstained	1	0	1	0	0	0
Not present	16	7	13	8	8	1

Source: Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002a

From the 147 present deputies, 127 were in favour, 18 were against, and two abstained from voting. The deployment was thus by more than a half of the total number of deputies adopted (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002a). In the Senate, there was no significant debate about the proposal of deploying Czech soldiers to Afghanistan (Senat PCR, 2002b). The results of the Senate voting are presented in the Table nr. 6.

Table 6: Senate voting results from April 18 2002 about participation in ISAF

	ODS	KDU-CSL	CSSD	US-DEU	No party
Yes	16	15	7	12	4
No	0	0	0	0	1
Abstained	0	0	1	0	0
Not present	6	4	6	4	5

Source: Senat PCR, 2002

As is clear from the table, 54 senators (out of 56 present that day) voted in favour of the Czech participation in ISAF, one was against, and one senator abstained from voting. The governmental proposal of deployment of the Czech field hospital was thus adopted by more than the half of the 81 senators.

The last main actor of the decision-making process is the president. The Czech president in 2002 was Vaclav Havel (no party). Havel (2001), as it comes out from his announcement of the start of the OEF, was convinced about the necessity of the multinational operations against terrorism and as such ratified the proposal on the Czech participation in ISAF.

We see from this analysis of the particular point of views that all the main actors in the decision-making process were in favour to the Czech participation in ISAF. The only party that is in the long term against the Czech membership in the NATO is the Communistic party (KSCM).

However, as the tables 3, 5, and 6 indicate, the KSCM never had enough votes in the parliament, nor posts in the government to outvote the other parties and enforce its interests.

Furthermore, the democratic system in the Czech Republic comes into play. The Czech constitution requires adoption of a proposal about participation on a multinational operation by at least 50,5% of the deputies in both chambers of the parliament, as well as ratification by the government and the president. However, the democracy also ensures that should not be there interest or capacital possibilities for participation on multinational operations or membership in international organizations as such among the Czech citizens, the party programmes or preferences would be different. As an example of such practise serves the case of what happened in the same year as the first soldiers were deployed to Afghanistan. In August 2002, the Czech Republic was hit by disastrous floods. Before that, the Czech field hospital deployed by the decision from April 2002 was supposed to be joined by a group of Special Forces soldiers. However, after the floods, the Czech government decided on not extending of the Czech participation in ISAF and even decided to reduce the numbers of deployed soldiers in order to save money for reconstructions after the floods (Natoaktual.cz, 2002). The data from the Czech army (Armada CR Mise, 2015) shows this reduction of the Czech soldier in ISAF: from 269 during 2002 to only 11 in 2003. More soldiers were deployed to ISAF mission again in 2004 and after 2007. The change in 2007 might be credited to the change of governmental parties (Supova, 2010). The swing from centre left CSSD led coalition to centre right ODS led coalition meant also a swing to more pro-NATO policies including promotion of building a radar as a part of the NATO ballistic defence system (Natoaktual.cz, 2007). Another reason for this change might have been also the withdrawing of the Czech soldiers from Iraq and therefore having more financial means for participation in the ISAF mission. This however is not the subject of analysis in this paper, but it shows the complexity of the decision making process and it encourages us for further research.

The Allison's bureaucratic model of decision-making process was chosen to illustrate and analyse the decision among the Czech authorities. The hypothesis (H3) that *the Czech Republic's decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was due to the particular character of the decision making process of the Czech foreign policy and the individual decisions of the critical actors of that process (X3)* can be now confirmed. As the events from 2002, both in April and

August show, if the main actors would not be persuaded about the importance and having enough capacities to participate on the mission, they would decide not to as it happened in August 2002. However the final answer on the research question *why the Czech Republic did took part in the ISAF mission*, is yet to be answered in following subchapter.

4.4 Analysis mirror on the wall, which hypothesis is the most right of all?

In the previous subchapters, the separate hypotheses were analysed against relevant data. All three variables seem to have influenced the final decision, but not in the same way, and not with equal impact. Two of those hypotheses assume the outside-in factors as deciding, while the last hypothesis based on the Allison's bureaucratic model of decision-making presumes the inside-out influence.

When it comes to outside-in factors, two theories, and subsequently hypotheses were considered. Did the Czech authorities decide to participate on the mission because of their fear of abandonment (H1 based on Snyder's theory)? Or was it rather because of their membership in the UN and NATO international regime and the regime of international law (H2 based on Keohane & Nye's theory)?

If we look at the data through Snyder's neo-realistic glass, behind the diplomatic talks and noble words of being responsible and active member of the international community, one can see the fear of abandonment and losing the control of the national security. The experience of not one, but two cases of abandonment has rooted so deeply in the Czechs that their rather be entrapped in a mission that might be beyond their interests and capacities than to risk another abandonment by its allies from NATO. Hints and indications for the fear of abandonment dominating and influencing the decision makers can be found at many places. The loyalty to NATO and all its member states is strongly expressed in the Czech security and foreign policy papers (Bezpečnostní strategie České republiky 2003; 2015; Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí, 2003). In the parliamentary voting about participating in ISAF, resp. OEF in December 2001, the Czech authorities proceeded in the bureaucratic process without yet valid UN Resolution 1386 (Idnes.cz, 2001). The NATO invocation of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was

sufficient for the Czech Republic to adopt plans for their participation on a NATO mission, although in today's international law regime, the UN resolutions are considered as necessary for any act of military action. In April 2002 when the Parliament was again voting about participation on multinational operations in Afghanistan, this time in ISAF only, the Minister of Defence, Jaroslav Tvrdik, was proud to be the most efficient out of the NATO 1999-newcomers in terms of numbers of men deploying to the ISAF mission. He explained it as an important example of the Czech competency for the membership in NATO (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b). Lastly, the increase in the number of Czech soldiers in the ISAF mission after 2007 as the result of the change of governmental parties is an indicator for the first hypothesis about fear of abandonment. This right centre government was involved in talks with NATO and the USA regarding the ballistic missile defence system. The possibility of building a radar base attached to the system on the Czech territory was an important issue for the government, although it did not have the needed support in the opposition and among the Czech citizens (Natoaktual.cz, 2007). This can be viewed as an effort to become even more attached to the alliance. As a country with this important part of the system could be then hardly abandoned in case of a crisis. Therefore extending the number and the mandate of the Czech soldiers in the ISAF mission could have been a deciding factor for the USA and NATO whether to place the radar in the Czech Republic or in some other country.

As the Czech Republic is a small state, it has deep trust in the international law system and its membership in the international organizations, esp. the UN. These international regimes allow to the small state to present their opinions in the big forum, therefore reduce the need for bilateral talks and their costs and resources. But, the membership is not a no strings attached relationship. It does carry benefits, but also some commitments; such commitment might be as well an assistance in a multinational operation. One of the articles of the UN charter specifically states that the member states are obliged to contribute to actions of the UN necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace (United Nations, 1945: Article 43). The Czech ministers themselves were using this reasoning in the debate whether to take part or not in the ISAF mission. All the key words such as "responsible and/or active member of the international community," "improving the national prestige" as well as "continuity" used in the discussions (Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b; Poslanecka snemovna 2010-2013, 2012) indicate the support for the second hypothesis.

It arises from the democratic constitution of the Czech Republic that the decision to participate cannot be taken by sufficient support in the government, the parliament and from the president who all have been elected in democratic elections by their co-citizens. Hence, the third hypothesis (H3) has its support and the independent variable X3 was necessary for the dependent variable Y. As the withdrawing of the Czech soldiers from Afghanistan in 2002 showed, the inside-out factors have a certain weight. Nevertheless, this decision was taken in the shadow of a natural disaster and as such was also interpreted to the NATO (Natoaktual.cz, 2002). One can only speculate how such withdrawal would be rationalized without any serious reason. Therefore, and because the outside-in factors are influencing the decision makers on the national level (see the reasoning of the deployment in Poslanecka snemovna 1998-2002, 2002b), I am convinced that the outside-in factors were more important than the inside-out.

In the light of these data, we can now evaluate the relative importance of the independent variables' (X1, X2, X3) influence on the dependent variable (Y). The first variable of the fear of abandonment (X1) came out from the analysis as the strongest. However as the parliamentary system shows, it is not a sufficient condition. The independent variable X1 was thus necessary for the dependent variable. The second independent variable (X2) of the international law and membership in the international organizations came from the analysis as the weakest in the terms of its influence on the choice about participation in the ISAF mission (Y). However, the second hypothesis (H2) had its considerable support, so the X2 may be evaluated as contributing. Lastly, the independent variable of the willingness of the Czech authorities (X3) was discussed. It was shown that without the decision of the crucial actors of the decision-making process in the Czech Republic, the Czech participation in ISAF could not be possible, and thus was this variable (X3) necessary for the final decision. Additionally, this independent variable (X3) is being influenced by the other independent variables, so the relation between the variables can be then drawn as following in the Figure nr. 2.




Figure 2: Relations between the dependent (Y) and independent (X) variables

From the figure, we see that two out of the three independent variables had direct impact on the dependent variable. Without the fear of abandonment (X1) and the legal decision of the Czech authorities (X3), the Czech participation in ISAF (Y) would not have been possible. Whereas, the international law framework (X2) was not that important in the final outcome of deployment of the Czech soldiers to Afghanistan, even though it had some support in the empirical data. It had, however, impact on the Czech authorities in their decision-making process, and therefore we see the line between those two independent variables. The same phenomenon can be observed between the fear of abandonment (X1) and the particular decisions of the key actors of the Czech decision-making process (X3).

5 Conclusion

In this thesis, the aim has been to better understand *why* the Czech Republic decided to take part in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The research-task was further specified in three questions:

- *How did the Czech government respond to NATO's call for action in Afghanistan subsequent to the 9/11 attacks?*
- *How was the decision-making process structured, and what agencies of the Czech Republic participated in the decision-making process?*
- *What framework conditions, concerns and motives may have contributed to the Czech government's decision to participate in the military intervention in Afghanistan?*

Three hypothesis were deduced in order to find answers to these questions. These three hypothesis were framed within a FPA-approach and derived from three corresponding theories: Snyder's theory of alliance dilemma, Keohane & Nye's theory of international regimes, and lastly Allison's bureaucratic model of the decision-making theory. The former two represent the outside-in approach to FPA and the latter one the inside-out explanatory approach of FPA.

In Snyder's (1984) theory, every state that chose to enter an alliance has to inevitably face the fear of abandonment by the alliance or the fear of entrapment in a mission that was rather unwanted by the national authorities and citizens. Based on these presumptions, the hypothesis that the Czech Republic participated in ISAF (Y) due to fear of abandonment by its NATO allies (X1) was suggested. The second theory, the theory of international regimes by Keohane & Nye (1977), is also an outside-in approach. It focuses on international institutions (regimes) such as international law, and their role in a state's actions and decisions. International regime gives states a set of procedures and rules they have to follow for the optimal work of the regime and thus for general reducing of costs of the international transactions. For the case of the ISAF mission, the international regime of the UN and the current international war law is relevant, and thus the second hypothesis emerged as that the Czech Republic took part in the ISAF

operation (Y) because the operation fulfilled requirements of the international law and because the Czech membership in the UN and NATO (X2). Adding to the outside-in approach, inside-out approach of bureaucratic politics was chosen. Allison's bureaucratic politics model of political decision-making looks at the national level and sees all decision as a result of bargaining between all crucial actors of the decision-making process. Could this process and the actors be the reason for Czech participation in ISAF? That is what the analysis of the third hypothesis that the Czech Republic's decision to participate in ISAF (Y) was due to the particular character of the decision making process of the Czech foreign policy and the individual decisions of the critical actors of that process (X3), was trying to answer.

With the hypotheses set, data for individual variables (Y, X1, X2, X3) were introduced in chapter 3, and further analysed in chapter 4. In the process, I found out that all three hypotheses received considerable support in empirical data. However, only the synthesis of the particular hypotheses' analysis shed more light on the actual reason why the Czech Republic decided to get involved in the ISAF mission.

The two historical cases of abandonment which the Czech Republic, resp. its predecessor Czechoslovakia, experienced in the 20th century, and the size of this small state build a solid ground for the fear of abandonment. The Czech Republic in its relation to the NATO, and the USA in particular rather risks entrapment than to say a "No" when the alliance calls for help, and be later abandoned by its allies in times of need. This hypothesis seems from the analysis as the one with strongest support in empirical evidence and thus the variable of fear of abandonment was evaluated as necessary for the dependent variable of the Czech participation in ISAF.

Furthermore, the fact that the mission was launched by the UN and under its supervision helped to the Czech decision to take part. The UN resolution 1386 made the mission legal, and as it appears from the UN Charter, the member states were expected to participate. As the Czech Republic presents itself as a state who deeply respects the United Nations and its international regime which allows it to have the same relative position as great powers, it felt as non-participating would spoil its good name in the international arena. Although there has been empirical evidence for this hypothesis, the evidence is not that strong, and the variable of the

regime of the UN and international law came out only as contributing to the final decision of Czech participation in ISAF.

Finally, there was a question of the Czech decision-making process itself. The Czech Republic is a democratic country and as such, the important decision of sending its soldiers to serve abroad and under an international command needs approval from four different official bodies: the government, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and the president. The approval from the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate is furthermore dependent on the coalitions and the political parties they are built from. However, as it was presented in the chapter 3.1.4, the majority of the Czech parties have a positive attitude towards NATO and the commitments to it. The debate connected to the particular decision to participate as well as the voting results also illustrated the general positive attitude to the Czech participation in ISAF. On the other hand, the analysis of the Czech parliamentary system showed that in case of negative attitude among more than 50% of the elected deputies, the Czech participation would not be possible. The third independent variable (the character of the decision making process of the Czech foreign policy and the individual decisions of the critical actors of that process) was thus found as necessary for the final decision of participating in ISAF.

Nevertheless, as the analysis further showed, this variable was actually not that independent as the actors of the decision making process were influenced by the outside-in factors – the fear of abandonment and the legalization of the mission. This finding demonstrates the complexity of the foreign policy decisions and the difficult task of balancing the state's basic interest – to ensure security of the state and its citizens, including those who are risking their individuals' lives far away from home in exchange for stability of the state.

After this process of finding of the empirical data and their analysis in the terms of the corresponding theories, the three questions, which were asked at the beginning of this thesis, can be finally answered:

- *How did the Czech government respond to NATO's call for action in Afghanistan subsequent to the 9/11 attacks?* The Czech Republic responded immediately by

discussing this issue at a meeting of the National Council. Furthermore, the Czech government drew up a particular proposal of the Czech participation that was approved by the Parliament, firstly in December 2001 regarding the participation in the OEF and ISAF, and secondly in April 2002 regarding the ISAF mission. Consequent to the April 2002 decision, a Czech field hospital joined the ISAF mission. The initial participation was thus rather symbolic, but was extended later in 2004, and after 2007.

- *How was the decision-making process structured, and what agencies of the Czech Republic participated in the decision-making process?* The government, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defence, in particular prepared a proposal of the Czech participation based on the outside-in foreign policy factors and the army capacities. This proposal was further discussed in the Parliament, at first in the particular parliamentary Committees, and later in the general plenum. The Parliament had to also vote, and the proposal had to be approved by more than 50% of all deputies and senators. The proposal in April 2002 was approved by 127 (out of 200) deputies and 54 (out of 81) senators. Last, but not least, the president had to ratify this decision.
- *What framework conditions, concerns and motives may have contributed to the Czech government's decision to participate in the military intervention in Afghanistan?* As was mentioned earlier, the fact that the UN legalized the mission was a contributing factor. However, the final decision of the Czech authorities was influenced by the fact that the USA requested the help by its allies by invoking the Article 5 of the NATO establishing treaty about collective defence. For a small country with a history of abandonment, as such the Czech Republic, this factor was probably the most determining in the decision whether to participate or not.

This study is an attempt to understand the interaction between external and internal drivers of the Czech policy in the case of contributing to ISAF. In particular, I have studied the initial decision to contribute with a military hospital to the ISAF multinational force. I found the

answers for the questions I set at the beginning of the thesis. However, during the process of finding answers for these questions, many more questions came up when some information were presented, and gave clues to future research. First, it could be interesting to make a dedicated study into how different kinds of governments influenced the way the Czech Republic engaged and disengaged in ISAF, and also what contribution were decided. Secondly, it is appealing to research on how the unforeseen events and non-anthropogenic events may influence foreign policy making. In particular, it would be interesting scrutinize how the floods in 2002 influenced and were used by different political actors to reason the withdrawal of the Czech soldiers from ISAF in 2002/2003.

6 References

- ALLISON, Graham T. (1969) "Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63 (3), pp. 689-718.
- ARMADA CESKE REPUBLIKY (CR) MISE (2015) Historie zahraničních misi [online]. Available at: <http://www.mise.army.cz/historie-misi/historie-zahranicnich-misi-3699/> (accessed 24. 5. 2015).
- BEZPEČNOSTNÍ STRATEGIE ČESKÉ REPUBLIKY 2003. (2003) Praha: Úrad vlády ČR.
- BEZPEČNOSTNÍ STRATEGIE ČESKÉ REPUBLIKY 2015. (2015) Praha: Úrad vlády ČR.
- ČESKÝ STATISTICKÝ ÚRAD (2015) *Volby.cz* [online]. Available at: <http://volby.cz/> (accessed 24. 9. 2015).
- BRYMAN, Alan (2008) *Social Research Methods*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- CSSD (n.d.) *Dlouhodobý (základní) program CSSD* [online]. Available at <http://www.cssd.cz/data/files/cssd-dlouhodoby-program.pdf> (accessed 24. 9. 2015).
- CT24 (2013) *Mnichov: Mocnosti nas zradily, jejich jednani ale dava smysl* [online]. Available at <http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/archiv/1072871-mnichov-mocnosti-nas-zradily-jejich-jednani-ale-dava-smysl> (accessed 14. 11. 2015).
- DRULAK, Petr (2010) *Teorie mezinárodních vztahů*. Praha: Portal.
- DRULAKOVÁ, Radka & Petr DRULAK (2007) *Tvorba a analýza zahraniční politiky*. Praha: Oeconomica.
- FERMANN, Gunnar (ed.) (2013) *Utenrikspolitik og norsk krisehåndtering*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm.
- HAVEL, Vaclav (2001) *Prohlášení prezidenta republiky Václava Havla k zahájení útoku spojenců proti Talibanu. Praha, Pražský hrad 7. října 2001* [online]. Available at <http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/index.html> (accessed 25. 11. 2015).
- HEY, Jeanne A. K. (2003) "Introducing Small States Foreign Policy". In : Jeanne A. K. Hey (ed.) *Small States in World Politics : Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, pp. 1-13. London : Lynne Rienner Publisher.
- IDNES.CZ (2001) *Cesti vojaci v první fázi ISAF nebudou* [online]. Available at http://zpravy.idnes.cz/cesti-vojaci-v-prvni-fazi-isaf-nebudou-dxq-/domaci.aspx?c=A011219_104514_domaci_ton (accessed 25. 11. 2015).
- JANOŠEK, Josef (2013) "20 Let Armády České republiky." In *Armada České republiky – Symbol demokracie a státní suverenity 1993-2013*. Praha: Ministerstvo obrany ČR.

- KDU-CSL (2006) *Volebni program 2006 – 2010* [online]. Available at <http://www.kdu.cz/getattachment/6df00e14-9945-42ca-bce3-470b6b143390/Volebni-program-2006-2010.aspx> (accessed 24. 9. 2015).
- KEOHANE, Robert O. & Joseph S. NYE (2001) *Power and Interdependence. Third edition.* New York: Longman.
- MARES, Miroslav (1999) “Česke politické strany a zahraniční politika.” *Mezinárodní vztahy*, Vol. Year 1999 (1), pp. 7-20.
- MAREK, Jindřich (2013) “Čestí vojáci v zahraničních misích.” In: *Armáda České republiky – Symbol demokracie a státní suverenity 1993-2013*. Praha: Ministerstvo obrany ČR.
- MINISTERSTVO ZAHRANICNÍCH VECÍ (2003) *Koncepce zahraniční politiky České republiky na léta 2003-2006*. Praha: Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR.
- MORAVCSIK, Andrew (1997) “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” *International Organization*. Vol. 51 (4), pp 513-553.
- NATO (2014) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures Available at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140903-ISAF-Placemat-final.pdf (accessed 24. 10. 2015).
- NATO (2015a) *Topic: Collective defence* [online]. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm (accessed 6. 11. 2015).
- NATO (2015b) *ISAF's mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014)* [online]. Available at http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm (accessed 24. 10. 2015).
- NATOAKTUAL.CZ (2002) *Premier navštívil vojáky v Afghánistánu* [online]. Available at http://www.natoaktual.cz/premier-navstivi-vojaky-v-afganistanu-dhx-na_zpravy.aspx?c=A021029_052238_na_ca_m00 (accessed 29. 11. 2015).
- NATOAKTUAL.CZ (2007) *Mirek Topolánek k protiraketové obraně* [online]. Available at http://www.natoaktual.cz/mirek-topolanek-k-protiraketove-obrane-fci-na_analyzy.aspx?c=A070604_094921_na_analyzy_m02 (accessed 29. 11. 2015).
- ODS (1995) *Politický program ODS* [online]. Available at <http://www.ods.cz/politicky-program/politicky-program-ods> (accessed 24. 9. 2015).
- PETRAK, Karel (2001) “USA celi masivnímu teroristickému útoku.” In: *Česke noviny* [online]. Available at: <http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/usa-celi-masivnimu-teroristickemu-utoku/13109> (accessed 24. 10. 2015).
- POSLANECKÁ SNEMOVNA 1998-2002 (2001) *Hlasování 45. schůze* [online]. Available at: <http://www.psp.cz/sqw/hl.sqw?o=3&s=45> (accessed 6. 11. 2015).
- POSLANECKÁ SNEMOVNA 1998-2002 (2002a) *Hlasování Poslanecké snemovny 48/7* [online]. Available at: <http://www.psp.cz/sqw/hlasy.sqw?g=29272&l=cz> (accessed 6. 11. 2015).

- POSLANECKA SNEMOVNA 1998-2002 (2002b) *Stenografický záznam 48. schůze, 9. 4. 2002* [online]. Available at: <http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1998ps/stenprot/048schuz/48-1.html> (accessed 6. 11. 2015).
- POSLANECKA SNEMOVNA 2010-2013 (2012) *Stenografický záznam 40. schůze, 12. 6. 2002* [online]. Available at: <http://www.psp.cz/eknih/2010ps/stenprot/040schuz/40-5.html> (accessed 25. 11. 2015).
- PRAZSKÝ HRAD (n.d.) *Václav Havel* [online]. Available at <https://www.hrad.cz/cs/prezident-cr/prezidenti-v-minulosti/vaclav-havel> (accessed 24. 11. 2015).
- SENÁT PCR (2002a) *16. schůze, 5. hlasování, 18.04.2002* [online]. Available at <http://www.senat.cz/xqw/xervlet/pssenat/hlasy?G=2375&O=3> (accessed 30. 11. 2015).
- SENÁT PCR (2002b) *Stenoaznam z 1. dne 16. schůze* [online]. Available at <http://senat.cz/xqw/xervlet/pssenat/hlasovani?action=steno&O=3&IS=86&T=233#st233> (accessed 30. 11. 2015).
- SNYDER, Glenn H. (1984) "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics", *World Politics, Vol 36 (4)*, pp. 461-495.
- STERLING-FOLKER, Jennifer (2010) "Neoliberalism." In Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja & Steve Smith (eds.) *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity. Second edition*, pp. 116-134. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (2015) *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database* [online]. Available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex-data-1988-2014 (accessed 17. 11. 2015).
- STRANA ZELENÝCH (2006) *Volební program Kvalita života* [online]. Available at <http://strana.zeleni.cz/3516/clanek/volebni-program-ke-stazeni/> (accessed 24. 9. 2015).
- SUPOVA, Tereza (2010) *Nečekám zásadní obrát, předpovídá expert na zahraniční politiku* [online]. Available at http://www.lidovky.cz/necekam-zasadni-obrat-predpovida-expert-na-zahranicni-politiku-pst-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A100427_230252_In_domov_mpr (accessed 29. 11. 2015).
- TOP09 S PODPOROU STAROSTU (2010) *Volební program: Volby 2010 do Poslanecké sněmovny* [online]. Available at http://www.top09.cz/files/soubory/volebni-program-2010-do-poslanecke-snemovny_85.pdf (accessed 24. 9. 2015).
- UNITED NATIONS (1945) *Charter of the United Nations* [online]. Available at <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html> (accessed 17. 11. 2015).

- UNITED NATIONS (2001) "Security Council authorizes international security force for Afghanistan; Welcomes United Kingdom's offer to be initial lead nation." *Meeting Coverage and Press Release* [online]. Available at <http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7248.doc.htm> (accessed 6. 11. 2015).
- USTAVA CESKE REPUBLIKY (1992) [online]. Available at <http://www.psp.cz/docs/laws/constitution.html> (accessed 13. 10. 2015).
- V. SJEZD KSCM (1999) *Program obnovy – programovy document V. sjezdu* [online]. Available at <https://www.kscm.cz/viewDocument.asp?document=3916> (accessed 24. 9. 2015).
- VECI VEREJNE (2010) *Politicky program* [online]. Available at <http://www.olympic.cz/financovani/docs/VV.pdf> (accessed 24. 9. 2015).
- VESELY, Zdenek (2009) *Nastin dejin ceske zahranicni politiky*. Praha: Oeconomica.
- VLADA CR (n.d.) *Prehled vlad 1993-2013 CR* [online]. Available at <http://www.vlada.cz/cz/clenove-vlady/historie-minulych-vlad/prehled-vlad-cr/1993-2007-cr/> (accessed 24. 9. 2015).
- VLADA CR (2001) *Zaznam 29. schuze Bezpecnostni rady statu, 25. 9. 2001* [online]. Available at <http://www.vlada.cz/cz/ppov/brs/cinnost/zaznamy-z-jednani/zaznam-29-schuze-bezpecnostni-rady-statu--25--9--2001-18523/> (accessed 6. 11. 2015).
- WALTZ, Kenneth N. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley.
- WIRNITZER, Jan (2012) *Kdybychom odmitli Mnichov... narod hrdinu, nebo "viniku" valky?* [online]. Available at http://zpravy.idnes.cz/kdybychom-odmitli-mnichov-narod-hrdinu-nebo-viniku-valky-pmf-/domaci.aspx?c=A120224_121515_krimi_jw (accessed 30. 11. 2015).